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REINSTATED ATTORNEYS RICARDO A. BRACAMONTE

Bar No. 014303; File No. 08-1300 Supreme Court No. SB-09-0087-D

By Arizona Supreme Court judgment and order dated Dec. 17, 2009, Ricardo A. Bracamonte, 197 E. Fort Lowell Rd., Tucson, AZ, was reinstated to practice law.

DONALD W. HUDSPETH

Bar No. 012198; File No. 08-0342 Supreme Court No. SB-09-0090-D

By Arizona Supreme Court judgment and order dated Dec. 14, 2009, Donald W. Hudspeth, 3030 N. Central Ave., Phoenix, AZ, was reinstated as a member of the State Bar.

VICTORIA R. MIRANDA

Bar No. 018511; File No. 08-0407 Supreme Court No. SB-09-0047-D/R

By Arizona Supreme Court judgment and order dated Nov. 24, 2009, Victoria R. Miranda, 532 E. Lynwood St., Phoenix, AZ, was reinstated as a member of the State Bar.

GUSTAVO TOLEDO

Bar No. 012000; File No. 09-6000 Supreme Court No. SB-09-0095-R

By Arizona Supreme Court judgment and order dated Dec. 2, 2009, Gustavo Toledo, 5128 E. Tamblo Dr., Phoenix, AZ, was rein-stated as member of the State Bar. Mr. Toledo shall be placed on probation for one year and required to participate in the State Bar’s Law Office Management Assistance Program and Member Assistance Program.

SANCTIONED ATTORNEYS GREGORY L. DROEGER

Bar No. 012117; File No. 08-0462 Supreme Court No. SB-09-0119-D

By Arizona Supreme Court judgment and order dated Dec 29, 2009, Gregory L. Droeger, 274 W. View Point Dr., Nogales, AZ, was censured. He shall view the CLE “Ten Deadly Sins Conflict” and also was assessed the costs and expenses of the disciplinary pro-ceedings.

In February 2000, Mr. Droeger drafted and witnessed a will for an elderly client. In January 2003, Mr. Droeger drafted and wit-nessed a codicil to the February 2000 will. In April 2003, Mr. Droeger drafted and witnessed a new will, which made an in-home caretaker a contingent beneficiary and personal representative of the client’s estate. This will was destroyed soon afterwards, at the client’s instruction. In December 2003, another lawyer drafted a new will for Mr. Droeger’s client, without Mr. Droeger’s knowledge. This

LAWYER REGULATION

File retention and the lawyer’s ethical obligations in maintaining client files have long been problematic areas. A number of the Rules of Professional Conduct address aspects of the lawyer’s duties, but no rule specifically addressed the issue of file retention. For example, ER 1.6 requires the lawyer to safeguard information relating to the representation; ER 1.15 provides that the lawyer must safeguard the client’s property in the lawyer’s possession; and ER 1.16 requires the lawyer, at the termination of the representation, to sur-render documents to which the client is entitled. Prior Ethics Opinions have clarified the parts of the file to which the client is entitled, but not how long a client file must be retained at the conclusion of the representation.

Ethics Opinion 08-02 (www.myazbar.org/Ethics/) provides guidance on this problematic issue. First, lawyers are encouraged to develop a file-retention policy “tailored to the specific needs of the client and the lawyers’ practice” and to communicate that policy to their clients in writing at the beginning of the representation. Although Ethics Opinion 98-07 appeared to create a per se five-year retention period in certain types of cases, Op. 08-02 concluded that there is no bright-line rule for file retention in general. Although some files, in areas such as probate and estates, must be retained indefinitely, they are the excep-tion.

Storage space can constitute a great and ongoing expense. However, lawyers are advised not to purge the contents of files to minimize storage space needs without first consulting the client. The client’s possible future need for the file, or any of its contents, must be a paramount consideration. Lawyers are advised that they may fulfill their ethical duties by tendering the entire file to the client at the end of the representation, if no statutory or sub-stantive law requires the lawyer to retain the file and if doing so adequately protects the client’s interests. Lawyers deciding to tender the entire file must assemble not only all paper documents, but also all electronic documents, so that the client receives the entire file.

