El cambio de auditor: El caso portugués

R E V I S T A

D E

C O N T A B I L I D A D

S P A N I S H

A C C O U N T I N G

R E V I E W

w w w . e l s e v i e r . e s / r c s a r

The

change

of

auditor:

The

Portuguese

case

Paula

Alexandra

Heliodoro

,

Francisco

Alegria

Carreira

,

Manuel

Mouta

Lopes

b_{UniversidadeAberta,Portugal}

a

r

t

i

c

l

e

i

n

f

o

Articlehistory:

Received16January2015 Accepted25May2015 Availableonline14August2015

JELclassification:

M42

Keywords:

Audit

Theauditoropinion

Auditorchangeandauditreport Logisticregression

Stakeholders

a

b

s

t

r

a

c

t

Problemsregardingthechangeofauditorandtheopinionissuedbytheauditorthroughthefinancial auditreporthavebeenshowntobeanimportantissue.

Theobjectiveofthisstudyistoexaminetowhatextentthechangeofauditorisrelatedtothetypeof opinionthattheauditorexpressedintheauditreport.

Inpursuitofthisobjective,anempiricalstudywascarriedoutsupportedbyasamplefromasetof entitieswithsecuritiesadmittedtotradingonthePortuguesestockmarketintheperiodbetween2006 and2012(sevenyears)andusinglogisticregressiontotestwhetherthereceptionofthequalifiedaudit reportindicatedthechangeofauditor.

Thefindingspointtotherebeingasignificantpositiverelationshipbetweenthequalifiedauditreport andachangeofauditor,verifiableforqualifiedopinionsonassetsandothers,butnottothequalified opinionsonequityandliabilities.

Thelargestnumberofqualifiedopinionsoccurintheyears2007,2009and2011,mostofwhichwere relatedtoequityandassets,andthechangeofauditorismoreassociatedwithqualifiedopinionson assetsandotherqualifiedopinionsthanthequalifiedopinionsonequityandliabilities.

©2015ASEPUC.PublishedbyElsevierEspa ˜na,S.L.U.ThisisanopenaccessarticleundertheCC BY-NC-NDlicense(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

El

cambio

de

auditor:

El

caso

portugués

CódigosJEL:

M42

Palabrasclave:

Auditoría

Laopinióndelauditor

Cambiarelauditoryelinformedeauditoría Regresiónlogística

Stakeholders

r

e

s

u

m

e

n

Losproblemasexistentesrelativosalcambiodeauditoryalaopiniónemitidaporelauditoratravésdel informedelaauditoríafinancieraestáprobadoquesetratadeuntemadegraninterés.

Elobjetivodeestainvestigaciónesexaminarhastaquepuntoelcambiodeauditorestárelacionado coneltipodeopiniónqueelauditorexpresaenelinformedelaauditoría.

Enlaconsecucióndeesteobjetivosellevóacabounestudioempíricoapoyadoenunamuestra,un con-juntodeentidadesconvaloresadmitidosanegociaciónenelmercadodevaloresportugués,enelperíodo comprendidoentre2006y2012(sietea ˜nos)medianteregresiónlogísticautilizadaparacomprobarsila recepcióndelinformedeauditoríafinancierallevaalcambiodeauditor.

Losresultadosapuntanalaexistenciadeunarelaciónpositivasignificativaentreelinformedeauditoría yelcambiodeauditor,verificableporlasreservasdeactivosyotros,peronoalasreservasdelosfondos propiosyprestados.

Elmayornúmerodereservasseproduceenlosa ˜nos2007,2009y2011,lamayorpartedelasreservas naturalesserelacionaconlaequidadyactivos,yelcambiodeauditorestámásasociadoconlasreservas deactivosyotrasreservasqueconlasreservasdelosfondospropiosyajenos.

©2015ASEPUC.PublicadoporElsevierEspa ˜na,S.L.U.Esteesunart´ıculoOpenAccessbajolaCC BY-NC-NDlicencia(http://creativecommons.org/licencias/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

∗ Correspondingauthor.

E-mailaddresses:paula.heliodoro@gmail.com(P.A.Heliodoro),

francisco.carreira@esce.ips.pt(F.A.Carreira),Manuel.lopes@uab.pt(M.M.Lopes).

