CP Riano

CIVIL PROCEDURE REVIEWER

Procedure by Riano, San Beda Reviewer, and

1997 Rules of Court

Digests (by Abdulwahid, Cabal, Comafay, Fuster, Leynes, Mendame, Mendez, Paras & Regis) further summarized.

BASIC PRINCIPLES

Difference between substantive and remedial law

SUBSTANTIVE LAW REMEDIAL LAW It creates, defines

and regulates rights

and duties

concerning life, liberty or property, which when violated gives rise to a cause of action. It prescribes the methods of enforcing those rights and obligations created by substantive law by providing a procedural system for obtaining redress for the invasion of rights and violations of duties and by prescribing rules as to how suits are filed, tried and decided upon by the courts.

Civil actions, criminal actions, and special proceedings

(1) Civil actions—

It is one by which a party sues another for the protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Its primary purpose is compensatory. Civil actions may be:

(a) Ordinary, or (b) Special.

Both are governed by rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for special civil actions.

(2) Criminal actions—

It is one by which the State prosecutes a person for an act or omission punishable by law. Its primary purpose is punishment.

(3) Special proceedings—

It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact.

GENERAL PROVISIONS (Rule 1) Rule-making power of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court has the constitutional power to promulgate rules concerning:

(1) Pleading, (2) Practice, and (3) Procedure.

Three (3) limitations on the SC’s rule-making power:

(1) The rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases;

(2) shall be uniform for courts of the same grade; and

(3) shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.

Article 6, Sec. 30, Constitution—

No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice

and concurrence.

Procedural and substantive rules

Substantive law creates, defines, regulates,

and extinguishes rights and obligations, while remedial or procedural law provides the procedure for the enforcement of rights and obligations.

Force and effect of Rules of Court

The Rules of Court have the force and effect of law, unless they happen to be inconsistent with positive law.

Power of Supreme Court to suspend the Rules of Court

Whenever demanded by justice, the Supreme Court has the inherent power to

(a) suspend its own rules or

(b) exempt a particular case from the operation of said rules.

May parties change the rules of procedure?

General rule: They may not. This is because

these are matters of public interest.

Exceptions:

Matters of procedure which may be

 Agreed upon by the parties— Venue

may be changed by written agreement of the parties (Rule 4, Sec. 4[b])

 Waived— Venue may be waived if not

objected to in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. (Rule 16, Sec. 6);

judgment in default may be waived by failure to answer within 15 days.

 Fall within the discretion of the court—

The period to plead may be extended on motion of a party. (Rule 11, Sec. 11); rules of procedure may be relaxed in the interest of justice.

JURISDICTION

It is the power and authority of a court to hear, try and decided a case.

1. Generally

 The statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court.

 Before looking into other matters, it is the duty of the court to consider the question of jurisdiction without waiting for it to be raised.

• If court has jurisdiction, such must be exercised. Otherwise, it may be enforced by a

mandamus proceeding.

• If court has no jurisdiction, the court shall dismiss the claim and can do so motu proprio.  Doctrine of primary jurisdiction—

The courts will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal.

 Doctrine of continuing jurisdiction—

Once jurisdiction has attached to a court, it retains that jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case. Hence, it is not lost by

• The passage of new laws transferring the jurisdiction to another tribunal except when expressly provided by the statute;

• Subsequent filing of a notice of appeal;

• The mere fact that a party who is a public official ceased to be in office; or

• Finality of judgment (the court still has jurisdiction to enforce and execute it)

Elements of a valid exercise of jurisdiction

(1) Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the case;

(2) the parties;

(3) the res if jurisdiction over the defendant cannot be acquired;

(4) the issue of the case; and

(5) Payment of docket fees.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is a matter of substantive law.

Jurisdiction over the parties, the res and the issues are matters of procedure. Jurisdiction over the parties and the res are covered by the rule on summons, while jurisdiction over the issues is subsumed under the rule on pleadings.

(a) As to subject matter

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law.

Therefore, jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be conferred by

(1) Administrative policy of any court; (2) Court’s unilateral assumption of

jurisdiction;

(3) Erroneous belief by the court that it has jurisdiction;

(4) By contract or by the parties;

(5) By agreement, or by any act or omission of the parties, nor by acquiescence of the court; or

(6) By the parties’ silence, acquiescence or consent

 General Rule: It is determined by the

material allegations of the initiatory pleading (e.g., the complaint), not the answer of the defendant. Once acquired, jurisdiction is not lost because of the defendant’s contrary allegation.

Exception: In ejectment cases, where

tenancy is averred by way of defense and is proved to be the real issue, the case should be dismissed for not being properly filed with the DARAB.

 It is determined by the cause of action alleged, not by the amount substantiated and awarded. Example: If a complaint alleges a recoverable amount of P1M, RTC has jurisdiction even if evidence proves the only P300k may be recovered.

Note: Jurisdiction over the subject matter

CANNOT be waived, enlarged or diminished by stipulation of the parties.

(b) As to res or property

Jurisdiction over the res refers to the court’s jurisdiction over the thing or the property which is the subject of the action.

