CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
1. INTRODUCTION
The institutionalisation and the influence of both the existential-phenomenological approach and the humanistic values of the “Third Force” movement in current psychology leave much to be desired. The lack of outright organisation and an overall theoretical model remain a chief concern of the “Third Force” or humanistic movement to this day. The historical origins of paradigms and intellectual groupings that culminated in the humanistic movement are testimony to the fragmented history. For example, the existential movement according to Morris (1979), was rather fragmented than organised and so is the status of the “Third Force” psychology in contemporary psychology.
I regard the ‘fragmented’ history of the “Third Force” as challenging and fascinating. I maintain that the value of the “Third Force” movement lies rather in its complex and intriguing history than in its theoretical contribution to psychology. I use the term ‘fragmented’ to illustrate the epistemological diversity within the movement, reflecting influences from existentialism, phenomenology, humanism, and the American counterculture of the 1960s extending to the early 1970s. It is this tapestry of thought that invigorates my focus on the humanistic movement.
The study begins with the epistemological explication of existentialism, phenomenology, and humanism. The three schools of thought contributed to the epistemological diversity of the “Third Force”. Kierkegaard’s existentialism stresses human subjectivity and shall be given parallel attention alongside the theoretical orientation of the humanistic movement. Jean-Paul Sartre’s radical views on human freedom are discussed, reflecting on the atheistic approach to the view of man. However, Kierkegaard differs with Sartre in that Kierkegaard is theist: he regards the ultimate stage of transcendence as a union with the Godly.
Phenomenology had an immense impact on the development of existential-phenomenological psychology. Edmund Husserl and Martin Heiddegger were the main proponents of the phenomenological thought. Husserl’s phenomenology influenced qualitative research and psychotherapy alike. However, the focus of Husserl’s influence shall be confined to psychotherapy in this study. He viewed consciousness as intentional and transcendental. Heidegger applied the ontological theme of “being- in-the-world” to Husserl’s phenomenology. Ludwig Binswanger imported Heiddegger’s phenomenology into psychotherapy, culminating in the existential-pheno menological paradigm of psychology.
The contributions of the existential-phenomenological approach to therapy and the humanistic movement are documented in this study, based on Binswanger’s “existential analysis”. Theories of the eclectic group of founding psychologists (Maslow, Rogers, and May) are presented. Maslow’s views of “peak experiences” are integrated with Rowan’s (1983) stages of mystical experiences. Rogers’ “empathy” is viewed from the transcendental perspective of Zen meditation. Finally, the contributions of humanistic psychology are discussed, reflecting on the impact of humanistic views on various therapeutic approaches and the applicability of the person-centered approach to education and politics.
1.2 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS
The concepts applied in this study are philosophical as implied in 1.1 above. However, their definitions shall largely reflect how they apply in psychology. Existentialism and phenomenology are defined separately and then as existential-phenomenological psychotherapy.
1.2.1 Existentialism
Existentialism is a philosophical movement that emphasizes subjectivity, free will, and individuality (Reber & Reber, 2001). Existentialism has divergent thinkers within its ranks and this makes it difficult to clarify its practical usefulness in psychotherapy (Miars, 2002).
Morris (1979) argued that this disarray seems most pronounced in humanistic psychology, which draws most of its philosophical and theoretical concepts from existential sources.
1.2.2 Phenomenology
Phenomenology is a philosophical discipline that focuses on human experience. Tyler (1992b) for example asserted that the basic idea of phenomenology is to understand human experience as well as our interactions with the environment, and our relationship with each other. In phenomenology, individuals are considered as conscious subjects who act intentionally and who give meaning to their actions. Phenomenological psychology then, becomes the study of the way in which the individual himself or herself understands what he is doing, and how he feels about it.
1.2.3 Existential-phenomenological psychotherapy
Existential-phenomenological psychotherapists have assimilated the ideas of existential and phenomenological philosophers into a system of psychotherapy (Hansen, 1999). According to Worrell (1997), existential-phenomenological psychotherapy has, as its philosophical background, the concepts of “intentionality” and “intersubjectivity”. “Intentionality” refers to the act whereby consciousness reaches out to the world to interpret objects, retrieving them as meaningful things. According to Owen (1994), “intersubjectivity” is about therapists’ aims and intentional awareness about clients and their aims; intermingled with clients’ awareness and aims about therapists.
1.3 Intention of this study
The aim of this study is to demonstrate the historical significance of the “Third Force” and its contributions to psychology. The emergence of the “Third Force” brought the introduction of the existential-phenomenological approach to humanistic psychotherapies, putting Binswanger’s work to light. The dimension of transcendental psychology, pioneered by Abraham Maslow, came to the attention of psychologists. The study thus illustrates that the transcendental approach links psychology with mysticism and Eastern forms of
meditation. Also, the person-centered approach brought psychology closer to the issues of society.
1.4 Outline of the study
Chapter 2 provides the philosophical background of the study. Existentialism, Phenomenology, and Humanism are discussed, with regard to their relevance in psychology, particularly psychotherapy.
Chapter 3 illustrates the combination of existentialism and phenomenology into existential-phenomenological psychotherapy, with particular focus on Binswanger’s “existential analysis”. The contributions of this approach to psychology are indicated as well.
Chapter 4 reviews the emergence of the “Third Force” movement. The controversies and diversity within the movement are exposed. Its contributions to therapeutic psycho logy are reflected upon. Finally, its current status within contemporary psychology and the implications for the future are indicated.
CHAPTER 2
THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT OF THE STUDY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This section aims at explicating the three philosophical influences that contributed to the development of existential-phenomenological psychology, pioneered by the Swiss psychiatrists Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss. Existentialism and phenomenology were the main influences that contributed towards this paradigm. Humanism had some contributions towards the existential-humanistic approach of the “Third Force” movement. Brennan (1998a, 1998b) preferred the use of the concept “Third Force” to denote what was neither psychoanalysis nor behaviourism, which is humanistic psychology. I opted for the use of the same concept in order to reflect on the divergent epistemologies existent within the movement; ranging from existentialism, phenomenology, and secular humanism. The nature and critique of this diversity are presented in Chapter 4 below.
Existentialism is presented in this chapter from the early forms as espoused by Kierkegaard. The latter forms are discussed from the viewpoint of Jean-Paul Sartre. Existentialism did not emerge as an organised school of thought. The existential movement had divergent thinkers within its ranks, and this has made it difficult to clarify its practical usefulness in psychological endeavours like psychotherapy. It is more a series of thinkers who reflected on human existence than it is an integrated philosophy (Miars, 2002).
Phenomenology is a philosophical trend founded by Edmund Husserl. Ellenberger (1958) described Husserls’s phenomenology as a methodological principle: probably because of Husserl’s emphasis on subjectivity as consciousness, unlike Heidegger who integrated phenomenology with ontological issues. Martin Heiddegger introduced existential elements in Husserl’s phenomenology with his concept of “being- in-the-world”. Ludwig Binswanger brought the concept of being-in-the-world into psychotherapy in the guise of “existential analysis”, which is the core formulation of existential therapy.
