Understandi
ng Political
Law
Compilation
of
Case
Digests
This compilation contains the digested cases which are useful to understanding the different principles and legal concepts enshrined in Political Law.
20
09
Melvin Miscala Christine Ruflo Meltin Co. 7/5/2009
Procedure for Passage of Bills (Sec 26 [2])
Power of the Senate to propose amendments to revenue bills.
G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO vs. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
Facts:
Some of the petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine Airlines (PAL), Roco, and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA)) reiterate previous claims made by them that R.A. No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution. Although they admit that H. No. 11197 was filed in the House of Representatives where it passed three readings and that afterward it was sent to the Senate where after first reading it was referred to the Senate Ways and Means Committee, they complain that the Senate did not pass it on second and third readings. Instead what the Senate did was to pass its own version (S. No. 1630) which it approved on May 24, 1994.
Issue:
Can the Senate pass its own version of a revenue bill after the lower house passed its own version to it for aaproval when the Constitution says that revenue bill must originate exclusively from the Lower House? What is meant by the term “Exclusively?”
Held:
Yes. The power of the Senate to propose amendments must be understood to be full, plenary and complete "as on other Bills." Thus, because revenue bills are required to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the Senate cannot enact revenue measures of its own without such bills. After a revenue bill is passed and sent over to it by the House, however, the Senate certainly can pass its own version on the same subject matter. This follows from the coequality of the two chambers of Congress. In sum, while Art. VI, Sec 24 provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills must "originate exclusively in the House of Representatives," it also adds, "but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." In the exercise of this power, the Senate may propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure.
Query: What is the purpose of the three readings in 3 separate days?
Answer: The purpose for which three readings on separate days is required is said to be two-fold: (1) to inform the members of Congress of what they must vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure
is progressing through the enacting process, thus enabling them and others interested in the measure to prepare their positions with reference to it.
Facts:
PAL maintains that R.A. No. 7716 violates Art. VI, Sec 26 (1) of the Constitution which provides that "Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." PAL contends that the amendment of its franchise by the withdrawal of its exemption from the VAT is not expressed in the title of the law.
Issue: whether the law failed to comply with Art VI, Sec 26. Held:
No. PAL asserts that the amendment of its franchise must be reflected in the title of the law by specific reference to P.D. No. 1590. It is unnecessary to do this in order to comply with the constitutional requirement, since it is already stated in the title that the law seeks to amend the pertinent provisions of the NIRC, among which is Sec 103(q), in order to widen the base of the VAT. Actually, it is the bill which becomes a law that is required to express in its title the subject of legislation. The titles of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 in fact specifically referred to Sec 103 of the NIRC as among the provisions sought to be amended. We are satisfied that sufficient notice had been given of the pendency of these bills in Congress before they were enacted into what is now R.A. No. 7716.
In Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, supra, a similar argument as that now made by PAL was rejected. R.A. No. 7354 is entitled AN ACT CREATING THE PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION, DEFINING ITS POWERS, FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, PROVIDING FOR REGULATION OF THE INDUSTRY AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES CONNECTED THEREWITH. It contained a provision repealing all franking privileges. It was contended that the withdrawal of franking privileges was not expressed in the title of the law. In holding that there was sufficient description of the subject of the law in its title, including the repeal of franking privileges, this Court held: To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]
RODOLFO C. FARIAS et al vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Facts:
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the
dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the
ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices,
while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who
run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them
as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject
matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
Issue:
Whether the law violates the constitutional requirement.
Held:
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title.
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that:
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the one subject-one title rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be,
so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to
the general subject
, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public. In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners, as members of the House of Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.
ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE
The signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment.
Query:
The Effectivity clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 provides that it shall take effect immediately upon its approval. Valid?
Answer:
No. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid. In Tanada v. Tuvera,1[54] this Court laid down the rule:
... the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended.
