Stcherbatsky Th. The central conception of buddhism and the meaning of the wrod dharma.

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PRIZE PUBLICATION F U N D VOL. VII

THE CENTRAL

CONCEPTION OF BUDDHISM

AND THE

MEANING OF

THE WORD "DHARMA"

TH. STCHERBATSKY, PH.D.,

PROFESSOR I N T H E UNIFERSITY OF PETRORRAD, MEMBER OF THE

ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF RUSSIA

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY THE

ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY

AND SOLD AT

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STEPHEN AUSTIN AND SONS, LTD PRINTERS, HERTFORD.

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73 APPENDIX I. Vasubandhu on the fundamental principle

of the Sarvistiv%da School

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Sarvjstividins

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INDEX OF PROPER NAMES

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PREFACE

HIS short treatise was originally conceived as a contribution t o t h e Royal Asiatic Society's Journal: its size induced the Council to publish i t as a monograph, and my Lest tl~anlia are due t o the Council for this kind decision. I must also express my gratitude Lo Mrs. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, who was alway.. ready to help with her vast lrnowledge of Pali literature. Professor H. Jacobi kindly went through the proofs, and to him I am indebted for many a valuable suggestion. Dr. McGovern contributed some of the references to Chinese sources. But my deepest gratitude is due to Dr.

I?.

W. Thomas, who devoted much of liis plecious time to the revision of my work and to carrying it through the press.

I n transliteration I have usually not distinguished the guttural, etc., nasals, when occurring before the con- sonants of their respective classes.

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The central conception of Buddhism and the

meaning of the term Dharma

I N a recent work Mrs. M. Geiger and Professor W. Geiger

have made an attempt to solve the uncertainty which still prevails about the meaning of the term dhama.l They h a w drawn up a concordance of almost every case where the word occurs in Pali canonical literature, and established a great variety of meanings. Among them there is, indeed, only one that really matters, that is the speciiically Buddhistic technical term d h a m . The other significations which Buddhist literature shares with the Brahmanioal do not present any serious difficulty. About this meaning the authors rightly remark that it is a " central conception of the

Buddhist doctrine which must be elucidated as far as possible ". They also contend that the method followed by them is " purely phiological

".

This is also an indication

of the limitations of their work, because the central conception of a highly complicated system, a conception which

in its varied connotations includes almost the totality of the system, cannot be expected to be fully elucidated by

" philological " methods only. We therefore propose, in

addition to Mrs. and Professor Geiger's most ,valuable collections, to consider the matter from the philosophical standpoint, i.e. to give, with regard to this conception, a succinct account of the system in which it admittedly occupies the keystone position. Our chief source will be, not the Pali Canon, but, a later work, the Abhidliamta- koga of Vasubandh~.~ Althaugh late, it is professedly

l Pali Dhumma, von &gdalene u. Wilhelm Geiger, Munich, 1921.

A plan af an edition and translation of the whole work has been out-

lined and pilrtlg carried through by the Bibliotheca Buddhica at Petrograd.

There have appeared, (1) Abhidhammkop-kririkc3 and Bh&sya, Tibetan

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2 THE CENTRAL CONCEPTION O F BUDDHISM

only a systematized exposition of a much earlier work- the Bbhidharma-dbZsci:-~Gtra, which, in its turn, is but a commentary on the abhidharma of the Sarvistividiu school. This school is one of the earliest, if not the earliest, of Buddhist sects. The question upon which it dissented and from which i t received its name had a bearing on the essence of what was called a dharma, so that an exposition of its views will afford the best opportunity of examining the full connotation of this term.l It must be left to latcr investigation .

to determine the points where Vasubandhu's exposition may be a t variance with the primitive doctrine; but, generally speaking, he seems to have rendered the original doctrine very faithfully. Since his age is about the same as that of the Pali c~mmentaries,~ the difference between him and the

text, pt. i, edited b y Professor Tb. Stoberbstsky, Petrograd, 1917; (2) Sphutrirthribhidbrnta-kop-vyrikhyri of Yapomitra, Smscrit text, pt. i, edited by S. LBvi and Th. Stoherbatsky, Petrograd, 1917. The second parts of both these works, Tibetan text edition by Professor Th. Stcherbatsky and Vyikhyl (Sanscrit) by Professor W. Wagihsra. of Tokyo, are being printed in the Bi6liotheca Buddhiea. An English translation of the ninth (additional) part has been published by Professor Th. Stcherbatsky under the title " The Soul Theory of the Buddhists" in t h e Bulletin de l'Acaddmie des Sciences de Russie, Petrograd, 1920 (pp. 823-54 and 937-58). A review of the system has been published by the late Professor 0. Rosenberg, of Petrograd Universit,~, under the title Problems of Buddhist Philosophy, Petrograd, 1918 (in Russian). This scholar has also issued s n index of Buddhist technical terms in Chinese and Japanese under the title An Introduction to the study of Bvddhismfrom Chinese and

J a p n a e Sources, Tokyo, 1917. Professor de la V d C e Poussin has published in Brussels a. French translation of the third part, and is now engaged in.printing a translation af the &st and second parts of the Abhidharma-koca.

BesideMrs. and Prof. Geiger the question has been treated by Mrs. Rhys Davids, Bud. Pay. Ethics, xsxiii ; Walleser, Grundlage, 97-104 ; Wureu, Bgddhim i n Translations, 116, 209; S. Z. Aung, Compendium, 179 n., 254-9 ; S. LSvi, S?lt~ri2a?pkrira, 18, 21 ; I,. de la. VallBe'Poussin, hrotes suv les cmps du Bouddha, MuaCon, 1913, pp. 263, 287. The question has been put in tbe proper light and brilliantly treated by Professor 0. Rasenberg, Problems, chap. vi : but, since his workis writtenin Russian and inaccessible a t prasent, some of his results are repeated here.

The date of Vasubsndhu is not yet quite settled; of. the references in V. Smith, Early History, 3rd ed., pp. 328 ff. A t the end of chap. viii Vasubandhu remarks t h a t in his time the dgama had had a n existence of

I. PRELIMINARY 3

pali sources is not so much one of time as of school. Nothing is more instructive than the study of the divergent views of different schools, since it allows us to watch the builders of the Buddhist doctrine a t work.

