The Specificity and Autonomy

25

67

85

109

117

Alexandre Kojeve The

_Specificity

and

_Autonomy

of Right

Translated and with an Introduction

_by

Bryan-Paul Frost and Robert Howse

Gary

Alan Scott and An Overlooked Motive in Alcibiades' William A. Welton Symposium Speech

In Ha

_Jang

Book Reviews

Will

_Morrisey

Harry

Neumann

The Problematic Characterof

Socrates'

Defense

of Justice in Plato's Republic

Erotic Liberalism: Women and Revolution in Montesquieu'

s Persian

Letters,

_by

Diana J. Schaub

Political

_Philosophy

or Self-Knowledge? Comments on Glossarium: Aufzeichnungen

der Jahre

1947-1951,

_by

Carl

Schmitt,

and

Die Lehre Carl Schmitts: Vier Kapitel zur

Unterscheidung

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The

Problematic

Character

of

Defense

of

Justice in

Plato's Republic

In Ha Jang

University

of Toronto

Ofthe _many great _scholarly controversies _{regarding Plato's}

_Republic,

two

deserve especially tobe noted for theirinterconnection. The first controversy, started

_by

Sachs

₍₁₉₆₃₎

several decades ago and kept alive

_by

numerous re sponses since then, concerns this problem: although Glaucon and Adeimantus atthe

_beginning

ofBook Two askfor a defense ofjustice as _ordinarily under stood, Socrates responds in Book Four

_{by defending}

justice on the basis of a

definition of the justice of the individual that appears to have little link with

justice as _ordinarily understood. The other _controversy which is much older

(see,

e.g., Foster

1936)

but is still a source of_{sharp debate}

_today

deals with

Socrates'

argument in Book Seventhat it wouldbejust for thephilosophers to ruleinthebestregime even ifthis entailstheir

_having

toleadworse lives. How can Socrates hopetodefend justice in thus _pointingto a crucial instancewhere

justice seems to be at odds with happiness? It is obvious that the issues that gave riseto theseheretofore separate controversies are linked in that

_they

both bear on the question of the _adequacy of

Socrates'

defense ofjustice in the

Republic,

butthe connection between these

_issues,

in this and other important respects, hasnotbeen sufficiently explored and emphasized

_by

thosewho have participated in the controversies.1

I here seek to _remedy this situation in the course of _considering the _overarching theme of the problematic character of

Socrates'

defense ofjustice in theRepublic. In

_trying

to understand

Socrates'

view ofjusticeinthe

_Republic,

it is impor

tant forus to take account ofthe factthat he presents, throughout most ofthe work, a defense ofjustice. In Book

One,

for example,

_having

heard

_Thrasy

machus'

assertion that justice is not good at all for the one who practices it

(338c-339a,

343b-

_344c),

_{Socrates defends justice}

by

getting him to agree to the following: that justice is both virtue and wisdom; that it is stronger than

injustice;

andthatitbrings happiness (348a-354a). But it is nottoo hardtosee that

_Socrates,

in his discussion with

_{Thrasymachus,}

is not above

_defending

justice

_by

hookor

_by

crook. Thus Glaucon and Adeimantus are

_justified,

atthe

beginning

ofBook

Two,

in

_forcing

Socratestoprovide a

_truly

adequatedefense

ofjustice (357a-367e). That Socratesengages in arhetorical defense ofjustice

inBook

One,

however, serves as a clear _warningto us. There is no guarantee that the defense ofjustice that Socrates provides in the rest of the Republic is

86

notitselfrhetorical. JustasThrasymachus may betoo_easily charmed

_by

Socra

tes'

arguments, as Glaucon suggests

_(358b),

we must beware of _suffering the same fate. I arguethat

Socrates'

defense ofjustice in therest ofthe

_Republic,

designed to prove that justice is

intrinsically

good and that it is better than

injustice,

is in factproblematic. Thispaperdelineates the

_key

difficultiesofthis

defense,

to which one must _pay the utmost attention in attempting to _grasp Socrates'

view ofjustice inthe Republic.

JUSTICE IN THE SOCRATIC SENSE

Responding

to therequest ofGlaucon and Adeimantus for atrue defenseof thejusticeofthe

individual,

Socratesfirstendeavorsto

_bring

tolightthejustice

ofthe city,

for,

he says, sincethejusticeofthe _{city is bigger} and easier tosee than thejusticeofthe

individual,

it is better for thosewho cannot see_sharplyto turn to the justice of the individual after _examining the justice of the _city

(368c-369b). To facilitate the

_discovery

of the justice of the city, Socrates

outlines (through Book

_Four)

a succession of cities:

_first,

the _{city based} on needs; next, theluxurious city; and,

finally,

the _city purged ofluxuries a_city that is characterized

_by

the existence of a warrior class, the recipients of an

extensive civic or moral education (369a-427c). After

_looking

for justice in

this last city, the good or virtuous _{city (in} whichjustice is most

_likely

to be found

[420b-c, 434d-e]),

Socrates declares that thejustice ofthe _city can be defined as each of the three classes ofthe _city whether the ruling, guarding, or _wage-earning class _{minding its} own business (432d-434c).

_Then,

on the premise that thejustice of the _{city is} parallel to the justice of the

individual,

Socrates defines the justice of the individual as each of the three parts ofthe soul the rational, the spirited, and the appetitive _{minding its} own business

(442d-e,

443c-e).2

He also makes clear that thejust individual is concerned not with affairs that are external to him butwith the

_harmony

of his own soul; and that such an individual calls "just" _{any action,} whether political or other

wise, that helps produce this condition in the soul (443c-e).

_By

arguing that thejustice ofthe individual asdefined in this _{way is} analogous to thehealthof

the

_body,

_{moreover, Socrates ultimately leads us to draw the conclusion} that

justice is

_{intrinsically}

good because it is a kind of health of the soul

(444d-445b).

Unfortunately, however,

there are difficulties with

Socrates'

definition of the justice of the

_individual,

on which his argument in favor of the intrinsic

goodness ofjustice relies. In the first _place, while _according to this definition

the just man is concerned with the

_harmony

of his own soul or with his own

good, thejustman is_ordinarilythoughtof as

_being

_{eminentlydevoted}to others ortothe commongood.3

Furthermore,

_accordingto this

_definition,

thejustman

Defense of Justice

thisdefinition has the

_troubling

_{implication that,} atleast inprinciple, an action thatis _ordinarilyconsideredunjust couldbe just (andviceversa). Italsohasthe

surprising result that an action that is not even in the realm of justice and

injustice for

_instance,

the act of_{engaging in}mathematical studies could, in principle, bejustor unjust. These difficulties castdoubton

Socrates'

assurance that the justice of the individual as embodied in his definition would be per

fectly

in

_keeping

with the _ordinary standards of

_justice,

that

_is,

his assurance that the just man who allows each of the parts of his soul to mind its own

business would not _{steal, cheat,} dishonor his parents, and so on (442e-443b. Cf. Sachs

1963,

p.