The philosophical foundations of Humanism are presented under Section 2.4 below. According to Hansen (2000), humanism is a philosophical hybrid of existentialism and phenomenology. The emphasis of the humanistic philosophy is on a person’s inherent capacity for growth and self-realization. In other words, humanism as a philosophical paradigm had a bearing on the ideology of the “Third Force” Movement; hence its inclusion as one of the philosophical trends in this study. The concept “psychological humanism” is used herein to reflect on the influence of humanistic theory on the “Third Force” Movement. Hansen (2000) asserted that psychological humanism emerged as a reaction to the reductionistic orientation of psychoanalysis and behaviourism, and so did the “Third Force”.
2.2 EXISTENTIALISM
Existentialism is a philosophical movement that emphasises subjectivity, free will, and individuality above theories that stress the role of society and social groups (Reber & Reber, 2001). In the same vein, Ellenberger (1958) defined existentialism as the philosophical trend of thought which takes as its focus of interest the consideration of man’s most immediate experience, his own existence.
Existentialism sprang up spontaneously in different parts of Europe and among different schools. It has a diverse body of researchers and creative thinkers. Existential thinkers came in two stages, the phenomenological stage and the existential phase. The former was represented by Eugene Minkowski in France, Erwin Straus in Germany, and V.E. von Gebsattel in Germany. The latter comprised of among others, Ludwig Binswanger, Medard Boss, and Roland Kuhn in Switzerland, and J.H. Van Den Berg in Holland (May, 1958b, 1983). These thinkers formulated ideas that contributed to the emergence of existentialism. They disagreed with Freud’s psychoanalysis. The contention was that psychoanalysis disregarded issues pertaining to human existence.
Foulquie (1947) maintained that existence is not a state, but an act, the actual transition form possibility into reality; to exist is to take leave of what one is (ex) in order to establish oneself (sistere) on the level of that which formerly was possible. To exist, for existentialists, is not merely to be (sein) but to be here or there, (dasein); to be in a situation,
in a determinate relationship with the world and with other conscious beings. This is a phenomenological description of existence, akin to Heidegger’s “Being- in-the-world” (Heidegger, 1962) detailed in 2.3.3 below. In the same vein, May (1958b, 1983) asserted that the term “existence” comes from the word ex-sistere, which means literally to stand out, to emerge.
This portrays the human being not as a collection of static substances or mechanisms or patterns but rather as emerging and becoming, that is, as existing. The approach of existential psychologists and psychiatrists is always dynamic; existence is equivalent to coming into being, becoming. The term being is not used as a static word, but a verb form, the participle of the verb “to be”. Existentialism is thus concerned with ontology, that is, the science of being. Ontos is a Greek equivalent of “being” (May 1958b, 1983).
Brennan (1998a) described existential philosophy as a paradigm that proposes individual existence as the act of being, which defines a person’s essence, so that existence precedes essence. The concept essence was brought into Christian thinking by the scholastic philosophers of the medieval era, and it brought psychology to a synonymous level with the Christian goal of perfection of the essence shared by each person, which is the eternal salvation of the soul. That is, for the scholastics, essence preceded existence.
Foulquie (1947) also viewed existentialism in relation to essence. To Foulquie, existentialism is a theory that affirms the primacy, or priority of existence. This priority is affirmed in relation to essence. Essence is what a thing is; for example, ‘I am a man’, and ‘I’ possess the human essence. Foulquie (1947) distinguished between the “universal essence” and “individual essence”. The “universal essence” comprises of those characteristics that are common to all the objects of the same kind. With the addition of those characteristics peculiar to each individual, the universal essence becomes “individual essence”.
However, it should be noted that Sartre’s (1964) view that existence precedes essence is not a universally accepted thesis, even to current thinkers. Some thinkers proposed the opposite, that essence precedes existence, as indicated by the scholastic philosophers above. Kierkegaard (1964b) is a typical case in this regard. He maintained that the essence of man
lies in his or her authentic communication with God. To Kierkegaard, true communication belongs to those who exist in the isolation of their inwardness, who desire through this inwardness to express the life of eternity. True communication is opposed to direct communication. Kierkegaard (1964b) denounced direct communication because it presupposes certainty; but certainty is impossible for anyone in process of becoming, and the semblance of certainty constitutes for such an individual a deception. The religious individual has learned that human indulgence profits nothing, and therefore refuses to listen to anything from that side, but he or she exists before God. In this regard, essence in communication with God precedes existence.
2.2.1 Antecedent expressions of existentialism: Kierkegaard’s concept of subjectivity
Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), a Danish thinker and clergyman, is regarded as the main proponent of modern existentialism. Ellenberger (1958) asserted that existential thinking had been implicit from time immemorial in many religious and philosophical systems. Kierkegaard was the first to make explicit its basic assumptions, later elaborated by Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre.
Kierkegaard’s ideas on existentialism were in direct contradiction to Hegel’s philosophy of
rationalism. Rationalism was a philosophical school of thought that shared the assumption that truth was to be ascertained by the use of rational thought. Kierkegaard reacted to the tenets of rationalism by arguing that faith, rather than rational truth, was central to a person’s existence (Brennan, 1998a). Kierkegaard’s philosophical arguments were mainly around man’s acceptance of God as true essence, and the emphasis on the concept of “subjectivity”. Valle, King and Halling (1989) maintained that for Kierkegaard, philosophy should address itself to the concrete existence of the individual person. It should help to explain the fundamental themes with which human beings invariably struggle (existential themes).
Several prominent psychologists (such as Carl Rogers, Abraham Maslow, Rollo May, Adrian Van Kaam, and J.F.T Bugental) have drawn philosophical strength from the writings of Soren Kierkegaard, hence he was considered by many as the “founding father” of the existential movement. Central to his thought was the concept of
subjectivity. Kierkegaard’s subjectivity implied the process of how individuals think and understand the existence they know to be true. For this notion, Charlotte Buhler (cited in Morris, 1979) emp hasized the indebtedness of humanistic psychology to Kierkegaard, especially his interpretation of truth as being contained in the nature of the relationship of the subject to reality.
Kierkegaard (1964a) distinguished between “objective thought” and “subjective thought”. He was critical of “objective thought”: he argued that the objective thought translates everything into results, and helps all mankind to cheat, by copying these off and reciting them by rote. The “subjective thought” on the other hand, puts everything in process and omits the result, partly because this belongs to him who has the way, and partly because as an existing individual he or she is constantly in “process of coming to be.” That is, an existing individual is constantly in process of becoming. According to Kierkegaard (1964a), the actual existing subjective thinker constantly reproduces this existential situation in his thoughts, and translates all his thinking into terms of process.
The central theme in his writings is the individual as a free agent in a constant process of becoming. Equally important is the thesis that only as the individual participates in truth, can it exist. Values and end goals are theologically determined and realized ultimately when one is able to move through the “aesthetic” and “ethical” stages of existence to the final stage, “the religious”, where the individual through the “leap” of faith achieves an existential union with God (Brennan, 1998a; Kierkegaard, 1964b; Morris, 1979).
