September 24, There's an App for that...the Browser

(1)

Brian.Nowak@morganstanley.com

Benjamin.Swinburne@morganstanley.com

Michael.Costantini@morganstanley.com

Owen.Hyde@morganstanley.com

Kevin.Liu@morganstanley.com MORGAN STANLEY & CO. LLC

Brian Nowak, CFA

+1 212 761-3365

Benjamin Swinburne, CFA

+1 212 761-7527

Michael Costantini

+1 212 296-8248

Owen Hyde

+1 212 761-7036

Kevin Liu

+1 212 296-8180

Google

( GOOGL.O, GOOGL US )

Internet / United States of America Stock Rating

Stock Rating OverweightOverweight

Industry View

Industry View AttractiveAttractive

Price target

Price target $820.00$820.00

Shr price, close (Sep 23, 2015) $653.29

Mkt cap, curr (mm) $453,926 52-Week Range $713.33-490.91

Industry View

Attractive

Stock Rating

Overweight

Price Target

$820.00

Google

September 24, 2015

There's an App for that...the Browser

Counter to the GOOGL "app bear case" we find mobile browser

traffic is 2X larger than app traffic, growing 1.2X faster. Traffic in 3 of

GOOGL's key categories – Retail, Finance, Travel – over-indexes

toward browser, speaking to GOOGL's entrenched position to

continue driving the mobile ad market.

U.S. Mobile Browser Traffic 2X Larger than App Traffic, Growing 1.2X

Faster:

Despite the popularity of mobile apps (an est. 76bn downloaded in

'14),

U.S. mobile browser audiences are 2X larger than app audiences

across the top 50 mobile web properties and have grown 1.2X faster over the

past 3 years. Only 12 of the top 50 U.S. mobile sites - including YouTube,

Instagram, Snapchat, and Pinterest- have larger app audiences.

GOOGL and FB Apps Appear Well Positioned to Continue to Capture

More Engagement and Ad Dollars

: These app-dominated sites are category

winners. 4 of the 12 leading apps are GOOGL properties – YouTube, Google

Search, Maps and Gmail – which speaks to GOOGL's entrenched position to

continue to monetize its app user base through the mobile transition. FB's

Instagram is also included. The only reason FB itself isn't on the list of 12 is

because of its strong mobile browser growth, as FB mobile app

and

browser

audiences are now larger than any other mobile property, which speaks to its

leadership in both mobile use cases.

Google "App Disintermediation" Bear Case Generally Not Playing Out:

Our findings also run counter to the common GOOGL "app disintermediation"

bear case that people will migrate to mobile apps rather than mobile

search/browser. We find that mobile traffic in 3 of Google's biggest search

spend categories – Retail, Finance and Travel – over-indexes toward browsers,

and that

~90% of the companies analyzed in these 3 categories are

driving over 50% of their mobile traffic growth from browsers.

This

speaks to the structural advantage of GOOGL's search product (still at the top

of the mobile consumer funnel), and the need for companies to continue to

spend on GOOGL paid search to grow.

(2)

commerce. That said,

AMZN and WMT stand out among the group, as

they are now driving ~60% of their mobile user growth through apps.

This is a likely positive for AMZN and WMT, as over time larger app audiences

will likely lead to lower customer acquisition costs, stickier customer bases and

a greater share of wallet. On the flip side, these retailers' size and marketplace

structure does make this a potential threat to be monitored for GOOGL.

Online Travel Agency (OTAs) Mobile Browser Audiences are 4.5X Larger,

and 6 of the 9 Largest Hotels Still Don't Have App Audiences Large

Enough to be Measured:

OTA mobile browser audiences are ~4.5X larger

than app user bases. This speaks to the browser-based travel research

behavior that is migrating from desktop to mobile. Further, the traffic overlap

between these sites speaks to how consumers often shop among the OTAs ,

which we believe further holds back OTA-specific app adoption. Mobile traffic

to the large hotel chains is even more browser based, as 67% of the largest

hotel chains don’t have mobile app audiences large enough to be measured.

