Transportation Law

(1)

T

RANSPORTATION AND

P

UBLIC

S

ERVICE

D

OCTRINES

D

IGEST

A

TTY

. V

IVENCIO

F. A

BAÑO

3B

SY 2010-2011

SBC V

(2)

I. I

NTRODUCTIONNTRODUCTION

1. 1. C

C

ONCEPT OFONCEPT OF

T

RANSPORTATIONRANSPORTATION

2. 2. G

G

OVERNINGOVERNING

L

AWSAWS

(A

RTRT

. 1766, NCC)

II. C

OMMONOMMON

C

ARRIERSARRIERS

1. 1. C

C

ONCEPTONCEPT

/E

LEMENTS OFLEMENTS OF

C

OMMONOMMON

C

ARRIERARRIER

(A

RTRT

. 1732, NCC)

C

ALVO VSALVO VS

. UCPB I

NSURANCENSURANCE((

379 SCRA 510)

--

Principal activity vs. ancillary activity; “general public” vs. “narrow segment of population”

o

o Art. 1732 makes no distinction between one whoseArt. 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal principal business business activityactivity is the carrying is the carrying

of persons or goods or both, and one who does such

of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as ancarrying only as an ancillary activity.ancillary activity.

o

o Neither does the said article distinguish betweenNeither does the said article distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the “generala carrier offering its services to the “general

public

public (i.e. the general community or population), and one who offers services or solicits (i.e. the general community or population), and one who offers services or solicits business only from

business only from a narrow segment of a narrow segment of the general populationthe general population.. --

“Common

“Common Carrier”

Carrier”

“Public

“Public Service”

Service” under

under the

the Public

Public Service

Service Act

Act

o

o The concept of Common Carrier under Art. 1732 may be seen to coincide neatly with theThe concept of Common Carrier under Art. 1732 may be seen to coincide neatly with the

notion of “public service” under the PSA, and under which is defined as

notion of “public service” under the PSA, and under which is defined as includingincluding

"" “Every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage or control in the“Every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage or control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes, any permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes, any common carrier, either for freight or passenger or both, with or without fixed route common carrier, either for freight or passenger or both, with or without fixed route and whatever may

and whatever may be its classification, engaged in the transportation of passengersbe its classification, engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight or both…”

or freight or both…” G

GUZMAN VSUZMAN VS. CA. CA(168 SCRA 612)(168 SCRA 612)

--

No distinctions (3 aspects)

o

o Article 1732 makesArticle 1732 makes no distinctionno distinction between between

""

Business

– One whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or – One whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as a “sideline”)

local idiom, as a “sideline”)

""

Schedule –

One between a person/enterprise offering transportation on a regularOne between a person/enterprise offering transportation on a regular or scheduled basis or one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or or scheduled basis or one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis

unscheduled basis

""

Public

– One between a carrier offering its services to the general public (i.e. the – One between a carrier offering its services to the general public (i.e. the general community or population), and one who offers services or solicits business general community or population), and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population.

only from a narrow segment of the general population. --

Coincides with PSA Definition of “public service”

o

o “Every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage or control in the“Every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage or control in the

Philippines, for hire or compensation,

Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether permanent,with general or limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes, any common carrier

occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes, any common carrier …”…” --

Requisite to incur liability

o

o A certificate of public convenience is NOT a requisite for the incurring of liability underA certificate of public convenience is NOT a requisite for the incurring of liability under

the NCC. Such liability arises

the moment a person or firm acts as a common carrier

,, without regard

without regard as to whether or not such carrier has also complied with the requirements of as to whether or not such carrier has also complied with the requirements of applicable regulatory statute implementing regulations and has been granted a certificate applicable regulatory statute implementing regulations and has been granted a certificate of public convenience or other franchise.

of public convenience or other franchise.

"" Rationale:Rationale: this would be offensive to sound public policy; it would be to reward a commonthis would be offensive to sound public policy; it would be to reward a common carrier for failing to

carrier for failing to comply with applicable statutory requirementscomply with applicable statutory requirements

•

• The law imposes duties and The law imposes duties and liabilities upon common carriers for the safetyliabilities upon common carriers for the safety

and protection of those who

(3)

I. I

NTRODUCTIONNTRODUCTION

1. 1. C

C

ONCEPT OFONCEPT OF

T

RANSPORTATIONRANSPORTATION

2. 2. G

G

OVERNINGOVERNING

L

AWSAWS

(A

RTRT

. 1766, NCC)

II. C

OMMONOMMON

C

ARRIERSARRIERS

1. 1. C

C

ONCEPTONCEPT

/E

LEMENTS OFLEMENTS OF

C

OMMONOMMON

C

ARRIERARRIER

(A

RTRT

. 1732, NCC)

C

ALVO VSALVO VS

. UCPB I

NSURANCENSURANCE((

379 SCRA 510)

--

Principal activity vs. ancillary activity; “general public” vs. “narrow segment of population”

o

o Art. 1732 makes no distinction between one whoseArt. 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal principal business business activityactivity is the carrying is the carrying

of persons or goods or both, and one who does such

of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as ancarrying only as an ancillary activity.ancillary activity.

o

o Neither does the said article distinguish betweenNeither does the said article distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the “generala carrier offering its services to the “general

public

public (i.e. the general community or population), and one who offers services or solicits (i.e. the general community or population), and one who offers services or solicits business only from

business only from a narrow segment of a narrow segment of the general populationthe general population.. --

“Common

“Common Carrier”

Carrier”

“Public

“Public Service”

Service” under

under the

the Public

Public Service

Service Act

Act

o

o The concept of Common Carrier under Art. 1732 may be seen to coincide neatly with theThe concept of Common Carrier under Art. 1732 may be seen to coincide neatly with the

notion of “public service” under the PSA, and under which is defined as

notion of “public service” under the PSA, and under which is defined as includingincluding

