Has democracy destabilized East Asia?

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2016-06

Has democracy destabilized East Asia?

Elkin, Zachary T.

Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/49449

NAVAL

POSTGRADUATE

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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited HAS DEMOCRACY DESTABILIZED EAST ASIA?

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Zachary T. Elkin June 2016

Thesis Advisor: Robert J. Weiner

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HAS DEMOCRACY DESTABILIZED EAST ASIA?

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Japan and South Korea share many similarities. Both have experienced periods of extraordinary growth, both have advanced market economies, and they both have recently experienced the first transition between parties that control its executive branch. In each case, scholars have blamed the new parties for instability.

The Democratic Party of Japan’s rule witnessed base issues that exacerbated U.S.-Japan relations, the 3/11 disaster, and the nationalization of the Senkaku Islands, an action that increased tension with China over the disputed territory. In South Korea, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun presided over the “desecuritization” of the North Korean threat, heated anti-American protests, and a near conflict with Tokyo over the disputed Dokdo Islands. These were all tense scenarios for new leaders. But were they tense because of these administrations’ policies and actions; that is, do political parties in Tokyo and Seoul actually matter? Or would these outcomes have occurred regardless?

It is the conclusion of this research that the administrations did contribute to the instability within East Asia; however, their impact on regional stability was transitory. Each administration attempted significant policy changes and each had differing degrees of failure because of international and domestic constraints that tended to reinforce the status quo.

14. SUBJECT TERMS

Japan, Korea, democracy, Asia, stability

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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

HAS DEMOCRACY DESTABILIZED EAST ASIA?

Zachary T. Elkin

Lieutenant, United States Navy

B.S., Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, 2009

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (FAR EAST, SOUTHEAST ASIA, THE PACIFIC)

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 2016

Approved by: Robert J. Weiner Thesis Advisor

Christopher P. Twomey Second Reader

Mohammed Hafez

ABSTRACT

Japan and South Korea share many similarities. Both have experienced periods of extraordinary growth, both have advanced market economies, and both have recently experienced the first transition between parties that control its executive branch. In each case, scholars have blamed the new parties for instability.

The Democratic Party of Japan’s rule witnessed base issues that exacerbated U.S.-Japan relations, the 3/11 disaster, and the nationalization of the Senkaku Islands, an action that increased tension with China over the disputed territory. In South Korea, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun presided over the “desecuritization” of the North Korean threat, heated anti-American protests, and a near conflict with Tokyo over the disputed Dokdo Islands. These were all tense scenarios for new leaders. But were they tense because of these administrations’ policies and actions; that is, do political parties in Tokyo and Seoul actually matter? Or would these outcomes have occurred regardless?

It is the conclusion of this research that the administrations did contribute to the instability within East Asia; however, their impact on regional stability was transitory. Each administration attempted significant policy changes and each had differing degrees of failure because of international and domestic constraints that tended to reinforce the status quo.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.  INTRODUCTION...1 

II.  JAPAN ...15 

A.  EXTERNAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ...17 

1.  Balance of Power ...18 

2.  Allies and Trade Relations ...24 

3.  Nationalism and Historical Revisionism ...29 

B.  ANALYSIS ...31 

1.  Yuai Policy ...33 

2.  Territorial Disputes ...36 

3.  U.S. Alliance ...40 

4.  Security Policy and JSDF Modernization...44 

C.  CONCLUSION ...45 

III.  KOREA ...47 

A.  EXTERNAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ...48 

1.  Balance of Power ...48 

2.  Allies and Trade Relations ...53 

3.  Nationalism and Identity Politics ...56 

B.  ANALYSIS ...61  1.  China’s Rise ...63  2.  U.S.–ROK Alliance ...65  3.  North Korea ...67  4.  Japan ...72  C.  CONCLUSION ...76  IV.  FINDINGS ...79 

A.  WHERE DID NEW ADMINISTRATIONS MAKE A DIFFERENCE?...79 

1.  Democratization of Security Policy ...79 

2.  Greater Foreign Policy Autonomy ...82 

B.  WHY WERE NEW ADMINISTRATIONS CONSTRAINED? ...83 

1.  Inexperience and Lack of Information ...84 

2.  Divergence of Domestic and International Objectives and Preferences ...85 

C.  FURTHER AREAS OF STUDY ...86 

2.  Democratic Consolidation? ...88  LIST OF REFERENCES ...91  INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...103 

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.  Japan Stability Analysis ...31 

Figure 2.  South Korea Stability Analysis ...62 

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.  Japan Military Spending ...20 

Table 2.  South Korean Military Spending ...50 

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADIZ Air Defense Identification Zone

AFC Asian financial crisis

CC conservative coalition

CCP Chinese Communist Party

CLCS Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf

CSR cross-Straits relations

DMZ demilitarized zone

DPJ Democratic Party of Japan

DPP Democratic Progressive Party

DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)

ECS East China Sea

EEZ exclusive economic zone

FTA free trade agreement

GDP gross domestic product

GNP Grand National Party

GOJ Government of Japan

IGO intergovernmental organization

IMF International Monetary Fund

IR international relations

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JCG Japanese Coast Guard

JMSDF Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force

JSDF Japanese Self Defense Force

JSP Japan Socialist Party

KDJ Kim Dae-jung

KMT Kuomintang

KYS Kim Young-sam

LC liberal coalition

LDP Liberal Democratic Party

MDP Millennium Democratic Party

MID militarized interstate dispute

MILEX military expenditures

MOD Ministry of Defense

NPS Naval Postgraduate School

PGH Park Geun-hye

PLAAF People’s Liberation Army Air Force

PRC People’s Republic of China

RMH Roh Moo-hyun

ROK Republic of Korea (South Korea)

ROKN Republic of Korea Navy

RTW Roh Tae-Woo

SCAP Supreme Commander of Allied Powers

SDF self-defense forces

SIPRI Stockholm international Peace Research Institute

SCS South China Sea

U.S. United States

UN United Nations

UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

URI Uri Party

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis is not a testament to my personal ability, but to the mentorship and encouragement of so many friends, family, and colleagues. First, Dr. Robert Weiner was a patient thesis advisor and a great mentor during my year-and-a-half at the Naval Postgraduate School. Likewise, Dr. Christopher Twomey introduced me to international relations and helped with my transition into the world of social science. Thank you both for the confidence you have given me and the effort you have exerted toward helping me finish the thesis.

While there were many colleagues I would like to name, there are too many people who shared ideas with me to mention. I personally want to thank a few classmates who helped me put this research into context: CDR Chi-hung Wan, CPT Dong-gun Lee, MAJ Dae-kyu Lee, CDR Mong lin Sin, MAJ Eugene Choi, MAJ Andy Lee, and Lt Col Miga Dorj. Each of you contributed to the knowledge I have gained while at NPS.

