Deliberated Force

A Case Study in

Effective Air Campaigning

Final Report of the Air University B a l k a n s A i r C a m p a i g n S t u d y

Edited by

Col Robert C. Owen, USAF

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

Deliberate force a case study in effective air campaigning : final report of the Air U n i v e r s i t y B a l k a n s a i r c a m p a i g n s t u d y / e d i t e d b y R o b e r t C . O w e n .

p . c m .

Includes bibliographical references and index. I S B N 1 - 5 8 5 6 6 - 0 7 6 - 0

1 . Y u g o s l a v W a r , 1 9 9 1 – 1 9 9 5 — A e r i a l o p e r a t i o n s . 2 . Y u g o s l a v W a r , 1 9 9 1 – 1 9 9 5 — C a m p a i g n s — B o s n i a a n d H e r c e g o v i n a . 3 . Y u g o s l a v W a r , 1 9 9 1 – 1 9 9 5 — F o r e i g n participation. 4. Peacekeeping forces—Bosnia and Hercegovina. 5. North Atlantic Treaty Organization—Armed Forces—Aviation. 6. Bosnia and Hercegovina— History, Military. I. Owen, Robert C., 1951–

DR1313.7.A47 D45 2000

C h a p t e r Page

DISCLAIMER . . . ii FOREWORD . . . x i ABOUT THE EDITOR . . . x v PREFACE . . . xvii 1 The Demise of Yugoslavia and the

D e s t r u c t i o n o f B o s n i a : S t r a t e g i c C a u s e s ,

E f f e c t s , a n d R e s p o n s e s . . . 1

Dr. Karl Mueller

2 T h e P l a n n i n g B a c k g r o u n d . . . 3 7

Lt Col Bradley S. Davis

3 US and NATO Doctrine for

C a m p a i g n P l a n n i n g . . . 6 5

Col Maris McCrabb

4 The Deliberate Force Air Campaign Plan . . . . 8 7

Col Christopher M. Campbell

5 Executing Deliberate Force,

3 0 A u g u s t – 1 4 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 9 5 . . . 1 3 1

Lt Col Mark J. Conversino

6 Combat Assessment: A Commander’s

Responsibility . . . 1 7 7

Maj Mark C. McLaughlin

7 Assessing the Effectiveness of Deliberate Force:

Harnessing the Political-Military Connection . . 1 8 9

Maj Mark C. McLaughlin

8 Aircraft Used in Deliberate Force . . . . 1 9 9

9 Weapons Used in Deliberate Force . . . . 2 5 7

Lt Col Richard L. Sargent

1 0 Deliberate Force Targeting . . . 2 7 9

Lt Col Richard L. Sargent

1 1 Deliberate Force Tactics . . . 2 9 7

Lt Col Richard L. Sargent

1 2 D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e C o m b a t A i r A s s e s s m e n t s . . . 3 3 1

Lt Col Richard L. Sargent

1 3 Aspects of Leading and Following:

T h e H u m a n F a c t o r s o f D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e . . . . . 3 5 1

Lt Col John C. Orndorff

1 4 C h a r i o t s o f F i r e : R u l e s o f E n g a g e m e n t

in Operation Deliberate Force . . . 3 8 1

Lt Col Ronald M. Reed

1 5 Roads Not Taken: Theoretical Approaches

to Operation Deliberate Force . . . 4 3 1

Lt Col Robert D. Pollock

1 6 S u m m a r y . . . 4 5 5

Col Robert C. Owen

CONTRIBUTORS . . . 5 2 3 INDEX . . . 5 2 7

I l l u s t r a t i o n s

Figure

2.1 UNSCRs and NAC Decisions Leading

to Deliberate Force . . . 4 0

2.2 NATO Organization . . . 4 2 2.3 UN/ NATO Command Relationships . . . 4 9

2.4 Air Strategy to Execution . . . 5 1 2.5 Deliberate Force Operational Locations . . . 5 4

4.1 Operation Deadeye Key Nodes . . . 1 0 1 4.2 Zones of Action . . . 1 0 4 4.3 Deliberate Force Air Strike Concept . . . . 1 0 8

8.1 Assigned Aircraft by Nationality

( 3 0 A u g u s t 1 9 9 5 ) . . . 2 0 3 8.2 Assigned Forces by Nationality

( 1 4 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 9 5 ) . . . 2 0 4

1 0 . 1 Zones of Action . . . 2 8 3 1 0 . 2 Deliberate Force Air Strike Concept . . . . 2 8 4 1 1 . 1 BSA Order of Battle . . . 3 0 0

1 1 . 2 D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e C o n c e p t o f O p e r a t i o n s . . . . . 3 0 8 1 2 . 1 National Sortie Distribution . . . 3 3 2 1 2 . 2 Overall Sortie Distribution . . . 3 3 2

1 2 . 3 Distribution of Penetrating Sorties . . . . 3 3 2 1 2 . 4 Distribution of Support Sorties . . . 3 3 3 1 2 . 5 D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e M i s s i o n s . . . 3 3 3 1 2 . 6 D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e M i s s i o n A p p o r t i o n m e n t . . . . 3 3 4 1 2 . 7 U S J o i n t S o r t i e D i s t r i b u t i o n . . . 3 3 5 1 2 . 8 G r o u n d - a n d A i r - A b o r t S u m m a r y . . . . 3 3 7 1 2 . 9 P o s t s t r i k e R e s u l t s . . . 3 4 1 1 2 . 1 0 Deadeye Results . . . 3 4 3

1 2 . 1 1 T a r g e t s R e m a i n i n g . . . 3 4 4 1 2 . 1 2 DMPIs Remaining . . . 3 4 4

1 4 . 1 ROE Influences . . . 3 8 3 1 4 . 2 Development of ROE . . . 3 9 6 1 4 . 3 N A T O a n d U N C h a i n s o f C o m m a n d . . . . 4 0 1

1 4 . 4 Zones of Action for Deliberate Force . . . . 4 0 9 1 5 . 1 Warden’s Five Rings . . . 4 3 5 1 5 . 2 T h e C a m p a i g n - P l a n n i n g M o d e l . . . 4 4 1

Photo

Richard Holbrooke . . . 2 8

Adm Leighton W. Smith . . . 3 8

Gen Michael E. Ryan . . . 4 7

Lt Gen Hal M. Hornburg . . . 5 0

Lt Gen Michael C. Short . . . 1 8 3

F - 1 6 s . . . 2 0 6 Mirage 2000 . . . 2 0 8 F - 1 4 . . . 2 1 0 F - 1 8 . . . 2 1 1 EA-6B . . . 2 1 2 A-10 . . . 2 1 5 F - 1 5 . . . 2 1 5

AC-130 . . . 2 1 6 KC-135 . . . 2 2 1 KC-10 . . . 2 2 1 U-2 . . . 2 2 5 Predator UAV . . . 2 2 7 S - 3 V i k i n g . . . 2 2 9 P-3 Orion . . . 2 3 0 RC-135 . . . 2 3 0 E F - 1 1 1 . . . 2 3 2 E - 3 a i r b o r n e w a r n i n g a n d c o n t r o l s y s t e m a i r c r a f t . . . . 2 3 4 E-2 Hawkeye . . . 2 3 5 MH-53 . . . 2 3 7 C - 1 7 s . . . 2 3 8 C - 2 1 . . . 2 3 8 F - 1 5 C . . . 2 4 0 B - 5 2 . . . 2 4 2 F - 1 1 7 s . . . 2 4 3 AGM-65 Maverick . . . 2 6 2 GBU-15 . . . 2 6 3 AGM-88 HARM . . . 2 6 6 2 . 7 5 - i n c h r o c k e t . . . 2 6 7

Loading an A-10’s cannon . . . 2 6 8

Serb artillery . . . 2 9 3

B r i d g e d a m a g e . . . 2 9 4

F-18 with HARMs . . . 3 1 2

G e n J a m e s J a m e r s o n . . . 4 5 6

Lt Gen Jay W. Kelley . . . 4 5 6

Tables

2.1 NATO Aircraft for Deliberate Force . . . 5 3 4.1 OPLAN 40101 “Deny Flight” Phases

and Objectives . . . 9 6 4.2 Example Target Matrix . . . 1 0 9

8.1 Players Available at Onset . . . 2 0 3 8.2 E n d - S t a t e F o r c e S t r u c t u r e

(Assigned Aircraft Only) . . . 2 0 5 8.3 Shooter Missions . . . 2 0 7

8.4 Supporter-Mission Sorties . . . 2 2 0 8.5 Allocation and Apportionment of Aircraft

in Deliberate Force . . . 2 4 7 9.1 Deliberate Force’s Precision Munitions . . . . . 2 5 8

9.2 Deliberate Force’s Nonprecision Bombs . . . . . 2 6 5 1 0 . 1 Safe-Area Target Sets . . . 2 8 2 1 0 . 2 O n s e t T a r g e t a n d D M P I D a t a . . . 2 9 0

1 1 . 1 O b s c u r a n t E f f e c t s o n S e n s o r P e r f o r m a n c e . . . 3 0 3 1 1 . 2 SEAD Windows in Deliberate Force . . . . 3 1 3