Lawyers may cease practice for a number of reasons, expected and unex-pected, such as retirement, firm dissolution, or sudden illness. If a lawyer chooses to assume responsibility for another lawyer’s files, the assuming lawyer is advised to follow the file-retention policy of the original attorney. In addition, the assuming lawyer should use reasonable diligence in attempting to contact the affected clients and advise them of the situation. A good resource on this issue is ABA Formal Opinion 92-369.

If a lawyer does not have a file-retention policy, the lawyer must make rea-sonable efforts to notify the client before destroying client files. There may be applicable law that requires the lawyer to preserve the file. If there is not, the lawyer is advised to retain the file for a period equal to the period for aban-donment of personal property.

Contact the State Bar’s Ethics Hotline at (602) 340-7284.

File Retention

Bar Counsel Insider provides practical and important information to State Bar members about ethics and the disciplinary process.

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new will named the current in-home caretaker as personal representative of the estate. At this time, the in-home caretaker contacted Mr. Droeger with concerns about the client’s competency. Mr. Droeger filed a Petition for Appointment of a Guardian for his client, alleging that the client was incompetent. Mr. Droeger’s client passed away in February 2004. The same day the in-home caretaker retained Mr. Droeger to repre-sent him as the personal reprerepre-sentative for the estate. A family member of the client immediate-ly contested the will and the appointment of the in-home caretaker as the personal representative. Mr. Droeger knew that the wills he drafted were at issue with the will drafted by the other lawyer. He was also aware that it was likely that he would be a necessary witness in the contest over that will. Mr. Droeger’s representation of the in-home caretaker/personal representative caused a delay in the probate proceedings and caused additional cost to be incurred by the fam-ily member.

One aggravating factor was found: substantial experience in the practice of law.

Two mitigating factors were found: absence of a prior disciplinary record and remorse.

Mr. Droeger violated Rule 42, ARIZ.R.S.CT.,

ERs 1.7, 3.7 and 8.4(d).

TED J. DUFFY

Bar No. 016907; File No. 06-1958 Supreme Court No. SB-09-0099-D

By Arizona Supreme Court judgment and order dated Dec. 1, 2009, Ted J. Duffy, 301 W. Jefferson, Phoenix, AZ, was suspended for 30 days. He will be placed on probation for one year following reinstatement. Mr. Duffy will be required to complete 15 hours of CLE in ethics with no fewer than 10 hours in the area of trial ethics. He also was assessed the costs and expens-es of the disciplinary proceedings.

Mr. Duffy was the lead prosecutor in a capital murder trial that spanned more than six months. During the course of the proceedings, Mr. Duffy violated court orders and made several argu-ments that drew multiple defense motions to dis-miss and/or for mistrial. The motions were denied and the trial proceeded.

Mr. Duffy failed to redact portions of a taped witness interview prior to it being played for the jury. During opening statements, Mr. Duffy made a misleading reference to DNA evidence that had not been timely disclosed to defense counsel. Also during opening statement, Mr. Duffy made reference to bloody footprints found at the crime scene and implied that they belonged to the defendant when he knew there was insufficient evidence to support that finding. Mr. Duffy also improperly made arguments dur-ing his opendur-ing statement. Durdur-ing the presenta-tion of evidence, Mr. Duffy asked a witness in cross-examination about the defendant’s “other crimes,” knowing that such an inquiry is forbid-den by the eviforbid-dence rules. He also characterized a witness’s pretrial statement as the “best evi-dence,” which forced opposing counsel to seek

and obtain from the judge an admonition to the jury to disregard that characterization. During closing argument, Mr. Duffy incorrectly argued to the jury that the “reasonable doubt standard” meant only that the jury needed to “feel com-fortable” in their decision that the defendant was guilty. Finally, at various times during the trial, Mr. Duffy injected his personal knowledge and beliefs into the case, and engaged in improper vouching.

Four aggravating factors were found: pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct and substantial experience in the practice of law.