Jurisdiction over the res is acquired by

(1) Custodia legis—placing the property or thing under the court’s custody (e.g., attachment)

(2) Statutory authority—statute conferring the court with power to deal with the property or thing within its territorial jurisdiction

(3) Summons by publication or other modes of extraterritorial service (Rule 14, Sec. 15)

(c) As to the issues

Issue— a disputed point or question to which

parties to an action have narrowed down their several allegations and upon which they are desirous of obtaining a decision. Thus, where there is no disputed point, there is no issue. Jurisdiction over the issue may be conferred or determined by

(1) Examination of the pleadings—

Generally, jurisdiction over the issues is determined by the pleadings of the parties.

(2) Pre-trial—

It may be conferred by stipulation of the parties in the pre-trial, as when they enter into stipulations of facts and documents or enter into an agreement simplifying the issues of the case (Rule 18, Sec. 2)

(3) Waiver—

Failure to object to presentation of evidence on a matter not raised in the pleadings. Said issues tried shall be treated as if they had been raised in the pleadings.

(d) As to the parties

The court acquires jurisdiction over the  Plaintiff—

when he files his complaint

 Defendant—

i. Valid service of summons upon him, or

ii. Voluntary appearance:

“The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. (Rule 14, Sec. 20)

Examples:

When defendant files  The necessary pleading;  A motion for reconsideration;

 Petition to set aside judgment o f default;

 An answer;

 Petition for certiorari without questioning the court’s jurisdiction over his person; or  When the parties jointly submit

a compromise agreement for approval

BUT the filing of an answer should

not be treated automatically as a

voluntary appearance when such answer is precisely to object to the court’s jurisdiction over the defendant’s person.

La Naval v. CA: A defendant should

be allowed to put up his own defenses alternatively or hypothetically. It should not be the invocation of available additional defenses that should be construed as a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person, but

the failure to raise the defense. Note: Jurisdiction over a non-resident

defendant cannot be acquired if the action is in personam.

2. Estoppel to deny jurisdiction

HEIRS OF BERTULDO HINOG v. MELICOR (455 SCRA 460, 2005)

Since the deceased defendant participated in all stages of the case before the trial court, he is estopped from denying the jurisdiction of the court. The petitioners merely stepped into the shoes of their predecessor and are effectively barred by estoppel from challenging RTC’s jurisdiction.

FACTS: Bertuldo Hinog allegedly occupied and built a small house on a portion of a property owned by respondents Balane for 10 years at a nominal annual rental. After 10 years, Bertuldo refused to heed demands made by respondents to return said portion and to remove the house constructed thereon. Respondents filed a complaint against him. Bertuldo filed his Answer, alleging ownership of the disputed property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale. Bertuldo died without completing his evidence during the direct examination. Bertuldo’s original counsel was replaced by Atty. Petalcorin who entered his

appearance as new counsel for the heirs of Bertuldo.

Atty. Petalcorin filed a motion to expunge the complaint from the record and nullify all court proceedings on the ground that private respondents failed to specify in the complaint the amount of damages claimed so as to pay the correct docket fees; and that under Manchester doctrine, non-payment of the correct docket fee is jurisdictional.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners are barred by

estoppel from questioning the jurisdiction of RTC

YES. The petitioners are barred from questioning jurisdiction of the trial court. Although the issue of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceedings as the same is conferred by law, it is nonetheless settled that a party may be barred from raising it on the ground of estoppel. After the deceased Bertuldo participated in all stages of the case before the trial court, the petitioners merely stepped into the shoes of their predecessor and are effectively barred by estoppel from challenging RTC’s jurisdiction.

3. Jurisdiction at the time of filing of action

PEOPLE v. CAWALING (293 SCRA 267, 1998)

The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. Once the court acquires jurisdiction, it may not be ousted from the case by any subsequent events, such as a new legislation placing such proceedings under the jurisdiction of another tribunal. Exceptions to this rule arise when: (1) there is an express provision in the statute, or (2) the statute is clearly intended to apply to FACTS: Brothers Vicente and Ronie Elisan were drinking tuba at the kitchenette of one of the accused, Fontamilla. When they were about to leave, they were warned by Luz Venus that the six (6) accused consisting of Mayor Cawaling, four (4) policemen and a civilian, had been watching and waiting for them outside the restaurant. Nevertheless, the two went out and were chased by the armed men. Vicente successfully ran and hid behind a coconut tree while Ronie unfortunately went to the ricefield and was shot to death there.

An Information alleging murder was filed in the RTC against the 6 accused. RTC convicted them of murder. On appeal, the

appellants questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC over the case, insisting that the Sandiganbayan was the tribunal with jurisdiction since the accused were public officers at the time of the killing.

ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan had

jurisdiction

NO. The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. Once the court acquires jurisdiction, it may not be ousted from the case by any subsequent events, such as a new legislation placing such proceedings under the jurisdiction of another tribunal. Exceptions to this rule arise when: (1) there is an express provision in the statute, or (2) the statute is clearly intended to apply to actions pending before its enactment.

Section 4-a-2 of PD 1606, as amended by PD 1861 lists two requisites that must concur before the Sandiganbayan may exercise exclusive and original jurisdiction over a case: (a) the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office; and (b) the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or higher than a fine of P6,000.

Sanchez vs. Demetriou clarified that

murder or homicide may be committed both by public officers and by private citizens, and that public office is not a constitutive element of said crime. The relation between the crime and the office contemplated should be direct and not accidental.

The Information filed against the appellants contains no allegation that appellants were public officers who committed the crime in relation to their office. The charge was only for murder.

