How To Understand The Security Environment In European States

EF

2013

Airbus Military

CESAR SANCHEZ

LOPEZ

[HANDBOOK -

COMMON

SECURITY AND DEFENSE

POLICY - 8

TH

HIGH LEVEL

COURSE “ALCIDE DE

FOREWORD

For more than 10 years, the Common Security and Defense Policy has been one of the crucial topics within the European Union, in particular because this policy reflects the ambitions of the Union and its Member States to be more active, more consistent and more capable.

The Union launched its first crisis management mission in 2003. Since then the Union has deployed over 20 civilian and military missions and operations on three continents. From the start of its operational engagement, the EU has tried to present its ability to deploy both civilian and military instruments together as its particular strength, which is one of the main features of its comprehensive approach to crisis management.

Training in general is an important aspect of such successful operational engagement and following its comprehensive approach, training in civil-military co-ordination and co-operation is a special requirement for the EU which needs to be met through special training and combined civilian and military participation.

The European Security and Defense College is providing such training at the strategic level with a mixed civil-military participation in all its courses and is so playing a significant role in the implementation of the EU‘s comprehensive approach to crisis management.

The challenges and risks the Defense and Security sector is facing nowadays in Europe, and its implications for the EU CFSP and its global leadership, must be tackled from a more comprehensive approach. The EDTIB (European Defense and Technology Industrial Base)

role must be enhanced beyond from its traditional supply management. Increasingly important today, this traditional focus on the ‖supply‖ must evolve to a more active involvement in the ―demand‖ definition and harmonization processes. Further engagement in the discussions and decision making processes in the EU arena and with other key public stakeholders is paramount step for the success of this process.

This handbook on CSDP, compiled during my participation in the HLC in the ESDC, mirrors this approach and thus provides a sound documentation for professionals and officials dealing with strategic aspects in the field of the European Security and Defense sector and beyond. It is also a hope that it will also help to promote a better and comprehensive understanding of the Common Security and Defense Policy, and its implication for the Industry.

César Sánchez López

PREFACE

The overall aim of the High Level Course (HLC) is to promote a common European security culture among senior officials dealing with strategic aspects in the field of CFSP/CSDP and to form a European security and Defense community able to contribute to the further development of CSDP and to cooperate effectively with the various actors in the field of CSDP through:

Updating course participants' knowledge of the developing EU Defense and security architecture, the comprehensive nature of the CSDP as a key tool of CFSP, and its complexity and interlocking structure;

Facilitating discussion on EU policies and their implementation in the overall context of the international environment;

Providing a forum for further CSDP development, keeping in mind the long-term objectives set for this policy area by the Treaty on European Union.

A major feature of the course is to promote networking among course participants and with lecturers and faculty members.

CONTENT

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1.1.1.1 General description ... 16

1.2

CHAPTER 1 - The Origins of European Co-Operation in the Security and Defense Field ... 16

1.2.1.1 Introduction ... 16

1.2.2

1. SETTING AN AMBITIOUS AGENDA - FROM THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY TO THE WESTERN

EUROPEAN UNION ... 17

1.2.2.1 The European Defense Community ... 17

1.2.2.2 The Western European Union ... 18

1.2.3

2. SOWING THE SEEDS OF EUROPEAN COOPERATION: FROM THE DAVIGNON REPORT (1970) TO THE

PETERSBERG TASKS ... 19

1.2.3.1 European Political Cooperation ... 19

1.2.3.2 Linking the WEU and the EU ... 21

1.2.4

3. DEVELOPING THE EU'S COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY: FROM MAASTRICHT TO NICE ... 23

1.2.4.1 The Treaty on European Union (TEU) ... 23

1.2.4.2 The Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997 ... 24

1.2.4.3 The Treaty of Nice, 2001 ... 25

1.3

CHAPTER 2 - The development of European Security and Defense Policy ... 26

1.3.1.1 Introduction ... 26

1.3.2

1. LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY (ESDP) ... 27

1.3.2.1 The Franco-British Joint Declaration on European Defense, St. Malo, 1998 ... 27

1.3.2.2 Cologne European Council Meeting, 3-4 June 1999 ... 28

1.3.2.3 Helsinki European Council Meeting, 10-11 December 1999 ... 29

1.3.2.4 Santa Maria da Feira European Council Meeting, 19-20 June 2000 ... 30

1.3.3

2. LINKING CFSP AND ESDP/ CSDP ... 31

1.3.3.1 Complementary objectives ... 31

1.3.3.2 The Lisbon Treaty and CFSP/CSDP ... 31

1.3.3.3 The evolution of EU foreign policy ... 36

1.3.3.4 Basic Time-line of Events ... 37

2.1.1.1 General description ... 39

2.1.1.2 Learning objective ... 39

2.1.1.3 Bibliography & Other Sources ... 40

2.2

CHAPTER 1 – Before the ESS ... 40

2.2.1.1 Strategic Divisions ... 40

2.2.1.2 The EU Treaty Provisions ... 41

2.2.1.3 Strategic Indications ... 41

2.2.1.4 Unique Features ... 42

2.2.1.5 Need for a Strategy ... 42

2.3

CHAPTER 2 – Adoption of the ESS in 2003 ... 43

2.3.1.1 A Favorable Context ... 43

2.3.1.2 The Drafting Process ... 44

2.3.1.3 Basic Orientations ... 45

2.3.1.4 Framework for Consensus ... 45

2.4

CHAPTER 3 - Summary of the ESS ... 46

2.4.1.1 The Security Environment ... 46

2.4.1.2 Strategic Objectives ... 47

2.4.1.3 Policy Implication ... 49

2.5

CHAPTER 4 – Main Characteristics of the ESS ... 50

2.5.1.1 Recommended Reading ... 50

2.5.1.2 The GPG Approach ... 51

2.5.1.3 Haves and Have–nots ... 51

2.5.1.4 Long–Term vs. Short–Term Challenges ... 52

2.5.1.5 The Keys for Implementation ... 52

2.6

CHAPTER 5 – The Role and impact of the ESS ... 54

2.6.1.1 A New Type of Power ... 54

2.6.1.2 A Positive Power ... 55

2.6.1.3 The Role of the ESS ... 56

2.6.1.4 The Impact of the ESS ... 56

2.7

CHAPTER 6 – Prospects of Revision ... 58

2.7.1.3 Questions for the Future ... 60

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CSDP ... 62

3.1.1.1 General description ... 62

3.2

CHAPTER 1 - EU institutional structures involved in the field of CSDP ... 62

3.2.1.1 EU INSTITUTIONS ... 62

3.2.1.2 COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY (CFSP)/ COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE

POLICY (CSDP) ... 63

3.2.1.3 EUROPEAN COUNCIL ... 63

3.2.1.4 COUNCIL ... 65

3.2.1.5 EUROPEAN COMMISSION ... 67

3.2.1.6 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ... 67

3.3

CHAPTER 2 - High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy ... 68

3.3.1.1 MULTIPLE ROLES AND TASKS ... 69

3.3.1.2 SUPPORTING INSTRUMENTS & STRUCTURES ... 70

3.3.1.3 EU´s EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE ... 70

3.4

CHAPTER 3 - EU Council roles in the field of CSDP ... 72

3.4.1.1 CSDP CAPABILITIES ... 73

3.4.1.2 CSDP MISSION SPECTRUM ... 74

3.4.1.3 CONDUCTING CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS ... 74

3.5

CHAPTER 4 - European Commission´s external activities ... 75

3.5.1.1 EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND CFSP ... 76

3.5.1.2 CO–ORDINATION WITH THE COUNCIL´S CFSP/CSDP ACTIONS AND OBJECTIVES ... 77

3.6

CHAPTER 5 - European Parliament roles in the field of CFSP/CSDP ... 78

3.6.1.1 COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY / COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY. 79

3.6.1.2 LEGISLATIVE PROCESS ... 81

3.6.1.3 LEGISLATIVE CO–DECISION PROCEDURE ... 81

3.7

CHAPTER 6 - Financing CSDP ... 82

3.7.1.1 FUNDING MILITARY OPERATIONS ... 84

3.7.1.2 START–UP FUND ... 85

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4.1.1.1 General description ... 86

4.1.1.3 Learning content ... 86

4.1.1.4 Bibliography & Other Sources ... 87

4.2

CHAPTER 1 – Historical Context of Capability Development ... 87

4.2.1.1 Introduction ... 87

4.2.1.2 Landmarks and Engagements ... 88

4.3

CHAPTER 2 – Mechanism and Actors ... 91

4.3.1.1 Capability ... 91

4.3.1.2 EU Capability Development ... 92

4.3.1.3 Availability of capabilities for EU crisis management ... 92

4.3.1.4 Actors in the EU´s capability–development process ... 93

4.3.1.5 The specific case of Military Rapid Response and the Battle groups ... 95

4.4

CHAPTER 3 – Military Capability Development ... 97

4.4.1.1 Introduction ... 97

4.4.1.2 The Process ... 97

4.4.1.3 Military Capability Requirements ... 98

4.4.1.4 EU Capability Development ... 99

4.4.1.5 Shortfall implications and further action ... 99

4.4.1.6 Capability Development Plan ... 101

4.4.1.7 Process Continuity ... 101

4.4.1.8 Military Capability Development Areas ... 103

4.4.1.9 Lessons Learned from the HLG 2010 process ... 104

4.4.1.10

EU–NATO military capability development co–operation ... 106

4.5

CHAPTER 4 - European Defense Agency... 107

4.5.1.1 Enhancing European Defense Capabilities: The EDA Approach ... 107

4.5.1.2 Why a European Defense Agency? ... 108

4.5.1.3 EDA in the CSDP Institutional Landscape ... 108

4.5.1.4 Mission and functions ... 109

4.5.1.5 EDA´s ‘Strategic Framework’... 109

4.5.1.6 Results – Projects ... 109

4.5.1.7 Results – Invest More Together in Defense R&T ... 110

4.6.1.1 Introduction ... 110

4.6.1.2 Civilian Capability Development Process ... 111

4.6.1.3 Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (CHG 2008) ... 112

4.6.1.4 Civilian Headline Goal 2010 (CHG 2010) ... 114

4.6.1.5 Personnel Quality & Training ... 115

4.6.1.6 Concepts in Support of EU Civilian Crisis Management ... 115

4.6.1.7 Civilian Capability Management Tool ... 116

4.6.1.8 Wider Co–operation and Co–ordination ... 117

4.6.1.9 Civilian Headline Goal 2010 Perspectives ... 119

4.7

CHAPTER 6 - Perspectives for EU Crisis Management Capabilities ... 119

4.7.1.1 The Challenges of the Present ... 120

4.7.1.2 Permanent Structured Co-operation ... 120

4.7.1.3 Perspectives of Civilian Capabilities ... 121

4.7.1.4 From Capabilities to Operations and Missions ... 122

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5.1.1.1 General description ... 123

5.1.1.2 Learning content ... 123

5.1.1.3 Bibliography & Other Sources ... 124

5.2

CHAPTER 1 - About Planning ... 125

5.2.1.1 Introduction ... 125

5.2.1.2 Functions of Planning ... 125

5.2.1.3 Levels of Planning ... 126

5.2.1.4 Types of Planning ... 127

5.2.1.5 Planning Procedures ... 127

5.2.1.6 Enabling Success ... 129

5.3

CHAPTER 2 - Advance Planning ... 131

5.3.1.1 Purpose of Advance Planning ... 131

5.3.1.2 Who Does What? ... 132

5.4

CHAPTER 3 - Crisis–response Planning ... 133

5.4.1.1 Crisis–Response Planning for Military Operations ... 135

5.4.1.2 Crisis–Response Planning for Military Operations ... 136

5.5

CHAPTER 4 - Introduction to Operational Planning ... 139

5.5.1.1 Command Options ... 139

5.5.1.2 Force Generation ... 141

5.5.1.3 Operational Design Approaches ... 142

5.5.1.4 Operational Design Tools ... 142

5.6

CHAPTER 5 - Challenges and Prospects ... 143

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6.1.1.1 General description ... 145