1 2 . 1 D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e M i s s i o n A p p o r t i o n m e n t . . . . 3 3 4 1 2 . 2 D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e S o r t i e S u m m a r y . . . . 3 3 7 1 2 . 3 G r o u n d - a n d A i r - A b o r t S u m m a r y . . . . 3 3 8

1 2 . 4 US Air Force Precision Munitions Analysis . . . 3 3 9 1 2 . 5 I n d i v i d u a l T a r g e t s A t t a c k e d / D e s t r o y e d . . . . . 3 4 2

1 2 . 6 Sarajevo ZOA Targets . . . 3 4 2 1 2 . 7 Deadeye Targets . . . 3 4 3

E v e r y a i r m a n o r p e r s o n i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e a r t a n d s c i e n c e o f a i r a n d s p a c e w a r f a r e s h o u l d r e a d t h i s b o o k . T r u e t o t h e d i r e c t i o n o f G e n J a m e s J a m e r s o n , f o r m e r d e p u t y c o m m a n d e r i n c h i e f o f U S E u r o p e a n C o m m a n d , a n d m e , t h e A i r U n i v e r s i t y B a l k a n s A i r C a m p a i g n S t u d y ( B A C S ) h a s e m e r g e d a s a b a l-a n c e d l-a n d w i d e - r l-a n g i n g d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e D e l i b e r l-a t e F o r c e l-a i r c a m p a i g n , w h i c h o c c u r r e d d u r i n g t h e f a l l o f 1 9 9 5 . E x p l o i t i n g t h e s o u r c e s a n d r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e t o t h e m , t h e B A C S t e a m members have laid out a mile-wide and foot-deep exploration o f t h e c o n t e x t , t h e o r e t i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s , p l a n n i n g , e x e c u t i o n , leadership, and effects of this milestone event. In so doing, t h e y h a v e c o n t r i b u t e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y t o o u r k n o w l e d g e a b o u t t h e p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y , t e c h n i c a l , a n d h u m a n e l e m e n t s t h a t s h a p e a i r c a m p a i g n s a n d i n f l u e n c e t h e i r o u t c o m e s . M o r e o v e r , t h e BACS offers insights into persistent questions of military plann e r s , s u c h a s t h e r e l a t i o plann s h i p o f d i p l o m a c y a plann d w a r ; t h e s y plann -e r g y o f l a n d p o w -e r , s p a c -e p o w -e r , a n d a i r p o w -e r ; a n d t h -e r o l -e o f c h a n c e a n d “ f o g ” i n t h e c o n d u c t a n d o u t c o m e o f a i r a n d s p a c e w a r f a r e . F i n a l l y , b e c a u s e t h e B A C S t e a m f r o m t h e s t a r t w r o t e this report for immediate declassification, virtually the entire r e p o r t a n d a l l o f i t s s u b s t a n t i v e e l e m e n t s a r e a v a i l a b l e h e r e a s a n o p e n s o u r c e , o n l y f o u r y e a r s a f t e r t h e e v e n t . G i v e n i t s s c o p e , t h i s b o o k s h o u l d c o n t a i n m a t e r i a l o f i n t e r e s t t o a l l a e r o s p a c e - w a r f a r e p r a c t i t i o n e r s a n d / o r t h i n k e r s , r e g a r d l e s s o f their area of expertise.

The following are core implications of the BACS:

• Deliberate Force was a d e c i s i v e e l e m e n t i n s h a p i n g t h e outcome of the allied intervention into the Bosnian con-f l i c t , b u t i t s con-f u l l e con-f con-f e c t m u s t b e u n d e r s t o o d i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e o t h e r p o l i t i c a l a n d m i l i t a r y d e v e l o p m e n t s a l s o u n-d e r w a y a t t h e t i m e .

• The characteristics and weaponry of air and space warfare gave the diplomats and soldiers of the intervention a u s able

e v e n t s i n t h e B a l k a n s r e g i o n .

• For all of the capabilities of modern information technol-o g y , t h e s c a l e , p a c e , h u m a n f a c t technol-o r s ( s u c h a s l e a d e r s h i p , c u l t u r e , a n d c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n ) , a n d o t h e r n o n t e c h n i c a l elements of Deliberate Force ensured that Clausewitz’s trilogy of fog, friction, and chance remained important in s h a p i n g i t s u l t i m a t e o u t c o m e .

• If Deliberate Force is considered a new form of intervention -ism on behalf of peace, then the experience gained from that operation suggests the need for a review of our concep -tions about the nature of military and diplomatic leadership i n s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s .

• If it is to be useful, doctrine—as formalized advice on wha t m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s s h o u l d d o w h e n f a c e d b y c e r t a i n k i n d s o f p r o b l e m s — m u s t b e r e a d a n d u n d e r s t o o d . B u t i t a l s o m u s t b e u n d e r s t o o d a s a g u i d e f o r thinking t h r o u g h p r o b -l e m s a h e a d o f t i m e , r a t h e r t h a n a r e c i p e f o r t h e i r s o -l u t i o n a f t e r t h e f a c t . T h e s t u d y m a k e s o t h e r i m p o r t a n t p o i n t s , o f c o u r s e , a n d a n y given reader likely will find things with which to agree and disagree. However, these core implications of the BACS serve t o i l l u s t r a t e i t s v a l u e , b o t h a s a h i s t o r i c a l d o c u m e n t a n d a s a s p a r k f o r d e b a t e a n d t h o u g h t — i t s r e a l p u r p o s e . I w o u l d b e r e m i s s i f I d i d n o t c o m m e n d t h e d e d i c a t i o n a n d p e r s i s t e n c e o f a l l t h e m e m b e r s o f t h e B A C S t e a m . W h e n t h e y v o l u n t e e r e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h i s s t u d y , w e a l l u n d e r s t o o d t h a t i t w o u l d b e a f o c u s e d e f f o r t t o c a p t u r e t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t political and operational events of Deliberate Force and to s t a r t a n a r c h i v e o f r e l a t e d m a t e r i a l s t o s u p p o r t f u r t h e r r e-s e a r c h . A e-s t h e y p u r e-s u e d t h e i r r e e-s e a r c h , h o w e v e r , t h e t e a m m e m b e r s s o o n r e a l i z e d t h a t t h e y h a d a h o l d o n t h e t a i l o f a much bigger “elephant” than anyone at Air University origi-n a l l y h a d e x p e c t e d . D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e t u r origi-n s o u t t o h a v e b e e origi-n a very complex event, composed of layered political, military, a n d h u m a n e l e m e n t s t h a t a l l b o r e s o m e l e v e l o f e x a m i n a t i o n . Despite its growing scale and complexity, every team member e l e c t e d t o s t a y w i t h t h e s t u d y , e v e n t h o u g h i t d e f i n i t e l y w a s a “voluntary society” and even though their work on it was in

U n i v e r s i t y . A f t e r m o s t o f t h e B A C S t e a m m e m b e r s d i s p e r s e d t o n e w a s s i g n m e n t s a s f a r a w a y a s G e r m a n y a n d H a w a i i , t h e y c o n t i n u e d t o w o r k t h e p r o j e c t a n d t o m e e t a l l o f t h e d e a d l i n e s i m p o s e d o n t h e m b y t h e e d i t o r i a l a n d d e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n p r o c -e s s -e s . T h -e r -e s u l t o f t h -e i r d -e d i c a t i o n i s t h i s f i n -e r -e p o r t , o n -e t h a t c e r t a i n l y b e n e f i t e d f r o m t h e w i d e - r a n g i n g e x p e r i e n c e s a n d intellectual capabilities of the people who wrote it.

JAY W. KELLEY

Lieutenant General, USAF, Retired C o l o r a d o S p r i n g s , C o l o r a d o

E d i t o r

Col Robert C. Owen is chief of the Policy and Doctrine Divi-sion, Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, Illinois. In that pos ition he supervises the development and articulation of air-mobili ty c o n c e p t s a n d d o c t r i n e a n d s p e c i a l p r o j e c t s , s u c h a s t h e c o m -m a n d ’s i n v o l v e -m e n t i n t h e E x p e d i t i o n a r y A i r F o r c e a n d F u t u r e Total Force Unit. At the time he directed the Balkans Air C a m p a i g n S t u d y , C o l o n e l O w e n w a s d e a n o f t h e S c h o o l o f Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. While h e s e r v e d a s c h i e f o f t h e J o i n t D o c t r i n e B r a n c h o f t h e D o c t r i n e D i v i s i o n a t H e a d q u a r t e r s U n i t e d S t a t e s A i r F o r c e , h e w r o t e t h e

Chronology volume of the Gulf War Air Power Survey. H e a l s o

h a s p u b l i s h e d a n u m b e r o f j o u r n a l a r t i c l e s a n d h a s a b o o k ,

The Rise of Global Airlift in the USAF, in final editorial review.

A c o m m a n d p i l o t w i t h o v e r t h r e e t h o u s a n d h o u r s o f o p e r a-tional flying in the C-130 and T-41 aircraft, Colonel Owen holds an MA in African studies from UCLA and a PhD in military history from Duke University.