In the absence of any allegation that the offense was committed in relation to the office of appellants or was necessarily connected with the discharge of their functions, the regional trial court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.

REGULAR COURTS (MTC, RTC, CA, SC) (See San Beda Reviewer)

SPECIAL COURTS (Sandiganbayan) (See San Beda Reviewer)

QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES

Securities and Exchange Commission (Sec. 5.2, RA 8799)

 Pending cases involving intra-corporate disputes submitted for final resolution which should be resolved within one (1) year from the enactment of this Code, and

 Jurisdiction over pending suspension of payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June 2000 until finally disposed. Civil Service Commission

MAGPALE v. CSC (215 SCRA 398, 1992) Under Section 47 of the Administrative Code, the CSC shall decide on appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of “… (d) removal or dismissal from office.”

The MPSB decision did not involve dismissal or separation from office, rather, the decision exonerated petitioner and ordered him reinstated to his former position. The MSPB decision was not a proper subject of appeal to the CSC.

FACTS: Magpale, port manager of Philippine Ports Authority-Port Management Unit (PPA-PMU) of Tacloban, was found by the Secretary of DOTC guilty of Gross Negligence on two counts: (a) for his failure to account for the 44 units of equipment and (b) for failing to render the required liquidation of his cash advances amounting to P44,877.00 for a period of 4 yrs. He was also found guilty of frequent and unauthorized absences. He was meted the penalty of dismissal from the service with the corresponding accessory penalties.

He appealed to the Merit System and Protection Board (MSPB) of the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The MSPB reversed the decision.

PPA filed an appeal with the Civil Service Field Office-PPA, which indorsed the appeal to CSC. Magpale moved for the implementation of the MSPB decision which was opposed by the PPA. MSPB ordered the immediate implementation of its decision, which became final and executory.

Respondent CSC reversed MPSB’s decision and held Magpale guilty.

ISSUE: Whether the law authorized an appeal

by the government from an adverse decision of the MSBP

NO. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, decisions of the MPSB shall be final, except only “those involving dismissal or separation from the service which may be appealed to the Commission”

While it is true that the CSC does have the power to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, the exercise of the power is qualified by and should be read together with Sec. 49 of Executive Order 292, which prescribes, among others that “(a) the decision must be appealable.”

Under Section 47 of the Administrative Code, the CSC shall decide on appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of:

(a) a penalty of suspension for more than 30 days;

(b) fine in an amount exceeding 30 days salary;

(c) demotion in rank or salary or transfer; or

(d) removal or dismissal from office.

The MPSB decision did not involve dismissal or separation from office, rather, the decision exonerated petitioner and ordered him reinstated to his former position. The MSPB decision was not a proper subject of appeal to the CSC.

Settled is the rule that a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions acts without jurisdiction if no authority has been conferred by law to hear and decide the case.

Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)

SANDOVAL v. CAÑEBA (190 SCRA 77, 1991)

It is not the ordinary courts but the National Housing Authority (NHA) which has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of (a) unsound real estate business practices; (b) claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and (c) cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, FACTS: Estate Developers and Investors Corporation (Estate) filed a complaint against Nestor Sandoval (Sandoval) in the RTC for the collection of unpaid installments of a subdivision lot, pursuant to a promissory note, plus interest. Sandoval alleges that he suspended payments thereof because of the failure of the developer to develop the subdivision pursuant to their agreement. The RTC ruled in favor of Estate, and ordered

Sandoval to pay. A writ of execution was issued which thereafter became final and executory.

Sandoval filed a motion to vacate judgment and to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. A motion for reconsideration of the writ of execution was also filed by petitioner. Estate opposed both motions. RTC denied the motion to vacate for the reason that it is now beyond the jurisdiction of the court to do so. A new writ of execution was issued.

Sandoval filed a petition alleging that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion since the exclusive and original jurisdiction over the subject-matter thereof is vested with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) pursuant to PD 957.

ISSUE: Whether the ordinary courts have

jurisdiction over the collection of unpaid installments regarding a subdivision lot

NO. Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 957 the National Housing Authority (NHA) was given the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide certain cases of the following nature:

(a) Unsound real estate business practices:

(b) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and

(c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. The exclusive jurisdiction over the case between the petitioner and private respondent is vested not on the RTC but on the NHA. The NHA was re-named Human Settlements Regulatory Commission and thereafter it was re-named as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

KINDS OF ACTION

1. As to cause or foundation

The distinction between a real action and a personal action is important for the purpose of determining the venue of the action.

(a) Personal

Personal actions are those other than real actions. (Sec. 2, Rule 4)

Examples

 Action for specific performance

 Action for damages to real property  Action for declaration of the nullity of

marriage

 Action to compel mortgagee to accept payment of the mortgage debt and release the mortgage

(b) Real

An action is real when it affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. (Sec. 1, Rule 4)

To be a real action, it is not enough that it deals with real property. It is important that the matter in litigation must also involve any of the following issues:

(a) Title; (b) Ownership; (c) Possession; (d) Partition;

(e) Foreclosure of mortgage; or (f) Any interest in real property

Examples

 Action to recover possession of real property plus damages (damages is merely incidental)

 Action to annul or rescind a sale of real property

2. As to object

The distinctions are important

(a) to determine whether the jurisdiction of the defendant is required, and (b) to determine the type of summons to

be employed (a) In rem

An action is in rem when it is directed against the whole world. It is for the determination of the state or condition of a thing.

