Imagination without images
By Concettina Manna and Giuliano Minichiello*
Imagination between representation and invention.1
In Teaching as story telling: an alternative approach to teaching and curriculum in the elementary school (1986), Kieran Egan examines the process of imagination and more specifically poses the question, “ ... What is imagination?”. He states that «according to standard dictionary definition it is "the act or power of forming mental images of what is not actually present", or "the act or power of creating mental images of what has never been actually experienced"» (Egan, 1986, p. 7). This is a definition that, in Egan’s view, contrasts with the image that he is so fond of, in which the child is depicted principally as energetic creator of mental images. It suggests a wider characterization of the same notion of imagination in the light of the distinction made between a child’s imagination, an active imagination and a creative imagination (Galimberti, 2001_, pp.509-510).
The child’s imagination assumes the form of the primary expression of the psyche, which is not yet adequately differentiated into cause and time structures, or organized on a strict logical basis. It is clearly influenced by more sentimental and emotional factors. It is with this specific meaning that the imagination has been the subject of psychoanalytic study, with different lines of thought having emerged. Although these have different theoretical approaches, they ultimately link imagination with fantasy; that is with the dimension of the psyche that generates hallucinatory fantasies, able to provide a sort of immediate substitute to satisfaction, when the desired object is unobtainable.
Nevertheless, as the functions of the ego gradually find structure and articulation, the child develops the ability to adapt his early imagination with the “reality principal”. By providing an informed perception of reality, this generates a gradual acquisition of awareness of the fact that it is reality which determines the possibility or impossibility, and the usefulness or otherwise, of a given satisfaction.
In a different perspective and area of research, Carl Gustav Jung develops the notion of active imagination, based on his own personal interpretation of the structure and working of the psyche. Jung believes that the imagination can be depicted as the space in which “collective unconscious” appears, as opposed to the Freudian personal unconscious. Indeed, if
the personal unconscious is made up of all of an individual’s lifetime experiences, once conscious and subsequently removed, the collective unconscious, as general psychic fundamental principle, can be described as a sort of superpersonal subconscious, where content and behavioural patterns common to all individuals are stored. These have never been part of our conscious and have therefore never been acquired individually. The contents of the collective subconscious, which Jung defines as “archetypes”, are a sort of hereditary lay-out and therefore a specific psychic operational mode, which brings together primordial and meta-individual images of the psyche, the result of the repetition of identical situations.
Within the Jungian psychoanalytic prospective, the “archetype” notion is specified as an innate possibility of representation that is often veiled with symbols. Interesting sources of “archetype” material can be found in what Jung refers to as “active imagination”, distinguishing it from fantasy. On this subject, the Author states that he prefers the notion of “imagination” to “fantasy”, as there is a difference between the two, which the old doctors had in mind when they said that opus nostrum, or our work, should be done per veram imaginationem et non phantasticam, that is, by true imagination and not by a fantastical one. …A fantasy is more or less your own invention, and remains on the surface if personal things and conscious expectations. Active imagination on the other hand, as the term denotes, means that the images have a life of their own and that the symbolic events develop according to their own logic» (Jung,1969, pp. 62-63).
incompréhensible ou sur une impression visuelle spontanée et l'on observe comment cette image se transforme. Elle s'enrichit petit à petit de détails et évolue. Cette méthode fait surgir de nombreux contenus de l'inconscient. Elle repose sur un abaissement voulu de la conscience et de son influence limitative sur l'inconscient. Il faut éliminer toute critique provenant de la raison et observer ce qui se passe avec une objectivité absolue” (Brandner Liard, 2004), so that the emotion takes shape.
