Data Handling in an Outbreak

(1)

Data Handling in an Outbreak

Emma Paul MA VetMB LLB (Hons) MRCVS

Veterinary Adviser

Veterinary Exotic Notifiable Diseases Unit (VENDU) Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories Agency (AHVLA)

London, United Kingdom

With special thanks to Kate Sharpe, Ruth Moir and Helen Roberts, AHVLA

(2)

Data Handling in an Outbreak

• Collection, storage and analysis and

distribution of data

• Data related to disease situation

• Data related to implementation of

control measures

• Data related to regaining disease free

status

(3)

Definitions

• What is meant by an “outbreak”?

 Exotic (not in this country)

 Notifiable (official rules governing the control)

• What is meant by data?

 Raw data...field visits, existing IT databases (populations, premises, movements etc), lab results

 Filtered/processed data...reports, maps, press releases, briefing notes to Ministers...EU, OIE reports, presentations ... the same fundamental principles apply to any situation

“Pressure”

to control the disease

Demands on ... Databases – sophisticated and

simple systems ... Staff

∞

... Time allowed to produce reports! 1

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Raw Data....

How to get information

from here...

(5)

Raw Data....

• Huge amounts!!

• Data capture...

• Forms

• Databases

• Different

sources...teams...organisations

• Keep it simple and consistent across

different diseases

• Keep it as much in line with “BAU” –

business as usual

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...Procedures

Investigation

• Suspicion stage

Head Office Government Vets VENDU No disease Government Vet AHVLA

Why get field vet to phone in each and every time?

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....Procedures

EXD1 Investigation • Suspicion stage Head Office Government Vet VENDU

CVO

Why results sent only to VENDU?

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• VENDU...3 vets...2 main roles

• Provision of Veterinary policy advice for

exotic diseases

• Disease reporting function

– Oversee all exotic dx vet investigations

– Challenge and audit

– Ref lab liaison

– Interpret results on behalf of CVO

24/7/365

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Others where we control their use in Laboratories Babesia (bovis,bigemina, caballi) Echinococcus (m& g) Ehrlichia ruminatum Heartwater Hendra Histoplasma farciminosum New World screwworm

Nipah PRRS 2 Theileria (equi,parva,annulata) Trypanosomosis Bluetongue CBPP (& caprine) Contagious agalactia Foot and Mouth

Sheep/Goat Pox Lumpy Skin Disease

Pests des Petits Ruminants Rift Valley Fever

Rinderpest Warble Fly Avian Influenza Newcastle Disease African Swine Fever Classical Swine Fever Swine Vesicular Disease (Teschen)

Epizootic Haemorrhagic Virus Disease Bat Lyssavirus

40

plus... Anthrax Aujeszky’s Brucellosis – abortus, melitensis, suis, ovis Rabies Vesicular Stomatitis African Horse Sickness Contagious Equine Metritis Dourine

Equine Viral Arteritis Encephalomyelitis

(W, E, V, J ... + )

Equine Infectious Anaemia Epizootic Lymphangitis Glanders & Farcy

West Nile Virus

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•Text alerts

•NDI1 email

Communicating details of the exotic

disease investigations...

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Number of Exotic Notifiable Disease Investigations by Year Year 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2004 39 2005 140 2006 236 2007 609 2008 607 2009 177 2010 192 2011 107 2012 98

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• Premises restricted, samples taken and submitted... • VENDU have details from over the phone

• Lab report results directly and only to VENDU • VENDU in liaison with CVOs and senior policy • May be a case conference

• Or if worrying initial results then CVO may decide on calling an “Amber Teleconference”

 ...VENDU, reference lab, epidemiologists, field lead, policy teams, communications team, cabinet office, (other government dept e.g. Health if zoonotic disease)

• CVO may decide to confirm disease...amber goes to a “red” teleconference

• UK Government moves to an agreed “battle rhythm” after confirmation of disease

Disease can‟t be ruled out

and samples taken...

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Who Responds to an Animal

Disease Outbreak?