Presidential Veto (Sec. 27)
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20740 June 30, 1964
BOLINAO ELECTRONICS CORPORATION vs. BRIGIDO VALENCIA Facts:
It is provided in the Appropriations Act that the amount appropriated for the operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service shall be made subject to the condition that the same shall not be used or expended for operation of television stations in Luzon, where there are already existing commercial television stations. The president vetoed this appropriation.
Issue:
Whether the president’s veto power include the conditions attached thereto. Held:
No. This is not a novel question. A little effort to research on the subject would have yielded enough authority to guide action on the matter For, in the leading case of State v. Holder,2 it was already
declared that such action by the Chief Executive was illegal. This ruling, that the executive's veto power 1
does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases.3 If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect
whatsoever,4 and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION vs.HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ Facts:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval. On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become Republic Act No. 7663. On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions. The president vetoed a special provision under one article in that law on debt payment but did not veto the amount appropriated by congress to debt payment. The petitioners question this because they argued that this is tantamount to vetoing the entire provision and the president cannot do this without vetoing the entire bill; thus the president cannot do this by a mere item veto.
Issue: whether this is a valid item veto. Held:
Yes. The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates (1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [2]). In other words, in the true sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to the entire bill.
The Court, citing Henry v. Edwards, La., 346 So. 2d 153 (1977), said that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as "item", which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power.
It is readily apparent that the Special Provision applicable to the appropriation for debt service insofar as it refers to funds in excess of the amount appropriated in the bill, is an "inappropriate" provision referring to funds other than the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriated in the General Appropriations Act of 1991.
The Court will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto, the same as it will presume the constitutionality of an act of Congress (Texas Co. v. State, 254 P. 1060; 31 Ariz, 485, 53 A.L.R. 258 [1927]).
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process (Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). That is why it is found in Article VI on the Legislative Department rather than in Article VII on the Executive Department in the Constitution.
There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.
Under his general veto power, the President has to veto the entire bill, not merely parts thereof (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]). The exception to the general veto power is the power given to the President to veto any particular item or items in a general appropriations bill (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[2]). In so doing, the President must veto the entire item.
As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in an appropriations bill must "relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein" and "be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates," it follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate provision" which can be vetoed separately from an item. Also to be included in the category of "inappropriate provisions" are unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are intended to amend other laws, because clearly these kind of laws have no place in an appropriations bill. These are matters of general legislation more appropriately dealt with in separate enactments. Former Justice Irene Cortes, as Amicus Curiae, commented that Congress cannot by law establish conditions for and regulate the exercise of powers of the President given by the Constitution for that would be an unconstitutional intrusion into executive prerogative.
The doctrine of "inappropriate provision" was well elucidated in Henry v. Edwards, supra., thus: Just as the President may not use his item-veto to usurp constitutional powers conferred on the legislature, neither can the legislature deprive the Governor of the constitutional powers conferred on him as chief executive officer of the state by including in a general appropriation bill matters more properly enacted in separate legislation. The Governor's constitutional power to veto bills of general legislation . . . cannot be abridged by the careful placement of such measures in a general appropriation bill, thereby forcing the Governor to choose between approving unacceptable substantive legislation or vetoing "items" of expenditures essential to the operation of government. The legislature cannot by
location of a bill give it immunity from executive veto. Nor can it circumvent the Governor's veto power over substantive legislation by artfully drafting general law measures so that they appear to be true conditions or limitations on an item of appropriation. Otherwise, the legislature would be permitted to
impair the constitutional responsibilities and functions of a co-equal branch of government in contravention of the separation of powers doctrine . . . We are no more willing to allow the legislature to use its appropriation power to infringe on the Governor's constitutional right to veto matters of substantive legislation than we are to allow the Governor to encroach on the Constitutional powers of the legislature. In order to avoid this result, we hold that, when the legislature inserts inappropriate
provisions in a general appropriation bill, such provisions must be treated as "items" for purposes of the Governor's item veto power over general appropriation bills.
