UACES 42
ndAnnual Conference
Passau, 3-5 September 2012
Conference papers are works-in-progress - they should not be cited without the author's permission. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s).
The European Union as an Emerging International Crisis Management Actor and the Development of an Acquis Securitaire
UACES 42nd Annual Conference Passau, Germany, 3-5 September 2012
Julia Schmidt
shmidt@uni-bonn.de
Work in progress. Please do not quote without author’s permission.
The European Union has launched and conducted nine crisis management operations of a military nature so far. The EU’s approach to crisis management aims to be unique. It is characterized through a comprehensive concept of crisis management that combines a variety of different measures, including economic sanctions, diplomatic tools and crisis management missions of a civilian or military nature, for example. In addition, the EU’s approach to crisis management is based on the values and principles that have inspired the EU’s own creation, namely the respect for human rights and democracy. The paper will argue that the more the EU will engage in crisis management operations, the more the EU will shape its profile as a security actor and will build up a portfolio. Patterns will develop that indicate when the EU is likely to act and what type of crisis management measures it is likely to use in a certain phase of a crisis. Through its international action, the EU is gradually building up an acquis securitaire. This development is not only of importance for the EU to become a legitimate international military actor but it has also implications for the European member states. The aim of the paper is to assess the development and the nature of the acquis securitaire. Is it a political or a legal concept and how does it affect the EU member states in the conduct of their national foreign policies?
Introduction
With its operation Atalanta off the Somali coast, the European Union is conducting its first naval operation. To protect merchant vessels as well as vessels of the World Food Programme that are delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia, Operation Atalanta shall
take the necessary measures, including the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring to an end acts of piracy and armed robbery which may be committed in the areas where it is present.1
Operation Atalanta is not being conducted in a post conflict situation but in a hostile environment. The participating military personnel are coming face to face with heavily armed pirates. Operation Atalanta indicates that the EU is fast developing as an international crisis management actor that has already conducted nine military operations2 under the auspices of the EU’s common security and defence policy.3 At the beginning, the EU’s military missions included rather traditional peace-keeping tasks. Operation Atalanta, however, is of a new quality as force is to be used not merely in self defence. Operation Atalanta indicates that the EU has already gone through a profound development as an international military actor.
1 Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast [2008] OJ L 301/33 Article 2.
2 Operation CONCORDIA/FYROM, Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP on the European Union military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [2003] OJ L 34/26; Operation ARTEMIS, Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP of on the European Union military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo [2003] OJ L 143/50; Operation EUFOR Althea, Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP on the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina [2004] OJ L 252/10; Operation AMIS, Council Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP on the European Union civilian – military supporting action to the African Union mission in the Darfur region of Sudan [2005] OJ L 188/46; Operation EUFOR RD Congo, Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP on the European Union military operation in support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the election process [2006] OJ L 116/98; Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA, Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP of on the European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic [2007] OJ L 279/21; EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta, Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of on a European military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast [2008] OJ L 301/33; Operation EUTM Somalia, Council Decision 2010/197/CFSP on the launch of a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia) [2010] OJ L 87/33.
The European Union is driven by comprehensive approach to crisis management. This comprehensive approach to crisis management can be illustrated by political statements, such as the European Security Strategy of 20034 which represents the first strategic concept for the EU as well as by its actual practice. The European approach to crisis management is comprehensive in two ways. Not only is the European Union prepared and willing to act in the whole life cycle of a conflict, including conflict prevention, peace-making, peace-enforcement, peace-keeping as well as post conflict stabilisation, but it is also willing to use a variety of tools that are at its disposal.5
In response to the identified key threats, including terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime, the European
Security Strategy recommends a mixture of instruments and considers the EU to be
‘particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations’.6
Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, political, judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government.7
Thus, European military operations are just one of the crisis management tools available to the European Union alongside civilian crisis management missions, economic sanctions, political and diplomatic tools. But what are the guiding principles behind the EU’s engagement as an international security provider? When is the EU willing to get involved in a specific crisis and how is the EU deciding which crisis management tool to use either on its own or in a combination of measures?
4 European Council, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy’ Brussels, 12 December 2003 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> [hereinafter European
Security Strategy].
5
European Security Strategy 11. 6 European Security Strategy 7. 7 European Security Strategy 7.