Introduction

Theauditreportissuestheauditor’sopiniononthefinancial demonstrations oftheenterprise,suchthatit becomes ofhuge

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rcsar.2015.05.001

1138-4891/©2015ASEPUC.PublishedbyElsevierEspa ˜na,S.L.U.ThisisanopenaccessarticleundertheCCBY-NC-NDlicense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

importance,bothfortheusersofthefinancialinformationandfor theadministrationoftheenterprise.

However,theusersofthefinancialinformationoften misun-derstandthattheauditor’sopinionistootechnicalandconciseand theadministrationoftheenterprisesmaybetemptedtorelatethe auditor’scontinuitywithhis/heropinion.

Theresearchundertakenstudiestherelationshipbetweenthe kindofopinionissuedbytheauditorinhis/herannualreportand thechangeofauditor,intermsofhis/hercontinuity,fromasample ofentitieswithvaluesadmittedtotradeinthePortuguesestock market,intheperiodbetween2006and2012,andusedlogistic regressiontotestwhetherthereceptionoftheauditreportfrom fourtypesofqualifiedopinionsindicatedthechangeofauditor.

Thearticleisstructuredinfourparts:thefirstonediscloses theaudit’stheoreticalcontextintermsofthereportandthe audi-tor’sopinionandthesecondonereviewsthefactorsthatexplain thechangeoftheauditor,thethirddevelopstheempiricalstudy intermsofsamplingandvariables,andthefourthandlastpart discussestheresults.

Inthecurrenteconomicalandsocialcontextofoursocietythis articleaimstoenhancethescientificcontributeontheissueofthe changeofauditor,whichhasgivenrisetosomuchcontroversyfrom theresearchersandauthorsinthesciencecommunity.

This research advantageously enhances the nature and the potentialimpactoftheinformationprovidedbytheauditorto any-oneinterestedintheentitiesandallowsstakeholderstoquestion theadministrationontheinformationreliabilityandthecurrent auditor’strust.

Audit’stheoreticalframework Theauditreport

The audit report is the document where the auditor issues his/heropiniononthefinancialdemonstrationsoftheenterprise audited,suchthatthisopinionisregardedbysocietyashavinga publiccharacter.Theauditreportisoftenregardedasa“barometer” fortheenterprise’sfinancialsituationandnotonlyasadocument thatrevealsreliabilityonthefinancialdemonstrations(Arensand

Loebbecke,1996),suchthattheauditreportistheclimaxofthe

auditprocessthroughwhichtheauditorissueshis/heropinionon theauditedfinancialdemonstrationsorthereasonsnottoissue them.

Under that line of thought, Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo, and

Subramanyam (1998) state that the auditreduces the existing

informationdifferencesamongthemanagersandtheremaining peopleinterestedontheenterprise,sincetheusersofsuch infor-mationgainaccesstoreliablefinancialdemonstrationsthroughthe certificationconveyedbytheauditor.

Thus, the message issued by the auditor must be perfectly understoodanditsfunctionclearlydefined,thatis,“theissuertaskis tofightforasimple,clear,interestingandinteractivemessage,insuch awaythatitconveysatleastthemainpointstothepublictarget”

(Kotler,1996).

ToPasiouras,Gaganis,andZopounidis(2007)theauditreport

consistsofareportwheretheauditorissuesanopinionregarding thefinancialdemonstrationsoftheauditedenterprise,enhancing whethertheyarefreefromrelevantdistortionsandwhetherthey weredevelopedaccordingtothespecificcurrentlegislationand followtheaccountingnormsandprinciples.

AlsotoHopeandLangli(2010),theauditreportisan

instru-mentofcommunication,whereintherelatedpartsareinformed onthe conclusions provided by the auditor, as well as onthe possible problems found in the internal controls and/or the

financial demonstrations of the enterprises audited, including thoseregardingtheenterpriseabilitytocontinue.

Thejustifiedtheoriesoftheauditinthepresentsocietymustbe framedinthefinancialinformationareasincetheauditreportand itspublishingareareliabilityelementaddedtothatinformation.

Findinganadequatetheorytoexplainitsexistenceis,inthe opinionofAlmeidaandSilva(2013)anacademicandintellectual challenge,whereintheagency’stheoryistheonewhichismore inclusiveandunifyingofthevariousjustifyingtheories.

Theagency’stheorycomesfromtheseparationbetween prop-ertyandentitiesmanagement,whichhasgivenrisetodifferences intheinformationandagencyconflictsamongownersand man-agers,thusstrengtheningtheauditor’sroleforitsreliabilityand credibilityprovidedtothesocietysinceitformsaninstrumentof screeningandreductionoftheagency’sconflict.