Operation Deliberate Force was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air campaign conducted between 30 Au -g u s t a n d 2 0 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 9 5 t o a d v a n c e t h e c a u s e o f p e a c e i n the Balkans region. Lt Gen Jay W. Kelley, commander of Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, and Gen James L . J a m e r s o n , d e p u t y c o m m a n d e r i n c h i e f o f U n i t e d S t a t e s E u r o p e a n C o m m a n d , S t u t t g a r t , G e r m a n y , j o i n t l y c h a r t e r e d the Balkans Air Campaign Study (BACS) in October 1995. T h e y d i r e c t e d t h e B A C S t e a m t o “ c a p t u r e ” t h e p l a n n i n g a n d operational experience of Deliberate Force on behalf of Air U n i v e r s i t y s t u d e n t s p r e p a r i n g f o r f u t u r e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s a s a i r - w a r f a r e p l a n n e r s a n d l e a d e r s , a n d o n b e h a l f o f t h e b r o a d e r community of air-warfare thinkers. Their specific direction en-tailed (1) writing a “mile-wide-and-foot-deep” report laying out t h e s a l i e n t e v e n t s , c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , a n d i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s i m p o r t a n t a i r c a m p a i g n a n d ( 2 ) a s s e m b l i n g a c o m p r e h e n -s i v e a r c h i v e o f r e l e v a n t o r a l a n d d o c u m e n t a r y e v i d e n c e t o -s u pp o r t f u t u r e r e s e a r c h i n t o t h e pp l a n n i n g , e x e c u t i o n , a n d d i pp l o -matic exploitation of Deliberate Force.1

T o h i g h l i g h t t h i s s t u d y ’ s f o c u s o n t h e p l a n n i n g a n d e x e c u -tion of an air campaign, the BACS team adopted the following a s i t s c o r e r e s e a r c h q u e s t i o n : H o w a n d w i t h w h a t c o n s i d e r a-t i o n s d i d a-t h e p l a n n e r s a n d e x e c u a-t o r s o f D e l i b e r a a-t e F o r c e l i n k military operations with the strategic, political, and diplomatic g o a l s t h e y w e r e c h a r g e d t o a t t a i n ? T o m a k e t h e r e p o r t u s e f u l t o a p o t e n t i a l l y b r o a d a u d i e n c e , t e a m m e m b e r s s e t o u t t o a n s w e r t h i s q u e s t i o n t h r o u g h a w i d e - r a n g i n g e x a m i n a t i o n o f the geopolitical, sociological, diplomatic, technological, and o p e r a t i o n a l f a c t o r s t h a t s h a p e d t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a n d o u t-c o m e o f t h i s p a r t i t-c u l a r a i r t-c a m p a i g n . T h u s , t h e t-c h a p t e r s o f t h i s r e p o r t d e a l b r o a d l y w i t h ( 1 ) t h e p o l i t i c a l a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l context of Deliberate Force planning, (2) the actual planning of t h e c a m p a i g n , ( 3 ) t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e c a m p a i g n , a n d ( 4 ) t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h o s e e x p e r i e n c e s . A n i m p o r t a n t i n i t i a l s u b-t h e m e o f b-t h e s b-t u d y w a s a n e f f o r b-t b-t o d e b-t e r m i n e b-t o w h a b-t e x b-t e n b-t

o f a n d / o r w i e l d e d i n f l u e n c e o v e r f a c t o r s t h a t m o s t s i g n i f i -c a n t l y s h a p e d t h e o p e r a t i o n a n d d e t e r m i n e d i t s o u t -c o m e . I n o t h e r w o r d s , t o w h a t e x t e n t w e r e t h e y i n c h a r g e o f e v e n t s a n d t o w h a t e x t e n t w e r e e v e n t s i n c h a r g e o f t h e m ? T h e t e a m e x -p e c t e d t h a t t h e a n s w e r t o t h o s e a n d o t h e r q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d b y t h e s t u d y w o u l d c a r r y s i g n i f i c a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e o r i e s a n d d o c t r i n e s o f a i r p o w e r s t r a t e g y a n d p l a n n i n g . A s s e m b l i n g a c o m p r e h e n s i v e d a t a b a s e o n D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e proved more challenging than the campaign’s relatively com-p a c t d i m e n s i o n s o f s c a l e a n d t i m e f i r s t s u g g e s t e d . I n c o n t r a s t t o t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t s d u r i n g t h e P e r s i a n G u l f W a r o f 1 9 9 0 – 9 1 , t h e n o n - U S c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r s i n D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e p l a y e d a m o r e i n d e p e n d e n t a n d n e a r l y c o e q u a l p o l i t i c a l a n d , t o a l e s s e r e x t e n t , m i l i t a r y r o l e w i t h t h e i r A m e r i c a n c o u n t e r p a r t s i n t h e p l a n n i n g a n d c o n d u c t o f t h e c a m p a i g n . T h i s l e v e l a n d c o n s e-q u e n c e o f n o n - U S p a r t i c i p a t i o n o b l i g e d B A C S r e s e a r c h e r s t o look far afield for data and perspectives on Deliberate Force. T h e i r s e a r c h w a s c o m p l i c a t e d b y t h e r e t u r n o f m a n y n o n - U S midlevel planners and flying personnel involved in Deliberate F o r c e t o t h e i r h o m e c o u n t r i e s s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e c a m p a i g n e n d e d . D i p l o m a t i c c i r c u m s t a n c e s f u r t h e r o b l i g e d t h e t e a m t o c a s t a w i d e n e t f o r d a t a . C o n d u c t e d a s a s t e p i n a l o n g e f f o r t t o m a i n t a i n p e a c e i n o r a t l e a s t c o n t a i n t h e v i o l e n c e o f t h e B a l k a n s r e g i o n , D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e w a s s h a p e d a n d e x p l o i t e d b y t h e o f t e n c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s o f n u m e r o u s r e g i o n a l a n d g l o b a l actors, including the United Nations (UN), NATO political and military agencies, diplomatic and military agencies of numer-o u s E u r numer-o p e a n s t a t e s , a n d , numer-o f c numer-o u r s e , t h e w a r r i n g r e g i numer-o n a l g r o u p s t h e m s e l v e s . T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t b a r r i e r s o f s e c r e c y , n a-t i o n a l s e n s i a-t i v i a-t i e s , a n d a-t h e l i m i a-t s o f i a-t s c h a r a-t e r a l l o w e d , a-t h e B A C S t e a m a t l e a s t a s k e d m a n y o f t h e s e s o u r c e s f o r i n f o r m a-t i o n a n d c o m m e n a-t s — w i a-t h l i m i a-t e d r e s u l a-t s . G i v e n t h e b r e a d t h o f a v a i l a b l e s o u r c e s a n d t h e c o n s t r a i n t s o f t i m e a n d r e s o u r c e s , t h e B A C S t e a m f o c u s e d o n a n a l y z i n g a n d d e s c r i b i n g D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e a s a d i s t i n c t m i l i t a r y c a m-p a i g n . T h e t e a m m e m b e r s d i d t h i s i n f u l l a w a r e n e s s t h a t t h e o p e r a t i o n w a s a c o m p l e x e v e n t — o n e t h a t c o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d only in its full political and military context. The team also r e m a i n e d c o g n i z a n t o f t h e r e l u c t a n c e w i t h i n s o m e U S m i l i t a r y

specific military component of a multiservice (joint) or multi-n a t i o multi-n a l ( c o m b i multi-n e d ) c o m m a multi-n d . T h i s r e l u c t a multi-n c e i s b u t t r e s s e d b y f u n d a m e n t a l U S j o i n t d o c t r i n e , w h i c h r e s e r v e s t h e p l a n-n i n-n g o f c a m p a i g n-n s f o r j o i n-n t f o r c e c o m m a n-n d e r s ( J F C ) a n-n d w h i c h r e l e g a t e s t h e i r c o m p o n e n t c o m m a n d e r s t o p l a n n i n g “ o p e r a t i o n s ” o r a n n e x e s t o t h e J F C ’ s c a m p a i g n p l a n .2 N e v e r t h e l e s s , d e s c r i b i n g D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e a s a c a m p a i g n makes good analytical sense. As a consciously connected serie s o f a i r a c t i o n s a i m e d a t c o e r c i n g t h e B o s n i a n S e r b s t o m a k e military and political concessions, what happened over the skies o f B o s n i a i n A u g u s t a n d S e p t e m b e r 1 9 9 5 e s s e n t i a l l y c o i n c i d e s with the US joint doctrinal definition of a campaign as “a s e r i e s o f r e l a t e d m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s a i m e d a t a c c o m p l i s h i n g a s t r a t e g i c o r o p e r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e w i t h i n a g i v e n t i m e a n d s p a c e . ”3 _{Moreover, labeling Deliberate Force as a campaign fits}

a u t h o r i t a t i v e u s a g e b y s e n i o r U S d e f e n s e l e a d e r s s u c h a s S e c-retary of Defense William Perry, who described it as a “mas-sive air campaign” that “stunned” the Serbs with its “power and effectiveness.”4 _{Still, given the importance of definitions in}