The paper will argue that at current no strong guidelines are available that could help the European Union to identify when to act and how to act. Past practice of the European Union and lessons learned as an international crisis management actor could help to build up the EU’s crisis management portfolio and could thereby help to identify in which situations the EU is likely to get involved and how the EU is usually reacting to a certain conflict or a specific stage of a crisis. The development of a strategic culture enhanced through the lessons learned in European crisis management missions will gradually develop an acquis securitaire. Comparable to the acquis communautaire, the EU and the member states will develop patterns of behaviour and create expectations for acting in certain ways when confronted with certain types of conflict or crisis. Models will emerge in which the EU prefers merely to impose economic sanctions, or when the EU will use a combination of different policy tools or when the EU will use specific types of civilian or military crisis management missions. Future patterns could emerge which will determine when the EU is prepared to engage in a robust military intervention.
In order to assess the development of an acquis securitaire, part one of this paper will outline why there is a need for such a development. This will be followed by an examination of the possible sources behind the creation of an acquis securitaire. Particular emphasis will be put on the impact of the European Security Strategy, possible foundations in the Treaty on European Union, the principle of good faith and the duty of loyal cooperation. Part three will examine whether the acquis securitaire represents a legal or a political concept. Finally, part four will discuss the implications of the development of an acquis securitaire for the European member states and the conduct of their domestic foreign policies on the one hand and its impact on the European Union as an international actor on the other.
Part 1
Why there is a need for an acquis securitaire
Although the European Union has a variety of different crisis management tools at its disposal, including economic sanctions, political and diplomatic tools, the core element
are formed by civilian and military crisis management missions that are conducted under the auspices of the EU’s common security and defence policy (CSDP). The common security and defence policy forms an integral part of the EU’s common foreign and security policy. When it starts a military crisis management operation, the European Union usually adopts a Council decision (formerly known as a joint action) in which it sets out the broader framework of its operational action, including the purpose of the operation8 as well as limits of time and territory.9 In the context of crisis management missions, the EU also adopts Council decisions (formerly known as common positions) to express a common stance regarding a certain topic that will guide the implementation of the EU mission, including for example its commitment to support the observance of ceasefire agreements.10
European crisis management missions my be used for the so-called Petersberg tasks that have been amended by the Treaty of Lisbon and now refer to joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation.11 When and how the European Union should use these crisis management tools is unclear. The Treaty on European Union offers some rather open objectives. The Treaty of Lisbon introduced a single set of objectives and principles that guide external Union action, irrespective of which policy sector is concerned. Thus the common security and defence policy shall be guided by the general principles of the EU’s external action.12
These general principles put a strong emphasis on fundamental rights and demonstrate a strong commitment to international law. They include the
8 For example to support the election process in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 9
See, for example, Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP on the European Union military operation in support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the election process [2006] OJ L 116/98.
10 See, for example, Council Common Position 2003/319/CFSP concerning European Union support for the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and the peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) [2003] OJ L 115/87.
11 Article 43 TEU.
principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.13
Furthermore, the Union is asked to,
(a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity;
(b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law;
(c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders;
(h) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance.14
The European Security Strategy (ESS) that provides the European Union with its first strategic concept identifies key threat, strategic objectives and policy implications for Europe, but unfortunately, the ESS also fails to identify when and how the EU should get involved as an international security provider.15 Due to differing political and cultural views amongst the European member states, the European Union is held back from exercising its full potential as an international actor.16 The development of an acquis
securitaire could help to fill this void of detailed objectives and values and could assist in
the definition of circumstance under which the EU should engage in crisis management missions.
13 Article 21(1) TEU.
14 Article 21(2) TEU.
15 S Biscop, ‘The European Security Strategy: Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Security’ (March 2004) ‘Sécurité & Sratégie’, Paper No. 82, the Royal Defence College (IRSD-KHID), Brussels
<http://www.politologischinstituut.be/PE2004/documents/6Biscop.pdf> 4.
16 F Moustakis and P Violakis, ‘European Security and Defence Policy Deceleration: An Assessment of the ESDP Strategy’ (2008) 17 European Security 421.