The formula of the Buddhist Credo (ye dhnmmd, etc.)- which professedly, contains the shortest statement of the essence and the spirit of Buddhism l--declares that Buddha discovered the elements (dharnm8) of existence, their causal connexion, and a method to suppress their efficicncy for cvcr (nirodho). Vasubandhu makes a similar statement about the essence of the doctrine : it is a method of converting the elements of existence into a condition of rest, out of which they never will emerge a g a h z From the first days of the Buddhist church the novices, before obtaining admittanoa into the order, went through a course of instruction in what may be termed the Buddhist catechism, i.e. an exposition of the elements (dharma) of existence and their different classifications into skandhas, Eyatanas, d h i t u ~ . ~ The same training was considered indispensable for the aspiring nuns.4 These conditions have not changed down to the present day in all Buddhist countries. I n the whole of Mongolia and Tibet, in those parts of Siberia where Buddhism is spreading against the primitive Shamanism among the Tungnz tribes of

1,000 (not 900) years, and the adhigama (=abhidharma) somewhat less than that. That there v e r s two Vasubmdhus is not " a guese with no solid basis"; the Kopa actually quotes the opinions of a uyiddMedryaVasubmdhu and rejects them (i, 13, Tibetan test, p. 23 ; cf. Yapomitra's comment). There remain t h e dates of the Chinese transl&ions of the works of Asanga and Vwubandhu, which alone, if correct, would be sufficient evidence t o assign them t o the fourth century. Otherwise one feels inclined t o bring Vasubandhu nearer t o Dignlga, whose teacher he was.

'

Cf. Mahd.uagg.ga, i, 23.

Ab. K., i, I, Tib. text, p. 3, 11. 12-13. Cf. Theragatlui, 1255 :

l a s s r i h vaeanap sutvd khandhe dyatanrini Co dhjtuyo ca viditt&m pabbuji?p anrigariyam.

4 Cf. Geiger's references t o Therigdthjs, op. oit., p. 65 ; the d7uitus there mentioned are probably the eighteen dluitus (not tbe six) ; a number of other divisions into dMtus are mentioned in the Bahu-dluituka-eatra, of. Ab. K., i, 27, Tib. text, p. 46.

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4 THE CENTRAL CONCEPTIOX OF BUDDHISM

Transbaikalia, in the governments of I r h t s k and Astrachan, where it is maintaining itself against orthodox Christianity- everywhere it invariably proceeds by starting religious schools (chos-grva), where manuals similar to the Dhamma-sa~gani containing tables of dhamzus are carefully studied, in the Tibetan original with explanations in vernacular, by the young generation aspiring to be admitted to the order and to be gradually promoted to the higher ecclesiastical ranks. Scholars of Buddhism in Europe will do well to follow this example.

A school of Buddhists which claims as its fundamental

doctrine the principle that " everything exists " has very naturally been supposed to uphold some ldnd of realistic views.l Tradition a h s that the question which gave rise to this sect had been discussed a t the time of Buddha himself. If a division arises in a community with the result that some of its members are declared to be, or claim to be, realists, one would naturally be led to suppose that there were others who were non-realists, i.e. idealists of some kind. But, as a matter of fact, we do not meet with views dehitely idealistic, i.e. with the denial of the existence of external objects, until a comparatively late date. Considering, on the other hand, that these would-be realists, like all Buddhists, denied the existence of a soul or a personality (&?man, pudgala), our uncertsinty increases, and the suspicion arises that the battle between the Sarv%stividins and their opponents was fought on an altogether different plane, about a question which had little

6

do with our conceptions of realism and idealism.2

So Takkakusu s.v. in Hastings' Encyclop~dia. Mr. S. Z. Aung and Mrs. C. Rhys Davids, Poimts of Controversy, p p 275-6, rightly observe t h a t the question bears upon the existence of future and past dkrmas, but this does not mean t h a t " they believed in continued or immutable existence of everything". This would be drifting into SZnkhys. doctrine, against which Buddhist philosophers were alwaya uttering warnings ; of. Appendix I.

a The Buddhists themselves ascribe the origin of their idealistic philosophy t o Vasubandhu; of. my artiolein theMulupPon, 1906, ii. But this was evidently only a. revival of a tendency which, in a different form, was already revealed

I . PRELIMINARY 5

The occasion upon which Rnddha himself is supposed to have put forward the watchword "everything exists " was

a discussion with the Givikas, who flatly denied the influence of past deeds upon our destinies, since they were past and non-existent.' This sect upheld a kind of extreme determinism which served as excuse for moral incontinence ; it maintained that "all things are inalterably fixed. There is no cause, either proximate or remote, for the depravity of being, or

.

for its purity .

. .

There is no such thing as power or energy or human exertion. Everything that thinks, has senses, is procreated, and lives, is destitute of force, power or energy. Their varying conditions, a t any time, are due to fate, to their environment and their own nature "."uddha's teaching, both in the moral domain and in ontology, was the reverse of this ; it maintained moral responsibility and a t the same time transformed all existing thmgs into a congeries of subtle energies (sal?ulkCra-samcha). When pressed to say what was meant by the words " everything exists

",

he answered

" everything exists means that the twelve ciyatanas exist ".3

Now the twelve Zyatanas are merely one of the many classifications of the elements of existence of matter and mind. The Sarvistividin school admitted seventy-five such elements. These elements were called dharms. The full memirig of the term will emerge a t the end of this article ;

in the works of A ~ v ~ g h o g a and Nigajuna. A6. K . bears witness that idealistic views were already diaoussed in the VibUgd-@stra; cf. i, 42, Tibetan text, p. 77, 10, and Yapomitra's comment.

A6. K. a d v, 24; cf. Appendix I.

Cf. R. Hoernle's article in Haetings' Encyclopmdia.

This passage (flamyukfrigama, xiii, p. 16 (McGovern) ) cannot be traced in the Pali Canon. Evidently t h e Theravidins suppressed i t because i t did not agree with their particular tenets. They socused the Vit~iputriyas of having suppressed the passages which ran againinst their views (floul Theory, p. 840), and evidently did themselves the same. But even in their ~ c h o o l the word sabba seems to have been used rather like a teohnical term. It did not mean " everything", but every item of the Buddhist table of elements. This table w i ~ s aupposed t o be an " exhaustive division " : cf. Mrs. Rhys Dsvids, Buddhist Psychology, p. 41 ; Samyutta, iv, 15-27 ; Vimddhi-Magga, ch, x i v ; Warren, Buddhism in tramlation, P. 158 ; G. Grimm, Buddhismuq passim.

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6 THE CENTRAL CONCEPTION, OF BUDDHISM

a t present we take it to mean an ultimate entity, the conception of which, in the domain of matter, excludes the reality of everything except sense-data, and in the field of mind, of everything except separate mental phenomena. We will begin by reviewing the different kinds of elements and their various classifications, and then proceed to determine what was the Buddhist conception of an element of existence. This will lead us to ascertain more precisely in what sense the older Buddhist doctrine may have a claim to be called a realistic system.

11. SKANDHAS

The simplest classification of all elements of existence is represented by a division into five groups of elements :

(1) matter, (2) feelings, (3) ideas, (4) volitions and other faculties, and ( 5 ) pure sensation or general consci~nsness.~ If we realize that the group of matter represents no other matter than sense-data, that a soul is excluded and replaced by feelings, ideas, volitions, and pure sensation, we cannot but be surprised that from under a cover of Oriental terminology an epitome of matter and mind emerges which very nearly approaches the standpoint of modern European science.