t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d a r t i c u l a t i o n o f d o c t r i n e , t h e c h o i c e o f campaign i n t h i s c a s e w i l l c a r r y u n c o m f o r t a b l e p o l i c y a n d b u d g e t a r y i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r s o m e r e a d e r s . B u t t h a t d i s c o m f o r t s h o u l d n o t b l o c k a n o p e n - m i n d e d r e a d i n g o f t h i s r e p o r t . F o r s i m i l a r r e a s o n s o f f o c u s a n d c o n c i s e n e s s , m o s t m e m -b e r s o f t h e B A C S t e a m d i d n o t s e t o u t o n t h e i r r e s e a r c h i n t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e w o u l d f i t n e a t l y i n t o s o m e n i c h e o f t h e s o - c a l l e d c o n t i n u u m o f w a r a r t i c u l a t e d i n U S doctrine.5 _{As a method of articulating the types of conflict and}

w a r t h a t m i g h t e x i s t b e t w e e n t h e e x t r e m e s o f a b s o l u t e p e a c e a n d a b s o l u t e w a r , t h e c o n t i n u u m - o f - w a r c o n c e p t u s e f u l l y p r e-d i c t s t h e b r o a e-d c a u s e s a n e-d p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s o f v a r i o u s k i n e-d s of conflict and, by implication, the sacrifices combatants will m a k e . B u t t h e c o n c e p t i s n o t p a r t i c u l a r l y u s e f u l a s a p r e d i c t o r of the likely intensity, tactics, strategies, political ramifica-t i o n s , o r m a n y o ramifica-t h e r s p e c i f i c d e ramifica-t a i l s o f s u c h c o n f l i c ramifica-t s a n d wars. For example, for the United States and most UN membe r states, Deliberate Force was a campaign of limited import a n c e to tangible vital interests. For the Balkan states, howeve r , it s outcome carried grave importance for their foreseeable political,

D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e w a s a c o n s t r a i n e d e x e r c i s e i n p o w e r a n d r i s k management. At the tactical level, though, NATO airmen expe-r i e n c e d t h e c a m p a i g n a s a m i c expe-r o c o s m o f t h e o p e expe-r a t i n g t e m p o s , t a c t i c s , w e a p o n s , a n d t h r e a t s t h e y w o u l d h a v e e x p e c t e d t o face in a high-intensity conflict in central Europe had the cold w a r g o n e h o t .

Deliberate Force also does not fit neatly into the military operations other than war (MOOTW) subcategory of the con-t i n u u m o f w a r . P e r h a p s con-t h e c a m p a i g n f i con-t con-t h e M O O T W c a con-t e g o r y politically since the UN and NATO launched it as a “peace operation,” without any formal declarations of war. However, e v e n i n s e c o n d a r y r e s e a r c h m a t e r i a l s a v a i l a b l e t o t h e t e a m a t the beginning of the study, Deliberate Force clearly had a split personality in terms of where it fit into the MOOTW concept. To the extent that NATO initiated the bombing to help the UN fo r c e B o s n i a n S e r b m i l i t a r y f o r c e s t o c e a s e s h e l l i n g t h e UN-declared technical exclusion zones or “safe areas” around se v-eral large Bosnian cities, Deliberate Force was an exercise in “ p e a c e m a k i n g . ” B u t t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e b o m b i n g a l s o u n-derpinned ongoing efforts by the UN and the five-nation Cont a c Cont G r o u p Cont o f o r c e Cont h e S e r b s Cont o e n Cont e r i n Cont o s e r i o u s p e a c e n e g o -t i a -t i o n s , -t h e o p e r a -t i o n i n v o l v e d “ p e a c e e n f o r c e m e n -t . ” T h e o p e r a t i o n a l c o m p l e x i t y o f D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e r e i n f o r c e d t h e s e n s e t h a t t h e r e a l - w o r l d b o u n d a r i e s o f t h i s c a m p a i g n w o u l d n o t c o n f o r m t o t h e t h e o r e t i c a l b o u n d a r i e s d e l i n e a t e d i n M O O T W t h e o r y . D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e m a y h a v e b e e n a r e s t r a i n e d peace operation strategically, but tactically it was an energetic operation characterized by the employment of technologically cutting-edge air forces.

A s a c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h e s e d e f i n i t i o n a l a m b i g u i t i e s , t h e BACS report was never intended to fix Deliberate Force’s place in an existing conflict taxonomy. Instead, as director of the r e p o r t , I w a n t e d i t t o d e s c r i b e t h e e v e n t a s a c c u r a t e l y a n d i n a s m u c h d e t a i l a s p r a c t i c a l a t t h e t i m e . E v e n a t t h e b e g i n n i n g , i t w a s o b v i o u s t o m o s t — p r o b a b l y a l l — B A C S t e a m m e m b e r s t hat this particular air campaign had distinctive characteristics, the description of which would in itself justify the report. S e v e r a l o f t h e s e f e a t u r e s s t o o d o u t a l r e a d y , i n o u t l i n e a t l e a s t , in the fall of 1995. First, Deliberate Force was strategically more

c o m m i t m e n t s a n d o b j e c t i v e s o f t h e c o m b a t a n t s t e n d e d t o r e-duce the advantage of NATO’s overwhelming military power. S e c o n d , t h e a i r c a m p a i g n w a s t a c t i c a l l y o n e - s i d e d . T h e d e-p l o y e d l a n d - a n d s e a - b a s e d a i r f o r c e s o f t h e N A T O e-p a r t n e r s d w a r f e d t h e “ a i r f o r c e ” a n d g r o u n d - b a s e d a i r d e f e n s e s o f t h e Bosnian Serbs. Third, Deliberate Force was not a politically or militarily isolated event. It was, after all, conducted in support of—or at least in the context of—the political activities of sev-e r a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s a n d n a t i o n s i n t sev-e r v sev-e n i n g i n t h sev-e B o s n i a n c o n f l i c t . F o r t h a t r e a s o n , b y t h e f a l l o f 1 9 9 5 , t h e a i r c o m m a n d -e r s h a d a l r -e a d y s t a t -e d t h -e i r b -e l i -e f t h a t , i n t h -e p o l i t i c a l l y c h a r g e d c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e c a m p a i g n , e v e r y t a c t i c a l e v e n t o f t h e o p e r a t i o n p o t e n t i a l l y c a r r i e d s i g n i f i c a n t a n d i m m e d i a t e strategic political importance. Also, at the time of the air cam-p a i g n , C r o a t i a a n d t h e B o s n i a n F e d e r a t i o n w e r e c o n d u c t i n g a c o o r d i n a t e d g r o u n d o f f e n s i v e t h a t s u c c e s s f u l l y p u s h e d C r o a -t i a n S e r b a n d B o s n i a n S e r b m i l i -t a r y f o r c e s o u -t o f a r e a s -t h e y h a d c o n q u e r e d p r e v i o u s l y . T h e B A C S t e a m u n d e r s t o o d t h a t a n y u s e f u l a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e s h a p e a n d i n f l u e n c e o f D e l i b e r -a t e F o r c e e v e n t u -a l l y w o u l d h -a v e t o c o n s i d e r t h e s i m u l t -a n e o u s i m p a c t o f t h e g r o u n d c a m p a i g n .

Given these salient elements, Deliberate Force’s theoretical “survey mark,” upon which most aspects of this study are ori-ented, is its unique identity as an air campaign conducted against an airpower-weak opponent, under conditions of politi-cal subtlety and limited time, in which every tactipoliti-cal event had g r e a t p o t e n t i a l i m p o r t a n c e . T h i s d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e c h ar a c-teristics and context of Operation Deliberate Force facilitates the effort of placing it in the existing body of theory and doctrine. As propositions, respectively, of how things work and of what ac-tions will most likely produce desired results under anticipated circumstances, theories and doctrines are contextually depend-e n t i n t h depend-e i r m depend-e a n i n g a n d a p p l i c a t i o n . O n depend-e m u s t p r depend-e s depend-e n t a n y theoretical proposition about the forces of human affairs, cause-and-effect relationships, and so on, in the context of an accurate description of the circumstances under which such observed events and processes happened. Likewise, effective doctrine must reflect both a solid foundatio n of relevant theories, based on experience, and a carefully constructed d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e

t h o s e a n s w e r s w o u l d b e l o a d e d w i t h t h e o r e t i c a l a n d d o c t r i n a l i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r f u t u r e a i r - w a r f a r e t h i n k e r s , p l a n n e r s , a n d l e a d e r s . T h e y w e r e n o t d i s a p p o i n t e d .

Notes

1. This archive, held at the Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell AFB, Ala., consists of over 10,000 pages of documents, about one h u n d r e d h o u r s o f o r a l i n t e r v i e w s o n a u d i o t a p e , a n d a n u m b e r o f c o m p u t e r disc files.

2. Joint Publication (Pub) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 F e b r u a r y 1 9 9 5 , c h a p . 3 , t h r o u g h o u t .

3 . J o i n t P u b 1 - 0 2 , Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and

A s s o c i a t e d T e r m s , 1 9 9 4 , 6 0 .

4. William H. Perry, remarks to Adjutant General Association of the U n i t e d S t a t e s , N a t i o n a l G u a r d A s s o c i a t i o n B u i l d i n g , W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . , 7 F e b r u a r y 1 9 9 6 .

5 . J o i n t P u b 3 - 0 , I - 2 a n d I - 3 .