"" “Every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage or control in the“Every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage or control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes, any permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes, any common carrier, either for freight or passenger or both, with or without fixed route common carrier, either for freight or passenger or both, with or without fixed route and whatever may

and whatever may be its classification, engaged in the transportation of passengersbe its classification, engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight or both…”

or freight or both…” G

GUZMAN VSUZMAN VS. CA. CA(168 SCRA 612)(168 SCRA 612)

--

No distinctions (3 aspects)

o

o Article 1732 makesArticle 1732 makes no distinctionno distinction between between

""

Business

– One whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or – One whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as a “sideline”)

local idiom, as a “sideline”)

""

Schedule –

One between a person/enterprise offering transportation on a regularOne between a person/enterprise offering transportation on a regular or scheduled basis or one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or or scheduled basis or one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis

unscheduled basis

""

Public

– One between a carrier offering its services to the general public (i.e. the – One between a carrier offering its services to the general public (i.e. the general community or population), and one who offers services or solicits business general community or population), and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population.

only from a narrow segment of the general population. --

Coincides with PSA Definition of “public service”

o

o “Every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage or control in the“Every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage or control in the

Philippines, for hire or compensation,

Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether permanent,with general or limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes, any common carrier

occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes, any common carrier …”…” --

Requisite to incur liability

o

o A certificate of public convenience is NOT a requisite for the incurring of liability underA certificate of public convenience is NOT a requisite for the incurring of liability under

the NCC. Such liability arises

the moment a person or firm acts as a common carrier

,, without regard

without regard as to whether or not such carrier has also complied with the requirements of as to whether or not such carrier has also complied with the requirements of applicable regulatory statute implementing regulations and has been granted a certificate applicable regulatory statute implementing regulations and has been granted a certificate of public convenience or other franchise.

of public convenience or other franchise.

"" Rationale:Rationale: this would be offensive to sound public policy; it would be to reward a commonthis would be offensive to sound public policy; it would be to reward a common carrier for failing to

carrier for failing to comply with applicable statutory requirementscomply with applicable statutory requirements

•

• The law imposes duties and The law imposes duties and liabilities upon common carriers for the safetyliabilities upon common carriers for the safety

and protection of those who

(4)

a common carrier to render such duties and liabilities merely facultative a common carrier to render such duties and liabilities merely facultative by simply failing to

by simply failing to obtain the necessary permits and authorizations.obtain the necessary permits and authorizations.

F

ABRE VSABRE VS

. CA

(259 SCRA 426)

--

On need to be engaged in public transportation to be liable

o

o The Fabres DID NOT have to be engaged in the business of public transportation for theThe Fabres DID NOT have to be engaged in the business of public transportation for the

provisions of the Civil Code on Common Carriers to apply to them. provisions of the Civil Code on Common Carriers to apply to them.

"" In the case: owner liable underIn the case: owner liable under culpa contractualculpa contractual; negligent driver under tort; negligent driver under tort

FGU I

NSURANCE VSNSURANCE VS

. S

ARMIENTOARMIENTO

(386 SCRA 312)

--

Who are comm

Who are common carriers

on carriers

o

o Common carriers areCommon carriers are

"" persons, corporations, firms or associationspersons, corporations, firms or associations

"" engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or bothengaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both

"" by land, water, or airby land, water, or air

"" for hire or compensationfor hire or compensation

"" offering their services to the publicoffering their services to the public

•

• whether to the public in general or to a limited clientele in particular, butwhether to the public in general or to a limited clientele in particular, but

NEVER on an

NEVER on an exclusive basisexclusive basis

o

True Test of a Common Carrier

– – the carriage of passengers or goods, providing space for tehosethe carriage of passengers or goods, providing space for tehose

who opt to avail

who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee.themselves of its transportation service for a fee.

B

ASCOS VSASCOS VS

. CA

(221 SCRA 318)

--

Test to determine if a common carrier

o

o Whether the given undertaking is a part of the Whether the given undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by the carrier which hebusiness engaged in by the carrier which he

has held out to the general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the has held out to the general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business transacted/

business transacted/ F

F IRSTIRSTPPHILHIL. I . I NDUSTRIAL VSNDUSTRIAL VS. CA. CA(300 SCRA 661)(300 SCRA 661)

--

Test if a common carrier (BKMH)

o

o Must be engaged in business of carrying goods for others as aMust be engaged in business of carrying goods for others as a

public employment

, and, and

holds himself out as ready to engage in transportation of goods for persons generally as a holds himself out as ready to engage in transportation of goods for persons generally as a business, and NOT as a

business, and NOT as a casual occupationcasual occupation

o

o Must undertake to carry goods of theMust undertake to carry goods of the

kind

to which his to which his business is confinedbusiness is confined o

o Must undertake to carry by theMust undertake to carry by the

method

by which his business is conducted and over his by which his business is conducted and over his

established roads established roads

o

o Transportation must be forTransportation must be for

hire

--

No distinction as to the

meansmeans

of transporting

o

o The definition of common carriers in the NCC makes no distinction as to the means ofThe definition of common carriers in the NCC makes no distinction as to the means of

transpor

transporting, as long as it is ting, as long as it is by land, water or air.by land, water or air.

o

o It DOES NOT provide that the transporting of the passengers or goods should be byIt DOES NOT provide that the transporting of the passengers or goods should be by motormotor

vehicle

vehicle (example: oil pipeline operators) (example: oil pipeline operators) . .

S

CHMITZ VSCHMITZ VS

. T

RANSPORTRANSPORT

V

ENTUREENTURE

(456 SCRA 557)

--

When consider

When considered a common ca

ed a common carrier; owne

rrier; ownership of vehicl

rship of vehiclee

o

o As long as a person/corporation holds itself to the public for the purpose ofAs long as a person/corporation holds itself to the public for the purpose of transportingtransporting

goods

goods as as a a businessbusiness, it is already considered a common carrier regardless if it owns the, it is already considered a common carrier regardless if it owns the vehicle to be used or has to hire one.

vehicle to be used or has to hire one. S

S ANCHEZ ANCHEZBBROKERAGE VSROKERAGE VS. CA. CA(447 SCRA 427)(447 SCRA 427)

--

Re: principal vs. ancillary business activity

o

o It suffices that the carrier undertakes to deliver the goods forIt suffices that the carrier undertakes to deliver the goods for

pecuniary consideration

..