6.1.1.2 Learning Content ... 145

6.2

CHAPTER 1 - The Origins of the Lisbon Treaty ... 145

6.2.1.1 The Laeken Declaration... 145

6.2.1.2 The Constitutional Treaty ... 146

6.2.1.3 The Lisbon Treaty ... 147

6.3

CHAPTER 2 - Changes in the EU Framework ... 148

6.3.1.1 Major Changes ... 148

6.3.1.2 European Parliament ... 149

6.3.1.3 European Council ... 149

6.3.1.4 Council of the European Union ... 150

6.3.1.5 The European Commission ... 150

6.4

CHAPTER 3 - Impact on the Common Security and Defense Policy ... 151

6.4.1.1 Major Changes ... 151

6.4.1.2 Recommended Reading ... 152

6.5

CHAPTER 4 - Major Challenges as Regards Implementation ... 153

6.5.1.1 Introduction ... 153

6.5.1.2 The EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy ... 153

6.5.1.3 The European External Action Service (EEAS) ... 153

6.5.1.4 Assistance and Solidarity Clause ... 155

6.5.1.5 CSDP Operations ... 156

6.5.1.6 Permanent Structured Cooperation ... 156

6.5.1.7 The creation of Permanent Structured Cooperation ... 157

6.5.1.10

The contribution of the European Defense Agency ... 158

6.6

CHAPTER 5 - Conclusions and Reflections ... 159

6.6.1.1 What´s next? ... 159

6.6.1.2 Conclusions ... 160

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7.1.1.1 General description ... 162

7.1.1.2 Learning Content ... 162

7.1.1.3 Selective Bibliography ... 162

7.2

A. Proliferation phenomenon ... 162

7.3

B. Nuclear proliferation ... 163

7.4

C. Biological & chemical proliferation ... 164

7.5

D. Ballistic missile proliferation ... 164

7.6

E. EU against the proliferation of WMD ... 165

7.7

F. Export Control Regimes... 165

7.8

CHAPTER 1 - Risk and threat assessment at regional and international levels ... 166

7.8.1.1 Introduction ... 166

7.8.1.2 Motivations of proliferating countries ... 167

7.8.1.3 Nuclear proliferation: historical perspective ... 168

7.8.1.4 Nuclear proliferation: current situation ... 168

7.8.1.5 Nuclear proliferation: global characteristics ... 168

7.8.1.6 Nuclear proliferation: ongoing crises ... 169

7.8.1.7 Nuclear proliferation: medium and long–term risks ... 172

7.8.1.8 Chemical proliferation ... 172

7.8.1.9 Chemical proliferation: new threats ... 173

7.8.1.10

Chemical proliferation: allegations ... 173

7.8.1.11

Biological proliferation ... 174

7.8.1.12

Ballistic missile proliferation ... 174

7.8.1.13

Cruise missiles ... 176

7.9

CHAPTER 2 - Political and legal multilateral instruments ... 176

7.9.1.2 NPT Review Conference (NPT RevCon) ... 177

7.9.1.3 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ... 177

7.9.1.4 IAEA Effective Safeguards ... 178

7.9.1.5 Comprehensive Nuclear–Test–Ban Treaty (CTBT) ... 180

7.9.1.6 The Fissile Material Cut–off Treaty (FMCT) ... 180

7.9.1.7 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) ... 181

7.9.1.8 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) ... 182

7.9.1.9 The Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) ... 183

7.9.1.10

G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass

Destruction 184

7.9.1.11

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) ... 184

7.9.1.12

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 ... 186

7.9.1.13

Other multilateral instruments relating to WMD non–proliferation ... 186

7.10

CHAPTER 3 - EU Policy against the Proliferation of WMD ... 187

7.10.1.1

EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD ... 187

7.10.1.2

Active role in support of multilateralism ... 188

7.10.1.3

WMD clause in relations with third countries ... 189

7.10.1.4

NPT – balanced approach required ... 190

7.10.1.5

Nuclear non–proliferation ... 191

7.10.1.6

Strengthening export controls ... 192

7.10.1.7

Complying with and promoting UNSCR 1540 ... 193

7.10.1.8

EU support to international security initiatives ... 194

7.10.1.9

EU in the G8 ... 194

7.10.1.10 Chemical Weapons... 194

7.10.1.11 Biological weapons... 195

7.10.1.12 Ballistic missiles ... 196

7.10.1.13 Non–proliferation actions within the EU ... 196

7.11

CHAPTER 4 - The European export control regime ... 197

7.11.1.1

Introduction ... 197

7.11.1.2

Export control regimes – general characteristics ... 199

7.11.1.3

Implementing export control regimes ... 201

7.11.1.6

News & Updates... 205

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8.1.1.1 General description ... 206

8.1.1.2 Learning Content ... 206

8.2

CHAPTER 1 - Climate Science and Physical Impact ... 206

8.2.1.1 Carbon Dioxide Heat Trapping ... 206

8.2.1.2 Burning Fossil Fuels ... 207

8.2.1.3 Impact of Global Temperatures Rise ... 207

8.2.1.4 For details, see also the following recommended readings... ... 208

8.3

CHAPTER 2 - Climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’ of existing tensions and its

contribution to instability... 208

8.3.1.1 The International System and Climate Change ... 209

8.3.1.2 Climate Change – disproportionate impact on the most vulnerable areas ... 210

8.3.1.3 The Threat of Mercantilism ... 210

8.3.1.4 Risk and International Security ... 211

8.3.1.5 For details please see the following recommended readings... ... 211

8.4

CHAPTER 3 - Climate Security in the Context of Security Planning ... 212

8.4.1.1 Evolution of climate change in European and national security strategies ... 212

8.4.1.2 An example of climate change incorporated at the national security level ... 214

8.4.1.3 Defense approaches to addressing climate change and environmental issues ... 214

8.4.1.4 UK MOD climate change strategy ... 214

8.4.1.5 US Quadrennial Defense Review ... 215

8.4.1.6 French MOD environment action plan ... 215

8.4.1.7 European Defense Agency ... 216

8.4.1.8 For details, please see also the following recommended readings... ... 216

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9.1.1.1 General Description ... 217

