22whobears.pdf

Charles

Siemon

Many

municipalitiesin theUnitedStates, especiallyin rapidly

growing

areas, areconsideringor

have adopted

impact

feesystemsto help

pay

for thecostsof

new

growth.

Although

such systemsarea logicalresponseto

development

pres-sures

and

the needforprovidingcapitalfacilities, they

may

violatewell-establishedplanninglawtraditions. This timely

article explores

whether

impactfee

programs

conflict withprinciples of planning

and

the

due

process oflaw, both of

which have

been integral to the

development

of

modem

planning law.

Introduction

Raisingexpansioncapitalbysettingconnection charges not exceedingaproratashareofreasonably anticipated costs ofexpansion, ispermissiblewhereexpansionis

reasonably required, if use of the

money

raised is

limitedtomeetingthecostsof expansion. Users"who

benefit especially, not from the maintenance of the system, butbythe extension of thesystem. . .should

bear thecost of that extension."1

The

concept ofdevelopmentexactions2

foroff-site capi-tal facilities, that is, that

new

growth and development

should

pay

a fairshare of thecostof facilitiesneeded to

serve that

growth

has, in justa

few

years, evolved

from

an

abstract theory3

into a full-blown land use"fad."4 In Florida, for example,

where

land use"fads" find fertile

ground,5_{local authoritieshave been ina virtualfeverto}

enact

and

enforce ordinances imposing impact fees for

roads, parks, potable water, libraries, sanitary sewers,

solid waste, police, fire,

and emergency

services.6

More

than forty local

governments

have enacted similar

ordi-nances during thelast

two

years.7

In such diverse areas

as

San

Francisco, Boston,

and

Aspen, developers

pay

a

feeorprovide foraffordablehousing.8_{Exactionsare, in}

fact, a logical

and

reasonable response to the cost of sprawl.9

Exactions arenot, however, freeof drawbacks.

Their seductive attractivenessin termsof efficiency

and

expediency should not be allowed to

overshadow

what

may

be veryseriousconflictswithwell-established

plan-ning law traditions. This article briefly discusses

two

aspects of those traditions

and

suggests several

ways

in

which

they conflict with exactions.

Reprinted from Law and ContemporaryProblems, DukeUniversity School ofLaw, Copyright °1987.

Contemporary

landuselaw, albeitsubjectto

much

crit-icism,10

isa reasonably balancedproductof careful

and

effective evolution.11

_The

rigidity of Euclidean districts

has given

way

toprocess-secureflexiblezoningdistricts.

Generally, a fair balance has been established

between

publicneeds

and

privateexpectations.12

_The

_{evolution of}

land use controls

and

theestablishment of a reasonable

balance

between

public

and

privateinterestsisthe result

of

two

importantinfluences

—

planning13

_{and due}

_process

of law.14 _Because

exactions

may

conflict with the

prin-ciplesofplanning

and

may

runcountertowell-established principles of

due

process, a genuine basis for concern

exists.

Planning

"If

American

landuse controls areto

work

effectively

and

fairly, they

must

be based

upon

(a)anoverall

understand-ing oftheneedsforlandinthecommunity,

and

(b)a sense ofdirection

—

that isto say,

upon

planning".15Simplyput,

the reasonableness of land use controls

depends

upon

planning forcoherence, comprehensiveness,

and

consis-tency.16 _{Otherwise, land use controls are nothing}

_more

than

ad

hoc

exercises of public authority over private

rights in a chaotic

and

often abusive process.

Unfortunately, planning, although influential in the evolutionofcontemporaryland usecontrols, hasnotlived

up

toitstheoreticalpromise. Indeed,

many

observers con-clude that planning has been anything but successful.17

Nevertheless, the overriding logic ofplanning asa basis

forlanduse controlshasbeenapowerful influenceinthe evolution ofland use controls. In fact, Professor Haar's

insightful article, In

Accordance

with a

Comprehensive

Plan,ls _{served as apowerful}

forcein

molding

theefforts

of

contemporary

reformerslike

Babcock

19

_and

Sullivan,20

Fall, 1987, vol. 13, no. 1 23

Land Development

Code

to

mandate

planningas a

prereq-uisite for zoning.21

_Haar

said:

Itisdifficult tosee

why

zoning shouldnotberequired, legislativelyand judicially, to justifyitself by

conso-nance with a master plan as well. It might even be

argued thatany zoning donebeforea formal master plan has beenconsidered and promulgatedis perse unreasonable,becauseof failuretoconsideras awhole

thecomplexrelationshipsbetweenthevarious controls

whichamunicipality

may

seektoexerciseoverits

in-habitants infurtherance of the general welfare.22

Although

no

one

would

claimthata clearjudicial

mandate

forplanning hasbeenestablished, evenabriefreviewof

the

Supreme

Court's recent foraysintothelandusearena

illustrates that planning is

now

a well-acceptedelement

of a valid system of land use controls. In

Penn

Central Transportation Co. v. Cityof

New

York," theCourt re-jectedan attack

on

New

YorkCity's

landmark

preserva-tionlawin partbecause "[i]ncontrast to discriminatory

zoning,

which

istheantithesisofland-use control as part

of

some

comprehensiveplan, the

New

York Citylaw

em-bodies a comprehensive plan to preserve structures of

historic or aesthetic interest. . .

."24

Similarly, in

Young

v.

American Mini

Theatres, Inc,25 Justice Stevensnotedthat "thecity's interest inplanning andregulatingtheuse ofproperty"26

isasubstantialpublic

interest.