Three mitigating factors were found: absence of a prior disciplinary record, absence of a dis-honest or selfish motive and full and free disclo-sure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings.

Mr. Duffy violated Rule 42, ARIZ.R.S.CT.,

ERs 3.1, 3.3(a)(1), 3.4(c) and (e) and 8.4(d).

BRIAN E. FINANDER

Bar No. 007739; File Nos. 06-1953, 07-0993 Supreme Court No. SB-09-0118-D

By Arizona Supreme Court judgment and order dated Jan. 5, 2010, Brian E. Finander, 2375 E. Camelback Rd., Phoenix, AZ, was suspended for one year effective Feb. 4, 2010. Upon reinstate-ment, he shall be placed on probation for two years and required to participate in the State

Bar’s Law Office Management Assistance

Program and Member Assistance Program. He also shall pay restitution and was assessed the costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceed-ings.

In count one, Mr. Finander was hired to rep-resent clients in a contract dispute. The written fee agreement stated that Mr. Finander would be paid an hourly fee and that he could hire individ-uals on contract basis to assist with the case at no charge to the clients. Mr. Finander hired another attorney to work on the case and increased his billing rate so that the clients actually paid for work done by Mr. Finander and the contract attorney. The monthly bills did not include a detailed explanation of the time spent on the case. Also, Mr. Finander did not inform his clients, in writing, that he changed his fee from hourly billing to hourly plus a contingent fee, nor did he obtain the client’s consent to collect a contingent fee.

A claim was also filed in federal court. When the federal case settled, Mr. Finander deposited the settlement check into his trust account with-out the endorsement or consent of his clients, then used the funds to pay his on-going legal fees. Near the conclusion of litigation on the state case, a settlement offer was made and Mr. Finander rejected the offer without first dis-cussing it with his clients.

During the course of representation, Mr. Finander routinely charged unreasonable fees and charged for work that was not performed. He failed to provide information to his clients or provided confusing or misleading information.

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Upon termination, Mr. Finander did not review the fees charged and make adjustments.

In count two, Mr. Finander rep-resented an elderly, disabled client. The client executed a power of attorney that unknowingly gave Mr. Finander an ownership interest in his personal property. The client also gave Mr. Finander unsigned checks with the agreement that they would be used to pay legal fees. Mr. Finander failed to provide a detailed accounting regarding the fees paid via the checks. Mr. Finander was designated as beneficiary on anoth-er bank account and failed to advise his client to seek independent

coun-sel regarding the matter.

Additionally, the client asked Mr. Finander to prepare a will and pro-vided specific instructions regarding the terms to be included. Mr. Finander drafted a will that was con-trary to his client’s instructions and which made him sole beneficiary of the estate. The representation was terminated and an accounting was requested. Mr. Finander did not review the fees charged to ensure they were reasonable and billed

additional fees.

Eight aggravating factors were found: prior disciplinary offenses, dishonest or selfish motive, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct, vulnerability of victim, substantial experience in the practice of law and indifference to making restitution.

There were no mitigating fac-tors.

Mr. Finander violated Rule 42,

ARIZ.R.S.CT., ERs 1.2, 1.4, 1.5,

1.7, 1.8(a) and (c), 1.15 and 8.4(c).

JAMES DARRELL JENKINS

Bar No. 005725; File Nos. 07-1075, 07-1083, 07-1483, 07-1523 Supreme Court No. SB-09-0105-D By Arizona Supreme Court judg-ment and order dated Dec. 3, 2009, James Darrell Jenkins, 6315 E. Main St., Mesa, AZ, was suspended for 18 months. He will be placed on probation for two years upon rein-statement and shall participate in fee arbitration. He also was assessed the costs and expenses of the discipli-nary proceedings.

In count one, Mr. Jenkins was

paid $3,500 to investigate and enforce the provisions of his client’s mother’s trust. A third party paid the fee and Mr. Jenkins did not exe-cute a written fee agreement, obtain his client’s informed consent or explain the conflict created by the third-party payor. Mr. Jenkins filed a

petition against another estate

member regarding an accounting of trust funds then failed to reasonably communicate with his client regard-ing the status of the matter. Mr. Jenkins informed his client that he was initiating settlement proceed-ings with the trustee, which he was not authorized to do. The represen-tation was terminated and the client retained new counsel.

