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Ozone Lessons and Climate Change
81 19E; lhe torld had been shocked by the discovery of Lhe Anlarctic "ozone hole," a recurring and prec\lirous decrease in dle proLectir€ slrelospheric ozone conccnlration in a huge and expanding area surrounding tire Sourh Pole. FuLther[rore, nosr scientists stud\ing rhis problem agreed that this phenonenon is related to and confirms the theory that chlorofluorocarbons (CFC5) pose a threat to the ozore layer, which was first proposed 13 )'ears earlier,by physical chemists F S. Ror,land and Mario J. Molina. ln 198; an interrlational conference of political and scjenrifrc delegates frorn both developed and developing nanons, meeting in \{ontreaL. canada, reached historic agreen,enr that few political analysrs had thought was possible: rhe Montreal Protocol, $'hich committed the signatory nations to significantil reducing the use of CFCs and reiated induslrial chemicals.
In subsequenr Years. as evidence of the destruction ol stratospheric ozone resuldng Irom atmosphedc contamination by these substaoces mounted- lhis iniLial agreemenr was strengthened, aud by 1996 rhe production of CFCs by developed narions bad oeen Danneo.
Richard Elliot Benedick is a seasoned diplomat with rnany years of experience in the U.S. Foreign Servjce. As cleplty assisLant secrelan'of state for environneut, health, and natural resource issues, he was assigned !o be the chief U-S. ncgotrator at the Montreal meeting. ln Ozone Diplomacy: Nela, Di?".tions rn SafeguaiLrng the Plarret (Harvard Universiq, press, 1991, l99B)- he describes the lessons he learncd fiom that expedence. 1n the follo]'ing selecrion, which has been taken from the firsr and last chapters of Olone Dil,lonrac], Bcnedick explains how thcse lessons can be applied in the quest lor inlernational agrccmenrs on other imporLant global environmental problems. In pa icular, he emphasizes the neecl for acdon on the mor'e complex and difficult issue of reducing the potentially disasnous consequences of clinate change due to atmospheric accumulation of greenhouse gases.
Key Concept: straregles for negotiatiDg intemarional environrnental agreements
A New Global Diplomacy:
Expeimenting with Planet Earth
The Altarctic ozone hole conr.eyed a warning. Nature is capable of producing unpleasant surprises. Even seem- ingly small interferences-in this case, an increase in strat- ospheric chlorine concentrations of a little more than one part per billion-cou1d trigger dramatic ard sudden reac- hons. Recent expedence with the forests of central Europe and North America indicates that other areas may also hare urLforeseen fhre>lrolds beyond which ndtuJdl proc- esses are unable to absorb the assaults of contemporarv economie:. The world may rrot lrar e Lhe lu>.ury of early u'anring signals before ar-L irreversible collapse occurs in some other segment of the planet's ecosystem. . . .
The new environmental threats to national and plan- etary security--of which climate change appears to be the most far-reaching--challenge both traditional science and diplomacy. A new science has evoh'ed in recent years, made possible by advalces in computer mod- eling, satellites, and measurement technologies. Known as earth systems science, tl"ds discipline attempts to inte- grate chemishy, physics, biolog1., geology, anthropology, meteorology, oceanography, and other subjects h order to understand more full1. the interrelated forces that govern this plarlet. ln 19E6 the krtemational Coulcil of Scientific Unions (ICSU) launched a long-term interdis- ciplinary initiative that has been de:cribed as the biggest intemational scientific effort ever organized. Its purpose is to develop new insights into planetary processes and the ways they are being affected by humar activities.
Designated as the Intemational Geosphere-Biosphere Programme, it was adopted unanimously by the more 1 1 9
120 Global \Varming and Ozone Deplerior.r
ttran 70 national acadernies and 20 internationai scientific unions that form the membership or ICSU-a manifes- tation of universal concern about the seriousness of the problems.
Dilemmas for Policy: Strihing a Balance
Because cooperation among sovereign states is essential for developilg effective policies to address these issues, the new science requires an analogue in the reahn of irtemational reiations.
The negotiato$ of the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol faced issues similar to those raised by potential climate change. The science was urLcertain, and the predicted harmful effects, though grave, were remote ard unproven. Entrenched industrial interests claimed that new goverment regulations would cause immense economic and social dislocations. Teclrlological solutions were either nonexistent or were considered ur-Lacceptable by most major participating €ioveuments.
Under these conditions, some goverrunents at first allowed commercial self-interest to influence their posi- tioos a\d tsqd sqier:..d€,.c as art excrrse {qt delaying decisions. Many political leaders were long pre- paled to accept future environmental risks, rather tharr to impose the short-term costs entailed in limiting use of CFCs and haloru viewed as essential to modern standards of living. Short-range political and economic concems proved fonnidable obstacles to cooperative hternational action based on the ozone-depletion theory.
Govelnment polic;rmakers face a dilemma in attempting to deal widr the new envionmental challenges. Premature actions or regulations based on imprecise and possibly incorrect theories ald data can incur costs that later turn out to be urmecessary. But postponing a decision might also not be cost {ree. Waiting for more complete evidence can run the risk of acting too late to prevent major and possibly iueversible damage. Irr the event that r.r.ishful or
?anposlan lbnkng lz2ms out tD be arD)eout ite Jutut e economic and social costs could be much higheq. perhaps even catashophic. Even with the success of the Montreal proiocof humanily will have io endure the conse.pences of increased ultraviolet radiation for several decades. And it couldhave been much worse had acfion been delayed as the special interests had at first recommended.