More

importantly, in Metromedia, Inc v. City

of

San

Diego,27 _{Justice Brennan,}

a central figure in the Court's decisions regarding zoning law,28 _criticized

San

Diego's sign regulations because:

[Bjeforedeferring toacity'sjudgment, a courtmust

be convincedthatthe cityisseriouslyand

comprehen-sivelyaddressingaestheticconcernswithrespect toits

environment.Here, San Diegohasfailed todemonstrate acomprehensive coordinatedeffort initscommercial andindustrialareastoaddress otherobvious contribu-torstoanunattractiveenvironment. ..

Of

course, this

is notto say that the city must addressall aesthetic

problemsatthesametime,ornoneatall.Indeed,from

aplanningpoint of view, attackingtheproblem incre-mentallyandsequentially

may

representthemost sen-siblesolution.

On

theotherhand, ifbillboardsalone

arebannedand no furtherstepsarecontemplatedor

likely, the commitment of the city to improving its

physicalenvironment isplacedindoubt. By showing

acomprehensive commitmenttomakingitsphysical

environmentincommercialandindustrialareasmore

attractive,and byallowingonlynarrowlytailored ex-ceptions,ifany,SanDiego could demonstratethatits

interest increatingan aestheticallypleasing

environ-ment is genuine andsubstantial.29

Due

Process of

Law

The

other fundamental influence

on contemporary

planning law with

which

exactions

may

well conflict is

due

process of law

—

a

group

of rights derived

from

the

fifth

and

fourteenth

amendments

of the Constitution.30

Reduced

tosimpleterms,dueprocessoflawisa limita-tion

on

the

manner

in

which government

exercises

power

over individual rights

and

interests.

As

JusticeFortasonce

noted: "Dueprocessoflawistheprimaryandindispensable

foundation of individual freedom. It is the basic

and

essential term in the social

compact which

defines the

rights of the individual

and

delimits the

powers

which

the state

may

exercise."31

Notwithstanding the accepted

fundamental

nature of

dueprocess, the precisemeaningof theconceptisundefined

and

has beenthe subject of"[m]anycontroversies."32"_'Due

process' is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable,

and

its content varies according to specific factualcontext. . .[A]sageneralization, itcan besaid that

due

process

embodies

differingrules of fairplay,

which

throughtheyears, have

become

associatedwith differing

types of proceedings."33

Due

processrequires thatgovernmental powersaffecting

private rights

and

interestsbeexercised inafundamentally

fairfashion." _{'Dueprocess'emphasizesfairness}

_between

the State

and

theindividual dealingwiththeState. . .

" 34

This conceptoffundamentalfairnesshasshaped

modern

landuse controlsbothsubstantively35

_and

_{procedurally.}

The

substantive natureof

due

process of

law

inrelation

torestrictions

on

landuse

was

discussed

by

the

Supreme

Court in

Nectow

v. City of Cambridge.36

The

Court

stated:

[T]hegovernmentalpowertointerferebyzoning regu-lationswith thegeneral rightsof the land owner by

restricting thecharacter ofhis use, is not unlimited,

andotherquestionsaside, suchrestrictioncannot be

imposed ifit does not beara substantial relation to

the publichealth, safety, moralsor general welfare.37

This standardhas,forfiftyyears, providedthe substantive

contoursoflandusecontrols.

These

contourshave

devel-oped

coincidentwiththeclearlyunderstoodideathatthe

publicwelfareisnotlimited toprotection

from

offensive

and

noxious activities and, therefore, the police

power

itself isbroad

enough

torespondtotheneedsof a develop-ing nation.38

Substantivedueprocessisalive

and

wellintheplanning lawcontext

and

providesclearjurisprudentialsupportfor

Haar'splanningthesis.39

Haar

believes thatlanduse regu-lations should be enacted pursuant to a comprehensive

plan becausesuchregulationswill bear a substantial

rela-tionshiptothepublichealth.40_{Inotherwords,}

comprehen-siveplanningensuresexistenceofasubstantialrelationship

between the particular character, locationorintensityof a

land use

and

thepublic health, safety,

and

welfare.

The

policy behindthe

due

process clauseisprotection of rights through procedures that are fair.

What

is fair

depends

upon

a host of factors, particularly the private

rightsinvolved. "Experience teaches. . that the affording

ofprocedural safeguards,

which by

their natureserveto

illuminatetheunderlyingfacts, initselfoftenoperates to

prevent erroneousdecisions

on

themeritsfromoccurring."41

Noticetoan individual ofan

impending

decision that

affectshim, the information

upon

which

the decisionis

tobe

made,

and

theopportunitytopresent opposing

in-formation

and argument

areexamplesofthekindof

safe-guardsthatensurefundamentalfairness. 'The assumption

isthat

by

givingpartieswith sufficient interest inthe

out-come

a chance to present evidence

from

their point of

view, the

government

canbest

make

an informeddecision

which

considers all relevant factors."42

As

the

above

illustrates,

fundamental

fairness

encom-passes a

number

ofconcepts.

The

first of theseconcepts

isthe notionthatgovernmental decisionsshould be

made

on

the basis of merit, not

on

the basis of personalities or

self-interest: "Thepublic hasthe right to expect its offi-cers. . to

make

adjudications

on

the basis of merit.

The

firststeptowardinsuring thattheseexpectations are

real-izedis torequire adherenceto thestandards of

due

pro-cess; absolute

and

uncontrolleddiscretion invites abuse."43

There

must

alsobe an adequate opportunityfor affected

personstofindout

what

informationwillbe usedinthe

decision-makingprocess

and

toofferinformationor

argu-ment

in rebuttal.