Part 2
Sources behind the development of an acquis securitaire
The terminology of an acquis securitaire has been used before but the concept has not been explained as such.17 As an integral part of the common foreign and security policy, the security and defence policy and its acquis might also be included in references to the ‘CFSP acquis’18 or the ‘acquis of the second pillar’.19 The development of an acquis
securitaire of the European Union is the product of several mixed influences. It is
motivated by political documents such as the European Security Strategy of 200320 but derives one of its biggest impetuses from the actual implementation of the common security and defence policy through crisis management missions in practice.21 In addition, the Treaty on European Union entails legal provisions that indicate a general openness towards the development of an acquis securitaire. Lastly, the international law principle of good faith supports the idea of a growing acquis securitaire against which future EU action has to be measured.
1. The European Security Strategy of 2003 as a benchmark for future military crisis management action
The European Union has developed a distinctive take on security that is based on European values and interest.22 The European Security Strategy of 2003 is the first strategic document of the European Union that covers foreign policy as a whole. It sets
17
See, for example, S Blockmans, , ‘An Introduction to the Role of the EU in Crisis Management’ in S Blockmans (ed), The European Union and Crisis Management: Policy and Legal Aspects (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2008) 3. As an integral part of the common foreign and security policy, the security and defence policy might also be included in references to the ‘CFSP acquis’ or to the 2nd pillar acquis. 18 C Hillion and R A Wessel, ‘Restraining External Competences of EU Member States under CFSP’ in M Cremona and B De Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals: Essays in
European Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2008) 79-121; R G Bono, ‘The Oragnization of the External
Relations of the European Union in the Treaty of Lisbon’ in P Koutrakos (ed), The European Union’s
External Relations a Year after Lisbon, CLEER Working Papers 2011/3 (TMC Asser Institute, The Hague
2011) 24; 19
M Trybus, ‘On the Common Security and Defence Policy of the Constitutional Treaty’ in M Trybus and N D White (eds), European Security Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007) 43.
20 European Security Strategy.
21 This development through a bottom-up approach outside the Treaty framework is not uncommon for the development of the EU’s common foreign and security policy.
22
General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, J Solana, ‘Report on the Implementation of the European
Security Strategy: Providing Security in a changing World’ Brussels, 11 December 2008, S407/08, 2
out the key threats and challenges faced by the Union and the strategic objectives the EU intends to use in order to address theses threats. The ESS does not provide operational guidelines but it sets out the principles that should guide the EU in its actions in order to ‘advance the EU’s security interest based on [the core European] values’.23 The values and principles that distinguish the EU from other security actors are its strong emphasis on the promotion of human rights and the call for effective multilateralism.24 The ESS states that the
best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.25
The implementation Report of the European Security Strategy of 2008 also emphasises the EU’s commitment to the Responsibility to Protect as agreed on the 2005 UN World Summit26 and provides that
[l]asting solutions to conflict must bind together all regional players with a common stake in peace. Sovereign governments must take responsibility for the consequences of their actions and hold a shared responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.27
With regards to effective multilateralism, the European Security Strategy states that the EU is
23 ESS Implementation Report 2008, 3. For a detailed discussion of the ESS see S Biscop, ‘The ABC of the European Union Security Strategy: Ambition, Benchmark, Culture’ in S Blockmans (ed), The European
Union and Crisis Management: Policy and Legal Aspects (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2008) 55-73.
24
A De Vasconcelos (ed), ‘The European Security Strategy 2003-2008: Building on Common Interests’ (February 2009) ISS Report No. 5, EU Institute for Security Studies
<http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ISS_Report_05.pdf> 33. 25 European Security Strategy, 10.
26 A De Vasconcelos (ed), ‘The European Security Strategy 2003-2008: Building on Common Interests’ (February 2009) ISS Report No. 5, EU Institute for Security Studies
<http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ISS_Report_05.pdf> 6. 27 ESS Implementation Report 2008, 2.
committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority.28
The values and interests the EU aims to base its action on as an international security provider will need to be put into concrete forms by the European Union in the actual undertaking of its missions. By doing so, the EU will gradually define what it actually means when referring to such vague terms as human rights promotion or when it calls for effective multilateralism. The actual military crisis management practice of the EU will shape its profile and will build up its portfolio. Not only European member states but also third parties, including states and international or regional organisations, will develop an understanding of when the EU is likely to act and whether the EU is more likely to start ‘just’ a civilian mission or whether they can expect the support of a military operation and if so whether force is going to be used merely for self-defence and to protect civilians or whether the operation will have a strong and robust mandate. The gradual development of a pattern for how the EU will act when faced with a certain crisis is essential in building up an acquis. The creation of an acquis securitaire is crucial for the build-up of the EU’s legitimacy and identity as an international security provider.