Brennan (1998a) explicates the progressive levels of existence as follows: The “aesthetic” stage characterizes the childhood stage, where experience is dominated by pleasure and pain. This stage is primitive because the child reacts to external contingencies according to the needs of the moment. The “ethical stage” requires a person to make choices about the values of life and take responsibility about those choices. The highest form of existence is the “religious stage”, where the individual transcends the social morals of the ethical stage to choose God, which is an act of faith. According to Morris (1979), Kierkegaard viewed self-actualization (“process of coming to be”) and creativity as expressed in the subjective
process of becoming and the individual’s creation of personal, existential freedom. Hence he referred to “the subject who exists in the isolation of his inwardness…” (Kierkegaard, 1964b, p. 177): constantly in the process of becoming.
Several concepts developed by Kierkegaard were also taken up by Martin Heiddegger to provide a basis for existential thought. One of those concepts was “dread”, existential anxiety. Existential anxiety is without any real object. In existential anxiety, Kierkegaard theorized that people become conscious of their intentions, choices and actions. Existential anxiety is assumed to be a motivating force which arouses strong defences, in the denial of death anxiety, fear of freedom and the selection of defensive choices, which is an aspect of inauthenticity (Owen, 1994).
2.2.2 Modern expre ssions of existentialism: Sartre’s atheism
Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980), a French writer of novels, plays, and philosophical essays, was probably the most popular existentialist of the twentieth century. Jean-Paul Sartre deserves credit for having explained in his popular writings the main theses of existentialism in the technical terms of philosophy, while at the same time rendering them accessible to the lay reader. According to Sartre, existence precedes essence. He asserted that existence defines the essence of an individual. He placed radical emphasis on choice, and that each person creates his or her own values and morality (Brennan, 1998a; Foulquie, 1947; Owen, 1994; Sartre, 1964).
Sartre argued that man chooses his essence. He distinguished between the universal essence, that which makes us man, and the individual essence, that which makes us this or that particular man – timid or brave, honest or dishonest. However, there are things we cannot choose: the social class into which we are born, our height, or our intelligence, but the attitude we adopt towards this crude fact depends upon ourselves. Above all, the choices that we make in the course of our lives depend upon the objectives that we have set ourselves (Foulquie, 1947). Thus, choice making is goal-directed and intentional.
Sartre’s ideas on existentialism contradicted those of Kierkegaard at the level of theism. Although Sartre strongly believed in human freedom of choice and the subsequent
responsibilities, he maintained that human freedom cannot accommodate the belief that there is God (Luypen & Dondeyne, 1960; Sartre, 1956, 1964). In Sartre’s atheism, God is not the King of mankind, for a human being is free. If God had wanted to rule human beings, He should not have created them as free beings. According to Sartre, “man has one law - his own” (Luypen & Dondeyne, 1960, p.316). Man is nothing else but what he makes of himself. According to Sartre, this is the first principle of existentialism: existence precedes essence (Sartre, 1956, 1964).
Therefore, freedom consists of a human being as completely independent from God. Sartre saw human freedom as a freedom to choose; the only compulsion in life is to choose. Thus, to live is to choose. These ideas culminated in Sartre’s famous dictum; “I am condemned to freedom”. Being human is fundamentally a choice in the world. He believed the essence of being human is freedom and one’s duty of self-determination and self- responsibility. In other words, there is no determinism, man is free, man is freedom (Marcel, 1948; Owen, 1994; Sartre, 1956, 1964).
The aim of Sartre’s existential ‘psychoanalysis’ was to find the essence of the client’s life and world, based on “the desire to be”. The original choice (project) a client makes can be traced to a decision a client has made to structure his or her world by means of some object or viewpoint. For Sartre (1956), an action is on principle intentional, explaining “the desire to be”. There are different kinds of choices though. We can choose to choose, or choose not to choose. Also, there are things outside the reach of choice. Sartre believed it was possible to deduce the sense of a person’s being, by an analysis of the regular types of aims, awareness and choices that a client made (Owen, 1994).
2.2.3 Implications of the Existential Philosophy for Humanistic Psychology
Kierkegaard’s concept of subjectivity is similar to the humanistic approach in that humanistic psychologists incorporate subjectivity in two ways: Firstly in the justification of their approach towards a new definition of science whose origin is immediate personal subjective experience. Secondly, humanistic psychologists understand the person as subject or self. Kierkegaard dedicated his efforts towards the rediscovery of the subjective, of the
individual self (Morris, 1979). Subjectivity is central to Carl Roger’s person-centered theory in the form of self-concept.
Kierkegaard and humanistic psychologists use the ontological base of existentialism to develop their positions on individuality, freedom, autonomy, decision, responsibility, authenticity, self-actualization, and the self that becomes creative (Morris, 1979). Other existential motifs are intersubjectivity, temporality, individuality, death, anxiety, ethics, guilt, choice, and the search to find the key essence of human nature (Owen, 1994). Similar to Sartre, Kierkegaard believed that freedom is created through decision.
Morris (1979, p. 76) listed several features that bring Kierkegaard’s existentialism closer to humanistic psycho logy:
§ A holistic perspective of the person is employed where the sum is greater than its parts.
§ Emphasis is on the client as a unique individual whose phenomenal perspective is as valid as the therapist’s.
§ Time is interpreted in relation to the future whic h is contained in the present.
§ Change is viewed as a continuous process rather than as a simplistic “before and after” sequence.
This model consists of imaginative involvement and intentionality on the part of the client. The therapist serves as an active reflector of subjective thinking. The future evolves within the context of dialogue and mutuality between therapist and client. Similarly, Karl Jasper’s existential philosophy emphasised communication as dialogue. Jaspers argued that communication opens thinking space, associated with the freedom of thought (Young-Breuhl, 1981).
However, Garrison (2001) expressed concern over the interpretation of human values as done by humanistic psychologists. Garrison suggested that theorists and practitioners of humanistic psychology should work to clarify their definition of the human condition that acknowledges the situation of human being within the larger realities that give human life meaning. He argued that the conception of human values by humanistic psychologists is ‘inward’ towards the ‘self’, rather than relating to the outside world. The romantic tradition
of the “Third Force” psychology drew attention to the individual person’s potential for self-transformation, growth, and freedom.
What was essentially human was an inner drive towards health, and wholeness, which was often stifled or compromised by society. However, this inner drive could be therapeutically reawakened in the presence of empathy and understanding. Garrison (2001) referred to this kind of theorising as “humanistic innerness”. He associates them with the drives pertinent to psychoanalysis, due to lack of interaction with society. Adams (1999) proposed an
‘interpermeation’ between the self and world where the two fuse and relate reciprocally in a co-creation of new meaning. Miars (2002) referred to the ‘self- and-world’ construct system that gives the client’s life meaning.
From the deliberations above, it appears that existentialism is a conscious process and subjective. These attributes bring the concept of existentialism closer to phenomenology. Similar to phenomenology, existentialism is immanent (inwardly directed) in terms of Kierkegaard’s ‘subjectivity’. Kierkegaard theorised that people become conscious of their intentions, actions, and choices. Because people are in the process of becoming, this brings existentialism much closer to the humanistic concept of ‘self- actualization’. The existential phrases “to emerge”, “to be”, and “being” are transcendental in description, akin to the ontological phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. This brings us to the view of phenomenology as a transcendental science.