Here again, we see GOOGL's search at the top of the funnel in mobile

travel...well positioned to continue to grow its share of ad budgets.

(3)

Price Target $820

Our $820 price target is based on our discounted cash flow

valuation and implies 19.4x 2017e core Google non-GAAP EPS of

$50.15. We then back out the discounted value of the Alphabet

investment losses to arrive at our $820 target. We use a 9.7%

WACC and a 3% terminal growth rate (2.5% previously).

Bull

$980

20.8X 2017e bull case Core

EPS of $52.96, Less the PV of

the Alphabet Investment

Losses

Improved core Google revenue disclosure,

better-than-expected expense discipline and share repurchases lead to

multiple expansion and higher earnings power.

Mobile

monetization proves highly incremental to core search revenue

growth and search takes more share of global budgets. YouTube

becomes an even bigger contributor to top-line growth, and, more

importantly, operates at a higher margin than in our base case.

Base

$820

19.4X 2017e base case Core

EPS of $50.15, Less the PV of

the Alphabet Investment

Losses.

Status quo on core Google core revenue disclosure and

capital allocation.

Google maintains share in global search

advertising, but mature US and UK markets weigh on growth.

Assumes midteens search revenue growth through 2017, as

mobile device proliferation leads to search advertising taking share

of global ad budgets. However, with ~50% of global search

revenue driven by more mature search markets in the US and UK,

we see organic growth slowing. We forecast YouTube growing at a

CAGR of ~45% over the next 3 years, though the segment is a

headwind to incremental margins (high content expense costs).

Investment Thesis

Increased transparency from the creation of

Alphabet Inc. is a positive step to better

understanding core Google profitability and

loss-generating investment projects.

Improved and more detailed disclosure lead to

multiple expansion with other internet companies

(up to 13-18% company-wide multiple expansion

at Expedia and Amazon), and we see a similar

outcome for Google as investors gain a clearer

picture of core Google's strong earnings power.

Google Website's growth is likely to surprise to the

upside, driven in large part by better than

expected YouTube results. We now see YouTube

growing at a 45% forward CAGR, driving 41% of

total Google Websites growth, as Google Websites

grows at an 18% forward CAGR the next 3 years.

Our $820 price target is based on 19.4x 2017e

core Google non-GAAP EPS of $50.15 less the PV

of the Alphabet investment losses.

Key Value Drivers

Search advertising spend continues to gain share

of global advertising budgets, including in the US

and UK where organic growth appears to be

slowing.

Mobile search advertising proves incremental to

organic search spend.

Investments in video content driving longer-term

monetization at YouTube.

Moderation of expense growth.

Risks to Our Price Target

Over 90% of the company’s net advertising

revenue comes from Search. While we believe

Search will continue to take share of global ad

budgets and Google will retain its dominant share,

growth in US and UK markets (~50% of Google

search revenue) has slowed.

Improved disclosure around the Google Inc. and

Other Alphabet segments may not decrease the

overall investment activity of the business.

Bear

$605

16.7X 2017e bear case Core

No change on core Google revenue disclosure and capital

allocation and global ad growth slows...investment spend

Risk Reward

(4)

(5)

There's an App for that...the Browser

Mobile Browser Traffic is 2X Bigger and Growing 1.2x Faster than App Traffic

U.S. mobile is still largely a browser based world as mobile browser audiences are ~2X larger than app

audiences across the top 50 U.S. mobile web properties ( see

Exhibit 1

). As shown, the median browser audience

(across the top 50 U.S. mobile apps as of July 2015) has grown at 61% per year, while app audiences have

grown at an average of 51% per year. Said another way,

mobile browser audiences have grown 1.2x faster

than mobile app audiences off of a 1.8x larger base

.

Please see the

Appendix

for full detail on the top 50 mobile browser and mobile app audiences.

Note that

this over-indexing toward browsers is the opposite of what most investors we speak with

expect

, who often ask about the "app-lification" of consumer behavior as we transition from desktop to mobile.