I would like to thank my wonderful wife, Satoko, and son, Ezekiel, whose encouragement and support gave me the strength to persevere through long nights of studying, and who continue to support my growth as a person. To my parents, Susan and Charles Walker, thanks for inspiring me to chase my dreams and instilling within me a solid work ethic. I would have not made it to this point without the support of each of you.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have many similarities. Each is a democracy, all share strong ties with the United States (U.S.), and each country has seen the first change of democratically elected party control of its government within the last two decades. One other distinction they share is that this political transition at home occurred in the context of a rise in regional tension.

Each country voted the new parties into power with the hope of change; however, is that what these parties provided? What part, if any, did each of the new administrations play in causing regional tension? This thesis pursues questions mainly with regard to Japan and South Korea, with Taiwan as an additional illustrative comparison case.

In Japan, under the Yukio Hatoyama administration, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) created major alliance problems between Japan and the United States over a base move within the Okinawa prefecture and the cancellation of an Indian Ocean refueling mission. The administration of Hatoyama’s DPJ successor, Naoto Kan, nationalized the Senkaku Islands; this action not only derailed Hatoyama’s Yuai policy, but also resulted in a tense escalation of fighter sorties and ship harassment that raised the probability of armed conflict between the two sides.1

In South Korea, progressive president Kim Dae-Jung’s (KDJ’s) administration ushered in a rise of anti-American sentiment, blaming U.S. policy against North Korea (DPRK) for diminishing progress under the Sunshine Policy. U.S. President George W. Bush “Scorned the ‘Sunshine’ or engagement policy of South Korea’s President Kim Dae-jung, and expressed skepticism about North Korea’s supposedly peaceful intentions.”2 _{Then Kim’s progressive successor, Roh Moo-Hyun (RMH), ran for}

1 _{Tomohiko Taniguchi, “Ishihara and the Senkakus: The Japanese State of Mind,” Brookings 63} (2012), https://cle.nps.edu/access/content/group/d588bacc-5ca7-4b5a-a203-6a2715cf87da/readings/tani guchi%202012%20Ishihara%20and%20the%20Senkakus_%20The%20Japanese%20State%20of%20Mind %20_%20Brookings%20Institution.pdf.

2 _{Victor D. Cha, “Korea’s Place in the Axis,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 3 (2002): 79, JSTOR: 2003} 3164.

president in 2002–2003, fueling overtly anti-American nationalist sentiment.3 _As President Kim was finally warming to America, President Roh was elected and led South Korea to new heights of anti-Americanism.4 _{As a result, Korean relations with the United} States reached their lowest point while relations with the DPRK improved in the short term.5

In Taiwan, Chen Shui-Bian became the first former-opposition, non-Kuomintang (KMT) president in 2000. His popular support stemmed from the independence movement, which consequently made him unpopular with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). During the Chen administration, cross-Strait relations (CSR) fell to their lowest point in decades. “Washington and Beijing began to’ ‘co-manage’ Taiwan.”6 _Eventually, the PRC passed an anti-secession law, which states that any attempt to declare independence would result in PRC opposition by all means necessary, to include force.7

Instability did occur in each case. Japan and China became more confrontational, especially regarding the Senkaku Islands. The Republic of Korea (ROK) became increasingly anti-American, especially through RMH’s Uri Party. Taiwan’s CSR during Chen Shui-bian’s administration deteriorated to a level comparable to those under prior president Lee Teng-hui, although without reliving another 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis.

While these former-opposition governments appear to have presided over a significant amount of change, the actual degree of change and the extent to which that change can be attributed to the political parties themselves is less clear. KDJ’s overtures to North Korea were confounded by the Bush administration’s heavy-handed approach to the DPRK, by Kim Jong-Il’s political maneuvering to drive a wedge between the United

3 _{Victor D. Cha, “America and South Korea: The Ambivalent Alliance?,” Current History 102, no.} 665 (September 2003): 279–84.

4 _{Katherine H. S. Moon, “Korean Nationalism, Anti-Americanism and Democratic Consolidation,” in}

Korea’s Democratization, ed. Samuel S. Kim (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 130– 55.

5 _{Cha, “America and South Korea: The Ambivalent Alliance?,” 281.}

6 _{Shelley Rigger, “Taiwan in U.S.-China Relations,” in Tangled Titans: The United States and China,} ed. David Shambaugh (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 2013), 302.

States and the ROK, and by domestic political challenges that would eventually see KDJ prosecuted for corruption and RMH impeached. Kim and Roh made changes by channeling popular support for their actions to counter political opposition, which consequently put them in a hostile relationship with the United States; a tough position to be in with the nation’s security guarantor. Hatoyama bypassed and marginalized Japan’s strong bureaucracy to effect changes that might not have been possible otherwise, but it also distanced him from the collective wisdom of the bureaucratic institutions, which were predisposed to see him fail. The DPJ’s inexperience and dismissal of bureaucratic experts resulted in mistakes upon which the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) easily capitalized. Chen Shui-bian’s presidency was severely constrained by the Legislative Yuan, China, and the United States, but he moved forward with corruption reform, attempts to increase Taiwan’s international space, and American military equipment purchases. In the end, Chen was only marginally effective at best, and perhaps, counterproductive and dangerous in reality.

When new and less-experienced political parties take power in East Asia, they do have the ability to make a difference, but three major constraints can be observed: (1) inexperienced leadership and strong opposition prevents enactment of the ruling party’s agenda, which tends to be overly ambitious, (2) international and domestic constraints, such as prevailing ideas that provide unforeseen impediments to new parties in power, and (3) the instability evidenced by new party changes has the potential to become routinized as institutions learn to accommodate pluralistic policy views, new parties gain insights into governing that moderate their message, and regional actors learn that democratic politics may not necessarily favor its strategic interests, but rather, may increase the legitimacy of domestic decision making in the democratic countries in the long run.

Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), as it heads to its second term in office, seems to provide an important caveat. Although newly elected DPP president Tsai Ing-wen has successfully moderated her party’s views and claimed the presidency, the PRC views the DPP as hostile to PRC interests regardless of its stated position. Taiwan’s ambiguous state/sub-state position, coupled with the diverging interests of the PRC and

Taiwan, appear to place the two on a collision course. The underlying shifting identity within the Taiwan populace, and not any specific president or administration, appears to be the driving force of this instability.

Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan each have been the subject of numerous articles and books. An attempt follows to review the most pertinent works relating to the countries and areas that this thesis covers. Relevant theoretical frameworks for regional stability analyses are presented first, and then actual comparative analyses are reviewed. While multiple comparative studies integrate the three countries, the few that also tie in their democratic institutions and regional stability are reviewed. Finally, this review addresses whether the parties actually matter.