2.3 PHENOMENOLOGY
Phenomenology is defined as the philosophical doctrine that advocates that the scientific study of immediate experience be the basis of psychology. Phenomenology was founded by Edmund Husserl with emphasis on events, happenings, occurrences, and so forth, as one experiences them, with a minimum regard for the external, physical reality, and for the scientific biases of the natural sciences (Reber & Reber 2001). Thus, phenomenology is the study of phenomena as they are immediately presented to experience (Foulquie, 1947). Akin to Foulquie’s definition of phenomenology, Heidegger (1962) defined phenomenology as the science of phenomena.
Moustakas (1994) indicated that the word “phenomenon” comes from the Greek
phaenesthai, meaning to flare up, to show itself, to appear. Constructed from phaino, “phenomenon” means to bring to light, to place in brightness, “to show itself in itself, the totality of what lies before us in the light of day” (p. 26). According to Heidegger (1962), the Greek expression of the term ‘phenomenon’ has the equivalence of the phrase “to show itself”. The expression ‘phenomenon’ signifies “that which shows itself in itself”, the manifest. ‘Phenomena’ are the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to the light. They may be expressed as ‘entities’.
Segal (1999) defined phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy that attempts to give a direct description of experience as it is in itself without taking into account its psychological origin and its causal explanation. The method used to achieve this is called phenomenological reduction, which implies putting aside all preconceived ideas about the event under focus.
The objective reality of events is not denied, but an effort is made to avoid paying a particular focus to them rather than to the way they are perceived and experienced.
Moustakas (1994) maintains that phenomena are the building blocks of human science and the basis of all knowledge precisely because subjective experience precedes the natural scientific method.
Phenomenology began with the philosophy of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) who argued for unbiased observations of phe nomena as a means of understanding the world (Hansen, 1999; Husserl, 1931). It was the controversy relative to the existence of the material world – or rather the external world as distinct from the internal world of psychic life – which led Husserl to the phenomenological attitude. The phenomenological movement comprises of a philosophical method which makes use of descriptions which are phenomenological in the ordinary sense of the word, but which regards them only as a means of reaching that which lies beyond the phenomenon (Foulquie, 1947). Hence, phenomenology is regarded as a transcendental science.
Husserl’s approach was academic; his goal was to find a philosophy of science that is empirically rigorous but excludes the breaking down of the subject matter into its
constituent elements. The implication was that an experience should be perceived as a whole rather than its constituent elements. Hence, Ellenberger (1958) described Husserl’s phenomenology as basically a methodological principle, intended to provide a firm basis for the foundation of a new psychology and of a universal philosophy.
The implication of the Husserlian phenomenology is the relatedness of a person to his or her world, the physical reality. That is, the subject and the object relate intentionally through consciousness (Husserl, 1931). This approach to rational knowledge differs with Cartesian dualism, emanating from Rene Descartes (1596-1650) who advocated that objective reality can be studied separately by scientific means of identification, measurement, and prediction (Pretorius & Segal, 2001).
According to Husserl (1977), Descartes gave transcendental phenomenology new impulses through his “Meditations”; their study acted quite directly on the transformation of an already developing phenomenology into a new kind of transcendental philosophy. The aim of the “Meditations” was a complete reforming of philosophy into a science grounded on an absolute foundation. Luypen and Dondeyne (1960) argued that Descartes accepted from the material world only that which could be expressed in terms of quantity. Cartesian dualism saw objective reality as separate from the experiencing subject, hence, the subject-object dichotomy. Its conception of reality affirms the guiding principles of the natural sciences.
Husserl contended that subjective and objective realities are mutually related and reciprocally determined; opposed to the emphasis on objective reality as separate from subjective experience (illustrated by the subject-object dichotomy in Cartesian dualism). Husserl’s phenomenology is based on the concept of intentionality. Intentionality here refers to consciousness, that is, the internal experience of being conscious of something. Thus, the act of consciousness and the object of consciousness are intentionally related (Husserl, 1931; Moustakas, 1994). Through intentionality, a person relates with the objective world. The interrelatedness is realised by means of phenomenological reduction.
2.3.1 Phenomenological reduction
Husserl’s phrase: “back to the things themselves”, is perhaps a simplified description of what phenomenological reduction is (Luypen, 1966; Pretorius & Segal, 2001). The phrase is a formulation of an intention to return to the world of original experience and the wealth of meanings which can be found there. Luypen (1966) maintains that this return must be without any prior theorizing about experience. That is, all preconceptions about an experience must be removed.
Luypen (1966) thus describes phenomenological reduc tion as “an instrument by means of which we can filter out the distorting influences of cultural and scientific prejudices” (p. 21). Phenomenological reduction implies that one gives a qualitative description of what one sees in consciousness (phenomenon), without any preconceived judgements. The process of suspending the preconceived assumptions is called “bracketing”. For bracketing to be a definite process, one needs to make clear these assumptions such that they are distinguishable to oneself in order to be set aside.
In the presence of a phenomenon, which could be an external object or a state of mind, the phenomenologist uses an unbiased approach; he observes phenomena as they manifest themselves and only as they manifest themselves. This observation is accomplished by means of an operation of the mind which Husserl called the “epoche”, or “psychological-phenomenological reduction”. The observer “puts the world between brackets”, that is, he or she excludes not only any judgement of value about the phe nomena but also any affirmation whatever concerning their cause and background (Ellenberger, 1958; Moustakas, 1994).
Ellenberger (1958) asserted that the observer also strives to transcend the subject-object dichotomy; he or she excludes the distinction of subject and object and any affirmation about the existence of the object and of the observing subject. In this manner observation is greatly enhanced: the less apparent elements of phenomena manifest themselves with increasing richness and variety, and previously unnoticed structures of phenomena may become apparent.
Valle et al., (1989) argued that bracketing describes a cycle between the pre-reflective thought and the reflective thought. The concept ‘pre-reflective’ describes something that gives birth to our reflective awareness. Reflective thought refers to the cognitive process where one thoughtfully reflects on a phenomenon as it appears in consciousness. As one brackets his or her preconceptions, more of these appear at the level of reflective awareness. That is, that which was originally pre-reflective becomes accessible at the level of reflective thought. This leads to the emergence and the subsequent realisation of new assumptions. The process continues in this linear fashion to infinity.
2.3.2 Consciousness as intentionality
Consciousness itself is intentional (Luypen, 1966; Moustakas, 1994). Consciousness is always and of necessity must be consciousness of something, something which is not consciousness itself. “If the ‘something’ which is no t consciousness itself is thought away, consciousness itself also is thought away” (Luypen & Dondeyne, 1960, p. 20). Thus, consciousness is not just locked up in itself but is ever intentional in relation to objective reality. Consciousness can thus be described as an intercourse with reality.
Husserl (cited in Segal, 1999) viewed consciousness as an intentional act through which a person lets the world appear to him or her. Therefore, in Husserl’s terms, an individual is able to focus on the things he wishes to know. In this manner, the ‘intended’ object makes itself known to the individual. From the viewpoint of phenomenology, whether the object actually exists or not makes no difference. Therefore, consciousness is not merely passive but is the active revelation of objects.
