Noun Phrases:
The nature o f reference
and
ambiguity.
Emma Borg.
Submission for a doctoral examination in Philosophy.
University College London.
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Abstract
T h e aim o f this thesis is to argue for a ‘unified’ stance on noun phrase
classification; whereby, given a com m on-sense syntactic category like
d e m o n stra tiv e or description, if one m em ber o f the c ategory belongs to a given
sem antic kind, then a ll do. T he thesis begins by draw ing a parallel b e tw e en tw o
d ebates which are not always b rought together: the issue o f w hether all o r only
so m e definite descriptions are quantified noun phrases and w h e th e r all o r only
so m e com p le x dem onstratives are referring terms. I suggest that w e should
p refe r a c o m m o n m ethodology for questions such as these, looking m ore
generally at w hat features lead us to ascribe an expression any particular
sem antic analysis. I consider three options: intuited behaviour across contexts;
syntactic categories; and syntactic properties which m ay cro ss-cu t syntactic
classes. T h e second option is then explored via an in-depth exam ination of
c o m p le x dem onstratives and is seen to be the m ost appealing.
H o w e v e r, unification is open to tw o serious objections: first, that it fails
to a c c o u n t properly for certain recalcitrant noun phrases in natural language;
second, th a t it is in tension with a (substantial) conception o f reference and w hat
it is to b e a referring term. I dismiss both these arguments: rejecting the first
th ro u g h a recognition o f the kinds o f features natural language speakers use in
p ractice fo r assigning syntactic category, and through an adoption o f the Gricean
distinction b e tw e en semantic and pragm atic meaning. I reject the s e co n d by
sho w in g th at the syntax-independent conception o f reference the argum ent
de pe nds on does n o t fit ordinary language users actual conception o f reference;
rath e r w e should em brace a syntax-dependent conception, which lends credence
to the m irroring o f semantics in syntax. Thus I conclude there is no bar to our
N o u n P h ra ses: The n a tu re o f referen ce a n d a m b ig u ity
CONTENTS:
Chapter One
( 1 )
(2)
Providing a Methodology
Noun Phrases
(i) T h e n a tu r e o f re f e r e n c e
Sem antic Theories and Truth Theoretic Accounts
(i) T h e a im s o f a s e m a n ti c th e o r y (ii) C o n d it io n s o f su ccess
(iii) T r u th c o n d it io n a l s e m a n t i c s (iv) U tilis in g a truth th e o r y
(v) C o n c l u d i n g c o n c e p t io n o f a s e m a n tic th e o r y
5
6
15
Chapter Two
(1)
Quantified Noun Phrases and Referring Terms
Quantified Noun Phrases
(i) F ir s t- o r d e r logical q u a n tif ie r s (ii) G e n e r a li z e d q u a n tif ic a tio n (iii) D e f in ite d e s c r ip tio n s
(iv) A s e m a n ti c m e c h a n i s m fo r q u a n tif ie d n o u n p h r a s e s
(2) Referring Terms
37 38 55 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
(3) Conclusion
E m p t y n a m e s C o n t e x t d e p e n d e n c e
C o n d it io n a l is e d truth th e o r e m s T r u t h th e o r ie s as r e la tiv is e d
A s e m a n ti c m e c h a n is m fo r r e f e rrin g te r m s
78
Chapter Three
(1)
(2)
(3)
Assigning Semantic Category
The Unified Theory
Ambiguity Theory (I): Semantic status as
dependent on intuited behaviour across contexts
(i) S im p lic it y (ii) R ig id d e s i g n a ti o n (iii) P e r m u t a t i o n in v a r ia n c e (iv) C o n c l u s i o n
Ambiguity Theory (II): Semantic status as dependent on syntactic properties
80
81
85
(4) The Way Ahead
101
109
Chapter Four
(1)
Complex Demonstratives
‘T hat’ is a Quantifier
113
N o u n P h ra se s : T h e n a tu r e o f re fe r e n c e a n d a m b ig u ity C o n te n ts
(2) Divide ‘T hat’ from the Matrix ~ 120
(3) The Pragmatic Approach ~ 126
(4) Complex Characters ~ 132
Chapter
Five ~ Non-standard Noun Phrases ~ 140
( 1 ) Non-standard Occurrences of Superficially
Quantified Noun Phrases ~ 142
(2) Non-standard Occurrences of Superficially
Referential Expressions ~ 150
Chapter Syntax, Surface Features
Six ~ and Pragmatics ~ 158
(1) Surface Form ~ 159
(i) A n a p h o r a
(2) Semantics and Pragmatics ~ 166
(I) T h e G r ic e a n m e c h a n is m
(3) Non-standard Quantified Noun Phrases ~ 172
(4) Non-standard Referential Expressions ~ 182
(5) Conclusion ~ 190
Chapter
Seven ~ The Nature of Reference ~ 193
(1) The Argum ent for Ambiguity ~ 194
(2) Singular Terms and Singular Thoughts - 195
(3) Reference as Independent of Syntax ~ 204
(4) Problems with Syntax-independent Conceptions of Reference - 217
(5) The Syntax-dependent Conception of Reference ~ 222
(6) Conclusion ~ 227
CONCLUSION ~ 229
Chapter 1 ~
Providing a Methodology
It is in d e e d a g e n e r a lly h a r m le s s a n d s a lu ta r y t h i n g to say th a t to k n o w the m e a n i n g o f a s e n t e n c e is to k n o w u n d e r w h a t c o n d it io n s o n e w h o u tte rs it says s o m e th i n g true.
- S tr a w s o n , ‘M e a n i n g a n d T r u t h ’, p . l O l .
T
he aim o f this thesis is to show that certain kinds o f syntacticcategories, as revealed by the surface features o f expressions, provide the key for ascriptions o f semantic allegiance for (atleast some) noun phrases.' I will label this position the ‘unified’ stance and it will
be contrasted with, and defended against, an opposing ‘am biguity’ approach.
T h e structure o f the thesis is as follows: in this chapter and the next w e will set
up the background necessary to discuss the unified stance properly. This will
involve, in this chapter, looking at w hat a noun phrase is and w hat kind of
syntactic categories we are interested in (the tasks of §1); and explaining w hat a
semantic category amounts to (in §2). T he m ethodological fram ew ork adopted
throughout this thesis will be that o f a com positional, truth conditional semantic
theory;" thus much o f this chapter will be d e v o te d to exploring the motivation
and means for such an approach. T he reasons for preferring such an a pproach
to, say, any rival communication, or intention, based a pproach will be touched
upon below, but limitations o f space will prevent us exploring the debate in
depth. Thus the idea that some form o f truth conditional a pproach provides the
m ost successful account of natural language m ay be tho u g h t o f as som ething
w hich is assumed, rather than established, by this thesis.^
' L im ita tio n s o f s p a c e will mean that I c a n n o t a i m to s h o w this h y p o th e s is h o ld s g o o d f o r a ll
nou n p h ra s e s ; the m o s t g la r in g o m issio n in w h a t f o l l o w s will be th e c la s s o f p lu r al n o u n p h ra s e s, w h ic h will re m a in alm ost en tirely u n e x p lo r e d .