Three of these groups, namely, feelings, ideas, and pure sensation, contain one element (dharma) each. They are, nevertheless, called groups because they include feelings, etc., as past, present, and future, proximate and remote, external and internal, morally pure or impure, etc.2 The group of matter includes ten elements, ten different varieties of sense- data.3 The group of volitions, etc., inclndes fifty-eight elements, various mental faculties and general force^.^

The reasons for these renderings of the terms repa, vedami, samjlid, samskta, and vijiibna will be given later on.

Ab. K., i, 20.

a Ibid., i, 14.

* All the sawzskbras except vedanb and samjlid, ibid., i, 15. The three eternal elements-asawkrta-are not included in the skandhnr, ibid., i, 22. Together with auij6apti-rlipu this will make wventy-five element8 in all.

11. SKANDHAB 7

The physical elements of a personality, including its outer world-the external objects-are represented in this classification by one item-matter; 1 the mental ones are

distributed among the four others.

For "Matter and Mind " the old, pre-Buddhistic term ndma-rGpa is used, where rGpa represents the elements of matter and ndma includes t,he four mental classes.

Rut the most general division of all elements is into matter (rGpa), mind (citta-caitta), and forces (samskQva). The fourth group (samskdra-skandha), which inclodes mental faculties and genersl forces, is here split into two parts; the mental faculties are then united to all other mental groups, and are brought under the head of mind ; the general forces or energies receive a separate place (citta-viprayukta-sam~kdra).~ This threefold division is very popular and known in Mongolia and Tibet to every ~choolboy.~

111. HYATANAS

A second, more detailed, classification of the elements is made with a view to a division into cognitive faculties and their objects. There are six cognitive faculties and six categories of corresponding objects. They make the twelve Qyatanas

or " bases " of cognition, viz. :-

I. S i r intsrnal bases (adhyitrnn- 11. Six external besea (bbhya- dyatana) or rexptive faculties dyatana) or object3 (vipaya).

(indriya).

1. Sense of visim (cakgw-inllriya- 7. Colaur and shape (reppa-dya-

bptanz). tena).

2. Sense of audition (qrob-endriya- 8. Sound (qabda-byatam). dyatana).

1 Among the physics1 elements there is one called avijeapti which broadly corresponds t o what we might call the moral oharaoter of a peraon :

for some speoial reasons i t is entered by theSarvlstividins in their physical olass (rlipa), but other schools include i t in mind (Ab. K., i, 11). I n the riyztana m d dluitlc clsssifioations i t is included not inthe physioalitema, but i n the genera olass dharmdh, i.e. dyatana or dhdtu No. 12. k the following account we leave this special element unnoticed, cf. Appendix 11, under Matter.

a Or a slightly differing fivefold division: rlipa, citte, caitla, v@r~yukla-sa?p9kbra, and nirvdna ; cf. Ab. K., ii, 22, and Appendix 11.

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i

8 THE CENTRAL CONCEPTION OF BUDDHISM

3. Sense of smelling (ghrdwendriya- 9. Odour (gandha4yatana). ciyatana).

4. Sense of taste (jihv-endriya- 10. Taste (rasa-dyatana). ayatana).

5. Sense of touch (!uiyedriya- 11. Tangihles(spra+tauya.ciyatona).

ciyatana).

6. Fsoulty of the intellect or con- 12. Non-sensuousobjects(dharma-

soiousness (mum-indriya- ciyalana or dhawnlh).

dyatana).

I n this classification the eleven first items correspond to eleven elements (dharma), each includmg one. The twelfth item contains all the remaining sixty-four elements, and it is therefore called dharma-dyatana or simply dharmdh, i.e. the remining elements.

The term dyatam means " entrance " ( d y a q tamti). It

is an " entrance

"

for consciousness and mental phenomena (citta-caifiindm). Consciousness, i t is stated, never arises alone, since it is pure sensation, without any content. I t is always supported or "introduced" by two elements : a cognitive faculty and a corresponding objective element. These are the supporters or the "doors " (dvdm) for con- sciousness to appear. Visual consciousness (cak~ur-VijGna) arises in correlation ( p a t i t y a ) with the sense of vision (cak8ur-idriya) and some colour (raps- ca). I n the case of the sixth cognitive faculty (manas), consciousness itself, i.e. its preceding moment, acts as a faculty for apprehending non-sensuous objects.

The trend of this classification, which is a characteristic feature of Buddhism from its very beginnings, is unmistakable.

It intends to give a division of all objects of cognition into sense-objects and non-sensuous ones. The first are then divided into ten groups according to the five senses and their five objects, and the second (dhawna-iyayatana, or simply dharmdh), including every non-sensuous object, is left un- divided. There are six items corresponding to six cognitive faculties. Thus the twelve dyatanas, or " bases of cognition

:,

represent all elements of existence distributed withm six subjective and six corresponding objective items. Their

111. AYATANAS 9

synonym is " cverything

"

(sarvam). When the principle

" everything exists " is set forth i t has the meaning that

nothing but the twelve bases of cognition are existent. An object which cannot be viewed as a separate object of cognition or a separate faculty of cognition is unreal, as e.g. the soul, or the personality. Being a congeries of separate elements it is declared to be a name, and not a reality, not a d h a r m ?

IV. D H ~ T U S

The division of the elements of existence into eighteen d&tus, although very similar-it represents, indeed, in its fmt twelve items a repetition of the former one-is taken from a quite different view-point. Buddhist philosophy is an analysis of separate elements, or forces, which unite in the production of one stream (santtina) of events. The unphilosophic mind of common people supposPs this stream to represent a personality or an individual (pzidgaab). Viewed b s components of such a stream, the elements arc called dh6tus. Just as different metals (d&tus) might be extracted out of a mine, just so does the stream of an individual life reveal elements of eighteen different kinds (dhdtu = g o t ~ a ) . ~ I t always includes six faculties (from cakgur-dhdtu up to mano-dhitu), six lddds of objective elements (from ?%pa-dhdtu up to d h a r m - d&tu), and six kinds of consciousness, beginning with visual con~ciousness, or visual sensation (cak,yur-vt$%a-dhdtu), and ending with consciousness purely mental, i.e. non-sensuous (maw-&j%na-d&tu). Thus, in addition to the twelve components corresponding to the twelve bases of cognition, we

have :-

I The right explanstion of the term ciyatana is given in 0. Rosenberg's Problems, p. 138 ff. The usual translation " sphere" ignores the fundamenturn diviaionia. S. Z. Aung, Compendium, p. 256, although con- taining the right suggestion, thinks it " might well be left untranslated

".

"

A6. K., i, 20. I t may be noted that the number of component element6 (tattvaa) of the rudimentary body in Sankbya is likewise eighteen. That the term dhritu has been borrowed from medical science, where it means element of the body, can hardly be doubted.