The concept of “regional stability” does not provide a rigid scale with which to measure variations. Robert Ayson states, “Stability, like peace, is a desired goal, but countries differ on what constitutes stability.”8 _{This study defines stability as the region’s} “tendency toward equilibrium, including its ability to find a new equilibrium in changing conditions,” including “the avoidance of major war, the stability of distribution of power, the stability of institutions and norms, [and] political stability within countries.”9

The Asia-Pacific region is the “system” for which this study attempts stability analysis, but the interrelationship of each country within the Asia-Pacific region is outside the scope of this work. For example, while domestic political dynamics within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) might impact Japan’s security environment, this study only needs to determine that the source of stability is external to Japan. This analysis includes the influence that the United States exerts on the region.

Determining structural changes within the regional balance of power may prompt an equilibrium shift. The rise of China, with its expansive military modernization and economic expansion, appears to require other regional actors to find a new equilibrium. This thesis compares economic and military data between regional powers to determine if

8 _{Robert Ayson, “Regional Stability in the Asia Pacific: Toward a Conceptual Understanding,” Asian}

Security 1, no. 2 (2005): 190–213, doi: 10.1080/14799850490961080. 9 _{Ayson, “Regional Stability in Asia Pacific,” 192.}

changes in the balance of power have occurred vis-à-vis other regional actors. Demographically, it entails comparing population trends. Given the prominence of contested islands within regional disputes, the likelihood that conflicts would involve a significant maritime components, and current concerns about anti-access technologies within East Asia, this paper expands upon the metrics traditionally used by offensive realists.10 _{While the defense budget is included, paramilitary activity must also be} considered because of the proliferation of white-hull fleets and the unorthodox behavior of those vessels within the past decade. For example, U.S. carrier forces have continued decrease relatively over recent years, as China has launched its first carrier, and started a program to create future indigenous carriers. Another U.S. intervention in cross-Strait tensions, like that of 1996 via two carrier strike groups, may be a riskier prospect in the future. The United States still has a significant maritime advantage vis-à-vis the PRC, but China’s development of technology, such as the DF-21D missile, could “prepare” China “for a foreign enemy’s military intervention” in future “anti-secessionist” conflicts with Taiwan.11 _{Eight years of DPP rule in Taiwan and 10 years of liberal coalition (LC) rule in} Korea allow enough of a period to discern a pattern, but the DPJ was only in power in Japan for three years. This weakness in explanatory power means that Chapter II relies more on a detailed analysis of policy prescriptions and changes in defense policies to ascertain whether they made a difference.

Balance of power calculations provides a foundation for understanding security dynamics, but does not explain the entirety of the security environment. Mearsheimer concludes that China’s rise will inevitably lead to conflict; in this view, elected governments in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, regardless of party, would make similar decisions when faced with external threats. The inevitability of conflict results from China’s rise and America’s attempt to contain it, along with a balancing coalition of “India, Japan, and Russia, as well as smaller powers like Singapore, South Korea, and

10 _{John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, updated (New York: W. W. Norton and} Company, 2003).

11 _{M. Taylor Fravel and Christopher P. Twomey, “Projecting Strategy: The Myth of Chinese} Counter-Intervention,” The Washington Quarterly 37, no. 4 (2014): 171–87, doi:10.1080/0163660X.2014.1002164.

Vietnam.”12 _{While this claim seems sensational, is a comparable NATO type institution} starting to form in East Asia? Lanteigne makes the case that soft balancing is occurring within Asia, which would look more like bilateral and multilateral cooperation in light of China’s rise.13

The amount and quality of institutions and alliance affiliations that countries share matter deeply in the decisions they will make regarding war. An alliance between two states makes a military dispute “40% less likely,” while being a player in the global decision-making process may constrain a country from going to war due to the potential of being ostracized by the international community.14 _{As institutional membership and} alliances matter in regional stability, this thesis analyzes the nature of alliance relations to determine whether a country’s foreign policy decisions stabilized or destabilized the region.

Democratization, democratic consolidation, and domestic politics are all phenomena that can produce uncontrollable forces; moreover, the impact of the resultant forces can lead to new (and sometimes unwanted) foreign policy conditions. Mansfield and Snyder note that instability, independent of either political party, tends to be associated with the rise of nationalism during democratization.15 _{Different from general} political infighting within democratic countries, it reflects the more generic shift toward allowing new groups to compete for power, which heightens nationalism and significantly increases the potential for conflicts with outside countries.16 _{Since Taiwan} and South Korea had only been a democracy for two election cycles prior to the opposition party’s coming to power, the effects of new democratization and fear of

12 _{John J. Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History 105, no. 690 (April 2006): 160–} 62, ProQuest: 200776171.

13 _{Marc Lanteigne, “Water Dragon? China, Power Shifts and Soft Balancing in the South Pacific,”}

Political Science 64, no. 1 (June 2012): 36, doi: 10.1177/0032318712447732.

14 _{Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and}

International Organizations (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2001).

15 _{Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” International}

Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 5–38, JSTOR: 2539213. 16 _Ibid.

backsliding back into authoritarianism were still a concern. Japan’s democracy, by contrast, can be seen as very stable and longstanding, since the LDP has competed and won in regular elections for over 60 years.

One question of importance to scholars of democratization is whether Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan were democratically consolidated in the first place at the time former-opposition parties gained power.17 _{A country can, as Japan did, have an} apparently vibrant democracy for decades without meeting the full consolidation criteria. Once properly consolidated, issues pertaining to governance, instead of patronage and nationalism, predominate the political agenda, but some scholars believe that for complete consolidation, a functioning two-party system must exist.18 _{Some scholars, such} as Cho, have found reason to believe that the democratic peace theory does not apply to countries that have not yet fully consolidated.19 _{His concern is relevant to the current} thesis to the extent that any regional instability might be caused by a country’s incomplete democratic consolidation, a condition mostly independent of the particular party in power.

Even if considering that a country is fully consolidated democracy, gridlock and opposition may still significantly constrain the ruling party’s ability to govern in an effective manner. If politics can constrain the amount of change a party can make, Japan should provide a rich example due to its ministerial government style and its reliance on coalition maintenance to govern. South Korea and Taiwan have presidential democracies, but government inaction is still possible given the possibility of a divided government between legislative and executive branches, alongside the potential that bureaucratic inertia can stifle a new administration’s initiatives.

17 _{Il Hyun Cho, “Democratic Instability: Democratic Consolidation, National Identity and Security} Dynamics,” Foreign Policy Analysis 8 (2011): 191–213, doi:10.1111/j.1743-8594.2011.00154.