' In S t r a w s o n ’s ( 1 9 7 0 ) te r m in o lo g y w e will b e p u r s u in g th e ro u t e o f th e ‘fo r m a l s e m a n t i c i s t ’ , as o p p o s e d to th e ‘c o m m u n i c a t io n th e o r e ti c ’ a p p r o a c h .
Having sketched the form o f our semantic theory, the task o f C h a p te r 2
will then be to explain how w e can accom m odate noun phrases within this
fram ew ork. T he aim will be to survey the current state o f play in this area,
however, not to provide a com plete account o f all aspects o f the semantic
analysis of noun phrases. O nce these semantic mechanisms are in place, w e can
then, in C hapter 3, begin to tackle the real w ork o f the thesis: establishing the
unified and ambiguity approaches clearly and looking at the m otivations for each.
C hapter 4 will help to clarify the positive proposal o f this thesis, by examining
w hat the unified stance might predict for a particular case, viz. ‘com plex
dem onstratives’; and this position will then be defended against w hat I take to be
the best objections available to the ambiguity theorist, in Chapters 5 to 7. B efore
all this, however, let us start at the very beginning by looking at the kind of
expressions we want to explore.
L Noun Phrases:
N oun phrases are those expressions in natural language which are
conventionally used for picking out entities in the w orld around us; they are the
‘o b jec t-w o rd s ’ o f our language, like names and dem onstratives, which form such
a crucial part o f any linguistic system.^ The category ‘noun p h ra s e ’ is a syntactic
category, meaning that we are able to group expressions to g eth e r as noun
phrases simply due to the formal features o f those expressions, like their
sentential position and their potential interaction with other expressions. Indeed,
categorisations like ‘noun p h ra s e ’ and ‘verb p h ra s e ’ form a key pa rt o f o u r best
theory o f syntax to date, viz. C h o m s k y ’s ‘Principles and P a ra m e te rs ’
grammatical theory.^ In this account, the syntactic unit o f a noun phrase is
view ed as c o m posed out o f smaller syntactic items, like nouns and determiners;
T h is c l a i m o f im p o r t a n c e fo r n o u n p h r a s e s is p e r h a p s r e in f o r c e d by r e c e n t w o r k in d e v e l o p m e n t a l p sy c h o l o g y s h o w in g that o b je c t w o rd s f o r m by fa r th e la r g e s t p e r c e n t a g e o f w o r d s a c q u ir e d by th e infant in th e early st a g e s o f la n g u a g e use, both b e f o r e and d u r i n g th e g r e a te s t p e rio d o f n e w w o rd a c q u is itio n (the ‘v o c a b u la r y s p u r t ’)- Cf. C o ld f i e ld a n d R e z n i c k ( 1 9 9 0 ) .
and as combining to g e th e r to form larger syntactic units, like sentences/'
H ow e ver, alongside the divisions recognised within a syntactic theory such as
C h o m s k y ’s, ordinary language speakers recognise a further class o f categories;
categories w hich a p p e ar to cut m ore finely than the b ro ad label o f ‘noun p h r a s e ’.
Within the category o f object-w ords are thought to be such expression-
types as proper names, dem onstratives, indexicals and definite descriptions
(phrases formed by concatenating the definite article ‘th e ’ with one or m ore
com m on nouns). F urthe rm ore , it is these com m on-sense syntactic categories
which have, to a large extent, p reoc c upie d philosophers in this area; with well-
know n debates including questions such as ‘is the m eaning o f a p r o p e r nam e its
b e a re r? ’ and ‘w hat is the c orre c t semantic analysis o f a definite description?’
Although such categorisations are not utilised within C h o m s k y ’s account, they
still seem to deserve the epithet 'sy n ta c tic ’ or ‘fo rm a l’, since p r im a fa c ie the
criterion for som e thing’s being a definite description, etc., seems to be the form
o f w ords o f the expression or similar formal properties.^ F o r instance,
traditionally, it seems that it is sufficient for an expression to c o u n t as a definite
description that it be o f the form o f w ords ‘th e ’^ ‘F ’ (w here ‘F ’ stands for any
c om m on noun and ‘^ ’ indicates the concatenation relation); while it is often
suggested that the w ords ‘this’ and ‘th a t’ are g o o d exam ples o f dem onstratives
in English. So, in what follows, I will often talk o f these classes (the syntactic
categories within the class o f noun phrases) as ‘com m o n -se n se syntactic
ca te g o rie s ’, for they can be recognised by theorists and speakers alike on the
basis o f quite superficial formal properties (such as the orthographic or phonetic
form) o f the expression.
A ' d e t e r m i n e r ' is an e x p r e s s i o n like ‘t h e ’ o r ‘a l l ’ w h ic h c o m b i n e s w ith a c o m m o n n o u n to f o r m an N P (o r nou n p h ra s e ); w e will b e e x a m i n i n g th e C h o m s k i a n th e o r y in m o r e d etail in C h a p t e r 3.
The kinds o f expressions we are interested in are, then, in the first place,
the noun phrases, or o bject-w ords, o f our language; and within this broad church
1 will take it that we can recognise such things as p ro p er names, definite
descriptions and dem onstratives. T h e issue for this thesis is ‘ho w should we
construe the relation be tw e en these categories w ithin the class o f noun phrases
and semantic cate gorie s? ’ T o begin to consider this issue we need to start by
reflecting on how we might generalise across the class o f noun phrases itself,
considering w hether it is possible to provide a single kind o f analysis for the
meaning o f all token noun phrases in natural language. H ow e ver, I believe that
even a cursory consideration o f the wide range o f these expressions suffices to
make us doubt the possibility o f providing a single, universal analysis for the
meaning o f all noun phrases. F o r it seems, p rim a fa c ie , that the meaning o f a
p roper name like ‘M a ry ’, and the relation it stands in to its bearer, is quite
different from the meaning o f an expression such as ‘som e girl’ and the way in
which it secures an object.