Intentional acts are acts of consciousness. Moustakas (1994) and Valle et al., (1989) argued that intentionality is equivalent to consciousness, to the internal experience of being conscious of something. When speaking of consciousness, one also refers to its intended object as well. Intentionality resembles the ongoing dimension of consciousness. It is about awareness of and relation to what is beyond an individual. Consciousness is itself intentional. Without consciousness there is no world. However, the word “intention” in this context holds a different meaning from that in its daily use, where it means that which one proposes or plans to do. In the phenomenological sense, it means consciousness itself.
2.3.3 Heiddegger’s “being-in-the -world”
Martin Heiddegger (1889-1976) described philosophy as a study of being, whereas Hurssel contended that consciousness is the core theme of philosophy (Brennan, 1998a). Heidegger (1962) argued that ‘being’ is the most universal concept. The ‘universality’ of being is not that of class or genus. The ‘universality’ of being ‘transcends’ any universality of genus. ‘Being’ may therefore be designated as a ‘transcendence’. According to Heidegger (1962), the concept of ‘Being’ is indefinable. I probably attribute this fact to the transcendental status of ‘Being’. In Heidegger’s terms, “Being” cannot be derived from higher concepts by definition, nor can it be presented through lower ones. It cannot be expressed as an entity.
Heidegger proclaimed that, “the essence of man lies in his existence” (Luypen, 1966, p.56). He asserted that a human being is a being concerned with his or her being. A person’s concern for his or her being defines what a person is. According to Frie (2000), Heidegger called for the return to the meaning of Being as such. He referred to the human being that questions the meaning of Being as Dasein. The word ‘Dasein’ does not have a direct English equivalent (often used untranslated) except in the relatively rare passages in which Heidegger himself breaks it up with a hyphen (‘Da-sein’) to show its etymological construction: literally ‘Being-there’ (Heidegger, 1962). Thus, the English equivalent of
Dasein is roughly estimated as being-there. Heidegger (1962) argued that Dasein is neither autonomous nor self-contained, but always already situated in the world. Thus, Dasein exists as ‘being-in-the-world’.
Because Dasein exists as ‘being- in-the-world’, it is ontological. That is, Dasein exists within the world of other entities, the world of Being- with-one-another. The concept of “falling” or “thrownness” was used to elaborate on this notion. The “falling” of Dasein referred to the basic kind of Being which belongs to everydayness. This term does not express any negative evaluation, but is used to signify that Dasein is inherently alongside
the ‘world’ of its concern. Dasein has fallen away from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and has fallen into the ‘world’. “Fallenness” into the ‘world’ means an absorption in ‘Being-with-one-another’, the latter being guided by curiosity and ambiguity (Heidegger, 1962).
Heidegger (1962) associates the ambiguity inherent in ‘fallenness’ with the concept of
anxiety. In the face of which one has anxiety, the ‘It is nothing and nowhere’ becomes manifest. Because of this “nothingness”, the ‘world’ becomes a place in which one has anxiety. Anxiety takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, it throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about –its authentic potentiality- for-Being- in-the-world. With that which it is anxious about, anxiety discloses Dasein as Being-possible.
The analysis of Being-in-the-world as ‘anxiety’ (“existential analysis”) is the basis of existential therapy. May (1958a) asserted that one of the major and far-reaching contributions of the existential therapists is the understanding of the person-in-his-world. Similarly, Heiddegger regarded human existence as “being- in-the-world”, a concept later fashioned by existential therapists into psychotherapy in the form of the three modes of ‘world’ (Ellenberger, 1958; Ghaemi, 2001; May 1958a). See Section 3.3.1 below.
Binswanger (1958) argued that by identifying the basic condition or structure of existence with Being- in-the-world, Heidegger intended to put a message forth about the condition of the possibility for existence. Binswanger asserted that the formulation “Being- in-the-world” is an ontological thesis, a statement about an essential condition that determines existence in general. As shall be discussed in the next chapter, Binswanger applied Heidegger’s formulation into psychotherapy and thus coined the concept “existential analysis”.
According to Binswanger (cited in Frie, 2000), Heidegger’s fundamental ontology provided an analysis of the primary structures of human existence and constituted a necessary foundation for the human sciences. Binswanger was interested in the ontological orientation of Heidegger’s phenomenology. As interpreted by Binswanger, the notion of “Being- in-the-world” signifies that we are not isolated individuals, but beings who are always in relation to other humans and the world around us. The implication is that there is neither a subject-object dichotomy nor a division between subjective and subject-objective experience.
2.3.4 Application of the phenomenological principles to psychotherapy
According to Owen (1994), Husserl’s concept of ‘bracketing’ is applicable to existential-phenomenological practice. Owen argued that the existential-existential-phenomenological therapy rejects any imposition of a rigid agenda, assumptions, presuppositions and hypotheses by therapists about clients.
Owen argued that bracketing can also be used in requesting clients to describe how they see a problematic situation again, and this encourages a search for new information. The existential-phenomenological approach encourages a minimal use of extraneous material to encourage clients constructing their own perception of their circumstances and how they relate to their world.
Varghese (cited in Nissim-Sabat, 1995) discussed the value of adopting the phenomenological method developed by Husserl as a means of conceptualising psychopathology and therapeutic change. Varghese conceptualises psychopathological states in epistemological terms as maladaptive paradigms. According to Varghese, paradigms are psychic constructs that enable people to make sense of their experience by viewing judgements as truths known with certainty. Judgements within a paradigm are thus protected from challenge, even when contradicted by experience. However, a paradigm may collapse under weight of a new experience to be replaced by another, more adaptive one.
Tyler (1992) described a paradigm as constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and so on, shared by the members of a given community. Paradigms are invisible and unnoticed and yet they largely determine the way that we interpret our experiences. Phenomenology maintains that these underlying paradigms affect our thinking and our understanding of experience as well as our interactions with the environment and our relationship with each other.
Varghese argued that psychopathology impedes the process of growth by rendering paradigms more resistant to change. For Varghese, empathy is a matter of grasping the paradigms, or epistemological constructs, through which patients construe their experiences. The therapist can achieve this by adopting an attitude that is maximally free
from bias; otherwise, the patient’s paradigm will be filtered through the therapist’s and thereby distorted (Nissim-Sabat, 1995).
For Varghese, optimal empathy or being with the client is enabled through an epistemological stance that will yield the capacity to encounter the raw data of experience without pre-existing judgements that will distort it. The phenomenologically inclined therapist would thus refrain from attaching any presumed idea to the raw data of the patient’s experience. This allows the therapist ‘to be where the client is’ in his or her suffering as well as in his or her uncertainty. In this manner, the client experiences the therapist as being with him or her and the fear of stepping into uncertainty is averted (Nissim-Sabat, 1995).
In a similar vein of grasping the client’s paradigm, Ellenberger (1958) argued that we do not understand what the psychotic individual really experiences. Verbal formulations that describe hallucination as a perception without object, or delusion as erroneous judgement which is maintained in spite of contrary evidence, are given. But these formulations are unable to convey to us anything of how a mental patient actually experiences a hallucination or delusion. The task of the phenomenologist is to grasp the subjective experience of the patient more fully than could be done with the older, classical frame of reference.