C

RISOSTOMO VSRISOSTOMO VS

. CA

(409 SCRA 528)

(5)

o One whereby a certain person or association of persons obligate themselves to transport

persons, things, or news from one place to another for a fixed price.

" Such person or association of persons are regarded as carriers, and are classified as private or special carriers and common or public carriers.

-

Object of a contract of carriage

– the transportation of passengers or goods

2. L

IABILITY OF

C

OMMON

C

ARRIER

O

CCIDENTAL

T

RANSPORT VS

. CA

(220 SCRA 167)

-

Liability of real owner of vehicle

o The real owner of the vehicle at fault is liable for damages arising from accident it is

involved in.

" In the case: The fact that the Fiera was owned by Almedilla though registered with Sevilla Line, will not alter the conclusion arrived at by the lower court. The party who stands to benefit or suffer from the decision is admittedly Almedilla and not Sevilla Lines. William Sevilla admitted that the real owner of the vehicle was Almedilla, in the case for damages.

BENEDICTO VS. IAC (187 SCRA 554) -

Liability of registered owner

o The prevailing doctrine on common carriers makes the

registered owner liable for

consequences flowing from the operations of the carriers, even though the specific

vehicle involved

may already have been transferred to another person.

" Rationale: in dealing with vehicles registered under the Public Service Law, the public has the right to assume that the registered owner is the actual or lawful owner thereof.

• It would be very difficult and often impossible as a practical matter, for

members of the general public to enforce the rights of action that they may have for injuries inflicted by the vehicles being negligently operated if they should be required to prove who the actual owner is. The registered owner is NOT ALLOWED to deny liability by proving the identity of the alleged transferee.

E

QUITABLE VS

. S

UYON

(388 SCRA 445)

-

Liability of registered owner

o Regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the

lawful operator

insofar as the public and third persons are concerned

; it is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation.

o The owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual operator and

employer being considered merely its agent

o Purpose of motor vehicle registration: The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to

identify the owner should that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefore may be fixed on a definite individual.

III. T

RANSPORTATION OF

G

OODS

1. E

XTRAORDINARY

D

ILIGENCE

(A

RT

. 1733, NCC)

E ASTERNSHIPPING VS. CA (196 SCRA 570)

(6)

o Common carriers are bound to observe

extraordinary diligence

over goods…according to

all circumstances of each case. A common carrier is required to exercise the highest degree of care in the discharge of its business.

-

Art. 1735

o In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1-5 of Article 1735, if the goods are lost or

damaged,

the common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or negligent

.

" Defenses: (1) Article 1734[5]; (2) Article 1733 [extraordinary diligence] -

If carrier fails to establish any caso fortuito

presumption of negligence

o If the carrier fails to establish any caso fortuito, the presumption by law of fault or

negligence on the part of the carrier applies; and the carrier must present evidence that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by Art. 1733 in order to escape liability.

D

ELSAN

T

RANSPORT VS

. CA (369 SCRA 24)

-

Duty of common carriers

o Common carriers are

bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the

goods and for the safety of passengers transported by them, according to all the

circumstances of each case.

(1733)

o In case of loss, destruction, or deterioration of the insured goods, common carriers shall be

responsible UNLESS the same is brought about by some natural disaster or calamity.

(1735)

o In all other cases, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are

presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently

, UNLESS they proved they observed

extraordinary diligence

. (1735, 1733)

PHILMAGEN VS. PKS SHIPPING(401 SCRA 222) -

Extraordinary diligence

o Art. 1733 requires common carriers to observe extraordinary diligence over the goods they

carry.

o In case of loss, destruction or deterioration of goods, common carriers are presumed to

have been at fault or to have acted negligently, and the burden of proving otherwise rests on them.

o The provisions of Art. 1733 notwithstanding, common carriers are exempt from liability for

loss, destruction or deterioration for any of the causes enumerated in Art. 1734 S ALUDO VS. CA (207 SCRA 479)

-

Bill of lading, defined

o A bill of lading is a written acknowledgment of the receipt of the goods and an agreement

to transport and deliver them at a specified place to a person named or in his order.

" Synonyms – shipping receipt; forwarder’s receipt; receipt for transportation

" Examples – freight tickets for bus companies; receipts for cargo transported by all forms of transportation; airway bills of lading

" Two-fold character

• A

receipt

as to the quantity and description of the goods shipped

• A

contract

to transport the goods to the consignee or other person therein

designated, on the terms specified in such instrument.

o It is prima facie evidence (not conclusive evidence) of delivery to the carrier.

" It is a general rule as to the parties to a contract of carriage of goods in connection with which a bill of lading is issued reciting that goods have been received for transportation, that the recital being in essence a receipt alone, is NOT CONCLUSIVE, but may be explained by parol or other evidence.

o Acceptance of bill of lading without dissent

" The acceptance of a bill of lading without dissent raises the presumption that all terms therein were brought to the knowledge of the shipper and agreed to by him, and in

(7)

the absence of fraud or mistake, he is estopped from thereafter denying that he assented to such terms.

• In order that any presumption of assent to a stipulation in a bill of lading

limiting liability of a carrier may arise, it must appear that the clause containing the exemption from liability

plainly formed part of the

contract contained in the bill of lading

. (i.e. printed on the back, or on papers attached)

-

When observance of ED commences

o The extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier BEGINS

from the time the goods

are delivered to the carrier

,

o and REMAINS IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT even when they are temporarily unloaded

or stored in transit, UNLESS! shipper/owner exercises the right of stoppage in transitu,

o and TERMINATES only

after a reasonable time of the acceptance of the goos by the

consignee or such other person entitled to receive them.

(1737) -

When is there

delivery

o There is delivery to the carrier

when the goods are ready for and have been placed in the

exclusive possession, custody and control of the carrier for the purpose of their

immediate transportation and the carrier has accepted them.