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10 THE CENTRAL CONCEPTION O F BUDDHISM 13. Visual cansoiousness (cak~r-uij7idna-dhdtu),

14. Auditory ,. (qrotra-vifldna-dhitu). 15. Olfactory ,, (gh~dw-vijiidna-dhitu). 16. Gustatory ,, (jihvd-uijana-dhitu). 17. Trotile ,, (Mya-vijlidna-dhdtu). 18. Non-sensuous ,, (mano-vijlirina-dhdtu).

Consciousness, which is but one element (dhawna), is split in this classification into seven items, since it enters into the composition of an individual life as a faculty (mano-dhdtu) and as six different kinds of sensations, differentiated by their origin, as from one of the senses, or from a purely mental non-sensuous source.l

All these varieties of consciousness exist only in the ordinary plane of existence (kima-Dhdtu). I n higher worlds (rapa- Dhitu) sense-consciousness gradually disappears, in the immaterial worlds (arcpa-Dhdtu) only non-sensuous consciousness is left. A division of consCiousness into various kinds (dhdtu 13-18) is thus made necessary for the composition of formulas of elements corresponding to the denizens of various

~ o r l d s . ~

We will now proceed to consider the separate elements in the order of their most general classification into Matter, Mind, and Forces.

Dhdtu is often defined just as dharma: sva.snohh~va-dhdr&t, or sua-lak~ana-dhriratLdt (of. S. Z. Aung, Compendium, p. 265 ff.), but this is only pertly correot, since the dhitu No. 12 include8 sixty-four dharmas, and the seven dhribus, No. ti m d Nos. 13-18, correspond to one single dharma-the vijficinn (=manas=cittam). The definition in Ah. K., i, 20, is dhdtu=gotra. We can, accordingly, translate dhritu by " component ", " element ", or " class of elements ", just as the case may require.

a When the three DI~dtusarementioned the term Dhdtu means world (loka) or plane of existence (auacara). It has nothing to do with the eighteen dhdtw. The worlds are divided into matsrb.1 (ripa-) and immaterial (mipa-) worlds, theformer again into worlds of carnal desire or defiled matter- kdma-(ripe)-Dhitu, and those of pure, or reduced, matter-(&&ma.) nipa-Dhbtu. I n the kdma-Dhdtu life consists of eighteen components (dhdtua), in the ripa.DMtu of fourteen (excepted are Naa. 9-10 and 15-16), in the aripa-Dhat~c of three (Nor. 6, 12, and 18). I n ripa. and aripa-Dhdtus life is chsractarized by different degrees of perpetual trance (dhydna). Ordinary people o m be tmnsferred into these higher regions of trmce either through being reborn in them (utpatti) or through an effort of transic meditation (samcipatti).

V. MATTER 11

V. ELE

M

ENTS OF MATTER

Matter (rcpa) or the physical elements (rcpino dharmib), which in the first classificati6n occupied one item (&pa-skandha), is otherwise distributed into ten items(Nos. 1-5 and 7-11). The term riipa-iyatam is reserved for visible matter or, more precisely, the phenomenon of visibility alone, this being matter par excelklzce? The general characteristic of matter, or material elements, is impenetrability (sa-pratighatva), which is defined as the fact that space occupied by one of them cannot, a t the same time, be occupied by another?

The elements of visibility are divided into two main groups, colours and shapes. There are eight colours and twelve different shapes. Another theory reduces all colours to two, light and darkness. All other varieties of visibility are represented as differences of lines. The opposite view, namely, that colours alone are realities and shapes (samsthdna) represent copstructions of the mind (wGnasam, parikalpitam) (superimposed upon the difference of coloration as an interpretation of it), was favoured by the S a ~ t r i n t i k a s . ~ A line, say a line drawn by the motion of the hand, being an

1 Ab. K., i, 24.

a The etymologid explannation is : rGpyccta iti rCpam, i.e. matter is what materislizes. Different meanings are then given of this materializing : pressure, p i n , disagpeartmee, or ohsnge. Thus matter is something t h a t disappears. The real meaning is impenetrability (85-pratiyhatva), which is further vmiausly explained. Kumaralibha gives to the phenomenon of impenetrability a n ideslistio interpretation: " t h e impossibility for the intellect t o imagine the presenoe of two suob objeots ocoupying the asme spaoe" (ibid., Tibetan text, p. 50, 17 ff.). Professor 0. Rosenberg strongly objects t o the interpretation of rzipa as matter. He maintains t h a t Buddhism from its very outset viewed the phenomenal world as s n illusion and relegated every reality to same transcendental world (cf. Problems, chap. x). He suggests "sense-elements" for riLpa. This would find a plsoe in a n idealistic system and would be supported by the above interpretation of Kumiralibha. But it is, evidently, not the view adopted by the school of the Sarvistivldins. I t is true that there is no other matter than sense-data. This should not prevent us, just as i t does not prevent modern philosophers who favour t h e same view, from using the term " matter" for faots characterized by impenetrability.

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intimation of something (vzj'iiapti), is an element (raps-Warma) of length ; the line of the flight of a bird in the air is the same. They are interpreted as the apparitions of the element of length or of some colour, and all Buddhist matter must be conceived according to this pattern. They are material elements without any matter in them.

A glance a t the ten items corresponding to matter in the Zyatana-division will convince us that no other matter except sense-data is recognized. I t is broadly divided into two categories, objective sense-data (visaya) constituting external objects, and sense?organs (indriya) conceived as a kind of translucent subtle matter which covers the body when it ie living. This division reminds us of the Sinkhya view that matter developed along two different lines, the one with predominance of the translucent intelligence-stuff (sattva) resulting in sense-organs, the other, with predominance of dead matter (tamas), resulting in sense-objects in their subtle (tan-mdtra) and gross CrnahEbhtita) forms. I n fact the concept of tan-mcitra comes very near to the Buddhist conception of an element of matter (rtipa-dharma). The fundamental difference between the two conceptions is that in the SBnkhya system these elements are modifications or

appurtenances of an eternal substance. I n Buddhism they are mere sense-data without any substance.

The translucent matter of the sense-organs (rtipa-pass) is very subtle ; i t is like the shining of a jewel, it cannot be cut in two,% it cannot be burnt,3 it has no eight,^ and i t disappears without a residue a t death.5 It is, nevertheless,

Ab. If., i, 10, Tib. text, p. 17.

If a member, or all members, are chopped off the body, the senae-organ- matter is not out even in two parts, i.0. the parts that are cut off are

senseless. The movements of a lizard's tail after i t is knocked off the m a n body are explained not by the presence of thia life-matter (indriya), but by theintensification of the vayu element, i.e. it is a, lifeless process (Ab. K.,

i, 30, Tibetan text, p. 63, and Yap. comment).