_154;

Weingartner

1964-65,

p.

_250;

Mabbot

_1971,

p.

_58;

and

Waterlow

_1972-73,

p. 24).

Socrates'

definition ofthejustice ofthe

_individual,

for

allthese reasons, isparadoxical andhas littlerelationtojusticeas_ordinarilyunder stood. It contrasts with the more commonsensical definitions ofjustice offered in Book

_One,

for example,justice as_{giving back} what onetakes and

_telling

the truth

(331b-c;

cf. Demos

1964,

p. 395). We have to wonder then whether

Socrates'

definition of the justice of the individual in Book Four is not _arbitrary, a mere

invention ofhis mind. Ifit is arbitrary,

Socrates'

defense of

_justice,

to the extent thatit relies on such an _arbitrary

_definition,

would not beadequate.4

As noted, this definition is based on the existence of a strict parallelism

between the justice of the _city and the justice of the individual

_(368e-369a,

434d-435a, 441d-e,

442d-443c). Butthe questionable characterofthis prem ise is _ultimately acknowledged

_by

Socrates himself: while he tries to support the existence of such a parallelism through _making the

_lengthy

argument that the soul, like the city, has three parts, Socrates reveals _{precisely in} the con text of _elaborating on the justice of the individual that there _{may be} more than threeparts ofthesoul

(435b-441c,

443d-e;

cf. Cross and

_Woozley

1964,

p. 113). In opposition to the above premise, moreover, we can point out that

justice sometimes demands much more from individuals than fromcities. Dur

ing

times ofwar, for

instance,

individuals are often askedtosacrificetheirlives

on behalf of

_justice;

but cities are seldom, if ever, asked to sacrifice their existence on behalf ofjustice. It is also worth _observing that Socrates is not

completely successful at _{giving definitions} of justice that would lead one to

believe

_firmly

in the existence of a strict parallelism betweenthejustice ofthe

city and thejustice ofthe individual.

_First,

his definition of thejustice of the

city as each ofthe threeclasses ofthecity's_mindingitsownbusiness isconsis tent with rule

_by

merit and absolutededication to the city, which are ordinarily

believedtobe just(420b-421c). Hence it is not as paradoxical ashis definition ofthejustice ofthe individual as each ofthe three parts ofthe soul's _minding

itsownbusiness (cf. Vlastos

1981,

pp. _115-17, 119). Second, hisdefinitionof

thejustice ofthe _{city does} not _necessarily rule out thepotential lack ofhappi

Despite the questionable character of the argument that results in Socrates'

definition of the justice of the

individual,

it is possible that this

_definition,

taken

_by

itself,

could becorrect. Yet, as _{noted, there} are difficulties connected

withthisdefinition considered

_by

itself,

such asthat_according tothisdefinition

thejust man is exclusivelyconcerned with his own good. Thisparticular aspect of the

definition,

though, appears to receive somejustification from Socrates' analysis of the justice of the _{city (as discovered in} a good or virtuous city).

While Socrates' definition of the justice of the city does not take account of

foreign affairs, it is in

keeping

with the good or virtuous city's

_looking

exclu

sively to its own advantage.

_Indeed,

Socrates indicates that such a _city takes care ofits owngoodin alessthanscrupulous way: inorderto preserve

_itself,

it

promotes something likecivil warinothercities (422a-423c). Ifeven the good

or virtuous _{city is} guided _only

_by

its own good, the question arises whether there is not some justification for

_describing

thejust individual as one who is

concerned _solely with his own good. Itcan be retorted,

however,

that the fact

that the good _{city is} concerned _merely with its own good is problematic from

the pointofview ofjustice. That

_is,

one could excuse thegood _{city for}pursu

ing

its own good even to the detriment of other cities insofar as it must preserve

_itself,

but one could _not, at the same time, call such a _{city positively}

just,

at least with respect to other cities. (Of course, it would be difficult to excuse the good _{city if it had} an expansionist _{foreign policy} that is geared toward neither _security nor inner

_harmony.)

This means that the _{way in}which the good or virtuous _{city behaves} toward other cities can

_hardly

be used to

justify

similar actions on the part of the

_individual,

at least if he is to be re

garded as_positivelyjust inregard toother individuals.

The paradoxical character of the justice of the individual in the Socratic

sense is underscored

_by

the factthat the most important members ofthe good andjust city, as described from Book Two through Book

_Four,

do not neces

sarily possess suchjustice. Socrates does givethe impression at one pointthat

both the guardians and therulers ofthis_city would be able, through the sort of

education

_they

receive, to acquire the justice of the individual as

_harmony

of the soul (441e-442a). Yet he delineates the

_following

two ingredients of such

justice,

which neither the guardians nor the rulers would possess: the wisdom

ofthe individualthatconsists inthe knowledgeof what is beneficial foreach of the three parts ofthe soul aswell as forthesoul as a whole

_{(442c, 443e-444a);}

and, the ruleinthe soul ofthe _reasoningpartthat provides "speeches" that

is,

reasoned arguments asto what is

_truly

to be feared and is capable of_making one wise as an individual (442c). Instead of

_being

guided

_by

the "speeches" about what is to be

_feared,

the guardians _rely on the "lawful opinion"

as to whatis terrible and whatis not(429a-430c). The_{rulers, moreover,} are wisein

the sense of

_knowing

how the _city as a whole woi'^ _{best deal}

with itself and

Defense of Justice

in the knowledge of what is good for the individual soul.

_Indeed,

_they

are

chosen toberulers _{only if}

_they

have love forthe_cityas well asthe_accompany

ing

convictionthatone mustdowhatis best forthe_{city (412c-d). Yet Socrates}

reveals that this conviction is not _{simply true,} at least insofar as it is meant to

be in

_keeping

with the assumption that a man would _{"love something} most when he believed that the same things are advantageous to it and to

_himself,

and when he supposed that if it did well, he too himselfwould do well _along

with

_it,

and if it

didn't,

neither would he"

_{(412d), for,}

in response to Adei

mantus'

objection thathe _{is making}thosewho governthe _cityunhappy, Socra

tes arguesthatwhatis best forthe _cityneednotbe consistent_{in every}case with

theindividual good

_(420b-c;

cf.