I regard the interchangeability that exists between existentialism and phenomenology as crucial in the prevalence of existential-phenomenology. This tendency is particularly evident in Kierkegaard’s conception of anxiety as “dread” akin to similar postulations by Martin Heidegger. As indicated above, both existentialism and phenomenology apply to humanistic oriented therapies. The goal directedness of the concept of “becoming” in existentialism and Husserl’s epoche as applicable in ‘empathy’ and psychopathology, bear testimony to the thesis above. Humanism as a philosophy incorporates the elements of both existentialism and phenomenology, in that humanism can be secular, transcendental, and existential. Section 2.4. below (Humanism) demonstrates that fact.
2.4 HUMANISM
Philosophically, humanism has its roots in phenomenological and existential philosophy. Psychological humanism has much in common with the existential and phenomenological philosophy because of its emphasis on free will and subjectivity (Hansen, 2000). The humanistic tradition has always been concerned with the full development of the person. The discussions below reflect this sentiment.
A brief history on the development of the humanistic tradition is presented. The history begins with the European Renaissance period, with emphasis on the appreciation and imitation of Greek and Roman architecture, art, and literature, including stylistic features (Criswell, 2000).
The ideological expressions of Humanism are published in “The Humanist” (a magazine of critical inquiry and social concern), launched by the American Humanist Association (AHA) in the spring of 1941. Over the decades, “The Humanist” had elaborated on broad human principles pertaining to altruism; spiritual meaning and value of life; creative and aesthetic endeavours; as well as applications specific to contemporary moral, cultural, and social issues (Leuba, 2001).
According to Doerr (2002), the AHA did not favour the division of Humanism into categories but opted for an unmodified and holistic approach. In addition to the philosophical explication of Humanism, three categories shall be discussed as proposed by Kendler (1987). These are, transcendental humanism, secular humanism, and existential humanism. The three types are given attention because of the implications they bear on the Third Force psychology.
2.4.1 Philosophical foundations of Humanism
The humanistic tradition has always been concerned with the full development of the person. Humanism was the term originally used in the European Renaissance period, which lasted approximately from the 14th to the 17th centuries. The word Renaissance is medieval French for rebirth. The Renaissance period marked the transition between the medieval and
the ‘modern’ period. It first appeared in Italy and represented the rediscovery of classical Greek and Roman manuscripts and the values they expressed (Criswell, 2000).
Criswell (2000) stated that there was, during the Renaissance period, a flowering of the arts, sciences, and literature, and an appreciation for individual endeavours. Thus, the Renaissance man was considered a man of universal genius: someone with expertise in several areas and broad interests and abilities. In the Renaissance spirit, the humanistic tradition brings together the mind and body, and the arts and the sciences. This reconciliation of dichotomous aspects leads towards a powerful development of human potential for all.
Doerr (2002) took the definition of humanism to even broader horizons. Doerr asserts that humanism is a progressive life-stance that affirms our ability and responsibility to lead ethical lives of personal fulfilment that aspire to the greater good of humanity. For Doerr, humanism recognizes that life is more than cognitive and appreciates the full range of human emotions, from the varied reactions to life’s tragedies to the wonder and awe at our natural self and surroundings.
However, Doerr (2002) argued that the modifiers placed in front of the concept Humanism in order to distinguish and clarify it are themselves confusing and unnecessary. The examples of these are “scientific humanism” in encyclopaedias or “secular humanism” under vicious attack from the religious right. Doerr’s argument is that if scientific humanism exists, then there is “unscientific humanism” existing elsewhere, and this can be misleading. Hence, the American Humanist Association (AHA), the oldest and the largest Humanist organisation in North America, leaves Humanism unmodified, offering it in its fullness without qualification.
Kendler (1987) maintained that the dominant theme of humanism is the exaltation of freedom. People should be given the freedom to decide their own fate (bearing in mind the Italian Renaissance of the fourteenth century) instead of having their future dictated to them by the church or state. With regard to the issues of knowledge, humanism allows individuals the freedom to interpret knowledge in their own enlightened way.
Because of the freedom in the interpretation of knowledge, Kendler (1987) asserted that various forms of humanism emerged.
Unlike Doerr (2002), Kendler had preferred to elucidate on the three types of humanism, which are transcendental humanism, secular humanism, and existential humanism. I had preferred to discuss the three humanistic categories because of their bearing on the “Third Force” (Humanistic) ideology and psychology in general. However, the common themes of personal freedom, human values, and respect for classical knowledge remain engrained in these categories.
2.4.1.1Transcendental humanism
The basic assumption of transcendental humanism is that important ideas need not be based on empirical observation. The two possible sources of such ideas are the intuitions of the mind and mystical experience. Therefore, transcendental humanism is more a state of the mind than a systematic philosophy. Transcendental humanism advocates the romantic and idealistic notions that the human spirit is godlike and that the ultimate authority of a person’s conduct is his or her own conscience (Kendler, 1987).
Maslow (1968/1999) is one of the major proponents of mystical experience as the ‘ultimate’ in self-actualization. He refers to mystical experiences as “peak experiences”. Peak experiences resemble transcendence. Maslow attributes peak experiences to self-actualized people. For Maslow, peak experiences epitomize a higher level of integration and personal identity. The detailed description of peak experiences and the accompanying arguments are presented under Section 4.3.2.1 below.
2.4.1.2 Secular humanism
Secular humanism rejects the religious principle that God created man in his own image and proposes instead that a human being created God in his own image. This view merges with Sartre’s atheism (cited in Luypen & Dondeyne, 1960), which stresses human freedom above the existence of God. Therefore, man is not dependent on God. Secular humanism argues that because of their intrinsic freedom, people are capable of arriving at moral
principles and a philosophy of life in the absence of any dogmatic claims of some higher authority (Kendler, 1987).
Ellis (1996) asserted that secular humanism is opposite to the religious, mystical, and spiritual humanism. Secular humanists view persons as unique individuals who always choose to live in a social group. They try to live together peacefully, fairly, and democratically. The personalities of individuals are an ongoing, constructing and reconstructing process. Secular humanists acknowledge that humans have the ability to imagine, fantasize, and strongly believe in superhuman entities and powers such as gods, angels, spirits, and fairies. However, Ellis (1996) indicated that belief in such spirits may help some people to overcome emotional problems such as anxiety. But devout belief in improbable gods and spirits may create difficulties such as dependency, dogma, and war against believers holding a slightly different dogma.
2.4.1.3 Existential humanism
Existential humanism, on the other hand, stresses the principle that the only universe that actually exists resides in human subjective experience. Existential philosophers like Soren Kierkegaard and Jean-Paul Sartre did enough to popularise existentialism. One basic obsession in existentialism was to break free from the “illusion of objectivity” of the natural scientific approach and formal systems of philosophy (Kendler, 1987). Living is seen as a conscious process; and ultimate freedom is the freedom to make choices. In order to cope with the chaos of life, the individual must give meaning to his or her own life.
One of the existential thinkers who emphasized “meaning” was Viktor Frankl (1969/1988; 1984). According to Frankl, life holds meaning even in the course of suffering, an assertion that he developed from personal experiences in the death camps of the Second World War. Like secular humanists, Frankl (1969/1988; 1984) viewed humans as conscious beings with a capacity to derive meaning from their existence. However, Frankl maintained that self-realisation moved beyond self-actualization into self-transcendence, a state he described as akin to experiencing God.
