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The Dictators’ Dilemma: Repression or Concessions in the Face of The Dictators’ Dilemma: Repression or Concessions in the Face of Resistance

Resistance

Chris Massaro

The Graduate Center, City University of New York

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THE DICTATORS’ DILEMMA: REPRESSION OR CONCESSIONS IN THE FACE OF RESISTANCE

By

Christopher Massaro

A master’s thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty in the Political Science program in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, The City University of New

York

2018

© 2018

CHRISTOPHER MASSARO

All Rights Reserved

The Dictators’ Dilemma: Repression or Concessions in the Face of Resistance

By

Christopher Massaro

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in the Political Science program in satisfaction of the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Arts.

2/28/2018 George Andreopoulos

Thesis Adviser

2/28/2018 Alyson Cole

Executive Officer

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 1

Key Concepts and Definitions 3

Regime Options 8

Repression

Concessions and Accommodations 18

Military Calculations and Defections 21

Security Force Fragmentation 28

Social Movement Strength and Structure 30

Rational Choice, Strategic Imperatives, & International Relations 37

Research Method 41

Arab Spring 45

Syria 50

Kingdom of Jordan 65

Egypt 78

Bahrain 87

Conclusions and Takeaways 94

Bibliography 101

The Dictators’ Dilemma: Repression or Concessions in the Face of Resistance By

Christopher Massaro Adviser: George Andreopoulos

Abstract:

The Arab Spring revolts of late 2010 and 2011 were a profound moment in the history of a region troubled by decades of authoritarianism. Years of economic mismanagement and security force repression trammeled on the rights and aspirations of people striving for a better life. When social movements and anti-government protests erupted throughout the region, each country responded to the uprisings with different methodologies. This research closely examines why autocratic regimes of the region chose such divergent responses, with some opting to use violent repression, others attempting to make concessions and most combined repression with

concessions. I will make the argument that authoritarian regimes use a cost-benefit analysis based on the rational choice theory, of whether state-sponsored violence on peaceful protests will ensure the survival of the regime and the individual autocrat. In the event the regime chooses not to fire on protesters, there are a number of intervening variables considered in this process. I argue that sectarian divisions within the armed forces are a fundamental determining factor in the regimes willingness to use violence. If the armed forces identify with the ethnic or religious sect of the ruling regime, the military is more likely to remain loyal and fire on protesters. The financial incentives of the armed forces also determine military action. If the regime protects the economic interests of the armed forces, the institution is more likely to remain loyal than not. A patrimonially based military, structured along ethnic or sectarian ties to the ruling regime, will have more at stake and view an uprising as an existential threat, backing the regime and using repression. When armed forces are highly institutionalized, based on professionalism and

conscription that represents society at large, not the ruling elite, the military will be less likely to support violent repression. I will also argue that external support is another extremely important variable. External support can either facilitate or stifle the possibility of repression, depending on the nature of the relationship between the allied states, and the geostrategic objective in question.

Also important in the discussion is the strength and structure of the anti-government movement.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War rivalry between the Super Powers culminated in an unprecedented wave of peaceful anti-government protests and

democratic transfers of power to more accountable forms of government. This trend has continued into the 21

century and showcases the power of peaceful protest and a greater urge for democratization around the world. Most recently, waves of anti-government protests erupted throughout the Middle East and North Africa in 2011 resulting in what is now known as the Arab Spring. There has been a great deal of research and focus on these events and the structural causes of the revolutions and toppling of regimes. However, a fundamental aspect of these uprisings that gain little attention is the concept of political violence and the calculations that are involved in assessing the costs and benefits of using state-sanctioned violence to suppress peaceful uprisings. Therefore, an important empirical question for both scholars and

policymakers to answer is why some authoritarian regimes respond to mass mobilization with violence and others do not. There are several critical variables that authoritarian regimes calculate when they are faced with mass anti-government protests. When a crisis surfaces the authoritarian government’s ultimate goal is regime survival and it will use whatever methods necessary to ensure the endurance of the regime. I will make the argument that authoritarian regimes use a cost-benefit analysis based on the rational choice theory, of whether state-

sponsored violence on peaceful protests will ensure the survival of the regime and the individual

autocrat. The costs of using violence must not outweigh the benefits of other methods to quell

the uprising and remain in power. In the event the regime chooses not to fire on protesters, there

are a number of intervening variables considered in this process. I argue that sectarian divisions

within the armed forces are a fundamental determining factor in the regimes willingness to use

violence. If the armed forces identify with the ethnic or religious sect of the ruling regime, the

military is more likely to remain loyal and fire on protesters. The financial incentives of the armed forces also determine military action. If the regime protects the economic interests of the armed forces, the institution is more likely to remain loyal than not. A patrimonially based

military, structured along ethnic or sectarian ties to the ruling regime, will have more at stake and view an uprising as an existential threat, backing the regime and using repression. When armed forces are highly institutionalized, based on professionalism and conscription that represents society at large, not the ruling elite, the military will be less likely to support violent repression. I will also argue that external support is another extremely important variable. External support can either facilitate or stifle the possibility of repression, depending on the nature of the

relationship between the allied states, and the geostrategic objective in question. Also important in the discussion is the strength and structure of the anti-government movement.

The most profound cases of anti-government protests against authoritarian regimes took

place across the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region. While much of the post-Cold War

world has made tremendous strides in democratic transitions and consolidation the MENA

region seemed to be immune to the wave of democratization that spread across the globe. The

region was stuck in a malaise of authoritarianism that greatly reduced civil liberties and free

expression that is a necessary component of a democratic society. In addition to the suppression

of civil and political rights, economic stagnation and rising unemployment, especially in the

regions overwhelmingly youthful population, boiled to a critical juncture in late 2010 and early

2011. The region finally succumbed to the wave of protest and destabilization that had taken

place in other parts of the developing world and each incumbent regime employed different

tactics and methodologies to either avert further crises or to stifle it once and for all. The cases

being examined are Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Bahrain. Each state experienced mass social

mobilization in opposition to the regime in power and various policies were adopted to address the economic crises.

Before closely examining each case and what measures the incumbent governments took in response to protest movements, it is important to define and conceptualize key terms that will help us understand the nature of the problem and to outline the theoretical construct of the dynamics at play within authoritarian governments and the interaction with anti-government protest movements.