2. The development of an acquis securitaire and its foundations in the EU legal order Unlike the development of the acquis communautaire that was and still is driven by the case law of the European Court of Justice, the acquis securitaire will predominantly be shaped by the EU’s practice as an international security provider and the CSDP instruments adopted for that purpose, 29 due to the lack of jurisdiction of the European Court over the common foreign and security policy, including the common security and defence policy.
28 European Security Strategy, 9.
29 See also Martin Ortega who argues that the instruments of the CFSP make up the substance of the EU’s foreign policy. M Ortega, ‘Military Intervention and the European Union’ (March 2001) Chaillot Paper No. 45, (Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, Paris 2001)
The development of an acquis securitaire nevertheless has a basis in the Treaty on European Union. Article 32 TEU refers to a common approach in matters relating to the common foreign and security policy and indicates that the development of an acquis
securitaire is viewed as a prerequisite for the Union to assert its interests and values on
the international scene. When read in this way, Article 32 TEU also shows that the development of an acquis securitaire is driven forward by the European Council and the Council; and that European institutions and bodies as well as member states have to follow their policy guidelines when putting the common foreign and security policy into concrete forms. According to Article 32 TEU
Member States shall consult one another within the European Council and the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to determine a common approach. Before undertaking any action on the international scene or entering into any commitment which could affect the Union’s interests, each Member State shall consult the others within the European Council or the Council. Member States shall ensure, through the convergence of their actions, that the Union is able to assert its interests and values on the international scene. Member States shall show mutual solidarity.
When the European Council or the Council has defined a common approach of the Union within the meaning of the first paragraph, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Member States shall coordinate their activities within the Council.
The development of an acquis securitaire is not only ongoing but it is also desirable from a European perspective. If the EU can transform its values and interests into concrete policy guidelines, it will make its foreign and security policy and its common security and defence policy more effective. Clear foreign policy goals will also enhance the coherence of the EU’s external relations competences that are scattered over different policy sectors but form part of the EU’s comprehensive concept of crisis management.
3. The development of an acquis securitaire and the principle of good faith
The development of an acquis securitaire can also be supported from an international legal perspective. The European Union enjoys international legal personality and as an
international organisation it is subject to general rules of international law. The principle of good faith, in the form of equitable estoppel, asks the European Union not to act contrary to the legitimate expectations it has created through its previous behaviour.30 Therefore, the more the European Union engages in crisis management missions, more concrete patterns of its behaviour will develop. These patterns will reveal when the EU considers human rights violations grave enough to support a mission and they will show what conditions have to be met for the EU to engage in different forms of the use of force, ranging from peace-keeping, humanitarian missions and peace-enforcement.
4. The duty of loyal cooperation
The duty of loyal cooperation has been used in the context of the EU’s external relations and in particular regarding the Union’s competence to conclude international agreements to argue that even if the EU has not yet exercised its external competence, member states must step away from any measure that would undermine the future exercise of Union competence.31 The duty of cooperation in the context of the EU’s external relations is linked to the general goal of achieving unity in the EU’s international representation. This motive has been influential in creating broad and exclusive European competences for the conclusion of international agreements and the introduction of a European role for the adoption of economic sanctions in order to avoid differing and therefore ineffective unilateral member state sanctions. In line with this reasoning, the development of an
acquis securitaire and the constraining effects it could produce on member states’
domestic foreign policy choices could enhance the EU’s ability to speak with one voice in the international arena, which will increase the effectiveness of the European Union as a crisis management actor and could in turn strengthen its legitimacy.
Part 3
Acquis securitaire – a legal or a political concept?
30 On the customary international law principle of good faith and its European counterpart, the principle of legitimate expectations, see Opinion Advocate General Mazák Case C-203/07P Hellenic Republic v
Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR I-8161 paras 78-81.
31
A Tizzano, ‘The Foreign Relations Law of the EU Between Supranationality and Intergovernmental Model’ in E Cannizzaro (ed), The European Union as an Actor in International Relations (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2002) 139.