The difference seems to lie in the way in which the object is secured in
each case; for some noun phrases seem to arrive at an object by describ in g it,
whilst others seem to attach in som e m ore direct, non-descriptive manner. T o
begin with then, as a w orking hypothesis, I should like to assum e that the
linguistic category of noun phrase contains (at least) tw o distinct types: those
which arrive at an object via its satisfaction o f predicative c onte nt and those that
do not. Furtherm ore, I should like to assum e that this distinction m arks a
sem antic division between w h a t we will call ‘quantified noun p h ra s e s ’ (for
reasons that will becom e clear in the next chapter) and ‘singular’ or ‘referring’
terms. W hat it means to claim the distinction as a ‘sem antic’ one will be
something we need to discuss further, when we c o m e to look at w hat a semantic
theory actually is (in §2). F o r now how ever, let us begin by considering the
p rim a fa c ie evidence for draw ing any kind o f distinction within the class o f noun
phrases. Although we will not be in a position to appreciate all the evidence until
semantic category) we might still rehearse the pre-theoretical evidence for such a
split.
The intuitive evidence for the descriptive class o f noun phrases, which we
are calling ‘quantified noun p h ra s e s ’, seems clear: som e expressions simply do
appear to select objects only through those o b jec ts’ satisfaction o f certain
predicates. The expressions themselves introduce a descriptive ‘profile’ or
'tem p late ’ which objects in the world can be ‘m atched a gainst’, with the object
(or objects) which satisfies that predicative com plex becom ing the ‘d e n o ta tio n ’
o f the expression (to b o rro w R ussell’s terminology).^ In w h a t follows the term
‘d e n o ta tio n ’ will be used ex clu sively for objects selected by description; thus it
will be used in contrast to the term ‘referent’ which will nam e only the object
selected by a singular term. (It will also, h ow ever, be useful to have a more
geneial term, covei ing the objects selected by both quantified noun phrases and
singular terms; thus I will stipulate that the term ‘extension’ will be used in this
thesis to talk about the object selected by a noun phrase, which is agnostic about
the semantic status o f that noun phrase.) Expressions settling on objects via the
properties they possess seem to have little or no rega rd for the particular identity
of their denotation; thus we m ight expect an utterance such as ‘a b oy is h a p p y ’ to
be true if John or Peter (or any other boy in the dom ain) is happy, for the identity
of which boy is happy is irrelevant. Intuitively, then, som e noun phrases in
natural language do seem to arrive at objects via those o b je c ts ’ satisfaction of
certain predicative material, and this is enough to w arrant at least a tentative
assum ption as to the existence o f quantified noun phrases.
The second p ropose d category o f noun p hrase is ‘singular’ o r ‘referring’
terms: these are expressions which are supposed to stand in som e more
immediate, non-descriptive relation to an object. I would s uggest that a j?rimci
fa cie motivation for this category com es from a recognition o f the usefulness of
having such an immediate way to pick out an object; for instance, w here that
object is of such significance that it deserves a p ro p e r name, as S traw son notes:
|I]t is c o n v e n i e n t to h a v e in c ir c u la tio n in [such] g r o u p s a tag, a d e s i g n a t i o n , w h ic h d oes not d e p e n d t o r its refe re n tia l o r id e n tif y in g fo r ce u p o n any p a r t ic u l a r s u c h p o s i tio n o r re la ti o n , w h ic h p re s e rv e s th e s a m e re f e re n tia l fo rce th r o u g h its o b je c t s ’ c h a n g e s o f p o s itio n o r r e la tio n a n d has th e s a m e re f e re n tia l fo rce fo r c o m m u n i c a t o r s w h o k n o w th e object in d if fe re n t c o n n e c t io n s a nd f o r w h o m q u it e d if fe re n t d e s c r ip tio n s w o u ld be u p p e r m o s t. It is c o n v e n i e n t , in fact, to h a v e p e rs o n a l n a m e s .
W hat underlies the usefulness o f p ro p e r names and oth er apparently referential
expressions is thal they provide us with a way o f keeping track o f objects
regardless o f the properties they c om e to instantiate; by being concerned with the
actual identity o f their referent, rather than simply the properties o f a denotation,
they give us a direct way to m ake and maintain contact with an object. As
Fpllesdal notes, this reflects an im portant aspect o f our interaction with the
world:
In o u r pra c tic a l life [th erefo re] it is often im p o r t a n t to k eep tr a c k o f [these] objects, th r o u g h th e c h a n g e s they u n d e r g o , th r o u g h o u r f u r th e r e x p l o r a ti o n o f th e m , a n d th r o u g h o u r c h a n g i n g o p in i o n s a b o u t t h e m an d c o r r e c ti n g o u r m i s t a k e n beliefs a b o u t th e m . W e s h o u ld e x p e c t th a t in o u r la n g u a g e th e r e o u g h t to be a re flectio n o f th e im p o r t a n t role th a t objects play in o u r lives. A n d I th in k th e r e are s u c h r e f le c tio n s ...n a m e ly , s i n g u l a r t e r m s . . . . W i th o u t such te r m s in th e l a n g u a g e w e w o u ld h a v e a p r o b l e m t a l k in g a b o u t c h a n g e s , a b o u t m is ta k e n beliefs a nd so o n . ' "
As w e will com e to see later (in C hapter 3), the idea that natural language
does contain a semantically distinct class o f expressions which are especially
tailored for direct talk about objects can be denied. For som e theorists have
suggested that even apparently paradigm leferential terms, such as p ro p e r names,
are in fact no more than specialised descriptive p h ra s e s ." H o w e v er, although we
will eventually have to face the question o f w h e th e r any observable behaviour o f
the p ro p o se d members o f this category dem a n d s semantic level accom m odation,
w e may at least draw an initial conclusion from o u r first reflection on noun
phrases. F o r intuition certainly does seem to d e m and a distinct class o f genuinely
referential expressions; and, while c om plete inability to a c co m m o d a te such a
class might make us look again at ou r strong intuitions, from the ou tse t
approaches which deny the existence o f a distinct kind o f referential noun phrase
are handicapped by riding ro u g h sh o d over ou r intuitive view o f the explananda
S tr a w s o n (1 9 7 4 ) , p p .45-6. " ’F p llesd al (1 9 9 5 ) , pp.6 0-1 .
o f natural language. T he argum ent is then that pre-theoretical reflection tells us
that some expressions, such as p ro p er names, refer to, rather than describe, the
objects they are about; and this is sufficient to w arrant at least a p rim a fa cie
acceptance o f a separate category o f singular terms. In the next chapter, we will
have to turn to the issue o f h o w such an assum ption (about the duality o f kinds
o f noun phrase) might be acco m m o d a te d within the sort o f truth conditional
semantic theory we will adopt (in §2). H ow ever, before we begin to explore
truth conditional semantics there is one final point w e should bring to the fore
concerning o u r discussion o f noun phrases: this is a possible equivocation in our
talk o f singular terms.