_465e-466c,

519e-520a).

While

_they

are not just in the Socratic sense,

however,

the guardians and

rulers would be regarded as just inthe _ordinary sense.5

They

certainly contrib uteto thejustice ofthe_cityunderstood as each oftheclasses

_doing

itsownjob and are devoted otherwise to the good ofthe city. For

_they

would send even theirown children to a lower class to ensure rule

_by

merit, and, in

having

no privacy and no more _property than what is needed,

they

would remain guard

ians and rulers instead of

_becoming

money-makers and hence would preserve the _{city (414d-417b). In}

_being

dedicated in these ways to the _city and its

justice,

moreover,

they

would, from the perspective of ordinary,

_justice,

be

considered to be just as individuals. But Socrates indicates that

_they

are far

from

_being

just on _purely rational grounds: their justice is dependent on the noble lie as well as on the institutional arrangements _{concerning privacy} and propertythatare forced upon them (414d-417b). _{(So too,} while

_defending

the

city would not _{only be} an act of courage but also to some extent an act of

justice [see

_332e],

the guardians would defend the _city on the _{basis only} of

lawful opinion

_[429a-430c]

. And the rulers would do what is best for the city

and hence be just inthe _ordinary sense as a result of a mere conviction, whose

truth is not beyond dispute

[412c-d].)

Socrates,

of course, never speaks

the-matically aboutjustice in outlining the official discussion ofthe education for

therulers andguardians, for he doesnot wanttospeak abouttheireducationto

justice before

_discovering

what the truth about justice

is,

even if this means

refraining fromcriticizingcertaintraditional viewsonjusticethatcastdoubt on

its goodness (392a-b).

_Thus,

_contrary to the expectation that he raises at the

outset, his discussion of their education does not contribute, in any obvious

fashion,

to an understanding ofjustice (376c-d). After his discussion of their official education, however, he

indicates,

in various _ways, that the sort ofjus

tice that

_they

would acquire wouldbe less than

fully

rational. Thequestion that

Socratesappears topose therefore is this: _{Can ordinary justice} reston a_strictly

rational foundation,just asjustice in the Socratic sense _{surely does?}

The definition ofthejustice ofthe individual in Book

Four,

as analyzed in the foregoing, must alsobe considered inthe lightof what occurs inthe rest of

Socratesattempts, atthe end ofBook

Four,

to turn toadiscussionofthe forms

of vice (445c-e).

Yet,

at the

_beginning

of Book

Five,

he is asked

_by

Adei

mantusto delve into theproposalfor thecommunity ofwomen and _children, a

proposal that he had mentioned without _{any discussion in}

founding

his good

city (449c. 423e-424a). Hence he is

induced,

in the first place, to outline the arrangement _concerning the equality ofthe sexes (which is in

_keeping

with the

community of women and men in education) and to show its _possibility and

goodness (451d-457c). He then is led to indicate the character ofthe commu nity of women and children as well as its goodness (457c-466d). Asked to showthepossibilityofthe_communityof womenandchildren,

however,

Socra

tes introduces the proposal for the philosopher-kings, the greatest ofthe three

waves (471c-473e). This hastheresult, as Glauconpoints out, thatfromBook Five through Book Seven Socrates brings to light a _{finer city} and individual

than he hadearlierdone (543c-544a).

Now,

Socrates andGlauconagree, atthe endofBook

Seven,

that itis plain who thisfiner individual is (541b). It issafe to _say that _they have in mindthe philosopher: the philosopher, after all, isthe

individual who is parallel to the _city ruled

_by

philosophers. Socrates confirms this when he turns to an analysis ofthe defective regimes and individuals in Book Eight. He there identifies the "good andjust

man"

with the fatherofthe timocratic man; and this man is almost a caricature of Socrates himself

(544e,

549c-550b;

cf.

_Nettleship

_1925,

p.

305;

Bloom

1968,

p. 420).

_By

_calling the philosopher good and

just,

then, Socrates puts forward theequation ofthejust man and the philosopher. He makes this equation quite explicit in

_trying

to

prove that justice is better than injustice in Book

Nine,

for he employs the

argument that _tyranny, that

_is,

injustice par _excellence, is inferior to justice because the pleasures ofthe philosopher arebetterand more realthan theplea sures of the tyrant (580d-587e). This is a crucial development in Socrates'

argument, _especially sincethe equation ofthejust man and the philosopher is from the _ordinary perspective rathersuspect (see 473e-474aand 487b-d).

In the light of this

_development,

we must ask, What is the status of the

definition of the justice of the individual as provided in Book Four? The ac

count ofthe soul on whichthis _{definition is based certainly} goesthrough some revision

_by

the end ofBook Nine: while still _maintaining the existence ofthe threeparts ofthe soul, Socratesrevealsthat therational and spirited parts ofthe soul have desiresand pleasures oftheirown

_(580d-583a;

cf. 435e-441c).6But thedefinition ofthejusticeofthe individual givenin Book Fouralsoundergoes

some modification.

_Socrates,

atthe end ofBook

_Nine,

modifies that definition

by

makingclearthat thephilosopher isjustin thesense outlined in Book Four.

Speaking

of the just man who would rule in the best regime that

_is,

the philosopher Socrates says, interms thathark backto his statements_regarding thejust man in Book

_Four,

that such a man is concerned with the

_harmony

of

his own soul and does _everythingwith a view to

_bringing

about such

_harmony

(591c-592b;

cf.

_549c-550b,

496d).7 _{This turn in the argument}

Defense of Justice

wholly surprising, for thejust man in Book Fouris describedas

_being

ruled

_by

reasonand abletoact on thebasisof wisdom_regarding whatis best for hissoul as a whole (443c-444a). Thus he is aharbingerof_{the philosopher,} who seeks,

ifnot possesses, the knowledge ofthe good

_(504a-521b;

cf. Strauss

1964,

p.

109;

Kraut

_1973b,

p. 214).