We attribute this difference to the most commonly cited industry report on app and browser behavior published

by Flurry, which asserts that nearly 90% of

time spent

on mobile (across iOS and Android devices) occurs in app.

But Flurry's breakdown of how people are spending their time on mobile matters, as we see that the app time

spent data is skewed upward by gaming (32% of time) and social (a total of 29% of time between Facebook at

17%, Other messaging at 10% and Twitter at 2%).

Exhibit 1:

For the top 50 mobile web properties browser audiences are 2X larger than mobile app audiences,

growing 1.2x faster

(6)

12 Mobile Properties with Larger App Audiences...Positioned to be Category Winners and Take a

Larger Share of Ad Dollars

In all, only 12 of the top 50 U.S. mobile properties (24%) have larger mobile app audiences than mobile browser

audiences (see

Exhibit 3

). There are multiple interesting findings here.

First,

50% (6 of 12) of

these app-traffic

dominated properties are "daily habits

"

like email (Gmail and Yahoo Mail), checking the weather (Weather

Channel), monitoring stock performance (Yahoo Finance), looking up maps/directions (Google Maps) and

searching online (Google Search). Of the other 50% , 3 are "social sharing" sites (Snapchat, Instagram, Pinterest)

and 3 are streaming media sites (Pandora, Netflix, YouTube)...which you could argue are also daily habits for

many Americans.

Second,

the app user bases of the leading ad "platforms" (like YouTube, Pandora) and social networks (like

Instagram, Snapchat and Pinterest) also stand out. This speaks to

these players' advantaged app position to

continue to garner a larger share of mobile time spent and engagement, which can be used to

improve their ad offerings and targeting and grow their overall share of advertiser budget

s

. In our

view, this is also likely to lead to a higher share of mobile display ad dollars moving into "walled garden"

ecosystems, rather than toward the mobile web. While we're generally not concerned about the current iOS ad

blocker trends (as we question whether consumers will adopt them) it is notable that these companies with

large app user bases, in our view, are at an lower risk of losing advertising revenue to mobile ad blocking

technology.

Exhibit 2:

Gaming and social skew the Flurry time spent data toward apps

So u rce : F lu rry An a lytics, M o rg a n Sta n le y R e se a rch

(7)

Third

,

4 of these 12

app-dominated mobile properties

are Google-based offerings

– Gmail, Google Maps,

Google Search and YouTube – which speaks to the breadth of the Android ecosystem and Google's strong and

entrenched position within users' mobile activity.

Facebook more browser-centric, but app traffic strong too

Note that Facebook, the leading U.S. internet property in both mobile browser and app audience size (see

Exhibit 4

), is not shown in the exhibit above because of its strong mobile browser growth which surpassed its

mobile app audience last year. This in our view speaks to Facebook's leadership in both consumer mobile use

cases.

Exhibit 3:

Only these 12 U.S. mobile properties (of the top 50) have more mobile app traffic than mobile

browser traffic

(8)

Addressing the Google "App-lification" Bear Case

We are often asked about the Google mobile "app-lification" risk – consumers migrating to mobile apps rather

than mobile web browsers and, in effect, bypassing Google search. Our analysis shows that

G

oogle search is

still positioned to win on mobile as U.S. mobile traffic in 3 of the top search spend categories

– Retail,

Finance/Insurance, and Travel, which in aggregate make up an estimated 38% of the total U.S. search market –

materially over-indexes toward browsers .

In addition, we find that

~90% of the companies analyzed in these 3

categories are driving over 50% of their mobile traffic growth

from browsers

(See

Exhibit 6

)

.

This is bullish for Google as it illustrates

how the company, in our view, will continue to monetize user traffic as

it transitions from desktop to mobile. We now turn to analyzing mobile

consumer behavior in each category in more detail.