(i) The na tu re o f reference:
In the above section we talked o f terms especially tailored for direct talk
about objects: expressions which did not simply describe objects, but served to
refei' to them. T he underlying assumption seem ed to be that reference was a
relation that an elem ent in a linguistic system could b ear to an object external to
that system; it was a ‘w o r d - w o r ld ’ relation (to b o rro w B r a n d o m ’s terminology)
in which it seem ed possible to arrive at correct pairings w ithout explicit mention
o f the user o f the w o rd .'" This approach is perhaps to be found in F r e g e ’s
account o f reference and other linguistic notions, for, as Nelson notes, in a
Fregean fram ew ork :
T h e h u m a n u s e r w h o k n o w s th e s t r u c tu r e g r a s p s a r e a d y - m a d e s y s te m o f la n g u a g e , s e m a n ti c s a n d all, an d is in no way p a r t o f th e m e c h a n i s m s o f r e f e r e n c e and a p p lic a tio n . T h e u se r is not c o n s t it u ti v e o f re f e r e n c e as h e is for L o c k e , B r e n t a n o a n d P e ir c e , bu t w ie ld s a p r e - f a b r i c a te d l a n g u a g e - w o r l d s y s te m .'^
This idea o f a ‘pre-fabricated language-w orld s y ste m ’ seems, with respect to
singular term s, to invoke a quite particular conception of reference. This is a
view o f reference as essentially ‘lang u a g e -b o u n d ’: as integral to, and arising out
of, o u r understanding o f the formal features o f ou r language. On such a model
the true hom e o f a theory o f reference will be within the theory o f m eaning for a
language, where this theory o f meaning is sensitive to the systematic properties
o f linguistic items.
On this kind o f a pproa c h ou r conception o f reference is tied to o u r
understanding o f the form and function of certain linguistic items. In this way
the reference relation might be thought to be implicitly defined, or exhausted, by
all the correct instances o f a referential axiom for the language. T h e re will be
nothing more to kn o w about reference than is supplied by claims o f the form ‘the
referent o f “ Aristotle” is A risto tle ’ (or similar constructions) and there will be no
substantial property o f reference dem anding non-linguistic explanation prior to
the generation o f such t h e o r e m s . T h e reference relation will not stand in need
o f explanation or analysis in any terms which lie outside the semantic theory; to
talk about reference we will not need a richer vocabulary than we need to deliver
o u r formal, truth conditional semantic theory. This conception o f reference, as
part and parcel o f our form al theory o f m eaning, and thus as adm itting w ords and
objects as its primary relata, I will call a ‘syntax-dependent’ conception of
reference, for it denies that there is any understanding o f reference to be had in
isolation from our study of the formal features o f a language.
Yet, p rim a fa c ie , such a conception o f reference, as intimately bound up
with study o f the syntax, might seem a s om ew hat technical or derived notion.
Instead, it might be thought, we have a conception o f the relation which can be
arrived at independently o f ou r formal semantic theory; so that, when an
expression refers to a given object, w hat this status reflects is not j u st the formal
properties o f the expression, but the instantiation o f som e non-linguistic state of
affairs. That is to say, we have a conception o f reference which is p r io r to a
study o f the formal features o f a language, and which can then be b ro u g h t to our
construction of a theory o f meaning. So, the reference relation m ad e use of in a
clause like ‘the referent of “t” = t ’, which pairs natural language expressions with
the objects they name, will be d e riv e d fr o m or su p e rv en ien t on som e state of
affairs beyond those c aptured within our formal theory. S tatem ents o f reference
pairing words and objects will not be primitive but will rest upon some more
fundamental condition, and thus the prim ary aim o f a theory o f reference will be
to characterise these conditions. This kind of approach assum es that the
linguistic relation o f reference stands in need o f explanation or analysis by appeal
to features beyond those the formal semantic theory is sensitive to. W e might
think of this kind o f conception o f reference as a ‘syntax-independent approach.
O f course, given this kind o f syntax-independent view, the k in d of state
of affairs the theory of reference needs to capture remains quite open. For
instance, a syntax-independent view may form part o f a w ider reductive
program m e which seeks to explain all semantic notions in som e m ore primitive,
or physicalist, vocabulary (for instance, as we will see in C h a p te r 7, Field seems
to advocate this kind of approach).'^ O r again, the vocabulary w e are familiar
with from the construction o f a theory o f meaning for a language may be
retained, though it is to be u nderstood th rough its role in characterising the
mental states o f agents. In this way, the true hom e o f a theory o f reference
w ould be within a theory o f mind, picking out the referential intentions o f agents
(e.g., as we will see below , S tra w s o n ’s ‘referential u s e ’).'*" Clearly, then,
approaches which will be grouped togethe r as syntax-independent accounts may
diverge significantly in further dimensions o f choice, such as the status accorded
to sem antic concepts.
H ow ever, although we will have reason to touch upon these further
debates again (when we c om e to exam ine c o ncrete examples o f theories of
reference in C hapter 7), we should note that these issues are orthogonal to our
primary debate. The division we are c oncerned with is betw een accounts which
view referential status as integral to, and delivered by, a formal semantic theory
for a language, and, on the other hand, those which view reference as emerging
from som e state o f affairs characterised independently o f such a theory. T o
lepeat: the crucial distinction wc will be interested in is betw een syntax-
dependent conceptions (which take our understanding o f reference to arise out of
our understanding o f syntactic properties) and syntax-independent conceptions
(which take our grasp o f the relation to be a u to n o m o u s from such formal
features). Finally then, let us conclude this section by briefly considering why
this distinction between syntax-dependent and syntax-independent theories of
reference might concern us.
The crucial aspect o f this debate concerns its repercussions for our
account o f the semantic assignments m ade to noun phrases. T o advertise a key
argum ent in advance: I will contend that the best theory o f noun phrase
classification, viz. ‘unification’ (whereby whole c o m m on-sense syntactic
categories map to a single semantic category), is threatened by a syntax-
independent conception o f reference, for this gives us no reason to expect the
semantic category o f referring expressions to be reflected in formal boundaries,
like those o f syntactic category. Yet, I will argue, we have reason to believe that
the conception o f reference actually deployed by natural language speakers is the
former, minimal model, w here an e x p re ssio n ’s status as a referring term is
determined by a formal theory o f meaning, independent o f a s p e a k e r’s aims or
intentions; thus the reference relation itself, properly conceived, will be seen to
give us no reason to reject unification. This is a com plex m atte r and one w e will
return to in much more detail in C hapter 7; but let us for the present note that
talk of an e xp ressio n 's status as a referring term glosses over fundam ental issues
about the way in which w e are characterising referential expressions in the first
place, issues which we will have to return to eventually.