Thisway,bybeingpartofthesocialcontrolprocess(Lee,1996) oroftheresponsibilityofprovidingtheaccountsFlint,1988)the audit is justified onthe basis of theagency’s theory,which is regardedtoacertainextentasacoverfortheriskofinformation

(Porter,Simon,&Hatherly,2008).

Inthesameline,AlmeidaandSilvastatedthat“theauditormay beseenasarefereewhodefinestheconsistencyofthefinancial demon-strationsdeveloped by the agent, taking asapattern the rulesof accounting(...)andassuchtheauditorisregardedasanagentwho verifiestheactionsofanotherinacontextofminimizationofthemain cost”(p.48).

Nonetheless,itisalsoimportanttorefer thattheauditoryis related tothetheoryofsignalling (disclosureand transparency regardingthemarketsignalstheentityandmayreducethe financ-ing costs), to the decision taking theory (as it allows for the assessmentoftheinformationvaluetopotentiatebetterdecisions, accordingtoSaada,2000),tothetheoryofthegovernmentof soci-eties(accordingtoPower(1997)asitisaninclusivepartofthe architectureofcontrolimposedbyinternalorexternalmotives), thetheoryofinsurance(accordingtoCosseratandRodda(2009)the insolvencyissoughttobeassociatedwithanaudit’sflaw,supported bytheassumptionthatthereleaseoffraudfinancialinformationis alsotheauditor’sresponsibility).

Therelevanceandunderstandingoftheauditreport

AuthorssuchasSiqueira (2004),Boynton, Johnson,and Kell

(2002),Wiesner(1987),Ricchiute(2002)andCabalGarcia(2001)

andnationaland internationalorganizationssuchasthe Ameri-canInstituteofCertifiedPublicAccountants(AICPA),theInstituteof CharteredAccountantsinEngland&Wales(ICAEW),the Compag-nieNationaledesCommissairesauxComptes(CNCC),theOrdemdos RevisoresOficiaisdeContas(OROC),theInstitutodeContabilidady AuditoríadeCuentas(ICAC),theInternationalFederationof Accoun-tants(IFAC)andtheEuropeanFederationofAccountantshavebeen concernedabouttheclarificationoftheauditreport’smaincauses fornotbeingfullyunderstood.Themainreasonsforthereport’s lackofunderstandingareasfollows:

•Standardizedreport:asthestructureofthereportisaccording tothenorms,regardlessoftheactivitysectorit isappliedto, itbecomesmoreasymbolicdocumentthanacommunication betweentheauditorandtheuser,whichleadstotheusersnot readingtheauditreports.

•Technical language:thecommission for theauditor’s respon-sibilities (Cohen Commission) enhances the use of a highly standardizedlanguagewhichresultsinanambiguityformost oftheuserswhooftenlacktheaccountantorauditskills.

Theusers arenot familiarwiththeterminology usedinthe reports andthat is whytheyfindit difficulttounderstandthe

message transmitted. If the aim of the audit report is to give credibilitytothefinancialdemonstrationsissuedbyanenterprise itbecomescrucialthatitsusersunderstandit.

Thus,GarcíaandMartínez(2001)haverealizedthatontheone handtheexcessiveuseoftechnicaltermsintheauditreportand ontheotherhandthereport’scontentbeingtooconcisemakeit difficulttounderstand.GayandSchelluch(2006),intheirresearch onthisissue,enhancetheuncertaintyintheunderstandingofthe auditreportfrommostofthestakeholders.

•The responsibility of the audit report is not clarified. Ruíz

Barbadillo(1998)believesthatdespitetheresearchcarriedoutin

thepreviousdecades,theauditreportstilldoesnotallowitsusers tounderstanditsnatureand theassetthatistheinformation conveyedinit.

ThatideaissharedbyLópezCombarros(1996)whenhedefends that“regardingtheseareasitisnecessarytocommunicatetotheusers ofthefinancialdemonstrationstheexactrangeoftheworkwehope toperformandthelevelofresponsibilitywetakeon.”

InaresearchperformedbySchelluchandGay(2006),the con-clusionswerethattheauditorsbelievetohave higherlevelsof responsibilityandaccountabilitythanthatwhichisactually con-ferred to them by the users of the financial information. The shareholdersskepticalattitudeprobablycomesfromtherecent financialscandalsintheenterprises.