-

Rights of the carrier

o To require good faith on the part of those persons who deliver goods to be carried, or enter

into contracts with it

o To inquire as to its value (inasmuch as the freight may depend on the value of the article to

be carried) -

Duty of carrier

o To make inquiry as to the general nature of the articles shipped and of their value before it

consents to carry them

" Failure to do so: CANNOT DEFEAT the shippers’s right to recovery of the full amount of the package if lost, in the absence of showing of fraud or deceit on the part of the shipper.

" Expounded: the carrier has the right to accept the shipper’s marks as to the contents of the package offered for transportation, and is not bound to inquire particularly about them in order to take advantage of a false classification and where a shipper expressly represents the contents of a package to be of a designated character, it is not the duty of the carrier to ask for a repetition of the statement nor disbelieve it and open the box and see for himself.

• Exception – where a carrier has reasonable ground to suspect that the offered

goods are of a dangerous or illegal character , he has the right to know the character of such goods and to insist on an inspection, if reasonable and practical under the circumstances, as a condition of receiving and transporting the goods.

-

Carrier’s liability for delay

o In the absence of a special contract,

a carrier is not an insurer against delay in

transportation of goods

.

" When a common carrier undertakes to convey goods, the law implies a contract that they shall be delivered at destination within a reasonable time, in the absence of any agreement as to the time of delivery.

" If there is an explicit contract to transport and delivery property within a specified time, it is bound to fulfill its contract, and is

liable for delay, no matter from what

cause it may have arisen

.

L

ORENZO

S

HIPPING VS

. BJ M

ATHEL

(443 SCRA 163)

(8)

o The ultimate criterion is

the actual or apparent intention of the parties

, and before time

may be so regarded by a court, there must be sufficient manifestation, either in the contract itself or the surrounding circumstances, of that intention.

-

Presumption that time is NOT of the essence

o When the time of delivery is not fixed or is stated in general and indefinite terms =

time is

NOT of the essence of the contract

" In such cases (i.e. when no time is fixed), the delivery must be made within a reasonable time.

o Regarding breach

" Even where time is of the essence, a breach of the contract in that respect by one of the parties may be waived by the other party’s subsequently treating the contract as still in force.

2. D

URATION OF

R

ESPONSIBILITY

(A

RTS

. 1736-38, NCC)

M ITSUILINES VS. CA (287 SCRA 366)

-

Loss

o Loss refers to the deterioration or disappearance of goods. (It was held that there was no

loss because the goods had simply been delivered)

o Whatever damage or injury is suffered by the goods while in transit would result in loss or

damage to either the shipper or the consignee.

As long as it is claimed that the losses or

damages suffered by the shipper or consignee were due to the arrival of the goods in

damaged or deteriorated condition, the action is still basically one for damages for

goods.

SULPICIO VS. F IRSTLEPANTO(462 SCRA 125) -

Standard of Care

o A common carrier is bound to transport its cargo and its passengers safely as far as human

care can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautions person, with due regard for all the circumstances.

" The standard of

extraordinary diligence

imposed upon common carriers is considerably more demanding than the standard of ordinary diligence.

• Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered for

shipment requires the common carrier to know and to follow the required precaution for avoiding the damage to, or destruction of, the goods entrusted to it for safe carriage and delivery.

• It requires common carriers to render service with the greatest skill and

foresight and to use all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristic of goods tendered for shipment, and to exercise due care in the handling and stowage, including such methods as their nature requires.

3. P

RESUMPTION OF

N

EGLIGENCE

(A

RT

. 1735)

W ILDVALLEYSHIPPING VS. CA (342 SCRA 213)

-

Proving foreign law

o Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction. Like any other fact, they must be

alleged and proved.

o When the foreign law sought to be proved is unwritten, the oral testimony of expert

witnesses is

admissible

, as are printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.

(9)

" For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory:

• (1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or

by his deputy;

• and (2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the

embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office.

o This requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to

justify the giving of full faith and credit to the genuineness of a document in a foreign country.

M

AERSK

L

INES VS

. CA (222 SCRA 108) [

INFRA

]

FGU I

NSURANCE VS

. CA (454 SCRA 337)

-

Art. 1739

o

Art. 1739

. In order that the common carrier may be exempted from responsibility, the

natural disaster must have been the proximate and only cause of the loss. However, the common carrier must exercise due diligence to prevent or minimize loss before, during and after the occurrence of flood, storm, or other natural disaster in order that the common carrier may be exempted from liability for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods . . .

-

Caso fortuito; necessary qualification

o It is not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is

commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid.

o To be exempt from liability because of an act of God, the tug must be free from any

previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss or damage may have been occasioned. For,

although the immediate or proximate cause of the loss in any given

instance may have been what is termed an act of God, yet, if the tug unnecessarily

exposed the two to such accident by any culpable act or omission of its own, it is not

excused.

DSR-S

ENATOR VS

. F

EDERAL

(413 SCRA 14)

-

Art. 1734

o Fire is not one of those enumerated under the above provision which exempts a carrier

from liability for loss or destruction of the cargo.

" Since the peril of fire is not comprehended within the exceptions in Article 1734, then the common carrier shall be presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by law.

" Even if fire were to be considered a natural disaster within the purview of Article 1734, it is required under

Article 1739[10]

of the same Code that the

natural

disaster must have been the proximate and only cause of the loss

, and that

the

carrier has exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before,

during or after the occurrence of the disaster.

-

Duration of Responsibility; presumption of negligence

o A common carrier’s duty to observe the requisite diligence in the shipment of goods lasts

from the time the articles are surrendered to or unconditionally placed in the possession

of, and received by, the carrier for transportation until delivered to or until the lapse of a

reasonable time for their acceptance by the person entitled to receive them.

-

Presumption of Negligence; exceptions to negligence

o When the goods shipped either are lost or arrive in damaged condition, a presumption

arises against the carrier of its failure to observe that diligence, and there need not be an express finding of negligence to hold it liable.

(10)

o They are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods are lost,

destroyed or deteriorated.

o There are very few instances when the presumption of negligence does not attach and

these instances are enumerated in Article 1734. In those cases where the presumption is applied, the common carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence in order to overcome the presumption.