Exhibit 4:

Facebook's U.S. browser site now gets more traffic than its mobile app, and both its app and

browser audiences are larger than any other U.S. mobile property

So u rce : C o msco re D a ta , M o rg a n Sta n le y R e se a rch

Exhibit 5:

We analyzed mobile

audiences in 3 of the top U.S.

search ad spending verticals

which make up ~38% of U.S.

search spend

So u rce : Ka n ta r d a ta , M o rg a n Sta n le y R e se a rch

(9)

Exhibit 6:

~90% of the companies in the Travel, Finance/Insurance, and Retail categories are driving 50%+ of

their mobile traffic growth from browsers

(10)

Retail: 30% of the Top 30 Retailers Don't Have App User Bases Large

Enough to be Measured

We start with Retail (an estimated 18% of the total U.S. search market) where mobile browser traffic is still very

important. Indeed, 9 of the 30 retailers (30%) in our sample – the 25 largest traditional retailers and 5

eCommerce pureplays – still don’t have mobile app audiences that are large enough to be measured (See

Exhibit 7

).

In addition,

of the 21 retailers that have app user bases, the median mobile browser audience is still

6.1x larger than the mobile app audience

(ranging from 1.7X larger at Amazon and eBay to 61x at Staples).

Said another way, mobile browser audiences are still ~6x larger even among the most successful mobile

Exhibit 7:

The retailer median mobile browser audience is 6X larger than the median mobile app audience

(11)

retailers. Given the importance of traffic to retailers (foot traffic or mobile eyeballs), this in our view speaks to

the importance for retailers to continue to spend on Google mobile paid search for traffic.

We attribute this to the fact that changing consumer behavior is difficult and takes time...and years of desktop

based shopping has (largely) conditioned shoppers to start their e-commerce experience and price comparing in

browsers and on Google. In addition, Google text search ads and product listing ads present traditional retailers

an opportunity to improve their mobile traffic reach vs. Amazon and grow their share of e-commerce dollars.

These data speak to Google's entrenched position to continue to monetize the retail category as it

transitions to mobile.

The retail mobile user data also highlights the strength of the "long-tail" to Google, as 79% of the next 14 largest

retailers don't have app audiences large enough to be measured (see

Exhibit 8

) and therefore are more

dependent on browsers and Google traffic to grow.

Don't Forget About Google's Deep Linking Efforts Either

We acknowledge that while mobile browser traffic is larger than mobile app traffic, a higher percentage of

transactions may occur in mobile apps. But Google has a strategy to address this too by working to integrate its

search product across the mobile browser and app environments through app indexing and deep linking. Via

app indexing and deep linking, mobile users who have an app installed will be able to open content within the

app directly from mobile browser search results (for example, a product search on mobile browser may show a

link directly into the eBay app). This allows Google to display search results in a mobile web environment that

Exhibit 8:

The mobile app user bases for 11 of the 14 (79%) next largest Retail sites are not large enough to

be measured

(12)

Amazon and Walmart Showing Some App Success

Only two retailers – Amazon and Walmart (covered by Simeon Gutman)– drove over 50% of their mobile traffic

growth from

app users

. To us, this is

positive for these two players

as over time we believe larger app

audiences can lead to lower long-term customer acquisition costs, stickier customer bases, and a greater share

of consumer wallets.

In addition,

given these two players’ size and marketplace structure, this is a potential risk for Google

that should be monitored.

It is also, in our view, part of the reason we continue to see Google roll out new

and improved shopping offerings like Google product listing ads, Google Shopping (fka Froogle), Google

Express, and "Purchases on Google" (essentially, a Buy Button on mobile), as Google hopes to bring eCommerce

transactions into its ecosystem to more directly link transactions to retailers’ search ad spending.

Exhibit 9:

93% of the top 30 Retailers are seeing over 50% of their mobile traffic growth come from

browsers.

So u rce : C o msco re D a ta , M o rg a n Sta n le y

(13)

Finance/Insurance: Still "Browsing" on Mobile...