Explainingfactorsofthechangeofauditor

Theauditorisresponsibleforalertingtheadministrationabout theweaknesses,uncertaintiesor irregularitiesfound,which are oftenmateriallyrelevantandmustthereforebementionedinthe auditor’sreport,andwhichgiverisetoaqualifiedauditor’sreport, andassuchthequalifiedauditor’sreportmayhaveparticular con-sequences:theenterprise’sadministrationmay“press”theauditor toissueanunqualifiedauditreport,asthevalueofthesharesaswell astheadministrationfeesmaybeaffected(Chow&Rice,1982).

Theadministrationwilltrytoeliminatethepossibilityofthe auditorofissuingqualifiedauditor’sreportsasthosereportsmay haveanegativeimpactontheperceptionofthestakeholdersover theadministrationingeneralandtheenterpriseinparticular.

TheenterprisescandalthatinvolvedEnronandtheassociated auditenterprise,ArthurAndersen,hasstartedthediscussionon theauditor’sindependencythroughtheprocessofauditing,since thehiringperiodoftheauditorisofabout10years.Thus,whenthe Sarbanes-OxleyActwasbeingimplementedtherewasasuggestion ofimplementingtherequirementofchangeofauditorintheUSA, whichneverreallyhappened(Defond&Francis,2005).

However,thechangeofauditorhasbeenimplementedinIndia, Australia,Singapore,SouthChorea,HongKong,amongothers.In Portugal,theCMVMhasimplementedthechangeofauditorsfor theenterpriseswithopencapital.

Theliteratureaboutthequalifiedauditreportsandthechange ofauditorislinked.Themostadvocatedvariables tojustifythe auditor’sopinioninthereportinclude,amongstothers:

•Audit’s enterprise fees (Addams & Davis, 1994; McKeown,

Mutchler,&Hopwood,1991);

•Financial issues (Carpenter & Strawser, 1971; Haskins and

Willams,1990);

•ChangeofAdministration(Burton&Roberts,1967;Carpenter&

Strawser,1971);

•Enterprisesize (Chow&Rice,1982; Shank&Murdock, 1978;

Warren,1980).

Forthelastfewdecadesseveralempiricalresearcheshavebeen carriedoutboth inEuropeandin theUnitedStatesofAmerica, highlightinga setof variables related tothechangeof auditor, namelyfinancialissues,entitysizeandadministrationorchange offinancialmanager.

Fromthesetofresearchesperformed,theSmith’s(1986) per-formedintheUSAshowthatonly4%ofthechangeofauditorcomes fromtheissuingofaqualifiedopinion.

WorthreferringtoisanotherresearchperformedintheUSAby

Davidson,JirapornandDaDalt(2004)onthepotentialreasonsfor

thechangeoftheauditor,whicharebasedonsituationsinwhich themanagerslookforanauditofaninferiorrankwithcostsforthe agency,thatis,signallingtheexistenceofissuesonthequalityof thefinancialauditory.

Also, in Europe, namely in the United Kingdom, a research hasbeenperformedbyHudaibandCooke(2005),whereinitwas realizedthat theentitieswithmore financialissues and where there is thechangeof thefinancialmanager are moreinclined to get a qualified opinion from the auditor and that the like-lihood of the change of auditor rises with the gravity of the opinion.

The worldwide literature has performed various researches related tothereasonsthat causetheenterprises tochangethe auditorasstatedaboveandwhicharecentredontwoapproaches. Oneis themarket approach in which thechangeof auditor is analyzed according to the nature of the audit demand that theenterprisescarryoutandthesupplyperformedbytheaudit professionals.Thechangeofauditorisrelatedtothechangesin theeconomic-financialandcorporativefeaturesoftheenterprises

(Firth,1999;Francis&Wilson,1988;Johnson&Lys,1990;Palmrose,

1986).

Theotherapproachiscontractual,whichfocusesonthe per-ceptionoftheauditasacontract inwhichtheenterprisefreely appointstheauditorandwherethepossibilityofadisagreement betweentheauditorandtheenterprisemayleadtoadecisionfrom theenterprisetochangetheauditor(Francis&Krishnan,1999;

Lennox,2000).