Key Concepts and Definitions

The study of regime type has become a focal point within political science and is

necessary to understand why certain regimes respond differently to challengers than others. Prior to the end of the Cold War, the study of regime type primarily focused on a binary and

dichotomous typology between democracy and non-democracy, or authoritarianism. Jennifer Gandhi conceptualizes regime type in the minimalist democracy-dictatorship dichotomy. Her parsimonious definition of dictatorship is a regime “in which rulers acquire power by means other than competitive elections” (Gandhi 7, 2008). This definition is too simplistic and does not include regimes who attain and remain in power through other mechanisms. In recent times, the debate surrounding regime type has been contested and the classic binary choice does not allow us to place a regime type neatly into the democracy or authoritarian category. It has become fashionable for authoritarian regimes to allow minimal levels of political opposition and conduct elections that are heavily managed and manipulated. This type of “hybrid” regime, as Larry Diamond suggests, includes trappings of democratic systems. Levitsky and Way conceptualize

“competitive authoritarian regimes” as a civilian regime “in which formal democratic institutions

exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents’

abuse of the state places them at a significant disadvantage vis-à-vis their opponents” (Levitsky, Way 5, 2001). These regimes understood the external costs of authoritarianism, leading elites to adopt certain aspects of democracy to placate the international system that was trending towards liberal democracy but, in reality, abusing institutions to preserve their power. In this

categorization of what we may also call “illiberal democracy,” the outcome of the election is all but certain.

Going back to Gandhi, her thesis is based on the premise that authoritarian leaders rely on institutions to stay in power. These institutions play “a central role in the construction,

policymaking, economic performance, and durability of authoritarian regimes” (Art 359, 2012).

The institutions of authoritarian regimes, most notably the armed forces are a crucial variable in the study of political violence and protest movements that will be elaborated on further in this research. For the purposes of this research project, I use Juan Linz’s definition of an authoritarian regime: “Political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones” (Linz 255, 1970).

Now it is important to define what we mean by “repression” based on the political

violence literature. Levels of political violence and repressive acts by the regime can be both

overt and covert. When discussing repression through the lens of social movements, Charles

Tilly defines repression as actions that increase the costs of protest (Tilly 1978). Davenport

provides a more specific definition of repression that includes “harassment, surveillance, spying,

bans, arrests, torture, and mass killing by government agents and/or affiliates within their

territorial jurisdiction…that violate First Amendment type rights, due process in the enforcement and adjudication of law, and personal integrity or security” (Davenport 2, 2007). Earl uses a broad definition of repression and defines it as “state or private action meant to prevent, control, or constrain non-institutional, collective action (protests) including its initiation” (Earl 263, 2011). If we disaggregate forms of repression into distinct categories, we can separate overt from covert forms of repressive tactics. Observable and overt coercion by a central government includes military based repression, security forces repression, and public protest policing.

Unobservable and covert actions by central governments include surveillance, enforced disappearances, and monitoring and infiltration of groups sponsored by the regime (Earl 265, 2011).

Sidney Tarrow’s definition of repression is limited to the “physical coercion of challengers” (Tarrow 170, 2011). The unit of analysis is the state and the violence it employs will be bodily harm and the physical integrity of an individual or groups of individuals. The violent state-sponsored repression I will focus on is repressive actions taken by the armed forces of the regime, specifically, firing on peaceful protesters in order to enforce compliance and shut down the threat posed by the demonstrations. This threat perception forces the authorities to act and quell dissent. As Earl states: “the more a movement or protest threatens authorities, the more likely it is to face repression” (Earl 266, 2011).

It is also important for us to analytically differentiate between military and security force repression because this distinction will help us understand why some regimes resorted to

violence and others refused. Any nation-state, not just an authoritarian regime, is concerned with

internal security and order. In order to ensure domestic tranquility, states establish some form of

a police or law enforcement agency to monitor the domestic population, while the military is

typically concerned with external aggression and adversaries. Lutterbeck conceptually refers to security forces as “usually applied to police forces which have a certain military characteristic and some degree of military capability even though strictly speaking they are not part of the armed forces” (Lutterbeck 47, 2004). Lutterbeck notes that many of the authoritarian Arab regimes created these parallel militarized internal security forces “whose primary task is to secure the regime in power against domestic threats, including challenges by the regular army”

(Lutterbeck 31, 2013). These forces tend to be highly ideological and indoctrinated by radical state ideology or have a level of emotional attachment to the regime and the leader. Internal security forces are less professionalized than the armed forces, meaning they do not operate in a system based on clearly drawn rules, and meritocratic principles. They function in a patronage oriented capacity with their loyalty benefits distributed by the leader (Lutterbeck 31, 2013). The sole function of internal security forces is to prevent the collapse of the leader and the regime.

According to Salih, Arab rulers understood the importance of the armed forces in building the nation-state after decolonization and independence and sensed the potential danger that the military could pose to their regime (Salih 190, 2013). Salih points to the regime in Tunisia where measures were taken to marginalize the military through economic and financial concessions while highly complex and sophisticated parallel security forces were established to protect the regime, not the state (Salih 190, 2013). Makara and Nassif discuss “coup-proofing”

methods of the regime, which the leader employs to impact the military’s ability to engage in a

coup. Such strategies involve balancing among the regime’s various coercive apparatuses,

offering different incentives while exploiting communal bonds (Makara, Nassif 359, 2013). A

strategy of marginalization of the military from political affairs is a propitious tactic to keep the

military in a peripheral position and prevent a hostile takeover of the government. Structural

coup-proofing creates obstacles for any one particular institution from plotting an overthrow of the regime. This strategy allows for a counterweight or balancing approach among the various coercive bodies that reflects a mutually suspicious atmosphere or divide-and-conquer

environment (Powell 175, 2014). The main divide here is the mandate of each institution and where their loyalty lies. The parallel structures created must be more loyal than the previous one which allows the dictator to reduce his reliance on the coercive institution that would carry out a coup, mainly the military (Folch, Rivero 8, 2016). The military is mainly responsible for

protecting the nation from external threats and invasions from foreign adversaries. And in most cases, internal security forces and intelligence agencies, generally under the rubric of an interior ministry, is responsible for internal stability and security and would be the agency committed to using repression to stifle dissent from mass uprisings. However, this can vary from each regime depending on many causal factors which will be elaborated on and will prove to be extremely relevant when we analyze why certain armies refused to shoot at protesters even though the internal security forces were willing to use violent repression.