Unfortunately, the market is essentially neutral with respect to the environment, and the current state of economics is not helpful in analyzing such situations.
Relyilg on Adam Smith to protect the ozone layer-or to mitigate climate change-could be disastrous. Tra- ditional methods of measuring income and growth appear increasingly irrelevani in the modern world: the more ozone-depleting substances or coal that a country produces, the greater the growth in its gross natior-Lal prooucr.
Under current accoulting standards, enterpdses can avoid the "extemal" costs of environmental damage
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cation by poJicymakers and jnvestors of the tools o{ cii-,rl venfjonal economj.s may result Lr precisely the wrong decisions From ar ecologicai perspectjve.
- T h e h i s t o r y o f e f f o r t D t o p r o t e c l t h e o z o n e l a y e r c l e a r , y d e m o n s t r a t e s lh e . c r u c j a l r o l e p l a y e d br industrl ii oe\ e,optng and rmplemenfing interrra{ional enr .1pe1- mental policy. Although the U.S. goveffment was instru- mental in first reducing CFC emissions in the 1970s and in achieving the Montreal protocol in 19g7, at several points during the ozone negotiations before arrd since.
senior officials or legislators for largell. ideological rea_
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ln conrrast, on every such occasion sirce l9bi, ;ra:- mafically orientcd industry lorces consistenilr _;_;
successfully-i:rtervened ir favor of the irrtemaiior.:_
regulatory regime, whether that hvolved sur,r,or:_
ing. the origbal American po"itiorr tor strong corirol;
at Montreal, endolsing the new financiaj miechamsm at London, or testifying before congressmen u,ho rr.ere Tlu"t o1 domestically unraveling the treatv,s control:.
I key rol5_rn thjs respeci was played by the Alliance ror l<esponslble A lmospheric lo licy, a consorLium oI sei eral hu1{1d cornpanies_ that produced or were dependent on ODS and their substitutes.
. ft",lu."potr:g of industry to an envkonmental problem is conditioned by a complex of consider.ations uid or""_
sures generated by ihe market, which is itself direct\.
jn9tze.nced by c<znsuzzzer pr,:(eten<=s an<l by govertr:
ment reguldtor) achons: and Lrnderlyine Lhese iinmedi_
ate inlluences may be educational actjvif,es of the media arrd environmenial organizations. The personal values of colporate leadership and stockholders, as well as reneral societal attifudes loward a given envi_ronmentai irrue, will also affect industry reactions.
In the early years of the ozone history, both American and European indusiridlists were resolulel\ ooposed to controls over CFCs. It seemed alrnost as if f.,"ir,"r, Ieaders simply couJd noi bring themselves to beljeve thdt these apparentlyideal chemicals, with so mant/ benefits to society. were capdble oI i_nflictirg a remote as"auJi on ihe env{onment. American industry, hora,ever, through the Chemical ManuJactuers Association, was consistenth, committed to resolvhg the ulcertainties raised bv the bcienfists, even iJ the results were to prove Lxtoleas_
anf: industry sirongly promoted jnternaiionaI scienLific research arrd the 1985 Vienna Convention. The position
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rommonl\ dccepled body of dala and artal)'ses dnd i.lre
;;;r;t;; o{ ranges ot uncertailf were Prerequisites Lo a uolitjcai solution among, negotiatirg Parhes ihdt were initiallt far apart. [n effecl' hundred' of scienhst' trom ln*u
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"ational poJiticians ald industrialists'
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mny haoe io act while there is still sciaiific ,r*toin u, ,nportibty balancing the risks and costs of delay' iv tf-r. ti-" *tl,
""iden.e on
""ih issues as the ozone layer and clirnate change is beyond all dispute' the damage may be irreversible, uid it -uy be too late to forestall serious f,urrn to h"-- Ue ard &aconian costs to society Politi-
.i""r r*t lherefore resist a |endency to lend too much (redence [o 5slf-servifg economic interests Lha[ demano scientific certainty, maintain that dangerc are remote ano unlikelv, and insisi that the costs of changing their ways- ary urno"J^i.* fn" tignatories at Mon €al knowingly risked imposing substantia-l short-run economic dislocations even thdreh ite
"vidunce was incomplete; the Prudence of their J"iJi"" *"t demonstrated when the scientific models tumed out to have underestimated the effects of CFCs on ozone. Governments must sponsor the needed rcsearch and act responsibly on the basis of often-equivocal results' Unfortunately, the current tools of economic alalysis are inadequate aiis in this task and can evel be deceptive indi- caiorsiihey are in urgent need of reform'
A w?ll-inJotmed p;blic opiuion can influence hes.ifanf po.l,i- ticians anrl ltriuale cotupauies !o a(t wilh resfonsiblllly lor ttle enuiral'nnent, The interest of the media in the ozone rssue/
uni tfre collabotation with television and press by diplo- mats, environmental groups, and legislators' had a major hfluence on govemmental decisions and on the intema- tionat negoti#ons. The fi-ndings of 'cienijsts needed {o be interpre#d and commr.uricated fo a wjder public UNEP u,ra ilnr,lO ptuy"a i*portalt roles in disseminating infor- mation thriugh pubiications and electronic media' and throueh othei activities. Many individual governments
*"r" itro particularly active in informing theii constit- uents about the ozone science, heaty obligations' and new technologies. Informed and concerned consumers Lrought aboui the collapse of the CFC aerosol markel