ROBERT C. OWEN, Colonel, USAF Scott Air Force Base, Illinois J u n e 1 9 9 9

T h e D e m i s e o f Y u g o s l a v i a

a n d t h e D e s t r u c t i o n o f B o s n i a :

S t r a t e g i c C a u s e s , E f f e c t s , a n d R e s p o n s e s

Dr. Karl Mueller T o u n d e r s t a n d U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d W e s t e r n p o l i c y i n B o s n i a H e r z e g o v i n a a n d t h e s u r r o u n d i n g s t a t e s i n g e n e r a l , a n d O p -e r a t i o n D -e l i b -e r a t -e F o r c -e i n p a r t i c u l a r , o n -e m u s t p l a c -e t h -e s -e policies in strategic context. The sequence of events that led to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) a i r c a m p a i g n o f A u g u s t a n d S e p t e m b e r 1 9 9 5 d i d n o t r e a l l y b e g i n i n t h e f o u r-t e e n r-t h c e n r-t u r y , a s s o m e w r i r-t e r s h a v e s u g g e s r-t e d , b u r-t i r-t d o e s predate the breakup of Yugoslavia and the civil war in Bosnia t h a t b e g a n i n 1 9 9 2 . T h i s c h a p t e r l a y s t h e g r o u n d w o r k f o r t h o s e t h a t f o l l o w b y d e s c r i b i n g t h e a c t o r s , r e l a t i o n s h i p s , a n d c o n d i t i o n s a t t h e s t r a t e g i c l e v e l t h a t n o t o n l y c a u s e d b u t s h a p e d a n d c o n -s t r a i n e d W e -s t e r n a c t i o n -s i n a n d a r o u n d B o -s n i a i n 1 9 9 2 – 9 5 . M o s t o f t h e c h a p t e r i s i n n a r r a t i v e f o r m , w i t h o c c a s i o n a l a n a -l y t i c a -l i n t e r r u p t i o n s , b u t i t d o e s n o t p u r p o r t t o b e a h i s t o r y o f i t s s u b j e c t . I t c a n p r o v i d e n o m o r e t h a n a s u p e r f i c i a l a c c o u n t o f Y u g o s l a v i a n a n d B o s n i a n h i s t o r y , a n d t h e r e a d e r w h o s e e k s a r e a s o n a b l y c o m p l e t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e s e c o m p l e x m a t -ters would be well advised to consult some of the excellent a c c o u n t s a n d a n a l y s e s c i t e d i n t h e n o t e s .1

The Yugoslavian Prologue

The state of Yugoslavia w a s c o n s t r u c t e d a f t e r t h e F i r s t World War f r o m t h e r u i n s o f t h e A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n E m p i r e a n d t h e i n d e p e n d e n t A l l i e d s t a t e s o f S e r b i a a n d M o n t e n e g r o , t h e m s e l v e s c a l v e d o f f t h e d i s i n t e g r a t i n g O t t o m a n E m p i r e i n t h e l a t e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . T h e G r e a t W a r had been triggered b y t h e J u l y C r i s i s o f 1 9 1 4 , w h i c h b e g a n w h e n a m em b e r o f a

S e r b i a n s u p p o r t e d B o s n i a n s e p a r a t i s t o r g a n i z a t i o n a s s a s s i n a t e d A r c h d u k e F r a n z F e r d i n a n d , h e i r t o t h e A u s t r o H u n g a r -i a n t h r o n e , a n d h -i s c o n s o r t d u r -i n g a v -i s -i t t o t h e B o s n -i a n provincial capital of Sarajevo. E n c o u r a g e d b y G e r m a n y, A u s -tria blamed Serbia for the killing, leading to a confrontation w i t h R u s s i a , Serbia ’s PanSlavic greatpower ally, and eventu -a l l y t o -a g e n e r -a l E u r o p e -a n c o n f l -a g r -a t i o n .2 _{I n r e d r a w i n g t h e}

m a p o f c e n t r a l a n d e a s t e r n E u r o p e a f t e r t h e w a r , t h e v i c t o r i -o u s A l l i e s b r -o k e u p t h e A u s t r i a n e m p i r e , c -o m b i n i n g i t s S -o u t h S l a v i c p r o v i n c e s w i t h t h e e t h n i c a l l y r e l a t e d S e r b i a n a n d M o n -tenegrin states to form Yugoslavia .3

The Allies intended the creation of Yugoslavia a n d t h e o t h e r p o s t - V e r s a i l l e s m u l t i n a t i o n a l s t a t e s o f E a s t e r n E u r o p e (Czechoslovakia, Poland, and an expanded Romania) to help s t a b i l i z e t h e c o n t i n e n t . F r a n c e i n p a r t i c u l a r s t r o v e d u r i n g t h e 1 9 2 0 s t o c r e a t e a n e t w o r k o f a l l i a n c e s w i t h t h e s e s t a t e s a g a i n s t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f e x p a n s i o n i s m b y t h e d e f e a t e d c e n t r a l p o w e r s .4 _{T h e m o s t s u c c e s s f u l a s p e c t o f t h i s e f f o r t w a s t h e}

establishment of an alliance between Czechoslovakia , Yugo -slavia , a n d R o m a n i a d i r e c t e d m a i n l y a g a i n s t H u n g a r y, which b e c a m e k n o w n a s “ t h e L i t t l e E n t e n t e .” Although it deteriorated i n t h e 1 9 3 0 s a s i t s m e m b e r s ’ s e c u r i t y c o n c e r n s b e g a n t o d i-verge, during the early years of the League of Nations , s o m e statesmen optimistically viewed the Little Entente a s t h e f u n c-t i o n a l e q u i v a l e n c-t o f a s i x c-t h m a j o r E u r o p e a n p o w e r , a c-t l e a s c-t i n t h e d i p l o m a t i c s p h e r e .5

On the domestic political plane, Yugoslavia w a s d o m i n a t e d b y S e r b s , w h o w e r e n o t o n l y o n t h e w i n n i n g s i d e i n t h e w a r b u t w e r e t h e m o s t n u m e r o u s o f i t s e t h n i c g r o u p s , c o m p r i s i n g a b o u t 3 8 p e r c e n t o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n ; t h e S e r b i a n k i n g a n d c a p i t a l b e c a m e t h o s e o f t h e n e w Y u g o s l a v i a n s t a t e . I n t e r w a r Yugoslavia was never a paragon of political stability, and its t r o u b l e d d e m o c r a c y w a s r e p l a c e d b y a t r o u b l e d d i c t a t o r s h i p i n 1 9 2 8 . B e l g r a d e’s various efforts to overcome the country’s eth -n i c d i v i s i o -n s a -n d f o r g e a p o l i t i c a l l y u -n i t e d s t a t e d u r i -n g t h e i n t e r w a r y e a r s m e t w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l y l e s s s u c c e s s t h a n d i d t h o s e o f t h e p o s t w a r Y u g o s l a v i a n g o v e r n m e n t .6

As the power of Fascist Italy a n d N a z i G e r m a n y g r e w i n t h e 1 9 3 0 s , B e l g r a d e’s t i e s t o F r a n c e w e a k e n e d , a n d i t s o u g h t i n -creasingly to appease the looming Italian threat. Finally, in

April 1941, while the Italian invasion of Greece w a s f l o u n d e r -i n g , t h e Y u g o s l a v -i a n g o v e r n m e n t ’ s e f f o r t s t o r e a c h a m o d u s vivendi with the Axis—like the one Sweden w a s d e v e l o p i n g w i t h G e r m a n y—led to a pro-Allied military coup. Germany a n d its allies responded by invading Yugoslavia , c o n q u e r i n g t h e country in short order before going on to defeat Greece a n d then to invade the Soviet Union .7 _{Under brutal Axis control,}

parts of Yugoslavia w e r e a n n e x e d b y G e r m a n y, Italy , H u n g a r y, and Bulgaria , a n d t h e r e s t w a s d i v i d e d i n t o G e r m a n a n d I t a li a n z o n e s o f o c c u p a t li o n a n d a n o m li n a l l y li n d e p e n d e n t C r o a -t i a n f a s c i s -t s -t a -t e ( i n c l u d i n g p a r -t o f p r e s e n -t - d a y C r o a -t i a a n d a l l of BosniaHerzegovina), which was in practice an ItaloGer -m a n c o n d o -m i n i u -m .8 _{T h e F a s c i s t U s t a s a s, w h o r a n w a r t i m e}

Croatia , set out to kill a third of their state’s Serb population a n d e x p e l a n o t h e r t h i r d , p r i o r t o c o n v e r t i n g t h e r e m a i n d e r t o C a t h o l i c i s m .9