Finally, we must define the contentious politics of anti-government protests. As Tilly astutely puts it, anti-government demonstrations represent a “repertoire of contention” within dissident behavior, and Eckstein describes it as “alternative channels” of political participation.

These varying strategies or repertoires of dissent present degrees of threats to the regime and

must be addressed accordingly. Motivations for anti-government protests are diverse and include

a range of grievances from economic and policy reforms, corruption charges, human rights

concerns and other issues as well. Brancati’s contribution to the discourse is important for the

disaggregation of protest movements that erupted across the Middle East and North Africa

during the Arab Spring revolts. These protest movements were diffuse and encompassed a wide

variety of actors with multiple preferences that were ignited by deleterious economic conditions and included the desire for democratic reforms that have escaped the region for decades.

Now that we have conceptualized key terms and definitions we must examine the theoretical construct behind the repressive calculations of an authoritarian regime. I will first analyze how the authoritarian regime views the protest movement and the determinations and choices the regime has at its disposal to combat the threat. The level of threat, or threat

perception, is a profound variable in this equation. Also important in this model is the dynamics of the protest movements and how the government interacts with the threat. What other options does the regime have that would mitigate the threat and ensure regime survival? If violent repression is viewed as too costly, what other measures can be taken? What is the military’s role in regime calculations and how does it impact authoritarian endurance and movement success?

How does the military differ from the security and police force and does each institution have its own separate and distinct interest at stake? Once we have a greater understanding of the

literature and prior research on the costs and benefits of state repression, we can utilize this background to analyze the Arab Spring movements and gain a greater understanding of how authoritarian regimes function while providing lessons for future research on how we study authoritarian survival.

Regime Options:

Repression

When an authoritarian regime faces threats to its rule and survival there are a number of

different options that the regime can take in order to quell the dissent and reestablish stability and

the rule of law under regime guidelines. As previously mentioned, one of these options is violent

repression. Repression, being physical sanctions against individuals or organizations for the purposes of imposing costs and deterring continued or future collective action against the state and its institutions. When I refer to physical sanctions in this context, I mean specifically regime authorized military engagement against the protesters with the clear objective of suppressing dissident activities.

Governmental behavior in these instances can be viewed in a rationalist perspective under the auspices of rational choice theory. The rational choice paradigm is a prominent decision- making theory within the political economy and international relations subfields and provides insights into actor preferences and the choices made that would lead to optimal outcomes under certain conditions. The argument rests on the assumption that individuals, in this case, regime leaders, are rational actors and carefully calculate the costs and benefits of repressive behavior.

Rational choice is predicated on the assumption of the leader’s rational egoism under certain circumstances. “In each case, the political sphere is seen to bear distinct similarities to the working of a competitive market. All share the assumption that exogenous forces do not

constrain rational actors from pursuing their own self-interests” (Crane, Amawi, 22, 1997). From this perspective, the regime, being a rational actor, will pursue its self-interests as a consumer does in the marketplace to achieve an optimal outcome.

Game theory and more specifically the iterated prisoner’s dilemma are useful analytical tools for analyzing cooperative and non-cooperative situations in the social sciences. Axelrod outlines the benefits of mutual cooperation through the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game.

Mutual cooperation can be achieved despite great antagonism and mutual restraint is preferred

over mutual defection or punishment. With a sustained interaction over time, the stable outcome

could be mutual cooperation based on reciprocity. Once again, a cost-benefit analysis must be

employed and a Pareto-optimal outcome, or “outcomes from which no actor could become better off without worsening the pay-offs to another actor” (Aggarwal, Dupont, 56, 2014) are

ultimately desired for both the regime and the armed forces. In the classical rationalist paradigm,

“political leaders carefully weigh the costs and benefits of coercive action…when benefits exceed costs, alternatives are not viewed favorably, and there is a high probability of success, repressive action is anticipated. When costs exceed benefits, alternatives exist, and the

probability of success is low, no repression is expected” (Davenport, Inman 621, 2012). But how can we assume that actor preferences are rational and that the consequences of repressive

strategies are fully understood? Analysts cannot assume that the primary players involved have complete information to base their decisions. The concept of bounded rationality can help explain these information asymmetries and why a regime might choose one method of

movement control over another. Faber outlines how bounded rationality impacts a government’s decision to deal with both internal and external threats. Faber notes and confirms my overall contention that the primary objective of the autocrat is to survive and remain in power, and in that pursuit, the leader will have to make choices on how best to remain in power. However, decisions made by the government or the autocrat are hampered by “incomplete and inaccurate information and limited mental information-storage and information-processing capabilities”

(Faber 309, 1990). Selten notes that “human capabilities of computation and cogitation impose

cognitive limits on rationality” (Selten 641, 1990). The decision emergence view, which is

related to boundedly rational decision-making, empathizes that rationality has little influence

over behavior (Selten 641, 1990). The impact of emotions such as fear or anger also limits

deliberative decision making. The author notes these types of emotions can shift the focus of the

individual on a narrow set of activities related to temporary goals and fears and “thereby control

the direction of thinking and imagination” (Selten 641, 1990). This is a reality that a leader under threat from a mass uprising or an armed opposition must face and that fear or desperation could prompt the leader to choose repressive measures that backfire and further escalate tensions. The decision-maker will choose an option that seeks to minimize losses and preserve the status quo.

As a result, when their survival is under threat from an uprising, the government will adopt a risk-taking posture in the decision-making process and which ultimately will result in repression.