In an attempt to find the link between the Gestalt theory and art, Rudolf Arnheim explores the notion of the “creative imagination” in another area of research related to the analysis of artistic perception and creative processes. Here, the “creative imagination” is perceived as the ability to organize and combine different perceptions into units that the imagination structures before they are actually visualized. In Arnheim’s view, this type of imagination is the basis of the formation of artistic production and more specifically of artistic imagination; in fact “when formal chromatic patterns are considered as «forms» - that is, images which represent some content – the question of an invention or an artistic imagination arises. …
Imagination and image in Philosophy : imitation or participation?2
In many of his dialogues Plato attempts to define the role of the imagination in cognitive and learning processes; he partly identifies it with the reminiscence process. For example, in Fedone, he defines recollection as the “image [eidos] of an absent object”; he gives the example of the lover who, at the sight of his sweetheart’s clothing or lyre, is led to look upon it as the object of his own desire (Plato, Fedone, 73 d-e). Here, the image is explained by the mechanism of association. Elsewhere, however, in considering the relationship between the imagined object and its corresponding image – between an individual and its artificial representation, for example – Plato introduces the concept of “imitation” [mimesis], but adds that the “copy” cannot be an exact reproduction of the model. In fact he maintains that an image which is completely true to the model is no longer so, and loses its statute of image; an image, if is to be considered as such, cannot “convey everything in exactly the same way as what it imitates”. In short, nothing can totally and completely represent the properties of another: in such case, assuming the possibility of a god who represents not only the shape and colouring of Cratilus, but also “his inner self”, “and gesture and soul and mind”, we would have not Cratilus and Cratilus’s image, but “even two Cratilus”. It is pointless to maintain that an image has the “same” properties as the object that it imitates, or that imitation means the exact reproduction of an object. Imitation, in the sense of “creating the image of”, does not consist of reproduction as in “duplication”. An imitation is made only when something is missing from or added to the image compared to the original, while respecting some sort of minimum framework of features according to which make an equivalence between the copy and the object that it imitates (Plato, Cratilus, 432 b-e).
The object that is represented has a particular shape, while the image that represents it has a different shape and this does not happen by chance, but rather because of the very nature of the image. The idea of mimesis presupposes that of deformation: there is no opposition between “perfect” imitation and “imperfect” imitation, in that the perfect imitation is no longer the imitation, but rather the thing itself, or at least an absolutely identical and coinciding double of it; in short the only imitation is the imperfect one. It is well-known that the concept of imitation is used in Platonic dialogues to define the relationship between the ideal world and the real one, this would be an image [eidos] of that. The etymological origin of the term eidos is the verb “to see” conjugated in the past (oida): the image is the
recollection or the trace of “things seen in the past”. It is here that we find the origin of the idea of the image as an imitation weakened by an archetype. In the Parmenides, however, Plato confutes the concept of mimesis of the ideal using the so-called “Third Man argument”. According to this argument, if a thing is created in imitation of another (for example “this man” as an imitation of the idea of “man”), a third idea that includes the first two will be required, and so on at infinitum (Plato, Parmenides, 132 c –133 a).
In actual fact, here the very idea of the image as a representation of an absent model is deeply shaken, by virtue of the simple remark that the imitated “thing” – the “idea” – is in turn an eidos, an image: the image (as a trace) is the representation of an image (as an object of recollection). To get out of this vicious circle, alongside the interpretation of the activity which produces images in terms of association or reminiscence, Plato places an interpretation of the same activity as erotic or as metessi.
With the term metessi (“participation”) – unlike mimesis – , Plato indicates the real presence [parousia] of the object in the image (Plato, Charmides, 159 a); the image is the result of a direct relationship in which the model is present within the image that it represents (Plato, Parmenides, 129 onwards.)
Here the image is not the representation of an absent object, but rather a “blend” of two different types of beings: on the one hand, the object “as it is” empirically; on the other, the mental image of this object, which is evoked by the image. This “blend” is neither the identity of the two beings, nor their confusion. Plato speaks on this subject of metax_, a sort of intermediate entity between the two extremes; A splendid example of this Eros, who is neither handsome nor ugly, and neither good nor bad, but makes the two opposites communicate with one another (Plato, Convitus, 202 b). Indeed, the philosopher states, there is a whole territory – the daimonion, “something between god and mortal” – which has the power to “translate and pass on the things that come from men to the gods, and those that come from the gods to men” (ivi, 202 d).