4. D

EFENSES AND

C

ONDITIONS

(A

RTS

. 1734, 1739-43)

C

ENTRAL

S

HIPPING VS

. I

NS

. (438 SCRA 511)

-

Storm

o According to PAGASA, a storm has a wind force of 48 to 55 knots,[24] equivalent to 55 to

63 miles per hour or 10 to 11 in the Beaufort Scale.

" The second mate of the vessel stated that the wind was blowing around force 7 to 8 on the Beaufort Scale. Consequently, the strong winds accompanying the southwestern monsoon could not be classified as a storm. Such winds are the ordinary vicissitudes of a sea voyage.

" To our mind it would not be sufficient to categorize the weather condition at the time as a storm within the absolutory causes enumerated in the law. Significantly, no typhoon was observed within the Philippine area of responsibility during that period.

-

Art. 1739; force majeure must be without any human interference

o Even if the weather encountered by the ship is to be deemed a natural disaster under

Article 1739 of the Civil Code, petitioner failed to show that such natural disaster or calamity was the proximate and only cause of the loss.

"

Human agency must be entirely excluded from the cause of injury or loss. In

other words, the damaging effects blamed on the event or phenomenon must

not have been caused, contributed to, or worsened by the presence of human

participation. The defense of fortuitous event or natural disaster cannot be

successfully made when the injury could have been avoided by human

precaution.

" Hence, if a common carrier fails to exercise due diligence -- or that ordinary care that the circumstances of the particular case demand -- to prevent or minimize the loss before, during and after the occurrence of the natural disaster, the carrier shall be deemed to have been negligent. The loss or injury is not, in a legal sense, due to a natural disaster under Article 1734(1).

C ITADELLINES VS. CA (184 SCRA 544) -

Failure to prove

o Failure to prove that the loss of goods was occasioned by an excepted cause ! carrier is

liable

-

Stipulation limiting liability of carrier, binding

o A stipulation limiting the liability of the carrier to the value of the goods appearing in the bill of

lading, unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value, is

binding

.

o Further, a contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the owner or shipper for the

loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods is valid, if it is reasonable and just under the circumstances, and has been fairly and freely agreed upon.

E

VERETT

S

TEAMSHIP VS

. CA (297 SCRA 496)

-

Stipulation limiting liability

o A stipulation in the bill of lading limiting the common carriers liability for loss or

(11)

value, is sanctioned by law, particularly Articles 1749 and 1750 of the Civil Code which provide:

" ART. 1749. A stipulation that the common carriers liability is limited to the value of the goods appearing in the bill of lading, unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value, is binding.

" ART. 1750. A contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the owner or shipper for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods is valid, if it is reasonable and just under the circumstances, and has been freely and fairly agreed upon.

o Must be reasonable – It is required that the stipulation limiting the common carriers

liability for loss must be reasonable and just under the circumstances, and has been freely and fairly agreed upon.

o Contracts of adhesion

–

contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a

ready-made form of contract on the other are contracts not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres he gives his consent.

5. L

IMITED

L

IABILITY

(A

RTS

. 1744-52)

PAL

VS

. CA (207 SCRA 100)

-

Governing law

o The liability of the common carrier for the loss, destruction or deterioration of goods

transported from a foreign country to the Philippines is governed primarily by the New Civil Code. In all matters not regulated by said Code, the rights and obligations of common carriers shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by Special Laws.

"

Art. 1753. The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported shall

govern the liability of the common carrier for their loss, destruction or

deterioration.

" In this case: Since the passenger's destination in this case was the Philippines, Philippine law governs the liability of the carrier for the loss of the passenger's luggage.

PANAMVS. IAC (186 SCRA 687) -

Discourteous employees

o When airline passenger’s luggage was left at airline’s fault in Manila and passenger was

not adequately or properly given assistance in Hawaii to locate his luggage an award of moral damages is proper.

o In this case: Even accepting PAN AM's version of the occurrence at face value, it is clear that

none of the PAN AM employees exerted the least effort to assist Ongsiako in his predicament, despite his appeal for help; that not one of them even deigned to look at Ongsiako's baggage tag, or listen to his problem, or give assurances that something would be done about his difficulties, or otherwise show any sign of sympathy or commiseration; that instead, they looked at their watches-an impolite and dismaying gesture of impatience, to be sure, considering the circumstances-and told him he could not be helped because there were other people waiting for their turn-to be served, of course, like Ongsiako, as they had a right to expect as paying passengers-and that it was best if he just went to his plane so as not to miss his flight.

C ATHAYP ACIFIC VS. CA (219 SCRA 520) -

Breach of contract of carriage

o Failure of common carrier to deliver luggage of passenger at designated place and time

(12)

o Discourteous and arbitrary conduct of common carrier’s personnel amounts to bad faith

entitling passenger’s recovery for moral damages.

o In the absence of fraud or bad faith in breach contract of carriage, liability of common

carrier limited to natural and probable consequences of said breach, otherwise, moral and exemplary damages are recoverable.

-

Warsaw Convention

o Recognition of the Warsaw Convention does not preclude the operation of the Civil Code

and other pertinent laws in the determination of extent of liability of common carriers in cases of breach of contract of carriage, particularly for willful misconduct of their employees.

6. B

AGGAGE

/L

UGGAGE

(A

RT

. 1754)

IV. T

RANSPORTATION OF

P

ASSENGERS

1. E

XTRAORDINARY

D

ILIGENCE

(A

RT

. 1755)

PAL

VS

. CA (275 SCRA 621)

-

Attended with public duty

o The contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or

malfeasance of the carrier’s employee’s could give ground for an action for damages. -

In this case: basis for action for damages

o Not whether or not the hotel room was an amenity, but whether it was discriminatory in

that the amenities were not given to all. It had also been sufficiently established that it was company policy to extend cash assistance or accommodations at hotels with which the airline had existing tie-ups. Therefore, the refund of hotel expenses was surreptitiously and discriminatorily made by PAL since the same was not made known to everyone, except through word of mouth to a handful of passengers.