The

mere

existence of procedural safeguards is not

enough

tosatisfytherequirementsof

due

process. "A

fun-damental

requirementof

due

process is'theopportunity

tobeheard.' It is

an

opportunity

which must

be granted

at a meaningful time

and

in a meaningful manner."44

A

meaningful opportunity to be heard also requires a

realisticopportunitytoparticipate, freeofpractical

con-straints that prevent actual participation.45

Due

process alsocontemplates equal access

and

treat-ment. It "is secured

when

the laws operate

on

all alike,

and no one

issubjectedtopartialorarbitraryexerciseof the

powers

ofgovernment."46_{This concept}

includes access

toprocesseswithoutregardtoeconomicstation.

As

Justice

Blackstated inGriffin v. Illinois, "[sjurely

no one

would

contend that either a state or the Federal

Government

couldconstitutionallyprovidethatdefendantsunableto

pay

court costsin

advance

should be denied the right to

plead not guilty or to defend themselves in court."47 In

addition, he noted that "there can be

no

equal justice

where

the kind of a trial a

man

gets

depends

upon

the

amount

of

money

he has."48

Another

doctrinethatisrootedinthedueprocess clause

isthe doctrine ofvagueness

—

the constitutional

require-ment

that a

government

proscription beexplicit

enough

that affectedpersonsare

on

notice ofthose actsor

omis-sions that will expose

them

to liability.49 In theabsence

ofdefinedstandardsthatareuniformlyapplied therecan

be

no

equal treatment except

by

mere

coincidence.

Governmental

power

must

be confined to the principles of

due

process ifthe salutory goals of the constitutional

draftsmen are to be achieved.

The

difficultywithexactionsisthattheyare antithetical

to theplanning

and due

process principles stated

above

in a

number

of ways.

They

are inherently inconsistent

withthe establishedtenetsthathavedefinedplanning

and

due

process in the past.

First, exactionsconflictwith planning

and due

process principlesbecausethe idea ofafairshare"payas

you

go" exaction system creates the illusion that the character,

location,

and magnitude

of land use is simply a matter

of a developer's willingnessto

pay

forthecostof

new

ser-vices required

by

new

growth. Indeed, developers are often vocal supporters of reasonable exactions because

they see

them

as a

means

of

overcoming

local concern

about growth. Giventhat most growth

management

Fall, 1987, vol. 13, no. 1 25

facilities,50the developers' perspective isunderstandable.

The

troubleisthattheappropriateness of aparticularland

useata particular location

depends

on

far

more

thanthe developer'swillingness topayforneeded infrastructure.

The

intangible values,

community

character

and

quality

oflife,

which

lieattheheartof JusticeDouglas'

now

often-repeated

ode

to

community

character in Village ofBelle Terrev. Boraas,51

are vulnerabletoincompatible or

unde-sirablelanduses

whether

ornotadeveloperiswilling to

payfor water, sewer, or roads. In other words, quality

oflifeinvolvesfar

more

thanfiscalefficiency. Itis

impera-tivethatlanduse controlsbe capableofconserving

com-munity

values even if a developer is willing to

pay

for

thecostof needed improvements.

Of

course, imposition

of an exaction system does not

mandate

abandonment

of planning

programs

directed toward maintaining the

community

character

and

quality of life. Nevertheless,

some

legislatorsappeartoacceptthatadoptionofan

exac-tion

scheme

results in

abandonment

of thistypeof

pro-gram. Forexample, theFloridaLegislature52_{hastaken the}

view that change is inevitable

and

that the focus

must

be

on

how

to

accommodate

that change. This position has upsetdozensof local authorities thathave

comprehen-sive plans designed to protect important

community

valueseven thoughgreaterdensities, higher buildings,or

more

coverage could be

accommodated

financially.

The

antiplanning implications of exactionsgo

beyond

the political impacts just described.

The

reason is that

quality oflife

and

community

character areconceptsthat aredifficult to quantify

and

thereforedifficultto reduce

tosimple regulatory equations, particularlyincommunities

thatarenotlarge

enough

tosupport a sophisticated

plan-ningdepartment.

The

inevitable temptationissimplyto

abandon

theintangibles

and

todevoteavailableenergies

tocapitalfacilitiesplanning

—

a reactiveratherthana

pro-active

approach

to the future.

As

troublingastheantiplanning aspectofexactionsare,

the

whole

idea thatpermission todevelopshould be

de-pendent

on

one's willingness to

pay

raises

an

even

more

odiousimplicationthat

was

rejectedlongagoas

inappro-priate

—

thatzoningisorshouldbeforsale.

Most

exaction

ordinancescontain a scheduleof

payments

purportedly

linkedtothe

community

needsoccasioned

by

new

growth

and

development.

Most

ordinances,however,alsoprovide

foranalternative feecalculation thatresponds tothe

im-precision ofimpactassessments.

As

willbe

shown

below,

thistypeofprovisionisunfortunatebecausethe calculation

isarrivedat throughnegotiation, another

contemporary

land use "fad."

Inplain terms,

under

thistypeofprovision, the

devel-operbargains for his zoning.

He

may

agree to give the

community

a

new

road, ambulance, orwhatever, if

per-mittedtobuildata higherdensity.

Such

aprocess ignores themerits ofa particularlanduseata particular location

and

focuses instead

on

the

payment

to be received. In

otherwords, a six-laneroad

may

solve the trafficneeds

of

new

growth

and

development, butitdoessoatacost.