_But,

insofar as thephilosopher is just in the sense outlined in Book

_Four,

the equation of the just man and the philosopher is problematic for the same reasons that the definition ofjustice in Book Four is problematic. To begin_{with, the} philosopher does not act_{wholly in} accordance

with _ordinarystandards of

_justice;

_{his activity}of_thinking, for

_instance,

requires thathe question the _authority oflaw (consider in this regard Socrates' discus sion of dialectics [537e-539a]).

_Furthermore,

he spends a substantial amount ofhis time in activities that appear to have _{very little} connection with justice (such as

_{investigating}

whatnature

_is)

. Butthemain

difficulty

is thatthephilos

opher would be concerned _exclusively withhis own good,

for,

in

_being

just in

the sensedescribed in Book

Four,

he _{does everything for} the sake ofthe har mony orhealth ofhis own soul.

Fromthepoint of view of_ordinary

_justice,

_contributingto thegood of others

ifand_only ifitis conducivetoone's own good wouldbe questionable. Butthe possible coincidence between what one does _{in pursuing} one's own good and what is good for others is critical in terms of_establishing at least some link

betweenjustice in the Socratic sense andjustice as _ordinarily understood. Soc

rates points to the existence of such a coincidence _{precisely in} the context of

making clear, at the end of Book

Nine,

that the philosopher is just in the

Socratic sense. Inresponse toGlaucon's statement that the man who is just in

the sense of_pursuing a

_healthy

soul would not mind the political things, Soc

rates declares that such a man that

_is,

the philosopher would mind the po

litical things at least in the best regime (592a-b).8

_{Unfortunately,}

that the philosopher would rulein no other_city suggests the remoteness, atleaston the political

_level,

of the _possibility of a coincidence between the good of the

individualwho is just in theSocratic sense andthe good of_others,

_for,

accord

ing

to

_Socrates,

it is _very

_difficult,

though not

_impossible,

for the bestregime to come into

_being

(499b-d,

502c,

540d). It should be noted, moreover, that

Socrates saysthat_ultimately itdoes notmatter whethertheregime inwhich the philosophers rule is or will be somewhere, for the best regime that exists in

speechescanserve as a vehiclefor individualreform

_{by being}

apattern"forthe man who wants to see and found a_city within himselfon the basisofwhat he

sees"

(592b). _{At any} rate, Socrates provides an extendedargument in favorof the _possibility of philosophic rule in his discussion from Book Five through

Book Seven. Hence an examination of this discussion will

_help

us to see whetherthere can _{really be any} coincidence on the political level between the good ofthe individual whois just in theSocratic sense and the goodofothers. In another respect, too, this discussion will shed light on the precise relation

justice as _ordinarilyunderstood: while

_being

silent aboutthe philosopher's be

ing

just in sensedescribed in Book

Four,

Socratesthere speaksexplicitlyofthe

way in which the philosophers can be said tobe just in the _ordinary sense.

THE PHILOSOPHER-KINGS AND JUSTICE IN THE SOCRATIC SENSE

In Book

_Five,

Socrates puts forward the proposal for the philosopher-kings as the single _necessary and sufficient condition for the transformation of an

ordinary city into the best regime

_(473b-e;

cf. Strauss

1964,

pp.

_{118, 122,}

126). In

_defending

this proposal against Glaucon's vehement_objection, Socra

tes tries to show, amongother _things, that "it is

_by

nature

_fitting

for [philoso

phers] both to engage in philosophy and to lead a city, and for the rest not to engage in _philosophy and to follow the leader"

(473e-474a,

474b-c). Accord

ing

to

Socrates,

the philosophers are fit to rule forthe

_following

reasons:

_they

would be best able to guard, as well as to give, the laws of the _{city because}

they

are superior

_{intellectually}

(due to their

_being

able alone tocomprehendthe

ideas);

and

_they

are neither

_lacking

in experience nor inferior in the rest of virtue

_(484b-c,

484d). After

_listing

a number of the philosopher's virtues, moreover, Socratesmakes clearthat there is no_{way in} which"the orderlyman, who isn't a lover of money, or

_illiberal,

or a

boaster,

or a coward, could

become a hard-bargainer or

unjust,"

and hence that, starting from youth, a

philosophic soul would be both just and gentle (486b).

Thus,

while he ismore

orless silent about the philosopher's

_being

just in the sense describedin Book

Four,

Socrates here argues that the philosopher is qualified to rule in part be causeheis just inthe _ordinarysense. It isworthnoting,

however,

that Socrates hints atthefactthat the philosopherwouldbe just in this sense _{simply because}

he lacks interest in those things that _{ordinarily lead} to injustice. As Socrates

suggests, the philosopher is concerned not with the pleasures of the

_body

but with thoseofthesoul.

_And,

"when someone's _{desires incline strongly} to some one_thing,

_they

are therefore weakerwith respect to the rest, likea streamthat

has been channeled off in that other

direction"

(485d;

cf. Kraut

_1973b,

pp.

214-15;

Mara

1983,

p. 601). _{At anyrate,} ifthephilosophers are fittorulefor

the reasons that Socrates mentions,

they

wouldhave the _capacity to be just in

the broad sense of

_being

able toprovide forthe common good.

Expressing

a _{strong doubt} as to the justice of _{the philosophers,}

however,

philoso-Defense of Justice

phers must be placed on those who do not make use of them: "For it's not

natural that a pilot

_beg

sailors to be ruled

_by

him nor that the wise go to the

doorsoftherich"

(489b). As forAdeimantus'

chargethat the philosophers are vicious, Socrates offers the countercharge that potential philosophers are cor

rupted

_by

the _city

_itself,

which is the true sophist (489d-495c).

_Having

done

so, hepoints outthat thephilosophers'

reputationforviciousness is due merely to the pretenders to _{philosophy (495c-496a).}

_Returning

to the theme of the

uselessness of _{the philosophers,} he then makes the

_following

argument: the

philosophercannot _safely come to theaid ofjustice _{in ordinary} cities and be

useful in this _way given the savageness present within those cities; hence he is forced to mind his own business instead of _{participating in} politics in a

substantial _{way (496a-e). To this, Glaucon}replies that the philosopherwould

still leave his life here

_"having

accomplished not the least of

things"

(497a). But Socrates remarks in turn thathe would not accomplish "the greatest either

if he didn'tchance upon a suitableregime. Forinasuitable onehehimselfwill grow more and save thecommon things _along with theprivate"

(497a). To the extent that _saving the common things _along with the private is tantamount to

justice,

Socrates here asserts that justice is the greatest ofthings _something which, under the rightcircumstances, the philosophers would be able to come to the aid of.