How ever, what we need to do now is to take a step ba c k and begin to
clarify those fundamental notions which have a central role to play in o u r
discussion. For instance, we need to understand w h a t is m eant by the term
‘sem antics’ and what sort o f b a c k g ro u n d m ethodology our debate will employ.
For only by settling our general m ethodology can we give c o n te n t to the
noun phrases as a se m a n tic distinction am ounts to. So, let us begin by looking at
the aims of, and the constraints on, semantic theorising in general; before
ultimately embracing the truth theoretic a c count o w e d to Frege, Tarski and
Davidson.
(2) Sem antic Theories a n d Truth Theoretic A ccounts:
( i ) The aim s o f a s e m a n tic theory:
Let us begin by asking w hat we w ant a semantic theory /br: w hat is a
semantic theory a theory o f and w hat should a successful one do? A semantic
theory is a theory o f m eaning, but only o f one particular aspect o f meaning: our
theory should deal with that portion o f meaning derivable solely from the
meanings and com position o f solely linguistic items. T hat is to say, it should
account for the literal meaning o f utterances, sentences and w ords in a given
language. W e might think o f such a theory as the m ost basic level o f linguistic
analysis, yielding w hat Recanati has called ‘the minimal p ro p o sitio n ’, from which
further meaning analyses may be draw n (for instance, once pragm atic features
have been brought into play, as we will see b e l o w ) . F r o m the outset w e should
distinguish this kind o f en d e av o u r from a distinct project, which might also
warrant the label ol' ‘a theory o f m e a n in g ’, one which seeks to explore the nature
of meaning itself. T he kind o f semantic theory which is o f interest to us in this
thesis is one which yields, for e ach sentence, s, a way o f com pleting a sentence of
the form: means that...’; while the alternative conception o f a theory of
meaning w ould offer us som e (possibly reductive) account o f w h a t m eaning is
(along the lines, say, o f an account o f k n o w le d g e which analyses it as ‘justified,
true belief’).'^ Since we are not involved in this latter kind o f project we must
accept the possibility that a satisfactory theory o f m eaning, in our first sense, may
yet not fully explicate the meaning relation itself and thus may n o t serve as a
theory o f m eaning in the second sense.
R e c a n a ti (1 9 9 3 ), p . 243. p p . 2 65-6; p r a g m a t i c r e f i n e m e n t s to s e m a n ti c p r o n o u n c e m e n t s wi c o m e to the to r e in C h a p te r 6.
Concentrating on this first form, then, we might immediately recognise
tw o distinct co m p o n e n ts o f any semantic theory; there is the language the theory
treats of, which we m ight call the 'o b ject-language', and there is the language the
theory is stated in, which we might call the ‘m eta-language’. So the task o f ou r
semantic theory is to give, for each sentence o f the object-language, som e
specification o f that s e n te n c e ’s meaning. W e want a systematic account which
yields, for each and every (well-formed) sentence o f the object-language a
theorem o f the form, or equivalent to:
( 1 ) .V means (in-L) that p.
Following Frege, this sort o f statem ent o f the aim o f semantic theorising takes
the primary display o f linguistic meaning to be the sentence, rather than the
word.''^ The sentence seems to be a g o o d candidate for the principal level at
which m eaning is assessed, for it is only at the sentential level that agents are able
to express thoughts and represent states o f the world. As W ittgenstein noted:
N a m i n g is not so f a r a m o v e in th e l a n g u a g e - g a m e - a n y m o r e th a n p u t t i n g a p ie c e in its p l a c e on th e b o a rd is a m o v e in chess. W e m a y say: n o th in g h a s so far be en d o n e , w h e n a t h i n g h as been n a m e d . It has no t e v e n g o t a n a m e e x c e p t in th e la n g u a g e - g a m e . T h i s w as w h a t F r e g e m e a n t too, w h e n h e said that a w o rd had m e a n i n g o n ly as part o f a se n te n c e .
111 this way a w o r d ’s significance can be characterised in terms o f its role in
sentences and the contribution it m akes to the meaning o f larger propositions.
This conjecture, that it is only within the context o f a sentence that a smaller
linguistic item can be assessed for meaning, is sometim es labelled F r e g e ’s
‘context principle’."'
On its own, a theory which yields specifications like (1) above will not
how e ve r be sufficient, for it requires som e way o f connecting with the s p e a k e r ’s
aims or intentions. T h a t is to say, we need to recognise that it is n o t ju st
sentences p e r se that are the candidates for meaning, b u t rather w hat Austin
called ‘illocutionary a c ts ’."" W h a t we are concerned with are meaningful
F r e g e (1 9 1 8 ) ; this, as D u m m e t t (1 9 7 8 ) , p p .9 4 -5 , p o in ts ou t, s h o u ld n o t be ta k e n as the a s s e rtio n that ‘the s e n t e n c e is th e u n it o f m e a n i n g ’ , i.e. that th e s e n t e n c e p r o v i d e s a s in g le , n o n - c o m p le x m e a n in g f u l sign.
' " W i t t g e n s t e i n ( 1 9 5 3 ) , 24e, §49.
linguistic acts, which are constituted not just by the p roduction o f a sentence, but
the uttering o f an expression under som e particular ‘cognitive g u ise ’, e.g. an
assertion that p, a question or com m and that p. This recognition that what a
given sentence in some sense m eans has much to do with w hat it is being u sed to
say has led many theorists away from a formal approach and to w a rd s approaches
which try to account for linguistic meaning in term s o f ‘speech a c ts ’ or
‘comm unicative intentions’."’ H ow ever, it seems that the need to accom m odate
illocutionary force may be view ed as an addendum , rath e r than a rival, to a
formal, truth theoretic approach. As D u m m ett notes:
W h e n we m a k e an as s e rtio n w e are not m e r e ly u tt e r i n g a s e n t e n c e with d e te r m i n a t e ir u th - c o n d i ti o n s u n d e r s to o d by th e h e a re r , a n d h e n c e w ith a p a r t ic u l a r truth v a lu e ...W e are also, r ig h tly o r w ro n g ly , s a y i n g th a t the s e n t e n c e is true. T h is activity o f a s s e r tin g th a t th e t h o u g h t w e a r e e x p r e s s i n g is true is s u i g en eris: it is not a f u r th e r d e te r m i n a t i o n o f th e t r u th - c o n d i ti o n s o f th e s e n te n c e , w h ich r e m a i n u n c h a n g e d w h e th e r w e a re a s s e r ti n g it to be true or not, but r a t h e r s o m e t h i n g w h ic h we d o w ith a s e n t e n c e w h o s e tr u th - c o n d itio n s h a v e a lr e a d y b een fixed.