9.2

CHAPTER 1 - Introduction ... 217

9.2.1.1 DEFINITIONS ... 217

9.2.1.2 Styles of Mediation ... 218

9.2.1.3 Levels of Mediation and Multi–Track Approaches ... 219

9.3.1.1 EU Political and Development Actors ... 220

9.3.1.2 EU Security Actors ... 221

9.4

CHAPTER 3 – EU support for mediation and dialogue led by others ... 222

9.4.1.1 Promoting Mediation ... 222

9.4.1.2 Providing Technical Support ... 223

9.4.1.3 Providing Financial Support ... 223

9.4.1.4 Exerting Leverage on the Parties ... 224

9.4.1.5 Creating an environment that is conducive to a settlement ... 225

9.5

CHAPTER 4 – The EU Concept´s guiding principles and recommendations for

strengthening mediation and dialogue capacities ... 225

9.5.1.1 PRINCIPLES ... 226

9.5.1.2 RECOMMENDATIONS... 226

9.6

CHAPTER 5 – Other organizations engaged in peace mediation ... 227

9.6.1.1 Countries or States ... 227

9.6.1.2 The United Nations (UN) ... 227

9.6.1.3 Other Regional Organizations ... 229

9.6.1.4 NGOs/Private Diplomacy Organizations ... 229

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10.1.1.1

General description ... 231

10.1.1.2

Learning Content ... 231

10.1.1.3

Some useful links ... 231

10.2

CHAPTER 1 - Introduction to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 ... 232

10.2.1.1

1325, what do these four digits mean? ... 232

10.2.1.2

Facts and figures ... 234

10.2.1.3

International Commitments... 235

10.2.1.4

International Commitments... 236

10.3

CHAPTER 2 - Gender–sensitive peacekeeping = Effective Peacekeeping ... 238

10.3.1.1

Multiple Approaches ... 238

10.3.1.2

The Policy Cycle ... 241

10.3.1.3

Roles and Responsibilities ... 242

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11.1

Summary of Acronyms ... 246

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1.1.1.1

General description

This Autonomous Knowledge Unit gives an overview of the historical and geopolitical context within which developed the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) (re-named Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), under the Lisbon Treaty). Specifically, it outlines the evolution of European foreign policy cooperation - emphasizing the key political and diplomatic events that led to the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and of the ESDP.

1.2

CHAPTER 1 - The Origins of European Co-Operation in the

Security and Defense Field

Describes the origins of foreign policy cooperation in Europe and examines

early attempts to establish a European Defense Community and the creation

of the Western European Union. It also identifies relevant concepts unveiled

in EU treaties and in European Council summit meetings.

1.2.1.1

Introduction

The origins of the security and Defense architecture of Europe can be found in the post-World War II situation. Starting in the late 1940s, a number of initiatives set the stage for increased cooperation across Europe. Examples include the launch of the U.S. sponsored Marshall plan in 1947, the signing of the Franco-British Treaty of Dunkirk (1947) containing a clause of automatic armed assistance, the signing of the Brussels Treaty (1948) sowing the seeds for a Western European Union, and the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington (1949). With the gradual emergence of the Cold War, the first European institutions in this field had a pronounced Euro-Atlantic dimension.

supranational authority. It would later serve as a model for the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community established in 1957 through the Treaty of Rome. The three communities were merged in 1967, highlighting the trend towards legal arrangements to move European co-operation forward. Follow-on treaties would develop closer collaboration in the area of security and Defense, culminating with the Treaty of Nice in 2001.

1.2.2

1. Setting an ambitious agenda - from the European Defense

Community to the Western European Union

1.2.2.1

The European Defense Community

On 9 May 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman pronounced a plan calling for the "Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole [to] be placed under a common High Authority". Inspired by the French economist Jean Monnet, the Schuman Plan sought to lower the potential for conflict in Europe by placing the control of these strategic resources at the supranational level. The Schuman Plan also underscored the importance of a "united Europe" to

enable peaceful relations.

The Schuman Plan led to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 through the Treaty of Paris. It included Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The breakout of the Korean War in June 1950 made it urgent to find a solution for a contribution by the newly created West Germany to the West's Defense efforts. Inspired by the Schuman Plan, Jean Monnet (then serving as head of France's General Planning Commission) proposed the creation of a unified European army. French Prime Minister Rene Pleven officially tabled a plan for

"the creation for the common Defense of a European army under political institutions of the united Europe" in October 1950. This common army would respond to a European Defense minister, be financed by a common budget and placed at the disposal of the unified Atlantic command. Known as the European Defense Community, it would include Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany.

1.2.2.2

The Western European Union

The conception of the Western European Union (WEU) dates to the Brussels Treaty signed on 17 March 1948. Known as the Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense, it calls for the member countries to assist each other in case one is "the object of an armed attack in Europe". The signatories of the Treaty were Paul-Henri Spaak (Belgium), Georges Bidault (France), Joseph Bech (Luxembourg), Baron von Boetzelaer (Netherlands), and Ernest Bevin (United Kingdom).

The Modified Brussels Treaty, 1954 Image credit: Ministère des Affaires étrangères

- Service photographique

However, the WEU was not formally created until the signing of the modified Brussels Treaty on 23 October 1954. The treaty came in the wake of the failed European Defense Community. Signed in Paris, it also included Germany and Italy. The treaty modified the original Brussels Treaty by incorporating controls and ceilings on armed forces and armaments production. It also added a new Article IV, based on Article V of the original Brussels Treaty, which recognized NATO's prime responsibility for protecting Europe.

It became rapidly clear that a substantial portion of the WEU's portfolio overlapped with that of other international institutions such as NATO and the Council of Europe. Over time, the WEU saw many of its functions transferred away to these organizations. As a result, the WEU gradually entered a dormant phase, focusing on lower profile activities such as monitoring arms production and armaments stocks. An external presence was nonetheless facilitated through the WEU Assembly with its status as the sole European parliamentary assembly with a mandate to monitor Defense issues.

1.2.3

2. Sowing the seeds of European cooperation: From the Davignon

Report (1970) to the Petersberg tasks

1.2.3.1

European Political Cooperation

At the time the WEU entered a dormant phase, the European Community (EC) began to explore ways in which to harmonize members' foreign policies. While the Treaty of Rome does not contain any reference to cooperation in foreign policy nor, a fortiori, in the field of security and Defense, the idea of some form of political cooperation began to appear in the informal framework of the meetings of the European heads of state and government. At the Hague Summit held in December 1969, European leaders instructed their respective foreign ministers to examine the feasibility of closer integration in the political domain.