It has been argued that the EU’s practice as a crisis management actor will lead to the gradual development of an acquis securitaire through a bottom-up approach. But what is the nature of the acquis securitaire – is it a legal or a political concept?32
An analysis of the EU’s common security and defence policy could be helpful in answering this question. European member states are legally bound by Council decisions with which crisis management missions are launched and conducted in practice. Once European member state have unanimously decided in the Council to engage in a crisis management operation, they are bound by this decision, as indicated by the wording of the instruments formerly known as joint actions and common positions.33 The binding nature of the instruments with which the common security and defence policy is conducted in practice34 is reinforced by the principles of systematic cooperation35 and the principle of loyal cooperation36.37 European member states are thus required to actively support a European crisis management mission38 and are obliged to refrain from any action or inaction that could undermine the success of a European mission. But is this conclusion sufficient to argue that Council decisions that have been adopted to address a specific situation can be binding European member states in the future through the creation of an acquis securitaire?
32 The acquis communautaire is legally binding. States joining the European Union thus have to accept the acquis communautaire.
33 For a detailed discussion of how the common foreign and security may constrain member states in the conduct of their domestic foreign policies, see C Hillion and R Wessel, ‘Restraining External Competences of EU Member States under CFSP’ in M Cremona and B De Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law:
Constitutional Fundamentals: Essays in European Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2008) 79-121.
34
On the binding nature of common positions and joint actions see also M Cremona, ‘Enhanced
Cooperation and the Common Foreign and Security and Defence Policies of the EU’ (2009) EUI Working Paper Law2009/21 <http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/13002/LAW_2009_21.pdf?sequence=1> 2 and M Koskenniemi, ‘International Law Aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy’ in M Koskenniemi (ed), International Law Aspects of the European Union (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1998) 31-35.
35 Article 32 TEU. 36 Article 24(3) TEU.
37 For a detailed discussion of how the common foreign and security may constrain member states in the conduct of their domestic foreign policies, see C Hillion and R Wessel, ‘Restraining External Competences of EU Member States under CFSP’ in M Cremona and B De Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law:
Constitutional Fundamentals: Essays in European Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2008) 79-121.
Two arguments could speak against the legally binding nature of an acquis securitaire. First, although EU member states are legally bound by the instruments with which crisis management missions are conducted, their binding nature is not without limits.39 European member states can prevent topics from being discussed within the Council and even if Council decisions are adopted, they can be put in open and vague terms. 40 Second, the common security and defence policy recognizes several elements of flexibility that could indicate that the evolving acquis securitaire is not legally binding.41 The next section will look at the elements of flexibility in the context of the adoption of CSDP instruments – namely the principle of constructive abstention and the principle of enhanced cooperation. This will be followed by a brief overview of the possibility of ad hoc coalitions and the possibility of permanent structured cooperation in the context of the implementation of CSDP instruments.
1. The adoption of CSDP instruments and elements of flexibility
Council decisions including those initiating a crisis management mission of a military nature need to be adopted by the Council that either acts on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or in response to an initiative from a member state.42 Security and defence decisions require a unanimous vote.43 Member states, however, still have the possibility of abstaining from a vote in the Council without blocking a Council decision, according to the principle of constructive abstention.44 Under the condition that they make a formal declaration qualifying their abstention, they are not obliged to apply the decision. The Council decision nevertheless
39 On the limits of legal rules in the sphere of the Union’s common security and defence policy see P Koutrakos, ‘The Role of Law in Common Security and Defence Policy: Functions, Limitations and Perceptions’ in P Koutrakos (ed), European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham 2011) 235-258.
40 K Lenaerts and T Corthaut 301, ‘Of Birds and Hedges: The Role of Primacy in Invoking Norms of EU Law’ (2006) 31 European Law Review 301; C Hillion and R Wessel, ‘Restraining External Competences of EU Member States under CFSP’ in M Cremona and B De Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law:
Constitutional Fundamentals: Essays in European Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2008) 79-121.