Ab. K., i, 36, Tib. text, p. 63, 13. Ibid. Ab. K., i, 37, and Ysp. comment: mrtmya amneurtteh. This is a

point of anslogy with the lingn-pvarira of the SSnkhyas.

v. MATTER 13

atomic, and is represented by five different kinds of atoms. The atoms of the organ of sight (caksur-indriya) cover in concentric circles the eye-ball. The atoms of the organ of taste, or, more precisely, that matter which is supposed to convey the sensation of taste, covers in concentric semicircles the tongue. The atoms of the organ of touch (Ey-endriya) cover the whole body? The idea that all these different kinds of special matter are, indeed, the same translucent subtle stuff covering the whole living body and disappearing a t death had also its advocates, who consequently reduced all senses to one, the sense of touch, but this did not h d general acceptance. Being as subtle as the shining of a jewel, this matter cannot appear alone; i t is supported by gross matter (mahdbhata); of which the eye-ball and flesh in general consist.

The atoms of external matter are likewise divided into atoms of general, universal, or fundamental matter, and special atoms of colour-, sound-, tangibility-matter, etc. The fundamental elements are four in number; they are manifested by the facts of hardness or repulsion, cohesion br attraction, heat and m o t i ~ n . ~ Conventionally they are called earth, water, fire, qnd air; but it is specifled that these are only conventional appellations, and that in the name of the fourth general element (<raga) alone both the technical and the usual meanings coalesce, because the word % r a w has both the significations of motion and air as well.3 The fact that the fourth element is motion is an indication of the trend of this division ; the general elements of matter, like all Buddhist elements, are more forces than substances. These four elements appear always together, always in equal proportion. There is as much element of heat in a blazing flame as there is in wood or in water, and vice versa, the difference is only in their i n t e n ~ i t y . ~ The general elements of matter (mahdbhata)

1 Ab. K., i, 44, Tibetan text, p. 84, 15 ff.

Ab. K., i, 12. Ab. K., i, 13.

e.g. tbe taotile sensation may have a different degree of intensity as the touoh hy a bunch of steelneedles ia more intensely felt than the touch of a painter'^ brush, although thequantity may be thessme. Theexistence

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are brought under the head of tangibles (Zyatana No. 11). Since there is only a limited number of general manifestations of tangibility, therefore their number is four? There is, apparently, a distinction between the elements in themselves and their manifestations, because the four facts of resistance, attraction, heat, and motion are clearly called manifestations (Zaksaw) of the elements (dharma), which, accordingly, must be something different, somet'hing mysterious or transcendental, similar in this respect to the gunas of the Sinkhyas. The other five kinds of objective matter (Zyatanas Nos. 7-11) were not general, but special, corresponding to each of the five senses ; the tangibility-matter alone (ayatana No. 11) includes both the general (mahZhht~ta) and the special (hhautika) elements of matter.% They were also atomic, but could not appear independently without being combined with the fundamental ones, in the ratio of four atoms of primary matter to one of secondary. Thus the minimum number of atoms indispensable for their actual appearance in life was eight : four atoms of general materiality combined with each atom of colour, odour, taste, and secondary tangibility-matter (such as smoothness, coarseness, etc.). If the particular piece of matter resounded, atoms of sound were added and the combination consisted then of nine different atoms.s The combined atoms (sanghita-paramZnu) alone appear in phenomenal reality, the simple ones, or infra- atomic elements, presumably, were relegated to traus- cendental reality, in accordance with the general character of cohesiveness, i.e. oi the element "water" in a. flame, is proved by its keeping a shape; the presence of repulsion, i.e. of the element " earth ", in water, is proved by the fact of its supporting a ship, etc. (cf. Ab. K., ii, 22, and Yapom.).

Ab. If., i, 35, Tibetan text, p. 61, 5 ff. ,Ibid.

The actual number of atoms in 8 sang7uita.paramci?zu will be much greater, since each atom of secondary (hhautika) matter needs a aat of four primmy stoms of its own, hut if d7uitus alone are reckoned the number will express the clesses (dhrite) of elements (dlmma) represented (cf. Ab. K.. ii, 22).

V. MATTER 15

of a Buddhist element. This device made it an easy task for Buddhists to oppose the indivisibility of atoms.1

In the Zyatana classification two items (Nos. 6 and 12) are devoted to the elements of mind (citta-eaitta-dharmEh, arapiizo dharmEh) and, according to the principle of this classification, they represent ' two correlative groups : a subjective one (indriya) and an objective one (+aya). The principle of externality of one element in regard to another, i.e. the idea of separate elements (pythag-dharma), is maintained in the field of mind just as in the field of matter. Mind is split into two chief parts. The subjective part, or mind viewed as a receptive faculty, is represented by one element called, indiscriminately,

&a, vzj'ddna, or m a n a ~ . ~ It represents pure consciousness, or pure sensation, without any content. Its content is placed in the objective part which contains the definite sensation (sparp), feelings (vedami), ideas (safljfid), volitions (eetanci), and various other mental phenomena up to the number of forty-six separate elemenh3 So it is that feelings come to be viewed as objects of the mind, a posit,ion which, for other reasons, they likewise possess in the Siukhya syst,em. The category in which they are entered is called the (general) group of elements (dhavma-Zyatana) or simply " the elements " (dharmZh). As stated above, the first eleven

"bases" contain one element (dharma) each, but this last one contains the remaining sixty-four elements of the list. Beside the forty-six mental phenomena it contains the fourteen elementary forces (tgprayukta-samskdra), the element of character (avijriapti) and the three eternal elements (asamskm) : among the latter is Nirvipa, the chief dharma.

'

Ab. K . , i; 43, Tibetan text, p. 83.

a Ab. K., ii, 34. The same terms in the P d i Canon, Sumgutla, ii, 94. The ThemvMa reckoned fifty-one. Cf. the fifty b7uivas of the Sinkhyas, some of them exhibiting an andogy with corresponding Buddhist caifta- d h a r m . A full list of the fortysix caitta-dharnas is given below, App. 11.

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For this reason the term " elements " (dharmdh) is a sufficient

indication of this group, because the oiher categories, although also containing elements (dharmcih), have a special name each.l The common feature of all these elements is that they are apprehended by the intellect directly without any inter- mediate agency of the senses. I n the apprehension of sense- objects there is likewise participation by the intellect; but these d h a d h are non-sensuous objects, t,hey are the exclusive domain of the receptive intellect, just as colour is the exclusive domain of the sense of visfon.2 The de6nition 'of receptive consciousness is pregnant : vij'iiaam pratio@aptih, i.e. " con-

sciousness is an intimation, or awareness, in every single case "

(of what is now present to the senses, or to the mind d i r e ~ t l y ) . ~ If an apprehension contains some, albeit quite indefinite, content, say some indefinite visual sensation, it will then 1 Every dyatana is thus a dharmriyatana, but No. 12 ia dharm@tana par exoellence. J u s t so is i t t h a t the ten material dyatanas all include matter. They are, consequelitly, all of them, ripriyatanas. But only one of them-the visible element, dyatana No. 7-retains the name of ri&atana as itu speoial designation, because i t represents the most characteristic and important among the elements of matter. Cf. Ah. K., i, 24, Tibetan text, p. 42, 17 ff.

