POLITICAL LAW - Case Digests

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

POLICE POWER

POLICE POWER; THE STATE UNDER ITS POLICE POWER, MAY ALTER,

MODIFY OR AMEND MINING EXPLORATION PERMITS IN ACCORDANCE

WITH THE DEMANDS OF THE GENERAL WELFARE.

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLDMINING CORP. vs. BALITE PORTAL

MINING COOP., et al.

[G.R. No. 135190, April 3, 2002]

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:

FACTS:

On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper) was granted Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which included the Diwalwal area.

On June 27, 2991, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7076, or the People's Small-Scale Mining Act. The law established a People's Small-Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented by the Secretary of the DENR and created the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) under the DENR Secretary's direct supervision and control.

Subsequently, a petition for the cancellation of EP No. 133 and the admission of a Mineral Production Sharing Arrangement (MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was filed before the DENR Regional Executive Director, docketed as RED Mines Case.

On February 16, 1994, while the RED Mines case was pending, Marcopper assigned its EP No. 133 to petitioner Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), which in turn applied for an integrated MPSA over the land covered by the permit.

In due time, the Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office No. XI in Davao City (MGB-XI) accepted and registered the integrated MPSA application of petitioner and thereafter, several MAC cases were filed.

On March 3, 1995, Republic Act No. 7942, the Philippine Mining Act, was enacted. Pursuant to this statute, the MAC cases were referred to a Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA) tasked to resolve disputes involving conflicting mining rights. The RPA subsequently took cognizance of the RED Mines case, which was consolidated with the MAC cases.

On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-03 which provided that the DENR shall study thoroughly and exhaustively the option of direct state utilization of the mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area.

On July 16, 1997, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Court of Appeals against PMRB-Davao, the DENR Secretary and Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative (BCPMC). It prayed for the nullification of the above-quoted Memorandum Order No. 97-03 on the ground that the "direct state utilization" espoused therein would effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133; and that the memorandum order arbitrarily imposed the unwarranted condition that certain studies be conducted before mining and environmental laws are enforced by the DENR.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the "direct state utilization scheme" espoused in MO 97-03 divested petitioner of its vested right to the gold rush area under its EP No. 133.

HELD:

NO. MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt "direct state utilization" as a policy in

resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed thereunder was merely a study of this option and nothing else. Contrary to petitioner's contention, it did not grant any management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners or to any party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned to undertake studies to determine its feasibility.

As to the alleged "vested rights" claimed by petitioner, it is well to note that the same is invariably based on EP No. 133, whose validity is still being disputed in the Consolidated Mines cases. A reading of the appealed MAB decision reveals that the continued efficacy of EP No. 133

is one of the issues raised in said cases, with respondents therein asserting that Marcopper cannot legally assign the permit which purportedly had expired. In other words, whether or not petitioner actually has a vested right over Diwalwal under EP No. 133 is still an indefinite and unsettled matter. And until a positive pronouncement is made by the appellate court in the Consolidated Mines cases, EP No. 133 cannot be deemed as a source of any conclusive rights that can be impaired by the issuance of MO 97-03.

It must likewise be pointed out that under no circumstances may petitioner's rights under EP No. 133 be regarded as total and absolute. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals EP No. 133 merely evidences a privilege granted by the State, which may be amended, modified or rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is necessarily so since the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural mineral resources are matters impressed with great public interest. Like timber permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in the grantee any permanent or irrevocable right within the purview of the non-impairment of contract and due process clauses of the Constitution, since the State, under its all-encompassing police power, may alter, modify or amend the same, in accordance with the demands of the general welfare.

Additionally, there can be no valid opposition raised against a mere study of an alternative which the State, through the DENR, is authorized to undertake in the first place. Worth noting is Article XII, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution and Section 4, Chapter II of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.

Thus, the State may pursue the constitutional policy of full control and supervision of the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural mineral resources, by either directly undertaking the same or by entering into agreements with qualified entities. The DENR Secretary acted within his authority when he ordered a study of the first option, which may be undertaken consistently in accordance with the constitutional policy enunciated above. Obviously, the State may not be precluded from considering a direct takeover of the mines, if it is the only plausible remedy in sight to the gnawing complexities generated by the gold rush.

EMINENT DOMAIN

EMINENT DOMAIN; JUST COMPENSATION IS DETERMINED AT THE DATE

OF THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT EXCEPT WHEN THE COURT FIXES

THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY AT THE DATE IT WAS TAKEN

CITY OF CEBU vs. SPOUSES APOLONIO and BLASA DEDAMO

[G.R. No. 142971, May 7, 2002]

DAVIDE, JR., C .J:

FACTS:

On 17 September 1993, petitioner City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. The petitioner alleged therein that it needed the land for a public purpose, i.e., for the construction of a public road which shall serve as an access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu City. The lower court fixed the amount of just compensation at P20,826,339.50.

Petitioner alleged that the lower court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation at P20,826,339.50. The just compensation should be based on the prevailing market price of the property at the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.

The petitioner did not convince the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court’s decision in toto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.

HELD:

NO. In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of reckoning for the

determination of just compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual taking.

The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power Corp. vs. Court of Appeals. We did not categorically rule in that case that just compensation should be determined as of the

filing of the complaint. We explicitly stated therein that although the general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings."