13 Defra Policy OGD‟s Wildlife Cabinet Office/CCS Chief Veterinary Officer

(CVO) _{Exotic Disease Policy} Animal Welfare

Livestock Wider Stakeholder (Retail& Food)

International Relations Export Policy

Disease Mitigation & Control Communications Rural Legal Finance HR Procurement H&S Science AHVLA Contingency Planning

Veterinary Exotic Notifiable Disease Unit

(monitoring & reporting) Rapid Analysis & Detection of Animal Related Risk ( RADAR) (Maps)

National Emergency Epidemiology Group (NEEG) National Experts Group

Finance

HR

Field Ops: Regional Operations Director Reference Labs

Local Authorities

Food Standards Agency (FSA) Health Protection Agency (HPA)/ Dept of Health (DoH)

Environment Agency (EA) Dept Communities Local Gov (DCLG) National Animal Health & Welfare Panel (NAHWP)

Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Dept of Transport (DTR)

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Co-ordinating and control structures

for disease response

Ministers & Senior Officials

National Disease Control Centre (NDCC) Including the Joint

Co-ordination Centre (JCC)

Local Disease Control Centre & Forward Operations Base (LDCC)

Strategic

Tactical

Operational

Affected Premises

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Policy

Defra Director for Animal Health and Welfare: Disease Control CVO(UK)

Operations AHVLA Chief

Executive

Director of Operations

Outbreak Co-ordination Centre

Rural Communities Policy Unit Sustainable & Competitive Farming Reference Laboratories National Disease Control Centre (London) Outbreak Veterinary Director Operational Partners Stakeholders

Regional Policy Liaison Function

AHWBE

National Expert Group / Tactical Advisory Group

Local Operations Vet & Tech

Operations Outbreak Coordination National Emergency Epidemiology Group (NEEG) Disease Reporting Team Corporate Support Functions Human Resources Finance Operational Communications

IT, GIS & Mapping Operations Manual Team

Veterinary & Science Experts

AHVLA Executive Team

Sponsorship & Ecosystems

Food Policy, Competitiveness &

Growth

Waste Strategy & Regulation

Legal (TSOL)

Knowledge & Information Management, Data, Contingency Planning &

Security

Animal Welfare

Exotic Diseases, Livestock & Movement Controls

Animal Health: Global Trade & Aquaculture

Zoonoses & Surveillance

Evidence: Economists & Social

Science

Communications

Finance

Procurement Human Resources

Core Groups

“NDCC”

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•Central spine of three “birdtable”

meetings per day, but flexible

•NDCC & LDCC have a battle rhythm/day

•Briefings, strategic stocktakes, COBR

meetings all planned in advance at set

times

•Other meetings fit around timings

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NDCC BT “Battle Rhythm” Daily Management meeting LDCC BT Daily Comms meeting LDCC BT NDCC BT LDCC BT National Security Council - THRC

Field Media briefing

Defra Media Briefing

Daily Strategic Stocktake LDCC/NDCC Teleconference National Security Council - THRC Animal Disease Policy Group National Experts Group Industry Core Group

Good & Bad points

NDCC BT

Sit rep

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Raw Data....Forms

• Forms – generic,

simple (?!)

• EXD40 – 28 pages, 11

to be completed before

confirmation

• Handwritten on farm –

needs to be scanned in

or typed up

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Raw Data....Forms

• Sample Submission

• EXD36

• EXD37

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Raw Data....Forms

• Restriction notice

EXD1

• Licence

• Clinical

Inspection Form

EXD44

• Valuation Form

• Cleansing and

_disinfection

Notices

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Disease Confirmed....

• Zones – restrictions – communicate

clearly

• Plan ahead extent of work required

• Known timescales – find disease but

also plan exit strategy

 Farming Industry like to know the “not before dates”

• Tracings – out of zone, premises

• Surveillance work

Heavy reliance on existing

livestock databases

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Scottish Animal Movement s System (SAMS) AH Sam Syste m Agricultur al Survey x3 (England, Scotland, Wales) AH Disease Control Systems (FMD, CSF, AI) MHS Abattoi r Syste m Custome r & Land Databas e (CLAD) VLA FarmFil e System AH Vetnet System GB Poultr y Regist er Cattle Tracing System (CTS) Animal Movement s Licensing System (AMLS)

15 source systems/databases across

the Delivery Network

But, integration on this scale is difficult... different

technology platforms, data formats & definitions, refresh rates etc.

National Equine Databas e (NED)

Rapid Analysis and Detection of Animal-related Risks

Launched in 2003.