Yugoslavia w a s o n e o f t h e f e w A x i s - o c c u p i e d c o u n t r i e s t h a t s a w s i g n i f i c a n t r e s i s t a n c e - f i g h t i n g d u r i n g t h e w a r . T h i s f i g h t-ing involved two main guerrilla groups: the royalist Chetniks a n d t h e c o m m u n i s t p a r t i s a n s l e d b y t h e C r o a t - S l o v e n e l e a d e r of the Yugoslav Communist Party, J o s i p B r o z , k n o w n b y t h e p s e u d o n y m Tito.1 0 _{The resistance forces fought a grisly war}

a g a i n s t t h e A x i s o c c u p i e r s a n d t h e i r C r o a t i a n a l l i e s a n d , m o r e o f t e n , a g a i n s t e a c h o t h e r . T h e C h e t n i k s grew increasingly col-l a b o r a t i o n i s t u n d e r G e r m a n p r e s s u r e , a n d t h e i r c a m p a i g n o f v i o l e n c e a g a i n s t C r o a t s a n d M u s l i m s p r e v e n t e d t h e Y u g o s l a v-i a n g o v e r n m e n t - v-i n - e x v-i l e v-i n L o n d o n f r o m g a v-i n v-i n g s u b s t a n t v-i a l s u p p o r t f r o m n o n S e r b s . T i t o ’s partisans received Soviet sup port (although Tito rejected Moscow’s instructions to cooper -a t e w i t h t h e C h e t n i k s -a n d o t h e r -a n t i c o m m u n i s t f o r c e s ) , -a n d , ultimately, the Western Allies decided to back Tito as well. T h e y d i d s o s i n c e h e s e e m e d f a r m o r e w i l l i n g t h a n t h e C h e t -n i k s to prosecute the war agai-nst the Axis i-n spite of horrific G e r m a n r e p r i s a l s a g a i n s t t h e c i v i l i a n p o p u l a c e . O v e r a m i l l i o n Y u g o s l a v s d i e d a t t h e h a n d s o f t h e i r v a r i o u s d o m e s t i c a n d f o r e i g n e n e m i e s d u r i n g t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r; t h i s n u m b e r r e p r e s e n t e d m o r e t h a n 6 p e r c e n t o f t h e c o u n t r y ’ s p r e w a r p o p u l a t i o n — a g r e a t e r p r o p o r t i o n a l l o s s t h a n w a s s u f f e r e d b y a n y o t h e r s t a t e i n t h e w a r e x c e p t f o r G e r m a n y, Poland, a n d the Soviet Union .

Tito b e c a m e p r e m i e r a n d l a t e r p r e s i d e n t o f p o s t w a r Y u g o s l a -via , a s w e l l a s C o m m u n i s t P a r t y g e n e r a l s e c r e t a r y . H e e s t a b-l i s h e d a p o b-l i t i c a b-l s y s t e m b a s e d o n a s t r o n g f e d e r a b-l g o v e r n m e n t b u t w i t h s i g n i f i c a n t p o w e r s a n d p e r q u i s i t e s r e s e r v e d f o r e a c h of the six Yugoslav republics and protections for the various official ethnic groups.1 1 _{T h i s s y s t e m u n d e r w e n t s e v e r a l r o u n d s}

o f r e v i s i o n o v e r t h e y e a r s , m o s t n o t a b l y i n 1 9 7 1 , w h e n M u s -l i m s r e c e i v e d f u -l -l r e c o g n i t i o n a s a n e t h n i c n a t i o n , a n d i n t h e 1 9 7 4 c o n s t i t u t i o n , w h i c h i n c r e a s e d f e d e r a l d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n a n d g a v e v i r t u a l r e p u b l i c s t a t u s t o t h e a u t o n o m o u s S e r b i a n regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina .

Yugoslavia e m e r g e d f r o m t h e w a r a s a l e a d i n g m e m b e r o f t h e c o m m u n i s t m o v e m e n t i n E a s t e r n E u r o p e, but Tito a n d h i s Soviet allies soon parted ways; Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform in 1948 for its disobediently militant foreign policies and for Tito’s criticism of Stalin , a l t h o u g h Y u g o s l a v i a n relations with Moscow improved somewhat following Stalin ’s d e a t h .1 2 _{T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s provided arms to Yugoslavia u n d e r}

t h e M u t u a l A s s i s t a n c e P a c t d u r i n g t h e 1 9 5 0 s , a l o n g w i t h l a r g e amounts of other foreign aid, and for a while Yugoslavia even appeared to be a potential candidate for eventual NATO m e m -b e r s h i p . I n t h e 1 9 6 0 s r e l a t i o n s -b e t w e e n B e l g r a d e and Moscow improved, and Yugoslavia b e c a m e o n e o f t h e s o l i d l y n e u t r a l s t a t e s o f E u r o p e , e n j o y i n g t h e a t t e n t i o n s o f b o t h E a s t a n d W e s t a s t h e s u p e r p o w e r s v i e d f o r i n f l u e n c e o v e r i t .1 3

Together with neutral Austria —and Albania a f t e r i t s b r e a k with Moscow—Yugoslavia w a s a b u f f e r b e t w e e n t h e s o u t h e r n flanks of NATO a n d t h e W a r s a w P a c t during most of the cold w a r , largely insulating Italy f r o m e x t e r n a l m i l i t a r y t h r e a t .1 4

Yugoslavia b a s e d i t s d e f e n s i v e s t r a t e g y u p o n a n a t i o n a l a r m y (the JNA) supported by territorial defense forces organized in e a c h r e p u b l i c .15 _{In the event of invasion (most likely from the}

Soviet Union ), the JNA w o u l d d e l a y t h e a g g r e s s o r l o n g e n o u g h for the mobilization of territorial forces, after which national defense would increasingly fall back upon a strategy of guer rilla warfare, e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e m o u n t a i n o u s r e g i o n s o f B o s n i a -Herzegovina (where Belgrade concentrated Yugoslavia ’s devel-o p i n g d e f e n s e i n d u s t r i e s ) , M devel-o n t e n e g r devel-o, a n d K devel-o s devel-o v devel-o . T h e prospect of fighting a long and bloody guerrilla war i n t h e Y u g o s l a v i a n m o u n t a i n s w o u l d l i k e l y d e t e r a n y p r o s p e c t i v e

c o n q u e r o r o f t h e c o u n t r y . T h e l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e J N A included disproportionate numbers of Serbian officers—especially Bos -n i a -n S e r b s —due to factors relati-ng to historical traditio-n a-nd t o t h e l i m i t e d e c o n o m i c o p p o r t u n i t i e s a v a i l a b l e i n r u r a l B o s nia . The multinational army, however, was probably the Yugo -s l a v i a n i n -s t i t u t i o n t h a t c o n t r i b u t e d t h e m o -s t t o f e d e r a l u n i t y .1 6

On the international political scene, Yugoslavia r o s e t o a d d i-t i o n a l p r o m i n e n c e i n i-t h e 1 9 6 0 s a n d 1 9 7 0 s a s a p r i n c i p a l l e a d e r o f t h e n o n a l i g n e d n a t i o n s m o v e m e n t . T h e p o s t - S t a l i n i s t Yugoslav experiment of an economic middle course between c a p i t a l i s m a n d S o v i e t c o m m u n i s m s e e m e d t o b e , i f n o t a r o a r -i n g s u c c e s s , a t l e a s t a m o d e s t o n e , e s p e c -i a l l y c o m p a r e d t o s o m e o f i t s n e i g h b o r s . H o w e v e r , d u r i n g t h e 1 9 7 0 s , s p e c u l a t i o n a b o u n d e d a b o u t t h e l i k e l y r e s u l t s o f T i t o ’s presumably im -p e n d i n g d e a t h . A n i m -p r e s s i o n w i d e l y h e l d i n t h e W e s t w a s that Yugoslavia h a d a n i n t r i n s i c t e n d e n c y t o w a r d s d i s i n t e g r a -tion and interethnic conflict held off only by Tito ’s personal prestige and power. Yet, after Tito did finally die in 1980, his political creation survived. Defying many expectations, Yugo -slavia seemed to continue inertially along its decentralized s o c i a l i s t p a t h b e t w e e n E a s t a n d W e s t m o r e o r l e s s a s b e f o r e . Other leaders peacefully succeeded Tito, a l t h o u g h w i t h o u t h i s l e a d e r s h i p , m a k i n g a n y n e w c h a n g e s i n t h e f e d e r a l s y s t e m would prove difficult. The 1984 Winter Olympics showcased t h e a p p a r e n t s u c c e s s o f t h e Y u g o s l a v e x p e r i m e n t ; t h e y w e r e held in Sarajevo , where, as Olympic television viewers were r e m i n d e d a l m o s t n i g h t l y , t h e s p a r k t h a t i g n i t e d t h e F i r s t World War h a d b e e n s t r u c k 7 0 y e a r s e a r l i e r .