In response, foreign ministers introduced the idea of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the Davignon Report from October 1970. Also known as the Luxembourg Report, it defined its objectives (harmonization of positions, consultation and, when appropriate, common actions) and its procedures (six-monthly meetings of the Foreign Affairs Ministers, quarterly meetings of the

Political Directors forming the Political Committee). Overall, the EPC aimed to facilitate the consultation process among EC Member States.

On 13 October 1981, the EC foreign ministers adopted the London Report on EPC. It noted that although the EPC excludes Defense issues, it could extend to "certain important foreign policy issues concerning political aspects of security". To give some substance to EPC, the report introduced crisis procedures to enable the organization of emergency meetings within 48 hours if needed and provided the rotating Presidency with a team of officials of the preceding and following Presidencies ("troika" formula).

At the Stuttgart European Council held in June 1983, the heads of state and government of the Member States of the EC issued a Solemn Declaration on European Union. Known as the Stuttgart Declaration, it set the stage for the future Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

Finally, the Single European Act, signed in Luxemburg and The Hague in February 1986 (at twelve, given the accession of Greece, then Spain and Portugal), incorporated the EPC into the Treaties. The parties agreed to "endeavor jointly to formulate and implement a European foreign policy" and to develop "a European identity in external policy matters". The Act provided a legal framework to the EPC structures and procedures as well as to the European Commission's role. With the signing of the Single European Act, a secretariat was set-up in Brussels under the Presidency's authority to prepare and follow up on European Council meetings. The consistency between EPC, operating on consensus, and Community processes was likewise strengthened.

1.2.3.2

Linking the WEU and the EU

In the 1980s, the Western European Union received new impetus. During the 1987 Hague Platform, WEU members reaffirmed the obligations of the modified Brussels Treaty and posited the idea of defining common positions on security policy matters. In 1988, the WEU carried out its first military operation. Known as Operation Clean-Sweep, it coordinated mine clearance along a 300-mile corridor around the Strait of Hormuz. Additional missions were carried out in the 1990s, including a naval operation in the Adriatic (Sharp Guard), a police and customs operation (Danube Operation), and a police operation in Mostar in 1993 on behalf of the European Union. Among the WEU's last missions was a Multinational Advisory Police Element sent to Albania in 1997 to train local police forces.

WEU Membership (by membership category)

Members (1954) Associate Members (1992) Observers (1992) Associate Partners (1994)

Belgium Czech Republic (1999)

Austria

(1995) Bulgaria France Hungary (1999) Denmark Estonia

Germany Iceland Finland

(1995) Latvia

Greece (1995) Norway Ireland Lithuania

Italy Poland (1999) Sweden

(1995) Romania

Luxembourg Turkey Slovakia

Netherlands Slovenia (1996) Portugal (1990) Spain (1990) United Kingdom

The signing of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in Maastricht in 1991 opened the door to closer collaboration between the EU and the WEU. In the TEU, the WEU is recognized as "an integral part of the development of the Union." According to Article J.4 of the TEU, the WEU is "to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have Defense implications." Reflecting a closer relationship with the EU, the WEU Headquarters was relocated from London to Brussels in 1993.

In 1992, the WEU Council of Ministers met in Petersberg (outside Bonn) and outlined a new operational role for the organization. Ministers declared the WEU's readiness to make available military units for a range of tasks: "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking." Collectively, these became known as the Petersberg tasks.

With the gradual incorporation of WEU assets and functions into the European Union - such as the WEU Satellite Centre (now the EU Satellite Centre) and the Petersberg tasks - the WEU once again plays a limited role in the European security domain. As a result, EU-WEU relations are currently less dynamic and intensive, even though the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy / Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union is double-hated as the Secretary-General of the WEU.

The WEU presently houses a small Secretariat-General in Brussels with residual functions. Nonetheless, the WEU Assembly, now also known as the European Security and Defense Assembly, continues its activities through its committees and bi-annual plenary sessions. In addition, the WEU is still the guarantor of Article V on collective self-Defense of the Modified Brussels Treaty.

In 1996, the WEU was involved in the establishment of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO. According to the Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Berlin, the ESDI would "permit the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU."

facilitating the identification of capabilities that were separable - but not separate - and that could be used in WEU-led operations. Moreover, as ESDI could rely on the newly established concept of Combined Joint Task Forces, it also served to limit potential duplication. The groundwork laid via ESDI would eventually serve as a template for the Berlin Plus Arrangements adopted in 2003 between NATO and the EU.

1.2.4

3. Developing the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy: from

Maastricht to Nice

1.2.4.1

The Treaty on European Union (TEU)

The Treaty on European Union - often called the Maastricht Treaty - was signed in Maastricht (the Netherlands) on 7 February 1992 and entered into force on 1 November 1993. Using the Single European Act as its departure point, the Maastricht Treaty created a single institutional framework (the European Union) based on three pillars. These pillars encompass community affairs (1st pillar), common foreign and security policy (2nd pillar), and justice and home affairs (3rd pillar).

In spite of a single institutional framework, the roles of institutions in the decision-making process differ considerably according to the pillar and policy area. In the 2nd and 3rd pillars, an intergovernmental approach to policy making prevails. However, it should be noted that the European Commission is "fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and security policy field" (art. J9) and "may refer to the Council any question relating to the common foreign and security policy and may submit proposals to the Council" (art. J8). Overall, CFSP aims to enhance the EU's ability to address the growing number of challenges at the international level, identifying five principal objectives.

CFSP is more far-reaching than European Political Cooperation in at least four ways. First, it breaks new ground - Article J.4 of the TEU states that CFSP includes "all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common Defense policy, which might in time lead to a common Defense." Second, the Maastricht Treaty introduces a new legal instrument - the Joint Action - in support of the CFSP decision-making processes. A Joint Action enables the mobilization of EU assets (human, financial, etc) to reach Council-defined objectives. Third, CFSP encourages a closer consultation and co-ordination process, explicitly calling for national policies to be consistent with Common Positions. Lastly, and as noted earlier, European leaders agreed at Maastricht that the WEU forms an integral part of the development of the EU, tasking it to elaborate and implement EU decisions and actions with Defense implications.