On this kind o f picture, it seems that we can posit a degree o f meaning which a
sentence possesses independently, to som e extent, from the use it is being put to,
which remains static throughout different uses. This w o u ld then be subject to a
further mechanism introduced to ac co m m o d a te differences in m ood, such as
M c D o w e ll’s theory of f o r c e . A theory o f force w o u ld take us from our
provisional description o f the meaning o f the utterance ( ‘j- m eans that p ') to a
particular, contentful linguistic act; e.g. the assertion that p . P rim a fa c ie , then, a
foi'mal semantic theory can resist the pressure from divergent kinds o f speech
act; how ever, the requirem ent for a theory o f force (or som e equivalent notion)
is not the only aiea in which our semantic theory will p ro v e wanting. A
successful accoLinl will also need to work in tandem with an account of
know ledge o f gram m ar or syntax, phonological p ro duction and recognition,
lexical information, etc; in addition to a wealth o f further, non-linguistic
know ledge, such as that usually labelled ‘p ra g m a tic ’. Clearly then, the
endeavour o f our semantic theory to give an a c count o f m eaning is a m odest and
24
' C l. G r ic e ( 1957); S tia w s o n ( 1970); B a r w i s e and P erry (1983). D u m m e t t ( 1978), p. 106.
restricted project; and yet the o p a q u e and peiplexing character o f the connective
‘means that’ makes the task still a very difficult one.
(ii) C ondi rions o f success:
Providing a systematic specification o f the meaning o f sentences is the
primary aim o f our sem antic theory; yet such a statement o f our aim still provides
us with no definite suggestion as to how we should proceed. O ne difficulty is
that we have, as yet, no clear idea o f w hen we should accept that a theory has
successfu lly given us the meaning o f all sentences in a language; that is to say,
wc need a less opaque and more specific criterion o f success. A second difficulty
is that, how ever we are to measure success, we still have no notion o f how to
achieve our aims; i.e. w hat /b rm a semantic theory should take. As Davidson
notes:
W h il e th e r e is a g r e e m e n t that it is th e c e n tr a l task o f s e m a n ti c s to g iv e the s e m a n tic in te r p r e ta ti o n (th e m e a n i n g ) o f every s e n te n c e in th e la n g u a g e , n o w h e r e in th e lin g u is tic lite r a tu re will o n e find, so fa r as I k n o w , a s tra ig h t f o r w a r d a c c o u n t o f h o w a th e o r y p e r f o r m s th is task, o r h o w to tell w h e n it has been a c c o m p lis h e d . " '’
Initially, then, it seems that, in addition to our overarching aim, we need some
more specific idea o f what will constitute success for a semantic theory. This is a
very complex question, for we do not have ju st one description o f the evidence
the theory must account for (e.g. in speech do we hear ju st noise disturbance,
phonetic forms or w ords with meanings attached?), nor do w e have a single
model of how the information the theory captures should relate to speakers.
Since these issues remain very much alive in the contem porary debate, the most
we can hope to do in setting up the background for our discussion o f noun
phrases is to survey the area and hope to say enough to m otivate one particular
kind o f approach. So, we are in search o f som e plausible b u t less opaque
conception o f success for a semantic theory and, the suggestion now is, this
might be thought to arise out o f how we conceive o f the relation betw een the
theory and the speaker. F o r how w e relate the information captured in the
theory to that deployed by the agent will, to a large extent, dietate the nature of
the evidence for semantic theorising and the conditions o f success for that
account.
One aspect that w e might stress is that a semantic theory should suffice
for understanding or interpreting other speakers; in this way we w ould be
looking to capture a body o f know ledge, possession o f which w ould allow
som eone to understand the language, regardless o f w h e th e r this was actually
identical to or divergent from the know ledge possessed by natural language
speakers. On this conception a theory o f meaning might seem akin to a kind of
'tianslation m anual’, ready for use by speakers o f different languages in order to
understand one another. A second possibility, how ever, is to relate the speaker
and the theory m ore intimately, maintaining that w h a t the speaker know s is the
p roper explanandum o f a semantic theory. On this m odel w e w ould be
concerned to capture the actual body o f know ledge which speakers o f the
language operate with; a natural language speaker is in fact, tacitly o r otherwise,
in possession of the know ledge captured by a semantic theory. T o see why we
might want to embrace either o f these claims and to ckuify their implications for
our present task, lei us look at each o f these options in a little m ore detail.
T he first suggestion is that a good semantic theory m ust m ake speakers
and their b ehaviour (both linguistic and non-linguistic) explicable. T h a t is to say,
it must em body know ledge which suffices to explain or make non-mysterious
those w ho use the language o f which the theory treats. In this way, w e might
envisage a semantic theory as the kind of account required by interpreters or
constructed by a ‘field linguist’, which, once in hand, could act as a manual by
w hich native speakers’ linguistic behaviour is understood. A successful theory of
meaning for a language should thus result in speakers o f th at language becoming
interpretable and predictable in w o rd and deed to som eone w ho possesses the
theory. As Platts suggests:
p re p o s iti o n a l attitu d e s c o n s e q u e n tly a s c r ib e d a nd o f th e p re p o s i ti o n a l a ttitu d e e x p r e s s io n s c o n s e q u e n t ly a ttrib u ted .'^
This claim that a semantic theory must be interpretative (in P la tt’s sense o f
offering fitting propositional attitude ascriptions to the native speaker), and its
links to translation, forms one of the key motivations for a Quinean-Davidsonian
a pproach to meaning, as we will see below. H ow e ver, on this approach it
remains fairly open as to how we should construe the relation betw een the
semantic theory and the actual speakers o f the language. T h a t is to say, it would
be possible that there be nothing more in com m on betw een the theory and the
speaker than that they are related by a shared interest, i.e. the same body of
information, the language L.
H ow ever, som e theorists have objected that merely specifying know ledge
which w ould suffice for interpretation (in the above sense) cannot be all that we
dem and o f a satisfactory semantic theory; for, they contend, it is a mistake to
sever the link between the speaker and the theory. A semantic theory, we might
think, cannot just be an account o f any know ledge which might suffice but must
canvass knowledge which is proper to us as interlocutors. In this way a semantic
theory might be thought o f as a theory o f understanding for ordinary language
users, capturing w hat speakers actually know . O ne o f the m ost famous
proponents of this approach is D um m ett, w ho writes, for instance, that; “a
theory o f meaning is a theory o f understanding; that is, what a theory o f meaning
has to give an account o f is what it is that som eone k n o w s when he know s the
language, that is, when he knows the meanings o f the expressions and sentences
o f the l a n g u a g e . W e should thus expect an adequate theory to distinguish
betw een those w ho understand the language in question (i.e. possess the theory)
and those w ho do not; the explanandum o f semantic theory will be language use
with understanding. On D u m m e tt’s a pproach such a concentration on what is
understood by the individual language user does not threaten a slide into ‘privacy
o f m eaning’ (whereby the meaning o f a linguistic item is given by som e personal,
private activity in the mind o f the speaker), for he ties the theory o f meaning
closely to behaviour: the meaning o f an expression is w hat is know n by an
understanding speaker and w hat is known is fully exhibited in the use speakers
make o f that expression."'' O ur semantic theory, it seems, should for D um m ett
be a eomplete description o f the linguistie practice o f the c om pe tent speaker.