Summingup,wecanconcludethatthereisadifference concern-ingtheimpactoftheauditreportandthechangeoftheauditor.If, ontheonehandsomeauthorspointoutthechangeasaresultof theclientssearchforauditorswhoissueaclearopinion,onthe otherhand,organizationssuchasSEC(2000)andauthorssuchas

PettyandCuganesan(1996)defendtheneedtoimposemeasures

ofmandatoryrotationoftheauditors,arguingthatlongcontracts reducetheauditorsmotivationtokeepanindependent relation-shipwiththeclients.

Empiricalresearch Populationandsampling

Thepopulationtargetconsistsoftheentitiesissuingsecurity valuesadmittedtotradeinacontinuousmarketinthePortuguese stockmarket,andthesamplingisbasedontheabovementioned entitiesthathaveprovidedtheirfinancialdemonstrationsonthe internetsiteofthe“ComissãodoMercadodeValoresMobiliários” (CMVM)duringthemonthofJuly2013,correspondingtotheperiod between2006and2012(forsevenyears).

Henceitcamethatthepopulationconsistedof120entities,of which37werecut(astheydidnotpresentanykindof economic-financialinformation,bothontheinternetsiteoftheCMVMand theirowninternetsite)and26(forbeingfinancialentities, there-foretheirfinancialdemonstrationsdisclosedaspecificframework notcomparabletotheotherentities),whereinthesampleconsists of57entities,whichrepresentabout69%ofthetotalentities.

Table1

Descriptionofthevariables:Dependentandindependent.

(Yn) ChangeofAuditor Dicotomicdependentvariablethattakesonthevalue1ifthe

enterprisechangestheauditorintheyearNandthevalue0doesnot change

Thiswaythevariableconsideredinthemodelreflectsthetypeof opinionissuedbytheauditorinaparticularexercise

Dependentvariable

QualifEq QualifiedopinionontheirEquityfrom N-1toN-3

Dicotomicvariablethattakesonthevalue1iftheenterprisehasat leastoneReservationastheirOwnCapitalandthevalue0otherwise

Independentvariable1

QualifLib QualifiedopinionontheirLiabilities fromN-1toN-3

Dicotomicvariablethattakesonthevalue1iftheenterprisehasat leastotherReservationsasBorrowedandthevalue0otherwise

Independentvariable2

QualifAs QualifiedopinionontheirAssetsfrom N-1toN-3

Dicotomicvariablethattakesonthevalue1iftheenterprisehasat leastoneReservationasAssetsandthevalue0otherwise

Independentvariable3

OtherQualif OtherQualifiedopinionfromN-1to N-3

Dicotomicvariablethattakesonthevalue1iftheenterprisehasat leastoneReservationasOtherReservationsandthevalue0otherwise

Independentvariable4

Source:Theauthors.

These57entitieswereanalyzedinaconsistentmanner through-out the research period even if at some times they were not includedin the listof issuing entities,according to theCMVM and,altogetherasetof337observationswereachievedduringthe researchperiodoftime.

Descriptionoftheresearchandvariables

Inordertoanalyzetowhatextentthechangeofauditorscanbe explainedbytheauditor’sreportitself,wehavegradedtheauditor’s reportsinaperiodofsevenyears,thatis,withoutqualifiedopinions andranked,asthisleadstoamoreconsistentpictureaswellasa moreobjectivereality(ChoandTrent,2006).

Thus,Patton(2002)hasadoptedanidenticalprocedureof expla-nation,asitcontributestothevalidityandreliability,buildinga morefaithfulpictureofthephenomenonthroughconvergence.

Wehaveadoptedthestatisticaltechniqueoflogisticregression,

justasMcFadden(1973),Ismail,AliAhmed,MdNassir,andAbdul

Hamid(2008)andHeliodoroandPaula(2014)havedefendedand

usedtoanalyzetherelationshipbetweenthedependentvariable (Yn)–changeofauditor(whichtakesonthevalueof1.Whenthere

isachangeofauditorandthevalue0(zero)intheopposite situ-ation)–andfourindependentvariables,estimatedbythemethod ofmaximumsimilitude,whichare:

•Qualifiedopiniononequity; •Qualifiedopiniononliabilities; •Qualifiedopinionontheasset;

•Otherqualified opinionsnotmentioned intheonesdescribed above.

Table 1 enhances the variables which were the object of

research,thatis,thedependentvariableaswellasthefour inde-pendentvariables.