18 _{Cho, “Democratic Instability,” 196.} 19 _{Cho, “Democratic Instability,” 209.}

Ideas of threat and security are said to be socially constructed. How a country views anarchy, not anarchy itself, shapes its relations toward other countries.20 _To determine party change and whether the ideas it generated were a determining factor in changes to regional stability, this paper traces sources of interstate tension between major regional actors to determine whether the new party played a role in promoting or endorsing destructive ideas for political gain. One major trend that has become troublesome in East Asia is rising nationalism among the many neighboring countries. At first glance, opposition parties in South Korea and Taiwan have either supported or pursued ideas and policies that eroded regional stability in this regard, while Japan’s traditional opposition party has opposed the strong nationalist thread that has stirred up discontent among its neighbors in recent years. This work seeks to incorporate ideas into its analysis mainly because anti-Japanese sentiment puts South Korea and Japan on an unnecessarily hostile trajectory while Taiwan’s increasingly felt Taiwanese identity has put it on a collision course with China.

The author now turns to the major literature regarding Japan in particular. Hughes observes that the DPJ’s failure to implement its “new grand strategy” was due to the amount of pressure exerted by the international system, specifically China and the United States.21 _{Also, the lack of experience and domestic political issues helped to block} progress on the DPJ’s attempt to become more regionally accepted. Sneider explains that U.S. alliance pressures posed significant domestic issues for Hatoyama and that his promotion of “Asianism” was misunderstood by U.S. policy makers.22 _{Each of these} works focuses on different institutional characteristics that boxed in Japanese decision makers. While Sneider tends to give the DPJ more benefit of the doubt, Hughes blames the Hatoyama administration for the lack of experience and failure to govern

20 _{Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It,” International Organization 46, no. 2} (1992): 391–425, JSTOR: 2706858.

21 _{Christopher W. Hughes, “The Democratic Party of Japan’s New (but Failing) Grand Security} Strategy: From ‘Reluctant Realist’ to ‘Resentful Realist’?,” The Journal of Japanese Studies 38, no. 1 (2012): 109–40, doi:10.1352/jjs.2012.0006.

22 _{Daniel Sneider, “The New Asianism: Japanese Foreign Policy under the Democratic Party of} Japan,” Asia Policy, no. 12 (July 2011): 99–129, doi:10.1353/asp.2011.0016.

effectively.23 _{Hughes acknowledges the political infighting between the DPJ and Japan’s} LDP, as well as bureaucratic rigidity, which contributed to souring relations with the United States.24 _{Pekkanen, Reed, and Scheiner note that the LDP’s strong opposition} greatly affected the DPJ’s ability to govern.25 _{Together, this literature paints a grim} picture of the constraints arrayed against the DPJ administration’s attempts to effect change in Japan.

Another set of literature discusses the DPJ’s failure to govern during the 3/11 crises and the diplomatic row over nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoutai Islands.26 While the LDP, which failed to hold nuclear regulators accountable for decades, might not have handled the Fukushima triple disaster any better, Krauss makes an important point about the DPJ Prime Minister Hatoyama’s stance on the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. His political jockeying unnecessarily reignited domestic conflict, which is still to be fully resolved.27 _{Richard Samuels discusses domestic and international} considerations that have shaped Japan’s politics from the end of WWII until 2006, but does not cover the period that this analysis covers, 2009 to the present.28 _{The author’s} analysis attempts to add to Samuels’ comprehensive political analysis for the three historic years of DPJ rule and beyond.

In South Korea, the literature notes KDJ’s initial effective handling of the Asian financial crisis (AFC), as well as Korea’s fall back into predation.29 _{Political constraints} kept KDJ from reforming the developmental state collaboration between the Chaebol and the government bureaucracy that has led to corruption. While not directly related to

23 _{Hughes, “The Democratic Party of Japan’s New (but Failing) Grand Security Strategy,” 109.} 24 _Ibid.

25 _{Robert Pekkanen, Steven R. Reed, and Ethan Scheiner, eds., “Japanese Politics between the 2009} and 2012 Elections,” in Japan Decides 2012 (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 8–19.

26 _{Ellis Krauss, “Crisis Management, LDP, and DPJ Style,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 14,} no. 2 (2013): 177–99, doi:10.1017/S1468109913000029; Taniguchi, “Ishihara and the Senkakus.”

27 _{Krauss, “Crisis Management,” 193-4}

28 _{Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca:} Cornell University Press, 2007).

29 _{Dwight H. Perkins, East Asian Development: Foundations and Strategies (Cambridge, MA:} Harvard University Press, 2013).

security, it highlights the potential that Kim had to make a difference. Moon and Suh write that Kim’s policies of thawing South Korea’s relationship with Japan were constrained by three factors: collective Korean identity that stems from “historic memory of colonial domination,” nationalist abuse of history in both Japan and South Korea, and in the opposite direction, the U.S.’ support for South Korea and Japan’s cooperation.30 Moon and Suh focus on some of Kim administration’s positive accomplishments and the ideational and international constraints that affected Kim’s ability to make progress on democratic reforms or dismantling the developmental state; however, they focus only on one administration, not party change, in assessing the contribution of changes in government control to regional stability. Katherine Moon argues that nationalism and the anti-Americanism in Korea is part of the consolidation process of foreign policy within democratic principles, and it is natural and healthy for consolidating democracies.31 _Both KDJ and RMH featured anti-American sentiment in their administration and presidential campaign, respectively, but Roh began to backpedal on anti-American sentiment after he was elected.32 _{Both the Cha and Moon analyses are useful for understanding ideological} motivations that fueled RMH’s increasingly nationalistic campaign, but neither study focuses on the question of whether KDJ’s or RMH’s presidencies made a difference. In contrast, Zhu notes that President Roh’s “peace and prosperity policy” was vital in balancing South Korea’s alliance with the United States with its ability to help stabilize Northeast Asia.33 _{Haggard and Nolan determine that, although Roh’s peace and} prosperity plan sounded productive, he had very little good will among his neighbors to achieve any of his lofty goals; for example, the U.S.-South Korea free trade agreement (FTA) was being discussed as Koreans took to the streets to protest American beef.34

30 _{Chung-in Moon and Seung-won Suh, “Security, Economy, and Identity Politics: Japan-South} Korean Relations under the Kim Dae-Jung Government,” Korean Observer 36, no. 4 (2005): 595, ProQuest 209360696.

31 _{Moon, “Korean Nationalism, Anti-Americanism and Democratic Consolidation.”}

32 _{Zhu Zhiqun, “Small Power, Big Ambition: South Korea’s Role in Northeast Asian Security under} President Roh Moo-Hyun,” Asian Affairs 34, no. 2 (2007): 67–86, JSTOR: 30172663.

33 _{Ibid., 83.}

34 _{Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, “A Security and Peace Mechanism for Northeast Asia: The} Economic Dimension,” The Pacific Review 22, no. 2 (2009): 119–37, doi:10.1080/09512740902815284.

This study further assesses whether progressive presidents Kim and Roh actually made an appreciable difference.