Growth

for its

own

sake cannot justify transforming

neighborhoods, wetlands, parks,

and

waterfronts into

freeways.

Worst

ofall, thedeal

made

usuallydepends

on

who

thedeal

maker

is,ratherthan

what

isproposed. This

negotiatory process,

which

isincreasingly beingused to

arriveat decisions relatingtoland use,53_{exacerbates the}

riskinherentinexactions.

The

reasonisthatnegotiations

areuncomprehensive

and

not standard- orprocess-oriented;

they rely not

on

well-conceived policies but

on ad hoc

agreementsthatareusuallyprivate.

The

finelytuned

ten-sion

between

public

and

private interest, tempered

by

citizen involvement

and

participation, threatens to be

replaced

by

negotiated deals, the fairness of

which

depends

on

theintegrity of individuals in office at

any

given time.

After years offaithfuladherencetothe principles of

fun-damental

fairness, it isdifficult to understand

why

this

nation

would

suddenlyfind salvationinanidea thathas

thepotential forabuse

and

disparatetreatment.

Of

course,

the obvious solution is to eliminate the alternative fee

calculationprocessfromexaction ordinances, which

would

eliminate thepossibilityofabuse

and

manipulation.

The

troubleisthatthe so-calledscience ofexactionsisso

im-perfect that(understandably)fewauthoritiesfeel comfort-able relying exclusively

upon

a rigid preset schedule,

which

represents astrong

condemnation

of theentire

con-cept of exactions. In the abstract, these concerns are

manageable.

The

limitedscrutinyappliedtolocal

regula-tions

by

courts, however,

makes

itdifficult tobelievethat

the abusesdescribedwill notflourish

and

heighten

con-cern about the concept of exactions.

Once

itisacceptedthatitisappropriatefora

landowner

to

pay an

exactionin order toexercise hisconstitutional

property rights, judicial review of exaction standards is

limited to a "fairly debatable" standard54

_—

_what

_Judge

Goldberg

of the Court of

Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

fondlyreferstoasthe"anything goes"test.55Simplystated,

aregulatorystandard hastobe outlandishbefore a court

willintervene,anotionthathasassuredlybeen confirmed bythe

Supreme

Court's

modern

polestarof localeconomic

regulations,

New

Orleans v. Dukes.56

Dukes

was

in fact

an

equal protection case, but the

scopeofjudicial scrutinyimplicit inthefairly debatable

standard

and

the rational basisstandardare virtually

Impact fees—wheredoes theroadlead?

in particular, reportedly apoliticallyinfluential

individ-ual),

exempted

those vendors

who

had

been active in streetvendingfor

more

thansix years.57

A

_hot

_dog

_vendor

withlessthansixyearsinthestreetsbroughtsuit challeng-ing theordinance.

The

Fifth Circuitinvalidated the

ordi-nance

on

the

ground

thatit

was

ludicroustosuggestthat

sixyearsofexperiencesellinghotdogs

was

distinguishable

from

five years

on

the job.

The

United States

Supreme

Courtreversed, holdingthat judicialscrutiny ofesentially

economic

regulations is limited,

and

that courts should

not second-guess the

judgment

of elected officials:

Statesareaccordedwidelatitude intheregulationof their localeconomies under theirpolicepowers, and

rationaldistinctions

may

be

made

withsubstantially

lessthanmathematicalexactitude. Legislatures

may

im-plementtheirprogramstepbystep...insucheconomic

areas,adoptingregulationsthatonlypartially amelio-ratea perceivedevilanddeferringcompleteelimination of theevil tofuture regulations....In short, the judiciary

may

notsitas a superlegislaturetojudge the

wisdom

ordesirabilityof legislativepolicydeterminations

made

inareasthatneitheraffectfundamentalrightsnor pro-ceed along suspect lines.... In the local economic

sphere, it is only the invidious discrimination, the

whollyarbitraryact, whichcannot standconsistently

with the Fourteenth

Amendment.

58

The

theoryadoptedin

Dukes

isanappalling invitation

forabuse

by

localgovernmentsinthecontextofexactions.

Because the judiciary isunwilling to interfere with

eco-nomic

regulations, municipalities are confident that

devel-opers will find it easier

and

cheaper to accept exaction

fees rather than challenge the regulations in court.

An

example,

anonymous

becausethedeveloper'stravails

continue, illustratesthe potentially coercivecharacter of

theexaction process.

The

developer

proposed

todevelop

a parcel located at a

boundary

of a municipality.

The

municipality maintains a municipal

sewage

system that

collects

and

transmits

sewage

to a regional wastewater

treatment facilityoperated

by

thecounty. Pursuant to a

sewerserviceagreement, themunicipalitycollectsforthe

countyan impactfeefor thefairshareoftreatmentfacility

capacityused

by

eachunit ofdevelopment. Unfortunately

forthedeveloper, themunicipality'scollectionsystemdoes

not reachhisproperty.

He

isthereforeobligatedtobuild

a sanitarysewerthatconnectstoanotherpartofthe

coun-ty's system in an adjacent municipality.

Worse

still,

becauseof a

downstream

infiltrationproblem, the

devel-operis obligatedto contributeanadditional$250,000to

the repair of the

downstream

system.

When

he applied

fora building permit, he

was

required to

pay

an impact

fee that

was

three

and

a half times the

amount

due

the

county

underthesewer service agreement, even

though

he

had

already constructedthesewer

main and

contributed

$250,000 to support

downstream

remedial efforts.