We find a similar mobile situation in the financial category (an estimated 14% of the total U.S. search market),

as

8 of the 14 insurance companies (57%) don’t have mobile app audiences large enough to be

measured

(See

Exhibit 10

). In addition, even among insurance companies that have mobile apps, mobile web

traffic is still ~4.5X larger than mobile app traffic. This, in our view, again speaks to the difficulty in changing

consumer behavior as

people looking for insurance in a mobile world are still (

at least) 4.5X more

likely to do their product/price comparing through a browser

(and probably Google) rather than a

brand-specific app downloaded on their mobile device.

The insurance companies’ mobile traffic growth is predominantly coming from browsers too, as all of them

except Geico (which had its app contribute 54% of mobile growth y/y) and Esurance (which saw its browser

traffic's mobile contribution to growth fall y/y) are getting over 50% of their mobile traffic

growth

from mobile

browsers (See

Exhibit 11

). This again speaks to the browser’s entrenched position in mobile consumer behavior

and the importance for insurance companies to continue to spend on Google paid search for traffic and new

customer acquisition even through the mobile transition…which is important to Google’s long-term earnings

power given the size of this category.

The Banks and Networks have Had Success Building App User Bases (we believe) because of Personal

Banking

On the other hand, the banks and card networks have had more success building mobile app user bases (we

believe, in large part, for personal banking purposes), but

even here mobile browser audiences are still ~1.5x

larger than mobile app audiences

.

We attribute this in large part to the convenience of personal mobile banking

(checking account balances, etc.) rather than the ability to search for financial products within providers' apps

(see

Exhibit 12

). After all, it is still important to shop and compare rates and offerings when purchasing financial

products, which in our view is still a process that is more likely to begin on Google or in a browser.

Exhibit 10:

Consumers looking for insurance on a

mobile device are ~4.5X more likely to do their

search on a mobile browser than an app

Source: C om score Data, Morgan Stanley Research

Exhibit 11:

Only 2 insurance companies – Geico

and Esurance – drove over 50% of their mobile

traffic growth from apps

(14)

Exhibit 12:

Almost all U.S. consumers (92%) use mobile banking/finance apps to check their account

balances and recent transactions

So u rce : B o a rd o f G o ve rn o rs o f Th e F e d e ra l R e se rve Syste m, M o rg a n Sta n le y R e se a rch

Exhibit 13:

The banks and card networks have

had more success building mobile app user bases,

but mobile browser audiences are still ~1.5x

larger...

Exhibit 14:

...And only 3 of 8 sites drove over 50%

of their mobile traffic growth from apps

(15)

Travel: OTA Mobile Browser Audiences Over 4X Larger

Travel makes up an estimated 6% of the total U.S. search market and here again we see browser traffic

continuing to be important as consumers migrate from desktop to mobile. First,

consider the online travel

agencies/intermediaries

(see

Exhibit 15

), where 10 of 11 (91%) have mobile apps, but

mobile browser

audiences are still ~4.5x larger than mobile app audiences

(among those with mobile apps and browsers).

The browser reach advantage ranges from 1.4X (at Airbnb) to 19.2x (at Booking.com). Given its small size and

rapid growth, Airbnb's current browser vs. app traffic mix speaks to how this player (in our view) is likely best

positioned to eventually grow its app user base to be larger than its browser base.

But it is telling that despite the online travel agencies’ (OTAs') continued efforts over the past 2 years to grow

their mobile app install bases – to generate more direct traffic and reduce their dependency on Google and

lower their customer acquisition costs – nearly 4.5x more mobile travel shoppers still visit via browser than app.

The OTAs’ mobile traffic growth is largely coming from browsers too, a

s anywhere from 52% to over 100%

of OTA mobile traffic

growth

is coming via browser

(see

Exhibit 16

).

This again, in our view,

s

peaks to the difficulty in changing consumer behavior

as travel shoppers are

more accustomed to searching and researching their travel in mobile browsers from their years doing the same

activity on desktop. Many consumers prefer to visit multiple online travel agencies as well (as the mobile traffic

over-lap among the OTAs ranges from 14% to 58%) which again makes people more likely to use a browser

than an OTAs' specific app. These data again speak to how

the OTAs are likely to continue to be dependent

on Google as travel migrates to mobile

(which is important given the size of the travel search spend

category).