The same concept is applied to the relationship between science and ignorance: between them we can find to orthà doxazein, an expression that has been translated in a variety of ways, and which literally means “to consider objects of thought as correct”, although these are not held up as being right (ibid, 202 a). Between the opposites there is an intermediate being which strongly connects them.
which it represents, but instead expresses it is another way, we would say: it expresses it in a different code. But it is here that the real mystery of the image begins: it is not a simple representation, but an expression, it does not imitate an existing thing, but rather creates a different order of existence. The Platonic concept of metax_ seems to be the desire to show that in the passage from representation of a thing to its image, there is a formal change of regime and representative system, and not simply a “de-formation” attributable to the code used to build the image of the object. The written word is an image of the spoken one, not in the sense that it deforms it, but rather in sense that it expresses it in a different formal system. The word [logos] – Aristotle would later say – is an image of the voice [phoné], which is an image of the pathos of the soul. Plato demonstrates that he has understood that between the thing and the image, or between two images, there are discontinuities, obstacles, blind spots, and “linear glimpses of thoughts”, which occasionally have to be passed in order for the form of the image to be able to express the form of the object that precedes it. These blank spaces are not images, and yet they still belong to the imagination process, which can therefore be described, for an essential aspect, as imagination without images.
The “blind spots” of the imagination.3
In answer to the question of whether the “blind spots” of the imagination can be clearly defined, Kant responds with his theory of the “productive imagination”, through which he makes a precise distinction between “schema” and “image”. In the Critique of Pure Reason he states: in itself, the schema is in any case simply a product of the ability of imagination; but since its synthesis does not aim in any way at a single intuition, but instead only aims at unity in the determination of sensibility, the schema then must nevertheless be distinguished from image. In this way, if I put five dots one after the other: ….. , this is an image of the number five. On the other hand, if I only think of a number in general – which could be five, or even a hundred – this thought is the representation of a method to represent a plurality – a thousand, for example – in an image, in conformity with a particular concept, rather than this image itself, which in the case cited I could have dominated and compared to the concept. So, this representation of a universal way of behaviour of the ability of the imagination, with which it gives a concept its image, I call this the schema of this concept” (Kant, 1787, p. 135).
of imagination, it is essential to find the missing image, which stretches out over the two opposite and complementary sides of what has already been seen and what has yet to be imagined.
Image and deep learning.4
Despite the great variety in approaches to research, the modern schema theory5 tends to converge on certain essential features: 1) the schemata have active character and add their own cognitive cohesion to the accentuated and identifiable phenomenology of stimulus flows; 2) as far as the superior psychic functions are concerned, these depend on interests and intentions; 3) while they maintain certain constant factors that preserve their identity, they undergo variations in proportion to the specificity of situations and change with experiences. All of these features assume specific importance as regards the formation of subjective representations and the approach to educational intervention (Cavallini, 1995, p. 198). Nevertheless these features almost exclusively regard the link between schemata and concepts and with their function of preparation for conceptual thought (Rumelhart, 1991). The schemata are prevalently considered as a rough draft of thought, which has to be transformed and purified of its own empirical features, in order to provide the mind with a landing point for the abstract dimension of conceptuality (Cavallini, 1995)6. A point which is not properly examined, is the function performed by the schemes not in preparation for conceptualization, but instead as a formal rule of organization and creation of images, not only in the sphere of images belonging to a certain formal regime, but also in the linking of different formal regimes. Here, in fact, the central question concerns the way in which the rule of schematism intervenes to direct the choice of the absent image, whether this be a specific formal system (linguistic, iconic, etc.), or different formal systems. Again it is Kant who provides an interesting contribution regarding the first point. He identifies the schema with “the determination of the internal sense in general”, that is, with the “form of time” (Kant, 1787, p.136)
4 By Giuliano Minichiello. 5
Introduced into psychology by Bartlett, who had taken it from the physiologist Head to explain how memories are organized, the schema concept – unlike that of image – moves in a cognitivist context (in which it is modelled as “prototype”, “frame”, “script”, “plan”, “goal” and “theme”), and in the Piagetan and post-Piagetan approaches (Rumelhart,1989; Cavallini, 1995, pp. 202 onwards.).