BILL OF RIGHTS

DUE PROCESS

DUE PROCESS; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS NOT PART OF THE DUE

PROCESS GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION

BENEDICTO and RIVERA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

[G.R. No. 125359, September 4, 2001]

QUISUMBING, J:

FACTS:

On December 27, 1991, Mrs. Imelda Marcos and Messrs. Benedicto and Rivera were indicted for violation of Section 10 of Circular No. 960 1 in relation to Section 34 of the Central Bank Act (Republic Act No. 265, as amended) in five Informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, the charge sheets alleged that the trio failed to submit reports of their foreign exchange earnings from abroad and/or failed to register with the Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank within the period mandated by Circular No. 960. Said Circular prohibited natural and juridical persons from maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad without prior authorization from the Central Bank.

On August 11, 1994, petitioners moved to quash all the Informations filed against them in Criminal Cases Nos. 101879 to 101883; 101884 to 101892, and 101959 to 91-101969. Their motion was grounded on lack of jurisdiction, forum shopping, absence of a preliminary investigation and extinction of criminal liability with the repeal of Circular No. 960.

On September 6, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners' motion. A similar motion filed on May 23, 1994 by Mrs. Marcos seeking to dismiss the dollar-salting cases against her due to the repeal of Circular No. 960 had earlier been denied by the trial court in its order dated June 9, 1994. Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration, but the trial court likewise denied this motion on October 18, 1994.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the Motion to Quash for absence of a valid preliminary investigation.

(2) Whether or not the repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Republic Act No. 265 by Circular No. 1353 and Republic Act No. 7653 respectively, extinguish the criminal liability of petitioners.

HELD:

(1) NO. Preliminary investigation is not part of the due process guaranteed by the

Constitution. It is an inquiry to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof. Instead, the right to a preliminary investigation is personal. It is afforded to the accused by statute, and can be waived, either expressly or by implication.

When the records of the case were disclosed to them, in opting to enter their respective pleas to the charges, and filed various motions and pleadings, they are deemed to have made an express waiver of their right to have a preliminary investigation.

(2) NO. In the instant case, it must be noted that despite the repeal of Circular No. 960,

Circular No. 1353 retained the same reportorial requirement for residents receiving earnings or profits from non-trade foreign exchange transactions. Even the most cursory glance at the repealing circulars, Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 shows that both contain a saving clause, expressly providing that the repeal of Circular No. 960 shall have no effect on pending actions for

violation of the latter Circular. A saving clause operates to except from the effect of the repealing law what would otherwise be lost under the new law. In the present case, the respective saving clauses of Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 clearly manifest the intent to reserve the right of the State to prosecute and punish offenses for violations of the repealed Circular No. 960, where the cases are either pending or under investigation.

DUE PROCESS; THE RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS A

COMPONENT PART OF DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE.

SALES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

[G.R. No. 143802, November 16, 2001]

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:

FACTS:

Petitioner, the incumbent town mayor of Pagudpud, Ilocos Norte, fatally shot the former mayor and his political rival, Atty. Rafael Benemerito, in an alleged shootout after a heated altercation between them. After the shooting incident, petitioner surrendered and placed himself under the custody of the municipal police. The next day, a criminal complaint for Murder against petitioner was filed. Municipal Judge Calvan then conducted a preliminary investigation as under the old rules, with two stages: (1) the determination of whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof, so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial; and (2) the preliminary investigation proper where the complaint or information is read to the accused after his arrest and he is informed of the substance of the evidence adduced against him, after which he is allowed to present evidence in his favor if he so desires.

Municipal Judge then forwarded the case records to the Provincial Prosecutor who, instead of conducting a preliminary investigation of his own, merely forwarded the said records to the Ombudsman for the latter to conduct the same. The Ombudsman then directed the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit, which the latter found superfluous as he previously submitted such to the Provincial Prosecutor. An Information for Murder was filed against petitioner.

This Court is tasked to resolve the issue of whether or not the proper procedure was followed and whether petitioner's constitutional rights were safeguarded during the preliminary investigation conducted before the filing of an Information for Murder against him and the issuance of a warrant for his arrest by respondent Sandiganbayan. Petitioner asserts that the Information was hastily filed and the warrant for his arrest was improper because of an incomplete preliminary investigation. Respondents say otherwise.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the preliminary investigation conducted by the municipal judge was proper. (2) Whether or not the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman was proper.

HELD:

(1) NO. Presidential Decree 911 (further amending Sec. 1, R.A. 5180, as amended by P.D.

77) upon which the present rule is based, removed the preliminary examination stage and integrated it into the preliminary investigation proper. Now the proceedings consists of only one stage.

Respondent Judge did not conduct the requisite investigation prior to issuance of the arrest warrant. The Rules require an examination in writing under oath in the form of searching questions and answers. The statements of witnesses were not sworn before him but before the Provincial Prosecutor. The purported transcript of stenographic notes do not bear the signature of the stenographer.

Moreover, he did not complete the preliminary investigation. He claimed to have examined only the witnesses of the complainant. He issued a Resolution and forwarded the records to the Provincial Prosecutor without giving the accused (petitioner) an opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and supporting documents. While it is true that the usual remedy to an irregular preliminary investigation is to ask for a new preliminary investigation, such normal remedy would not be adequate to free petitioner from the warrant of arrest which stemmed from that irregular investigation. The Provincial Prosecution has no power to recall the warrant of arrest.