ln th"eir educational effbrts, the proponents of ozone- laver protection-at least in ihe early years-generally avoided invoking apocalypse alrd resisted temPtations to overstate their
"it" itt oia". to capture public attention' LxaggeraLed Pronouncements and selectite use of sclen- ,:fif"a'uo t'u"" a way of backfirinS: damagirg credibility and oro!idirg amJnulifion Io those iilterest grouPs ural want' to delaliaciion. The media have a special responsi biliir to eduiale Lhemselr e' on fhe issues and nof simpl;
pori'ot conflicting claims thai only confuse the public
delesations-it is essential to have an effective seoe- tariai arrd chairperson. A major role in sudr negotiatioru is olaved bt regjonal or interesl grouPs: loo>e a::''..r:- tion, of srater, ginerally lile-minded ihai mce: :e{nr'\
during a negotiation to excharge ideas' re:o1\e.ol::::- ences, and attempt to harnmer out coorcbnale: ;'::- tions; examples inilude the "Toronto Group' ir':he ea:-r ororl" r-tug&iutiotts; the OECD industrialize<i coi:ades;
the "Groip oI 77 and China" (actuall.v more iiar 1-d develophe, natjonst; the 15-nalion European Ln:t'n: ire Arab siarei; l\ordic nations; and regional groupinr'' rom Africa, Asia, eastern Europe, and Latin Amenca'
Srrang lendershiY by a major toun!trl (utt bc n:-i?i:.1i't't {orce itt'dcueloping itttetnntional cons?utus The L S gor- imment early oi reflected its concerns over the thte of
the ozone layer by stimulathg and supporting -both ' American ald international scientific research- Latet convinced of the dangers, it undertook coordinaied dip- L lomatic and scientific initiatives to promote an ozone- - Drotection plar to other countries, many of which I'ere i ir-ririultu t.tottil" or ildj{lerent to tlte idea As lhe largest emittei of botlr ozone-destroying chemicals and green- house gases, the United Slates has. great Potentlal to ilfluenie the policy considerations of other governments ;' ir favor o{ enr ironmenfal Prolecfion h fact' because ol the geographic size and population ol lhe UnjLed St'iies' irs eionirnic and scientiJic sh'englh, and ils infcmdhonal intelests and irLlluence, progresb in addressing glolral enviJonmental ploblems carr probably noi be aclie\ ed wilhout Amerjcan leadership However' jn ihe moa- ern worid, no single country can prer-ail: allialrc* must be {oreed, in particular beiween North dnd Souih lhe
i"'"pE"" u"ii' can also be an tTp:il1l: l:T:?l|:""sj
it hai had problems forging and holding intemal sus among its 15 member nations
It may-be useful for a leading country ar Sraup 0f h'ies to iake preemptizse enaironmental protection
and world public opirion, and played an indispensa- l bte catalytic and *"diuti.,g role duling- the. negotiation ''"
and implenteniation o{ the protocol Other irlrergo\ ern- mental oreanizdtions irlcludilg WMO, rhe \\orld Bank' UNDR UNIDO, ihe Global Envirorrment Facility, arld the 'i:i Worta Ueatttr Organization, were also drawn ilto varied 'i aspects of the oione-protecticn process The Montreal
".-' Pritocol itself generated arr hstitutional structure of sub- i' sid iarv bodies and comnjttees tlraT supported ihe d ec ision- mak ig responsibilitie' of the partie' Because o[ the laree iumber of countlies participating in the ir-rterna- tioiral environmental negotiations-often more than 120
eaen in adaance of a global agreement 'Nt.er.
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negotiations and for development of techlological .- -uiions. The i978 U.S. ban or.r aerosols both relieved :::ssure on the ozone layer and lent greater authority ,-. ihe governme,rt r,\''hen it subsequently campaigned :--: even more stringent worldwide measules. Although ::.r.ironrnental controls might conceivably harm a coul- :\- s intemational competitiveness in the short run, they :-.e.'also, bl stimulating research into alternative tech- :r..togies, g:r\-e that couitry's indushy a head start on the :',::u:e. Pioneer countries-and cornpanies-that adopt ::.--:. !;inqen-t controls can provide valuable exPerience ::: ::r.er= r. ho follow on the sarne path; thls has been an ,:--.,--a..i iactor iri aiding developirg countries to reduce -::: aependence on ODS.
i-.'c ciric sector-includittg citizens' gt'oups and priaate itausiry-lus a crttcial role in the new diplomacy. The activi- ties of both environmental organizations and Privaie industry in undertaking research, lobbying governments, and ilIluencirrg public opinion signficantly affected the international delate on the ozone issue. Amajor by-prod- uct o{ the ozone negotiations was the development of cioser relations among hitherto-separated environmental groups aror.md the world, reflected in their cooPeration at environmental treaty negotiations and conJerences in the last decade. Enviromental orgardzations can also play an informal watchdog role in monitoring compli- ance by governments arld irdustry wiih intemationally agreed commitments. For their part, entrepreneurs are becoming awale that their corporate image is increas- ingly affected by environmental issues. The intellectual and financial resources of the private sector are, more- ovel essential for developing the necessary technological solutions. The ozone process was in fact characterized by arr unparalleled degree of collaboration among industry, environmental groups, goverrunents, arld intemational organizations; r.,,'ide-rarlging joint activities included cooperation in research ald development of alternatives, participation in the protocol's technical palels, and pro- viding hformation and tecluologies to developing coun- tdes.