Effectivity of Laws
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAÑADA vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA Facts:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
Issue: Whether publication of the law is an indispensable requirement. Held:
Yes. Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.
In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary
to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 June 18, 1987
PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY
WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided . . .;" WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective only a publication thereof in the Official Gazette will suffice has entailed some problems, a point recognized by the Supreme Court in Tañada. et al. vs. Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No. 63915, December 29, 1986) when it observed that "[t]here is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic release and limited readership";
WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that "[u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly"; and
WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2 of the Civil Code should accordingly be amended so the laws to be effective must be published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order:
Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines," and all other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in the Official Gazette. Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.
G.R. No. 105364* June 28, 2001
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-N.U.B.E. and PERFECTO V. FERNANDEZ vs. HONORABLE BENJAMIN VEGA
Facts:
The Central Bank of the Philippines (Central Bank, for brevity) filed with Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Philippine Veterans Bank. On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7169 providing for the rehabilitation of the Philippine Veterans Bank. Despite the legislative mandate for rehabilitation and reopening of PVB, respondent judge continued with the liquidation proceedings of the bank. Petitioners argue that with the passage of R.A. 7169, the liquidation court became functus officio, and no longer had the authority to continue with liquidation proceedings. The law provided for its immediate effectivity upon its approval. On April 10, 1992, the Monetary Board issued Monetary Board Resolution No. 348 which approved the Rehabilitation Plan submitted by the Rehabilitaion Committee. The Central Bank and Liquidator of PVB claimed that R.A. No. 7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992 or fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette; and, the contention of intervenors VOP Security, et. al. that the effectivity of said law is conditioned on the approval of a rehabilitation plan by the Monetary Board, among others.
Issue:
Whether Congress can provide for an exception of the publication requirement. Held: Yes (I am surprised!).
Anent the claim of respondents Central Bank and Liquidator of PVB that R.A. No. 7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992 or fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette; and, the contention of intervenors VOP Security, et. al. that the effectivity of said law is conditioned on the approval of a rehabilitation plan by the Monetary Board, among others, the Court is of the view that both contentions are bereft of merit.
While as a rule, laws take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions, as indicated in the clause "unless otherwise provided."
In the case at bar, Section 10 of R.A. No. 7169 provides:
Sec. 10. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Hence, it is clear that the legislature intended to make the law effective immediately upon its approval. It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7169 was signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on January 2, 1992. Therefore, said law became effective on said date.
Assuming for the sake of argument that publication is necessary for the effectivity of R.A. No. 7169, then it became legally effective on February 24, 1992, the date when the same was published in the Official Gazette, and not on March 10, 1992, as erroneously claimed by respondents Central Bank and Liquidator.
c.5 Initiative and Referendum
EN BANC[G.R. No. 111230. September 30, 1994.]
ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, ET AL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MORONG, BATAAN
Facts:
In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with Republic Act No. 7227.
On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. The municipality of Morong did not take any action on the petition within thirty (30) days after its submission. Petitioners then resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991. They started to solicit the required number of signatures 4 to cause the repeal of said resolution. In its session of July 6, 1993, the COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative on the ground that its subject is "merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance. COMELEC contended that under the Local Government Code of 1991, a resolution cannot be the subject of a local initiative.
Issue: Whether Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan is the proper subject of an initiative.
Held: Yes. We reject respondents' narrow and literal reading of the above provision for it will collide with the Constitution and will subvert the intent of the lawmakers in enacting the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 on initiative and referendum.
The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as
appropriate subjects of a local initiative.