(2) NO. As this Court pointed out in Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, "the purpose of a preliminary

investigation or a previous inquiry of some kind, before an accused person is placed on trial, is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution and to protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial. It is also intended to protect the state from having to conduct useless and expensive trials. While the right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. To deny the accused's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process."

Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair. The officer conducting the same investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the crime with the end in view of determining whether or not an information may be prepared against the accused. Indeed, preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of law to order an acquittal. A preliminary investigation has been called a judicial inquiry. It is a judicial proceeding. An act becomes a judicial proceeding when there is an opportunity to be heard and for the production of and weighing of evidence, and a decision is rendered thereon.

The authority of a prosecutor or investigating officer duly empowered to preside or to conduct a preliminary investigation is no less than a municipal judge or even a regional trial court judge. While the investigating officer, strictly speaking, is not a "judge" by the nature of his functions, he is and must be considered to be a quasi-judicial officer because a preliminary investigation is considered a judicial proceeding. A preliminary investigation should therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material damage.

Indeed, since a preliminary investigation is designed to screen cases for trial, only evidence may be considered. While even raw information may justify the initiation of an investigation, the stage of preliminary investigation can be held only after sufficient evidence has been gathered and evaluated warranting the eventual prosecution of the case in court. In other words, it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the State. More important, it is a part of the guarantee of freedom and fair play which are the birthrights of all who live in our country. It is therefore imperative upon the fiscal or the judge, as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason.

Measured vis-a-vis the foregoing legal yardsticks, we hold that the proper procedure in the conduct of the preliminary investigation was not followed, for the following reasons: First, the records show that the supposed preliminary investigation was conducted in installments by at least three (3) different investigating officers, none of whom completed the preliminary investigation. There was not one continuous proceeding but rather a case of passing the buck, so to speak, the last one being the Ombudsman hurriedly throwing the buck to the Sandiganbayan. Second, the charge against herein petitioner is Murder, a non-bailable offense. The gravity of the offense alone, not to mention the fact that the principal accused is an incumbent mayor whose imprisonment during the pendency of the case would deprive his constituents of their duly-elected municipal executive, should have merited a deeper; and more thorough preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman, however, did nothing of the sort and instead swallowed hook, line and sinker the resolution and recommendation of Graft Investigation Officer. Third, it was patent error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied purely on the Ombudsman's certification of probable cause given the prevailing facts of this case much more so in the face of the latter's flawed report and one-sided factual findings. In the order of procedure for criminal cases, the task of determining probable cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is a responsibility which is exclusively reserved by the Constitution to judges. People v.

Inting clearly delineated the features of this constitutional mandate, viz: 1.] The determination of

ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this determination; 2.] The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assists him in making the determination of probable cause. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes, if any, and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the judge in his determination of probable cause; and 3.] Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. Even if the two inquiries be made in one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about their objectives. The determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper — whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial — is the function of the prosecutor. Stated differently, while the task of conducting a preliminary investigation is assigned either to an inferior court magistrate or to a prosecutor, only a judge may issue a warrant of arrest. When the preliminary investigation is conducted by an investigating prosecutor, in this case the Ombudsman, the determination of probable cause by the investigating prosecutor cannot serve as the sole basis for the issuance by the court of a warrant of arrest. This is because the court with whom the information is filed is tasked to make its own independent determination of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Indeed the Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution which requires probable cause to be personally determined by the judge, not by any other officer or person.

DUE PROCESS; THE FACT THAT THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED BY THE

CSC ITSELF DOES NOT MEAN THAT IT COULD NOT BE AN IMPARTIAL

JUDGE.

CRUZ and PAITIM vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

[G.R. No. 144464, November 22, 2001]

KAPUNAN, J:

FACTS:

On September 9, 1994 it was discovered by the Civil Service Commission that Paitim, Municipal Treasurer of Bulacan took the non-professional examination for Cruz after the latter had previously failed in the said examination three times.

The CSC found after a fact finding investigation that a prima facie case exists against you for DISHONESTY, GRAVE MISCONDUCT and CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE.

The petitioners filed their Answer to the charge entering a general denial of the material averments of the "Formal Charge." They also declared that they were electing a formal investigation on the matter. The petitioners subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that if the investigation will continue, they will be deprived of their right to due process because the Civil Service Commission was the complainant, the Prosecutor and the Judge, all at the same time. On November 16, 1995, Dulce J. Cochon issued an "Investigation Report and Recommendation" finding the Petitioners guilty of "Dishonesty" and ordering their dismissal from the government service

Petitioners maintain that the CSC did not have original jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative case. Allegedly, in accordance with Section 47(1), Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title 1, Book V, Administrative Code of 1987, the CSC is vested with appellate jurisdiction only in all administrative cases where the penalty imposed is removal or dismissal from the office and where the complaint was filed by a private citizen against the government employee.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners’ right to due process was violated when the CSC acted as investigator, complainant, prosecutor and jugde all at the same time.

HELD:

NO. The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself does not mean that it could

not be an impartial judge. As an administrative body, its decision was based on substantial findings. Factual findings of administrative bodies, being considered experts in their field, are

binding on the Supreme Court. The records clearly disclose that the petitioners were duly investigated by the CSC.

After a careful examination of the records, the Commission finds respondents guilty as charged. The photograph pasted over the name Gilda Cruz in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP) during the July 30, 1989 Career Service Examination is not that of Cruz but of Paitim. Also, the signature over the name of Gilda Cruz in the said document is totally different from the signature of Gilda Cruz.