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In 2001, it took 10 days to produce this map of livestock premises:

• 4 days to write the code & extract the data from CTS – 350k premises (& get

extract from Vetnet – 550k premises &

Agricultural Survey – 250k premises) • 3 days to manually combine and

de-duplicate information

• 3 days to geo-reference the data using address cleansing software & manual look ups as necessary

Resulting dataset was so large &

technical capability so restricted, it was broken down into „tiles‟ – limited

analytical ability

Still no movement information available, only estimates of livestock numbers

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•Taken 7 years to connect to the required data and write the correct algorithms

• CTS transformation algorithm – 20million movement records every year. Each reported independently as a birth, death, on or off.

•RADAR matches „on‟ and „off‟ movements, imputes missing movements & creates a life history for each animal.

•From this it generates population counts, and derives additional information about each animal

cattle breeds are converted in to „breed purpose‟ – dairy, beef etc. •Brown Swiss –dairy

•Dexter –dual breed •Friesian –dairy

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But locations are not just points – they can be land parcels, postcodes, parishes, counties, gov offices, AH regions, countries, an outbreak zone or any other type of area you are interested in ... Standard GIS packages - useful for visualisation, but limited analytical capability (esp large

datasets remember 2001?) e.g. unable to

combine land parcels & livestock info on national scale

RADAR generates ‘dissolved layers’ of land parcels with livestock data already combined – for easy visualisation & interrogation in GIS

The RADAR warehouse is also ‘spatially enabled’ - allows users to analyse all RADAR data at any location level without using GIS – you can even draw your own zone in GIS, upload it into RADAR and query the RADAR data against it immediately

RADAR – realising the

potential

But, its not just zones we are interested in!

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RADAR maps

Mapping abattoir locations in relation to zones & IPs

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RADAR – who uses it?

COBR, Ministers,

Senior Managers & the Press…

All love maps!

RADAR has been

commended by the Cabinet Office as “the only team in

Whitehall which can provide an effective mapping

response to COBR within 24hrs of an emergency”

Right: Taken from BBC News website on 9th_{April 2006}

at

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sco tland/4893108.stm

Left: Taken from Guardian website in April 2006 at

http://www.guardian.co.uk/flash/0, ,1131346,00.html

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NDCC Head of field Epidemiology (AH) FFG Head of VST Epidemiology Head of NEEG (AH) Head of CERA (VLA) NEEG Executive NEEG In NDCC Field Epidemiologists (AH with VLA VIOs)

Project management & admin team (CERA, AH, FFG)

LDCCs NEEG In LDCC Analytical Epi team (FFG & VLA/CERA) incl Modelling team, Duty Epi

function and other specialisms as required Team leader: Analytical Epidemiology (FFG & VLA) Team leader: Project Management (CERA) Field Epidemiologist in NDCC (AH)

Epidemiologists...

Field

HQ

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What NEEG delivers in

outbreaks...

• Hypothesis generation to guide activities

• Assessment of risks and advice (eg transmission risk

from manure)

• Co-ordinated national investigation

• Risk factors eg imports, integrated multi-site companies • Priorities for epi investigation – time periods, risk factors

• Co-ordinated field investigation

• Led by Field Epi

• Makes use of others

• NEEG in NDCC: overview, joining up with others (OEP)

• Written Outputs

• Within NEEG, eg timelines, risk factors, field and expert reports • External, eg CVO brief, epidemiology reports, tracing priorities,

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FMD 2007:

The First Weekend

• FMD confirmed 3 August 07 (Friday)

– Beef finishing, 64 cattle – 3 locations,

– No movements on, movements off only to slaughter – 4.5 km from Pirbright laboratory complex

– Thame market, 21,000 sheep, 3 August

• By 6 August 07 (Monday)

– Virus typed as O1BFS

• Only present in FMD ref laboratories

– 51 PZ premises visited

– 19 reports, all negated except:

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August 2007 cluster September 2007 cluster 3 Aug: PZ and SZ established 2 IPs (IP1-IP2)