Examples

 Probate proceeding  Cadastral proceeding (b) In personam

A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person.

Its purpose is to impose some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. In an action in

personam, no one other than the defendant is

sought to be held liable.

Examples

 Action for damages (c) Quasi in rem

An action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property.

Such action deals with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property, but which are intended to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings, and not to ascertain or cut-off the rights or interests of all possible claimants.

NOTE: These rules are inapplicable in the following cases: (1) Election cases; (2) Land registration; (3) Cadastral; (4) Naturalization; (5) Insolvency proceedings;

(6) Other cases not herein provided for,

except by analogy or in a suppletory

character, and whenever practicable and convenient.

(Sec. 4, Rule 1)

COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION (Sec. 5, Rule 1)

A civil action is commenced

 by the filing of the original complaint in court, or

 on the date of the filing of the later pleading if an additional defendant is impleaded irrespective of whether the motion for its admission, if necessary, is denied by the court.

(with respect only to the defendant later impleaded)

1. Condition precedent

— matters which must be complied with before a cause of action arises.

 When a claim is subject to a condition precedent, compliance must be alleged in the pleading.

 Failure to comply with a condition precedent is an independent ground

for a motion to dismiss. (Sec. 1 [j], Rule

16)

Examples:

 Tender of payment before consignation  Exhaustion of administrative remedies  Prior resort to barangay conciliation

proceedings

 Earnest efforts towards a compromise

 Arbitration proceedings, when contract so provides

Katarungang Pambarangay (RA 7160)

Purpose: To reduce the number of court

litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought by the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts.

 Only individuals shall be parties to KB proceedings, no juridical entities.  Parties must personally appear in all

KB proceedings and without assistance of counsel or representatives, except for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next-of-kin, not lawyers.

 Conciliation proceedings required is

not a jurisdictional requirement.

 NOTE: Failure to undergo the barangay conciliation proceedings is non-compliance of a condition precedent. Hence, a motion to dismiss a civil complaint may be filed. (Sec. 1 [j], Rule 16).

 BUT the court may not motu proprio dismiss the case for failure to undergo conciliation.

Initiation of proceedings

(1) Payment of appropriate filing fee (2) Oral or written complaint to the

Punong Barangay (chairman of the Lupon)

(3) Chairman shall summon respondents to appear the next working day

(4) Mediation proceedings for 15 days (5) Should the chairman fail in his

mediation efforts within said period, he shall constitute the Pangkat

Tagapagkasundo,

(6) If no amicable settlement is reached, the chairman shall issue a certification to file action.

All amicable settlements shall be (1) In writing;

(2) In a language or dialect known to the parties;

(3) Signed by them; and

(4) Attested to by the lupon chairman or the pangkat chairman, as the case may be.

Effect

The amiable settlement and arbitration award shall have the effect of a final judgment of a court upon expiration of 10 days from date thereof, unless:

(1) Repudiation of the settlement has been made, or

(2) Petition to nullify the award has been filed before the proper city or municipal ourt

Execution shall issue upon expiration of 10 days from settlement.

LUMBUAN v. RONQUILLO (489 SCRA 650, 2006)

While admittedly no pangkat was constituted, the parties met at the office of the Barangay Chairman for possible settlement. The act of Lumbuan in raising the matter to the Katarungang

Pambarangay and the subsequent confrontation of the lessee and lessor before the Lupon Chairman or the pangkat is sufficient compliance with the precondition for filing the case in court. FACTS: Lumbuan (lessor) leased a lot to respondent Ronquillo (lessee) for 3 years at a rental of P5000/month. They agreed that: (a) there will be an annual 10% increase in rent for the next 2 years; and (b) the leased premises shall be used only for lessee’s fastfood business. Ronquillo failed to abide by the conditions, and refused to pay or vacate the leased premises despite Lumbuan’s repeated verbal demands.

Lumbuan referred the matter to the Barangay Chairman’s Office but no amicable settlement was reached. The barangay chairman issued a Certificate to File Action. Lumbuan filed an action for Unlawful Detainer with MeTC of Manila which ordered respondent Ronquillo to vacate the leased premises and to pay P46,000 as unpaid rentals.

RTC set aside the MeTC decision and directed the parties to go back to the Lupon Chairman or Punong Barangay for further proceedings and to comply strictly with the condition that should the parties fail to reach an amicable settlement, the entire case will be remanded to the MeTC for it to decide the case anew.

The CA reversed the RTC and ordered the dismissal of the ejectment case, ruling that when a complaint is prematurely instituted, as when the mandatory mediation and conciliation in the barangay level had not been complied with, the court should dismiss the case and not just remand the records to the court of origin so that the parties may go through the prerequisite proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether the CA properly dismissed

complaint for failure of the parties to comply with the mandatory mediation and conciliation proceedings in the barangay level

NO. It should be noted that although no pangkat was formed since no amicable settlement was reached by the parties before the Katarungang Pambarangay, there was substantial compliance with Section 412(a) of R.A. 7160.