Petitioners' contention that they were denied due process of law by the fact that the CSC acted as investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge, all at the same time against the petitioners is untenable. The CA correctly explained that the CSC is mandated to hear and decide administrative case instituted by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal including actions of its officers and the agencies attached to it pursuant to Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12, paragraph 11 of the Administrative Code of 1987.

It can not be denied that the petitioners were formally charged after a finding that a prima facie case for dishonesty lies against them. They were properly informed of the charges. They submitted an Answer and were given the opportunity to defend themselves. Petitioners can not, therefore, claim that there was a denial of due process much less the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the CSC to take cognizance of the case.

DUE PROCESS; DUE PROCESS OF LAW REQUIRES THAT EVERY

LITIGANT MUST BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.

MANUEL C. ROXAS, et al. vs. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, et al.

[G.R. No. 114944, May 29, 2002]

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:

FACTS:

Petitioner Roxas was the Chairman, while Nacpil was a Member, of the Bids and Awards Committee of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (INP). The PC-INP invited bids for the supply of sixty-five units of fire trucks. The Bids and Awards Committee voted to award the contract to the Tahei Co., Ltd., manufacturer of Nikko-Hino. Accordingly, the contract was executed between PC-INP and Tahei Co.

The COA subsequently discovered that there was a discrepancy in the amounts indicated on the disbursement voucher and the purchase order.

Consequently, the DILG Secretary filed a complaint with the Ombudsman against the respondents.

After preliminary investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military recommended the indictment of all respondents, except Ramirez. On review, the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the complaints against Roxas, Nacpil, Codoy, Kairan and Ramirez. Formal charges were filed with the Sandiganbayan against Nazareno, Flores, Tanchanco, Custodio, Osia, Espeña and Santos. Petitioners were not included in the criminal information.

Flores and Tanchanco moved for a reinvestigation, which was granted. Thereafter, the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges against Flores and Tanchanco. In the same resolution, however, the Special Prosecutor made a sudden turnabout as regards Roxas, Nacpil and Kairan, and ordered their inclusion as accused.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the inclusion of the petitioners as accused violated their right to due process.

HELD:

YES. It appears that the charge against respondents was previously dismissed. For

this reason, there being no motion or reconsideration filed by the complainant, said respondents ceased to be parties. Consequently, the mere filing of motions for reconsideration by those previously indicted, without questioning the dismissal of the charge against the said respondents, could not and should not be made the basis for impleading them as accused in this case without violating their right to due process.

Furthermore, it appears that petitioners were deprived of due process when the Special Prosecutor reinstated the complaint against them without their knowledge. Due process of law requires that every litigant must be given an opportunity to be heard. He has the right to be present and defend himself in person at every stage of the proceedings.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; PROBABLE CAUSE REQUIRES THAT FACTS

AND CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANT A BELIEF THAT THE ACCUSED IS

GUILTY OF THE CRIME JUST COMMITTED.

SALES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

[G.R. No. 143802, November 16, 2001]

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:

FACTS:

see page 22

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan was properly issued.

HELD:

NO. What the Sandiganbayan should have done, faced with such a slew of conflicting

evidence from the contending parties, was to take careful note of the contradictions in the testimonies of the complainant's witnesses as well as the improbabilities in the prosecution evidence. Certainly probable cause may not be established simply by showing that a trial judge subjectively believes that he has good grounds for his action. Good faith is not enough. If subjective good faith alone were the test, the constitutional protection would be demeaned and the people would be "secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects" only in the fallible discretion of the judge. On the contrary, the probable cause test is an objective one, for in order that there be probable cause the facts and circumstances must be such as would warrant a belief by a reasonably discreet and prudent man that the accused is guilty of the crime which has just been committed. This, as we said is the standard.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; “PERSONAL DETERMINATION” MERELY

EMPHASIZES THE EXCLUSIVE AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE

ISSUING JUDGE TO SATISFY HIMSELF OF THE EXISTENCE OF

PROBALBE CAUSE.

ATTY. EDGAR H. TALINGDAN vs. JUDGE HENEDINO P. EDUARTE

[A.M. No. RTJ-01-1610, October 5, 2001]

BELLOSILLO, J:

FACTS:

Complainant alleged that sometime in April 2000 elements of the PNP stormed into his residence to arrest him and his client, Luzano, on the strength of a Warrant of Arrest dated 12 April 2000 issued by respondent Judge Eduarte in Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1373 of the RTC-Br. 20, Cauayan, Isabela for the supposed crime of libel. Surprised that such a case existed against him and his client as they had not been previously charged, complainant filed a Very Urgent Motion to Quash and/or Set Aside Warrant of Arrest and Direct Prosecutor's Office to Conduct Preliminary Investigation dated 5 May 2000 asking that the Warrant of Arrest be set aside for being premature since they had not been previously notified of the charge against them and no preliminary investigation was ever conducted by the public prosecutor's office yet, and for being defective since the amount of bail was not specified therein in violation of their constitutional right to bail. Respondent Judge granted the motion and recalled the warrant of arrest in an Order dated 12 May 2000 admitting that he issued the same under the mistaken belief that a preliminary investigation had already been conducted and an information already filed in court. Complainant nonetheless filed this administrative case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the judge failed to follow the required procedure and was negligent in the issuance of the warrant of arrest.