This kind of aim, linking the know ledge em bodied in a semantic theory to a g e n ts ’
actual understanding, may, as w e will see below , prove difficult for the kind of
semantic theory advocated by D avidson and others.
H ow ever, (here are also diffieulties inherent in pursuing a Dum m ettian
approach; for as m entioned above there is an emphasis on publicity (meaning as
manifested in use), which requires a description o f linguistic practice which is
both rich enough to satisfy the publicity constraint and yet is still able to provide
independent support for the theory. There remains a question as to w hether
behaviour (or dispositions to behaviour) alone can truly serve to underpin a
single unique theoiy which is supposed to characterise what speakers actually
know. ’" Yet D u m m ett’s approaeh is not the only way to pursue a conception of
se man tie theorising which makes it answerable to the know ledge possessed by
speakers. An alternative m ove w ould be to follow the kind o f approaeh
advocated by Chom sky in the realm o f syntax and turn instead to the kind of
cognitive mechanisms possessed by the speaker. In this way, the p r o p e r target
for a theory (of gram m ar for C hom sky or a semantic theory for those
philosophers w ho have advanced his general approach in this area) is the
psychological structures which undeipin linguistic competence.^' So, though
linguistic behaviour may provide evidence for the theory, it is linguistic
com petence and not actual perform ance which the theory attem pts to capture
(since our actual behaviour may belie the know ledge we possess).'^ A semantic
theory view ed in this way becom es an aspect o f cognitive science, pa rt o f the
internal structure o f the language u se r’s mind; C hom sky writes: “ linguistie theory
is mentalistic, sinee it is concerned with discovering a mental reality underlying
2V
F o r th e p r o b l e m o f p ri v a te m e a n i n g , see W i t tg e n s te i n (1 9 5 3 ) , 9 I e - 9 5 e . " ’ F o r a d is c u s s io n o f these issues see M c D o w e l l (1987).
a c l L i a l b e h a v i o L i i ” ." W hat our theory must capture is the information, tacitly or
olherwise known by the agent, which is systematically responsible for her
understanding and manipulation o f language. In this way then w e will have an
account which is explanatory in a productive or causal sense, one which can
account for ou r ability to p roduce/understand a potentially infinite and novel
array of utterances, despite our finite cognitive capacities.
W hich o f these conceptions o f our original e n d e av o u r we accept or reject
will shape the kind o f semantic account we will give.^"^ It will determine, for
instance, w hether we are satisfied with a theory which acts as an in te rp re te r’s
manual, describing kno w le d g e sufficient for understanding native s p e a k e r ’s
utterances, but ignoring any questions o f productive explanation within that
speaker (as the Q uine-D avidson approach does). O r w hether we dem and an
account which focuses on what the speaker (tacitly) know s or, in C h o m s k y ’s
teiminology, ‘c o g n iz e s’. ’'^ Yet, at least initially, both o f these aims seem quite
desirable, and we may thus feel that a truly successful semantic theory m ust be
answerable to both. In this case, while an account which shows ho w to achieve
either one o f o u r aims will be good, to be entirely acceptable it will also have to
offer some account o f the other, collateral aim. A successful semantic theory
must, it seems, account for both the translation and production o f language, or
show why one or (he other is, in aetual fact, an im proper constraint on such a
theory.
Before turning to look at the form a putative satisfier o f ou r aims might
take, I should like to raise one further possible constraint on a successful
account: this is the constraint to uniqueness. F o r it seems that if, in w hat
follows, we are to make claims about the correct meaning o f certain expressions
(including what constitutes the semantic c o m p o n e n t o f an expression’s meaning
versus what is only a contextual or p ra g m a tic aspect o f meaning), these claims
Ib id ., p.4.
F o r an e x p a n s i o n o f the d if fe re n t c o n s tr a in ts a c c e p t e d by D a v id s o n , D u m m e t t a nd C h o m s k y , see S m ith (1 9 9 2 ).
will require the background o f a single, correct semantic theory for a language.
If we should we discover that there are in fact multiple, distinct yet equally
correct semantic theories for a given language then ou r claims as to the c orrect
form o f natural language expressions will themselves be relativized rather than
absolute. The claim that the form suggested is the correct statem ent o f an
exp re ssio n ’s underlying structure will no longer be able to be sustained; instead
the w eaker claim, that the outlined form is one, am ongst possibly many, adequate
ways o f handling the expression, will be all that is available. A lthough this would
not negate the findings of this thesis, it w ould limit the generality o f the claims to
be made; so, if we should find that satisfying the above constraints also results in
a constraint to a single possible theory, this will be o f benefit to ou r overall
project. The force o f this final concern is perhaps s o m e w h at open to question,
for it may be argued that, although there is nothing internal to a semantic theory
which demands uniqueness, the nature o f the explananda is such that, de fa c to ,
we should expect only a single solution. The complexity and difficulty o f the
subject matter, and our inability to discover, as yet, even a single entirely
successful account, should allay fears about a multitude o f equally adequate
accounts ‘waiting in the wi ngs ’. Y e t , even with this recognition, it w o u ld still
seem that if we can find theory-internal reasons for uniqueness this will be an
added advantage for subsequent claims regarding syntactic and semantic form.
So, we now know what we expect a semantic theory to be a theory of,
and we have tw o suggestions as to how to tell w hen such a theory is successful
(i.e. either when it accounts for interpretation, perhaps in the so m e w h at
specialised sense discussed earlier, o r w hen it captures the kno w le d g e actually
possessed by natural language users). H ow e ver, we as yet have no idea o f the
possible form such an account might take. T o begin to clarify this m atter let us
start by looking at the first suggested aim above: the thought that a successful
semantic theory should suffice for interpreting speakers o f that language, and see
whal form an accouni which is successful in this area might take. This
conception o f the project comes to the fore initially in the w o rk o f Quine on
radical translation, and, later, in the form o f interpretative theories o f truth, in the
w o rk o f D a v id s o n .’^ Pursuing a Davidsonian approach to the question of
meaning shifts the centre o f emphasis slightly in tw o directions: first, we com e to
concentrate not on speakers o f a language directly, but on the hearers and
interpreters of those speakers; and, secondly, rather than looking directly at the
opaque and perplexing notion of meaning itself, we turn o u r attention instead to
the notion o f truth, attempting to arrive at meaning via the clearer conception o f
the conditions under which a given utterance w ould be true. T he thought is that,
by pursuing a truth conditional account for a language, w e may arrive at
som ething that will ‘do duty as a theory o f mea ni ng’. T o see ho w these twin
shifts o f focus affect and ameliorate ou r overarching aim o f giving an account o f
the m eaning o f all the well-form ed sentences within a language, let us look a little
m ore closely at truth theoretic sem antics as advocated by Davidson.