Taiwan, which is isolated from many international organizations and treaty alliances because of its peculiar status vis-à-vis China, is considered by the PRC to be a domestic issue, but is still accorded assurances that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully under the Taiwan Relations Act and the three joint communiques. Rigger notes that “Chen undertook a series of initiatives aimed at raising Taiwan’s international status: promoting a new constitution, pressing for referendums on issues related to Taiwan’s sovereignty, filing an application for United Nations membership for ‘Taiwan.’”35 _{It is clear that Chen Shui-bian’s administration attempted unilaterally to} change Taiwan’s international profile in an attempt to acquire more of the trappings of other independent countries. Furthermore, division within the government proved to be a problem for Chen. As Rigger notes, “For seven years, the KMT-dominated Legislative Yuan refused to appropriate funds to purchase most of what the United States was willing to sell.”36 _{This division had the effect of further deteriorating the U.S.-Taiwan} relationship. Yet, deteriorating relations may not have clearly been caused by Chen Shui-bian’s actions. Although Chen pushed for referenda and other measures that attempted unilaterally to change the status quo to provide Taiwan more international recognition, his initial tone toward China was not nearly as radical. Taiwan’s new DPP party leader and president, Tsai Ing-wen, has also moderated the party’s stance on independence. Independence is still a contentious part of the party plank, but it has not been a part of her political message.37 _{Certain other pressures, such as domestic PRC concerns and relative} balance of power change between China and the United States, might also factor into the interactions amongst the United States, China, and Taiwan from 2000–2008.

Finally, each chapter of this thesis reviews whether the former, opposition party administrations, as opposed to other phenomena, ultimately have any effect on regional

35 _{Rigger, “Taiwan in U.S.-China Relations,” 301.} 36 _{Ibid., 302.}

37 _{“DPP Selects Tsai as Presidential Candidate,” April 16, 2015, http://taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=} 229411&ctNode=420#.

stability. Cho provides intriguing findings about each country’s nationalist outbidding politics and democratic institutional structures.38 _{His work holds that a major caveat to} the democratic peace theory is consolidation,39 _{and it furthers Mansfield and Snyder’s} research on how democratization might lead to aggressive foreign policies and potential for war.40 _{While addressing some potential political constraints, Cho’s article argues that} the lack of democratic consolidation and the “political salience” of negative nationalism resulted in nationalistic outbidding.41 _{As a consequence of its focus on democratic} consolidation and the influence of ideas, the article does not attempt to address what difference, if any, a new political party can make in bringing stability to the region. That topic, however, is the intent of this thesis.

In light of initial political party changes within Japan and South Korea, as well as Taiwan, this thesis analyzes how and whether changes to long-standing political control among East Asian democracies can affect regional stability within the Asia-Pacific. By focusing on phenomena that have traditionally led to conflict or tension in the region— balance of power changes, alliance troubles, and ideas like nationalism and identity—the succeeding chapters narrow down ways that each country’s new administration might have contributed to instability. Typically, a confluence of multiple factors governs instability interdependently, but this thesis tries to distinguish between the effects of external factors, the actual policies and actions of the president or prime minister, and other domestic factors. This thesis finds that new administrations in Japan, and Korea, did negatively impact regional stability in certain ways, but that this instability seemed to be transient at best. It also finds that new administrations are significantly constrained from implementing changes due to a confluence of international and domestic forces that tend to reinforce the status quo.

38 _{Cho, “Democratic Instability,”208-9.} 39 _{Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace.}

40 _{Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” 5–38.} 41 _{Cho, “Democratic Instability,” 191.}

These findings are important because the United States has rebalanced to the Pacific to protect its national interests, address concerns from allies about the rise of China, and ensure that the conflictual nature of the East China Sea (ECS) and South China Sea (SCS) disputes do not escalate into violence. The countries studied in this thesis have very close relationships with the United States. South Korea and Japan are both strong regional allies. Taiwan does not share a formal alliance with the United States, but benefits from military sales and an ambiguous security commitment that appears to guarantee that the cross-Strait dispute will be settled peacefully to some. If domestic politics in these countries destabilize the region, the United States could find itself entangled in a regional conflict.

This study also tries to understand whether something is uniquely destabilizing about these East Asian cases. Multiple scholars have pointed out that countries in Asia seem not to follow the democratic peace theory as closely as other regions do, and by looking closer at Japan and South Korea, this thesis attempts to unpack these claims while providing an explanatory framework to put different sources of instability into perspective. Besides providing a new lens from which to judge whether domestic phenomena will affect international relations (IR) among a region’s many dynamic actors, it is the author’s hope that this work clarifies some of the challenges facing stability in the Asia-Pacific region and what should be expected during future iterations of administration in democracies in that region.

Two main chapters, beside the introduction and conclusion, focus on Japan and South Korea. Each contains a section on how and whether instability within the regional security environment corresponded to periods of opposing party rule. These initial sections for each country are subdivided into three functional areas: changes to regional balance of power, changes in alliances, and ideological currents that impact stability. The second section of each chapter analyzes each area in which the first section found areas of instability and filters the sources of this instability into three causal areas: international constraints or sources of friction, policies and actions solely attributable to the administration, and other domestic constraints and sources of friction.

This thesis focuses on historical accounts, using mostly secondary sources. Minor data sets are used to analyze military spending numbers and economic indicators. Furthermore, polling data from primary and secondary sources, when it appeared to be trustworthy, was used to measure change in ideas, such as nationalism or identity.

This thesis measures the effects on regional stability through two components, severity and persistence. While a significant event, such as an invasion of another country, is extremely severe, it may or may not be a persistent source of instability, depending on whether occupation occurs and whether hostilities diminish or persist afterward. On the other hand, historical contestation over an uninhabited rock can rise to a level of dispute that poisons diplomatic relations between countries for decades, but does not result in military conflict, which would constitute persistent but not severe instability. The measurements of the first section consider the persistence and severity of the phenomena that affect regional stability to provide an overall measurement of stability.

II.

JAPAN

Japan has had a single dominant party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), rule the country almost without interruption through six decades of peace and prosperity. Within the past 10 years, a true opposition party, The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), has not only materialized, but for the first time also won control of the Diet and appointed a prime minister with no coalition support from the LDP. During the DPJ’s three years of rule from 2009 to 2012, three prime ministers, Hatoyama Yukio, Kan Naoto, and Noda Yoshihiko attempted to make large changes that appeared to destabilize the region in a number of key ways. This chapter focuses on those years of 2009 through 2012 to determine whether or not the DPJ destabilized the region, or whether it made a difference at all.

The first section introduces the regional trends in play and how they affect Japan. These macro-level trends include balance of power considerations that affect long-term regional stability, alliance maintenance with regional actors, and identity shifts that affect Japan’s image abroad. Each subsection helps to determine the overall instability that Japan’s interaction with the regional system has produced.