Prof. and Mrs. Gcig-~r, op. eit., p. 80, have established for thedharmrih in the technied sense the signification " t h e empirical things

".

Thin is

a n example of the impotence of the "philological method" ! It has not escaped their attention that dharmdh is synonymous witL dharmdyatana and dharmadh&tu, in which Xirirvi?a is included (p. 83), whioh is anythiiig but empirical. The dharmdh are apprehended by manah (p. 81), but the emphasis is put on the fact t h a t they m e apprehended withut the co- operation of the senaes. Everything is apprehended by r n ~ ? ~ , bnt the dharmrih are external with regard to manah; their plsoe in the system is among the s i r s i ~ a y a , ss opposed t o the six indriya, one of which, the sixth, is manah. Concerning the meaning of the terms " external" and " internal" some remarks will be made later on, pp. 58-9, when discussing the theory of cognition.

3 Ab. K., i, 16. Cittam uijdndti, Asl., p. 42 = " is aware uariously " (M. Ting), must have the same import, if any. Cf. the Sinkhya d e h i t i o n of pmtyakga in Srinkhya-!&%kc% 5 : pratiui~ay-ridhyauasriyo drg.tam, where

~ v e have likewise the distributive -ti-, but vij%ina=tijliapttih, since i t is i n the SLnkhya system represented by purwa (of. below, Theory of Copition, p. 63), is replaced by ndhyavas8ya-the fanotinn of the i n t m a l organ (synthesis).

VI. MIND 17

t'he next degree, a real sensation ( s p r g a ) . l The definite perception (parichitti) of a colour will be an " idea " (sanjgd), but consciousness as the perceptive faculty is pure sensation. Although quite undifferentiated in itself, this pure sensation is, nevertheless, distinguished from the standpoint of its origin or, more precisely,'its environment, i.e. the elements by which its appearance is accompanied. From this point of view, as stated above, there is a set of six diierent kinds ( d h i t u ) of consciousness, corresponding to a set of six receptive faculties and a set of six k i d s of objects. We thus have six categories of consciousness (gad-vyfidna-kdydh), beginning with visual sensation or, more precisely, pure sensation arising in conuexion with some colour (caksur-vijfidna-dhdtu) and ending with consciousness accompanying a non-sensuous object (mano-vyEna-dhdtu). We have besides the same conscious- ness as a receptive faculty (dhdtu No. 6). As a receptive faculty mano-dhdtu is not different from consciousness arising in connexion with abstract objects (mano-.uzj'riCna-dhdtu) ;

it is the same reality, the same dhamna. But for symmetrical arrangement it has been found necessary to have a set of three items for the purely mental elements, just as there is a threefold set of faculty, object, and sensation corresponding to each of the ~ e n s e s . ~ The difference between consciousness as a receptive faculty and the same consciousness accompanying an abstract object is then said to be a difference of time. Consciousness in the role corresponding to the place occupied in the system by the senses is the consciousness of the preceding moment? The Theravidins, evidently for the same purpose of symmetrical arrangement, introduced into 1 Three d h ~ r m 9 are engaged when this kind of sensation, sometimes transletad r s " oontsot ", iis produced : traydvdm sannipitah 8pvpah (tima? s a w a t i phuso) : the consciousness (citta), the sense-organ, and the sense-object. Cf. below under theory of cognition.

*

Ab. K., i, 16, Tibetan text, p. 29, 1. 17.

8 The mental phenomena (eaitta-dharma) also have their objeots ; they are sccording to Lhe current t e r m h l o g y sdlawbana, buL Lhey are themaelves cilaya s n d not indviya (Ah. K., i, 34, of. Tibetan text, p. 49.1. 19).

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18 THE CENTRAL CONCEPTION O F BUDDHISM

the system a " heart-stuff " (hdaya-vatthu) which supports the non-sensuous cognitions, just as the .other sense-stuffs "support " sense-cognitions. It occupies in the s y s t e ~ the place of the sixth organ (dyatam or dhdtu No. 6)?

Although external in regard to one another, consciousness and mental phenomena (citta-cailta) were conceived as being in a closer, more intimate, connexion than other combining elements. Pure sensatioa (&&!a) could never appear in life in its true separate condition ; i t was always accompanied

by some secondary mental phenomena (caiua)? Among

these mental phenomena (cairn-dharma) or faculties

( s a m s k a ) three are especially conspicuous, namely, feelings (wdani), ideas (sanjlid), and volitions (cekcnd). I n the classification into groups (shndha) they occupy three separate items, all the remaining ones being included together with the volitions in the sa?nsk&a-skandha. Feelmgs (vedand) are defined as emotions pleasant, unpleasant, or neutraLs Ideas ( a a n j k ) are defined as operations of abstract thought, as that. which "abstracts " (wEgrahawa) a common characteristic sign (nimitta) from the individual objeck4 Even the definite representation (parichitti) of a colour is brought under this head.4 It is exactly what in later Indian philosophy, Buddhist as well as Brahmanical, was understood by "definite" (sa-wikalpaka) cognition. Digngga and Dharmabirti introduced into Indian logic the distinction between pure sense knowledge, free from any operation of abstract

thought (kalpanipodha), and definite cognition (sa-

vikalpaka).5 It was then adopted by Uddyotakara and

Cf. Mrs. C. Rhys Davids, B. Psych., pp. 32, 70. This heart-stuff had, presumably, as little to do with the actual heart as the cakgur-indriya-stuff with the actusl eye. Indian medical science assumed the esiatenee of a,

subtle dMp-food-stuff rm a vehicle of mental processes. I t is here called heart-stuff.

a Ab. K., ii, 23.

a Ab. K., i, 14.

'

Ihid

Cf. the delinition of patyak+a in inn'yyd-bind* 1.

VJ. MIND 19

the whole' of the Nyiya-Vai~egika school? I t now

appears that Digniga was not the originator of this doctrine, he only adapted it to his system. From the very beginning Buddhism had established this difference : uzj'%na and its qmonyms citta, manah represent pure sensation, the same as the kalpawipo@a pratyaksa of Digniiga, and sanjiiii corresponds to definite ideas. Every construction (kalpawi), every abstraction (udgrahana),l every definite (parichinna) representation, such as blue and yellow, long and short, male and female, friend and enemy, happy and miserable-this is all brought under the head of ideas (sanjr?.d) as distinguished from vijGna = pure sensation.

Volition (cetani) is d e h e d as the mental effort that precedes action. I t is an element or a force which enters in the composition of a personal life (santzna). It must not be forgotten that, since there is no personality in the, Buddhist outlook of the universe, there certainly is no will in our sense, i.e. no personal will. There is a certain arrangement of elements, there is an element, or a force, or, still more precisely, the simple fact (dharma) that the elements are arranged in a certain way, according to certain laws. This fact is pointed to by the term oetaG. It " arranges " (sancetayati) the elements in

" streams

",

which simple folk deem to be personalities. It

is synonymous with the law of moral causation (karma) and likewise with the force of vitality, the " Blan vital " (bhzuani, vikanli), which in the Buddhist system replaces any conscious agent, whether soul or God or even a conscious

'

Cf. NyQ&wirttika, patyakpa-8Btra.