1.2.4.2

The Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997

The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed on 2 October 1997 and entered into force on 1 May 1999. Building on the Treaty of Maastricht, its main contributions in the area of CFSP relate to institutional arrangements and the decision-making process.

With respect to institution-building, the Treaty of Amsterdam created the post of a High Representative for the CFSP to be held by the Secretary-General of the Council of the EU (henceforth Council). The Secretary-General/High Representative (SG/HR) serves to improve the efficiency and consistency of the CFSP by assisting with the formulation, processing, and implementation of decisions. In support of the SG/HR's work, the Treaty of Amsterdam established

with an early warning capability. The Policy Unit also facilitates joint analysis, thereby strengthening the EU's capacity to support a Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Lastly, the Amsterdam Treaty supported closer institutional relations between the EU and the WEU - including the incorporation of the Petersberg tasks into the TEU - with a view to the integration of the WEU into the EU, "should the European Council so decide."

In the area of decision-making, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced the concept of constructive abstention. This mechanism makes it possible for an EU Member State to abstain in a CFSP-related vote in the Council without blocking a unanimous decision. The Amsterdam Treaty also introduced a new legal instrument to enhance coherence in the Union's external action: the Common Strategy. These may be used to specify a political objective and the resources needed to achieve the objective(s). To date, a limited number of Common Strategies have been formulated, including one on Russia (1999), Ukraine (1999) and the Mediterranean (2000).

1.2.4.3

The Treaty of Nice, 2001

The Treaty of Nice was signed on 26 February 2001 and entered into force on 1 February 2003. Coming in the heels of the St. Malo Declaration (1998) and numerous European Council meetings focusing on crisis management capabilities (treated in greater detail in the next section), the Treaty of Nice formalized European Security and Defense Policy by bringing it into the EU's institutional structure.

For example, in line with the December 2000 European Council held in Nice establishing the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee, and the EU Military Staff, the Treaty of Nice formally tasked the PSC to "monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council." In addition, the PSC is to "exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations."

In some areas of decision-making, the Nice Treaty extends the use of qualified majority voting. For example, the Council may now rely on qualified majority voting when concluding international agreements under the second pillar, specifically those needed to implement a joint action or common position. Likewise, the concept of enhanced cooperation, introduced by the Maastricht

Treaty, is extended to the second pillar for the implementation of relevant joint actions or common positions. Enhanced cooperation allows a number of Member States (at least eight are required - nine under the Lisbon Treaty) that wish to work more closely on a specific area to do so. Under the second pillar, however, enhanced cooperation may not have military or Defense implications.

1.3

CHAPTER 2 - The development of European Security and

Defense Policy

Presents the establishment of ESDP, its relation to CFSP, and how both

policies might evolve.

1.3.1.1

Introduction

Aceh Monitoring Mission, 3rd Phase of Decommissioning,

Nov. 2005

Photo credit: Council of the EU

While the European Union identified ambitious objectives in the area of external security and Defense in 1992 through the Maastricht Treaty, it would not be until the late 1990s, in the aftermath of the wars of secession in the Balkans, that concrete provisions were introduced to endow the EU with tangible crisis management capabilities. Following the St. Malo Declaration in 1998, numerous European Council summit meetings defined the military and civilian capabilities needed to fulfill the Petersberg tasks. Examples include the Helsinki European Council Meeting (1999), which laid the foundations for the Headline Goal 2003, and the Santa Maria da Feira European Council Meeting (2000) which identified four civilian priority areas. In 2003, ESDP became operational through the initiation of the first ESDP missions, giving policy-makers

developments, the Lisbon Treaty offers several provisions to increase the Union's coherence in the field of external security, signaling the movement towards a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

1.3.2

1. Laying the foundations for European Security and Defense Policy

(ESDP)

1.3.2.1

The Franco-British Joint Declaration on European Defense, St. Malo,

1998

A Franco-British summit was held in French port city of St. Malo on 3-4 December 1998. It was a turning point in European public diplomacy, with the UK and France jointly underlining the growing need for greater European engagement in the areas of security and Defense. The St. Malo Declaration calls on the EU to have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use these forces, and a readiness to do so in order to respond to international crises. In line with previous formulations, these capabilities should not challenge the role of NATO as EU Member States should act "in conformity with the respective obligations in NATO".

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To better understand the context surrounding the St. Malo Declaration; it is useful to briefly summarize some of the key British and French motives behind it. From the British perspective, an

important foreign policy concern during the post-World War II period was to maintain and strengthen the transatlantic link between Europe and the US: The United Kingdom saw itself as a bridge-builder between the two continents. However, the security system changed fundamentally after the Cold War. After the bloodshed in the Balkans, the British government came to the conclusion that the EU had to take on more responsibility for security and Defense. Furthermore, Tony Blair's election as prime minister marked a fundamental shift in the United Kingdom's approach to Europe. Blair favored a policy of constructive engagement within European institutions. And in the field of security and Defense, the United Kingdom could offer both credibility and leadership.

France, like the United Kingdom, was convinced that after the Cold War domestic stability and integration into the EU no longer sufficed to ensure security in Europe. Moreover, a core objective of French foreign and security policy had long been to create a (relatively) autonomous European security and Defense policy to balance the US and complement NATO. France also hoped that such a policy would lead to a more equitable transatlantic partnership. After St. Malo, a number of European Council meetings from the late 1990s onward focused on providing ESDP with the necessary tools to strengthen crisis management capabilities.

1.3.2.2

Cologne European Council Meeting, 3-4 June 1999

At the June 1999 European Council meeting held in Cologne (Germany), EU heads of state and government reiterated the message contained in the St. Malo Declaration, calling on the EU to acquire the necessary means and capacities to engage in EU-led crisis management operations. Serving as the stepping stone for ESDP, they also made it clear that the EU's efforts in this area should not challenge the role of NATO as the basis of collective Defense of all NATO members.

the principles of the UN Charter. The Presidency Report states that "necessary arrangements must be made in order to ensure political control and strategic direction of EU-led Petersberg operations." To do so, the report identifies the need "for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning." It foreshadowed the need for, among others:

A permanent body in Brussels (Political and Security Committee).