(Hi) Truth c o n d itio n a l sem antics:
T he idea that to understand a sentence is to grasp the conditions under
which it is true does not originate with Davidson, but can be found much earlier
in the w ork o f Frege and Wittgenstein. For instance, Wittgenstein writes in the
T ractatus that:
4 . 0 2 2 A s e n te n c e in use {satz) s h o w s h o w th in g s s ta n d if it is true. A n d it say s th a t th ey d o so stand.
4 .0 2 4 T o u n d e r s ta n d a s e n t e n c e in use m e a n s to k n o w w h a t is th e c a s e if it is true.^^
F urtherm ore, I w ould suggest, there is som ething intuitively appealing and
natural in the basic idea that the meaning o f a sentence is intimately bound up
with the conditions in which it is true. H ow ever, going beyond this initial
thought proves difficult; for, on closer inspection, it seem s less possible that truth
alone can give us any serious insight into meaning. T he problem , as w e will see,
S e e Q u in e (1 9 6 0 ) an d D a v i d s o n (1 9 7 3 ).
D a v id s o n (1 9 7 6 ) , p p. 178-9. T h is fo r m u l a t io n o f the D a v id s o n i a n p r o je c t is, p e r h a p s , slig h tly m is le a d in g , s in c e th e te r m ‘c o n d i t io n s o f t r u t h ’ m ig h t s u g g e s t a m o d a l e le m e n t to th e a c c o u n t, w h ic h is not there. A l th o u g h (as w e will see b e lo w ) w e m ig h t q u e s t io n w h e th e r D a v i d s o n ’s p ro je c t is n e c e s s a rily first-o rd e r , it is c le a r that it is n o n - m o d a l.
is that a theory o f truth for a language, dealing as it does with a purely
extensional notion, does not seem equipped to capture the aspect o f semantic
content we are interested in, unless the theory itself m akes appeal to som e other
semantic notions. That is to say, it seems quite possible to deliver som ething
which might serve as a theory o f truth for a language and yet which does not tell
us anything about meaning for that language. D a v id s o n ’s great advance then is
not seeing the relation between meaning and truth conditions p e r se but showing
how to deliver the latter in such a w ay as to tell us about the former.
T o begin with, then, let us consider what is required o f a theory for it to
be a theory o f truth for a language. An initial idea might be that the theory
should suffice to pair a true object-language sentence with a specification o f the
conditions which make it true, or a false object-language sentence with the
conditions under which it is false. This basic idea is codified in T a r s k i’s
discovery of w hat is required o f the axiomatisation o f a predicate in a formal
language for it to count as the predicate ‘tru e ’ for that l a n g u a g e /" His
suggestion is that a characterisation o f a predicate w ould be adequate for the role
of the truth predicate for a language if it entails, for every object-language
sentence, a biconditional of the form:
(T) s is true iff p
where ‘s ’ stands for a structural description o f the object-language sentence and
‘p ’ is a place m arker for its m eta-language translation."^' This is T a r s k i’s
‘Convention T ’ and the biconditionals it gives rise to are usually k now n as ‘T-
s e n te n c es ’, e.g:
(a) ‘S now is w h ite ’ is true iff snow is white.
(a) is a ho m o p h o n ie T-sentence; that is to say, the sentence o f the left-hand .side
is simply disquoted to provide the sentence on the right-hand side.
T a r s k i (1 9 5 6 ).
■" T h e im p o r t a n c e o f th e e n t a i im e n t c o n s t r a in t , i.e. th at th e th e o r y s h o u l d be m a te r ia lly a d e q u a t e in a d d it io n to b e in g fo r m a lly c o r r e c t, is stressed by M c D o w e l l (1 9 8 0 ) ; b u t a p p a r e n t ly m is s e d by F ield ( 1 9 7 2 ) , p.95, w h e r e he r e p l a c e s C o n v e n ti o n T w ith his o w n C o n v e n ti o n M : “ A n y c o n d itio n o f th e fo rm
(2) (V e) [e is tr u e = B (e )l
DisquotationaJ T -sentences are possible where the m eta-language contains the
object-language as a proper part. H ow ever, the h o m ophonie nature o f (a) should
not disguise its explanatoiy p o w e r, which becom es evident w hen w e consider T-
sentences where the object-language and the m eta-language diverge, e.g:
(b) 'L a neige est b la n c h e ’ is true iff snow is white.
Tarski was able to ensure that, even though w e are primarily concerned with
capturing an ex te n sio n a l notion like truth, the theory pairs true object-language
sentences with the particular state o f affairs in which the sentence is true by
explicitly introducing the notion o f translation into the statem ent o f Convention
T (i.e. so that the unexplained semantic notion o f translation is introduced as an
external condition o f adequacy on the acceptance o f any formally adequate
theory of truth).
D a v id so n ’s pivotal m ove at this juncture is to suggest that, if w e w ere to
take o u r understanding o f truth as primitive, we could then use this as a ro u te to
understanding m eaning in natural language. T h e tho u g h t is that, by using the
form o f a Tarski an T-theory, yet freeing ou r account o f all semantic notions, we
could construct an account which would yield the same object-language/m eta-
langLiage pairings as an account using the intensional connective ‘means t h a t ’. If
we had such a theory then we would clearly have som ething fitting the title o f a
‘theory o f m e a n in g ’ (at least in the first o f D a v ie s’ senses discussed in §2.i).
H ow ever, the disparity betw een truth and m eaning should be all too evident from
the outset: for while a disquotational T-theory may well generate the same kinds
of pairings as a theory o f meaning for a language, such a T -theory will be /«.s7
one am ongst m any formally adequate theories o f truth for that language. The
problem is that (he biconditional in (T) is simply the ordinary material
biconditional, familiar from first-order logic; such a biconditional will be true ju st
in case both its left-hand side and right-hand side sentences share a truth-value
(i.e. are both true or both false), otherwise it will be false. So, for instance,
w ithout appeal to features external to the theory o f truth, such as the appeal to