In count two, Mr. Jenkins was paid $206 to file probate for his client’s deceased son. Part of the estate consisted of an automobile, which Mr. Jenkins took possession of and used to conduct personal business unrelated to the represen-tation. Mr. Jenkins also attempted to buy the auto from the estate. Mr.

Jenkins further impermissibly

applied the deceased’s insurance funds to his legal bill. The

represen-tation was terminated and the client retained new counsel who requested the case file and an accounting. Mr. Jenkins did not timely provide the requested information.

In count three, Mr. Jenkins was hired to assist a client with her

deceased daughter’s estate. Mr.

Jenkins negotiated and agreed to take the daughter’s car as partial payment without advising his client, in writing, to seek independent legal advice about the transaction. Mr. Jenkins received funds regarding the deceased and was instructed to use the fund to pay creditors. Mr. Jenkins failed to do so and the rep-resentation was terminated. Mr. Jenkins failed to return funds col-lected during the representation. The client retained new counsel who requested an accounting, a refund of the retained funds and the case file. Mr. Jenkins failed to respond and a charge was filed with the State Bar. Mr. Jenkins failed to respond to the State Bar’s request for information regarding the mat-ter.

In count four, Mr. Jenkins was paid $1,500 to prepare

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ning documents for a client who was hospital-ized. During the representation, Mr. Jenkins took possession of his client’s vehicle as partial pay-ment of his fees without advising his client, in writing, to seek the advice of independent coun-sel concerning the transaction. The client, with Mr. Jenkins’ assistance, obtained a reverse mort-gage on his home. After paying off the home, Mr. Jenkins deposited the remaining funds into his trust account. Mr. Jenkins contracted to have his client’s home cleaned and renovated and hired his brother to perform some of the work. Mr. Jenkins also arranged for his daughters to per-form caretaker duties for his client for a weekly fee. In neither instance did Mr. Jenkins advise his client or obtain written consent regarding the conflict of interest created by the employment of his brother and daughters. The representation was terminated and his client retained new coun-sel who requested an accounting, copies of all documents and identification cards in Mr. Jenkins’ possession and the return of any funds being held. After two requests, Mr. Jenkins sub-mitted an accounting.

Seven aggravating factors were found: prior disciplinary offenses, dishonest or selfish motive, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad-faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency, vulnerability of victims and substantial experience in the practice of law.

Five mitigating factors were found: personal or emotional problems, delay in disciplinary pro-ceedings, character or reputation, imposition of other sanctions and remoteness of prior offenses.

Mr. Jenkins violated Rule 42, ARIZ.R.S.CT.,

ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.7 and 1.8(f), 1.15, 1.16(d), 8.1and 8.4(a) and (d), and Rule 53(d) and (f), ARIZ.R.S.CT.

VALERIE K. JUDGE-MEYERS

Bar No. 025564; File No. 08-2215 Supreme Court No. SB-09-00117-D

By Arizona Supreme Court judgment and order dated Dec. 29, 2009, Valerie K. Judge-Myers, 601 N. Alma School Rd., Chandler, AZ, was cen-sured. She shall be placed on probation and required to participate in the State Bar’s Member Assistance Program. She also was assessed the costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceedings. Ms. Judge-Meyers was conditionally admitted to the practice of law on Sept. 18, 2008, with the requirement that she completely abstain from the consumption of alcohol, other drugs, or any mood altering chemicals for 18 months. Ms. Judge-Meyers tested positive for alcohol and admitted to consuming alcohol in December 2008. The cir-cumstances surrounding the consumption related directly to Ms. Judge-Meyers being overwhelmed with adjusting to the dual responsibilities of new motherhood and a legal career.

There were no aggravating factors.