Beneath the superficial level, however, the Yugoslavian sys -t e m c a m e u n d e r a c u -t e e c o n o m i c p r e s s u r e i n -t h e 1 9 8 0 s .1 7 _As

Yugoslavia ’s political system ossified, its economic fortunes declined due to a variety of factors, including rising energy p r i c e s . B o t h t h e s t a t e a n d t h e r e p u b l i c s i n c r e a s i n g l y t u r n e d t o f o r e i g n b o r r o w i n g t o s u s t a i n t h e m s e l v e s . I n t h e 1 9 8 0 s , t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l M o n e t a r y F u n d r e q u i r e d B e l g r a d e t o i n s t i t u t e i n c r e a s i n g l y s t r i n g e n t a u s t e r i t y m e a s u r e s a s a c o n d i t i o n f o r f u r t h e r l o a n s . D e s p i t e e f f o r t s t o r e d u c e t h e m , i n c o m e d i s p a r i -t i e s b e -t w e e n -t h e r i c h e s -t a n d p o o r e s -t r e p u b l i c s c o n -t i n u e d -t o grow. The evaporation of the cold war r e d u c e d t h e s u p e r p o w -ers’ interest in buying Yugoslavia ’s f r i e n d s h i p , a n d W e s t e r n

i n v e s t m e n t h e a d i n g e a s t f o u n d m o r e a n d m o r e a l t e r n a t i v e p l a c e s t o l a n d . T h e s e f o r c e s c o m b i n e d t o u n d e r m i n e T i t o’s e l a b o r a t e s p o i l s - d i s t r i b u t i o n s y s t e m a m o n g t h e r e p u b l i c s a n d r e g i o n s , t h u s w e a k e n i n g t h e a d h e s i v e t h a t h e l d t h e c o u n t r y t o g e t h e r . B e t w e e n 1 9 8 2 a n d 1 9 8 9 , t h e Y u g o s l a v i a n s t a n d a r d of living fell by 40 percent.1 8 _{When newly elected Yugoslav}

prime minister Ante Markovic l a u n c h e d a n e c o n o m i c a n d p o -l i t i c a -l r e f o r m p r o g r a m i n 1 9 8 9 , -l i t t -l e i n t e r e s t o r s u p p o r t w a s f o r t h c o m i n g f r o m a U S g o v e r n m e n t t h a t w a s p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h developments in the Soviet Union a n d t h e W a r s a w P a c t .1 9 _As

economic conditions grew more difficult, support for the feder a l s tructure eroded, especially in the wealthiest republics, so that w h e n d o m e s t i c r e v o l u t i o n a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e a l i g n m e n t s w e p t E a s t e r n E u r o p e in 1989, the stage was set for the breakup of Yu g oslavia .

T h e D i s s o l u t i o n o f Y u g o s l a v i a

I t i s n o t u n u s u a l t o h e a r W e s t e r n o b s e r v e r s c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e explosive decompression of Yugoslavia a s t h e i n e v i t a b l e r e s u l t o f a n c i e n t a n d e n d u r i n g h a t r e d s a m o n g t h e c o u n t r y ’ s c o n -s t i t u e n t e t h n i c g r o u p -s . They -sugge-st that only Tito’ -s p r o g r a m o f r e p r e s s i o n w a s a b l e t o k e e p t h e s t a t e t o g e t h e r d u r i n g t h e cold war, a n d a f t e r h i s d e a t h n o o n e e l s e c o u l d h o l d b a c k t h e mighty centrifugal forces of ageold interethnic animosity. Im plicit, and occasionally explicit, in this argument is a sugges -t i o n -t h a -t -t h e Y u g o s l a v i a n p o p u l a c e i s p r i m i -t i v e a n d e v e n s a v-age in a way that full-fledged, civilized Westerners are not.2 0

Although Americans manage to live in relative peace in multi-e t h n i c c o m m u n i t i multi-e s ,2 1 _{S e r b s a n d C r o a t s (like Rwandans, Cyp}

-r i o t s , a n d K a s h m i -r i s ) c a n n o t f o -r g e t t h e w -r o n g s t h e i -r a n c e s t o -r s d i d t o e a c h o t h e r . T h e r e f o r e , w e s h o u l d n o t h a v e b e e n s u r-prised by Yugoslavia ’s b r e a k u p , a n d w e s h o u l d n o t f e e l g u i l t y a b o u t i t .2 2 T h i s e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e c a t a s t r o p h e i s a t t r a c t i v e l y s i m p l e , b u t i t i s t o o a d h o c t o b e s a t i s f y i n g — a n d i t i s a t o d d s w i t h t h e f a c t s . M a n y p e o p l e s r e c a l l a n c i e n t ( a n d t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y ) wrongs done by their traditional enemies but live peacefully with each other anyway. Moreover, although Tito d i d u s e a n

i r o n f i s t t o r e p r e s s a n t i f e d e r a l n a t i o n a l i s m , p r o g r e s s t o w a r d s t h e c r e a t i o n o f a p a n - Y u g o s l a v i d e n t i t y p r o c e e d e d b y m a n y m e a n s , o n l y s o m e o f t h e m c o e r c i v e .2 3 _{F o r c e s s i m i l a r t o t h o s e}

t h a t l a y b e h i n d c l a s s i c a l s o c i a l r e v o l u t i o n s c a u s e d t h e r e v o l u -tionary changes in Yugoslavia :2 4 _{demand for political change}

from below, triggered in this case primarily by economic hard-s h i p , c o m b i n e d w i t h t h e w e a k e n i n g o f t h e hard-s t a t e ’ hard-s c a p a c i t y t o r e s i s t t h e s e p r e s s u r e s — a t t r i b u t a b l e h e r e n o t o n l y t o T i t o’s d e a t h b u t a l s o t o t h e c o l l a p s e o f t h e b i p o l a r E u r o p e a n o r d e r a n d t h e w a v e o f r e v o l u t i o n s s w e e p i n g E a s t e r n E u r o p e i n 1 9 8 9 – 9 1 . A s t h e s e r e v o l u t i o n a r y f o r c e s s t r e n g t h e n e d , l e a d e r s ( a n d n a t i o n a l m e d i a ) w h o r e c o g n i z e d t h e p o t e n t i a l p o w e r o f e t h n i c a n d r e l i g i o u s p r i d e a n d h a t r e d e a g e r l y k i n d l e d t h o s e e m o t i o n s , a s w a r t i m e a n d w a r m o n g e r i n g l e a d e r s h a v e o f t e n done before.2 5 _{In short, ethnic relationships in Yugoslavia did}

n o t s i m p l y b u r s t i n t o f l a m e s ; r a t h e r , i n c e n d i a r y e t h n i c f u e l was thrown onto the fires of regional and class conflict.2 6

Nevertheless, Yugoslavia w a s u n u s u a l l y f e r t i l e g r o u n d f o r the growth of ethnic conflict . S e r b s did recall the Battle of Kosovo Polje i n 1 3 8 9 , i n w h i c h S e r b i a ’s army was gloriously d e f e a t e d b y O t t o m a n f o r c e s , a n d c o n s i d e r e d i t r e l e v a n t t o t h e m s e l v e s f i v e h u n d r e d y e a r s l a t e r . I t w a s m u c h m o r e i m p o r -t a n -t -t h a -t m e m o r i e s o f -t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r were far from d i s t a n t a n d e v e n f a r t h e r f r o m p l e a s a n t , e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e c o n flict between Serbs a n d C r o a t s w a s i n f a c t q u i t e u n u s u a l b e -fore the twentieth century.2 7 _{S u c h f a c t o r s d i d a g r e a t d e a l t o}

make the slope towards warfare and atrocity in Yugoslavia m u c h s t e e p e r a n d m o r e s l i p p e r y t h a n i t o t h e r w i s e w o u l d h a v e been. To describe postwar Yugoslavia a s a p o w d e r k e g o r a h o u s e o f c a r d s i m p l i e s f a r t o o m u c h d e t e r m i n i s m , b u t i t w a s c e r t a i n l y a c o m p l e x s y s t e m w i t h m a n y s e r i o u s i n s t a b i l i t i e s . I t did not simply fail; it tore itself apart—as a result of being vandalized.

The first major cracks in the Yugoslavian federation began in Kosovo following Tito’s death. Local Serbs, who were be-c o m i n g a n e v e r s m a l l e r m i n o r i t y i n t h e r e g i o n k n o w n a s t h e historical heart of Yugoslavia ,2 8 _{b e g a n t o c o m p l a i n o f p e r s e c u}

-tion and injury by the poorer Albanian majority in Kosovo— accounts widely reported and believed elsewhere in Serbia . In 1 9 8 7 , a s a p o p u l a r g r o u n d s w e l l o f S e r b r e s e n t m e n t a g a i n s t

the Kosovan Albanians grew, Slobodan Milosevic , t h e a m b i-t i o u s p r e s i d e n i-t o f i-t h e S e r b i a n L e a g u e o f C o m m u n i s i-t s , capii-tal- capital-i z e d u p o n t h e p o t e n t capital-i a l p o w e r b a s e a n d e s t a b l capital-i s h e d h capital-i m s e l f a s l e a d e r o f a n e w n a t i o n a l i s t S e r b i a n p o l i t i c a l m o v e m e n t .2 9

Milosevic’s party rebuked him for his deviation from its feder -alist principles, but in the ensuing power struggle, Milosevic gained an overwhelming victory and expelled his key oppo-n e oppo-n t s f r o m t h e p a r t y . H e t h e oppo-n s e t o u t t o b u i l d h i s a oppo-n d S e r b i a ’s power within Yugoslavia : i n r a p i d s u c c e s s i o n , h e a n d h i s s u p porters took control of communist parties in Vojvodina, Mon -t e n e g r o, a n d -t h e n K o s o v o , ins-talling pro-Milosevic p r e s i d e n -t s in each region or republic.3 0 _{W h e n t h e A l b a n i a n m a j o r i t y i n}

Kosovo objected, Milosevic u s e d t h e t h r e a t o f S e r b i a n m o b violence in Belgrade to coerce the federal government into g r a n t i n g h i m e m e r g e n c y p o w e r s t o u s e t h e J N A a g a i n s t t h e m a n d d e c l a r e d t h a t t h i s s h o w e d t h a t S e r b i a h a d r e g a i n e d i t s former power.3 1