Hodgson identifies a “doing one’s best” notion of rationality that often fails to identify their situations or how they define what the best outcome is. Hodgson further explains that “the problem with this ‘doing one’s best’ notion of rationality is that it lacks the necessary

explanatory detail concerning agent cognition and goal-formation” (Hodgson 95, 2012). The regime or the central figure leading the regime may perceive a certain tactic or strategy to be in his best interest in order to ensure his own survival, but that limited ability to fully comprehend other options and outcomes could lead to choosing a strategy that would seal their ultimate demise. Hodgson refines his idea of the “doing one’s best” notion and claims it is better described as “following incentives or adapting to circumstances” (Hodgson 95, 2012). The expected payoff utility, where a payoff is “a reward in a game that has an explicitly expected worth that is known to the analysts of the game and to all its players” (Hodgson 95, 2012) is generally accepted within mainstream economics and consumer behavior, but it assumes the regime and its challengers are aware of what a potential payoff would be in a struggle against one another.

But what if the various players involved have a different set of preferences and interests?

This is where the rational actor model runs into a wall. If the ultimate goal of the regime leader is

to ensure his own survival by any means necessary, that same logic applies to the military

establishment and the various actors within the security forces. Each institution has its own preferences that might run counter to the other. The leader may opt to repress the movement, fearing it could take down its regime. The law enforcement establishment may follow through on orders to repress, given the close ties it has to the regime, depending on the country in question.

The military, however, may decide to remain neutral or directly oppose the regime and its law enforcement arm and refuse to fire on innocent protesters, fearing the many costs it could face and the possibility that it could lose certain economic privileges that are distinct from the actual regime in power. Members of the elite ruling class of the military may fear these losses of economic privilege most. Rank and file members, on the contrary, may have serious and

legitimate concerns about killing unarmed innocent civilians. On the other hand, members of the police and security force may have different fears. Depending on the structural makeup of a police force, individuals may fear losing their job and benefits or fear losing their life if they abandon a regime that they must protect from challengers. We will see this play out in Egypt, where the members of the elite within the armed forces were extremely cautious and deliberate in the initial outbreak of protests, using selective forms of repression and carefully observing where the movement was headed (Barany 32, 2011). As we will see, each coercive institution indeed has its own interests in mind and that could run directly counter to the mission and interests of other institutions.

There is no unitary consensus within the literature on the consequences of using violent

repression against dissent. The regime must calculate whether or not repressive tactics will

achieve the ultimate desired goal of squashing the opposition and ensuring the stability of the

regime. This is often referred to as the repression-dissent nexus (Lichbach 1987). There are

several hypotheses within the literature to suggest the varying degrees of effectiveness of

political repression. Repression can deter social mobilization, can escalate mobilization, can have no effect but affect how individuals become involved and what tactics are used (Earl 267, 2011).

Repressive tactics can actually backfire and instigate protest movements, acting as a trigger event and spurring collective action amongst the disgruntled populace. Therefore, a regime must be cautious when weighing the options against dissent. The ambiguities and uncertainties that exist in the choices regimes have resulted in a game-theoretic model that is based on a strategic interaction between multiple players, mainly the regime, the armed forces and the opposition. It is not simply a binary choice between using repression or restraint.

The regime’s decision to use repression against a social movement will be based on the threat perception relative to the state’s capacity to survive such a challenge to its rule. How does the regime properly measure or view threat perception under fast-moving and fluid conditions that characterize mass upheaval? The regime may be boundedly rational, operating with minimal information or a limited amount of reasonable options. Cohen states that a “threat may be

perceived, and countermeasures are taken, even when the opponent possesses no malicious intent” (Cohen 93, 1978). Cohen further disaggregates perception into two separate stages, observation and appraisal. The observation stage is where cues are received and the appraisal stage is where the environment is evaluated as either threatening or benign, from which options are weighed or debated (Cohen 95, 1978). This threat perception sequence is a psychological process where information and evidence are analyzed and a proper response is formed. Here, the consequences of bounded rationality are on display, as the regime monitors the social movement that is ongoing and always evolving, it can misinterpret the message trying to be delivered.

Viewing a threat, the dictator must also anticipate how the opposing movement will behave and

respond to threats of its own. Under duress and social instability, the regime may act based on

this fear, without complete information. Pruitt contends that perception finds its source in distrust, past experience, contingency planning and personal anxiety (Pruitt 400, 1965). We will learn how the diffusion effects from the Arab Spring throughout the MENA region played into the calculations of all the relevant actors involved across the region. No dictator wants to end up like Egypt’s Mubarak or worse Libya’s Qaddafi, who wound up killed at the hands of rebels. So what may be a relatively benign movement that could be co-opted or accommodated, or doesn’t have the resource strength to pose a significant challenge, could be radicalized by a strategic blunder on the part of the regime. “Perceptions of threat are anticipations of the future,” (Cohen 101, 1978) and as we will discover, the use of repression can result in several outcomes, one being the dissipation or elimination of the social movement which would be a desirable and optimal outcome for the regime, or it could increase collective action and radicalize the

movement toward reciprocal violence. The payoff of employing violence is simply unknown.

Davenport outlines threat perception and how this predisposes the regime towards the use

of political repression. This is referred to as the “Law of Coercive Responsiveness” and assumes

regimes will use repression in response to real and perceived challenges to its rule. Davenport

claims the difference in threat perception is based on four state-level variables: system type,

coercive capacity, economic development, and dependency (Davenport 690, 1995). According to

Davenport’s thesis, these four elements impact the government’s domestic threat perception and

the impetus to resort to repressive tactics. Regime type is central to this argument and the

authoritarian regime type is the unit of analysis for my research. Whereas democracies gain

legitimacy through free and fair contested elections and permit the free exercise of expression

through protected civil liberties, authoritarian regimes most certainly do not. Davenport refers to

this as the “domestic democratic peace” and is a state level version of the democratic peace

thesis in international relations theory. Institutional mechanisms of restraint, accountability, and rule of law prevent democracies from using violent repression against peaceful mobilizers. The legitimacy of the authoritarian regime does not come from competitive elections and civil liberties are generally curtailed as they are deemed threatening to regime survival. Thus, if widespread dissent emerges, the authoritarian regime is more likely to use coercive and repressive tactics to remain in power.

The coercive capacity of the state is the second factor that influences domestic threat perception and the regimes willingness to resort to violence. Coercive capacity is measured by the state’s allocation of military and security expenditures relative to the overall budget.