_Furthermore,

Socrates indicates thatjustice is beneficial for the philosophersthemselves in

_implying

that

_they

would"growmore"

in savingthe common things _along with theprivate.

Socrates'

overall argument in defense of the proposal for the

philosopher-kings,

as outlinedinthe

_foregoing,

is open toa numberof questions. The first

question has to do with Socrates' view as to the right conditions under which

thephilosophers would rule. In thepassage where he speaks aboutthe greatest ofthings, Socrates describes the

philosophers'

simply coming upon a suitable

regime inwhich

_they

would rule

(497a;

cf. 497b-c). But he first indicatedthat therule of philosophers is the single _necessary and sufficient condition for the transformationof an _{ordinarycity into}thebestregime(473b-473e). Hence itis

not clearthat the right conditions under whichthe philosophers would rule will

bepresent without_any action onthepart ofthephilosophers themselves. Inthis

connection, it isworth _callingattention to the _{fact that,} whilehe

_initially

points

to the need for a coincidence of_philosophy and political power _(473c-d; cf.

592a),

Socrates also assertsthatsome sortof_necessity (togetherwithchance) is required: _{"neither city} norregime will everbecomeperfect, nor yet willa man

become perfect in the same _way either, before some _necessity chances to con

strain those few philosophers who aren't vicious, those now called useless, to take charge of acity, whether

_they

wanttoor_not, andthe_cityto

obey"

(499b-c, myemphasis; see also499c-d and 500d). But itremains to beseen whether

suchnecessity, which wouldhavetoovercomethegreat obstaclesto thephilos

ophers'

being

useful (and hence

being

positively

just)

inordinary cities, would

necessity for the philosophers to lead a city "whether

they

want to or

not,"

Socrates raises the

_difficulty

that the philosophers _may not, for reasons yet to

be made

_fully

clear, willingly undertake the transformation of an _{ordinary city}

into the best regime. But he also leaves the impression that the philosophers

would _ultimately welcome such a transformation

_by

_pointing to the view that

they

will become

"perfect"

only

by

becoming

rulers. Unless the best regime is

possible, though, such perfection (not to mention the growth of the philoso phers that Socrates mentions at

_497a)

would be imaginary.

Even ifthe best regime is possible to this issue I will return a bit later

Socratesreveals thatthe willingness ofthe philosophers to rule (and hencealso their willingness to come to the aid ofjustice in the _{ordinary sense)} in an already existing best regime is not as certain as he first suggests. In Book

Seven,

Socrates says that the philosophers ought not to be allowed to pursue

philosophy uninterruptedlyto the endbutthat

_they

musttake turns _{in ruling}the

city (519b521b). To this, Glaucon asks whether

_they

are not

_doing

an injus

tice to them _{in making}themlivea worselife when abetter is possibleforthem

(519b-d). While not _{contradicting Glaucon's} assertion that the philosophers

would lead worse lives (White

_1986,

p.

_27),

Socrates first reminds him ofthe

factthat the concern oflawis notto

_bring

aboutthe_well-being of_anyone class

inthe _{city but}the _well-beingofthe_city as awhole(519e-520a). Socrates then states that

_they

will not in fact be

_doing

injustice to the philosophers and that

they

will _{say just}things to them while _compellingthemin additiontorule and share in the labors of the _{city (520a).}

_They

will _say that when philosophers come into

_being

_{in ordinary} cities it would be

_fitting

for them notto share in

the labors ofthose cities: "For

_they

grow _{up spontaneously} against the will of theregime ineach; and a naturethat grows

_by

itselfanddoesn'towe its rearing to anyone has justice on its side when it is not eager to _pay off the price of

rearing to

anyone"

(520a-b). But Socrates asserts that

_they

would owe some

thing

to the best regime, which is responsible for their _receiving a superior education and rearing, and hence that it wouldbe a matter ofjustice that

_they

rule. Socrates still _maintains,

_however,

that

_they

must be compelled to rule

(520b-521b).9

Therefore he points out that the simple appeal tojustice is not enough to get the philosophers to act in accordance withjustice. The philoso

phers, in Socrates'

account, would indeed be _unwillingly just. It is true that,

when Socrates asks whether the philosophers would

_disobey

the command to rule, Glaucon replies that this is impossible since

_they

would be

_"laying

just

injunctions on just men"

(520e),

but,

having

noticed Socrates' stress on the need for compulsion in this case, Glaucon _quickly adds that

_they

would still

regard _ruling as a_necessary

_thing

_(520e).

Now,

Socrates says that the potential philosophers must also be compelled

to pursue the _study ofthe Idea ofthe Good

_{(515c-516c, 519c-d),}

and, since the compulsion usedinthiscase is_something thatis _ultimately desirable asit

Defense of Justice

tempted to believe that the compulsion for the philosophers to rule could also

be desirable in the end (cf. Kraut

_1973a,

p.

_342;

Hall

1977,

p. 302). But the

compulsion to rule is not declared to lead to a positive good at all. Indeed Socrates'

paradoxical argument is that the philosophers are fit to rule_precisely

because due to their belief that _{ruling is} not some great _good,

_they

are least

eager to rule and have the most contempt for the political life

_(520d,

520e-521b, 500b-c;

cf.

_540d-e;

cf. Aronson

1972,

p. 393).

Thus,

accordingto this

argument, ifthephilosophers ever come toregard_ruling as a positive good, as

doall others whoengage in politics,

they

would no longer be considered as fit torule. Itis significantthat Socrates suggests thatcompulsion would beneeded

precisely

by

thosewho are guided

_by

the_studyofthegood whichhe callsthe greatest_study

_(503e-506a)

ratherthan

_by

thosewho are guided

_by

some sort ofconvictionor

_by

lawful opinions. The

philosophers'

keen sense oftheirown

good as separate fromthegood ofthe_{city is} responsiblefortheir_needingtobe

compelledtorule. (For the philosophers,_ruling wouldbe different from engag

ing

in thegreatest studies inthat the

_latter,

unlikethe

_former,

would_ultimately

lose its compulsory character, for once one becomes aware that _{something is} good, one would _{automatically} pursue

_it.)

Socrates'

reference, at the end of

Book

_Seven,

to the

philosophers'

actingon the basisofthe view thatjustice is

the "greatest and the most

necessary"

thing, then, has to be understood in a certain _way

(540e;

cf. 497a).