LTdgrahana is literally " abstraction ", k a l p m i " imsgimtion ", " oon- struotion

".

It corresponds to the part taken in Kant's system by " pro- ductive imagination ", whereas t;ij%m, or the p a t y a k p of Digniga, corresponds to " reine Siunlichkeit

".

Cf. my Logic of later Buddhists (chapter on kalpand).

To be derived from the root ci from which the Buddhists derive citla as well (Ash., p. 63); sancetayati is exactly, in form and meaning, the Russian sochetayeti; the PPli abhisalzdahati has the same import, cf. S. Z. Aung, Compendium, p. 235.

1 Thedebition of hrma is cetand cetayitwi ca karatban, Ab. K., iv, 1 ff., the same as in Anguttam, iii, 416; of. Ebrs.C. Rhys Davids, B. Psych., p. 93.

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20 THE CENTRAL CONCEPTION O F BUDDHISX human being.' A moment of this kind of will accompanies every conscious moment (citta).

There are, on the whole, ten mental elements which accompany every conscious moment ; they are called the "general " mental element^.^ There are ten others which are particularly

" favourable " for progress towards the final appeasement of

life ; they are faith, courage, equanimity, etc. Ten others have the contrary unfavourable or oppressive (klzsta) character. There we some others which have no definite moral character. All these mental elements are not general ;

they accompany only some of the moments of consciousness, not all of them.3

VII. FORCES

The definitions of the will (cetani) and of the force ( s a @ x Z r a ) are indeed the same, " what produces the manifestations (abhi-sa~skaroti) of combining elements (saqzskrtam) " : it is

a " concerted agency ".6 Since all forces are agencies acting

in some combination with other elements, we may in rendering this conception, for the sake of expediency, safely drop the word " combining " and use " forces " alone! There are some

indications that originally there was only one s a & % r a in the Buddhist system, the will, and that gradually a whole catalogue of them was developed, some of the elements being entered into this group rather forcibly, with e x c ~ s e s . ~ The

A6. K., ix, Soul T h o r y , p. 942.

Citta-mahdbhcmika.

A full list of them wiU be found in 0. Rosenberg's Pwblems, p. 374, and st the end of this book.

'

This de6nition we find already in the oldest souroes, e.g. Samyutta, iii, 87, and i t is repeated in numberless paasages of the A6. K.; cf. S. Z. Aung, Compendium, p. 236.

8ambhCya-kirituam, A6. K., i, 7.

This the Buddhists themeelvee have also done in replacing saqtskrta by kytaka, of. Nyciyab. tika, pp. 47, 50, eta. A unity, without combining, e m produce nothing : na E m i d ekam eknsmrit (Dignlga).

In the Ab. K., i, 15, there is a n interesting effort to prove t h a t dl

samslniras (sixty) are inoluded in the somskirira-skandha and notcetand alone,

as it would he possible t o conclude from scriptural patlsages. AE tho ~ e c o n d member of the chain of causation, samakcira is equivalent t o karma.

VII. FORCES 21

most typical forces are the four forces of origination and decay, etc., which accompany every other element in life. Some details concerning them will be given in the sequel. I n general, all elements may be divided into substances and forces (dravya and sarczfikira). The forces are then divided into meGal faculties, with the will as chief among them, and non-mental (citta-viprayukta) forces, among which the origination and decay forces are the most typical. But even these latter forces are sometimes given a certain amount of substantiality (drayatopi santi).l The word and conception sa?zskira performs a conspicuous part in all Indian philosophical systems. It usually means some latent mysterious power, which later on reveals itself in some patent fact. I t sometimes is identified with the

" unknown " ( n d r ~ t a ) conceived as a force sui genaris. Since

every philosophy is but a search for the hidden reality as opposed to the patent surface of life, the importance of the conception of a sa?)ls&ra is quite natural. Every system had its own dehition and scope attributed to the connotation of this term. The -&jivika sect, as we have seen, was known by its denial of the existence of such forces. The Buddhists, on the contrary, converted all their elements into subtle forces of some degree. The subtler the element the more was it

given the character of a force ; but even the coarsest elements, the rnahdbhtltas, look more like forces than substances. There is a constant fluctuation in Buddhist terminology between a force (sanzskira) and a substance influenced by these forces (sanaskrta). A force, it must be recalled, should not be regarded as a real influence of somethmg extendmg beyond its own existence in order to penetrate into another-this would be

Mrs. C. Rhys Davids oaUs my attention t o the following very illuminating words in Samyuita, iii, 60 : Katamd ca 6hikkhave salikhrird ? Cha-y-ime cetancikciyci r~pa-sadda-gandha-rma~pha~!h~166a~aa~ictand dhammasafieetanci i m e uz~ceantiaadkhdvi. Acoording t o Yapomitre, l.e., the mental faculties are

inoluded in the samskdva-skandha because they obey the will, tbe other forces because they are similar to the wi!! (cetand).

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22 THE CENTRAL CONCEPTION OF BUDDHISM upakira-but simply as a condition, a fact, upon which another fact arises or becomes prominent (utkarsa) by itself -this is s a w k i r a in the Buddhist system.l

The little we know of the history of Indian philosophy induces us to look to the Sinkhya system as the foundation of scientific thinking. I n that school the fundamental ideas were formed which sometimes unconsciously affected all later constructions. 11That do we find there 1 Three fundament

a l principles, Matter,

find-stuff,

and Energy-stuff, as inter- dependent moments in every real and substantial existence. Even energy is substantial in this sense. The infinitesimals of energy, present everywhere, are semi-material ; although different from the inertia of Matter, and the luminosity of Mind, they are separate and ~ubstantial.~ The Buddhist elements as infinitesimal realities, divided into elements of Matter, Mind, and Forces, look like a reply to the Sinkhya constructions from an architect of greater skill : " you main-

tain the realities are gunas, we say they are dharmas." The fundamental idea of infinitesimal realities may be recognized in the dharmas, the idea of forces everywhere present can be traced to its origin in the Sankhya conception of rajas ;

there are forces which are different from matter and mind

(pipa-citla-vipayttkta). A pIura1istic view of the whole is added to make the originality of the new system, in contrast to the unitarian tendency of the old one. But, be the case as it may, every element of matter and mind may be called in Buddhism a sapskdra, which, in this case, will stand for samsk~ta-dharma.3 The Buddhist idea of a force Cf. the paribhigas to Pilzini, ii, 3,53 : ri, 1, 139 ; andiv, 2, 16 ; iv, 4,3, in the KdgiM (not occurring in the M. bhdgya). Cf. below, p. 69.