41
R G Bono argues that ‘[t]here is no permanent CFSP acquis: it can be amended or revised at any time without limitation and the principle of irreversibility of powers does not apply to CFSP.’ R G Bono, ‘The Oragnization of the External Relations of the European Union in the Treaty of Lisbon’ in P Koutrakos (ed),
The European Union’s External Relations a Year after Lisbon, CLEER Working Papers 2011/3 (TMC
Asser Institute, The Hague 2011) 24. 42
Article 42(4) TEU. 43 Article 42(4) TEU. 44 Article 31(1) TEU.
commits the Union as a whole and it is not without effects for the abstaining member states. ‘In a spirit of mutual solidarity’, they are under the negative obligation to ‘refrain from any action likely to conflict with or to impede Union action based on that decision’.45 However, if the abstaining states represent one third of the member states as well as one third of the Union’s population, the Council decision cannot be adopted.
For the first time, the Treaty of Lisbon also enabled member states within the common security and defence policy to use the concept of enhanced cooperation.46 This concept allows a group of at least nine member states to adopt CSDP acts under strict substantive and procedural conditions. Enhanced cooperation is only permissible if it furthers Union objectives, protects Union interests and reinforces the process of European integration.47 According to the last resort principle, the Council shall only authorise enhanced cooperation if the objectives of such cooperation cannot be attained by the Union as whole within a reasonable time.48 CSDP instruments adopted within the framework of enhanced cooperation are only binding on those member states that participate.49
The principle of constructive abstention and the concept of enhanced cooperation are of differing importance for the development and the nature of the acquis securitaire. The principle of constructive abstention that safes member states from being legally bound by a CSDP decisions nevertheless requires abstaining states not to undermine a European initiative. In line with a general loyalty obligation as explained above, this principle could additionally support the argument that some provisions of the Treaty on European Union indicate a general openness towards the development of an acquis securitaire. CSDP
45
Article 31(1) TEU.
46 Article 20 TEU in conjunction with Articles 326 TFEU-334 TFEU. The concept of enhanced cooperation was introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam. Back then it excluded the common foreign and security policy. The Treaty of Nice extended the concept to the CFSP but only referred to the implementation of CFSP instruments and not to their adoption. The Treaty of Lisbon abolished this distinction. For a detailed analysis of the concept of enhanced cooperation see M Cremona, ‘Enhanced Cooperation and the Common Foreign and Security and Defence Policies of the EU’ (2009) EUI Working Paper Law 2009/21
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/13002/LAW_2009_21.pdf?sequence=1> 1-17; R Wessel, ‘Differentiation in EU Foreign, Security, and Defence Policy: Between Coherence and Flexibility’ in M Trybus and N White (eds), European Security Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007) 225-248. 47
Article 20(1) TEU. 48 Article 20(2) TEU. 49 Article 20(4) TEU.
decisions that are adopted within the framework of enhanced cooperation are not binding the non- participating member states and thereby indicate that not all CSDP decisions are envisaged to create binding effects for the future through the development of a legally binding acquis securitaire.
2. The implementation of CSDP instruments and elements of flexibility
The Treaty of Lisbon codified past practice and formally recognises two ways in which a group of member states can be assigned with the implementation of the Union’s common security and defence policy. According to the concept of ad hoc cooperation,50 ‘the Council may entrust the execution of a task…to a group of Member States in order to protect the Union’s values and serve its interests’.51
In addition, the Treaty introduced the possibility of permanent structured cooperation52 for those ‘Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions’.53 The Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon54 sets out the conditions for participation and outlines the objectives that ought to be achieved.
Council decisions with which military crisis management missions are conducted in practice have to be adopted by unanimous votes. The possibility to implement Council decisions with which crisis management missions are launched and conducted in practice in a second step by an ad hoc coalitions of states or by using the framework of a permanent structured cooperation, cannot offer any arguments either in favour or against the legal nature of an acquis securitaire. The actively participating member states have to
50 Article 42(5) TEU, Article 44 TEU. 51
Article 42(5) TEU.
52 Article 42(6) TEU, Article 46 TEU in conjunction with the Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation.
53 Article 42(6) TEU. For a discussion of the concept of permanent structured cooperation see for example S Biscop, ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation and the Future of ESDP’ (2008) Egmont Paper 20, Egmont-The Royal Institute for International Relations <http://aei.pitt.edu/8970/1/ep20.pdf> 1-19.
54 Protocol (NO 10) on Permanent Structured Cooperation Established by Article 42 of The Treaty On European Union [ hereinafter Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation].
put the mission mandates into concrete forms. This allows only a limited amount of discretion that should be guided by practical needs.