The

municipality'spositionissimple: itdoesnot matter

whether

thefeeisfair

—

no

fee,

no

building permit.

Given

thatlitigation will cost thousandsof dollars

and

last

be-tweennine

months and one

year(ifthemunicipalitydoes

not appeal), the developerhas

no

choicebut to

pay

the

fee.

Worst

ofall,tosome,the municipality'sposition

may

seem

plausiblebecausethe cost levied against thedeveloper

isinfactaproratashareofthecostofthevillage'ssystem.

This view, however, overlooks the simple fact that the

developer does notactually use the village'ssystem

and

issaddledwiththefeeonly becausehispropertyislocated

within the village.

Inotherwords, theimpotencyofjudicialreview

exagger-ates the potential for abuse outlined above,

and

explains

why

it isnecessarytoadherestrictlytothe principlesof

fun-damentalfairness.

The

abusesinherentinexactions are

inev-itableand, inthe face ofyearsofexperience directedtothe

fairness of the planning process, unacceptable.

Regretfully, theantiplanning

and

dueprocessdifficulties

do

not exhaustthepotentialproblems withexactions.

Im-plicitin theconceptof payingfortheright todevelop is

thereality that onlythose

who

can affordto pay are

per-mittedtodevelop

—

acircumstancethat offersa

community

a clever, but shameful,

means

of excluding those of an

undesirablecharacter. Infact, in

my

opinion, thisinsidious

by-product of exactions earns it the label as the latest

sheepskin for the wolf of exclusionary zoning.

The

impact ofpublic regulation

on

thecostofhousing

hasbeen the subject of extensive treatment

and

it takes

no

significant imagination to appreciate that a carefully

established exaction

scheme

can keep out undesirables.

Indeed, an impactfeeof$5,000to$10,000has asignificant

impact

on

the affordability ofhousing

and

could ensure

that onlythose of substantial

means

locate ina

commu-nity—allfortheseeminglylegitimatepurposeofimposing

Fall, 1987, vol. 13, no. 1 27

Growth indowntown Chicago.

that are easily manipulated

by

elected officials through

judiciousplanning. Considera

community,

forexample,

thatimposesa regulatoryimpactfee fora

wide

rangeof

facilities, including

many

desirablebutunnecessary

facili-tiessuchasaculturalcenterorexpansive recreation

facili-ties.

The

proratashareofsuchfacilitiesis$15,000, afee

that is de minimis to the wealthy, but discriminatory

against the less fortunate, not

by

classification but

by

effect.

One

finalaspect ofexactions meritsbriefmention.

The

Constitutionclearlyproscribesthetaking ofprivate

prop-erty for public use without

payment

of just

compensa-tion,59yetexactions

amount

to sucha taking.

Although

courtshavetraditionallyvalidatedexaction systems, itis

difficult to understand

how

a regulation that requires dedicationofland or

payment

ofafeein lieuthereofdoes

not violate the takingclause.

Under an

exaction scheme,

private property, land or

money,

is taken for public use

withoutjustcompensation. Thisparadox goescuriously

unresolved.

Conclusion

Exactionsarea viable

means

ofensuringthat adequate

facilitiesare available toserve

new

growth

and

develop-ment. It isimperative, however, that the draftsmen

and

publicofficials

who

developsuch

programs

clearly under-stand that there are great risks inherent in

any

exaction

system

and

that carefulpreparationisnecessarytoensure

that the system achieves true equity.

Charles Siemonis a partner in thelaw firm Siemon, Larsen, Mattlin

&

Purely,basedinChicago.Thefirmspecializes in

plan-ning law.

1. ContractorsandBuilders Ass'nv. City ofDunedin, 329So. 2d

314, 320 (Fla. 1976) (footnote omitted), reconsideredon appealfrom

unpublished remand, 358So.2d 846(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978)(amended exaction heldlegal),cert,denied.370So.2d458,cert,denied,444U.S. 867(1979).

2. "Developmentexactions"isagenericterm usedin thisarticle to

describean assortmentoftechniquesemployedbylocalauthoritiesto

compeladeveloper,eitherbyregulation,negotiation,or simpleleverage, toexchangeland,money,materials,orservicesforpermissiontodevelop.

3. See, e.g.,AmericanSoc'yofPlanningOfficials, Local Capital

Improvementsand Development Management57-59(1977).

4. Inroughorder oftheirappearance, other notable land use"fads"

includeplannedunitdevelopment,transferabledevelopmentrights,land usecontrols, and performancezoning.

5. See generally Fla. Stat.Ann.ch.380 (West 1974

&

Supp.1986). For a discussion ofFlorida'sattemptstoguidelocal decisionsrelating togrowthanddevelopment,see Finnell, SavingParadise: TheFlorida EnvironmentalLandand WaterManagementActof1972,6Urb.L.Ann.

103 (1973).

6. Eg.,

Home

BuildersandContractors Ass'nv.Palm BeachCounty.

446So.2d140,141(Fla.Ct.App.1984)(discussingPalm BeachCounty's

enactmentofacomprehensiveplaninresponsetoits "unsualgrowth

rate"); Hollywood, Incv. BrowardCounty, 431 So. 2d606.612(Fla.

Ct.App.1983) (discussingBroward Countyordinanceenactedtomeet needs raisedbynewsubdivisiongrowth).

7. Ihave beeninvolvedinnumerousimpactfeeprogramseitheras a consultantor as counselfor aprivate sector interestand have compiled

asubstantiallibrary ofimpactfeeordinancesfrom aroundthecountry including ordinances from, forexample,Lincolnshire,Illinois;Palm Beach County, Florida; BrowardCounty, Florida;Sarasota County,Florida;

and SanDiego, California.