HELD:

YES

.

Enshrined in our Constitution is the rule that "[n]o . . . warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing . . . the persons . . . to be seized." Interpreting the words "personal determination" we said that it does not thereby mean that judges are obliged to conduct the personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses themselves. To require thIs would be to unduly laden them with preliminary examinations and investigations of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before them. Rather what is emphasized merely is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself as to the existence of probable cause. To this end he may: (a) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, disregard the prosecutor's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence. What he is never allowed to do is follow blindly the prosecutor's bare certification as to the existence of probable cause. Much more is required by the constitutional provision. Judges have to go over the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes if any, and other documents supporting the prosecutor's certification.

In the case at bench respondent Judge not only failed to follow the required procedure but worse, was negligent enough not to have noticed that there was not even a prosecutor's certification to rely upon since no information had even been filed yet in court, and that Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1373 was merely docketed as such on the strength of a mere complaint filed by the private complainant Leoncio Dalin Sr. himself. Respondent Judge admitted that he signed the Warrant of Arrest against complainant and the latter's client simply because it was presented to him for signature by the Criminal Docket Clerk. There was thus a total and unwarranted abdication of a judicial function. Respondent cannot exculpate himself from administrative liability by contending that the mistake was entirely attributable to the Criminal Docket Clerk who failed to faithfully comply with her "duty" of going over the records of criminal cases and ensuring first that an information had already been filed in court before preparing the warrant of arrest. A judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification of the investigating officer as to the existence of probable cause making him administratively liable.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; ISSUANCE OF A WARRANT OF ARREST IS

DISCRETIONARY UPON THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE.

CRUZ and MONEDERO vs. JUDGE AREOLA

[A.M. No. RTJ-01-1642, March 6, 2002]

PUNO, J:

FACTS:

On November 26, 1998, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Estafa against Marilyn Carreon, an employee of the Land Transportation Office, based on the complaint filed by herein complainants. The Office of the City Prosecutor found no cogent reason to reverse, modify, or alter the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman and recommended that the case be set for trial.

Complainants filed the instant complaint charging both respondent Judge and his Branch Clerk of Court with ignorance of the law. Complainants take issue of the fact that although respondent Judge already issued a warrant of arrest, he still deferred its implementation to give way to a reinvestigation of the case on motion of the accused. They believe that there is no longer any reason why the respondent Judge should withhold the issuance of a warrant of arrest considering that the Office of the City Prosecutor already made a finding that there exists probable cause to indict the accused.

In their Joint Comment, respondent Judge manifests that the issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ministerial function of a judge as he is mandated to determine the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant. Respondent Branch Clerk of Court, on the other hand, claims that it is a ministerial duty on her part to release duly signed orders, resolutions and decisions of the presiding judge of her branch.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Judge erred in deferring the implementations of the warrant of arrest.

HELD:

NO. The 1987 Constitution provides that no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon

probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.

Preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution’s job. The second kind of preliminary investigation is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge.

In making the required personal determination, a judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the judge’s sound discretion.

It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the investigating judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused, even after having personally examined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. For the determination of whether a probable cause exists and whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion.

It appears from the records that the challenged Orders issued by the respondent Judge were not at all baseless. The respondent Judge merely exercised his sound discretion in not immediately issuing the warrant of arrest and in suspending further proceedings pending reinvestigation of the case. On her part, respondent Branch Clerk of Court cannot be faulted for performing a ministerial function, that is, releasing Orders duly signed by the respondent Judge.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION DOES

NOT REQUIRE PRECISE AND MINUTE DETAILS.

YOUSEF AL-GHOUL, et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

[G.R. No. 126859, September 4, 2001]

QUISUMBING, J:

FACTS:

Presiding judge of the RTC of Kalookan City, issued search warrants for the search and seizure of certain items in Apartment No. 2 at 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City. The police searched Apartment No. 8, in the same compound and found one (1) . 45 caliber pistol. Found in Apartment No. 2 were 2 M-16 rifles with 2 magazines and 20 live M-16 ammunitions, among others.

Petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court informations accusing them with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thereafter, petitioners were arrested and detained.

At the hearing for bail, the RTC denied petitioners' motion for bail earlier filed for the accused are being charged of two criminal offenses and both offenses under Presidential Decree 1866, Sections 1 and 3 thereof prescribe the penalty of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum period to Reclusion Perpetua. Under Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended by Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-94, particularly Section 7 thereof, no person charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

Petitioners contend that the search and seizure orders violated Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of Rights as well as Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure because the place searched and articles seized were not described with particularity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that the search and seizure orders in question were valid and the objects seized admissible in evidence.

HELD:

As held in PICOP v. Asuncion, the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged nor amplified by the police. Policemen may not be restrained from pursuing their task with vigor, but in doing so, care must be taken that constitutional and legal safeguards are not disregarded. Exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional

injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, we are constrained to declare that the search made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .45 caliber pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence against petitioners. Now, in contrast, the search conducted at Apartment No. 2 could not be similarly faulted. The search warrants in question specifically mentioned Apartment No. 2. The search was done in the presence of its occupants, herein petitioners, in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioners allege lack of particularity in the description of objects to be seized pursuant to the warrants. That the articles seized during the search of Apartment No. 2 are of the same kind and nature as those items enumerated in the search warrant appears to be beyond cavil. The items seized from Apartment No. 2 were described with specifity in the warrants in question. The nature of the items ordered to be seized did not require a technical description. Moreover, the law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities, otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a search warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Substantial similarity of those articles described as a class or species would suffice.