And Hotels Remain Dependent on Google for Traffic too

In the U.S., the

large hotel chains

(covered by Thomas Allen) are even more dependent on Google, as

6 of 9

(67%) don’t have mobile app audiences large enough to be measured

(See

Exhibit 17

). This speaks

(again) to the entrenched browser consumer behavior in travel research, as well as the lack of a “hotel chain

app” use case. That is, it is arguably less efficient to use a Starwood app, then a Hyatt app, then a Marriott app,

Exhibit 15:

OTAs browser audiences are still

~4.5x larger than mobile app audiences...

Exhibit 16:

...and the OTAs’ mobile traffic growth

is largely coming from browsers too

(16)

The Airlines have had the most App success in the Travel Vertical, but Still Over-index toward

Browsers

Among the U.S. travel players, the airlines (covered by Rajeev Lalwani) have been most successful at growing

their app user bases, but even here we see that mobile browser traffic is still ~3X larger than mobile app traffic

(

Exhibit 19

). We attribute part of the airlines’ app success to mobile check-in and other “in-travel functionality”

(flight notifications, etc.) rather than a strong travel “search-and-research-and-book” use case.

That said, given the importance of airfare and ticket prices for shoppers, we believe that cross airline flight

search and comparison remains a frequent mobile activity…which speaks to why the airlines will continue to

have to buy Google paid search advertising. In addition, browser traffic is important for growth, as anywhere

from 63% to over 100% of the airlines’ mobile traffic

growth

is coming via browser (see

Exhibit 20

). Here again

we don’t see any signs that the airlines will be able to pull away from spending on paid search as consumer

behavior transitions to mobile.

Exhibit 17:

The large hotel chains are very

dependent on Google, as 6 of 9 (67%) don’t have

mobile app audiences large enough to be

measured...

Source: C om score Data, Morgan Stanley Researc

Exhibit 18:

...and most of their mobile traffic

growth is coming from browsers

Exhibit 19:

The airlines have been more

successful than the hotels at growing their app

user bases, but their browser traffic is still ~3X

larger than app traffic...

Exhibit 20:

...and most of their mobile traffic

growth is coming from browsers

(17)

Appendix

The top 50 mobile sites in the U.S. (below) were selected from monthly Comscore data. We ranked them by total

mobile browser plus mobile application unique visitors across all mobile platforms (smartphones and tablets).

This lists comprises the top 50 sites by unique visitors from July 2015.

The below list is ranked by "Browser Reach Advantage" – a metric that captures the size of mobile browser

traffic relative to mobile app traffic. A Browser Reach Advantage above 1.0x indicates more mobile browser

traffic than mobile app traffic.

(18)

Exhibit 21:

Top 50 U.S. Mobile Properties by Unique Visitors, Browser vs. App- July 2015

(19)

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Morgan Stanley uses a relative rating system using terms such as Overweight, Equal-weight, Not-Rated or Underweight (see definitions below). Morgan Stanley does not assign ratings of Buy, Hold or Sell to the stocks we cover. Overweight, Equal-weight, Not-Rated and Underweight are not the equivalent of buy, hold and sell. Investors should carefully read the definitions of all ratings used in Morgan Stanley Research. In addition, since Morgan Stanley Research contains more complete information concerning the analyst's views, investors should carefully read Morgan Stanley Research, in its entirety, and not infer the contents from the rating alone. In any case, ratings (or research) should not be used or relied upon as investment advice. An investor's decision to buy or sell a stock should depend on individual circumstances (such as the investor's existing holdings) and other considerations.