8. See,e.g.,Porter,TheLocalRegulatory Scene:Overviewand

Out-look, inDevelopment ReviewandOutlook,1984-1985,at403(1985).

9. For a discussion of the costsof sprawl, seeCouncil onEnvtl. Quality, The Costsof Sprawl(1974).

10. See,e.g.,R.Nelson,ZoningandPropertyRights(1977);

11. Muchofthe criticism leveled atzoningignoresthemanypractical

andeffectivereforms accomplished bylocalauthoritiesthroughoutthe country.Indeed,ithasbeensuggestedbyEdSullivan,deanofOregon's planninglawyers,thatthecriticsareoutoftouchwiththecurrentstate

ofplanninglaw. He believesthat many oftheconcernsrehashed by

thecriticswerelongagosolvedwithclearlywritten, flexibleordinances

thatemphasizespecificstandardsanddefinedevelopmentreview proce-dures.Personal conversationwithEdSullivan, Partner, Sullivan,

Jossel-son, Roberts, Johnson

&

Kloos(Oct. 26, 1985).

12. Thereare,ofcourse,jurisdictionswherethe balanceistippedin

favorofthepublicinterest.ThemainstreamofAmericanplanninglaw,

however,isfarmorereasonablethanthecriticsoftheexcessesin Califor-niawouldhavetheworldbelieve.Seegenerally, Porter,

On

Bemoaning

Zoning, Urb.Land, March 1983, at34.

13. "Planning,"asusedin thisarticle,describesadiscipline inwhich

adecisionmakercompilesinformationrelative to his responsibilities, assessestheinformation,andthenestablishesabstractpolicies tobe

ap-plied toindividualdecisions.Asusedin thisarticle,planningrepresents theantithesis ofadhocdecisionmaking.

14. "Dueprocess of law"refersgenerallytoa range of substantive andproceduralprinciples thathaveevolvedthroughthetwo dueprocess clauses of theConstitution. U.S. Const, amend. V, XIV, § 1.

15. 1N.Williams,American PlanningLaw§1.01,at2 (1974) (em-phasisadded).Williams goesontoobservethat,"|u]ndera rationalsystem ofpublicaction, thebasicpolicy decisionsshould bemadefirstona

coordinated basis (planning);andthen theappropriatetools(including thevariousland usecontrols)shouldbeselected tocarryout these deci-sions."Id. at 3.

16. See generallyF.Bosselman,D.Feurer& C.Siemon,ThePermit Explosion, Coordinationofthe Proliferation (1976).

17. See,e.g.,Siemon

&

Larsen,InAccordancewiththeComprehensive

Plan—theMythRevisited,1979Inst,onPlan.,Zoning&Eminent Do-main 105. AlanJacobshas decried the failureofplanning tomature asaprofessionandsuggestedthat theprofession of planning be abolished andthatwestartanewtoestablishthe"professionofOlmstead."Address by Alan Jacobs, Professor of City and Regional Planning, Annual

Meetingof theAmericanPlanningAssociation, FloridaChapter(Nov.

6-8,1985).Jacobs ofcourse,hasmuchtobedissatisfiedwith,asBabcock

and Siemonhaveobserved:

Planninghasbeenscorned,mocked,disparaged,anddisdainedsince

theearliestdaysofland useregulation.Worseyet,ithasbeenignored.

Oh, therehave beenmillionsandmillions spentonplanning(most ofitlavishedonlocalgovernmentbyvarious agencies ofthe federal

government),but theofficiallyadopted, actuallyused planning

in-strumentisararebeast indeed. Itwas, forstarters,a stepchild of land useregulation, sittingbythehearthwhileitsmorerobustsisters,

zoningandsubdivisioncontrols,werecavorting acrosstheAmerican landscape.

R. Babcock & C. Siemon, TheZoningGame Revisited261(1985). 18. Haar, InAccordance with aComprehensivePlan, 68Harv. L.

Rev.1154 (1955).

19. OneofBabcock's principalworksreflecting hisphilosophy on land use isR. Babcock & C.Siemon, supra note17.

20. Sullivan discussessomeof hisviewsonland use planninginSullivan

&

Kressel, TwentyYearsAfter—RenewedSignificanceofthe

Comprehen-sivePlan Requirement, 9 Urb.L. Ann. 33 (1975).

21. SeeModelLandDev.Code(1976). ProfessorDanMandelker,

another strong advocateofplanning, ably recountstheneedforplanning

inhisarticle, Mandelker, TheRoleof the LocalComprehensivePlan

inLand UseRegulation, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 899 (1976). 22. Haar,supranote18, at1174.

23. 438, U.S.104 (1978).

24. Id. at1323 (emphasisadded). The SupremeCourt'spreference

forplanningisalsoevidentin JusticeDouglas' majorityopinioninVillage

ofBelleTerrev.Boraas,416U.S. 1(1974). Ina footnote.JusticeDouglas complementedtheCourt'srefusaltolimittheconcept ofthepublicwelfare witha reference toVermont'sland usecontrols, which, accordingto

Douglas:

direct localboardstodevelopplans ordering the uses oflocalland,

interalia, to"createconditions favorabletotransportation,health,

safety,civicactivitiesandeducationalandculturalopportunities,[and]

reducethewastesof financialandhumanresourceswhichresultfrom

eitherexcessivecongestion or excessivescatteringofpopulation...