Overall, the analysis of the intergovernmental common security and defence policy showed that member states are legally bound by existing Council decisions with which crisis management missions are conducted. However, the binding nature of Council decisions is not without limits. European member states can prevent topics from being discussed within the Council and even if Council decisions are adopted, they can be put in open and vague terms. 55 Whether member states can be legally constrained in the conduct of their domestic foreign policies even when no positive Council decisions has been adopted yet through an acquis securitaire seems unclear. The elements of flexibility in the context of the CSDP cannot offer a precise answer either. Due to the special nature of the common security and defence policy, it is more likely that the developing acquis
securitaire is of a political nature.
Part 4
The implications of the development of the acquis securitaire
The proposed assumption that the development of an acquis securitaire is ongoing entails two consequences for the member states and for the conduct of their national foreign policies. First, the member states of the European Union will find it more difficult to act unilaterally before a Union decision within the common security and defence policy has been taken if they are aware that their domestic action is contrary to an established line of the practice of the European Union. For example, if member states are aware that the EU usually reacts to a certain crisis by imposing first economic sanctions or by using diplomatic tools, or if they know that the EU adopts a certain strategy in relation to particular countries, for example in light of the EU’s neighbourhood policy, member states will find it politically challenging to justify unilateral behaviour that is contrary to
55 K Lenaerts and T Corthaut 301, ‘Of Birds and Hedges: The Role of Primacy in Invoking Norms of EU Law’ (2006) 31 European Law Review 301; C Hillion and R Wessel, ‘Restraining External Competences of EU Member States under CFSP’ in M Cremona and B De Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law:
or more severe than the expected common European approach.56 If they are completely unbound and act as they please, although they have reason to expect a common European approach in the near future, member states will have it in their power to create situations that could not be reversed by a European approach. They could prevent the EU from speaking with one voice and they could undermine the values, interests and strategies that the EU usually pursues with its external relations. In this regard, the duty to act in accordance with the acquis securitaire of the European Union could be reinforced by the above discussed duty of loyal cooperation.
Second, if they are aware from previous experiences that the EU is likely to contribute with an EU-led operation in a similar crisis, member states will find it more difficult to justify their involvement in the settlement of this crisis outside a European framework, and to act only within NATO, the UN or an ad hoc coalition of states. This is even more so in the light of the recent practice of the EU as a crisis management actor. At each stage of the decision making process behind the launch of European crisis management missions, a discussion takes place about the role that the EU should assume in a particular conflict. It will be discussed whether the EU should start an independent EU-led operation on its own or in cooperation with other international actors or whether the European member states should rather contribute their troops to missions under the auspices of the UN, NATO or an ad hoc coalition of states or international organisations outside a European framework instead.57
In relation to the European Union, the development of an acquis securitaire that consist of past practice and is influenced by European values could help the European Union to develop a distinct approach to crisis management. A unique identity as an international
56
The development of a particular strategy towards certain states is not unknown to the European Union. With regards to democracy, the rule of law and human rights, the EU has for example defined a coherent strategy for its future relations with countries of south-east Europe. See on this topic B Brandtner and A Rosas, ‘Human Rights and the External Relations of the European Community: An Analysis of Doctrine and Practice’ (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 479.
57
T Hadden (ed), A Responsibility to Assist: EU Policy and Practice in Crisis-Management Operations
under European Security and Defence Policy: A COST Report (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland,
crisis management actor could enhance the credibility and the legitimacy of the EU as an international actor.
Conclusion
The acquis securitaire will shape future EU missions and has the potential to influence the European member states in the conduct of their national foreign policies. The development of an acquis securitaire is still at very early stages. The more the European Union acts as a crisis management actor, the more its member states, its institutions and third parties will expect the Union to act in a certain way when faced with a certain type and a certain gravity of crisis or conflict. The development of an acquis cannot be prevented and it is desirable for the build-up of a unique European identity in international crisis management. The purpose of an acquis is to ensure continuity and to preserve a core of values, concepts and principles of the constantly evolving European Union as an external actor.58 By ensuring consistency the acquis securitaire could also generate an impulse for future EU crisis management missions.59
58 L Azoulai, ‘The Acquis of the European Union and International Organisations’ (2005) 11 (2) European Law Journal 196, 197.
59 Azoulai, ‘The Acquis of the European Union and International Organisations’ (2005) 11 (2) European Law Journal 197.