6
Schematism makes it possible for the images produced by the mind to be linked to one another according to their time characteristics. The schema of the “substance” concept, for example, is the “permanence in time” and the images that represent this concept cannot lack this particular time quality. The schema of the quantity concept is “succession”, and the images that represent it (the five dots in the example cited) are subjected to a time mode of this kind (ibid, p. 137).
Leaving aside Kant’s extremely detailed analysis, we can accept the hypothesis that the imagination system as a whole obeys a substantially narrative form of connection: the missing image is traced in the setting of a story. This story does not necessarily have to be typical, on the contrary – we believe –, a story that gives images a meaning obeys strict rules regarding form – such as, for example, that of “opposite platforms” (Egan, 1986) – however it does not serve to build rigid “scripts”, but rather to increase the wealth of images possessed by the mind and body of the subject, making constant references from the past to the future.
As far as the link between images belonging to different formal regimes is concerned (the affection expressed in the “voice”, the voice which is articulated in “word” and the “word” in a flowing conversation, to use Aristotle’s example), The activity supposed is that of translation. By this we do not mean an activity similar to the translation of a text from one language to another, but rather similar to the translation of a phonetic image into an iconic image or vice versa. The problem can be clarified with an empirical case. A child who watches a cycling race on a television screen, without knowing the meaning of the word runners (cyclists), will translate this word (phonetic image) into a word that he or she already knows, such as runners (corridors), and on the screen will “see” runners cycling quickly along corridors (iconic image)7. Here there is a double translation: from iconic to verbal image, from one of the same type to another and from this new verbal image to an iconic one. Quite evidently, the absent image emerges parallel to a narration in embryonic form: “there are cyclists who have tried to race along corridors” (the result of the test remains uncertain).
It is generally accepted that language, with its blend of logic, culture and experience, influences representations even at a perceptive level. In our view, it should be added that different systems of representation can be integrated, and that such integration is attributable to a process – which we define as translation – and which requires an activity that Plato called metax_ and Kant schematism. A more recent attempt to conceptualize the relationship between different physical representations can be found in L. Wittgenstein, who speaks on the subject, of “perspicuous representation” or “portrayal”, that is, of translation of an image
belonging to a system into another image not belonging to that system: a musical score, for instance, “portrays” the melody, that is: the visual image (the score) portrays the acoustic image (the melody), because there is a relationship between the individual signs and sounds of the two systems (Wittgenstein, 1922, propp. 2.1 - 2.171). The philosopher states that, in general, “the form of the portrayal is the possibility that to one another the things can be in the same relationship as the elements of the image” (ibid, prop. 2.151). In this, the translation is different from the metaphor, which links elements set arranged in different image fields (Bildfelder) but belonging to the same representative system (visual, iconic etc.)
In the context of learning theories, in conclusion, the problem of the passage from the psychological dimension governed by images to the “scientific” dimension dominated by concepts needs to be reformulated. The starting point of the question should be recognition. At a deep level, between the two dimensions, there is a bridge, the design of which can be sensed but not its establishment. A child’s mind cannot be confined to a pre-scientific limbo, and nor should it be made a sort of mysterious, magical source of knowledge. It is perhaps better to suppose that so-called child creativity indicates the presence of a complex network of semantic procedures, at the center of which we find the capacity to activate imagination processes that are at the same time rich, without any images and able to join together systems of representation of different types according to rules. A subject who learns constantly is performing translations, and the visible result of this is the image, which, however, can arise only if the process that created it and is incorporated within it, remains non-representable. The essential part of the learning process – the deep part –, therefore, cannot be observed, because it operates through processes which are neither images nor concepts. These processes, nevertheless, are the channels via which concepts can translate themselves into images and in turn these can translate into evidence of concepts; and furthermore, it is through translation procedures that the affections of the soul express themselves in semantic worlds, which are self-organized (Minichiello, 2003, pp. 15 onwards.). In every communicative event, not only the content but also a certain type of relationship is communicated between the “speakers”; similarly, in each cognitive event, not only a meaning but also a particular mysterious way of living in the world and of fulfilling its stories.
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