Id. at5 n.3.

25. 427U.S. 50 (1976). 26. Id. at62 (emphasisadded).

27. 453 U.S.490(1981).

28. SeeWilliamsonCountyv.Hamilton Bank,105S.Ct.3108(1985) (Brennan,J.,concurring);San DiegoGas

&

Elecv.City ofSanDiego, 450U.S.621(1981) (Brennan,J.,dissenting);

Owen

v.City of Indepen-dence,445U.S.622(1980);Monellv.DepartmentofSocialServs.,436 U.S.658(1978);PennCent. Transp.Co.v.

New

YorkCity,438U.S.104 (1978).

29. 453U.S.490, 531-33 (1981) (emphasisadded)(footnotes omitted).

30. U.S. Const. Amend.

V

XIV, § 1.

Twohundredyearsago, thefoundingfathersestablishedagovernment oflawsandnot ofmen,inordertoensurethatpersonalprivilegewould

notsupplant the ruleoflaw. AsJamesMadison said:

Ifthey(the tenamendmentscomprisingtheBillofRights]are

incor-poratedintotheConstitution, independenttribunals ofjustice will

consider themselves ina peculiar manner theguardiansof those

rights;theywillbeanimpenetrablebulwarkagainsteveryassumption

ofpowerintheLegislativeor Executive; theywillbenaturallyled

toresisteveryencroachmentuponrightsexpressly stipulated forin

theConstitutionby the declaration of rights. 1 AnnalsofCongress439 (J. Galesed. 1789).

31. InreGault,387U.S.1,20(1967). JusticeHarlanhasalsoremarked: Perhapsnocharacteristic ofanorganizedandcohesivesocietyismore

fundamentalthanitserectionand enforcementof asystemofrules

defining thevariousrightsanddutiesofitsmembers,enablingthem

togoverntheir affairsanddefinitely settle theirdifferencesinan or-derly, predictablemanner...

Americansociety, ofcourse,bottomsitssystematic definition of individualrightsandduties,aswellasitsmachineryfordispute

settle-ment, notoncustomor thewillofstrategicallyplaced individuals, butonthecommonlawmodel....Withinthisframework,thosewho

wroteouroriginalConstitution,intheFifthAmendment, andlater

thosewhodraftedtheFourteenthAmendment,recognizesthe central-ityof the concept ofdueprocessin the operationof this system. Boddiev.Connecticut, 401U.S. 371,374-75(1971)(emphasisadded).

32. Mullanev.CentralHanoverTrust Co.,339U.S. 306,313(1950). 33. Hannahv. Larche, 363U.S. 420,442 (1960). Notealso Justice

Johnson's characterization of the dueprocess principle:

(A]ftervolumes spokenandwrittenwithaviewtotheirexposition, thegoodsense ofmankindhasatlengthsettleddowntothis:that

they (thewordsofdueprocess] intended tosecure the individual fromthe arbitrary exerciseofthepowersofgovernment,unrestrained bytheestablishedprinciplesof privaterightsanddistributivejustice.

Bank ofColumbiav. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)235, 242 (1819).

Thedueprocess concept evolvedfromEnglishcommonlaw,andwas

incorporatedintheBillofRights.Ithas continuedtofind amplification throughthefourteenthamendment,legislativeenactments(forexample, the AdministrativeProcedureAct,5 U.S.C.§§500-576(1982)),and

Fall. 1987, vol. 13,no. 1 2^

perspectiveonjudicialactivisim,evolutionhas notyetproduceda precise

constructionofthedueprocessclause,acircumstanceJusticeBlack has lamented inseveral dissents.

Theelasticityof thatclause necessaryto justify thisholdingisfound,

Isuppose,inthenotionthatit[thedueprocessclause]wasintended

togivethisCourtunlimitedauthoritytosuperviseallassertions of

stateandfederalpowertosee thattheycomport with ourideasof

whatare"civilizedstandards of law...

Thisperhapsisinkeepingwiththe idea that theDueProcessClause

is ablanksheet ofpaper. .

Boddiev.Connecticut,401 U.S.371,393-94 (1971)(Black,J.,dissenting)

(quotingWilliamsv.NorthCarolina,325U.S.226, 271-74 (1945)(Black,

J., dissenting).

34. Rossv.Moffitt, 417U.S. 600, 609(1974).

35. After theerabegunbytheSupremeCourt's decisioninLochner

v.

New

York,198U.S.45(1905),theCourtretreatedfromjudicial scru-tinyofthesubstance ofeconomicregulations.G.Gunther, Constitu-tionalLaw462-75 (11thed.1985). Zoninglaw, however, hasalways andsteadfastlybeen definedbyasubstantiverequirementthata regulation

mustprovideaminimumfactual basisunderthe "fairlydebatable"

stan-dard.Foradiscussion ofthisstandard,see infratextaccompanyingnotes 54-57.

36. 277U.S. 183(1928).

37. Id. at188(1198) (citingEuclidv.AmblerRealty Co., 272U.S. 365, 395(1926)).

38. VillageofBelle Terrev.Boraas, 416U.S. 1 (1974). 39. Haar, supranote 18;see textaccompanying notes 18-22.

40. Thereisasecondsubstantive limitationthat arisesfromthedue process clausethatisnotdirectlyimplicatedbyexactions,theso-called "taking" issue. InWilliamsonCountyv.Hamilton Bank,105S.Ct.3108

(1985), JusticeBlackmanrehearsedwithoutendorsingtheargumentthat aregulationthatisoverly intrusiveisa violation ofdueprocess.Itis

apparent, however, that thelengthy discussion, togetherwithJustice Stevens'cogent concurrence,id.at3125(Stevens,J.,concurring),suggests

acceptance ofthisargument, apositionthatwasalso takenbyJustice

Holmesin Blockv. Hirsch, 256U.S. 135, 156(1921).