Davenport highlights two explanations in this calculus; the first being a strategic issue and the second an organizational matter (Davenport 691, 1995). Providing the regime with the resources for coercive measures reduces the costs of undertaking repressive tactics. Davenport states: “This reduced cost made repressive strategies more attractive to those in authority because more areas and more individuals could be subject to the regulatory efforts of the regime” (Davenport 691, 1995) and this increases the probability that the regime will use repression because it is viewed as a possible answer to the domestic threat. The other factor, organizational structure, shapes the regimes preferences through what Davenport calls the bureaucratic “law of instrument”

(Davenport 691, 1995). Much in line with organization theory, the coercive apparatus of the state

has a vested interest in repressive behavior and will seek further access to key resources such as

monetary allocations and political influence (Davenport 691, 1995). A bureaucratic machine

composed of soldiers within the military and security forces, judges, lawyers, and other groups

become embedded in such a coercive structure and are predisposed to violent means. When

faced with revolutionary challenges such as the Arab Spring, the “law of instrument” would take

effect and “as a result of this pursuit, the organization would become more attentive to different aspects of anti-systemic behavior and it would consistently lobby the government to respond repressively” (Davenport 691, 1995). Rational choice theory can be applied here as well as the coercive institutions of the state believe it is in their self-interest to promote such tactics in order to gain political influence and resources.

The third variable in Davenport’s thesis is the political economy and economic development of the state. A sound and prosperous economy lower the perception of domestic threats and repression is not a viable tool. “Since basic human needs (including health care, housing, food, economic opportunity) have a greater likelihood of being met within this context, important elements of society are probably not called into question” (Davenport 692, 1995). This claim by Davenport is important because the primary causal mechanism of legitimacy for an authoritarian regime is economic development. When the economy performs well, collective action against an authoritarian regime is unlikely. If the economy deteriorates and erodes the legitimacy of the regime, it is more likely to influence collective action in opposition to the state.

“As underdeveloped economies have a much more difficult time providing basic human needs, if conflict does take place, then the latent hostilities felt towards the regime has a potential for escalating” (Davenport 692, 1995). When the population feels the effects of a lagging economy and take to the streets, the threat increases and so does the possibility of repressive measures.

Henderson elucidates on the importance of sound economic policy to authoritarian resilience and maintaining power. It is perhaps more crucial for the authoritarian to ensure a stable economy because the mechanisms available to the public to redress grievances are limited and narrow. Whereas in a democracy, a struggling economy will often lead to electoral

realignments, or the “throw the bums” out mentality. Citizens can vote out their representatives if

they feel they are mishandling or mismanaging the economy. These same mechanisms are not permitted by authoritarian systems and even those that do permit elections, the process is generally manipulated and rigged. The authoritarian regime must be proactive and engaged in managing its economy while reducing the scarcity of goods. Henderson states: “the most lasting pattern has been for authoritarian governments of various types to take charge, presumably to offer more manageability of the economy” (Henderson 124, 1991). More scarcity will inevitably result in greater repression. The level of inequality in a society also determines whether the government will use repression against anti-government protesters. The inequality problem creates a gap between the few at the top with the most wealth and resources and the rest of the population that is not blessed with such status. Along with other economic indicators discussed above, high inequality breeds instability and discontent and “because elites do not want to share, repression appears relatively efficient in the short run when resources are scarce” (Henderson 125, 1991). Economic development played a crucial role in the Arab Spring and I will look at several domestic economic indicators within each Arab Spring country later in this research. As Davenport makes clear: “despite the presence of anti-systemic behavior, high levels of economic development should have a negative effect on threat perception and repressive response because the regime does not wish to antagonize dissidents” (Davenport 692, 1995). However, the direct correlation between GNP per capita may be spurious and not a clear indicator of regime

decision-making.

The final factor mentioned by Davenport is dependency and how the global economy penetrates the domestic economy which increases the need to protect certain political and

economic relationships (Davenport 692, 1995). This last point may be salient but I am inclined to

revise this in the analysis phase of the Arab Spring portion of this paper. Dependency may not

necessarily involve the disenfranchisement of capitalists, but dependency on foreign aid,

particularly from the United States or other external actors, which I will argue weighs heavily in the repressive decision-making process of the regime.

Concessions and Accommodation

The ambiguities and uncertainties that exist in the choices regimes have resulted in a game-theoretic model that is based on the strategic interaction between multiple players, mainly the regime, the armed forces and the opposition. It is not simply a binary choice between using repression or restraint but rather a strategic choice between violent repression and

accommodation and certain concessions offered by the regime. Brancati outlines three possible forms of concessions: political, economic, or policy. According to Brancati, economic and policy concessions can include promises to improve living standards, increase public sector

employment, and reduce widespread corruption (Brancati 107, 2016). Political concessions have the greatest potential to impact regime structure and can include reforms to the electoral system, restoration of elections, and reducing the powers of the central government. Rasler notes that such concessions can either be procedural or substantive (Rasler 138, 1996). Procedural concessions are rather hallowed and limited but signal the regimes willingness to negotiate.

Procedural concessions can include “the release of political prisoners, mass pardons or amnesties, reshuffling of administrative personnel, or arrests of controversial government figures” (Rasler 138, 1996). Substantive concessions reflect a higher degree of regime vulnerability and include a wide range of accommodations such as extensive liberalization efforts or co-opting the opposition to the government under certain conditions.

This interplay can be viewed as a game theoretical model whereby cooperation on one

encourage defection on the other. The strategic interaction between the players involved is summed up by Pierskalla and resembles this structure of choices following mass mobilization (Pierskalla 123, 2010):

Regime Anti-Government

Protesters

Outcome

Represses Protesters escalate Conflict escalation

Represses Protesters acquiesce Status quo remains

Accommodates Protesters escalate Conflict escalation

Accommodates Protesters acquiesce Status quo remains unless

genuine democratic reforms offered

Regime repression can either force the movement to back down and acquiesce or it could have a significant backlash and provoke civil conflict. If the regime is willing to compromise and offer concessions, the movement can either continue to escalate, knowing full well the costs of refusal will likely result in civil conflict, or the payoff structure is adequate enough where the movement can afford to compromise with the regime. Examples from the Arab Spring which will be

explored in the case studies section of the research, show this dynamic interplay at work. Syria under the Assad regime illustrates that government repression can actually radicalize the

opposition and provoke a civil war. Bahrain will show us that sustained government repression,

along with other factors including external support, can adequately suppress a rebellion. The case

of Egypt shows that the government tried to offer concessions to the opposition and make limited

accommodative reforms, but the challengers refused to make any such compromises with a regime believed to have lost legitimacy, and protests continued to escalate. Finally, the Kingdom of Jordan highlighted that regime’s ability to offer minimal concessions to the opposition that did not challenge the monarchy’s hold on power alongside selective repression to finally co-opt the movement and prevent a hostile takeover of the government.