Four mitigating factors were found: absence of prior disciplinary record, absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, full and free disclosure to

discipli-LAWYER REGULATION

nary board or cooperative attitude toward pro-ceedings and remorse.

Ms. Judge-Meyers violated Rule 53(g),

ARIZ.R.S.CT.

ROBERT R. JUNG

Bar No. 014198; File Nos. 1801, 1842, 08-1966

Supreme Court No. SB-09-0109-D

By Arizona Supreme Court judgment and order dated Dec. 3, 2009, Robert R. Jung, 21001 N. Tatum Blvd., Phoenix, AZ, was suspended for 60 days. Upon reinstatement, he will be placed on probation for two years and required to participate in the State Bar’s Law Office Management Assistance Program and Member Assistance Program. He also shall pay restitution and was assessed the costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceedings.

In count one, Mr. Jung was hired to represent a client in a criminal matter. The client was incar-cerated and his client’s father paid Mr. Jung’s $5,000 fee. Mr. Jung failed to execute a written fee agreement stating the scope of representation and stating that the fee had been paid by a third party. Mr. Jung performed some work on the mat-ter and appeared at the initial pretrial conference. Thereafter, Mr. Jung failed to return telephone calls or communicate or visit his client and the rep-resentation was terminated.

In count two, Mr. Jung was hired to represent a client in a DUI and was paid $2,500. Mr. Jung performed some work on the matter and made a court appearance. Thereafter, Mr. Jung failed to respond to the client’s numerous requests for information regarding the case status and the rep-resentation was terminated.

In count three, Mr. Jung was hired to repre-sent a client in a criminal matter. His client’s mother paid the $15,000 fee. The fee agreement contained a “non-refundable” fee statement but did not advise the client that Mr. Jung could be discharged at any time and all or part the fee may be refunded. The representation was terminated after Mr. Jung had done some initial work and appeared at an initial appearance hearing.

In all counts, Mr. Jung failed to provide and accounting and refund of unearned fees. In all counts, a charge was filed with the State Bar and Mr. Jung did not respond to the State Bar’s numerous attempts to contact him regarding the matters until a complaint was filed.

Four aggravating factors were found: prior dis-ciplinary offenses, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses and substantial experience in the practice of law.

Three mitigating factors were found: absence of a dishonest or selfish motive and personal or emotional problems.

Mr. Jung violated Rule 42, ARIZ.R.S.CT., ERs 1.4, 1.5, 1.15 and 1.16, and Rule 53(f), Ariz. R. Sup.Ct.

C

CAAUUTTIIOONN!! Nearly 16,000 attorneys are

eligible to practice law in Arizona. Many attorneys share the same names. All discipline

reports should be read carefully for names, addresses and Bar numbers.

WILLIAM M. LABUDA, JR.

Bar No. 022216; File Nos. 1383, 1766, 08-1796, 08-1828, 08-1829

Supreme Court No. SB-09-0108-D

By Arizona Supreme Court judgment and order dated Dec. 2, 2009, William M. Labuda, Jr., 2970 Camino del Rio, Bullhead City, AZ, was suspended for six months and one day and shall pay restitution. He also was assessed the costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceedings.

In count one, Mr. Labuda was paid $1,800 to represent a client in a child-custody matter. Mr. Labuda failed to appear for a scheduled meeting with his client and the representation was termi-nated. The client requested her file and an accounting of work and funds expended. The file was returned but Mr. Labuda did not provide a full accounting after numerous requests from the client. Mr. Labuda failed to file a motion to with-draw and failed to appear at a hearing to have his representation formally terminated.

In count two, Mr. Labuda was paid $500 to represent a client in a child-custody matter. Mr. Labuda did not file any pleadings in the matter and failed to respond to his clients numerous attempts to contact him regarding the case status. The representation was terminated.

In count three, Mr. Labuda was paid $2,500 to represent a client in a civil matter in 2006. The representation was terminated in April 2008 and Mr. Labuda failed to file a motion to withdraw. In May 2008, opposing counsel mailed a motion for partial summary judgment to Mr. Labuda. Mr. Labuda received a copy of the motion but did not file a response and the motion was grant-ed. Opposing counsel also filed an order for attorney’s fees and costs against Mr. Labuda’s client. Mr. Labuda failed to file a response and the order was granted.