C ALALAS VS. CA

-

Source of liability; how to prove breach

o Quasi-delict – negligence of the tortfeasor

" The negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action

o Breach of contract – negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation

" The action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case a common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination.

-

Art. 1756

o In case of death/injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 provides that

common carriers are

PRESUMED to have been negligent or at fault unless they prove that they observed the

ED as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755.

This provision necessarily SHIFTS THE BURDEN OF PROOF to the carrier.

" In the case: Because of the accident, the carrier is presumed negligent, and should have proved ED. This he failed to prove. He had parked askew and the jeepney was apparently overloaded.

JAL

VS

. CA

-

Liability of common carriers; fortuitous event

o Failure on the part of the common carrier to live up to the exacting standards of care

(13)

o HOWEVER! it is

incorrect

to say that common carriers are absolutely responsible for all

injuries or damages, even if the same were caused by a fortuitous event.

" When a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of

force majeure

, the general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance. -

Force Majeure

o In the case: Whatever losses in the form of hotel and meal expenses the stranded passengers

incurred cannot be charged to JAL. Their predicament was not due to the fault or negligence of JAL, but the closure of NAIA to international flights (Mt. Pinatubo)

o Airline passengers must take such risks incident to the mode of travel,

" In this regard, adverse weather conditions or extreme climate changes are some of the perils involved in air travel, the consequences of which the passenger must assume or expect. After all, common carriers are not the insurer of all risks.

o HOWEVER ! if the FE was accompanied by

neglect and malfeasance of the carrier’s

employees

= an action for damages against the carrier is permissible.

" In the case: JAL’s duty was to transit new passengers, making the necessary arrangements themselves for the next flight to Manila. This JAL failed to do. Liable for nominal damages.

2. D

URATION OF

R

ESPONSIBILITY

D

ANGWA VS

. CA (202 SCRA 574)

-

Duty to stop for a reasonable length of time to allow boarding

o It is the duty of common carriers of passengers to stop their conveyances a reasonable

length of time in order to afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are LIABLE for

injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden

starting up or jerking of their conveyances while they are doing so.

-

When deemed a passenger

o The victim herein, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already considered a

passenger and is entitled to all the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual relation.

o Presumption in stopping – When the bus is not in motion, there is no necessity for a person

who wants to ride the same to signal his intention to board.

A public utility bus, once it

stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders.

Therefore, it becomes the duty of the driver and the conductor, everytime the bus stops, to do no act that would have the effect of increasing the peril to a passenger while he was attempting to board the same.

A

BOITIZ

S

HIPPING VS

. CA (179 SCRA 95)

-

Extent of passenger relationship to carrier

o The relation of carrier and passenger

continues until the passenger has been landed at the

port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises.

o Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily TERMINATE until the passenger has,

after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises.

" All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance = to be deemed

passengers

.

" What is a

reasonable time

or a reasonable delay within this rule = determined from all the circumstances

• Includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his

departure.

o The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the

fact that the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier's premises to claim his baggage.

(14)

their destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to

claim their baggage.

"

Reasonable presence with the carrier’s premises

– That reasonableness of time should be made to depend on the attending circumstances of the case, such as

• Kind of common carrier • Nature of its business

• The customs of the place, etc.

o Primary factor of extent of passenger-carrier relationship –

the existence of a reasonable

cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or near the petitioner’s vessel.

D

IAZ VS

. CA

-

Presumption of negligence

o In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier is at fault or is negligent

when a passenger dies or is injured.

" In fact, there is even no need for the court to make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence.

" In the case at bar : petitioner, as common carrier, failed to establish sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of negligence. The accident which led to the death of Sherly Moneo was caused by the reckless speed and gross negligence of petitioner's driver who demonstrated no regard for the safety of his passengers.

3. P

RESUMPTION OF

N

EGLIGENCE

(A

RT

. 1756)

D AVILA VS. PAL (49 SCRA 223)

-

Burden of Proof

o Burden of Proof that extraordinary diligence in transporting passengers was observed is on

the common carrier (1756). -

Stipulation to avoid liability

o Responsibility of common carriers for safety of passengers cannot be dispensed with by

notice and stipulations.

J

UNTILLA VS

. F

ONTANAR

(136 SCRA 625)

-

Liability for defect in appliance

o A passenger is entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an INJURY resulting from a

defect in an appliance purchased from a manufacturer

, whenever it appears that the defect would have been discovered by the carrier had it exercised the degree of care which under the circumstances was incumbent upon it, with regard to inspection and application of the necessary tests.

o Rationale - the passenger has neither choice nor control over the carrier in the selection and

use of the equipment and appliances in use by the carrier. Having no privity whatever with the manufacturer or vendor of the defective equipment, the passenger has no remedy against him, while the carrier usually has.

4. N

ON

-E

XEMPTION FROM

L

IABILITY

(A

RTS

. 1759-1760)

ONGY IU VS. CA

-

Provision limiting liability

o In this case: Petitioner didn’t declare a higher value; nor question the stipulation’s validity;

it was easily readable; and the petitioner should've been fully aware of conditions

o Such provisions have been held to be

a part of a contract of carriage

, and VALID AND

BINDING upon the passenger regardless of the latter’s lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation! a

contract of adhesion

(15)

" A contract limiting liability upon an agreed valuation does not offend against the policy of the law forbidding one from contracting against his own negligence ESTRADA VS. C ONSOLACION(71 SCRA 523)

-

Legal presumption

o Once a passenger in the course of travel is injured or does not reach his destination safely,

the carrier and the driver are presumed at fault.

o In the case: private respondents were able to prove that the accident which resulted in the

death of petitioner’s wife was due to the fault or negligence of the drivers of the two pick-up trucks over whom the carrier has no spick-upervision or control. Having therefore shown prima facie that the accident was due to caso fortuito and that the driver of the respondent was free from

concurrent fault or negligence,

it was incumbent upon petitioner to rebut such proof

. This petitioner failed to do.