The second section attributes the instability to external pressures, internal political pressures other than those driven by the DPJ, or to the policies that the DPJ itself implemented (or failed to implement). The section further is divided into four subsections: regional leadership, history issues, territorial disputes, and base issues. The regional leadership subsection analyzes Japan’s attempts to instill a sense of regional institutionalization in East Asia to counter China’s rise. The history issues subsection discusses whether or not the DPJ was able to overcome Japan’s perceived failure to acknowledge historical atrocities it committed during WWII. The territorial disputes section addresses how Japan has attempted to deal with islands over which it disputes sovereignty with China, Taiwan, and Korea. Finally, base issues are a significant strain to U.S.-Japanese relations and have the potential to morph into a regional issue.

Many scholars have warned that democratization, incomplete consolidation, and other transitional phenomena related to democracies can lead to instability or conflict.42 Japan’s initial attempt to democratize was the Taisho Democracy of the WWI era.43 _This experiment did not last, as the Japanese Imperial Army assassinated politicians who got in its way, with the military eventually taking over the prime minister’s position.44 _After Japan’s defeat in WWII, the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) implemented the post-war constitution, which has persisted unchanged since. But even as the Japanese government hosted free and fair elections, the LDP’s conservative predecessors, and then the LDP itself since 1955, have maintained a monopoly on power.45 _{In the 1990s, the bubble burst, and Japan’s economy experienced what some} have called the lost decades.46 _{The LDP’s failure to shore up a spiraling economy while} also dealing with political scandals resulted in party fragmentation and its first loss of power. The first instance of LDP defeat occurred from 1993–1994, when a coalition of eight parties, led by Hosokawa Morihiro, ruled for less than a year before the coalition disintegrated.47 _{This study does not include this period for two reasons. First, the parties} in power were not in power long enough to provide useful data on regional stability. Second, the Hosokawa government’s main policy effort focused on electoral reform and other internal matters, not security or foreign policy. Directly after Hosokawa’s successor, Tsutomo Hata, took office, the coalition’s rule was ended through a vote of no

42 _{Mansfield and Snyder, “Democracy and Danger”; Amitav Acharya, “Democracy or Death? Will} Democratization Bring Greater Regional Instability to East Asia,” The Pacific Review 23, no. 3 (2010): 335–58, doi:10.1080/09512748.2010.481052; Cho, “Democratic Instability.”

43 _{Takayoshi Matsuo, “The Development of Democracy in Japan—Taisho Democracy: Its Flowering} and Breakdown—,” The Developing Economies 4, no. 4 (1966): 612–32, doi:10.1111/j.1746-1049.1966.tb 00495.x.

44 _{Conrad Shirokauer and Donald N. Clark, Modern East Asia: A Brief History, 2nd ed. (Boston:} Houghton Mifflin, 2008).

45 _{Gerald L. Curtis, “The Liberal Democratic Party: Perpetuating Dominance,” in The Japanese Way}

of Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 45–79. 46 _{Perkins, East Asian Development, 154–55.}

47 _{Gerald L. Curtis, “The Politics of Complacency,” in The Logic of Japanese Politics: Leaders,}

confidence.48 _{The LDP then coopted the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) by promising it the} position of prime minister if the JSP would help the LDP form a ruling coalition. Thus, Tomiichi Murayama of the JSP became prime minister, but supported by a majority-LDP ruling coalition. The JSP’s power sharing agreement with the LDP was unique to domestic politics. It accomplished multiple breakthroughs in regional diplomacy, but citizens had not given majority support to Murayama’s party in the way they did to Hatoyama’s DPJ. Also, the traditional ruling party, the LDP, was not actively impeding the JSP’s attempt to rule. The period that Murayama ruled, 1994–1996, was thus essentially not a non-LDP government. It may deserve study in and of itself, but this study aims to examine the first time that a traditional opposition party was installed by the people. For this reason, it focuses on the period of 2009–2012 to determine whether the non-LDP governments make a difference.

A. EXTERNAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Japan appears to have filled the role of Perfidious Albion of East Asia. Its position of offshore balancer almost mirrors that of Great Britain, including an even greater resentment and hostility toward it by its continental neighbors. Japan’s history includes the brutal occupations of Korea, and parts of China during the early 1900s, which continue to haunt relations with its neighbors today.49 _{Although its economic might had} increased exponentially from the 1950s through the 1980s, Japan’s bubble burst in the 1990s, which resulted in a stultification of growth.50 _{Also, Japan’s close relations with} America allowed Japan’s constrained military to take advantages of the high technology that the West was implementing. The past two decades have greatly diminished Japan’s

48 _{J. A. A. Stockwin, “To Oppose or to Appease? Parties out of Power and the Need for Real Politics} in Japan,” Japan Forum 18, no. 1 (2006): 115–32, doi:10.1080/09555800500498459.

49 _{Thomas U. Berger, “The Politics of Memory in Japanese Foreign Relations,” in Japan’s}

International Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State, ed. Mike Berger, M. Mochizuki, and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007), 179–211; Takashi Yoshida, “Revising the Past, Complicating the Future: The Yushukan War Museum in Modern Japanese History,” accessed January 27, 2016, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/yoshida.pdf; Ji Young Kim, “Escaping the Vicious Cycle: Symbolic Politics and History Disputes between South Korea and Japan,” Asian Perspective 38, no. 1 (2014): 31–60.

economic and military lead over traditional adversaries like China and have allowed Korea to close the gap slightly. This situation matters inasmuch as the three countries still maintain disputes over islands stemming from an incomplete understanding of the Potsdam Agreement and Treaty of San Francisco that ended WWII and repatriated land back to countries that Japan had historically conquered in the 20th century.51 _{As the past} two decades have seen absolute increases in military spending, Japan’s 1% defense spending cap has not hobbled its ability to expand the Japanese Self Defense Force’s (JSDF’s) capabilities. While the PRC has surpassed Japan in the quantity of most military units, including ships, aircraft, and armored divisions, the quality of Japan’s military surpasses most regional powers with little exception. If the JSDF is lacking in any area, it would be its level of tactical experience.