Last case 6 August 24 Aug: PZs lifted 8 Sep: SZ lifted

12 Sept: PZ and SZ established

6 IPs (IP3 – IP8) Last case 30

September 17 Oct: PZs lifted 5 Nov: SZ lifted

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FMD – August 2007 – Protection Zones Premises Visited 82 Samples Taken Species Number sampled Sheep & Goats 1,606 Work undertaken

• Slaughter of Infected Premises / Dangerous Contacts / Slaughter on Suspicion

•PZ Clinical Inspection of Pigs (Daily)

•PZ Clinical Inspections of Cattle (2 day cycle)

•PZ Clinical Inspections and Bleed in Sheep & Goats (2 day cycle for

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Premises Visited 372 Samples Taken Species Number sampled Sheep & Goats 4,161

FMD – August 2007 – Surveillance Zone

Work undertaken •SZ Clinical Inspections of Cattle (1 final) •SZ Clinical Inspection of Pigs (1 final) •SZ Clinical Inspection of Camelids (1 final)

•SZ Sheep & Goat Bleed (1 final at 95/5)

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FMD 2007: Spread

Investigations, IP1 & 2

• No evidence of further aerosol spread

• Met. modelling indicated plumes very unlikely

• Full surveillance of PZ and SZ as per Directive, plus • All live movements out of PZ and SZ traced negative • Increased, enforced biosecurity throughout PZ & SZ • Premises at risk from water courses and flooded

areas traced negative

• Sewage from Pirbright – specified handling protocol • Low susceptible population density + few movements • Restrictions lifted 8th _September

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Detected 16 September by PZ serosurveillance

15/ 16 sheep sero+ve; 10 with old lesions No clinical signs but 17/ 22 cattle had 4-5 week old lesions

All seropositive, virus negative.

First evidence that clinical disease could be missed in cattle

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Work undertaken

•Slaughter of Infected Premises / Dangerous Contacts / Slaughter on Suspicion

•PZ Clinical Inspection of Pigs (Daily) •PZ Clinical Inspections of Cattle (2 days cycle)

•PZ Clinical Inspection & Bleed in Sheep & Goats (Weekly at 100%)

Premises Visited 88 Species Samples taken Cattle 10, 778 Sheep 10, 455 Goats 323

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FMD September 2007 - Stock Checks and Foot Patrols

Stock Checks and Foot Patrols Completed 1km² Tiled Foot Patrolled 214 Premises Stock Checks - to Verify No Stock 941

Foot power...

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Fomite Spread?

High risk vehicle movements from

(43)

September cluster

- Surveillance activities

Surveillance Zone Council Directive (2003/85/EC) Additional Intensive Patrol Area (IPA) Enhanced Surveillance Areas (ESAs) Additional Assurance Areas (AAAs)

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ESA Area 1–3 Holdings with Cattle Number Sampled ESA1 57 1,777 ESA2 17 681 ESA3a 68 1,957 ESA3b 88 1,660 ESA4 Number of premises Cattle Sampled Sheep Sampled Goats Sampled 8 265 400 10 Total Sampled ESA 1-4 Sampled Work undertaken

•Cattle Sampling (at 100%)

FMD - September 2007 – Enhance Surveillance Area (ESA) 9 September to 18 October

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Number of

holdings with Cattle

Total Number of cattle sampled

8 1,900

Work undertaken

•Daily Clinical Inspection / Examination of Cattle. •Cattle Sampling (every two days at 100%)

FMD - September 2007 – Intensive Patrol Area (IPA)

30 Sept IP8,

beef suckler herd 30 Sep detected during intensive PZ surveillance

PCR used to detect pre-clinical stage (e.o.d sampling)

(47)

47

(48)

AA Area 1–4 Holdings with Cattle Number of Sample Taken AA1 4 67 AA2 7 403 AA3 60 2,021 AA4 3 130 Total 2,621 Work undertaken

•Cattle Sampling (at 100%)

FMD - September 2007 – Additional Assurance (AA) Surveillance Area 16 October – 2 November

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(50)

FMD – Epidemiology (timeline)