5. L

IMITED

L

IABILITY AND

D

EFENSES

(A

RTS

. 1757-58)

Y

OBIDO VS

. CA

-

Assumption of risks incidental to mode of travel

o When a passenger boards a common carrier, he takes all the risks incidental to the mode of

travel he has taken. After all, a carrier is not an insurer of the safety of its passengers and is not bound absolutely and at all events to carry them safely and without injury. HOWEVER, when a passenger is injured or dies while travelling, the law presumes tha the common carrier was negligent.

-

Defenses under

culpa contractual

o In culpa contractual, once a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have

been at fault or to have acted negligently.

o How overcome:

" Evidence that the carrier had observed extraordinary diligence (1733, 1755, 1756)

" Evidence that the death or injury was due to a fortuitous event.

o The court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier

to hold it responsible for damages sought by the passenger. -

Force majeure

o Requisites of caso fortuito:

" Must be independent of human will

• There must be a total exclusion of human agency from the cause of injury

" Must be impossible to foresee, or if it can be foreseen, impossible to avoid

" The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner

" The obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.

o In this case: human factors were involved!

" That the tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free from manufacturing defects or that it was properly mounted

" That it was a of a brand noted for quality doesn’t follow that it couldn’t have exploded within 5 days of use.

o

An accident caused by either defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its

driver = NOT CASO FORTUITO

o

Absolution

" A common carrier may not be absolved from liability in case of force majeure alone.

The common carrier must still prove that it was

not

negligent in causing the

death or injury of the passenger

.

" In the case: The carrier said that it was running within speed limit. But there was contrary evidence which said the driver had ignored warnings from passengers.

(16)

These contradictory testimony give rise to the presumption that the carrier was negligent (1755)

AIRF RANCE VS. CA (171 SCRA 399) -

Restricted air fare

o International Air Transportation Association (IATA) Resolution No. 275 e, 2., special note

reads: "Where a fare is restricted and such restrictions are not clearly evident from the required entries on the ticket, such restrictions may be

" written, stamped or reprinted in plain language in the Endorsement/Restrictions box of the applicable flight coupon(s);

" or attached thereto by use of an appropriate notice.

o Changes to the ticket requested by the passenger will be subject to carriers regulations

-

Claim for damages; requisite

o It is also essential before an award of damages that the claimant must satisfactorily prove

during the trial the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal connection to defendant's acts.

B

AYASEN VS

. CA (103 SCRA 197)

- In the case:

no evidence of negligence

o The witness for the prosecution herself said that they were driving at moderate speed,

didn’t know the cause of the accident, no bump/jolt, no “distracting” conversation, didn’t notice anything wrong with the condition of the jeep, road was wet but fair enough to drive on; fair weather; wasn’t drinking! NO EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE

" The testimony of a credible witness that he saw or heard at a particular time and place is more reliable than that of an equally credible witness who with the same opportunities, testified that he did not see or hear the same thing at the same time and place.

F

ORTUNE

E

XPRESS VS

. CA

-

Lack of diligence in protecting passengers; liability for hijacking

o Had petitioner and its employees been vigilant they would not have failed to see that the

malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Under the circumstances, simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the passengers constitutional rights.

"

A common carrier can be held liable for failing to prevent a hijacking by

frisking passengers and inspecting their baggage.

-

In this case, not a fortuitous event

o Under the requisites enumerated in Yobido ! lacking #2 (they were forewarned by the

police)

6. A

CTS OF

P

ASSENGER AND

O

THERS

(A

RTS

. 1761-1763)

M ANILAR AILROAD VS. B ALLESTEROS(16 SCRA 641)

-

Acts of passenger

o (NCC) Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on

account of the wilfull acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.

o (Motor Vehicle Law) Sec. 48(b). No professional chauffeur shall permit any unlicensed

person to drive the motor vehicle under his control, or permit a person, sitting beside him or in any other part of the car, to interfere with him in the operation of the motor vehicle, by allowing said person to take hold of the steering wheel, or in any other manner take part in the manipulation or control of the car.

(17)

B

ACHELOR

E

XPRESS VS

. CA (188 SCRA 216)

-

Must prove it was not negligent

o In order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it is

not enough that the accident was caused by force majeure. The common carrier must still

prove that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such accident.

V. D

AMAGES

–

SEEOUTLINE

VI. T

RANSPORTATION

O

VERLAND

1. T

IME TO

D

ELIVER

, D

ELAY IN

D

ELIVERY

Maersk Line vs. CA (222 SCRA 108)

-

Bills of Lading as Contracts of Adhesion

o Bills of lading are contracts not entirely prohibited. One who adheres to the contract is in

reality free to reject it in its entirety; if he adheres, he gives his consent. -

Nature of Bills of Lading

o A bill of lading operates both as a receipt and as a contract.

" Receipt – for the goods shipped

" Contract – to transport and deliver the same as therein specified

o Names the parties

o Fixes the route, destination and freight rates or charges o Stipulates the rights and obligations assumed by the parties

• It is the law between the parties who are bound by its terms and

conditions.

• Becomes effective upon its delivery to and acceptance by the shipper. • It is presumed that the stipulations of the bill were known to the shipper,

and he is generally bound by his acceptance whether he reads the bill or not -

Delivery; when made

o While it is true that common carriers are not obligated by law to carry and deliver

merchandise not obligated by law to carry and deliver merchandise, and that persons are not vested with the right to prompt delivery, unless such common carriers previously assume the obligation to deliver at a given date/time,

delivery of shipment/cargo shout at

least be made within a REASONABLE TIME

" In the absence of a special contract, a carrier is not an insurer against delay in transportation of goods.

When a common carrier undertakes to convey goods, the

law implies a contract that they shall be delivered at a destination within a

reasonable time

, in the absence of any AGREEMENT AS TO THE TIME OF

DELIVERY.

" But where a carrier has made an express contract to transport and deliver property within a specified time, it is bound to fulfill its contract and is

liable for any delay, no

matter from what cause it may have arisen

.