Section 32 of Article VI provides in luminous language: "The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body . . ." An act includes a resolution. Black 20 defines an act as "an expression of will or purpose . . . it may denote something done . . . as a legislature, including not merely physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgments, resolves, awards, and determinations . . ." It is basic that a law should be construed in harmony with and not in violation of the Constitution. In line with this postulate, we held in In Re Guarina that "if there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the legislative, if the words or provisions are obscure, or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that interpretation will be adopted which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, even though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent import of the language used."The constitutional command to include acts (i.e., resolutions) as appropriate subjects of initiative was implemented by Congress when it enacted Republic Act No. 6735 entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor." Thus, its section 3(a) expressly includes resolutions as subjects of initiative on local legislations, viz: prcd
"Sec. 3. Definition of Terms — For purposes of this act, the following terms shall mean:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution.
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance."
Similarly, its section 16 states: "Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies — Any proposition on ordinance or resolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended, by the local legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date therefrom . . ." On January 16, 1991, the COMELEC also promulgated its Resolution No. 2300 entitled "In Re Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum, on National and Local Laws." It likewise recognized resolutions as proper subjects of initiatives. Section 5, Article I of its Rules states: "Scope of power of initiative — The power of initiative may be exercised to amend the Constitution, or to enact a national legislation, a regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay law, resolution or ordinance." LLjur
There can hardly be any doubt that when Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6735 it intended resolutions to be proper subjects of local initiatives. The debates confirm this intent.
We note that respondents do not give any reason why resolutions should not be the subject of a local initiative. In truth, the reason lies in the well known distinction between a resolution and an ordinance — i.e., that a resolution is used whenever the legislature wishes to express an opinion which is to have only a temporary effect while an ordinance is intended to permanently direct and control matters applying to persons or things in general. Thus, resolutions are not normally subject to referendum for it may destroy the efficiency necessary to the successful administration of the business affairs of a city.
In the case at bench, however, it can not be argued that the subject matter of the resolution of the municipality of Morong merely temporarily affects the people of Morong for it directs a permanent rule of conduct or government. The inclusion of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone has far reaching implications in the governance of its people.
D. Limitations to Power of Legislation
d.1. Express Limitations
Art III
Sec 26, 28
Art XIV, Sec 4 [3]
Sec. 29-31
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998.]
TERESITA G. FABIAN, petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO Facts:
Private respondent Nestor Agustin was administratively charged for inter alia grave misconduct committed by him as then Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highways before the Office of the Ombudsman. The Graft Investigator found him guilty of the charge and henceforth issued a resolution ordering his dismissal from the service. The resolution was approved by the Ombudsman, but on motion for reconsideration, Deputy Ombudsman Jesus Guerrero set aside the resolution and exonerated private respondent.
At issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 27 of R.A. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) which vests appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court over decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman as it infringes the constitutional proscription against laws increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its advise and consent.
Issue:
Whether Sec Section 27 of R.A. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) is constitutional. Held:
No. Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed
under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.
d.2. Implied Substantive Limitations
d.2.a. Non-delegation of Legislative Powers
[G.R. No. 45685. November 16, 1937.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. JOSE O. VERA Facts:
Act No. 4221 (Probation Law) is assailed because section 11 of said Act No. 4221 endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective provinces.
Issue: Whether the delegation to the provincial board as to the enforcement of Act No. 4221 is valid. Held: No. The rule, however which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. On quite the same principle, Congress is empowered to delegate legislative power to such agencies in the territories of the United States as it may select. Courts have also sustained the delegation of legislative power to the people at large, though some authorities maintain that this may not be done. Doubt less, also, legislative power may be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of Article VI of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that "The National Assembly may by law authorize the President, subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, — to fix within specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues." And section 16 of the same article of the Constitution provides that "In times of war or other national emergency, the National Assembly may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy."
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. In United States vs. Ang Tang Ho ( [1922], 43 Phil., 1), the Supreme Court adhered to the foregoing rule. The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.
The Probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted is a "roving commission" which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 of the Act, the legislature does seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. If a provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. This is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards.
The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. ( Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Clinton County Comrs. [1852], 1 Ohio St., 77, 88. See also, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 68.) To the same effect are decisions of the Supreme Court in the Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binañgonan ([1917], 36 Phil., 547); Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro ([1919], 39. Phil., 660); and Cruz vs. Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil., 234).
Laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people of a particular community (6 R. C. L., 116, 170- 172; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., vol. I, p. 227). In Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1; 6 Law. ed., 253), the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the legislature may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process common to all branches of the government. Notwithstanding the apparent tendency to relax the rule pro hi biting delegation of legislative authority on account of the complexity arising from social and economic forces at work in this modern industrial age, the orthodox pronouncement of .Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations finds restatement in Professor Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the United States and is accepted. The legislature has not made the operation of the Probation Act contingent upon specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the law upon the provincial boards. The discretion vested is arbitrary be cause it is absolute and unlimited. A provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any fact, or await the happening of any specified contingency. It is bound by no rule — limited by no principle of expediency announced by the legislature. It may take into consideration certain facts or conditions; and, again, it may not. It may have any purpose or no purpose at all. It need not give any reason or have any reason whatsoever for refusing or failing to appropriate any funds for the salary of a probation officer. This is a matter which rests entirely at its pleasure.
The legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from those applicable to other localities and, while recognizing the force of the principle hereinabove expressed, courts in many jurisdictions have sustained the constitutionality of the submission of option laws to the vote of the people. (6 R. C. L., p. 171.) But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely local in character which should receive different treatment in different localities placed under different circumstances. Without denying the right of local self-government and the propriety of leaving matters of purely local concern in the hands of local authorities or for the people of small communities to pass upon in matters of general legislation like that which treats of criminals in general, and as regards the general subject of probation, discretion may not be vested in a manner so unqualified and absolute as provided in Act No. 4221.
The statute does not expressly state that the provincial boards may suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces but, considering that, in being vested with the authority to appropriate or not the necessary funds for the salaries of probation officers they thereby are given absolute discretion to determine whether or not the law should take effect or operate in their respective provinces, the provincial boards are in reality empowered by the legislature to suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces, the Act to be held in abeyance until the provincial boards should decide otherwise by appropriating the necessary funds. The validity of a law is not tested by what has been done, but by what may be done under its provisions. (Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad [1922], 43 Phil., 259; 12 C. ,T., p. 786.)
A great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not only in the expression of what may be termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and execution thereof. "Without this power, legislation would become oppressive and yet imbecile." (People vs. Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1.) It has been said that
popular government lives because of the inexhaustible reservoir of power behind it. It is unquestionable that the mass of powers of government is vested in the representatives of the people and that these representatives are no further restrained under our system than by the express language of the instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions which by clear intendment, have that effect. But it should be borne in mind that a constitution is both a grant and a limitation of power and one of these time-honored limitations is that, subject to certain exceptions, legislative power shall not be delegated.
[G.R. No. L-32096. October 24, 1970.] ROMEO F. EDU vs. HON. VICENTE G. ERICTA Facts:
Petitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner issued Administrative Order No. 2 implementing the Reflector Law. This was assailed as an invalid delegation of legislative power.
Issue: whether there was an invalid delegation of power. Held: No.
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute all its term and provision when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enactment. The legislative does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may be the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.
The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be obtained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads." This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not-too-long after the Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of 'subordinate legislation' not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments." He continued: "Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts." Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed.
[G.R. No. 76633. October 18, 1988.]
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION Facts:
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The POEA granted the award prayed for pursuant to the said Memorandum Circular no. 2. The petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. Issue: Whether the subject memorandum is violative of the principle against non-delegation of legislative power.
Held: No.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz,, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the many instances when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally pertain. In the case of the legislative power, however, such occasions have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation." With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."
Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards "public interest" in People v. Rosenthal, "justice and equity" in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR, "public convenience and welfare" in Calalang v. Williams, and "simplicity, economy and efficiency" in Cervantes v. Auditor General, to mention only a few cases. In the United States, the "sense and experience of men" was accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, and "national security" in Hirabayashi v. United States.