41. Silverv.

New

York StockExch., 373U.S. 341, 366 (1963). 42. Sinaiko, DueProcess Rights of Participation inAdministrative Rulemaking. 63 Calif. L.Rev. 886(1975).

43. Homsbyv.Allen,326F.2d 605,610(5th Cir. 1964). Implicitin therequirementthatdecisionsbemadeonthe basis ofmeritisa

require-mentthatdecisionsbe based onallrelevantinformation. Thehearing requiredbytheDueProcessClausemustbe'meaningful'..Itisa

proposi-tionwhichhardlyseemstoneedexplication that ahearingwhichexcludes considerationofan elementessential tothedecision.. doesnotmeet

thisstandard." Bell v. Burson, 402U.S. 535, 541-42 (1970) (citations

omitted).

44. Armstrongv.Manzo, 380 US.545,552 (1965)(citationsomitted).

45. Forexample,inVlandisv.Kline,412U.S.441(1973),theCourt struckanirrebuttablestatutorypresumptionthattheresidence ofa uni-versitystudentwouldalwaysbethe locationfrom where anapplication wassent"because[thepresumption] providesnoopportunityforstudents

whoappliedfromout ofstate todemonstratethattheyhavebecome bona fideConnecticutresidents."Id. at453.

Similarly,ina casechallengingmandatorymaternityleave for teachers

beginningfivemonthsbeforetheanticipatedbirth of theirchildren, the

SupremeCourtstruck the regulationandrepeateditsdislikefor proce-duresthatdonot afford individualized consideration of the underlying

facts in eachcase.

Thereisnoindividualized determinationbytheteacher'sdoctor— ortheschool board's—astoanyparticular teacher's ability tocontinue

atherjob.Therulescontainanirrebuttablepresumptionof physical

incompetency,andthatpresumptionappliesevenwhenthemedical evidenceastoanindividualwoman'sphysicalstatusmightbewholly

tothe contrary.

Cleveland Bd. of Educv. Le Heur,414 U.S. 632, 644 (1975). 46. Maxwellv. Dow, 176U.S. 581,603 (1900). Courtshavefound dueprocess violationswhereproceduresaffectindividuals disparately

inanumberofcontexts:"Steadfastadherencetostrictprocedural

safe-guardsisourmainassurancethattherewillbe equaljusticeunderlaw."

Anti-Fascist

Comm.

v. McGrath, 341U.S. 123, 179(1951) (Douglas,

J., concurring).

47. 351 U.S.12,17 (1956) (footnotes omitted). InanotherSupreme

Courtcase,indigentpersonssoughtaccess to thedivorce courtsof

Con-necticut,butwere denied becausetheirindigency preventedthemfrom being abletopaythefiling fees.The SupremeCourtstrucktheprovisions andrequired thestate todevelopaprocedurethatdidnot disparately bar persons fromthecourts.

[W]econcludethat theState's refusal toadmit theseappellants to

itscourts, thesolemeansinConnecticut forobtaining a divorce, must beregarded astheequivalent ofdenyingtheman opportunity

tobeheardupontheirclaimedrights to adissolutionof their

mar-riages,and, intheabsenceofsufficient countervailingjustification

for theState's action, a denial of dueprocess.

Boddiev.Connecticut,401U.S. 371, 380-81(1971) (footnotes omitted).

Thecourtnotedthatthestatehadinterposeditselfintomaritalrelations

and by law hadprovidedthatmarriagescouldbedissolvedonlythrough

judicial process, and, having doneso, had tomakethoseprocedures equally available to all persons.Id.

48. 351 U.S. at19.

49. SeeUnitedStatesv.Harris,347U.S. 612,617(1954),wherethe Courtstated that "[t]heunderlyingprincipleisthatnomanshallbe held criminally responsibleforconduct whichhe could not reasonably under-standto beproscribed."

50. E.g.,Construction Indus. Ass'nv.City ofPetaluma,522F.2d897

(9th Cir. 1975); Goldenv. PlanninagBd., 30 N.Y.2d359, 285N.E.2d 291, 334S.2d138(1972).

51. 416U.S. 1, 9 (1974).

52. TheFloridalegislature,acknowledgingthatplanningmustoccur alongwith population growth, passed the LocalGovernment

Compre-hensivePlanningandLand DevelopmentRegulationAct. ch. 85-55,1985 Ha.Sess.LawServ,251(codefiedasamendedatFla. Stat.Ann.§380.06

(15)(d) (West Supp. 1986)).

53. See generallyManagingDevelopmentThroughPublic Private Negotiations (R.Levitt

&

J. Kirlin eds. 1985).

54. Village of Euclid v. AmblerRealtyCo., 272U.S.365 (1926). 55. Arceneaxv.Treen,671F.2d 128,137(5th Cir. 1982) (Goldberg,

J., dissenting).

56. 427U.S.297(1976).

57.

A

suspiciousobserverwouldundoubtedlysuggestthatthe cut-off

periodhad beensetatsixyearsbecause thepoliticallyinfluentialvender

hadbeeninbusinessforsevenyears.Therecord,however,containsno

evidenceon thispoint.

58. 427U.S.at 303-04 (citations omitted).