Economic and structural dffirences among cowltries must be equitably reflected it an iftternqtional regulatoty regime.In the longer rul, the developing countries, with their huge and growing populations and needs, could ur-rdermine efforts to protect the global environment. For many devel- oping coultries, the Montreal Protocol provided the first intensive exposure to environmental problems, leading to a sensitization o{ both private and public sectors and the de\ielopment of capacity to deal with other environ- mental challenges. As a consequence of the ozone issue, a North-Soutl-L bargain was struck that set an impodant
Riclgrd ElIioL Benedtch Safeguarding rhe pLaner 123 precedent for future environmental accords: ihe richer r-raiions for the first time acknowledged a responsibility to help developing courrtries to implement needed envi- ronmental policies without sacri{icing aspirations for improved standards of living. The Montreal Protocol broke new ground with its uniquely balanced r.oting procedures ald r4/ith the Multilateral Fr-rnd's concepts of incremental cost fulding and parhrership between the World Bank and LrI'J ager-Lcies; the MLF itself became a model for the Global Enr.ironment Facility and for finan- cial mechanisms in the climate charge and biodiversity conventions. The protocol was the first global experi- ment in environmental technology transfer, sewed by a network of formal consortia and ilformal connections involving goverments al1d enterprises, reinforced by UNEP's extensive clearinghouse activities. The expJicit linkage between developing countries' performance and their receipt of adequate financial and technical support was another imovative feature. Finally, the noncompli- ance procedure was the first to be tested in a global envi- ronmental treaty, ar1d its sensitive handling of the CEIT issues demonstrated the equitable but effective function- ing of the system-
Th.e effectiaeness of a regulatory ngreenlerlt is enhanced when it employs mqrket incefltioes to stinxulate teclmologi- cal innouation. Tecluroiogy is dynamic and not, as some industrialists have seemed io imply, a static element. But left completely on its won, the market does not necessarily foster the right teclrnologies to protect the environment.
Although in 1987 the ozone protocol set targets that were initially beyond the reach of the existing best-available technologies, its goals were in fact achievable for most of industry-thereby averting monolithic industrial opposi- tion that might have delayed international agreement. The Montreal Protocol was not a "radical" treaty, as some ideo- Iogues have suggested: on the contrary, it was an expres- sion of faith in the market system, in the system's abfity to respond to incentives. The treaty actually stimulated collaboration among otherwise competing companies in research and testing that saved both time and money in the development of replacement technologies. By expedi- tiously getting the protocol established in intemational law in 1987 even rvith a 50 percent reduction target the negotiators effectively signaled the markeq)lace that research into solutions would now be profitable-thus set- ting the stage for the later decisions for phaseout. For one substance ar-rd application after another, as the technology advanced, the opposition to stronger controls inevita- bly receded. Polic)'makers must be careful not to convey vague or ambiguous signals, as appeared to be happen- ing on the HCFC issue, which could heighten uncertainty ald undermine industry's confidence in the regime.
The signing of a treaty is not necessarily the deckiae eaent in a negotitt-tio11: the process before and after signing is critical. It was extremely important to separate the complicated ozone-protection issue inlo manage- able components. The hformal fact-finding efforts
L
1Z Globai Warming and Ozone Depletion
during 1985 and 1986 ard again after the treaty entered into force-workshops, conferences, consultations- esiablished an environment conducive to building per- sonal relationships and generating creative ideas, and ihereby facilitated the formal negotiations. During the negotiations themselves, the use of small working groups and a single consolidated text (prepared by a legal drafting group) fostered the gradual emergence of consensus. Tire developments following the 1987 sign- ing illustrated the wisdom of designing the treaty as a flexible instrument. By providing for periodic irtegrated assessments-the first of which was advanced from 1990 to 1989 in response to the rapidly changing science- the negotiators made the accord adaptable to evolving circumstances. In effect, the protocol became a dynamic process rather than a static solution. A guiding principle throughout was to send the dght signals-and avoid the wrong signals-to industry as well as to the contracting parties themselves. Hence the Meeting of Parties and its associated institutions interpreted the treaty flexibly while not doing damage to the fabric of its obligations, as mani{ested in the actions on essential-use nominations, MLF issues, the CEIT problems, and data reporting. The deiicate inierplay between the Meeting of Parties and the various expert panels was an important factor in the protocol's success.