In count four, Mr. Labuda was paid $5,000 to represent a client in a civil matter. The client made numerous attempts to contact Mr. Labuda regarding the matter. Mr. Labuda did not return a significant number of the phone calls.

In count five, Mr. Labuda was paid $1,000 to represent a client in a matter against Bullhead City, Arizona. Mr. Labuda failed to timely file a notice of claim with the city or respond to his client’s request for information on the matter. His client requested the return of her paperwork, but Mr. Labuda failed to comply.

In all counts a complaint was filed with the State Bar and Mr. Labuda failed to respond to the State Bar’s numerous requests for informa-tion regarding the matters.

Three aggravating factors were found: pat-tern of misconduct, multiple offenses and bad-faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency.

Three mitigating factors were found: absence of prior disciplinary record, absence of a dishon-est or selfish motive and personal or emotional problems.

Mr. Labuda violated Rule 42, ARIZ.R.S.CT., ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.16(d), 3.4(c), 8.1(b) and 8.4(d), and Rule 53(b), (d) and (f), ARIZ.R.S.CT.

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disciplinary offenses, multiple offenses, and sub-stantial experience in the practice of law.

Three mitigating factors were found: absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, personal or emo-tional problems and remorse.

Mr. Tynan violated Rule 42, ARIZ.R.S.CT., ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), (a)(4) and (b), and 8.1(b) and Rule 53(f), ARIZ.R.S.CT.

The Client Protection Fund was created by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Arizona in 1961 as required by a rule of the Supreme Court of Arizona. Its purpose is to promote public confidence in the administration of justice and to preserve the integrity of the legal profes-sion by reimbursing clients who have sustained losses caused by the dishonest conduct of lawyers admitted and licensed to practice in Arizona.

The fund is a nonprofit charitable organiza-tion governed by a Declaraorganiza-tion of Trust and administered by five volunteer trustees appoint-ed by the Bar’s Board of Governors. The Fund receives a yearly assessment from each active and inactive member of the State Bar (paid with the annual bar dues). In addition, the fund earns interest on its invested fund balance.

More information about the fund is at

www.azbar.org/cpf. Or contact the fund administrator at karen.weigand@staff.azbar.org or by phone: (602) 340-7286, toll free 866-482-9227.

The following is a brief summary of claims paid in the third quarter of 2009:

JOHN T. FRANKLIN

Bar No. 022163 ($2,000)

3The claimant retained Franklin to represent

her in a collection matter. The claimant states that Franklin performed only minimal legal work for her before he stopped return-ing calls and she lost contact with him. The Trustees found that Franklin did not per-form any services of value and that his failure to refund unearned fees constituted dishon-est conduct. The Fund paid the claimant $2,000.

JAMES T. GREGORY

Bar No. 021499 (three claims totaling $5,224)

3The Trustees reviewed three claims filed by

former clients of Gregory, each of whom had retained Gregory to represent them in a divorce matter. Each claimant alleged that Gregory did little or no work and then ceased contact with them. For each claim,

CLIENT PROTECTION

FUND QUARTERLY

REPORT

GARY L. LASSEN

Bar No. 005259; File No. 06-1529 Supreme Court No. SB-09-0115-D

By Arizona Supreme Court judgment and order dated Dec. 14, 2009, Gary L. Lassen, 2020 N. Central Ave., Phoenix, AZ, was censured. He will be placed on probation for one year and required to participate in the State Bar’s Member Assistance Program. He also was assessed the costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceed-ings.

Mr. Lassen pled no contest and was found guilty of extreme DUI, endangerment and leav-ing the scene of an injury accident. He was placed on probation for three years beginning Nov. 7, 2006 and required to serve 10 days in the coun-ty jail on work release.

There were no aggravating factors.

Six mitigating factors were found: timely good-faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct, full and free disclo-sure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings, character or reputation, delay in disciplinary proceedings, imposition of other penalties or sanctions and remorse.