_They

would regard justice in this _{way only in} connection withtheir_{ruling (540d-e).}

_They

would not considerit asthe great est andmost _necessary simply.10

As noted, ifthephilosophers must becompelled torulebecause

_they

do not regard _ruling as a positive good, then

_they

would _{be unwillingly just.}

_They

would _{surely be unwillingly just in}regard tojustice understood as _giving what is owed. But

_they

would be unwillingly just in a more _{fundamental way be} causeruling, atleast whenit is gearedtoward thecommongood, could encom pass greater acts ofjustice than _{merely giving} what is owed. This is all the more

_distressing

because Socrates' argument is that the philosophers have the greatest _capacitytobe just (inthe _ordinary sense) through ruling.

_{Indeed, they}

wouldbe especially fit for rulebecause

_they

possess the knowledgeof what is goodforhuman beings

(503e-506a;

cf. 520c). Stillmore

_disquieting

isthe fact that, for

_Socrates,

the philosophers have the greatest latitude to be just in the

bestregime. There

_they

no longer havethe excuse ofthe obstacles ofordinary

political life that prevent them _{from ruling} and _coming to the aid of justice.

This suggests that it is politics as such (rather than _{merely unhealthy} politics) that is questionable for them. Even the sort ofpolitics as practiced

_by

the best

regime which aimsto be as rational as possible is questionable for the phi

losophers. The philosophers thus can

_hardly

be understood to be paragons of

justice,

at least understood in the _ordinary sense. But there is no reason _why

they

would notbe just inthe Socraticsense (cf. Foster

1936,

pp.

303-4;

White

1986,

pp. 27-31). In

fact,

it is precisely their concern withjustice in the

So-cratic sensethatwould leadthem tobe lessthan

_fully

just in the_ordinary sense.

This, I believe, points _powerfullyto the problematic character ofjustice in the

Socratic sense as practiced

_by

thephilosophers. Thetension_{between ruling}and philosophy, we note, undercuts the

_following

suggestions made

_by

Socrates in

the course of

_defending

the proposal forthe philosopher-kings: that itisnatural

for philosophers both to philosophize and to lead a _city

_(474b-c);

that the

philosophers would"grow

more"

inthe bestregime

_(497a);

andthat

_they

would

become"perfect"

in

_becoming

rulers (499b-c).

At this point, we can return to the question of the _possibility of the best regime. An answerto thisquestion would

_decide,

_amongother_things, whether the philosophers would evenhave the opportunity to reveal that

_they

would be unwillinglyjust when _they have the greatest latitude to be just.

_According

to

Socrates,

philosophic rule is the single _necessary and sufficient condition for transformation ofan _{ordinary city into} the best regime

_{(473b-e), but,}

_evading

theissue ofwhat _{is really involved in}such atransformation, Socrates atvarious

times speaks as if the best regime _already exists, without _{explaining how} this

regime comes into

_being

(497a,

502c-d,

519b-521b). He in fact

implicitly

indicates that the kind oftransformation required for the best regime to come

into

_being

is impossible. To begin with,

having

heard

Adeimantus'

statement

that perhaps the _many will become less angry after

_hearing

truthful arguments

in favorofphilosophicrule, Socrates rests satisfied withthe mereassertion that

they

would indeed be completely persuaded (502a).

_Furthermore,

he reveals that, in orderforthebestregimeto come into

_being,

thephilosophers willhave to exile all those over the age of ten from an _{ordinary city} that

_they

want to transform (540e-541a). It would be difficult to find greater evidence of the

impossibility

of the best regime than this: there _{is obviously} no _possibility of

persuading the manyto leavethe city, andno _{army loyal}tothe philosophersis available to _carry out a forcible expulsion ofthem (cf. Strauss

1964,

p. 126). An equally massive _obstacle,

_however,

is that the philosophers _would, in the

final analysis, refrain from undertaking the transformation of an _{ordinary city}

intothebestregime dueto theirlackof_{desire for ruling (519b-521b).}

Besides,

ifthe philosophers do not owe _anything to _ordinary cities

_(520a-b),

then _they would even have justice (though in anarrow_sense) ontheir sideinnotendeav oring to achieve such atransformation. There

_is,

in short, no

"necessity"

that, accordingto

_Socrates,

wouldlead tothe transformationof an _{ordinary city into}

the best regime

(499b-c, 499c-d,

500d). Ifthe best regime

_is,

forthe above

reasons,

impossible,

one could doubtthe truth of

Socrates'

assertionthatphilo

sophic rule is natural

_(474b-c),

for how can _{anything impossible be} natural?

Moreover,

one can _say that the philosophers are not required

_by

justice (in a

broader sense than _{merely repaying} what one _{owes) to}

_try

to transform an

Defense of Justice

Now,

Socrates speaks about the philosopher's desire to release some from

the confines ofthe cave

_(515c-516a),

and this raises the question whether the philosophers'

interest _{in providing} a philosophic education does not furnish them with an incentive to rule in the best regime (cf. Kraut

1973b,

p.

_223;

Cooper

_1977,

p. 156). For

Socrates,

ofcourse, thereis no_possibilityof provid

ing

the _city as a whole with a philosophic education, as the

_truly

philosophic

natures to which such an education _{is properly directed} are few (503b-d). In

keeping

with _this, Socrates makes clear that political _society as such is a kind

of a cave, and hence that even the best regime as ruled

_by

philosophers, in contrast to the best

_individual,

cannot be

_fully

rational (514a-521b). (It is

worth _{noting here that, in} his account of the virtues in Book

Four,

Socrates indicates that the education to civic virtue as opposed to education to virtue simply,whichis gearedtowardindividuals asindividuals is not_entirelyratio

nal

_{[427e-434c, 441c-444a].)}

But there is a philosophic education provided

for the rulers ofthe bestregime.

Socrates'

proposal for _{the philosopher-kings,}

whichis aimed_partly at _ameliorating the tension that _ordinarily existsbetween

philosophy and the _city as a whole

_(490e-493d,

496a-e),

dictates that the _city

itselfshould _supply its potential rulers with an education to _philosophy whose coreis dialectics (502e-540e). Thequestion, then, is whetherthis aspect ofthe

best regime does not offer a sufficient incentive for the philosophers to rule willingly.

_{By indicating}

that thephilosophersmustbe compelledtorule inspite of this aspect of the best regime, Socrates gives a negative answer to this question. Forthe philosophers, the unwelcome burden of_ruling which, even in the best regime, is aimed at_many things other than

_fostering

a philosophic

education (and hence for this reason, among others, has the character of a

drudgery)

far outweighs whatever attraction the _possibility of _providing a philosophic education in the bestregime has.