1. Balance of Power

Japan’s constrained military is a difficult factor in a stressful geostrategic environment in which it actively disputes territory with Russia, Korea, and China while concerned about North Korean nuclear provocation and random acts of aggression. Its security gap had been filled by subsidizing the American military presence, but it continues to worry both about being either abandoned by Washington during its time of need or being entangled in America’s various adventures around the world, such as Koizumi’s deployment of self-defense forces (SDF) forces into Iraq.52

South Korea is half the size of Japan based on population, spends approximately half as much as Japan on its military, and continues to maintain an economic gap with Tokyo regarding its latent power capabilities. Both countries are manufacturing powerhouses with a penchant for high technology and innovation, and both have purchased some of the most technologically advanced weapon systems from the United States to bolster their defense posture. While potential exists for the two nations to work

51 _{M. Erika Pollmann, “The Politicization of the Liancourt Rocks Dispute and Its Effect on the} Japan-South Korea Relationship,” Issues and Insights 15, no. 10 (October 2015), http://csis.org/files/publication/ issuesinsights_vol15no10.pdf.

together on issues like ballistic missile defense, they also have an interesting chance to be locked into conflict regarding the Takeshima/Dokdo Islands.53 _{In 2005, Japan’s Shimane} prefecture established “Takeshima Day” to celebrate annexation. This move increased the tension between Japan and Korea and led to a “near miss” in 2006 when South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun (RMH) dispatched 20 Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) ships to seize two Japanese Coast Guard survey vessels. As shown in Table 1, Korea spent roughly one-third as much as Japan on its defense in 2004, but Japan’s almost steady levels of spending for over a decade, coupled with ROK increases, have resulted in a narrower but still-significant divide in military spending: one-half in 2014. Investment in submarines and other maritime equipment can be seen as presenting a problem for Tokyo over reaching a settlement on the disputed islets.

53 _{Paul Midford, “Historic Memory vs. Democratic Reassurance,” in Changing Power Relations in}

Northeast Asia, ed. Marie Soderberg, East Asian Economics and Business Series (London: Routledge, 2011).

Table 1. Japan Military Spending54

China surpassed Japan in military spending in 2003 and has increased its spending threefold over the last decade.55 _{While Japan and China are economically intertwined,} they remain locked in a bitter dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. China’s military modernization has exacerbated the problem by setting a shipbuilding pace that Japan could not afford to match even if it chose to do so. To maintain a semblance of parity between the two, Japan has used its white-hulled Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) to police the Senkaku Islands. This move is important, because it may appear to be a de-escalatory measure, but it might represent more of a budgetary necessity than a confidence-building measure. The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF), like the rest of Japan’s

54 _{Adapted from “SIPRI Military Expenditures Database,” 2015, http://www.sipri.org/research/} armaments/milex/milex_database; Bureau of Verification and Compliance, 2012 World Military Expen ditures and Arms Transfers (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, n.d.), accessed November 15, 2015, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/2005/180131.htm.

55 _{“SIPRI Military Expenditures Database,” 2015, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/} milex_database.

de facto military, is limited in the Diet by a 1% spending cap. To circumvent this cap, the Kantei, or Office of the Prime Minister, has started funding national security programs outside the defense budget.56 _{For example, Japan’s cost incurred for basing U.S. forces in} Japan is considered outside of the defense budget. Also, the JCG is considered separate, and, therefore, a significant increase in JCG ships has augmented the traditional gray-hulled JMSDF ships.57 _{This measure has been reciprocated by China’s paramilitary sea} service, the Chinese Coast Guard, in recent years, and China has surpassed all other countries combined in the number of ships in its Navy and Coast Guard.58

Another method that Japan has attempted to manage the risk of China’s rise is to hug the United States close and reach out to other like-minded states throughout East Asia. In the previous decade, Japan has successfully strengthened relations with India, Australia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and a host of other countries.59 _{Recently, by} providing military assistance and conducting presence operations in the South China Sea, Japan has disbursed its resources around the East and South China Seas to divide China’s resources while attempting to address differences with Beijing in a constructive manner.60

North Korea provides a real but somewhat inflated risk to Japan.61 _{While the LDP} magnify the risk of DPRK nuclear attack, Japan currently possesses redundancy for

56 _{Samuels, Securing Japan, 169.} 57 _Ibid.

58 _{Department of Defense, The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy: Achieving U.S. National}

Security Objectives in a Changing Environment (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2015), http:// www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_SecuritY_Strategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF.

59 _{Swee Lean Collin Koh, “Japan and the ‘Maritime Pivot’ to Southeast Asia,” The Diplomat,} December 14, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/japan-and-the-maritime-pivot-to-southeast-asia/.

60 _{Tim Kelly and Nobuhiro Kubo, “Insight—Testing Beijing, Japan Eyes Growing Role in South} China Sea Security,” Reuters, March 11, 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/03/11/uk-japan-southchinasea-insight-idUKKBN0M62BN20150311; Yoichiro Sato, “Japan Aid to the Philippines a Warning to China,” East Asia Forum, August 29, 2013, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/08/29/japan-aid-to-the-philippines-a-warning-to-china/; Tim Kelly and Nobuhiro Kubo, “Exclusive: Japan’s Far-Flung Island Defense Plan Seeks to Turn the Tables on China,” Reuters, December 18, 2015, http://www.reuters. com/article/us-japan-military-china-exclusive-idUSKBN0U107220151218.

61 _{Samuels, Securing Japan; Hughes, “The Democratic Party of Japan’s New (but Failing) Grand} Security Strategy.”

countering North Korea’s inchoate ballistic missile threat. Japan has experienced DPRK small boat attacks and a string of kidnappings that only surfaced when Prime Minister Koizumi met with Kim Jong-Il on September 17, 2002.62 _{Although it would be difficult,} if not impossible, for North Korea to project any substantial force ashore against Japan, this threat does not assuage Tokyo’s concern over the North’s abundant stockpiles of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, its robust asymmetric forces, and cyber capabilities that pose a risk to Japan’s security.

Japan and Russia have never signed a peace treaty formally ending WWII, but this does not translate into the ill will experienced between Japan and North Korea. Generally, Japan has been viewed as an American proxy in the Far East and one of Russia’s adversaries during the Cold War. Further back, the Russian Empire’s collapse can be partly attributed to the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, in which Japan surprised much of the world by taking on and defeating the Russian juggernaut.63 _{The two still} have unsettled business. The Russian-administered Southern Kurile Islands are still claimed by Japan and referred to within Japan as the Northern Territories.64 _{In 2010,} President Medvedev visited the disputed islands and called for its Russian defenses to be increased.65

Russia’s other concern is that Japan controls two of the three straits going in and out of Russia’s only Far East naval base in Vladivostok and can contest the third. The Le Perouse straits, or Soya Kaikyo in Japanese, border Russia in the north and Japan in the south. The other two straits, the Tsugaru Straits between Hokkaido and Honshu and Tsushima Straits between the Korean Peninsula and the Japanese Islands of Tsushima and Honshu, pose a geostrategic concern for Russian defense of its east coast.

62 _{Linus Hagstrom and Ulv Hansson, “The North Korean Abduction Issue: Emotions, Securitisation} and the Reconstruction of Japanese Identity from ‘Aggressor’ to ‘Victim’ and from ‘Pacifist’ to ‘Normal,’”

The Pacific Review 28, no. 1 (2015): 71–93, doi:10.1080/09512748.2014.970043. 63 _{Shirokauer and Clark, Modern East Asia: A Brief History, 241–43.}

64 _{“Kurile Islands Dispute between Russia and Japan,” April 29, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/} world-asia-pacific-11664434.