Mr. Lassen violated Rule 42, ARIZ.R.S.CT.,

ER 8.4(b), and Rule 53(h)(1) ARIZ.R.S.CT.

MARK HYATT TYNAN

Bar No. 006212; File Nos. 05-1452, 05-1601, 06-1190, 07-0052

Supreme Court No. SB-08-0058-D

By Arizona Supreme Court judgment and order dated April 29, 2008, Mark Hyatt Tynan, 7320 E. Shoeman Lane, Ste. 204, Scottsdale, AZ, was censured and placed on probation for two years. He is required to participate in the State Bar’s Law Office Management Assistance Program and Member Assistance Program. Mr. Tynan also was assessed the costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceedings and paid restitution.

A four-count complaint was filed against Mr. Tynan but counts one and two were dismissed.

In count three, Mr. Tynan was hired to rep-resent a client in an appeal of a forcible entry and detainer judgment. The client, as directed by Mr. Tynan, filed a notice of appeal and paid the asso-ciated costs. Over the next five to six months, the client tried numerous times to contact Mr. Tynan without success. Mr. Tynan did not file any motions or take any action regarding the appeal and it was dismissed. The client filed a complaint with the State Bar. Mr. Tynan failed to respond to the State Bar’s request for information.

In count four, Mr. Tynan was paid $500 to represent a client in a bankruptcy proceeding. Over a 10-month period, the client left numer-ous messages for Mr. Tynan regarding her case without response. The bankruptcy case was dis-missed because Mr. Tynan failed to file a state-ment of monthly income and a declaration regarding payment. The client filed a complaint with the State Bar and again Mr. Tynan failed to respond to the State Bar’s request for informa-tion.

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the Trustees found that Gregory did not perform any services of value and that his failure to refund unearned fees constituted dishonest conduct. The Fund paid the claimants $2,000, $1,500, and $1,724, respectively.

JASON J. KELLER

Bar No. 022205 ($2,750)

3The claimant hired Keller to represent him in

a DUI matter and contended that the only legal work Keller performed on his case was to appear at one pre-trial hearing. The Trustees found that Keller did not perform any services of value and that his failure to refund unearned fees constituted dishonest conduct. The Fund paid the claimant $2,750.

CHRISTOPHER L. MAY

Bar No. 022583 ($2,250)

3The claimant retained May to represent him

in a criminal matter. The claimant states that May made one court appearance, and after that, the claimant had very little, if any, con-tact with May. The Trustees found that May did not perform any services of value and that his failure to refund unearned fees con-stituted dishonest conduct. The Fund paid the claimant $2,250.

JOHN G. MORRISON

Bar No. 006192 ($22,834.78)

3The claimants retained Morrison to represent

them in a personal injury matter. The claimants state that Morrison settled their case without their knowledge, forged their signatures to endorse the check, and kept the money. Upon investigation, the Trustees concluded that Morrison had converted the settlement proceeds, and reimbursed the claimants $22,834.78.

JESSE PAUL SUPLIZIO

Bar No. 022720 (two claims totaling $10,465)

3The Fund received two claims from former

clients of Suplizio, each of whom alleged that they had retained Suplizio to file trade-mark applications and that Suplizio had failed to perform any work and ceased com-munication with them. For each claim, the Trustees found that Suplizio did not perform any services of value and that his failure to refund unearned fees constituted dishonest conduct. The Fund paid the claimants $1,630, and $8,835, respectively.

ANDREW TODD WIRTH Bar No. 022317 (three claims totaling $14,500)

For each of the following claims, the Trustees found that Wirth did not perform any services of value and that his failure to refund unearned fees constituted dishonest conduct.

3The claimant in the first matter hired Wirth to

represent him in a civil matter. The claimant

CLIENT PROTECTION FUND

w w w . m y a z b a r. o r g / A Z A t t o r n e y M A R C H 2 0 1 0 A R I Z O N A A T T O R N E Y 69 that Franklin provided no services, despite numerous requests by the claimants for proof of work done. The Trustees found that Franklin did not perform any services of value and that his failure to refund unearned fees constituted dishonest conduct. The Fund paid the claimant $900.