An EU Military Committee consisting of Military Representatives making recommendations to the Political and Security Committee.

An EU military Staff and a Situation Centre.

Other resources such as a Satellite Centre and an Institute for Security Studies.

1.3.2.3

Helsinki European Council Meeting, 10-11 December 1999

The December 1999 Helsinki Summit focused mainly on the development of the EU's military crisis management capability. It called on EU Member States to "be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks." The annex provides further details on the development of military capabilities, including the need for forces that are "militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements."

The specific operational requirements for the Petersberg tasks are provided in the Helsinki Headline Goal Catalogue. Voluntary national contributions were pledged at the 2000 Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels, and a pool of more than 100,000 personnel and approximately 400 combat aircraft and 100 naval vessels was constituted.

Despite some qualitative shortfalls, the EU declared ESDP operational at the December 2001 Laeken European Council meeting, stating that the EU was "capable of conducting some crisis-management operations". This position was confirmed in May 2003 by the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) which declared that "the EU now has operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks, limited and constrained by recognized shortfalls" in the military sphere.

1.3.2.4

Santa Maria da Feira European Council Meeting, 19-20 June 2000

The Feira European Council meeting concentrated on the development of the EU's civilian crisis management capabilities. Appendix 3 of the Annex identified four priority areas for civilian crisis management:

Police

Strengthening the rule of law

Strengthening civilian administration Civil protection

It should be noted that additional civilian priorities were added in later years. These include monitoring, support for the EU Special Representatives, and the set-up of civilian response teams.

Within the police category, concrete targets were specified. By 2003, EU Member States were to be able to provide up to 5,000 police officers to international missions. Of these, up to 1,000 police should be available for deployment within 30 days. At the Goteborg European Council meeting held in Sweden on 15-16 June 2001, additional targets were identified for the remaining categories. In the area of rule of law, Member States were to be able to contribute up to 200 personnel "adequately prepared for crisis management operations in the field of rule of law" on a voluntary basis. Consisting of legal, judicial, and prosecution experts, such an element would be deployable within 30 days.

In the area of civil protection, "Civil Protection intervention teams" consisting of up to 2,000 individuals were to be available by 2003 in response to major natural, technological, or environmental emergencies. In addition, 2 to 3 assessment and/or co-ordination teams made up of 10 experts should be available for deployment within 3-7 hours. Lastly, in the domain of civilian administration, no numerical targets were provided. Instead, the Goteborg European Council identified the need for a "pool of experts able on a voluntary basis to take on assignments within civilian administration." All targets were later declared to be met. At the Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference held in Brussels on 22 November 2004, it was confirmed that "Member States have well exceeded the concrete targets set by the European Council."

1.3.3

2. Linking CFSP and ESDP/ CSDP

1.3.3.1

Complementary objectives

There were clear links between the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defense Policy. Both serve to fulfill the EU's foreign policy objectives, and as shown in the following diagram, ESDP was subsumed under the wider umbrella of CFSP. In addition, CFSP and ESDP were to complement each other, with CFSP concentrating on foreign policy objectives at the strategic level while ESDP enabling the EU to execute crisis management operations on the ground.

With respect to ESDP, it is essential to underline that it included both military and civilian dimensions. Many (erroneously) believe that ESDP only covers military missions. In fact, as of 2008, the majority of ESDP missions have been civilian in nature. Moreover, given the EU‘s strong emphasis on civil-military co-ordination and its recognition that the new security threats cannot be addressed through military means alone, many late ESDP crisis management operations include both military and civilian components, even if they are not used simultaneously or in proximity.

While there are links between CFSP and ESDP, they are not fully synchronized. From a historical perspective, when CFSP was established under the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s, there was no formal ESDP. Ironically, when the first ESDP missions were launched in 2003 – providing a strong push forward for the ESDP – CFSP was static due to differing European positions on the war in Iraq. Thus, while ESDP was progressing rapidly, the same was not the case for CFSP.

1.3.3.2

The Lisbon Treaty and CFSP/CSDP

The Lisbon Treaty was signed on 13 December 2007 and entered into force on 1 December 2009 after all EU Member States – including Ireland following a second referendum on 2 October 2009 –

ratified it. The Treaty provisions pertaining to CFSP and ESDP are by and large identical to the ones present in the failed Constitutional Treaty. Those provisions are about institutions, the scope of activities that the EU will be able to perform under the new Treaty, and decision-making processes.

a. Institutions

The Treaty renames ESDP as the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), to which it dedicates a full section. CSDP is presented as an 'integral part of the common foreign and security policy', and shall 'provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets', that can be used 'on missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security'. Several institutions or positions falling within the CFSP/CSDP framework are established, with the aim of enhancing the institutional coherence and the overall effectiveness of EU action. Among the key new positions is the post of President of the European Council and that of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Elected by the European Council by a qualified majority for a term of two and a half years, renewable once, the President of the European Council will 'ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy'. The former Belgian Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy was elected the first President of the European Council on 19 November 2009. As such, he is responsible for chairing the European Council, drive its work, and act as a consensus-builder within it.

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is appointed by the European Council, acting on a qualified majority vote, and with the agreement of the President of the Commission. The first holder of this position is Ms. Catherine Ashton, a British national and former Trade Commissioner. The post merges the two positions of High Representative for CFSP (held by Dr. Javier Solana between 1999-2009) and of Commissioner for External Relations (held by Benita Ferrero-Waldner between 2004 and early 2010) and

Representative also acts as Vice-President of the European Commission, giving the European Parliament a say on his/her appointment as the Commission is accountable to the Parliament. In her new position, Ms. Ashton represents 'the Union for matters relating to CFSP', conducts 'political dialogue with third parties on the Union's behalf', and expresses 'the Union's position in international organizations and at international conferences.' She also chairs the Foreign Affairs Council (a new format of Council meetings, separate from the General Affairs Council), while one of her representatives‘ chairs meetings of the Political and Security Committee (PSC). Overall, the new High Representative contributes to the preparation of CFSP and ensures its implementation (art.13A).