Theselectionofindependentvariablesallowsfortherealization oftowhatextenttheentitiesinthesamplinghavechangedtheir auditors,forhavingreceivedaqualifiedopinion,whichis consid-eredasrelevantandtheobjectofinternationalacknowledgement bythescientificcommunity,byBall,Walker,andWhittre(1979),

Ballestaand García-Meca(2005),Brío González(1998),

Gómez-AguillarandRuizBarbadillo(2000,2003)andSenteney,Chen,and

Ashok(2006).

Logisticregressionisastatisticaltechniquethataimsat pro-ducing,froma setofobservations, a modelthat allows forthe predictionofvaluesonthebasisofoneormorevariablesrankedas independentvariablesandconsideredbinary.

Theresearchwasbasedonthereportsandaccountsandonthe auditofthedifferententitiesthatweretheobjectoftheresearch inordertoidentifythetypologyoftheauditorandhis/herstayin theentitythroughtime,aswellasthenumberandtypeofqualified

opinions,whereintheStatisticalPackagefortheScienceSocial(SPSS), version21,wasusedfortheneededstatisticalanalysis.

Resultsanalysis

Theassessmentoftheresultsachievedconsistsofadescriptive analysisoftheconstantqualifiedopinionoftheauditreportand thelogisticregression.

Regardingthetypeofqualifiedopinionsthefollowingpoints havebeenfound:

•Interms of timetherisein thenumber ofqualified opinions between2006and2007–305qualifiedopinionswerereported inthisperiod,whichrepresentanaverageof43.57qualified opin-ionseveryyear,whereinthenumberofqualifiedopinionsshifted betweenaminimumof33(in2012)andamaximumof51(in 2007),ascanbeseeninFig.1.Itshouldbehighlightedthatthereis ahighernumberofqualifiedopinionsinyearsoflegislative elec-tions(2009and2011)andthat,atthesametime,thereisalower numberofqualifiedopinionsintheyearbeforethelegislative elections(2008and2010),exceptfortheyear2012.

•Intermsofthetypeofqualifiedopinionsitisclearthatthehigher numberofqualifiedopinionsconcernsequity(106,about35%), followed bythe qualified opinionsontheasset (70, approxi-mately23%),theotherqualifiedopinions(68,whichrepresent 22%)and,finally,thequalifiedopinionsconcerningtheliabilities (61,about20%).

•Ifweconsiderthetypeofqualifiedopinionsitbecomesclearthat thehighest numberofqualified opinionsconcernsequity and otherqualifiedopinionsandthatthelowestnumberconcerns thequalifiedopinionsonliabilities,ascanbeseeninTable2.

60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Sum of 2006 Sum of 2007 Sum of 2008 Sum of 2009 Sum of 2010 Sum of 2011 Sum of 2012

Fig.1. RiseinthenumberofQualifiedOpinionbetween2006and2012.

Table2

Entitieswithahighernumberofqualifiedopinion,bytype.

Totalofqualifications Qualificationonequity Qualificationonliabilities Qualificationonasset Otherqualification

Compta 7 7 0 0 0

CP 16 7 1 6 2

EDIA 14 2 1 6 5

EstorilSol 17 1 6 1 3

FCP 18 7 3 1 7

RealEstateGrão-Pará 13 1 4 2 6

Lisgráfica 20 5 2 6 7 ParqueExpo98 25 6 7 7 5 REFER 26 7 7 6 6 SCP 14 7 2 2 3 SLB 17 7 5 1 4 STCP 18 7 1 4 6

Source:Theauthors.

Table3

Independentvariables.

B SE Wald df Sig. Exp.(B) 95%CItoExp(B)

Lessthan Superiorto

1◦_{StepQualifEq .301 .412 .534 1 .465 1.351 .603 3.028}

QualifLib −.182 .422 .185 1 .667 .834 .365 1.907

QualifAs 1.062 .409 6.727 1 .009 2.891 1.296 6.450

OtherQualif −.752 .426 3.113 1 .078 .471 .204 1.087

Source:Theauthors.

Wehavefoundthatthehighestnumberofqualifiedopinions(7) referstoequity(coveringeightentities),followedbyqualified opin-ionsonassetandotherqualifiedopinions(fourentitieseach)and, lastly,thequalifiedopinionsonliabilities(seven)intwoofthetypes identified,whichisthecaseofRefer(qualifiedopinionsonequity andliabilities),FCP(qualifiedopinionsonequityandotherqualified opinions)andParqueExpo98(qualifiedopinionsonliabilities).