Day of outbreak-21 -20 -19 -18 -17 -16 -15 -14 -13 -12 -11 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 Day of outbreak Date 1 2 /0 7 1 3 /0 7 1 4 /0 7 1 5 /0 7 1 6 /0 7 1 7 /0 7 1 8 /0 7 1 9 /0 7 2 0 /0 7 2 1 /0 7 2 2 /0 7 2 3 /0 7 2 4 /0 7 2 5 /0 7 2 6 /0 7 2 7 /0 7 2 8 /0 7 2 9 /0 7 3 0 /0 7 3 1 /0 7 0 1 /0 8 0 2 /0 8 0 3 /0 8 0 4 /0 8 0 5 /0 8 0 6 /0 8 0 7 /0 8 0 8 /0 8 0 9 /0 8 1 0 /0 8 1 1 /0 8 1 2 /0 8 1 3 /0 8 1 4 /0 8 1 5 /0 8 1 6 /0 8 1 7 /0 8 1 8 /0 8 1 9 /0 8 2 0 /0 8 2 1 /0 8 2 2 /0 8 2 3 /0 8 2 4 /0 8 2 5 /0 8 2 6 /0 8 2 7 /0 8 2 8 /0 8 2 9 /0 8 3 0 /0 8 3 1 /0 8 0 1 /0 9 0 2 /0 9 0 3 /0 9 0 4 /0 9 0 5 /0 9 0 6 /0 9 0 7 /0 9 0 8 /0 9 0 9 /0 9 1 0 /0 9 1 1 /0 9 1 2 /0 9 1 3 /0 9 1 4 /0 9 1 5 /0 9 1 6 /0 9 1 7 /0 9 1 8 /0 9 1 9 /0 9 2 0 /0 9 2 1 /0 9 2 2 /0 9 2 3 /0 9 2 4 /0 9 2 5 /0 9 2 6 /0 9 2 7 /0 9 2 8 /0 9 2 9 /0 9 3 0 /0 9 0 1 /1 0 Date Day Thu Fri Sa t Su n Mo n Tue We d Thu Fri Sa t Su n Mo n Tue We d Thu Fri Sa t Su n Mo n Tue We d Thu Fri Sa t Su n Mo n Tue We d Thu Fri Sa t Su n Mo n Tue We d Thu Fri Sa t Su n Mo n Tue We d Thu Fri Sa t Su n Mo n Tue We d Thu Fri Sa t Su n Mo n Tue We d Thu Fri Sa t Su n Mo n Tue We d Thu Fri Sa t Su n Mo n Tue We d Thu Fri Sa t Su n Mo n Tue We d Thu Fri Sa t Su n Mo n Day

PS Spread window for PS

Spread window for PS PS Source window

for IP1A

Source window for IP1

Day 0 IP1A Day 0 IP1

Spread window for IP1A

Spread window for IP1 Source window

for IP2

Day 0 IP2 Day 0 IP2

Spread window for IP2

for IP4B

Source window for IP4B

Day 0 IP4B Day 0 IP4B

Spread window for IP4B

Spread window for IP4B Source window

for IP4B

for IP3B *

Day 0 IP3B _* Day 0 IP3B

Spread window

for IP3B *

for IP3C

Source window for IP3C

Day 0 IP3C Day 0 IP3C

Spread window for IP3C

Spread window for IP3C Source window

for IP6B

for IP7

Day 0 IP7 Day 0 IP7

Spread window for IP7

for IP8B

Spread window for IP8B Day of outbreak-21 -20 -19 -18 -17 -16 -15 -14 -13 -12 -11 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 Day of outbreak