Socrates also indicates that the sort of education provided for the rulers in

the best regime is problematic from the perspective of what is required for a

strictly philosophic education. He

_initially

says that the kind of _study that is

suitableforthepotential philosopher-kings mustbegood_{equally for}turningthe soulto

_being,

that

_is,

forphilosophy, as forwar_(521d),

_but,

when, inregardto astronomy, Glaucon says thatabetterknowledge ofseasons, months and years

is appropriate not _{only for}

_farming

and navigation but also for generalship,

Socrates rebukes him

_by

saying thathe seems like a man who is fearfulofthe

many in not _wishing to appear to demand useless studies. He then points out

thegreatbenefitofastronomy inthepursuit ofthetruth, of whichthe many are

wholly unaware

(527d-528a)."

By

thus _revealing theexistence ofa great gulf

between the sort ofeducation required forphilosophy and the sort required for

ruling, Socrates pointsto the viewthat _anyattempt at an assimilationofthe two ways oflife is doomed to fail. In the light of all this, it may be

reasonable to

privately in ordinarycities, where _they donothaveto rule. This concern ofthe

philosophers to provide a philosophic education, moreover, must be taken into

account in

_determining

whetherjustice inthe Socratic sense,as practiced

_by

the philosophers, has any connection with justice as _ordinarily understood. If the

bestregimeis

impossible,

then a coincidencebetweenthe goodofthe one who

is just in the Socratic sense and the good ofothers cannotexist on the political

level. But the

philosophers'

interest in providing a philosophic education to potentialphilosophers in ordinary cities suggests the_possibility of such a coin

cidence's _existing at _{least among} a small circleon the private level (cf. 496a-e).

Certainly,

there is room for optimism with respect to this _possibility

because knowledge is the kind ofgoodthat can be shared without thecompro mise of _any person's own good.

_Still,

it is far fromclear whetherthis coinci

dence that takes place in private, and for the _very

few,

is sufficient either to

justify

Socrates' identificationofthejustman andthe philosopher ortoprovide a _{strong link between justice}as_ordinarilyunderstood andjustice in theSocratic sense.

In this connection, it is worth _{noting that, from} the point of view of the requirements of aphilosophic _education,

_democracy

_{may be} moresuitable than one is first led to believe. To be sure, Socrates argues that

_democracy

_{is op} posed to what

_he,

_along with the others, solemnly said in

_founding

the best

regime: "that unless a man has a transcendent nature he would never become

good if from earliest childhood _{his play isn't} noble and all his practices aren't

such"

(558b). But one cannot overlook his suggestion that the individual who

has a "transcendent nature"

need not be adversely affected

_by

the lack of a good education in a

_democracy,

and, since his reference to such an individual

brings to mind his description ofthe philosopher as one who comes into

_being

spontaneously against the will ofbad regimes and whohas anature that grows

by

itselfanddoesnotowe_{its nurturing}toanyone

_(520b),

it ispossibletoargue that for Socrates those who possess

_truly

philosophic natures would notregard

democracy

as agreat impedimentto their education. We observe that Socrates

also

_implicitly

indicates that philosophers _{may look}

_favorably

upon

_democracy

at least to the extent _that, unlike the best regime, it does not compel to rule

eventhosewho are fittorule

_(557e;

Strauss

1964,

p. 131). Ofcourse,Socrates also saysthat

_democracy

isa regimethat"dispenses a certain_equalitytoequals

and unequals

alike"

(558c,

cf. 557a). This means, among other things, that

democratic justice is defective because it does not take account of the differ

ences _{among human beings} that are relevant to the question of who ought to rule (cf. Foster

_1950-51,

p.

_{209), but,}

insofar as he does not wish to rule, the philosopher_may not be too perturbed

_by

this defect of

_democracy,

atleast as faras

hisown interestisconcerned.

_This,

_however,

would give usfurtherreasontowonder

Defense of Justice

THE RHETORICAL ADVANTAGES OF JUSTICE IN THE SOCRATIC SENSE

Giventheproblems connected withjusticeintheSocratic sense(as practiced

by

the philosophers), we are led toask _{why Socrates introduces} suchjustice at all. In order to answer this question, we must begin

_by

_re-examining the

_key

passage _concerning the

philosophers'

returnto the cave. There

_Socrates,

while

being

silent aboutjustice in the Socratic sense, speaks ofjustice as _ordinarily

understood:

_first,

_by

_{mentioning justice} as _{paying back} what oneowes, which

recalls

Cephalus'

definition of justice in Book One (cf. 520b and

_331b-d);

second,

by

making the argument (forthe third time in the

_Republic)

that it is

not the concern of law to

_bring

about the _well-being of _any one class but the

well-being of the _city as a whole, an argument which points to the _ordinary

understanding ofjustice as devotion to the common good

_(420b-421c,

465e-466c,

519e-520a). Socrates first introducedthis argumentin response to Adei

mantus'

question whether he is not _making the guardians (who are to have no

privacy and no more _property than what is needed if

_they

are to remain a part ofthe guardianclass) unhappy (419a-421c). Andthis argumenthasthecrucial

implication that the definition of the justice of the _city as each of the three classes'

minding itsown businessis not_{necessarily in}

_keeping

withthe good of

every individual. Socrates is now _suggesting that happiness conceived not in

any childish _{way (the} sort of happiness the guardians run the risk of_pursuing

[466b])

butgenuine happiness as experienced

_by

the philosophersmust be sac

rificed to the demands of suchjustice (cf. Aronson

1972,

p.

393;

Foster

1936,

pp. 301-4). The call for some sort of sacrifice, ofcourse, is in

keeping

with the _{ordinary understanding} ofjustice. Yet the problem is that justice is also

ordinarily identified withthe good _somethingthat puts the _stampof approval

on the enterprise ofthe Republic as a whole, which is nothing so much as an

attempt to show thatjustice is indeed goodforoneself. There

is,

itappears, an

inner

_difficulty

with

justice,

a

_difficulty

thatis reflected in the curiousfact that

forcing

thephilosophersto ruleis viewed

_by

_Socrates,

on the one

_hand,

asjust and

_by

_Glaucon,

on the other, as unjust.