While admittedly no pangkat was constituted, the parties met at the office of the Barangay Chairman for possible settlement. Thereby, the act of petitioner Lumbuan in raising the matter to the Katarungang Pambarangay and the subsequent confrontation of the lessee and lessor before the Lupon Chairman or the pangkat is sufficient compliance with the precondition for filing the case in court. This is true notwithstanding the mandate of Section 410(b) of the same law that the Barangay Chairman shall constitute a pangkat if he fails in his mediation efforts. Section 410(b) should be construed together with Section 412, as well as the circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to the case. On this score, it is significant that the Barangay Chairman or Punong Barangay is herself the Chairman of the Lupon under the Local Government Code.

2. Payment of filing fee

Payment of the prescribed docket fee vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. The court acquires jurisdiction upon payment of the correct docket fees.

 All complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings must specify the amount of damages being prayed for, both in the body of the pleadings and in the assessment of the filing fees.  Manchester v. CA: Any defect in the

original pleading resulting in underpayment of the docket fee

cannot be cured by amendment, and

for all legal purposes, the court acquired no jurisdiction in such case.  BUT nonpayment of filing fees does

not automatically cause the dismissal

of the case. The fee may be paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

HEIRS OF BERTULDO HINOG v. MELICOR (455 SCRA 460, 2005)

Non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment. Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester

rule does not apply.

FACTS: Respondents filed a complaint against Bertuldo for recovery of ownership of the premises leased by the latter. Bertuldo alleged ownership of the property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale. Bertuldo died without completing his evidence during the direct examination. Atty. Petalcorin replaced the original counsel and filed a motion to expunge the complaint from the record and nullify all court proceedings on the ground that private respondents failed to specify in the complaint the amount of damages claimed as needed to pay the correct docket fees, and that under Manchester doctrine, non-payment of the correct docket fee is jurisdictional. ISSUE: Whether the nonpayment of the correct

docket fee is jurisdictional in the present case

NO. While the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment. Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply.

SUN INSURANCE OFFICE v. ASUNCION (170 SCRA 274, 1989)

Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the pleading and payment of prescribed filing fees but the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for the court’s determination, the additional filing fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien FACTS

Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) filed a complaint against Uy for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity. Uy was declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period. Uy filed a complaint in the RTC for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment initially against petitioner SIOL, but thereafter included Philipps and Warby as additional defendants. The complaint sought the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs of the suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint to be about P50,000,000.

Uy paid only P210.00 as docket fee, which prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his objection for under-assessment of docket fees.

Petitioners allege that while Uy had paid P182,824.90 as docket fee, and considering that the total amount sought in the amended and supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70, the docket fee that should be paid by private respondent is P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the same, petitioners contend that the complaint should be dismissed and all incidents arising therefrom should be annulled.

ISSUE: Whether or not a court acquires

jurisdiction over case when the correct and proper docket fee has not yet been paid

YES. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Where the trial court

acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefore shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefore is paid.

CAUSE OF ACTION (RULE 2) Cause of Action

A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the rights of another. (Sec. 2, Rule 2)

Every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action. (Sec. 1, Rule 2) Elements:

(1) A legal right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) A correlative obligation on the part of

the named defendant to respect or to not violate such right; and

(3) Act or omission on the part of defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff, or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. Distinguished from right of action

Cause of action is the reason for bringing an action, the formal statement of operative facts giving rise to a remedial right, and is governed by procedural law. A right of action is the remedy for bringing an action and is solely dependent on substantive law.

Right of action, elements

(1) There must be a good cause;

(2) A compliance with all the conditions precedent to the bringing of the action;

and

(3) The action must be instituted by the proper party.

Splitting a cause of action

Splitting of cause of action is the act of dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into several parts or claims and bringing several actions thereon.

 A party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. (Sec. 3, Rule 2)

 If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. (Sec. 4, Rule 2)

 Applies also to counterclaims and cross-claims.

Examples

Single cause of action (Cannot be filed separately)

 A suit for the recovery of land and a separate suit to recover the fruits  Action to recover damages to person

and action for damages to same person’s car

 Action for recovery of taxes and action to demand surcharges resulting from delinquency in payment of said taxes  Action to collect debt and to foreclose

mortgage

 Action for partition and action for the recovery of compensation on the improvements

 Action for annulment of sale and action to recover dividends

Distinct causes of action (separate filing allowed)

 Action for reconveyance of title over property and action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer

 Action for damages to a car in a vehicular accident, and another action for damages for injuries to a passenger other than the owner of the car

 Action to collect loan and action for rescission of mortgage

 Action based on breach of contract of carriage and action based on quasi-delict

JOSEPH v. BAUTISTA (170 SCRA 540, 1989)

Where there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated belonging to one person. Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted from several wrongful acts, only one cause of action arises.

FACTS: Joseph, petitioner, boarded Perez’s cargo truck with a load of livestock. At the highway, the truck driver overtook a tricycle but hit a mango tree when a pick-up truck tried to overtake him at the same time. This resulted to the bone fracture of the petitioner’s leg.

Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Perez, as owner, based on a breach of contract of carriage, and against Sioson and Villanueva, the owner and driver of the pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict. Petitioner impleaded Pagarigan and Vargas, since he could not ascertain who the real owners of the pick-up truck and the cargo truck were. Perez filed a cross-claim against the other respondents for indemnity, in the event that she is ordered to pay.