This strategic game is also referred to by Lichbach as the Rational Actor (RA) model.

This model focuses on the strategic interaction between the opposition group and the regime and the tactics used by each in response to the other. Lichbach highlights the key factor of the

government’s response and as an agent of “social control.” The government’s response will alter the costs of the opponent’s strategy. Pierskalla notes that “it is always rational for the opposition to acquiesce after the government accommodates” (Pierskalla 124, 2010) and that escalation becomes a viable option only after the government represses. An authoritarian regime with a weak or decentralized security structure that faces a strong opposition with preexisting social networks and a strong base of support to overcome the collective action problem will be more likely to concede accommodation in order to avoid escalation (Pierskalla, 125, 2010).

Lichbach states that “higher and higher levels of repression bring proportionally fewer and fewer rewards to the regime” (Lichbach 270, 1987). In this instance, regime repression is counterproductive, stimulating social mobilization and helping the opposition to overcome the collective action problem. Repression decreases the government’s legitimacy and movement organizers and activists who previously adhered to peaceful methods of protest become hard line, radicalized and heightening a sense of revolutionary fervor. Lichbach summarizes this

predicament by stating: “In this sense, coercive responses by the government are self-

reinforcing: After a certain point, they only trigger similar responses by opponents” (Lichbach 270, 1987).

It should also be noted that regime accommodation of protest movements and policy concessions may also backfire on the regime as well. Consequently, any type of concessions or accommodations offered by the regime to the opposition could have the reverse effect and whet the appetite of the challengers for greater concessions or possibly regime chance. Offering concessions can signal weakness or vulnerability to the opposition, spurring increased collective action and motivating people to join the movement, realizing that greater strength in movement numbers can increase the possibility of extracting further concessions from the regime. Rasler reiterates the potential counterproductive nature of concessions by stating: “the result is more dissent because successful collective action sustains the involvement of old participants while convincing sideliners of the usefulness of protest and ensuring their future participation” (Rasler 135, 1996). The regime could theoretically cause itself to collapse with this “trap of reform.”

Military Calculation and Defection

Military defections amidst peaceful civil resistance against the regime is a prime indicator of how the regime will respond to the protesters and whether coercive measures will be used.

The regime relies upon the state’s coercive capacities if repression is employed and key defections from within hamper the regimes ability to exert force over the demonstrations.

Military defections played an important role in several of the Arab Spring uprisings. The

question that demands answers is why some militaries experienced splits and defections and

others remained loyal? Nepstad argues that troop decisions to defect were shaped by “whether or

not they received financial or political benefits from the regime, and their perception of the

regime’s strength” (Nepstad 338, 2013).

Ensuring the loyalty of the armed forces is paramount for the regime when faced with

large-scale anti-government demonstrations. There are several methods the regime uses to

safeguard against defections and ensure loyalty while there are several structural variables

outlined by Nepstad that influence troop defection or loyalty to the regime. One clear regime

method to deter against defection is punishment; “Those who do not demonstrate sufficient

loyalty can be demoted, fired, or imprisoned” (Nepstad 338, 2013). However, negative sanctions

are not the only method used by the regime to deter defection and promote loyalty. Selective

incentives and positive inducements in the form of economic payoffs to troops are also viewed as

a propitious strategy by the regime to keep the armed forces cohesive and unified. Nepstad

states: “Many regimes have granted their security forces financial benefits or privileged access to

(often illicit) economic activities” (Nepstad 338, 2013). These lofty economic incentives will

likely keep the military in line with the regime despite its repressive nature to ensure continued

economic benefits for themselves and their families. McLauchlin, who spoke to these issues well

before the Arab Spring uprisings, agrees and notes that autocratic governments have various

economic tools at their disposal to ensure loyalty of the armed forces, which include providing

individual incentives and relying on “group-based strategies that exploit ethnic ties to cement in-

group bonds” (Brooks, 2017). These factors can help determine how the military will react in a

time of crisis such as a mass uprising. Brooks notes that individual incentives to soldiers may be

questioned if the regime is under threat which could compel members of the military to defect,

whereas ethnic or sectarian loyalty, soldiers “are reassured that others will stay loyal and the

regime will endure” (Brooks 6, 2017). Out-group soldiers, or soldiers that do not identify with

the ethnic or sectarian nature of the regime and armed forces, will be more likely to defect to the

opposition because their position is far more tenuous as an out-group actor. Nepstad agrees with

the tactic of ensuring loyalty and unity through political incentives and patronage politics based on religious or ethnic affiliation with the ruling regime. Nepstad states: “If security forces feel that the state protects their identity-based interests, they are likely to remain loyal – particularly in socially divided nations” (Nepstad 338, 2013). If members of the armed forces believe their ethnic or religious interests are protected it is more likely they will remain loyal and uphold the regime.

The anti-government protesters as a movement can also influence the military’s calculus and persuade defection from the regime. In order for the resisters to impact the military’s

calculus, the movement must attempt to increase the costs of regime loyalty while decreasing the costs of defection. One way the movement can increase the costs of loyalty and armed

crackdowns is through the media. Worldwide broadcasting of repressive regime crackdowns on peaceful protesters can have a heavy influence on the international community’s ability to affect realities on the ground and also raise the costs for the military and entice defection. Nepstad reinforces that this media tactic is effective because if troops cracked down such measures could lead to “international condemnation, the ending of diplomatic relations, the cessation of aid and trade agreements, and arms embargoes” (Nepstad 339, 2013). These costs can have a severe impact on the financial benefits provided to the military and provoke defection on the side of the protesters.