Kosovans’ resistance to Belgrade’s recision of their regional a u t o n o m y f o u n d w i d e s p r e a d s u p p o r t f r o m S l o v e n i a , t h e w e a l t h i e s t a n d m o s t W e s t e r n i z e d o f t h e Y u g o s l a v r e p u b l i c s . R e l a x a t i o n o f S l o v e n i a n p r e s s c o n t r o l s i n r e c e n t y e a r s h a d r e s u l t e d i n t h e p r o m i n e n t d i s p l a y o f a n t i f e d e r a l a n d a n t i -Milosevic opinion there; Serbia ’s a p p a r e n t b i d f o r h e g e m o n y i n Yugoslavia i n c r e a s e d t h i s s e n t i m e n t . B e l g r a d e’s efforts to sup -p r e s s t h i s d i s s e n t f u r t h e r f a n n e d t h e f l a m e s o f r e s e n t m e n t , and when Milosevic r e s p o n d e d b y c a l l i n g a n e x t r a o r d i n a r y Yugoslav Party Congress i n w h i c h t h e S e r b i a n b l o c c o n s i s -tently defeated reforms proposed by Slovenia , t h e S l o v e n i a n delegation walked out. Faced with the possibility of a poten -tially catastrophic split in the federation, Milosevic tried to p e r s u a d e t h e C r o a t i a n d e l e g a t i o n n o t t o f o l l o w s u i t , b u t t h e C r o a t i a n s d e p a r t e d a f t e r d e c i d i n g t h e y c o u l d n o t a c c e p t a f e d -erated Yugoslavia that excluded the Slovenes. Later, Milosevic would blame Slovenia for causing the breakup of Yugoslavia and all that followed.3 2

Milosevic’ s n a t i o n a l i s m c o n t r i b u t e d s u b s t a n t i a l l y t o t h e e l e c t i o n o f F r a n j o T u d j m a n as president of Croatia in April 1 9 9 0 .3 3 _{T u d j m a n’ s n a t i o n a l i s m a n d h i s i n v o c a t i o n o f s y m b o l s}

from Croatia ’s b r i e f h e y d a y o f i n d e p e n d e n t F a s c i s m i n t u r n c a u s e d f e a r a n d a l a r m a m o n g C r o a t i a n S e r b s , w h o m a d e u p

local majorities in parts of the impoverished, socalled Croa -tian Krajina and of Eastern Slavonia , r e g i o n s a l o n g t h e r e p u b-lic’s borders with Bosnia and Serbia . C r o a t i a n S e r b r e s i s t a n c e to the election of Tudjman a n d h i s n a t i o n a l i s t s w a s c e n t e r e d in the town of Knin , w h e r e l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s r e f u s e d t o a c c e p t t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e n e w g o v e r n m e n t i n Z a g r e b . They asked for s u p p o r t f r o m B e l g r a d e a n d r e c e i v e d S e r b i a n e n c o u r a g e m e n t a n d a d v i c e f o r t h e i r b u d d i n g r e b e l l i o n . C r o a t i a n l e a d e r s w e r e k e e n t o m o v e a g a i n s t t h e S e r b s , e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e k e y t r a n s p o r t r o u t e s t o t h e D a l m a t i a n c o a s t p a s s e d t h r o u g h t h e K n i n a r e a , b u t t h e y f e a r e d t h a t t h i s m i g h t t r i g g e r i n t e r v e n t i o n b y t h e J N A. W h e n t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n e s c a l a t e d a n d Z a g r e b s e n t s e veral helicopters carrying special forces to Knin , they were in -tercepted and turned back by MiG fighters of the Yugoslav air f o r c e . T h e C r o a t i a n g o v e r n m e n t b e g a n s e c r e t l y t o i m p o r t a r m s f o r u s e a g a i n s t t h e S e r b s a n d p o t e n t i a l l y t h e J N A.3 4 _Croatia a p p r o a c h e d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a s a p o t e n t i a l a r m s s u p p l i e r , b u t t h e U S g o v e r n m e n t r e b u f f e d t h e i n q u i r i e s , s t i l l h o p i n g t o keep Yugoslavia u n i t e d a n d t h e r e b y m i n i m i z e i n s t a b i l i t y i n t h e B a l k a n s . Croatia f o u n d o t h e r v e n d o r s , h o w e v e r . Milosevic f a v o r e d s e n d i n g t h e J N A a g a i n s t t h e C r o a t s, b u t t h i s r e q u i r e d a m a j o r i t y v o t e w i t h i n t h e Y u g o s l a v S t a t e C o u n -cil. O n 1 2 M a r c h 1 9 9 1 , S t a t e C o u n c i l c h a i r m a n B o r i s a v J o v i c of Serbia c a l l e d a m e e t i n g o f t h e c o u n c i l t o c o n s i d e r a p r o p o s a l b y t h e m i n i s t e r o f d e f e n s e t o e s t a b l i s h a n a t i o n a l s t a t e o f e m e r g e n c y t o s t o p t h e c i v i l w a r t h a t h e a c c u s e d t h e C r o a t s of p l a n n i n g . T h e C r o a t s a n d M a c e d o n i a n s o p p o s e d t h e p l a n , a n d t h e S l o v e n i a n d e l e g a t i o n w a s a b s e n t , f e a r i n g a r r e s t b y t h e S e r b s . W i t h t h e S e r b i a n , V o j v o d i n a n , K o s o v a n , a n d M o n t e n eg r i n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s s u p p o r t i n eg m a r t i a l l a w , B o s n i a H e r z e -govina held the deciding vote. Although Bosnia s e e m e d t o h a v e t h e m o s t t o l o s e i n a n i n t r a - Y u g o s l a v i a n c i v i l w a r , t h e Bosnian representative surprised Milosevic b y o p p o s i n g t h e motion. In response, Milosevic a n n o u n c e d t h a t S e r b i a a n d i t s allies would withdraw from the State Council , c a l c u l a t i n g t h a t w i t h c i v i l i a n a u t h o r i t y o v e r t h e J N A e l i m i n a t e d , t h e a r m y w o u l d b e f r e e t o a c t o n i t s o w n a g a i n s t t h o s e w h o t h r e a t e n e d t h e f e d e r a t i o n .

The United States a m b a s s a d o r w a r n e d B e l g r a d e n o t t o u s e force against Croatia , c a u s i n g c o n s i d e r a b l e c o n c e r n a m o n g

t h e S e r b i a n l e a d e r s h i p . T h e r e f o r e , t h e m i n i s t e r o f d e f e n s e s e-cretly traveled to Moscow to meet Soviet defense officials and asked for a promise of Soviet assistance in the event of West -ern intervention in Yugoslavia .3 5 _{The Soviets provided him}

with intelligence information indicating that the United States would not intervene, and Milosevic c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e w a y now lay clear for federal forces to reassert Belgrade’s c o n t r o l over Croatia . However, Milosevic ’s plan ultimately foundered b e c a u s e t h e c o m m a n d e r o f t h e J N A could not bring himself to establish military rule in Yugoslavia .

In May 1991 Croatians overwhelmingly voted to declare their republic’s independence effective in late June, coordinating with the date a similar Slovene independence declaration was already set to take effect. Slovene and Croat representatives lobbied the E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y ( E C ), which they aspired to join, to rec-o g n i z e t h e i r i n d e p e n d e n c e , b u t t h e E C h a d n rec-o d e s i r e t rec-o s e e Yugoslavia b r e a k u p . I n s t e a d , t h e W e s t s e t a b o u t e x e r t i n g pressure on Slovenia a n d C r o a t i a t o r e m a i n within Yugoslavia , culminating in a visit to Belgrade b y J a m e s B a k e r , US secretary of state. Baker declared that the United States would not recog-nize Croatia and Slovenia u n d e r a n y circumstances, which all sides took as a signal that Washington w o u l d n o t o b j e c t t o t h e use of force to hold the federation together.3 6

T h e t w o r e p u b l i c s d e c i d e d t o p r e s s a h e a d a n y w a y , a n d w h e n t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e d a t e c a m e o n 2 5 J u n e , S l o v e n i a ex -pelled Yugoslavian customs officials from their posts on the I t a l i a n a n d A u s t r i a n f r o n t i e r s . S l o v e n e p r e s i d e n t M i l a n K u c a n and his government resolved to fight the JNA if necessary. W h e n t h e J N A s e n t s o m e t w o t h o u s a n d p r e d o m i n a n t l y c o n -s c r i p t t r o o p -s t o r e t a k e t h e v a r i o u -s b o r d e r p o -s t -s , e x p e c t i n g n o s e r i o u s r e s i s t a n c e , t h e s e u n i t s s o o n f o u n d t h e m s e l v e s s u rr o u n d e d b y 3 5 , 0 0 0 S l o v e n e m i l i t i a f o rr c e s w h o u s e d t h e t e rr rr i t o rialdefense tactics designed to defend Yugoslavia a g a i n s t S o -viet invasion. Slovene troops blocked all major roads in the r e p u b l i c , t r a p p i n g u n p r e p a r e d a n d s t u n n e d J N A forces in t h e i r b a r r a c k s . J N A e f f o r t s t o b r e a k t h r o u g h t h e b a r r i c a d e s a n d r e s u p p l y t h e i r b e s i e g e d b a s e s b y a i r m e t w i t h f i r e f r o m t h e Slovene militia, and the first of a number of its helicopters was shot down. Croatia was not so eager as Slovenia t o b r e a k