Concerningtheresultoflogisticregression,alevelof signifi-cancehasbeendefined(˛)of0.1asitisanacceptableprobability

Newbold,1997)andwhenthecoefficientofthevariablespresenta

p-valuelowerthanthelevelofsignificancedefined(p-value>˛), then there is an influence of this independent variable, hence

Table3.

BearinginmindtheresultsoftheWaldtest,showninTable3, wehaveconcludedthattheindependentvariablesdisclose two differentbehaviours:

•Inductortothechangeoftheauditorfromtheindependent vari-able3–QualifiedopinionsontheAssetfromN-1toN-3(QualifAs) andtheindependentvariable4–Otherqualifiedopinionsfrom N-1toN-3(OtherQualif)–fordisclosingap-valuelowerthanthe levelofsignificancedefined(˛=0.1),thusaffectingthe depen-dentvariable –thechangeof auditor– that is,theexistence ofthesetwotypesofqualified opinionsin theauditreportis animportantfactortoallowforachangeoftheauditorbythe enterpriseaudited.

•Non-inductortothechangeoftheauditorfromtheindependent variable1–QualifiedopinionsonEquityfromN-1toN-3 (Qual-ifEq)–and theindependentvariable2–Qualifiedopinionon LiabilitiesfromN-1toN-3(QualifLib)–fordisclosingap-value higherthanthelevelofsignificancedefined(˛=0.1),notaffecting thedependentvariable–thechangeoftheauditor–thatis,the existenceofthesetwotypesofqualifiedopinionsisnotadecisive factortoreplacetheauditor.

Conclusion

Different authors defend that there are many factors that influencethechangeoftheauditor,whereintherearedifferent

approaches that try to explain them, namely the contractual approachandthetraditionalone.

Theauditreportsoftheentitiesthatissuesecuritiesadmittedto tradeinacontinuousmarketinthePortuguesestockmarketand thatconsistofoursampleintheperiodbetween2006and2012 enhance305qualifiedopinionsthat:

•Refertoanannualaverageof43.57qualifiedopinions.

•Mostofthequalifiedopinions(58%)arerelativebothtoequity (with35%)andtoasset(with23%).

Referringmostlytoentitieswithpubliccapital(withabout55%), followedatagreatdistancethesportiveanonymoussocieties(with 27%)andtheentitieswithprivatecapital(withtheremaining18%). Thechangeoftheauditor(dependentvariable)isinfluencedby thesituationofseveraltypesofqualifiedopinions(independent variables)asthefollowinghasbeenfound:

•Thenon-existenceofqualifiedopinionshasledtothekeepingof theauditorinabout66%ofthecases.

•Thefindingofonetosevenqualifiedopinionsledto,ontheone hand,a changeoftheauditor(inabout50%ofthecases)and, ontheotherhand,totwochangesoftheauditor(in33%ofthe situations).

•Thequalifiedopinionsontheassetandothers aredecisiveto thechangeoftheauditor,accordingtotheresultofthelogistic regressioncarriedout.

•Thequalifiedopinionsonequityandliabilitiesdonotcontribute tothechangeoftheauditor,asa consequenceofthelogistic regressioncarriedout.

Thechangeoftheauditormaybeaconsequenceofan inten-tionalbehaviourcarried outbytheentityinordertoavoid the adverseimagebeforetheusersoftheaccountingfinancial infor-mationofthefinancialauditreport,thatis,theentitiesthatcan changetheauditordoitinanintentionalwaysoastopreventa negativeimagefromthestockholders.

Theexistenceofqualifiedopinionsontheassetandothersinthe auditreportsarethemostrelevantandtheonesthatcontributeto

thechangeoftheauditorastheentitiesseektosavethe“valueof theactive”,whichaddsuptothestakeholderssatisfaction.

Theconclusionsoftheresearcharelimitedtothenumberof entitiesinthesampleandtotheperiodoftimeanalyzed.Ifthe periodoftimewerelongerandthesamplesizewerelarger,then theresultscouldeventuallybemoreconsistent.

Inspiteoftheabovementionedlimitationstheresearch under-takenhascontributedforabetterunderstandingoftheexisting relationshipbetweenthetype of opinionissued bytheauditor throughtheauditreportandthechangeoftheauditor.

Conflictofinterests

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