The structural composition of the military and their constitutional role in society also play

a role in potential defection. With respect to the composition of the military, the relationship

between the army and the society is essential. Whether or not the military is representative of the

social makeup of society can determine the willingness to use repression. If there is a lack of

overlap between the identity of the military and society, there will be greater likelihood to

repress a movement. Selective appointment and recruitment along ethnic, sectarian, or tribal lines are critical, and this is on display in Syria and Bahrain where the majority of high-level members of the military are taken from the ruling ethnic or sectarian clan. On the other hand, where this is conscription, the military will be more representative of society and complicates the possibility of using violent repression against your own people. Brooks notes “asking soldiers to fire on a population with whom they identify can produce substantial disaffection and potential insubordination” (Brooks 6, 2017).

Nepstad states that “if the armed forces are largely comprised of recruits, nonviolent movements may have a greater chance of winning their sympathy since recruits are likely to identify with civil resisters and share their concerns” (Nepstad 340, 2013). Nepstad mentions the case of East Germany during the 1989 uprising where soldiers were reluctant to crack down on peaceful protesters because many of the participants were friends and family members. The mission and identity of the armed forces may also play a factor. If the military views itself as the guarantors of democracy or stability, they may be less likely to fire on protesters and more likely to defect from the regime. A military that views itself as the protector of the regime or a

particular political party, defection will be less likely. And if there are constitutional or legal

protections for the military regardless of the regime in power, then it is less costly for the

military to defect and side with the movement. A second structural variable, according to

Nepstad, that will influence the military is the natural resource wealth of the nation, particularly

oil wealth. Nations with large oil revenues are better able to fund their coercive institutions

without heavily taxing the population. Nepstad claims “When autocrats lavishly fund their

militaries, troops tend to be loyal and dutifully carry out orders, including orders to repress”

(Nepstad 340, 2013). The regime can use the vast wealth generated from oil revenues to ensure the loyalty of the military and significantly raise the costs of defection on the part of the military.

The level of institutionalization of the armed forces is crucial in determining the coercive capacities of the state and their willingness to use violent repression on anti-government

protesters. Bellin examines this logic and reinvestigates the robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East and the vulnerabilities faced by regimes during the Arab Spring. Bellin concurs with Nepstad’s finding that natural resource wealth contributes to the vitality of the coercive

capacities of each state and their willingness to use coercion. Bellin claims the

institutionalization of the armed forces along with the level of social mobilization, discussed in a later section, are vital in determining the will of the military to repress (Bellin 129, 2012). When the military is organized along patrimonial lines, meaning, military leaders as well as rank and file soldiers are closely linked to the ruling regime through clan, ethnic, or religious bonds, and when professional advancement is premised on these bonds through patronage and cronyism rather than merit and the economic interests of the military are tied to the elite, the military’s leadership and survival is inseparable from regime endurance. Brooks also elaborates on the notion of institutionalization of the armed forces and how that impacts the calculus of the

military during moments of crisis. Patrimonial militaries are centered on the ethnic identity of the

leader, with personal ties between the ruling regime and the senior military officers. These are

primordial and existential relationships, cemented through patronage and corruption that are

mutually relied upon in order to survive. As Brooks states: “In this informal and highly

personalistic incarnation of civil-military relations, military leaders depend on the ongoing

support of the country’s leader to retain their positions and keep the regime intact” (Brooks,

2017). A military based primarily on patrimonialism rather than institutionalization will be more

likely to use repression and less likely to support the opposition because the institutional interests will be protected by the close ties with the ruling regime (Bellin 129, 2012) and this will be demonstrated further in the discussion of the Arab Spring countries.

In relation to the institutionalization of the armed forces, the military has several core interests that it must protect and uphold and this does not necessarily include regime survival under certain circumstances. Bellin outlines three institutional interests that guide the military’s missions: “defend the country; maintain security and order; and look out for the military’s institutional interests” (Bellin 131, 2012). Bellin further explains that the military’s interests can be disaggregated into several component parts including: “maintain internal cohesion, discipline, and morale within the corps; protect the image, prestige, and national legitimacy of the military (all of which depends on delivering on its role as defender of the nation); secure the economic interests of the military (both the economic interests of the military as an institution – that is, access to first rate military equipment, as well as the economic interests of the military as individuals – that is, access to adequate salaries, benefits, and professional promotion

opportunities” (Bellin 131, 2012). Barany agrees and claims that so long as the regime protects

the interests of the armed forces, the military will likely back the regime: “In general, the

stronger a regime’s record of satisfying political and socioeconomic demands, the more likely

the armed forces will be to prop it up” (Barany 29, 2011). We can expect that if the institutional

interests of the military are threatened by regime survival and they are ordered to use repression,

then there is a high risk of military defection and splits within the ruling elite that will hamper

the use of violent coercion. On the other hand, if the military’s interests are protected and

secured by the ruling regime then we can expect the likelihood of the armed forces remaining

loyal and using repression against innocent protesters.

The military also faces a moral quandary between remaining loyal to the regime and using force to suppress peaceful, nonviolent protesters or defecting from the regime and siding with the movement. Gould and Moe refer to this as “dilemma actions” that compel a regime to make a strategic choice, in game theoretic fashion, to either violently suppress a peaceful movement or create political space and seek concessions and accommodation. The question of morality is an effective tactic by resisters as it can “intentionally create moral conflicts for troops as a way to undermine their loyalty” (Nepstad 339, 3013). Nepstad also refers to “honor costs”

within the military that appeal to troops sense of honor and prestige to do what is right and not what is ordered. Nepstad states: “resisters can persuade troops that if they support the regime, they will go down on the wrong side of history” (Nepstad 339, 2013). Brooks highlights the importance of military cohesion and how the dynamics of the military shape the decision-making process. When discussing the cases of Egypt and Tunisia, Brooks claims: “senior military leaders feared that ordering junior officers and their subordinates to repress regular citizens would test their loyalties and lead to splits within the organization” (Brooks 12, 2017). This is in line with Nepstad’s argument regarding the “honor costs” incurred by military leaders and their

subordinates if they fired on innocent people protesting against the regime. Movement organizers can also compel military defections by highlighting the personal costs of loyalty and the benefits gained from defection. However, using the rational actor model, this only becomes an option once regime troops determine defection is in their rational self-interest. Nepstad argues that

“even if troops are suffering under the current system, they may conclude that there is little point

in rebelling if the opposition movement is destined to lose” (Nepstad 340, 2013). This is where

movement strength and organization comes into play and it must be made clear to the armed

forces that their best interests lie in supporting the opposition.