The other respondents paid petitioner's claim for injuries, so they were released from liability. They also paid Perez for her claim of damages. They thereafter filed a Motion to Exonerate and Exclude themselves since they’ve already paid Joseph by way of amicable settlement and Perez’s claim for damages. Perez filed an Opposition to the motion since the release of claim executed by petitioner in favor of the other respondents allegedly inured to his benefit. RTC dismissed the case.

ISSUE: Whether the judgment on the

compromise agreement under the cause of action based on quasi-delict is a bar to the cause of action for breach of contract of carriage

YES. A single act or omission can be violative of various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes a juridical a violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations. However, where there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated belonging to one person. Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted from several wrongful acts, only one cause of action arises.

There is no question that petitioner sustained a single injury on his person, which vested in him a single cause of action, albeit with the correlative rights of action against the different respondents through the appropriate remedies allowed by law. Only one cause of action was involved although the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against the defendants therein were not necessarily identical since the respondents were not identically circumstanced.

DEL ROSARIO v. FEBTC (537 SCRA 571, 2007)

It is well established, however, that a party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, or by pleading justifiable circumstances as herein petitioners are doing, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated.

FACTS: PDCP extended a P4.4 million loan to DATICOR, which that DATICOR shall pay: a service fee of 1% per annum (later increased 6% per annum) on the outstanding balance; 12% per annum interest; and penalty charges 2% per month in case of default. The loans were secured by real estate mortgages over six (6) parcels of land and chattel mortgages over machinery and equipment.

DATICOR paid a total of P3 million to PDCP, which the latter applied to interest, service fees and penalty charges. This left them with an outstanding balance of P10 million according to PDCP’s computation.

DATICOR filed a complaint against PDCP for violation of the Usury Law and annulment of contract and damages. The CFI dismissed the complaint. The IAC set aside the dismissal and declared void and of no effect the stipulation of interest in the loan agreement. PDCP appealed the IAC's decision to SC.

In the interim, PDCP assigned a portion of its receivables from DATICOR to FEBTC for of P5.4 M. FEBTC and DATICOR, in a MOA, agreed to P 6.4 million as full settlement of the receivables.

SC affirmed in toto the decision of the IAC, nullifying the stipulation of interests.

DATICOR thus filed a Complaint for sum of money against PDCP and FEBTC to recover the excess payment which they computed to be P5.3 million. RTC ordered PDCP to pay petitioners P4.035 million, to bear interest at 12% per annum until fully paid; to release or cancel the mortgages and to return the corresponding titles to petitioners; and to pay the costs of the suit.

RTC dismissed the complaint against FEBTC for lack of cause of action since the MOA between petitioners and FEBTC was not subject to SC decision, FEBTC not being a party thereto.

Petitioners and PDCP appealed to the CA, which held that petitioners' outstanding obligation (determined to be only P1.4 million) could not be increased or decreased by any act

of the creditor PDCP, and held that when PDCP assigned its receivables, the amount payable to it by DATICOR was the same amount payable to assignee FEBTC, irrespective of any stipulation that PDCP and FEBTC might have provided in the Deed of Assignment, DATICOR not having been a party thereto, hence, not bound by its terms.

By the principle of solutio indebiti, the CA held that FEBTC was bound to refund DATICOR the excess payment of P5 million it received; and that FEBTC could recover from PDCP the P4.035 million for the overpayment for the assigned receivables. But since DATICOR claimed in its complaint only of P965,000 from FEBTC, the latter was ordered to pay them only that amount.

Petitioners filed before the RTC another Complaint against FEBTC to recover the balance of the excess payment of P4.335 million.

The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint on the ground of res judicata and splitting of cause of action. It recalled that petitioners had filed an action to recover the alleged overpayment both from PDCP and FEBTC and that the CA Decision, ordering PDCP to release and cancel the mortgages and FEBTC to pay P965,000 with interest became final and executory.

ISSUE: Whether FEBTC can be held liable for

the balance of the overpayment of P4.335 million plus interest which petitioners previously claimed against PDCP in a previously decided case

NO. A cause of action is the delict or the wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. In the two cases, petitioners imputed to FEBTC the same alleged wrongful act of mistakenly receiving and refusing to return an amount in excess of what was due it in violation of their right to a refund. The same facts and evidence presented in the first case were the very same facts and evidence that petitioners presented in the second case.

A party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, or by pleading justifiable circumstances as herein petitioners are doing, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated.

SC held that to allow the re-litigation of an issue that was finally settled as between petitioners and FEBTC in the prior case is to allow the splitting of a cause of action, a ground for dismissal under Section 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.

This rule proscribes a party from dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into several parts or claims and instituting two or more actions based on it. Because the plaintiff cannot divide the grounds for recovery, he is mandated to set forth in his first action every ground for relief which he claims to exist and upon which he relies; he cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in successive actions to recover for the same wrong or injury.

Both the rules on res judicata and splitting of causes of action are based on the salutary public policy against unnecessary multiplicity of suits—interest reipublicae ut sit

finis litium. Re-litigation of matters already

settled by a court's final judgment merely burdens the courts and the taxpayers, creates uneasiness and confusion, and wastes valuable time and energy that could be devoted to worthier cases.

PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. CA (301 SCRA 367, 1991)

When a single delict or wrong is committed — like the unlawful taking or detention of the property of another — there is but one single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated, and all such rights should be alleged in a single complaint as constituting one single cause of action. In a forcible entry case, the real issue is the physical possession of the real property. The question of damages is merely secondary or incidental, so much so that the amount thereof does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. In other words, the unlawful act of a deforciant in taking possession of a piece of land by means of force and intimidation against the rights of the party actually in possession thereof is a delict or wrong, or a cause of action that gives rise to two (2) remedies, namely, the recovery of possession and recovery of damages arising from the loss of possession, but only to one action. For obvious reasons, both remedies cannot be the subject of two (2) separate and independent actions, one for recovery of possession only, and the FACTS: PDC leased to Westin a parcel of land with a commercial building for 9 years and 3 months, with a monthly rental of approximately P600,000. Westin failed to pay rentals despite several demands. The arrearages amounted to P8,6M. PDC repossessed the leased premises, inventoried

the movable properties found within and owned by Westin, and scheduled a public auction for the sale of the movables, with notice to Westin.

Westin filed a forcible entry case with the MeTC against PDC for with damages and a prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. A TRO enjoined PDC from selling Westin's properties.

At the continuation of the hearing, the parties agreed, among others, that Westin would deposit with the PCIB (Bank) P8M to guarantee payment of its back rentals. Westin did not comply with its undertaking, and instead, with the forcible entry case still pending, Westin instituted another action for damages against PDC with the RTC.

The forcible entry case had as its cause of action the alleged unlawful entry by PDC into the leased premises out of which three (3) reliefs arose: (a) the restoration by PDC of possession of the leased premises to the lessee; (b) the claim for actual damages due to losses suffered by Westin; and, (c) the claim for attorney’s fees and cost of suit.

On the other hand, the complaint for damages prays for a monetary award consisting of moral and exemplary damages; actual damages and compensatory damages representing unrealized profits; and, attorney's fees and costs, all based on the alleged forcible takeover of the leased premises by PDC.

PDC filed a motion to dismiss the damage suit on the ground of litis pendencia and forum shopping. The RTC, instead of ruling on the motion, archived the case pending the outcome of the forcible entry case.

Westin filed with the RTC an amended complaint for damages, which was granted. It also filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a TRO and Motion for the Grant of a Preliminary Prohibitory and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, which were all granted. PDC’s motion to dismiss was denied.

Thus, PDC filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition. But the CA dismissed the petition. It clarified that since the damages prayed for in the amended complaint with the RTC were those caused by the alleged high-handed manner with which PDC reacquired possession of the leased premises and the sale of Westin's movables found therein, the RTC and not the MeTC had jurisdiction over the action of damages.

ISSUE: Whether Westin may institute a

separate suit for damages with the RTC after having instituted an action for forcible entry with damages with the MeTC

NO. Sec. 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that all cases for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed before the MTC which shall include not only the plea for restoration of possession but also all claims for damages and costs arising therefrom. Otherwise expressed, no claim for damages arising out of forcible entry or unlawful detainer may be filed separately and independently of the claim for restoration of possession.

Under Sec. 3 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. Under Sec. 4 of the same Rule, if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the other or others.

Westin's cause of action in the forcible entry case and in the suit for damages is the alleged illegal retaking of possession of the leased premises by PDC from which all legal reliefs arise. Simply stated, the restoration of possession and demand for actual damages in the case before the MeTC and the demand for damages with the RTC both arise from the same cause of action, i.e., the forcible entry by PDC into the least premises. The other claims for moral and exemplary damages cannot succeed considering that these sprung from the main incident being heard before the MeTC. Jurisprudence says that when a single delict or wrong is committed — like the unlawful taking or detention of the property of the another — there is but one single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated, and all such rights should be alleged in a single complaint as constituting one single cause of action. In a forcible entry case, the real issue is the physical possession of the real property. The question of damages is merely secondary or incidental, so much so that the amount thereof does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. In other words, the unlawful act of a deforciant in taking possession of a piece of land by means of force and intimidation against the rights of the party actually in possession thereof is a delict or wrong, or a cause of action that gives rise to two (2) remedies, namely, the recovery of possession and recovery of damages arising from the loss of possession, but only to one action. For obvious reasons, both remedies cannot be the subject of two (2) separate and independent actions, one for recovery of possession only, and the other, for the recovery of damages. That would inevitably lead to what is termed in law as splitting up a cause of action.

What then is the effect of the dismissal of the other action? Since the rule is that all such rights should be alleged in a single complaint, it goes without saying that those not therein included cannot be the subject of subsequent complaints for they are barred forever. If a suit is brought for a part of a claim, a judgment obtained in that action precludes the plaintiff from bringing a second action for the residue of the claim, notwithstanding that the second form of action is not identical with the first or different grounds for relief are set for the second suit. This principle not only embraces what was actually determined, but also extends to every matter which the parties might have litigated in the case. This is why the legal basis upon which Westin anchored its second claim for damages, i.e., Art. 1659 in relation to Art. 1654 of the Civil Code, not otherwise raised and cited by Westin in the forcible entry case, cannot be used as justification for the second suit for damages.