65 _{Paul Midford, “Foreign Policy as an Election Issue,” in Japan Decides 2012, ed. Robert J.} Pekkanen, Steven R. Reed, and Ethan Scheiner (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 185.

Tokyo seems little worried about Russia’s increase in military spending even though Russia’s defense spending surpassed Japan’s in 2004 and continued climbing.66 Perhaps one reason that Japan and Russia have openly worked with each other since the end of the Cold War is that they perceive China’s rise as a common threat. Another reason that Tokyo has not sounded any alarms over Russia’s actions is that Moscow’s attention has been focused on the West in recent decades: Georgia, Crimea and the Ukraine, and now Syria.67 _{While Japan has followed the Western sanction regime against} Russia for its breach of other countries’ sovereignty, Tokyo’s interests were not directly at stake. With the exception of the Northern Territories, and Japan’s adoption of sanctions against Russia for its aggressions in Europe, a similar pragmatism exists that underpins relations and has benefited both countries economically.

America’s security commitment to Japan is based on the Treaty of San Francisco and the United States’ role in drafting Japan’s war-renouncing Constitution, but as U.S. forces become spread thin throughout the world, Japan grows increasingly concerned about whether its stalwart ally has the wherewithal to stay the course.68 _{In a regional} context, America’s presence provided security for East Asia’s miracle growth.69 _East Asian countries are sometimes viewed as wanting the benefit of American presence and security assurance without having to contribute, either in military might or in basing agreements. But Japan has disproportionately paid for the quartering of troops in East Asia. One reason this makes sense is that Japan has disproportionately benefited from America’s security assurance.

Japan has benefited from the American military presence while quietly subsidizing the bill. Japan’s defense spending has remained relatively low, less than 1% of its gross domestic product (GDP) since WWII. While this still translates into

66 _{“SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.”}

67 _{Philip Breedlove, “Commander U.S. Forces Europe Statement,” Testifying before Congress} presented at the House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, February 25, 2015.

68 _{Shirokauer and Clark, Modern East Asia: A Brief History; Samuels, Securing Japan.}

69 _{Richard F. Doner, Bryan K. Ritchie, and Dan Slater, “Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of} Developmental States: Northeast and Southeast Asia,” International Organization 59, no. 2 (2005): 327– 61, JSTOR: 3877907.

Japan constantly landing among the top five to 10 countries in overall defense spending, it is still far less than other countries based on its economic potential.70 _{To compensate} for its paucity in “military spending,” Japan spends a considerable amount on the operating costs of American bases. Calder notes that Japan contributed four to five trillion dollars annually for the expenses incurred from hosting approximately 40,000 U.S. personnel within Japan during the late 1990s and early 2000s.71 _{All in all,} Japan’s relatively light investment has, over the decades, allowed it to invest more domestically.

2. Allies and Trade Relations

In progressing from the mortal enemies to the closest of allies, the U.S. and Japan forged an alliance post-WWII that has served both countries’ interests since. After WWII, and the end of the U.S. military occupation of Japan, the two countries signed a security agreement and the Treaty of San Francisco. These have been the foundation of America’s security assurance as well as the raison d’etre for American military presence in Japan today. Japan benefited by investing in its economy instead of its security apparatus. In return, America has benefited from trade with Japan and enjoyed a stable place from which to project power into the region.

Early spats arose on both sides, but the relationship has weathered 65 years intact. America continued its control over the Okinawan Island group until 1972, despite the anger of some Japanese citizens, who felt that parts of Japan were still occupied by the U.S. military. However, forging the alliance also led to Prime Minister Kishi’s resignation in 1960 and a cancellation of President Eisenhower’s visit the same year. Japan’s economic growth started to apply pressure the other way by the 1970s, when the Japanese trade imbalance and influx of cheap manufacturing goods put pressures on American manufacturing companies. After numerous attempts to control the problem

70 _{“SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.”}

71 _{Kent E. Calder, “China and Japan’s Simmering Rivalry,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (2006): 129–39,} JSTOR: 20031916.

with quotas and other methods, the two countries finally resolved the issue of Japan’s undervalued currency at the Plaza Accords in 1985.72

U.S.-Japan relations hit a rough patch again in the late 2000s with the reemergence of the Okinawa base issue and the cessation of Japan’s Indian Ocean refueling mission, but relations have since grown stronger. Pressure to close Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma led to the agreement to relocate to Henoko in 2006. National and domestic politics have shaped the move plans, and legal battles and protests continue to slow progress to this day.73 _{Midford notes, “The United States supposedly} cancelled some bilateral working level meetings in retaliation” for Japan’s indecision on the Henoko relocation.74 _{Japan’s contribution to America’s Global War on Terror,} meanwhile, had involved refueling missions in the Indian Ocean since 2001. In 2009, the DPJ unilaterally ended the refueling mission, a move popular within Japan.75 _{In 2011,} American forces stood next to Japanese forces as they dealt with the aftermath of the 3/11 triple disaster. Also, former Secretary of State Clinton, since 2010, provided the strongest reassurances for defending Japan against attacks that include the disputed Senkaku Islands. In the strongest move that Japan could have made to take up an equal footing to its American alliance partner, Prime Minister Abe reinterpreted Article 9 of the Constitution to permit collective self-defense.76 _{At the time of this writing, the United} States and Japan have as close relations as they have had at any time in the past.

72 _{T. J. Pempel, “Challenges to Bilateralism: Changing Foes, Capital Flows and Complex Forums,” in}

Beyond Bilateralism: U.S.-Japan Relations in the New Asia Pacific, ed. Ellis S. Krauss and T. J. Pempel (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).

73 _{T&CT and Erin Jones, trans., “Onaga Administration’s 2016 Objectives Include Not Allowing} Construction of New Bases,” Ryukyu Shimpo, February 16, 2016, http://english.ryukyushimpo.jp/2016/02/ 19/24550/; Eric Johnston, “New Calls for Reopening Talks on U.S. Okinawa Base Closure Emerge after Ginowan Elects New Mayor,” Japan Times, February 3, 2016, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/02/ 03/national/politics-diplomacy/new-calls-reopening-talks-u-s-okinawa-base-closure-emerge-ginowan-ele cts-new-mayor/#.VsewPJX2bIU.

74 _{Midford, “Foreign Policy Issue,” 182.} 75 _{Ibid., 181.}

76 _{“Japan OKs Collective Self-Defense, Reinterprets Constitution,” July 1, 2014, http://www.japan} times.co.jp/news/2014/07/01/national/japan-oks-collective-self-defense-reinterprets-constitution/#.VsfI cpX2bIU.