Firmness ieeds to be combined with pragmstisffi to achieoe dipLonutic success. The proponents of strong controls in 1987 refrained from extreme positions but never relented in their pressure for a meaningful treaty. They did not insist on perfect solutions that might have unecessar- iiy prolonged the negotiations. Nor did they wait for universal participatiorL or even for agreement on fufure steps among all poiential major players. Instead, they achieved an interim solution with built-in flexibility that could, on the basis of scientfic ar"rd technological devel- opments, serve as a springboard for future action. The 1987 protocol deliberately did not attempt to predeter- mine every future step: marly issues were marked but left open for future resolution, including the financial mecha- nism, trade measures, and noncompliance procedures. ln subsequent stages of the protocof whenever there were large disagreements among the parties, every attempt was made to reach consensus rather than to bludseon the minority: a useful ard fepeated technigue .us for the parties to comrnission studies, gradually building up the weight o{ scientific and tec}urical analysis and iJlumi nating the policy options. V/hen differences remained, instead of postponing ary action the treaty moved for-
'ard with modest short-term steps (as in the methyl bromide freeze), which set the stage for stronger future acfions. The important thing was to maintain momenturn and get started on the right track-a characteristic of the Montreal Protocol from its creation.
lndiztidusls and intponderables can make a surprisingly signlficant difference; not eaety element of a successftl nego- ttation can be predicted and preplanned. IINEP's Mostafa
Tolba provided overall personal leadership
the critical phases leading up io the 1982 agreement the substantial revisions at the London and
Meetings of Parties. He initiating criticai
with key governments, pdvate interest groups, intemational organLations. During the
he moved from group tl group, arguing for hexibility, applying pressure, often floating his own proposals as a stimulus to the participants. Individual scientists, neeo- tjdtors, environmen Lalists, and industry officiais a.lso pio_
vided ideas, decisions, and actions that proved vitil to the final outcome. A few political scientists have tried to construct elaborate, engineering like models of the envi_
ronmental negotiations (press tftxs button and fhaf will happen). Real negotiations are, however, both richer and more treacherous than academic models. One can offer some "lessons," as this list of a dozen items attempts to do; but even if the lessoru are applied, things ma1, stiil not work out. Irnpasses are not alwavs resolved_ Like it or not, a lot in life still depends on the right people being in the dght place at the right time-and also on lorrLrrrai
Toward Action on Climdte Change
The relevance of the ozone treaties $'as not lost on ilE intemational commurfty as it tumed to address the issue of climate. In the summer of 1987, while preparing for the conclusive negotiation in Montreal, I recommended that the United States take an initiative to establish a formalized international scientific assessment of climate change, similar to what we had done on the ozone issue.
Before thery scientific pronouacements on climate had emanated from a relatively small body of excellent but largely self-selected scientists under the aesis of WMO ard L,TNEP, called the Advisory Croup on Green}ouse Gases, that had originated in the 1985 Viltach meetins.
My feeli-ng was thaL the subject would gain more creJ- ibility and influence if a larger, more diverse Foup of scientists was given responsibility under intergooernmen- tal auspices to coordinate systematic research. including assessmenl o[ feasible response sfragegies. . . .
In December 1990 the United Nations General Assemblv established the Intergovemmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (INC), aiming ai a tueaty that couJd be signed at the 1992 Lrl\ Con- ference on Envlonmentand Development inRio de lar.reiro.
Because of the scope and politics of the climate isiue, the INC was a creature of the General Assemblv rather than of UNEP and a separate secreLa-riat was esiablished wi0r headquarters in Geneva (moved in 1996 to Bonn).
Five negotiating sessionswere held over the ensuinq 1Z months, a fast timefable by any sfaldard of displomicy, parlicularly considering the compler,ity o{ the issues.
These wele big negotiations, irvolving an average ot 120 governments (approximately 90 from the South), plus more than 40 obsewers from industry and from environmental aI.Id civic groups.
1ts
, . ' r " t ,
< ^ , 4 ^ , l'"V,""%
...{)oifne negoiidrio"is were verv ciifficuJt. as greenhouse ...' t 4'hqo'. emissions u-ere irert-jcabrl linked rn ith enerev, .bs, oCrdusi';a1.. agr-icu ltural. and trmsportal ion policies"l aa4.-g.':= r erv fourdations of mooem economies, North and /r/i.\", ,rt-,. Becau,e of the many interconnected aspects of {he ,r'4- :--Jblem, lhere \vere no quick and easr solution:: il would
Richard Elliot B erredich
the 1985 VierLna Convention. Whereas the Vienna
veltion w1: linited to cooperation t" ,"r"u.li l:ii
.-d --e necessary to take acfions on many fronts that could '
,/ r-., o1r'." substartial changes in the ways people lit ed,
exchange of irrformation or, th-" o.or-r" fry".,-*Ji'rai"l even contarr any mention of CFCs, the FCCC embod- 1eo commltments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with specific reference to carbon dioxide."Certainly-ttr"e Amedcan coal ald oil interests and anti_environrn'ental ideologr-res, who had opposed ihe negotiatlons everv srep oJ the-way, clearJy undersiood whJt had happenei and were turious with the Bush administration ior its last-minute concessions.