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COVERAGE UNIVERSE INVESTMENT BANKING CLIENTS (IBC)

STOCK RATING CATEGORY COUNT % OF TOTAL COUNT % OF TOTAL IBC % OF RATING CATEGORY

Overweight/Buy

1206

36%

356 44%

30%

Equal-weight/Hold

1446

43%

352 44%

24%

Not-Rated/Hold

94 3%

11 1%

12%

Underweight/Sell

601 18%

83 10%

14%

TOTAL

3,347

802

Data include common stock and ADRs currently assigned ratings. Investment Banking Clients are companies from whom Morgan Stanley received investment banking compensation in the last 12 months.

Analyst Stock Ratings

Overweight (O). The stock's total return is expected to exceed the average total return of the analyst's industry (or industry team's) coverage universe, on a risk-adjusted basis, over the next 12-18 months.

Equal-weight (E). The stock's total return is expected to be in line with the average total return of the analyst's industry (or industry team's) coverage universe, on a risk-adjusted basis, over the next 12-18 months.

Not-Rated (NR). Currently the analyst does not have adequate conviction about the stock's total return relative to the average total return of the analyst's industry (or industry team's) coverage universe, on a risk-adjusted basis, over the next 12-18 months.

Underweight (U). The stock's total return is expected to be below the average total return of the analyst's industry (or industry team's) coverage universe, on a risk-adjusted basis, over the next 12-18 months.

Unless otherwise specified, the time frame for price targets included in Morgan Stanley Research is 12 to 18 months.

Analyst Industry Views

Attractive (A): The analyst expects the performance of his or her industry coverage universe over the next 12-18 months to be attractive vs. the relevant broad market benchmark, as indicated below.

In-Line (I): The analyst expects the performance of his or her industry coverage universe over the next 12-18 months to be in line with the relevant broad market benchmark, as indicated below.

Cautious (C): The analyst views the performance of his or her industry coverage universe over the next 12-18 months with caution vs. the relevant broad market benchmark, as indicated below.

Benchmarks for each region are as follows: North America S&P 500; Latin America relevant MSCI country index or MSCI Latin America Index; Europe -MSCI Europe; Japan - TOPIX; Asia - relevant -MSCI country index or -MSCI sub-regional index or -MSCI AC Asia Pacific ex Japan Index.

Stock Price, Price Target and Rating History (See Rating Definitions)

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INDUSTRY COVERAGE: Internet

COMPANY (TICKER) RATING (AS OF) PRICE* (09/23/2015)

Brian Nowak, CFA

Amazon.com Inc (AMZN.O) O (04/24/2015) $536.07

eBay Inc (EBAY.O) E (04/23/2015) $25.59

Etsy Inc (ETSY.O) E (05/11/2015) $14.61

Expedia Inc. (EXPE.O) E (05/01/2015) $122.14

Facebook Inc (FB.O) O (04/23/2015) $93.97

Google (GOOGL.O) O (08/11/2015) $653.29

HomeAway, Inc. (AWAY.O) U (02/25/2015) $27.12

IAC/InterActiveCorp (IACI.O) E (06/26/2015) $68.08

LinkedIn Corp (LNKD.N) O (02/25/2015) $196.85

Priceline Group Inc (PCLN.O) E (02/25/2015) $1,275.99

Twitter Inc (TWTR.N) E (11/03/2014) $26.79

Yahoo! Inc (YHOO.O) O (03/26/2015) $29.74

Yelp Inc (YELP.N) E (07/29/2015) $23.10

Dean J Prissman

Groupon, Inc. (GRPN.O) E (02/25/2015) $3.73

GrubHub Inc. (GRUB.N) O (02/25/2015) $25.59

King Digital Entertainment PLC (KING.N) O (07/13/2015) $13.76

RetailMeNot Inc (SALE.O) E (07/13/2015) $8.66

Shutterstock Inc (SSTK.N) U (07/13/2015) $30.46

TrueCar Inc (TRUE.O) E (07/13/2015) $5.52

Zillow Group Inc (Z.O) O (07/13/2015) $27.49

Zynga Inc (ZNGA.O) E (07/13/2015) $2.39

Stock Ratings are subject to change. Please see latest research for each company. * Historical prices are not split adjusted.