Cf. B. Seal, The Positive Sciences of the Hindus, and S. Dasgupt~, The Slndy of PataGjali. The interpretation of thegunae given there is entirely. based on Vy%a who, as will I?e seen below, p. 46, was strongly influeuoed by abhidbrma. Concerning their mythological origin of. Senart, J. Aa. 1915, v. ii, pp. 151 8.

Yapomitra (Ab. K., i, 16) remarks that the name s a w b t a ia given in anticipation, since an element rill become samskrta only when the forces (sawEva) ahall have exhibited their efficiency. In the popular formula anitye6 sarve aamskcirih the word sawkrilo stande for sawkrta-db~rna.

VII. FORCES 23

seems to be that it is the subtle form of a substance, but even substance is here subtle enough. The order in which the elements appear in the first classification into groups is

i

interpreted as a gradual progress from coarseness to smbtletp matter ( ~ B p a ) is coarser than feeling (uedanci), feeling more ; . palpable than ideds ( s a n j z ) , the remaining energies (sanwkira) still more subtle.=

The pure forces (viprayukta-samsk6ra) are the most subtle among the elements. In the loftiest, highest worlds, where existence is entirely spiritualized, their agency continues; they are the last to be suppressed before final extinction is reached. The chief among t,hem are the four forces of origination and destruction, etc., which are the very essence of every existence. Then there are two forces, pripti and uprapti, which are supposed to control the collection of elements composing a personal life or to prevent (aprlpti) the appearance in i t of an element that is not in agreement with its general character. The Sautrintikas and Vasubandhu deny the reality of these forces ; for them they are mere names (praihpti)? There are two forces supposed to be active in producing the highest degrees of trance-the unconscious trance (asanjfii-saGpatti) and the cessation (nirodha-) trance or catalepsy. They are also brought under the head of pure forces.3 They evidently could not be brought under the head of mind, because consciousness a t that bime is supposed to be suppressed. Then there are three forces corresponding to the sphop of other systems. All Indian systems contain speculations about the nature of sound, its physical as well as its significative aspect. The physical sound was in Buddhism considered, in agreement with the whole system, as a production, i.e. (flash'mg) of sound- atoms reposing on the atoms of fundamental matter. If S a v s & ~ a etymologized as kara?~a-sddham would mean force, and as k a m a - s b d h m would be equal to sawkrta-dbrma. The individud life, which consists of all these phyaicd and mental element^ end forces, ia called samskira-aamiibb, of. Yapm. (Ab. K., ir), sa ccipi Cailra-abhidhcinah ea~h%ra-mmiha-saptdmb.

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simultaneously some atoms of translucent sound matter (pbda-rapa-pmsoidn) appeared in the ear, an auditory sensation (yotra-v;jGna) was produced. But the significance of the sounds of speech was given by special forces. The Mim8msaka school was known for its theory of transcendental, intelligible sounds which were eternal and nbiquitous, like Platonic ideas, and manifested themselves in the case of physical words being pronounced. Followingtheirfundamental principle of analysidg everything into minutest elements, the Buddhists imagined three separate forces which imparted to the sounds of speech their significativeness ; the force of sound (vyanjana), which would seem to correspond to the modem idea of a " phonema " ,the force of words (n&na), and

the force of sentences (pada).l

Generality, general ideas, are also conceived as a kind of force, and it is christened by the name of nikdya-sabhcigatd, a conccption intended to replace by a "force" the substantial reality of the samdnya of other s y ~ t e m s . ~ In general this group of forces is a rather incongruous assemblage of elements which could not be placed elsewhere. As a separate group of elements it is absent in the Theravtida school. Some of its members seem to have found a place, for some reason, among the physical ( r ~ p a ) group of that school.*

YIII. NON-SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE ELEMENTS

After this succinct review of the elements of existence and their different classifications, we may consider the question as to what were they in their essence, what was the Buddhist

1 Ab. K., ii, 47 ff. Vyanjana here corresponds to varqa, mima to sanjvid, and ~ a d a t o udkya, a case exhibiting clearly the desire t o have a terminology of one's bwn, so common to Indian systems : " you maintain it in spho.la, we say it is uyanjana-luima-pada-sawkdva." The real existence of these forces is admitted by the Sarvistividin done. For this reason they bring the Holy Scriptures under the head of sawE~a-skandha, whereas the Sautr%ntikas classify it under rcpa, m pbdn, and the VijEinavidins under vij8dm-skandha; of. Vinitadeva's introduotion to the Santdndntara- siddhi, edited by me in the BibL Buddhica.

a Ab. K., ii, 41.

a Cf. S. 2. Aung, Compendium, p. 157.

conception of an element. The elements had four salient feat,ures: (1) they were not-substance-this refers to all the seventy-five elements, whether eternal or impermanent ;

(2) they had no duration--this refers only to the seventy-two impermanent elements of phenomenal existence ; ( 3 ) they were unres+thi•˜ refers only to one part of the latter class, that which roughly corresponds to the ordinary man as opposed to the purified condition of the elements of a saint (arya) ; and (4) their unrest had its end in final deliverance. Speaking technically: (I) all dharmns are andtman, ( 2 ) ail sa~skrta-dhrmas are anitya, ( 3 ) all sdsrava-dlzarmas are duhkha, and (4) t,heir nirv6?m alone is @eta. An element is non-substantial, it is evanescent, i t is in a beginningless state of commotion, and its final suppression is the only Calm. These are what the Tibetans call the four " seals " of Buddha?

We now proceed to examine them separately. Anatma

The term andtman, is usually translated as " non-soul",

but in reality itman is here synonymous with, a personality, an ego, a self, an individual, a living being, a conscious agent, etc2 The underlying idea is that, whatsoever be designated by all these names, it is not a real and ultimate f a d , it is a mere name for a multitude of interconnected facts, which Buddhist philosophy is attempting to analyse byreducing them to real elements (dharma). Thus " soullessness " (nair6tmyz)

is but the negative expression, indeed a synonym, for the existence of ultimate realities (dharrnnt~?).~ Buddhism

1 The Southerns reokoned three "marks ", evidently including the fourth in duhkha, as its cessation ; cf. 8. 2. Aung, Compendium, p. 210.

The whole issue with every detail is admirably expounded by Vasubandhu in a concluding, ninth, ohapter of Ab. K., translated in my S o d Theory of t h Bouddhists. The terms dtma, jivaa, saftva, pdgala are hereusedsssynonyms ; of. SoulThory, p. 838, and Katkvatthu-atthakathd, p. 8. The Vitsiputriyas made some difference hetweenpdgalaand dtman ;

they were pudga2auddins, hut not dtmrbdins. Although admitting a limited, very shady, reality of pudqala, they denied it the ultimate reality of a dharma ; ef. Soul T h m y and below, p. 70 ff.

Pravacanadharmki punar atra nairdtmyam buddknupdsani vd, Yapom. ad Ab. K., ix, in fine.