The structure of the international system, alliance formation, and the potential diffusion of conflict from neighboring states can also impact possible defections within the military.

Moves to defect are based on the military’s perception of regime strength or weakness. Nepstad states: “If a ruler’s repressive acts result in international sanctions, the regime may appear to be severely weakened - especially if it is heavily dependent on other nations for aid, trade subsidies, or military support” (Nepstad 340, 2013). On the other hand, if nations are dependent on the authoritarian regime and closely interdependent, then the international community may be apprehensive in applying sanctions, resulting in the military’s perception of state strength and decreasing the likelihood of defection. Bellin agrees that international support networks that were retained after the end of the Cold War because of Western strategic and security interests, such as assuring the free flow of oil and gas and also containing Islamic extremism are important factors in determining the coercive apparatus’ capacity and strength to intervene (Bellin 129, 2012).

Allied or neighboring state’s ability or willingness to intervene in the conflict also shapes military preferences. If neighboring states are willing to intervene on the side of the regime to ensure the survival and stability of the government, military defections will be less likely.

However, clear signals of nonintervention on the side of allies or neighboring states can portray state weakness and provoke a military mutiny. These factors that influence whether or not the military remains loyal to the regime or defects to the protest movement are crucial to the authoritarian’s decision to use repression and ensure regime survival or alter the balance of the conflict and increase movement success. The regime’s willingness to use repression or adopt accommodative compromises may lie with the military’s ultimate strategic decisions.

Security Force Fragmentation

Now we must disaggregate police or security forces from the military and explain why this differentiation matters to the survival of the authoritarian regime and how parallel coercive structures compete for power, which can result in higher levels of repression against incumbent challengers. What’s been called security force fragmentation involves creating several distinct coercive institutions that operate alongside and oftentimes in competition with the regular military (Folch, Rivero 4, 2016). “It is argued that leaders create parallel organizations in order to counterbalance the military thereby undermining its capacity to coordinate and making coups more unlikely” (Folch, Rivero 4, 2016). Creating these different structures, which generally took place immediately after decolonization and national independence were declared, helps the dictator consolidate power and reduce the likelihood of challengers from within. These different players are called the ruling coalition, which is essential for regime durability. Svolik defines the ruling coalition as consisting of “individuals who support the government and, jointly with the dictator, hold enough power to be both necessary and sufficient for the survival of the

government” (Svolik 480, 2009). This survival is predicated on keeping these institutions and their key members satisfied enough to dissuade them from defection.

The competing internal dynamics within the ruling coalition is revealing as to why repression is used and by what institution, “hence, successfully differentiating the security forces, creating paramilitary units, undermining the military as an organization, and placing security forces under the direct control of the ruler are key processes that may help establish a narrow autocracy headed by a largely unconstrained ruler or strongman” (Folch, Rivero 5, 2016).

This divide creates a different incentive structure for the multitude of institutions responsible for

ensuring stability and regime survival. We saw this scenario play out in the first country to revolt

in the nascent Arab Spring. When mass uprisings began in Tunisia, longtime dictator President

Ben Ali unleashed gangs not directly tied to the security establishment as well as the elite presidential guard against the demonstrators (Barany 31, 2011). Ben Ali also ordered the army chief of staff to deploy the armed forces into the streets, but that order was rejected, and

members of the military were placed in between the protesters and the security units. These types of personalist or sultanistic regimes, as Tunisia and Libya were and Syria currently remains, place a great emphasis on parallel and competing security forces to remain in power. The key to this organizational proliferation is to link the security forces to the rule of the leader so that they are more likely to resort to repression. It’s also important, as was discussed, to provide patronage to the military to buy their loyalty and prevent an intervention in politics (Powell 175, 2014).

Social Movement Strength and Structure

Although the main focus of this research is on the authoritarian regime and its response to anti-government demonstrations, we should also briefly examine the social movement and contentious politics literature, as it relates to challenging an incumbent government and how the internal dynamics of a social movement interacts with and ultimately affects what a government opts to do in response. Most importantly, why would ordinary individuals drop what they’re doing, go out into the street and protest against a highly repressive and authoritarian regime? The risks are enormous, and you are putting your life and the lives of your family and relatives in possible jeopardy. You and loved ones could be surveilled, harassed, beaten and tortured, indefinitely detained, and possibly killed. What are the incentives of taking such risks without knowing the expected benefits or outcome of a dangerous decision? Here, the literature on collective action and social movements can help us explain why.

Let us define social movements and contentious politics. McCarthy and Zald define

for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society”

(McCarthy, Zald 1217, 1977). Tarrow states that contentious politics occurs “when ordinary people – often in alliance with more influential citizens and with changes in public mood – join forces in confrontation with elites, authorities, and opponents…it is triggered when changing political opportunities and constraints create incentives to take action for actors who lack resources on their own (Tarrow 6, 2011). What motivates an individual to protest against a perceived injustice at the hands of the central power? Firstly, there must be some sort of collective grievance felt by the masses that inspires people to take action. This grievance or deprivation view holds that “discontent produced by some combination of structural conditions is a necessary if not sufficient condition to an account of the rise of any specific social movement phenomenon” (McCarthy, Zald 1214, 1977). The mobilization potential of a society must be triggered so that individuals take a positive stance toward a social movement (Klandermans, Oegema 519, 1987). Like rational choice theory, the expected benefits must outweigh the costs.

In volatile situations such as an uprising against an authoritarian regime, the cost of potentially losing your life is tremendous, and the benefits must real and substantial for such an undertaking.

People must be willing to engage in unconventional forms of politics with others who share some sort of common identity or goal (Klandermans, Oegema 519, 1987). In the Arab Spring cases, the motivations were many, but an emphasis on strain theories are important. The economic pressures being faced by the people in the Middle East was growing to a boil.

Economies had been lagging, people were suffering, starving, lacking gainful employment, and feeling otherwise dejected and disenfranchised. This formed the mobilization potential which is

“the reservoir the movement can draw from” (Klandermans, Oegema 519, 1987). There is

strength in numbers, and as individuals become motivated to participate, it creates a cascading