Exception Under the Constitution
Sec 23[2] and 28 [2] – Delegation to the President
Sec. 32, Art. VI – delegation to the people
Art. X, Sec.5 – delegation to LGUs
d.2.b.
Prohibition against Passage of irrepealable laws
d.3.
Procedural Limitations (sec. 26-27)
[G.R. No. 105371. November 11, 1993.]
THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION vs. HON. PETE PRADO Facts:
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 9228. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court and the lower courts. The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches
on the independence of the Judiciary. It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.
Issue:
Whether the title of the challenged act violates the Constitution. Held:
No. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act violates the Constitution.
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible. This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal of a statute on a given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a matter more germane to an act and to the object to be accomplished thereby than the repeal of previous legislations connected therewith."
The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title. As observed in one case, if the title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was never claimed that every other act which it repeals or alters by implication must be mentioned in the title of the new act. Any such rule would be neither within the reason of the Constitution, nor practicable.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is
germane to the accomplishment
of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.Another issue in this Case Facts:
The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or of House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as follows:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
Issue: Whether the Bicameral Conference Committee transgressed the limits of its power.
Held: No. While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is described thus:
A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In A Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81).
It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons, where we explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
Note: However,Sec 35 was declared unconstitutional based not on procedural lapses but because of a substantive infraction. SC said it violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
E. Aid to Legislation
Read: Part I of Legislative Investigations and Right to Privacy
By: Hon. Reynato S. Puno, The Lawyer’s Review, Apr 30, 2005
e.1. Question Hour (Sec 22)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 169777. * April 20, 2006.]
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA Facts:
The petitioners alleged that the President has abused its power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005. They thus pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional. On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464 which required all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress. It also invoked the principle of separation of powers and executive privilege. Issue: Whether the president abused its power in issuing EO 464.
Held:
Yes. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible.
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. The required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour.
SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning of Section 22 of Article VI. Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be interpreted vis-à-vis Section 21 which provides for the power of either House of Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid of legislation."
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission shows that the framers were aware that these two provisions involved distinct functions of Congress.
A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour.
While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was
compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation
. In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the "question hour" has a definite meaning. It is a period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other ministers accountable for their acts and the operation of the government, corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question period. There was a specific provision for a question hour in the 1973 Constitution which made the appearance ofministers mandatory. The same perfectly conformed to the parliamentary system established by that Constitution, where the ministers are also members of the legislature and are directly accountable to it.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during the question hour in the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of powers. To that extent, the question hour, as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs from the question period of the parliamentary system. That department heads may not be required to appear in a question hour does not, however, mean that the legislature is rendered powerless to elicit information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence of a mandatory question period, the need to enforce Congress' right to executive information in the performance of its legislative function becomes more imperative. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of legislation" under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
e.2. Legislative Investigations (Sec 21)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 169777. * April 20, 2006.]
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution which reads:
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
This provision is worded exactly as Section 8 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution except that, in the latter, it vests the power of inquiry in the unicameral legislature established therein — the Batasang Pambansa — and its committees.
That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be deduced from the same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with the power to legislate. The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.
Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on executive operations.
As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, "with process to enforce it," is
grounded on
the necessity of information in the legislative process
. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, the inquiry itself might not properly be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to avoid such a result as occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person
for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such statement in its invitations, along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less room for speculation on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation.
Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive privilege." Since this term figures prominently in the challenged order, it being mentioned in its provisions, its preambular clauses, and in its very title, a discussion of executive privilege is crucial for determining the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.
From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United States and in this jurisdiction, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
The President herself has, through the challenged order, made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department heads' possession of any information which might be covered by executive privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis-à-vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at all. Rather, the required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 89914. November 20, 1991.]
JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR. vs. THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS Facts:
On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), assisted by the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0035 (PCGG Case No. 35) entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, et al.",