I have considered the three types of Humanism because of the applicability to existential-humanistic approach of the “Third Force” related psychotherapies and its view of man as a self-actualizing being. Although Secular Humanism is the most influential of the three, Transcendental and Existential Humanisms have a significant stake in humanistic psychology. Rollo May’s and Ludwig Binswager’s “existential analysis” had adopted the existential and phenomenological principles into psychotherapy. Transcendental Humanism compares significantly with Abraham Maslow’s Transpersonal Psychology, based on mystical experiences and phenomenological principles. The predominant theme of ‘self-actualization’ in “Third Force” psychology is based on Secular Humanism, that the potential to achieve lies in the person. The adaptation of Humanism into psychology yields psychological humanism.
2.4.2 Psychological Humanism and the “Third Force” movement
Brennan (1998a, 1998b), preferred the concept of “Third Force” Movement to denote that which is neither psychoanalysis nor behaviourism. The concepts of “Third Force psychology” and “Humanistic Psychology” shall be used interchangeably as various authors use them to denote the same thing. I have preferred the use of “Third Force” Movement to signify the historical emphasis of its origins and the broad theoretical views that define the movement. The details on the historical development of the Third Force Movement and its contributions to mainstream psychology are discussed in the Chapter 3. The purpose of this section is to illustrate on how the ideas of psychological humanism emerge as the core philosophy of the Third Force Movement.
Embodied in the “Third Force” Movement in psychology, psychological humanism emerged as a reaction to the reductionist orientation of psychoanalysis and behaviourism. Early humanists emphasised treating the client as a whole person and were thus opposed to the prevailing theories of psychology of the time that reduced people to mechanistic collections of psychic parts (psychoanalysis) or discrete behaviours (behaviourism). According to humanists, a reductionist mind-set is an obstacle to apprehending the true experience of the person, a process that is essential for effective psychotherapy (Hansen, 2000).
Humanism owes its current form to the thinkers of ancient traditions, the scientific and social reformers of the European Renaissance, and the progressive thoughts of the twentieth century that shaped Humanism and founded the AHA. In familiar usage, the word humanism can mean different things to different people in different contexts. However, the AHA distinguishes the life-stance of Humanism from other usages by ‘uppercasing’ the word (Doerr, 2002).
Hansen (2000) alludes to the fact that Humanism is a complex psychological movement, and theorists have stressed various factors that constitute the humanistic mindset. In a broad sense, Humanism has placed emphasis on the freedom, subjectivity, and ‘will’ of the existentialist movement and combined it with the optimistic American mind-set. Thus, Humanism is a unique hybrid of existentialism (without pessimism), phenomenology (emphasis on understanding consciousness and human subjectivity), and the postwar American optimism of the 1950’s. Humanistic theorists, therefore, emphasize the inherent capacity for growth and “the importance of the therapist grasping and empathizing with the unique subjective experience of clients” (Hansen, 2000, p.22).
The humanistic tenets espoused by the founders of the Association for Humanistic Psychology (AHP) are basically creative: that humans behave out of intentionality and values. Humanistic psychologists differ widely in their approaches to application, but share some common elements as elaborated by Criswell (2000, p.75):
They focus on the experiencing person and the meaning of experience to the person; they emphasize the human qualities of choice, creativity, values, self-realization, and so on; they are concerned with problems that are meaningful to humans; their ultimate concern is with valuing the dignity and worth of humans and an interest in the development of the potential inherent in every person. Particularly important is the person as he or she discovers his or her own being and relates to other persons and social groups. From that perspective, humanistic psychology adds a “first person” focus to an essentially “third person” science.
In conclusion, Criswell (2000) asserted that humanistic psychology places its primary value on what facilitates the positive development of human beings within the unfolding universe.
Moustakas (1985) sums up when he says that the ultimate goal of humanistic psychology is the preparation of a complete description of what it means to be alive as a human being.
Criswell (2000) argued that the post- modern period had so many things in common with the principles of the humanistic tradition. According to Elkins (2000), since the birth of the “Third Force” Movement in 1964, we have seen the rise of postmodernism with its emphasis on multiple selves and transpersonal psychology and Eastern approaches on the illusion of separate selfhood. Therefore, Criswell and Elkins link the advent of postmodernism with the emergence of the Third Force psychology in the early 1960’s.
On the same note, Naudin and Azorin (1998) equated existential analysis with narrative analysis in that they both deal with the history of the client. Naudin and Azorin argued that Binswanger insisted on the narrative unity of one’s life and organized his narrative around the linear unfolding of one theme: As in a fictional narrative, there is a beginning, a development, and a close. In his narrative, the beginning and the end are not those of a disease but those of a biography. That is, the history of the patient’s disease is always connected with the history of the patient’s life.
The advent of European humanism has, without doubt, influenced events that shaped and provided impetus towards the development of the American Humanist Association. The adoption of humanistic views into psychology saw the founding of the Association for Humanistic Psychology in the early sixties. At clinical level, humanism appreciates the conscious experience of the client and a refusal to reduce client experience to underlying explanatory structures. Because humanism emphasizes free will, clients must take responsibility for their behaviour and cannot blame underlying conflicts or structures for their choices (Hansen, 2000). Humanistic psychology espouses this ideology.
The existential-phenomenological principles are thus prominent in humanistic therapies of the “Third Force” movement. This is particularly illustrated in Chapters 3 and 4 below. These Chapters illustrate the emergence of existential-phenomenological psychology and its stake in “Third Force” psychology, particularly the phenomenological principles of ‘wholism’ (akin to the Gestalt ‘field’) of experience and the principles of epoche in empathy.
CHAPTER 3
EXISTENTIAL-PHENOMENOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Existential-phenomenological psychotherapists have assimilated the ideas of existential and phenomenological philosophers into a system of psychotherapy. Like their philosophical counterparts, existential therapists are concerned with the issues of death, meaning and anxiety (Hansen, 1999). The name “existential psychotherapy” is herein used alternatively with “existential-phenomenological” to denote the same thing. This chapter is an illustration of how Ludwig Binswanger imported Heidegger’s phenomenology into psychotherapy, using “existential analysis” as therapeutic approach.
Existential analysis adopts the notion that man is an inherent part of his or her world. Through consciousness, man reaches out to the world to interpret objects and create a meaning-structure (existential structure) from the “self-and-world” interaction. Binswanger proposed three modes of “world” with connotative equivalence of the self, the biological, and the social. This chapter reviews applicability of the three dimensions to psychotherapy and the contribution of the existential-phenomenological approach to the ideology of humanistic psychology.
3.2 PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EXISTENTIAL
PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY
The two most famous writers who developed existential thought and applied phenomenology to human beings are Heidegger and Sartre. Martin Heidegger’s major existential-phenomenological work is titled “Being and Time”. It is Heidegger who brought together Husserl’s ideas on pure psychology and transcendental philosophy
Binswanger (1958) adopted Heidegger’s concept of “being- in-the-world” into existential-phenomenological psychology. Binswanger argued that Heidegger, in his concept of being-in-the-world as transcendence, had eliminated the gap between “self” and “world”. According to Binswanger, Heidegger had elucidated the structure of subjectivity as transcendence.