The case of Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823, 835 (1971), pointed out that one of the tests to determine the particularity in the description of objects to be seized under a search warrant is when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. A careful examination of the Search Warrants shows that they were worded in such a manner that the enumerated items to be seized could bear a direct relation to the offense of violation of Section 1 and 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, penalizing illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives. What the warrants authorized was the seizure of articles proscribed by that decree, and no other.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

WHEN VALID.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PO2 ALBERT ABRIOL

[G.R. NO. 123137, October 17, 2001]

QUISUMBING, J:

FACTS:

Appellants PO2 Albert Abriol of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Macario Astellero, Januario Dosdos, and PNP P/Chief Inspector Gaudioso Navales were charged with and convicted, of murder for having shot one Alejandro Flores, and of Illegal Possession of Firearms for the handguns that they were armed with. On appeal, one of their contentions against their conviction for murder is that the PNP cannot be presumed to have done their work regularly due to the errors and blunders they committed in transferring the possession and custody of the physical evidence and in having failed to issue acknowledgment receipts thereof. They further contend, as against their conviction for Illegal Possession of Firearms, that the handguns and ammunition taken from them by the police officers were illegally seized in the absence of a warrant.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the handguns and ammunitions used in the killing were illegally seized from appellants in the absence of a warrant.

HELD:

NO. There are eight (8) instances where a warrantless search and seizure is valid.

They are: (1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws; (4) searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in "plain view;" (7) searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building regulations; and (8) "stop and frisk" operations.

In this case, the warrantless search and seizure of the subject handguns and ammunition is valid for two reasons. It was a search incidental to a lawful arrest. It was made after a fatal shooting, and pursuit of a fast-moving vehicle seeking to elude pursuing police officers, and a more than reasonable belief on the part of the police officers that the fleeing suspects aboard said vehicle had just engaged in criminal activity. The urgent need of the police to take immediate action in the light of the foregoing exigencies clearly satisfies the requirements for warrantless arrests under the Rules of Court. Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with firearms and

ammunition which they were not authorized to carry, appellants were actually violating P.D. No. 1866, another ground for valid arrest under the Rules.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; THERE MUST BE A PRIOR JUSTIFICATION

FOR AN INTRUSION IN APPLYING THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE; SEIZURE

OF EVIDENCE DURING A VALID ARREST.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CUBCUBIN

[G.R. No. 136267, July 10, 2001]

MENDOZA, J:

FACTS:

At about 3:30 in the morning of August 26, 1997, Sgt. Rogel, desk officer of the Cavite City police station, received a telephone call that a person had been shot near the cemetery along Julian Felipe Boulevard in San Antonio, Cavite City. For this reason, a police team, composed of SPO1 Malinao, Jr., PO3 Rosal, PO3 Estoy, Jr., PO3 Manicio, and SPO3 Manalo, responded to the call and found Henry P. Piamonte slumped dead on his tricycle which was then parked on the road

A tricycle driver, who refused to divulge his name, told him them accused-appellant and the victim were last seen together coming out of the Sting Cafe, located in San Antonio near the gate of Sangley Point, Cavite City, about a kilometer and a half away from the crime scene.

Armando Plata, another tricycle driver, told Rosal and Malinao, Jr. that Garcellano's description fitted a person known as alias "Jun Dulce” and led the policemen where accused-appellant lived.

Upon arriving the police asked permission if they could enter the house. After entering they found a bloodied shirt and two spent .38 caliber shells. Accused appellant was then asked to return to the cafe for identification. He was positively identified by the waitress to be the person with whom the victim drank with. The police then went back to his house and there found a .38 paltik pistol.

An information for murder was then filed against accused-appellant. The trial court found him guilty and sentenced him with the capital punishment.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the arrest of the accused appellant was valid. (2) Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure.

HELD:

(1) NO. On the first issue, the arrest of accused-appellant was effected shortly after the

victim was killed. The question, therefore, is whether there was "probable cause" for PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr., the arresting officers, to believe that accused-appellant committed the crime. We hold that there was none. The two did not have "personal knowledge of facts" indicating that accused-appellant had committed the crime. Their knowledge of the circumstances from which they allegedly inferred that accused-appellant was probably guilty was based entirely on what they had been told by others, to wit: by someone who called the PNP station in San Antonio, Cavite City at about 3:30 in the morning of August 26, 1997 and reported that a man had been killed along Julian Felipe Boulevard of the said city; by an alleged witness who saw accused-appellant and the victim coming out of the Sting Cafe; by Danet Garcellano, waitress at the Sting Cafe, who said that the man last seen with the victim was lean, mustachioed, dark-complexioned and was wearing a white t-shirt and a pair of brown short pants; by a tricycle driver named Armando Plata who told them that the physical description given by Garcellano fitted appellant, alias "Jun Dulce" and who said he knew where accused-appellant lived and accompanied them to accused-accused-appellant's house. Thus, PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. merely relied on information given to them by others.

(2) NO. On the second issue, accused-appellant contends that neither he nor his son gave

permission to the arresting police officers to search his house and, therefore, the "Hanes" t-shirt, the two spent slugs, and the .38 caliber revolver allegedly found in his house are inadmissible in evidence. The prosecution, on the other hand, insists that accused-appellant consented to the search of his house.