PHILMAGEN VS. CA (222 SCRA 155)

-

Delay in unloading cargo; no negligence from common carrier

o Where delay in unloading of cargo not due to negligence of carrier, it cannot be held liable

for damages.

o In the case: While it is true that there was indeed delay in discharging the cargo from the

vessel, neither of the parties herein could be faulted for such delay, for the same was not due to negligence, but to several factors.

(18)

o Also, the diligence shown by the shipmaster to protect cargo from the typhoon and

pilferages exempts the carrier from damages (had sought police and coast guard assistance before abandoning ship).

T

RANSASIA

S

HIPPING VS

. CA (254 SCRA 260)

-

Seaworthiness; unseaworthiness as breach of contract of carriage

o For a vessel to be seaworthy, it must be

adequately equipped for voyage

and

manned

with a sufficient number of competent officers and crew

.

" Failure of a common carrier to maintain in seaworthy condition its vessel = breach of Art. 1755 of CC

o In contracts (and quasi-contracts): the obligor is liable for all the damages which may be

reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation if he is guilty of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude.

-

Art. 698 (Code of Commerce); rights and duties of parties arising out of delay

o Article 698 (Code of Commerce)

" In case a voyage already begun should be INTERRUPTED!

the passengers shall

be obliged to pay the fare in proportion to the distance covered

•

WITHOUT RIGHT to recover

! if the interruption is due to a fortuitous

event

•

WITH RIGHT TO INDEMNITY

! if the interruption was caused bythe

captain exclusively

o Cause of delay was from failure to observe ED ! Art. 698 in re: NCC 2199, 2200, 2201, 2208

and 21

" Ergo, the common carrier is LIABLE

for any pecuniary loss or loss of profits

which may have been suffered by reason of such lack of ED

o However, in this case ! “The loss [for the passenger in this case]…would be the loss of

income if unable to report to his office on the day he was supposed to arrive were it not for the delay. This however ASSUMES that he stayed on the vessel and was with it when it thereunder resumed the voyage;

but he did not.”

" Therefore, any further delay was his own fault!

2. R

OUTE AND

D

EVIATION

C AMPAGNIE VS. H AMBURG-A MERIKA(36 PHIL. 590) ( INFRA )

3. P

ARTIAL AND

D

EFECTIVE

D

ELIVERY

K UIP AI& C O.VS. DOLLARSTEAMSHIPLINE(52 PHIL. 863)

-

Duty of carrier

o It is the duty of the carrier to deliver the transported articles in as good order and condition

as when received, and for failure to do so, the carrier is liable for corresponding damage. -

Burden of Proof

o As to whether the goods which were delivered were those which were received = a

question of fact

" In an action by the shipper to recover damages for failure to make such deliver, it devolves upon the plaintiff

to both allege and prove that the articles tendered

weren’t the same as those which he delivered to the carrier

SOUTHERNLINES , I NC .VS. CA(4 SCRA 259)

-

Liability for damages to goods; Articles 361 and 362 of Code of Commerce

o Art. 361 – the carrier, in order to free itself from liability, was only obliged to PROVE that the

(19)

o Art. 362 – in order to hold the carrier liable, the consignee was obliged to PROVE that the

damages to the goods by virtue of their nature, occurred on account of the common carrier’s negligence or because the common carrier did not take the precaution required. -

Carrier not relieved from liability if improper packing of goods was APPARENT

o If the fact of improper packing is known to the carrier or his servants, or apparent upon

ordinary observation, but accepts the goods notwithstanding such condition, it is NOT relieved of liability for loss or injury resulting therefrom.

P

HILCHARTER VS

. C

HEMOIL

(462 SCRA 77) [

INFRA

]

ESSOSTANDARD VS. M ANILAR AILROAD(93 SCRA 305) - -

On “provisional” claims

o A claim, though dubbed “provisional,” for loss of goods handled by an arrastre operator is

sufficient compliance

with the 15-day requirement for filing claims against the arrastre operator

o Test for sufficiency of claim – Whether a claim, be it called a “provisional claim”, or a

“claim for value”, has served the purpose of giving the arrastre operator(s)

reasonable

opportunity to check the validity of the claim

while the facts are still fresh in the minds of the persons who took part in the transaction and while the pertinent documents are still available. -

A claim for losses of cargo NEED NOT state in detail the lisst of shipments lost or damaged

o It is not necessary that the provisional claims state a detailed list of the loss/damage

suffered by the said shipments; they only have to meet the test above mentioned

" Rationale: the determination and preparation of the specific amount of damages claimed should be done carefully and without haste, and these can be done practically only in a formal claim which can be filed even long after a provisional claim has been filed.

o The circumstance that the provisional claim DID NOT SPECIFY the value of the loss still

substantially fulfills the requirement of the contract and is not a defense against the claim of the consignee for recovery after it shall have ascertained later its actual loss or damage

-

A claim that a suit has prescribed

must be proved -

Constructive denial of claim

o Where a claim for cargo damage or short delivery is filed, and the arrastre operator DOES

NOT ACT on the claim within one year from discharge of the last package !

the claims

shall be deemed constructively denied upon expiration of one year therefrom

F

ILPRO VS

. M

ANILA

R

AILROAD

(97 SCRA 629)

-

To hold arrestre operator liable for goods lost or damaged (two steps)

o Claimant must file with the operator a claim for the value of said goods within 15 days

from the date of discharge of the last package from the carrying vessel

o Suit should be brought in the court of proper jurisdiction within 1 year

" from the date of discharge of the goods, or

" from the date when the claim for the value of such goods has been rejected or denied -

Constructive rejection of claim

o In case of INACTION on the part of the arrestre operator, he shall be deemed to have

rejected or denied the importer’s claim upon the expiration of one year from the date when the last package was discharged, and that the period within which to file suit shall then begin to run

-

Sufficiency of a “provisional claim”

o A provisional claim may be sufficient, even if the value of the goods involved were not

stated therein, provided it describes said goods sufficiently to permit its identification by the operator and the determination by the latter of the facts relevant thereto.

o Failure to specify value of loss – The circumstance that the provisional claim DID NOT specify