The German word for transcendence is Ueberstieg, meaning ‘climbing over or above, mounting’. An Ueberstieg requires, first, that towards which the Ueberstieg is directed and, secondly, that which is ueberstiegen or transcended; the first, towards which the transcendence occurs, is called the “world”, whereas the second, that which is transcended, is the “being” itself. That is, the “world” and the self constitute themselves in the act of transcending (Binswanger, 1958). Thus, Binswanger used Heidegger’s ontological themes of phenomenology to inform the basic conceptualisations of existential-phenomenological psychology.
This leads the discussion to the philosophical tenets of existential-phenomenology, and hence existential-phenomenological psychotherapy. Existential-phenomenology is a philosophical discipline that seeks to understand the events of human existence in a way that is free from the preconceptions of our value systems and the intrusions of the natural scientific approach to knowledge (Giorgi, 1971).
Existential-phenomenological psychology seeks to explicate the essence, structure, or form of human experience and behaviour as revealed through descriptive methods and disciplined reflection (Valle et al., 1989). Therefore, existential phenomenological-psychology has some traces of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. According to Worrell (1997), Husserl emphasizes consciousness as intentional, that consciousness is always consciousness of something. The descriptive method is effective in explaining that which lies within the experience of the subject.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) was one the major proponents of existential-phenomenological psychology. Merleau-Ponty described psychology as a study of individual and social relationships as they particularly link consciousness and nature. Having been influenced by the phenomenology of Husserl, Heiddegger, and Sartre,
Merleau-Ponty maintained that a human being is endowed with characteristics of consciousness beyond what is described by the traditional sciences (Brennan, 1998a).
According to Merleau-Ponty, a person is the absolute source of existence. He argued that psychology should then be the study of intentionality, and maintained that the primary subject matter of psychology must be experience. As indicated in 2.3.2 above, consciousness is intentional. Intentionality rela tes to “intersubjectivity” in which the observer and the observed are both relationally defined, that is, they co-constitute each other (Brennan, 1998a; Worrell, 1997). This assertion reiterates Heidegger’s concept of “being-in-the-world.”
Giorgi (1971) described existential-phenomenological psychology that emphasizes human experience as a core determinant of the philosophy. For the person to experience the essence of a phenomenon, all pre-conception about the phenomenon should be bracketed. Husserl’s “epoche” becomes a requirement of true experiencing. The existential-phenomenological psychotherapy adopts similar principles as illustrated in Section 3.3 below.
3.3 EXISTENTIAL-PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOTHERAPY
Existential-phenomenological psychotherapy has its roots in Heidegger’s phenomenology, with the influence of Husserl’s ideas on consciousness and phenomenological reduction. Worrell (1997) maintained that existential-phenomenological psychology has as its philosophical bedrock the relational concepts of ‘intentionality’ and ‘intersubjectivity’. The basic proposition is that all mental activity, affect and behaviour, is relationally constituted. The “self” and “world” co-constitute each other. Consciousness is held to a relational act; it is consciousness because of objects, other subjects, or ideas in the world.
Consciousness reaches out to the world to interpret objects, retrieving them as meaningful things. Consciousness is not separate from the world; consciousness is always consciousness of something. Therefore, human beings are seen as constantly involved in the interpretation of reality both in terms of the perception of objects as well as interpersonal perception. Thus, ‘meaning’ is regarded as a creation and is relative, and a result of a
relational process between human beings (Worrell, 1997). Meaning making is a theme of existential psychotherapy.
In applying phenomenological ‘bracketing’ in existential-phenomenological therapy, Owen (1994) argued that one consequence of phenomenology for existential therapy is to request that people talk from their own experience about things they have personally felt, heard and seen. An assumption of phenomenology is that consciousness can become conscious at some point in life. The material that is hidden in the preconscious can be brought to awareness through an act of ‘pure’ description.
In contrast with the client-centered approach, the therapist-client relationship is not defined by the reflection of the patient’s words and emotions. May and Yalom (1989) contended that the process of reflection reduces the client’s capacity to experience himself or herself as an individual in his or her own right, thus resulting in an amorphous kind of identity. Consequently, the client cannot stand against the therapist or experience being in an interpersonal world.
According to Owen (1994), the therapeutic relationship in existential therapy has an egalitarian character. The relationship in therapy is based around having trust in oneself. Corey (2001) argued that the therapist’s trust is important in teaching clients to trust their own capacity to discover a new source of values. In order to engage with the trusting person, the existential therapist eschews any demand for instant healing from a needy client. The locus of control is shared, and therapists may vary their presence in the sessions.
Acceptance is a major therapeutic subject. The therapist accepts the client’s ‘maps of the world’ and challenge safely and appropriately and thereby encourages reappraisal and reinterpretation by bracketing and helps the client to imagine different possible worlds. Thus, existential psychotherapy enables clients to change via the exploration of client’s worlds and histories. Existential therapy challenges the client to embrace a life which accepts pain, human inevitabilities, death, existential indebtedness without end, and those things that cannot be changed or carried out (Owen, 1994). Provided suffering is unavoidable, meaning is possible (Frankl, 1984).
The search for meaning is one of the core essentials of the existential-phenomenological therapy. Corey (2001) asserted that a distinctly human characteristic is the struggle for a sense of significance and purpose in life. According to Corey, the underlying conflicts that bring people to therapy are centered in these existential questions: What do I want from life? What gives my life purpose? Where is the source of meaning in life? Frankl (1984) argued that the meaning of life differs from person to person, and from time to time, in such a way that one cannot have a constantly held meaning.
Frankl (1984, 1969/1988) coined the word “logotherapy” for his approach to existential therapy. Logotherapy emphasizes meaning. “Logos” is a Greek word which denotes “meaning”. Logogtherapy focuses on the meaning of human existence as well as the search for such a meaning. This striving to find meaning in one’s life is the primary motivational force in man. This meaning is unique in that it can be satisfied by the individual alone; only then does it achieve a significance which will satisfy his own will to meaning.
The task of logotherapy is to assist the client to find meaning in his or her life. Logotherapy makes the client aware of the hidden logos inhis or her existence; it is an analytical process. In this regard, logotherapy resembles psychoanalysis (Frankl, 1984). According to Owen (1994), the difference between the two is that psychoanalysis relies on inflexible assumptions, while the existential-phenomenological approach includes facilitating clients in interpreting themselves, to make sense of their own world.
Frankl (1969/1988) went beyond the uniqueness of meaning to elucidate on values. Frankl maintained that there are meanings which are shared by human beings across society and throughout history. Rather than being related to unique situations, these meanings refer to the human condition. These meanings are called values. Thus one may define values as “those meaning universals which crystallize in the typical situations a society or even humanity has to face” (Frankl, 1969/1988, p. 56).
Therefore, the existential-phenomenological approach stresses the therapist-client relationship and the search for meaning by the client. The therapist does not impose himself or herself on the client, but facilitates the client to interpret his or her own existence. The therapeutic relationship is egalitarian; it is called the I-Thou relationship in existential