To be sure, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived expressly or impliedly. But a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There must be persuasive evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right. As in this cases, a mere failure on the part of the accused to object to a search cannot be construed as a waiver of this privilege.

Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the "plain view" doctrine. As this Court held in People v. Musa: The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.

What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification — whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused — and permits the warrantless seizure.

Finally, the prosecution says the search can be justified as incidental to a valid arrest. Even assuming the warrantless arrest to be valid, the search cannot be considered an incident thereto. A valid arrest allows only the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either in the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The rationale for such search and seizure is to prevent the person arrested either from destroying evidence or from using the weapon against his captor. It is clear that the warrantless search in this case cannot be justified on this ground. For neither the t-shirt nor the gun was within the area of accused-appellant's immediate control. In fact, according to the prosecution, the police found the gun only after going back to the house of accused-appellant.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO APPLY THE

PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMPACION

[G.R. No. 124442, July 20, 2001]

KAPUNAN, J:

FACTS:

Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police informant that accused-appellant was growing and cultivating marijuana plants, SPO1 Gilbert L. Linda and SPO2 Basilio Sarong of the 6th Narcotic Regional Field Unit of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of the Bacolod City Detachment conducted a surveillance of the residence of accused-appellant who was then the barangay captain of barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental on July 9, 1995. During the said surveillance, they saw two (2) tall plants in the backyard of the accused-appellant which they suspected to be marijuana plants.

Despite failing to obtain a warrant, the team proceeded to barangay Bagonbon and arrived at the residence of accused-appellant in the early morning of July 13, 1995. SPO4 Villamor knocked at the gate and called out for the accused-appellant. What happened thereafter is subject to conflicting accounts. The prosecution contends that the accused-appellant opened the gate and permitted them to come in. He was immediately asked by SPO4 Villamor about the suspected marijuana plants and he admitted that he planted and cultivated the same for the use of his wife who was suffering from migraine The operatives then uprooted the suspected marijuana plants.

Accused-appellant’s version of what transpired is that around one-thirty in the early morning of July 13, 1995 while he and his family were sleeping, he heard somebody knocking outside his house. He went down bringing with him a flashlight. After he opened the gate, four (4) persons who he thought were members of the military, entered the premises then went inside the house. It was dark so he could not count the others who entered the house as the same was lit only by a kerosene lamp. One of the four men told him to sit in the living room. Some of the men went upstairs while the others went around the house. None of them asked for his permission to search his house and the premises.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search and seizure performed at the backyard of the accused was valid.

HELD:

NO. In the instant case, the search and seizure conducted by the composite team in

the house of accused-appellant was not authorized by a search warrant. It does not appear either that the situation falls under any of he exceptions. Consequently, accused-appellant's right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated.

It is extant from the records that accused-appellant did not consent to the warrantless search and seizure conducted. While the right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure may, like every right, be waived either expressly or impliedly, such waiver must constitute a valid waiver made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The act of the accused-appellant in allowing the members of the military to enter his premises and his consequent silence during the unreasonable search and seizure could not be construed as voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to warrantless search and seizure especially so when members of the raiding team were intimidatingly numerous and heavily armed.

As a general rule, objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure without a warrant. It is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Thus, the following elements must be present before the doctrine may be applied: (a) a prior valid intention based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) "plain view" justified were seizure of evidence without further search.

Here, there was no valid warrantless arrest. They forced their way into accused-appellant's premises without the latter's consent. It is undisputed that the NARCOM agents conducted a surveillance of the residence of accused-appellant on July 9, 1995 on the suspicion that he was growing and cultivating marijuana when they allegedly came in "plain view" of the marijuana plants. When the agents entered his premises on July 13, 1995, their intention was to seize the evidence against him. In fact, they initially wanted to secure a search warrant but could not simply wait for one to be issued. The NARCOM agents, therefore, did not come across the marijuana plants inadvertently when they conducted a surveillance and barged into accused-appellant's residence.

RIGHT TO INFORMATION

RIGHT TO INFORMATION; COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL OF THE PLUNDER

CASES SHALL BE LIMITED TO AUDIOVISUAL RECORDING FOR

DOCUMENTARY PURPOSES.

RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE

SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER

PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

[A.M. No. 00-1-4-03-SC, September 13, 2001]

MENDOZA, J:

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners' request for permission to televise and broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The motion was filed by the Secretary of Justice, as one of the petitioners, who argues that there is really no conflict between the right of the people to public information and the freedom of the press, on the one hand, and, on the other, the right of the accused to a fair trial; that if there is a clash between these rights, it must be resolved in favor or of the right of the people and the press because the people, as the repository of sovereignty, are entitled to information; and that live media coverage is a safeguard against attempts by any party to use the courts as instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests.

On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his objection to the live TV and radio coverage of his trial on the ground that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that, based on his experience with the impeachment trial, live media coverage will only pave

the way for so-called "expert commentary" which can trigger massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the other. Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the people to information may be served through other means less distracting, degrading, and prejudicial than live TV and radio coverage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the cases of a former President pending before the Sandiganbayan can be covered by live television and radio broadcast without impairing the right of the accused to a just and fair trial.

HELD:

NO. The Court finds no reason to alter or in any way modify its decision prohibiting live

or real time broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the former president. In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court has resolved to order the audiovisual recording of the trial for documentary purposes.