A number of elements iestify to the comparative strength of the FCCC as a ,,framework conventi'on,,: the term itself clearly implied thai furiher actions, presurn, ably more specific and stronger, would foilowl as the Montreal Protocol had followed the Vienna Co^rr"rl hon. ferhaps most significant was ihe FCCC.s,,ultimate oolectrve,' against which dll dctions would be meas_
tu"ed: "siabilizafion of greenhuuse gas concentrahons in Lne atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous gnthrypogenic interference r.r,ith the .ti-ut"
"ylt".rl;
(article 2). The- precaufionary principle was also promi_
nent as a guid ing prirciple of the ionvenfion, ,,'VVh"r"
there are threa ts of serious or irreversible damaqe, lack of full scientific certainty shoujd not be used ,;; ;;"_
son. ror-posponing such [precautionary] measures. . .,, ( a r t i c l e 3 . 3 ) . . . .
_The lessons outlined earlier rn ttris chapter are appli cable to the climate change negotiations but are'no guarantor ol success. At the present jutchrre, the best recommendal.ton for lhe ciimate negotiators would be to cut thaough the complexities and ri,itl.rout further delav adopt some initial quantitative target, however modest. A ,iarget, anylarget, will provide experience ard can always oe adlusfed. -tt is essential, as h tle Monheal lrotocol, io send unambiguous signals to the market in order to stim_
ulate competitiort innovatior; and decisions to invest in less carbon-intensive technologies. But emission reduc_
hon ta_rgets alone wi.ll not be suJficient to accomplsh this.
If targets are set unreaLjsHca lly high, fo, exu-ple, thov may encourage resistance and n oncom plJanae ot- _uv iruhibit key nations from rati{yirg fhe proto.ol. t"rgetj, Tutr ..9|y case be complemented by policies to create 1"..:lo 1bo:: tor a techrologl revolution in energy simi_
lar fo thdt which occurred for ozone_depleting subiialces.
Only in this way car market forces be mobilized to work to dirninish fossil fuel use ald to expand sinks for carbon dior,ide tfor example, through relorestaLion).
Governnents should not be overwhekned by the fact ihat energy affects all sectors of the economy. jll ss616r;
are not equally important. li could be aivantageous to disaggregate and concenhate on the most ifipor_
tant energy users, such as transpodation, heating, 'ald energy-mtensive industries. euartitative targets"could
!q complemented by "no regrets" poticies tnJt genera;
other benefits besides reducirg greeniouse gur"i,
"^___
pres mctude energy consenration, reducirg dependence ',,'orked, arrd consumed, Nations wouid nJed io reduce
.jreir dependence on fossil fuels, which accourLted for :tore than half of greenhouse gas emissions hom human a;filities. Agriculturai practices that caused emissions of rutrous oxide and methane wouid have to be modified.
\ieasures \1'ould also have to be taken to half the massive je,iTuction of forests, which not ordy released carbon :: .',icie inic t\e armosphere bur also dirnhished a major :.::"rai silli for absorbing carbon dioxide frorn other r--.i:.es. Since most forest destruction was related to the . ::i. oi ooor people in the developing countries, issues :i:oleri-r- and population growth were also crucial to i,rnare cnange.
l^ridely varying national interests had to be reconciled in the climate negotiations. Regions and countries dif_
fered considerably. in their probable vutnerability and in their ability to adapt to climate change. Generaliy, the prospects were least favorabje irr already ecologlcaily fragiJe and poor parts of the world, notably arid aieas Jf Africa, parts of South America and southeast Asia, and low-lying island states that were threatened by a rise in sea level. lndeed, the climate negotiations stimulated the formafion o{ a new bLoc irr the Urrited Nations, a group of abouf 40 colrnfrie5 comprising Lhe n iance o{ "Smal lslard States (AOSIS).
The heavily industrialized North, including the eco_
nomics in fransition in central and eastem Eu;pe, were lhe mdior emiflers of green-house gases, parhcularlv carbon dioxide lrom fossil fuels. But within tfus groui there were also major differences in industrial
"t ,i.t rre that jrrfluenced respective national positions on cont ols For. elample, the United States, eaitern Europe, Russia, a n d , A u s f r a l i a w e r e h e a r i l y d e p e n d e n t on coa'l; N o r w a y , Australia, and other.developed counfries were major coal exporters. New Zealand, with a large sheep popuiation, was concerned about controls on methaae emissions. The United States, with its powerful coaf oil, and transpoita_
tror't,seclors,.was
lhe majn opponenf fo early dnd s|rong lrmits on cdrbon dioride emissioni. . . .
Nevertheless, the United Nations Framework Conven_
hon.on CLmaLe Chalge IFCCC) was signed on schedule rn rro ar'rd hds surce been rarified b) dpproximatel) j 60 l"lt:"', ..So-: ob_servers and lournatiiLs *"ro ji,"p_
poinLed thai the FCCC did not impose strirgenf conLrols on carbon dioride and olher greeniour" goio, si,.nila r to whai tJre MonLreal protocol effected for ozone-depJetirg substances- However, conbary to conventional wisdom]
u1e clmate convention was acfually a much stronger agreement than its analogue framework treatv on ozoie.