The High Representative will be assisted by a European External Action Service (EEAS) that 'shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States.' (art.13A) The EEAS will be sui generis, distinct from the Commission and the Council Secretariat, but bodies such as the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capacity (CPCC), and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) should be part of the EEAS. European Commission Delegations become EU Delegations and are part of the EEAS.

With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the division of tasks between the President of the Council and the High Representative, as well as the responsibilities that each will assume, are not clearly specified and are expected to be shaped in practice by the two incumbents. Likewise, the role of the President of the Council vis-a-vis the still existing rotating presidencies is to be further clarified. Formally, the creation of these positions puts an end to the rotating presidency in foreign affairs.

At the institutional level, the Lisbon Treaty also formally endorses the creation of the European Defense Agency, operational since 2004 with the mandate of harmonizing Defense spending, supporting Defense research, and assisting member states to meet the capability commitments (art.28D). Finally, the Treaty gives the EU a single legal personality (art.46A), something previously enjoyed only by the European Communities.

b. Scope of activities

The Lisbon Treaty contains provisions on the activities of the EU in the fields of foreign and security policy. In terms of missions, the Treaty formally endorses the extension of the so-called 'Petersberg Tasks', that now include ‗joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization' (art.28B). These tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by 'supporting third states in combating terrorism on their territories'.

The Treaty also extends the concept of 'enhanced co-operation' to all EU policy areas, including CSDP (art.10). 'Enhanced co-operation' - which allows EU Member States that wish to work more closely together to do so - can be established by the Council and requires at least nine member states participating in it. 'Enhanced cooperation' differs from 'permanent structured cooperation' (see below) in that the latter is permanent and deals with Defense matters, while the former can be activated in all EU policy areas and on a non-permanent basis.

The Treaty also unveils new mechanisms or commitments. For example, the Lisbon Treaty makes it possible for a group of Member states 'which are willing and have the necessary capability' to implement a task, within the Union framework, 'in order to protect the Union's values and serve its interests' (art. 28A §5 and 28C). The EU-led Artemis operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or the deployment of a battle group provides examples of such tasks.

In the same vein, flexibility in the CSDP field is encouraged by the establishment of permanent structured co-operation (art.28). EU Member States 'whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework' (art.28A6). This aims at allowing Member States (with no minimum number of countries involved) that are willing to move forward in the field of military cooperation to do so without being hindered by others. The Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation refers to a 'new stage in the development of the European Security and Defense Policy'. The Battle group Concept provides an example of what a permanent structured cooperation could look like, but

or a two-speed Europe. At the financial level, the Treaty establishes a 'start-up fund' aimed at allowing for urgent financing of initiatives in the framework of CFSP and EU-led missions that cannot be charged to the Union budget (art.28§3).

Finally, political and military solidarity among EU Member States is boosted by the inclusion of a

mutual assistance clause (art.28A7), and a

'solidarity clause' (Title VII, art.188R1). The mutual assistance clause is inspired by the Western European Union Treaty's clause. It states that 'If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter'. The importance of the clause is watered down by the provision stating that it 'shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and Defense policy of certain Member States', in reference to the role of NATO and its collective Defense provisions.

The 'solidarity clause', which was introduced in the context of the terrorist attack in Madrid in March 2004, states that 'The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster.' (art.188R1)

c. Decision-Making Process

The unanimity rule prevails in the CFSP/CSDP decision-making processes, and the Treaty confirms that 'Decisions relating to the common security and Defense policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously' (art.28 A4). However, exceptions are introduced in the Treaty. In particular, decisions pertaining to 'permanent structured co-operation', the procedures for setting up and administering the 'start-up fund', or the appointment of the High Representative, are adopted by qualified majority. On the other hand, the unanimity rule remains when deciding on the launch of a mission. In practice, this

means that states involved in permanent structured co-operation may not launch an operation on behalf of the EU without having the formal approval of all EU Member States.

These different provisions aim at giving CFSP and CSDP more coherence and visibility. They lay out a framework but most provisions are still unclear as to their practical implications and political sensitivities. Implementation and the passage of time will play key roles in clarifying what is possible and how it impacts on the way the EU conducts its foreign affairs and security policy.

1.3.3.3

The evolution of EU foreign policy

Over time, policy-makers have stressed the importance of enhancing the coherence not just between CFSP and CSDP, but across all foreign policy-related tools. In fact, several provisions in the Lisbon Treaty aim to improve the coherence across the EU's three pillars.

How CSDP and CFSP might evolve? The evolution of CSDP is partially visible in its two roadmaps: the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 and the Headline Goal 2010 (which focuses mostly on military capability development). Both headline goals identify the need for rapid response capabilities, consistent with the establishment of Civilian Response Teams and EU Battle groups. They also emphasize the importance of qualitative aspects of capability development – such as interoperability among military forces or advanced levels of training for civilian staff. Both headline goals incorporate a systematic review process to ensure that the EU achieves the capabilities needed to address current and future risks.

Aerial surveillance

during the EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission – May 2008

the speed at which new capabilities are acquired, the EU's relations with third states and international organizations, and EU-specific developments such as enlargement. With some over twenty CSDP missions either executed or currently underway, a number of lessons have been identified which likewise impact the evolution of CSDP.

The evolution of CFSP is not as clear cut as that of CSDP. While the linkage to CSDP is likely to be strengthened as policymakers strive to increase the coherence among tools in the foreign policy arena, the actual level of "common" foreign policy across the range of EU Member States remains to be seen. Given the volatile nature of politics, CFSP is more likely to evolve in a non-linear fashion, with periodic improvements marked by occasional dips as external challenges complicate the formulation of a common policy.

1.3.3.4

Basic Time-line of Events

Year Event

1945 End of World War II

1946 Churchill's speech at the University of Zurich calling for a United States of Europe 1947 Launching of the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan)

1948 Signing of the Brussels Treaty 1949 Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty

1950 Unveiling of the Schumann Plan Outbreak of the Korean War

1951 Signing of the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 1954 Failure of the European Defense Community

Signing of the Modified Brussels Treaty formally creating the WEU 1955 Establishment of the Warsaw Pact

1956 Suez Canal Crisis

1957 Signing of the Treaties of Rome 1961 Construction of the Berlin Wall