It is true that Socrates attempts in theRepublic to found aregime that is in

keeping

with a true or complete common good, which would encompass the

individual good without difficulty. In particular, the proposal for the commu nity of women and children is intended to eliminate the tension between the

individual and the common good. The aim of this proposal, after all, is to createthe greatest_unity possible within a city, thesort of_{unity usually} associ

atedwith an individual human

being,

inwhom thepleasures and pains that are experienced

_by

a part are also necessarily experienced

by

the whole

(462a-465c).

_Yet,

Socrates

_implicitly

suggests that this sort of unity, which would

possible. To be sure, he argues that the rule of philosophers,

_being

the single

necessary and sufficient condition for the transformation of an _{ordinary city}

intothe bestregime, would

_bring

about such _unity (473b-473e). But he

_tacitly

indicates that the rule of philosophers itself is not possible (see _especially 540e-541a).12

And one of the reasons _{why it is} not possible is the tension

between the own good and the good of the city:

_Why

would

philosophers want to transform an ordinary city into the best regime in which

they

would becompelled to rule? _Ironically, although the bestregime ruled

_by

philosophers is the _only regime that is meantto

_bring

about botha private and publichappiness (472c-473e), it does not secure this inthe highest case ofthe

philosophers.

_Perhaps,

then,

Socrates'

awareness of the problem within ordi

nary justice thetension betweentheindividual good and the common good

explains _{why he} takes refuge in theRepublic in what we havecalled justice in the Socratic sense. Unlike justice in the _ordinary understanding, this sort of

justice is meant to _{be wholly in}

_keeping

with the individual good.

Now, we cannot know whatjustice in the _{ordinary understanding is} unless

we address, more _adequately than we have done

_here,

the

_difficulty

_regarding

its goodness. It is true that

Socrates,

atthe end ofBook

One,

tries to separate the question of the goodness of justice and the question of what justice is

(354a-c),

but Socrates'

serious view, expressed in the context ofhis elabora tionofthe Ideaofthe Goodin Book

Six,

isthatwe cannotknow whatjustice is

unlessweknowthe _{way in}which it isgood(506a). As forthecriticismthat the enterprise oftheRepublicas awhole that

_is,

_trying

todefend justice in terms

ofits goodness is wrong and that this leads us to raise

_falsely

the issue ofan inner

_difficulty

of

_justice,

we can _say the following." In thefirst place, Socra

tes'

rather unambiguous thesis in Book Six is that all human beings strive for

the good (505d-e).

_Hence,

for

_Socrates,

the demand thatjustice must be good if it is to be acceptable would not come as a surprise.

_Moreover,

_according to the

_Republic,

the belief inthe goodness ofjustice is part ofthe _ordinaryunder standing of_{justice. This is especially} made clearin Book One. There Cephalus and

_Polemarchus,

who provide definitions ofjustice that are in

_keeping

with

the _{ordinary understanding} of

_justice,

assume that justice is good: the former

rejects the justice of_returning a weapon to a madman because he thinks that

justice is good forall concerned, while thelatter believes thatjustice is human

virtue

(331c-d,

335c). These two interlocutors _{apparently do} not evenfeel the

need to raise the question of the goodness of _{justice precisely because they}

assume that _{justice is something} good. This leads one to wonder,

however,

whether those who want to see the goodness ofjustice defended are not some how already beyond the_ordinary perspective on_{justice. It is probably}no acci

dent,

after all, that the first to raise the question of the goodness ofjustice in the Republic is

_{Thrasymachus,}

who is a great critic ofjustice (338c-339a,

Defense of Justice

want to seejustice defended in terms of its goodness (357a-367e). Since it is

not adequate _simply to assume that justice _{is something} good, Glaucon and

Adeimantus appeartobe in this respect superiorto Polemarchus and Cephalus.

Thus Socrates' attempt todefend justice in terms ofits goodness

_is,

_according to the

_Republic,

_fully

justified from the pointof view ofjustice itself.

There is a further important reason _{why Socrates is} induced to make the

equation ofthejust man and the philosopher or to positjustice in the Socratic sense. Atthe

_beginning

ofBook

Two,

Glaucon andAdeimantus askSocratesto show thatjustice is

_{intrinsically}

good and hence to make it clear that men are

capable of

_being

just not _merely for the external rewards that come from the

reputation for justice.

_They

are aware _{that, if justice} is good _merely for its

external _{rewards, then there} is always the temptation to practice injustice: one

could garner the rewards of justice

_by

_{merely appearing} to be just

(357a-367e).

Now,

in Book

Ten,

Socrates says that since

_they

have _already shown that justice is

_{intrinsically}

_good,

_they

should return the external wages and punishments for justice and injustice

_by

_allowing the just man to have the reputation forjustice and the unjust man the reputation for injustice (612a-d). ButSocrateswas abletoshowthatjusticeis

_{intrinsically}

good_only

_by

_referring to thejustice ofthe individual as outlined at the end ofBook Four tojustice

as

_harmony

of the soul, which is analogous to the health of the

_body

and

ultimately to thephilosopher's

_being

just inthis sense.

_Certainly,

thepleasures of_{the philosophers,} which Socrates cites in ordertoprove not _only thatjustice is

_{intrinsically}

good but also that it is superior to injustice in the form of tyr anny, are

_{intrinsically}

good and compatible with maximum self-sufficiency. The

_{difficulty, however,}

is that Socrates had been asked to show that _ordinary

justice is

_{intrinsically}

good, and, as far asI can tell, henowhere shows this. If

anything, hepoints to theobstaclesthatwould preventone_{from simply}accept

ing

such a view.

As forSocrates' turn to theexternal rewards and punishmentsfor justice and

injustice,

itis clear that from thepoint ofviewofjustice inthe Socratic sense, whichis

_{intrinsically}

good,

they

would be more orless superfluous (see

588e-591b). (Socrates does allow for punishments that would improve the unjust

[591a-b].14)

Hence his desireto turn to themdoesnot make much sense. In fact

Socrates gives back the external rewards and punishments not tojustice in the

Socratic sense but tojustice in the _ordinary sense, which, as I noted, had not

been shown to be

_{intrinsically}

good. This is confirmed

_by

the fact that the external rewards and punishments for justice and injustice are linked with the reputation for justice andinjustice among ordinary humanbeings (612a-614a).

Here,

the question _may arise whether thejustman in the ordinarysense would

regard theexternal rewards as mere

_icing

onthe cake, asitwere, ratherthanas

absolutely necessary. Socrates

implicitly

indicates thatthelatteris closertothe

truth, for in Book Three he argues that the decent man would not mourn the