RAUL GARZA, JR.

Bar No. 021090 ($2,500)

3The claimants retained Garza to represent

them in a property damage matter. The claimants state that the only legal work Garza performed was to prepare a demand letter that was never sent. The Trustees found that Garza did not perform any services of value and that his failure to refund unearned fees constituted dishonest conduct. The Fund paid the claimants $2,500.

JAMES T. GREGORY

Bar No. 021499 (three claims totaling $8,500)

For each of the following claims, the Trustees found that Gregory did not perform any services of value and that his failure to refund unearned fees constituted dishonest conduct.

3The claimant in the first matter retained

Gregory to represent her in a divorce matter. The claimant alleges that Gregory did no legal work for her, and also that she had no further contact with him after their initial meeting and he did not return her phone calls. The Fund paid the claimant $2,500.

3The second claimant retained Gregory to

rep-resent her in an immigration appeal matter. The claimant states that Gregory performed no legal work for her, and that she received no information or phone calls from Gregory after paying the retainer. The Fund paid the claimant $5,000.

3The claimant in the third matter retained

Gregory to represent him in a DUI matter. The claimant states that once he paid Gregory’s retainer, Gregory ceased all com-munication with him and did not appear at a scheduled court hearing. The Fund paid the claimant $1,000.

WILLIAM L. TIFFT

Bar No. 003022 ($1,000)

3The claimants retained Tifft to assist them

with a foreclosure on a tax lien. The claimants state that after they retained Tifft, they had very little contact with him, they received no communications from him, and that they eventually contacted the court and were informed that Tifft had filed no paperwork on their behalf. The Trustees found that Tifft did not perform any services of value and that his failure to refund unearned fees constituted dishonest conduct. The Fund paid the claimant $1,000.

CLIENT PROTECTION FUND

states that the only legal work Wirth per-formed was several phone conversations and meetings. The Fund paid the claimant $5,000.

3The second claimant retained Wirth to

repre-sent her in a visitation rights matter. The claimant states that Wirth performed only minimal legal work for her before he was placed on Interim Suspension in a formal dis-ciplinary proceeding and was unable to com-plete representation. The Fund paid the claimant $5,000.

3The claimant in the third matter hired Wirth

to represent him in a criminal matter. The claimant states that Wirth provided him with approximately three hours of court time prior to his receiving a letter from Wirth stating that Wirth was “disqualified from the practice of law.” The Fund paid the claimant $4,500.

The following is a brief summary of the claims paid in the fourth quarter of 2009:

STEPHEN JOHN BOYDEN

Bar No. 023598 ($2,000)

3The claimant retained Boyden to represent

him in a civil matter. The claimant states that Boyden did not file the complaint or perform any other legal work and also did not respond to phone calls. The Trustees found that Boyden did not perform any services of value and that his failure to refund unearned fees constituted dishonest conduct. The Fund paid the claimant $2,000.

GEORGE R. BROWN

Bar No. 009628 ($10,370)

3The claimant retained Brown to represent her

in a wrongful death matter. The claimant con-tends that Brown abandoned her case after taking her money, and also that he did not respond to her emails. She states that Brown did file the lawsuit, but did nothing else. The Trustees found that Brown did not perform any services of value and that his failure to refund unearned fees constituted dishonest conduct. The Fund paid the claimant $10,370.

JOHN T. FRANKLIN

Bar No. 022163 (two claims totaling $2,699)

3The claimant retained Franklin to represent

her in a bankruptcy matter. The claimant alleges that Franklin did not properly file her bankruptcy paperwork and this caused the case to be dismissed. The Trustees found that Franklin did not perform any services of value and that his failure to refund unearned fees constituted dishonest conduct. The Fund paid the claimant $1,790.

3The claimant, a homeowners association,

retained Franklin to correspond with a home-owner and to expedite to trial a breach of homeowner regulations. The claimant states

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