126 Global Warming and Ozone Depletion
on imported fossil fuels, and more efficient buming of coal. Other feasibie Policy instruments toward emissions reduction include removing subsidies (both direct and indirect) for fossil fuels, increasing research and fostering market e>,pansion for renewable energjes, raising energy efficiency standards, changing goverunent Procurement policies to Dromote energy conservation and alterna- tve enetgies, and enacting a small but gradually rising e n e r g v t a x . . . .
Lii;e the Monheal Protocol, the climate convention aiready has the built-in flexibility to reexamine and grad- uallv iatchet up the stringmcy of commitrnents on the basis of periodil scientific, economic, and technical assess- ments. ilre siruation is lar from hopeless, if the political wi-ll is present. The measures need not be draconian: the important thing is to get started-as we did in Montreal.
Global StewardshiP
Mostafa Tolba has described the Montreal Protocol as "the beginning of a new era of environrnental statesmanshiP."
YeJ, it wai, even though most other global environmental initiatives have nQt yet achieved similar fruition. \4ihen the Vienna Convention in 1985 set the stage for the Mon- freal Protocol, we could never have imagined the mul- tiplicitv of environmental conferences, negotiations, and wortshcips that lay ahead. We did not foresee the trans- formation of sovernmental bureaucracies to focus more attention on the environment, and the creation of special ambassadors for environmental negotiations. There was no indication of the expanding scope of national report- ing to freshly created intemational secretadats, the grow- ing influence of clizens'groups, the surge of industrial innovation in environmental technologies.
The protocol's bfluence was perceptible in the 1989 Basel Cinvention on the Control of Tiansboundary Move- ments of Hazardous Wastes; the establishment in 1991 of the Global Envirorunent Facfify; the 1992 UN ConJer- ence on Environment and Development and its offshoots, Aeenda 21 and the Commission on Sustainable Devel- oJment; the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate
Change; the 1992 Convention on Biological the 1993 UN Con{erence on Straddling Fish Highly Migratory Fish Stocks; the 1994 IIN on Sustainable Development of Smal1 Island States; the 1994 Convention to Combat
$e 1.994 krternaiional ConJerence on Population Developmenf afld numerous intergovernmental ing groups on such subjects as sustainable forest
ment land and water resources, economic instrumeits]
and biotechnology. These were not one-shot events, l1i rather constituted ongoing irlstitutional arrangemen6,' and continuing negotiations to appraise the effectiveness of commitments made and to address evolving condition.
Tiaken together, they represent a system for intemational environmental sovemance.
The story of the ozone heaty reflects the new reality that nations must work together h the face of globi threats, because if some major actors do not participate, the efforts of other will be vitiated. The process of arriv_
ing at the Montreal agreement, arrd the developments that followed iis signing, represented new directions for diplomacy, involving unconventional emphasis or, science and techlology, on rnarket forces, on equit]-, and on fleibility. For all of this, the Montreal Protocol slrculd prove to be a lasthg model of intemational cooperatiur-
In the realm of international relations, there v,i]l always be resistance to change, and there will a_lrr'avs be uncertahties-political, economic, scient6c, psr*cholog- ica1. The ozone protocol's greatest significance, in fa&, may be as much in the domain of ethics as eru.ironnenl its success may help to change attitudes aurong critical segments of society in the face of uncertain but poten- tially grave threats that require coordinated action by sovereign states. The treaty showed that even in the real world of ambiguity and imperfect knowledge, the inter- national communlty is capable of uldertaking difficult cooperative actions for the benefit of future generations.
The Montreal Protocol has proven [o be thJ forerunner of arr evolving global diplomacy, as nations seek ways of accepting corunon responsibility for stewardship of t h e p l a n e t . . . .
The idea that the heat-trapping ability of infrared-absorbing gases in the atmosphere is similar to rhar of rhe glass panes ,,, a greenhouse (hence the "greenhouse effect") was first proposed by the French malhemarical physicisr Jea[ Biptiste-Joseph Fouder in 1827. ln 1896, lhe sq'cdish chemist Svante Arrhenius, nho later won the 1903 Nobel prrze in chemistry predicred that if atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO,) levels doubled due to the burning ol fossil fuels, rhe resuking increase in the average temPeraturc.at the Earth's surlace rvould arnount to four to six degrees Celsius (seven to ten degrees Fahrenheit).
The Arrhenius predicrion abour global warrning was all but forgotten for more than half a century until direct observations and histodcal data demonstrated that by 1960, atmospheric CO, levels had risen ro 315 ppm from the preindustrial Level of 280 ppm Careful measuremenls since rhen have showr rhar rhJpresent co, level is approaching 380 ipm, and rising- The Allhenius predicrion thal the average ternperature on Earth will ise four ro si" degre"s Cekius ii like\ io come true before the end of the twenty-first century if present fossil fuel use and forest destrucrion trends continue. Most atmosphedc scieDtists agree that such a warming ra'ill be accompanied by changes in the worlds weather paLterns and a signif,canr increase in sea levels. The data on which these conclusions are based, as well as the conclusions themselves, have ieen vigorously debated for years.