Considering the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the importance of preserving the records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings. The recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for documentary purposes. Only later will they be available for public showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision in every case to which the recording pertains. The master film shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to law.

There are several reasons for such televised recording. First, the hearings are historic significance. They are an affirmation of our commitment to the rule that "the King is under no man, but he is under God and the law." (Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege). Second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our people who have a fundamental right to know how their government is conducted. This right can be enhanced by audio-visual presentation. Third, audio-visual presentation is essential for the education and civic training of the people.

They will be primarily for the use of appellate courts in the event a review of the proceedings, rulings, or decisions of the Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes necessary. The accuracy of the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial can be checked by reference to the tapes.

On the other hand, by delaying the release of the tapes for broadcast, concerns that those taking part in the proceedings will be playing to the cameras and will thus be distracted from the proper performance of their roles - whether as counsel, witnesses, court personnel, or judges - will be allayed. The possibility that parallel trials before the bar of justice and the bar of public opinion may jeopardize, or even prevent, the just determination of the cases can be minimized. The possibility that judgment will be rendered by the popular tribunal before the court of justice can render its own will be avoided.

At the same time, concerns about the regularity and fairness of the trial - which, it may be assumed, is the concern of those opposed to, as much as of those in favor of, televised trials - will be addressed since the tapes will not be released for public showing until after the decision of the cases by the Sandiganbayan. By delaying the release of the tapes, much of the problem posed by real time TV and radio broadcast will be avoided.

Thus, many important purposes for preserving the record of the trials can be served by audio-visual recordings without impairing the right of the accused to a fair trial. Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the production of such documentary. In Ayer Productions Pty.

Ltd. v. Capulong, this Court held: "A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been

regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a public character."

SEPARATE OPINION: VITUG, J:

In addressing the present motion for reconsideration, colleagues on the Court opine that there should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings for documentary purposes because, first, the hearings are of historic significance; second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our people who have a fundamental right to know how their government works; third, the audio-visual presentation is essential for education and civic training of the people; and fourth, such recording can be used by appellate courts in the event that the review of the proceedings, ruling, or decisions of the Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes necessary.

The proposition has novel features; regrettably, I still find it hard to believe that the presence of the cameras inside the courtroom will not have an untoward impact on the court proceedings. No empirical data has been shown to suggest otherwise. To the contrary, experience attests to the intimidating effect of cameras and electronic devices in courtrooms on the litigants, witnesses and jurors. In addition, the natural reticence of witnesses at the stand can even easily be exacerbated by placing them on camera in contravention of normal experience. The demeanor of the witnesses can also have an abstruse effect on the ability of the judge to accurately assess the credibility of such witnesses. The presence of cameras, for whatever reason, may not adequately address the dangers mentioned in the Court's decision of 29 June 2001. There are just too many imponderables.

Most importantly, it does not seem right to single out and make a spectacle of the cases against Mr. Estrada. Dignity is a precious part of personality innate in every human being, and there can be no cogent excuse for impinging it even to the slightest degree. It is not the problem of privacy that can cause concern more than the erosion of reality that cameras tend to cast.

RIGHTS UNDER THE MIRANDA DOCTRINE

MIRANDA DOCTRINE; THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL CANNOT BE CLAIMED

DURING INDENTIFICATION IN POLICE LINE-UP.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AMESTUZO, et al.

[G.R. No. 104383, July 12, 2001]

KAPUNAN, J:

FACTS:

On February 26, 1991, four days after a reported robbery with multiple rape, a group of policemen together with accused Federico Ampatin, who was then a suspect, went to the handicrafts factory in NIA Road, Pasay City where accused-appellant was working as a stay-in shell cutter. They were looking for a certain "Mario" and "searched the first and second floors of the building. Failing to find said Mario, the police hit Ampatin at the back of his neck with a gun and uttered, "Niloloko lang yata tayo ng taong ito" and "Magturo ka ng tao kahit sino." It was at this juncture that Ampatin pointed to accused-appellant Bagas as he was the first person Ampatin chanced to look upon.

Thereafter, Bagas was arrested and made to board the police vehicle together with accused Ampatin. They were brought to the Urduja Police Station in Kalookan City and placed under detention together with the other two accused, Amestuzo and Viñas.

When the complainants arrived, accused-appellant was brought out, instructed to turn to the left and then to the right and he was asked to talk. Complainant Lacsamana asked him if he knew accused Amestuzo and Viñas. Accused-appellant answered in the negative. The policemen told the complainants that accused-appellant was one of the suspects. This incited complainants to an emotional frenzy, kicking and hitting him. They only stopped when one of the policemen intervened.

Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court committed a serious error when it deprived him of his constitutional right to be represented by a lawyer during his investigation. His singular presentation to the complainants for identification without the benefit of counsel, accused-appellant avers, is a flagrant violation of the constitutional prerogative to be assisted by counsel to which he was entitled from the moment he was arrested by the police and placed on detention. He maintains that the identification was a critical stage of prosecution at which he was as much entitled to the aid of counsel as during the trial proper.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not appellant’s right to counsel was violated.

(2) Whether or not there was a valid out-of-court identification of appellant to the complainants.

HELD:

(1) NO. Herein accused-appellant could not yet invoke his right to counsel when he was

presented for Identification by the complainants because the same was not yet part of the investigation process. Moreover, there was no showing that during this identification by the