Date 1 2 /0 7 1 3 /0 7 1 4 /0 7 1 5 /0 7 1 6 /0 7 1 7 /0 7 1 8 /0 7 1 9 /0 7 2 0 /0 7 2 1 /0 7 2 2 /0 7 2 3 /0 7 2 4 /0 7 2 5 /0 7 2 6 /0 7 2 7 /0 7 2 8 /0 7 2 9 /0 7 3 0 /0 7 3 1 /0 7 0 1 /0 8 0 2 /0 8 0 3 /0 8 0 4 /0 8 0 5 /0 8 0 6 /0 8 0 7 /0 8 0 8 /0 8 0 9 /0 8 1 0 /0 8 1 1 /0 8 1 2 /0 8 1 3 /0 8 1 4 /0 8 1 5 /0 8 1 6 /0 8 1 7 /0 8 1 8 /0 8 1 9 /0 8 2 0 /0 8 2 1 /0 8 2 2 /0 8 2 3 /0 8 2 4 /0 8 2 5 /0 8 2 6 /0 8 2 7 /0 8 2 8 /0 8 2 9 /0 8 3 0 /0 8 3 1 /0 8 0 1 /0 9 0 2 /0 9 0 3 /0 9 0 4 /0 9 0 5 /0 9 0 6 /0 9 0 7 /0 9 0 8 /0 9 0 9 /0 9 1 0 /0 9 1 1 /0 9 1 2 /0 9 1 3 /0 9 1 4 /0 9 1 5 /0 9 1 6 /0 9 1 7 /0 9 1 8 /0 9 1 9 /0 9 2 0 /0 9 2 1 /0 9 2 2 /0 9 2 3 /0 9 2 4 /0 9 2 5 /0 9 2 6 /0 9 2 7 /0 9 2 8 /0 9 2 9 /0 9 3 0 /0 9 0 1 /1 0 Date Day Thu Fri Sa t Su n Mo n Tue We d Thu Fri Sa t Su n Mo n Tue We d Thu Fri Sa t Su n Mo n Tue We d Thu Fri Sa t Su n Mo n Tue We d Thu Fri Sa t Su n Mo n Tue We d Thu Fri Sa t Su n Mo n Tue We d Thu Fri Sa t Su n Mo n Tue We d Thu Fri Sa t Su n Mo n Tue We d Thu Fri Sa t Su n Mo n Tue We d Thu Fri Sa t Su n Mo n Tue We d Thu Fri Sa t Su n Mo n Tue We d Thu Fri Sa t Su n Mo n Day

KEY - range of uncertainty in age of lesions - most likely source window * Note: On IP3B, 28 out of 29 cattle found to be negative on serology. Therefore, expert opinion confirms that lesions ages must be five days or less. - range of uncertainty in source window - most likely day zero date Note: Expert opinion on IP7 confirms age of lesions at 5 days

- range of uncertainty in spread window - most likely spread window PS = Pirbright site

IP8B IP8B IP6B IP7 IP6B IP7 IP3 IP 1 IP 2 IP 4 IP 3 IP1 IP2 IP4 IP5 IP 5 IP4B day 0

IP4B most likely spread window 02/09 to 15/09 IP3B most likely source window

24/08 to 05/09

IP3B Day 0

IP3B most likely spread window 06/09 to 14/09 IP4B most likely source window

20/08 to 01/09 IP1A most likely source window

16/07 to 24/07

IP1A most likely spread window 25/07 to 05/08

IP2 most likely spread window 30/07 to 09/08 IP2 most likely source window

17/07 to 29/07

IP3C source window 26/08 to 07/09

IP3C Day 0

IP3C most likely spread window 08/09 to 16/09 Unlikely based on Pirbright evidence IP1A day 0 IP2 day 0 IP5 day 0

IP5 most likely spread window 12/08 to 21/09 IP5 most likely source window

30/07 to 11/08 Pirbright site most likely spread window

25/07 to 05/08

IP6B Day 0

IP6B most likely spread window 16/09 to 23/09

IP 7 Day 0

IP6B source window 03/09 to 15/09

IP7 source window 05/09 to 17/09

IP7 most likely spread window 18/09 to 25/09

IP8 most likely spread window 25/09 to 01/10 IP 8 Day 0

IP8 source window 12/09 to 24/09

(51)

Tracings (Sept. cluster)

Be careful about the phrasing of situation

(52)

Other data used for

freedom

evidence...

Abattoir surveillance

•360 abattoirs

•Additional checks

Sheep Goats Cattle Pigs Deer TOTAL

3,741,760 1,859 529,984 1,968,128 19,378 6,261,109

(53)

...Pre-movement licensing inspections of pigs

952 Certificates 1,892,195 animals

(54)

• 95% confidence of detecting 1% prevalence of sheep flocks and beef cattle herds

= 307 herds 20 - 30 km = 51 30 – 40 km = 51 40 – 90 km = 51 90 – 150 km = 154

FMD freedom - Additional

sampling

within 150 km of Pirbright

(55)

Far m A

Direct Moves – useful for diseases which

spread fast e.g. FMD

Market

Indirect moves via a transient location

Far m B Far m A Far m B Far m A Market Far m B Far m C Far m E Far m D

Indirect movements via several residences –

useful for slower spread e.g. TB

It can also analyse Individual Animal life histories...

RADAR again...analysis of movement data enabled UK to negotiate reduction in nation-wide intra-community trade ban

FMD 2007 -areas in yellow were lifted out of restriction as RADAR proved no movements out of the „risk area‟ had occurred

(56)

•Only 8 infected premises ...

1581 animals slaughtered (mainly cattle and pigs)

•Intensive surveillance well beyond minimum requirements of

EU Directive • 1200 visits

• 60,036 surveillance samples tested –

800 goats, 21,000 sheep, 26,500 cattle • 125 to 400 staff ~ 50 vets, 50-150 Animal Health officers •Nationwide monitoring through

report cases (>220),

>6million animals at abattoirs,

766 welfare visits, 1600 licensing inspections

•Plus – 307 premises in 20 to 150KM zones around outbreak

FMD 07 ~ a “small” outbreak

(57)

Staffing at the LDCC

- August to November 2007

LDCC Resources - August and September Outbreaks

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 0 5 /0 8 /0 7 0 7 /0 8 /0 7 0 9 /0 8 /0 7 1 1 /0 8 /0 7 1 3 /0 8 /0 7 1 5 /0 8 /0 7 1 7 /0 8 /0 7 2 1 /0 8 /0 7 2 3 /0 8 /0 7 2 5 /0 8 /0 7 2 7 /0 8 /0 7 2 9 /0 8 /0 7 3 1 /0 8 /2 0 0 7 - 1 1 /0 9 /2 0 0 7 1 3 /0 9 /0 7 1 5 /0 9 /0 7 1 7 /0 9 /0 7 1 9 /0 9 /0 7 2 1 /0 9 /0 7 2 5 /0 9 /0 7 2 7 /0 9 /0 7 0 2 /1 0 /0 7 0 4 /1 0 /0 7 0 8 /1 0 /0 7 1 0 /1 0 /0 7 1 2 /1 0 /0 7 1 7 /1 0 /0 7 1 9 /1 0 /0 7 2 3 /1 0 /0 7 2 5 /1 0 /0 7 2 9 /1 0 /0 7 3 1 /1 0 /0 7 Dates S I P Veterinary Technical Administration Management External Resource Total

First “cluster” Second “cluster”

(58)

FMD

BTV-8

About halfway

through FMD...

September 22nd ...Bluetongue-8 detected in a cow = potential for mass

(59)

Zone

boundaries kept

changing for

BTV as well as

(60)

Plus different

trade/export

(61)

(62)

FMD

Zone restrictions

declarations x 2

August

-amended 6 x

Sept amended 9 x

TCZ x 10

Legal Declarations...

(63)

(64)

13

th

November...

Highly pathogenic H5N1 confirmed in turkeys!! Defra website crucial

in advising farmers ...and staff Highlighted certain

weaknesses – systems geared up for one outbreak but 3 simultaneously put it under extra pressure

(65)

Data Handling - Conclusions

•FMD‟07 – assumption that one will find early disease in cattle may not be correct

•First time that pre-clinically viraemic animals were detected using PCR in an outbreak

•Be prepared! Directive may lay out surveillance requirements but...

•Judged by the reporting – aim for one version of the truth! •Try to keep everything “BAU”

•Clear communication lines – teams not people

•Different meetings to discuss different angles – but don‟t be crippled by the “battle rhythm”

•The same process for different diseases •Training, exercises

(66)

Data Handling - Conclusions

•UK – future...

(67)

CPH Viewer Application

CPH 01/001/0002

Can build up the spread of land being used by an individual farm business

CPH 01/001/0001

Using land parcel data, captured as a result of a

subsidy claim

There are a number of tasks that the user may now want to do, in this instance we

investigate whether stock is kept on a contiguous CPH

Data from Animal Health Customer Database now being used in tandem with RPA land parcel data.

- We now understand that cattle are kept on the neighbouring CPH.

(68)

Data Handling - Conclusions

•UK – future...

•Still improving our databases...SAM, MOSS, CPH viewer •NDCC/LDCC....new “managing outbreaks project”

•Reduced staffing, more outsourcing, reduced budgets

•“Virtual teams”...no longer able to rely on teams all in one place

(69)