ln 1988, due to concern about the potentially sedous disruptive e{fecrs that would result from signifrcanr, short-term changes in *'orld climate, the UniLed NaLions Environment Programmejoined wirh the World Mereoroio;ical Organuatlon ro esrablish the lntergovermnental Panel on ciimate change (IPcc) to assess Lhe available scienrific, technicai and so-croeconomic information regardlng greenhouse gas_induced climate change. Thousands of meteorologisrs and other atmosphedc and climate scientists have participated in periodjc reviews of rhe data. The Fourrh Assessmenr Reporr of the lpCC appeared in 2007. The following selection is taken from the 6rsr section of that report, ,,Summary for polic),rnakers: Clinure Change 2007: The Physical Scieoce Basis." lt clearly states that "warming of rhe clinrate sysrern is unequivocal, as is now evidenl lrom obselwations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of sno*, and ice, and rising global average sea level." Later sections of the reporr (see http://u.ww.ipcc.ch/) maie ir clear rhar rhe impacts on ecosyslems and hutran well-being (especially in developing nations) will be serious and ourline the steps that must ie taken Lo prevenl, ease, or cope with these irnpacts. Other reports (see Nicholas Stem, Sier-?l Rovieu,r The Econimics of Climdte Chdnge, Executive Summary October 30, 2006 [http://ww*rhm-treasurygovuk/independent-revier /s/stern_rel.iew_economics_climate_change/
sternreview index.cfml) make it clear that although taking steps now ro limir future impacts oI global warrning would be very expensive, "the benefiE of strong, early action considerably ourweigh the costs . . . lgnoring ciirnute charrge"will eventually damage economic growlll. . . . Tackling ciimate change is the pro-growrh sfategy fo, ihe longe, term, and iican be done in a
\4'ay that does not cap the aspirations for growrh of rich or poor countries. The carlier effective action is mken, the less cosliy it will be."
Almost all the lew remaining crilics of the reality of global warming are either employed by or funded by indusrries and nations that have a financial stake in rcsisting proposals lor significant reductions in the release of greenhouse lases
Key Concept: the causes and effects of greenhouse gas-induced climare change
S n r E c r r o N 2 6
Climate Change 2007:
The Plrysical Science Basis
The lntergovernmentdl Panel on Climate Change (IpCC)
727
128 Global Warming and Ozone Deplerion
Human and Natural Drivers of Climate Change
Global atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methale and nihous oxide have increased markedly as a result of human activities since 1750 and now far exceed pre-industrial values determhed from ice cores spalning rnany thousands of years (see Figure 1). The slobal increases in carbon dioxide concentration are due primarily to fossii fuel use and land-use change, while those of methane and nitrous oxide are primarily due to agriculture.
. Carbon dioide is the most important anthropo- genic greenhouse gas. The global atmospheric con- centation of carbon dioxide has increased from a pre-indusirial value of about 280 ppm to 379 ppm in 2005. The atmospheric concenhation of carbon dioxide in 2005 exceeds by far the natural range over the last 650,000 years (180 to 300 ppm) as determined from ice cores. The a.nnual carbon dioxide concentra- tion gaowth-rate was larger during the last 10 years (1995-2005 average: 1.9 ppm per year), than it has been since the beginrring of continuous direct atmos- pheric measurements (1960-2005 average: 1.4 ppm per year) although there is year-to-;.e7r variabfity in growth rates.
. The primary source of the increased atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide since the pre- irdustrial period results from fossii fuel use, with larrd use change prnviding another significant but smallel contribution. A:rnual fossil carbon dioxide emissions increased from an average of 6.4 [6.0 to 6.8]
GtC fgiga Ton of Carbon; equivalent io 3.67 GtCO"]
(23.5 122.0 +o 25.01 GICQ ) per year in th e 79q0s, Lo 7.2 [6.9 to 7 .5] GtC (26.41 .3 to 27 .51GICQ) per year in 2000-2005 (2004 and 2005 data are interim estimates).
Carbon dioxide emissions associated with land-use change are estimated to be 1.6 [0.5 to 2.71 GtC (5.9 [1.8 to 9.9] GICQ) per year over the 1990s, although these estimates have a large urcertainfy.
. The global atmospheric concentration of methane has increased from a pre-industrial value of about 715 ppb to 1732 ppb in the eaiy 7990s, ar.d is 1774 ppb in 2005. The atmospheric concentration of meth- ane in 2005 exceeds by far the natural range of the last 650,000 years (320 Io 790 ppb) as determined from ice cores. Growth rates have decihed since ihe early L990s, consistent with total emissions (sum of antluopogenic ald nahrral sources) being nearly constant during this period. It is oery likely t:'at tine observed increase in methane concentration is due to anth-ropogenic activities, predominantly agricul- ture and fossil fuel use, but relative contributions fiom different source t]?es are not well determined.
. The global atmospheric nitrous oxide concentra- tion increased from a pre-industrial value of about
CHANGES IN GREENHOUSE GASES ICE.CORE AND MODERN DATA
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ltfl1: 1 Op":pheric concenrraLions of carbon djoxide,
mernane and nifrous oxide over the lasl 10,000 vears (large panels) and since 1750 (inset p*"fJ' ir,f""i*"- ments are shown from ice cores (slzmbols with dif_
feren t colours for different srudies) and ,t
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samples (red lhes;. The correspondhg ."di";;";;;;;;
are snowr on fhe righL hand o,es of the large.panels.
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e a a Time (betore 2005)