CGR CORP. V. TREYES (522 SCRA 765, 2007)

Petitioners’ filing of an independent action for damages grounded on the alleged destruction of CGR’s property, other than those sustained as a result of dispossession in the Forcible Entry case could not be considered as splitting of a cause of action. FACTS: CGR Corporation, Herman Benedicto and Alberto Benedicto, petitioners, claim to have occupied 37 ha. of public land in Negros Occidental, pursuant to a lease agreement granted to them by the Secretary of Agriculture for a period of 25 years (to last October 2000 to December 2024). On November 2000, however, respondent Treyes allegedly forcibly and unlawfully entered the leased premises and barricaded the entrance to the fishponds of the petitioners. Treyes and his men also harvested tons of milkfish and fingerlings from the petitioners’ ponds.

Petitioners then filed a complaint for

Forcible Entry with the MTC. Another complaint to claim for damages was also filed by the

petitioners against the same respondent Treyes grounded on the allegations that Treyes and his men also destroyed and ransacked the Chapel built by petitioner CGR Corporation and decapitated the heads of the religious figures. ISSUE: Whether during the pendency of a

separate complaint for Forcible Entry, the petitioner can independently institute and maintain an action for damages which they

claim arose from incidents occurring after the forcible entry of Treyes and his men

YES. The only recoverable damages in the forcible entry and detainer cases instituted first by the petitioners with the MTC are the “rents” or fair rental value of the property from the time of dispossession by the respondent. Hence, other damages being claimed by the petitioners must be claimed in another ordinary civil action.

It is noteworthy that the second action instituted by the petitioners (complaint for damages) have NO direct relation to their loss of possession of the leased premises – which is the main issue in the first action they instituted. The second action for claim of damages had to do with the harvesting and carting away of milkfish and other marine products, as well as the ransacking of the chapel built by CGR Corp. Clearly, the institution of the two cases is not a splitting of a cause of action, since both are concerned with entirely different issues.

ENRIQUEZ v. RAMOS (7 SCRA 265, 1963)

An examination of the first complaint filed against appellant in CFI showed that it was based on appellants' having unlawfully stopped payment of the check for P2,500.00 she had issued in favor of appellees; while the complaint in the second and present action was for non-payment of the balance of P96,000.00 guaranteed by the mortgage. The claim for P2,500.00 was, therefore, a distinct debt not covered by the security. The two causes of action being different, section 4 of Rule 2 does not apply.

FACTS: Rodrigo Enriquez and the Dizon spouses sold to Socorro Ramos 11 parcels of land for P101,000. Ramos paid P5,000 downpayment, P2,500 in cash, and with a P2,500.00 check drawn against PNB, and agreed to satisfy the balance of P96,000.00 within 90 days. To secure the said balance, Ramos, in the same deed of sale, mortgaged the 11 parcels in favor of the vendors. Ramos mortgaged a lot on Malinta Estate as additional security, as attorney-in-fact of her four children and as judicial guardian of her minor child.

Ramos failed to comply with the conditions of the mortgage, so an action for foreclosure was filed by the vendors-mortgagees. Ramos moved to dismiss, alleging that the plaintiffs previously had filed action against her in the CFI of Manila for the recovery of P2,500.00 paid by check as part of

the down payment on the price of the mortgaged lands; that at the time this first suit was filed, the mortgage debt was already accrued and demandable; that plaintiffs were guilty of splitting a single cause of action, and under section 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, the filing of the first action for P2,500.00 was a defense that could be pleaded in abatement of the second suit.

CFI of Quezon City denied the motion to dismiss. Defendant Ramos re-pleaded the averments as a special defense in her answer. The CFI ruled against defendant Ramos; ordered her to pay P96,000.00, with 12% interest, attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit; and further decreed the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties in case of non-payment within 90 days. Ramos appealed directly to SC,

ISSUE: Whether there was splitting of cause of

action

NO, there is no splitting of cause of action in this case. An examination of the first complaint filed against appellant in CFI showed that it was based on appellants' having unlawfully stopped payment of the check for P2,500.00 she had issued in favor of appellees, while the complaint in the second and present action was for non-payment of the balance of P96,000.00 guaranteed by the mortgage. The claim for P2,500.00 was, therefore, a distinct debt not covered by the security. The two causes of action being different, section 4 of Rule 2 does not apply.

Remedy against splitting a single cause of action

(a) Motion to dismiss (Sec 1 [e] or [f], Rule

16)—

Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:

xxx

(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;

(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations

xxx

(b) Answer alleging affirmative defense

(Sec. 6, Rule 16)—

If no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this Rule may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in

the answer and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.

NOTE: As to which action should be dismissed (the first or second one) would depend upon judicial discretion and the prevailing circumstances of the case.

Joinder of causes of action

Joinder of causes of action is the assertion of

as many causes of action as a party may have against another in one pleading. It is the process of uniting two or more demands or rights of action in one action.

 This is merely permissive, NOT compulsory, because of the use of the word “may” in Sec. 5, Rule 2.

It is subject to the following conditions:

(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;

i. The right to relief should arise out of the same transaction or series of transaction, and ii. There exists a common

question of law or fact. (Sec. 6, Rule 3)

(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;

 Example: An action for claim of

money cannot be joined with an action for ejectment, or with an action for foreclosure. (c) Where the causes of action are

between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the RTC provided

i. one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court, and

ii. the venue lies therein; and (d) Where the claims in all the causes of

action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. (Sec. 5, Rule 2)

Misjoinder of causes of action

Misjoinder of causes of action is NOT a ground for dismissal of an action. A misjoined cause of action may be severed and proceeded with separately: