An Interim Assessment of Achieving Improved
Trip Times on the Northeast Corridor
Prepared by Amtrak
Under Section 212(d) of the Passenger Rail
Investment and Improvement Act of 2008
(Public Law 110-432)
Revised Version
October 21, 2009
Table of Contents
Introduction ... 1
Background ... 2
Trip Time Goals ... 4
State of Good Repair / Reliability... 6
Growth Trends ... 8
Capacity ... 9
Necessary Improvements to Achieve Trip Time Reductions ... 10
Estimated Costs... 14
Benefits of Investment ... 17
Risks, Opportunities and Challenges Ahead ... 17
Introduction
Section 212(d) of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, Public Law 110-432 (PRIIA), enacted October 16, 2008, requires that Amtrak conduct a study of Northeast Corridor (NEC) improvements necessary to reduce trip time for Amtrak’s high speedservice, known as the Acela Express service, between New York, NY and Washington, DC and between New York, NY and Boston, MA.
Specifically, under the law, Amtrak is required to “submit a report detailing the
infrastructure and equipment improvements necessary to provide regular high-speed service —
A. between Washington, District of Columbia, and New York, New York, in 2 hours and 30 minutes; and
B. between New York, New York and Boston, Massachusetts, in 3 hours and 15 minutes.”
The report is to include an estimated time frame for achieving the trip times, an analysis of any significant obstacles that would hinder such an achievement, and a detailed description and cost estimate of the specific infrastructure and equipment improvements necessary for such an achievement.
Amtrak is also directed to include in the report “an initial assessment of infrastructure and equipment improvements, including an order of magnitude cost estimate of such improvements, that would be necessary to provide regular high-speed service —
i. between Washington, District of Columbia, and New York, New York, in 2 hours and 15 minutes; and
ii. between New York, New York and Boston, Massachusetts, in 3 hours.” The report is due within one year after the date of enactment of PRIIA (October 16, 2009).
When complete, the report is to be submitted to —
A. the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate; B. the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
C. the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Representatives;
D. the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and E. the Federal Railroad Administration.
This report serves to fulfill the PRIIA statutory requirement by providing an interim assessment of the necessary improvements and associated costs, obstacles, and challenges to achieve the specified trip time improvements on the Northeast Corridor. Because significant Northeast Corridor planning and analysis is ongoing or will soon be undertaken by Amtrak, its state partners, and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Amtrak is submitting this report as an interim assessment, in recognition of the further refinements that are likely to result from the cooperative efforts to improve the
operations of the Northeast Corridor. Amtrak will update and expand upon this interim assessment with the completion of the ongoing cooperative Northeast Corridor planning effort known as the Northeast Corridor Master Plan, and upon consultation with the Northeast Corridor Infrastructure and Operations Advisory Commission, once established. Additionally, Federally-required environmental analyses, which are a prerequisite for Federal funding for major improvements to the Northeast Corridor, need to be undertaken and may impact the scope of the proposed improvements or materially alter the proposed approach in this interim assessment on trip time reduction. Thus, a subsequent update will reflect any relevant environmental analysis work then available.
Background
Major portions of the Northeast Corridor were first conveyed to Amtrak in 1976 under provisions of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 and the Railroad
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4R Act). The portions conveyed include the entire South End from Washington, DC to New York, NY; the Hell Gate Line from New York, NY to New Rochelle, NY; and the Shore Line from New Haven, CT to the Massachusetts - Rhode Island state line - totaling 363 route miles of the 457 mile main line from Boston, MA to Washington - as well as the Harrisburg, PA and
Springfield, MA Lines and a portion of the Albany, NY line. Other portions of the Northeast Corridor main line between New York and Boston were previously sold or leased in the early 1970s by then-owner Penn Central Railroad to the states of Massachusetts and Connecticut and the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (New York MTA). Figure 1 illustrates ownership of the Northeast Corridor.
Today, the Northeast Corridor is one of the busiest, most complex railroad operations in the world, hosting a mix of freight, commuter, intercity and high speed services. Amtrak operates 153 trains a day on portions of the Northeast Corridor, serving over 12 million passengers annually. Amtrak maintains and dispatches the entire main line between Boston and Washington, except for 56 route miles owned by the Connecticut
Department of Transportation (ConnDOT) and New York MTA between New Rochelle and New Haven. Amtrak’s high-speed Acela Express service between Washington and Boston, the United States’ only existing high-speed operation, is the company’s flagship service, reaching speeds of 150 mph and contributing over 25% of Amtrak’s overall ticket revenues.
Figure 1: Overview of Ownership and Operations on the Northeast Corridor
Source: NEC Master Plan (under development)
Revenues generated from Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor operations and use of Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor assets by commuter and freight railroads are substantial. However, they do not cover the necessary capital investments required to overcome years of deferred maintenance and investments, let alone the investments needed to
significantly improve Northeast Corridor assets.
Thus, Federal funding to maintain or improve Amtrak’s portion of the Northeast Corridor has been necessary throughout Amtrak’s history to supplement the revenues derived from operations. These funds have generally been provided to Amtrak directly or through the FRA from annual Federal appropriations bills. The reliance on such annual Federal funding has meant that multi-year improvement efforts have been difficult to
plan, sustain, and complete, as the availability of Federal funding in any successive year past the current fiscal year has generally been unknown and subject to change.
In addition to Amtrak’s role, overall responsibility for implementing Federal railroad policy, administering Federal grant programs and setting rail safety standards applicable to the Northeast Corridor rests with the FRA. Furthermore, the Secretary of
Transportation has a direct role in Amtrak’s governance as a member of the Amtrak Board of Directors and through the FRA’s responsibility for overseeing and
administering all direct Federal grants to Amtrak. The states and localities served by the Northeast Corridor also play a significant role in its development through joint planning activities such as the Northeast Corridor Master Plan, investments in Corridor infrastructure to facilitate commuter service, and station development.
Unlike in other regions of the country where most corridor service is state-supported, state investment in main line Northeast Corridor operations and infrastructure to directly benefit intercity passenger rail service has been limited. However, the enactment of PRIIA created a new relationship among Amtrak, the Federal government and the states related to rail infrastructure development, and established a more active role for the states in Northeast Corridor governance, planning, and funding. Specifically, PRIIA calls for the FRA to establish a Northeast Corridor Infrastructure and Operations
Advisory Commission, with responsibility for setting goals, and developing funding plans and cost allocation methodologies for operation of the Northeast Corridor. The
Commission, which has not yet been established, is to include balanced representation from the Northeast states, Amtrak and FRA.
The efforts of this Commission are expected to build upon Amtrak’s work with the Northeast states and railroads over the past two years to develop a comprehensive, long-range capital investment plan for the Northeast Corridor in the form of the
Northeast Corridor Master Plan. The initial draft of the plan is expected to be released in the winter of 2009 / 2010, and the trip time plans discussed in this report are derived in large part from work done as part of the master plan process.
Trip Time Goals
Trip time goals outlined in the study requirement of Section 212 of PRIIA are, for the most part, not new. Similar goals have been established going back more than 30 years.
The goal of achieving 2 hour and 30 minute service between New York and Washington and 3 hour service between Boston and New York was identified in 1976 in the 4R Act, which established the Federally-funded Northeast Corridor Improvement Project
(NECIP). The NECIP initially set a trip time goal of achieving 2 hour and 40 minute service between New York and Washington, and 3 hour and 40 minute service between Boston and New York by 1981, with a longer term objective of achieving the trip time goals contemplated by this study.
No regularly scheduled Amtrak service with multiple stops has operated between New York and Washington with a trip time of 2 hours and 30 minutes or less. Although Amtrak briefly operated a one-stop train that achieved this goal, this train was discontinued as, consistent with Amtrak’s subsequent experience, New
York-Washington service with a single intermediate stop did not generate sufficient revenue.
The primary reason for failing to achieve the 2 hour and 30 minute trip time goal was the lack of adequate Federal funding for necessary improvements to Northeast Corridor infrastructure, equipment and facilities, as the NECIP program was scaled back in the late 1970s. The initial NECIP estimate of the Federal funding required to restore the infrastructure to a full state of good repair and make high-speed improvements was between $4 billion and $5 billion in 1977 dollars. However, the original funding level established by NECIP was only $2.2 billion, and was reduced to $1.8 billion in 1979. By the end of NECIP and its successor program, the Northeast Corridor High-Speed Rail Improvement Program (NHRIP), only $4 billion of federal investment had been provided over a 22-year period (1976 to 1998), an amount that (adjusted for inflation) fell far short of even the original 1977 estimate. The cumulative effect of not fully funding the
program was that many of the projects necessary to restore the corridor to a state of good repair and achieve the trip time goals were never fully implemented. Today, regularly scheduled AcelaExpress service makes the 225-mile trip in an average time of about 2 hours and 52 minutes, or 22 minutes longer than what was originally
envisioned under the NECIP program.
On the Northeast Corridor’s North End, between Boston and New York, the situation is similar. The objective of 3 hour service envisioned under the 4R Act and formally set by NHRIP in the 1990s was never realized because major elements of the program were scaled back for budgetary reasons or never fully implemented. Amtrak Acela Express
services currently average 3 hours and 34 minutes between Boston and New York, 34 minutes slower than originally planned under NHRIP.
Passenger equipment issues have also contributed to slower trip times. The
performance specifications developed under the NHRIP program for the Acela Express
high-speed equipment operating on the corridor today originally called for a 3 hour trip time between Boston and New York and 2 hours and 30 minutes between New York and Washington, achieved in part by designing equipment to operate at high speeds through curves using “tilt” technology to offset centrifugal forces and maintain
passenger ride quality. The full tilt capability envisioned for this equipment was never realized, due to car body width and system design issues that prevented full tilt
actuation and instability of truck and suspension systems operating at speeds above 135 mph through curves.
Today, as will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections, achieving significantly reduced trip times on the Northeast Corridor has become increasingly difficult because of a combination of factors, including the continuing backlog of deferred investment that has its origins in decisions to scale back prior improvement programs such as NECIP and NHRIP, growing demand and increased utilization of the Corridor leading to significant capacity constraints, and limitations of existing equipment.
State of Good Repair / Reliability
Investment levels necessary to bring the corridor to a state of good repair have not been sufficient. A “backlog” of deferred investment remains, currently estimated at about $5 billion for Amtrak-owned and/or operated Northeast Corridor infrastructure (including the Massachusetts-owned portion and the Springfield, Harrisburg, and Albany lines) and $8 billion if the Connecticut- and New York-owned portions of the main line from New Haven to New Rochelle are included. This condition undermines the foundation of reliable infrastructure needed to improve trip times on the Northeast Corridor.
This backlog includes replacement of the Baltimore and Potomac Tunnel, dating to 1873, and six major moveable bridges, all approximately a century old. Additional backlog needs include obsolete interlockings (junctions and crossovers), century old fixed bridges and power supply components including transformers, electrical circuitry and overhead catenary wires from which trains draw their power.
Based on a 2007 assessment study by the Amtrak Engineering Department, $365 million annually through FY 2023 is required to eliminate the backlog of deferred investment on the Amtrak-owned Northeast Corridor. An additional $325 million annually is required to maintain existing infrastructure in a state of good repair, for a total investment need of $690 million annually to both maintain state of good repair and gradually eliminate the deferred investment backlog. These amounts are in 2007 dollars and do not reflect future inflation.
As shown in Figure 2 below, funding to Amtrak for investment in NEC infrastructure has increased in recent years, resulting in some reduction in the backlog of deferred
investment. The movable span of the Thames River Bridge, for example, was replaced in 2008, and replacement of the Niantic River Movable Bridge is scheduled over the next several years, funded in part with stimulus funds provided directly to Amtrak by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA). Additionally, some of the recent progress has been enabled by increases in state and commuter contributions for capital work, now averaging more than $100 million annually compared to less than $25 million as recently as 2003. Still, as noted previously, current funding levels to Amtrak are not sufficient to eliminate the backlog, threatening the future reliability of current services and potentially constraining growth on the corridor.
Figure 2: Amtrak Capital Funding for Infrastructure 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 b ud 11 e st ($ m illio n s )
Federal State / Commuter Stimulus
*Source: Amtrak Engineering Department, in year of expenditure dollars, except average annual amounts for Normalized Replacement and elimination of the Backlog of Deferred Investment. See “Northeast Corridor State of Good Repair Spend Plan, Prepared by Amtrak Under Section 211 of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-432)”, April 2009. Figures represent funding required for Amtrak owned / operated portions of NEC main line and branch lines.
**Note: The proportionally higher Federal funding levels depicted in fiscal years 1998 and 1999 reflect approximately $2.2 billion made available to Amtrak as a result of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-34), a portion of which was used for infrastructure improvements on the Northeast Corridor.
Moreover, most of the equipment used on Amtrak’s Northeast Regional service on the Northeast Corridor is at, or approaching, the end of its useful life and is due for
replacement over the next decade. Older equipment typically is more failure-prone than newer equipment, which has the potential to exacerbate reliability problems if offsetting measures are not taken such as increased maintenance or extensive overhauls.
When a heavily utilized rail corridor is at or approaching its capacity limits, as is the case with the Northeast Corridor (see discussion in following section), it is critical that both
infrastructure and equipment be in a state of good repair to minimize malfunctions and component failures that have the potential to disrupt operations. Such disruptions, when they occur in congested situations, often cascade through major portions of the system with the potential to delay hundreds of trains for hours at a time.
Table 1: NEC Main Line Delay Minutes
FY06 FY07 FY08
Total Delay Minutes 380,422 380,263 431,963
Acela / Regional Train Miles 9,370,006
Minutes of Delay Per 150 Train Miles 7
Amtrak Acela and Regional Services Boston to Washington
Delay minutes data source: Amtrak On Time Performance and Delay Reporting System
Amtrak has taken significant measures over the past several years to improve maintenance procedures to reduce both equipment and infrastructure-related failure rates. Acela Express rolling stock and infrastructure maintenance procedures have been revamped to target potential failures before they occur. In addition, the recent increase in capital spending helped to accelerate replacement of failure-prone infrastructure and rolling stock components.
Nonetheless, a closely watched measure of performance on the Northeast Corridor – delay minutes – increased by more than 13% in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 compared to the prior years (see table above). There are many reasons for delays, but a major cause is often unplanned failures to mechanical equipment or infrastructure components that disrupt operations in a highly congested environment with little or no flexibility for recovery. Such failures can be minimized by ensuring infrastructure and equipment is uniformly maintained in a state of good repair.
Growth Trends
In the meantime, after a period of relative stagnation in the post World War II period through the mid to late1980s, significant growth in passenger train services on the Northeast Corridor began to occur. That trend has continued through much of the current decade.
Today, the combined train miles of Amtrak and commuter agencies are approximately 19 million, up 90% from the number of train miles operated in 1975, the year before major portions of the Northeast Corridor were conveyed to Amtrak. By 2030, the number of train miles is expected to further increase to 26 million, up 37% from 2006 levels.
This increase in service, much of it
driven by growth in commuter service, has occurred with no significant increase in the capacity of the corridor since the NECIP program was substantially completed in the mid-1980s.
Figure 3: NEC Growth in Train Miles
Source: NEC Master Plan (under development)
Under generally conservative estimates, total rail ridership on the Northeast Corridor, intercity and commuter, is estimated to increase by about 60% between now and 2030. Higher increases are possible, depending upon factors such as the extent of future funding available for the development of feeder corridors under the FRA’s High Speed and Intercity Passenger Rail grant program; emerging environmental and air quality standards; fuel prices; and employment rates and overall economic activity in the
Northeast. A number of these alternative scenarios are anticipated to be evaluated as part of the environmental process for the Northeast Corridor (see also Risks,
Opportunities and Challenges Ahead).
Capacity
Due to this growth in ridership and train movements, much of the corridor is currently at or near capacity. As shown in Figure 4 below, operations on multiple portions of the corridor today exceed 75% of available capacity, including much of the territory between Trenton, NJ and Stamford, CT, as well as sections in the vicinity of Baltimore, MD, Wilmington, DE and Boston, MA.
A number of segments are operating at more than 100% of available capacity today, including segments in Northern New Jersey through the Hudson River Tunnels connecting New York and New Jersey. All major terminals on the Northeast Corridor are also at capacity, including Washington, New York and Boston. By 2030, at projected growth levels, the situation is expected to worsen dramatically without sustained additional investment, with approximately two dozen segments exceeding 100% of available capacity. The situation is actually direr than this figure suggests, because it assumes all tracks are in service during the peak period when, in fact, main tracks must be taken out of service periodically for both planned and unplanned
construction activity.
Capacity constraints pose significant obstacles to achieving trip time goals. As discussed in the background section, the goal of 3-hour service between Boston and New York was identified under the 4R Act of 1976, and set as a formal objective in the early 1990s under the NHRIP, before significant growth in commuter operations
consumed much of the latent capacity necessary to achieve that goal. Figure 4 shows that major portions of the North End of the Northeast Corridor from Boston to New York are already approaching capacity, and additional sections will exceed capacity based on estimates of 2030 service levels.
Many of the capacity constraints are on the Metro-North New Haven Line, owned by ConnDOT and the New York MTA, between New Rochelle and New Haven. Virtually the entire railroad from New York to Stamford, CT is expected to exceed capacity by 2030. Achieving 3-hour service between New York and Boston will likely require adding line capacity through some of the densest urban areas in the United States.
Metro-North is currently undertaking a major program to replace major bridges and upgrade the signal system on the New Haven Line, and to restore track capacity between Devon and New Haven. Over the past several years, as major construction has progressed, at least one track generally has been out-of-service, resulting in train conflicts and delays that frequently degrade service. Until the majority of this
construction is complete in the 2015 to 2018 time frame, it will not be possible to significantly improve trip times on this portion of the Northeast Corridor.
In the long-run, however, additional capacity and infrastructure improvements beyond what are currently planned will likely be needed to achieve less than 3 hour and 10 minute service between Boston and New York. The complete scope of these
improvements is unknown, and additional analysis is needed by all operators to define them, including potential alternative alignments. Amtrak anticipates these issues will be addressed through future planning efforts and as part of the Northeast Corridor
environmental analysis process expected to begin within the next several months.
Figure 4: Capacity Constraints on the NEC
Source: NEC Master Plan (under development)
Necessary Improvements to Achieve Trip Time Reductions
Amtrak has indentified a core set of infrastructure investments needed to achieve
significant trip time reductions in the Northeast Corridor, including those shown in Figure 5. These improvements generally fall into four principle categories: track alignment / curvature improvements, catenary improvements, bridge and tunnel improvements, and rolling stock and signal improvements.
Track Alignment / Curvature Improvements
True high speed service requires relatively straight track. Curves over 1 degree in arc typically require trains operating at high speeds to slow down to maintain safety and passenger ride quality. Speeds can be maintained through a combination of measures, including elevation (banking) of the track, reducing curvature, and use of tilt-body
equipment to mitigate excessive forces experienced by the passenger.
Unfortunately, the Northeast Corridor, unlike many newer rail rights-of-way in Europe and Asia, was constructed more than a century ago and not designed to support high speeds (in excess of 110 mph). While many curves on the Northeast Corridor were modified in the 1990s as part of the NHRIP program in conjunction with the introduction of high-speed Acela Express equipment (yielding 5-10 mph improvements), these modifications were insufficient to achieve all trip time goals. The Northeast Corridor retains many additional constrained alignments that will need to be reconfigured to support higher speeds. These include, among other locations, curves in the vicinity of Elizabeth, NJ, Northeast Philadelphia, PA, and Baltimore, MD where trains operating in excess of 125 mph must slow to as low as 40 mph.
However, reducing the curvature to support substantially higher speeds and improved trip times will likely require acquisition of land outside the boundaries of the existing right of way in densely populated urban areas. This would have potential community impacts and/or require substantial investment in new infrastructure, i.e., new embankments, bridges over streets and streams, utility relocations and modified structures.
Historically, gaining approvals for such improvements has proven very difficult.
Between Boston and New York, alignment issues pose major obstacles to achieving 3-hour service. Curvature along the coast between New Haven, CT and Westerly, RI will be difficult and very expensive to modify to accommodate higher speeds, particularly because of community and environmental mitigation requirements along a sensitive coast line.
On the Metro-North New Haven Line, Metro-North, Amtrak, and ConnDOT continue to plan potential curve modifications to improve trip times, although the amount of other construction on this line is likely to preclude significant trip time improvements until the 2015-2018 timeframe. The work on the New Haven Line is further complicated by the presence of multiple “open-deck” bridges, which present unique design challenges.
On the Amtrak-owned Hell Gate Line between New Rochelle and New York, numerous curves must be modified, in combination with the planned replacement of the Pelham Bay Bridge, in order to yield trip time benefits. The work envisioned must be
coordinated with the New York MTA’s prospective introduction of commuter service on the Hell Gate Line. This may require installation of additional main tracks, further limiting the space available to effect potential trip time reductions.
Catenary Improvements
Constant-tension catenary is required between New York and Washington to reliably achieve speeds in excess of 135 mph. Constant-tension catenary utilizes
counter-weights to maintain the tension of the catenary constant through the broad range of temperatures experienced on the Northeast Corridor. This prevents unnecessary arcing and loss of pantograph contact when the wires sag on variable tension catenary due to changing temperature. Arcing and the additional wear on the system caused by the sagging wires are the main factors limiting the maximum speed on the existing fixed tension catenary system.
Since the conversion to constant-tension catenary is expensive and disruptive to
service, an initial step would be to install intermediate catenary structures to shorten the overall span lengths of the existing variable tension catenary. The reprofiling of the existing catenary system on these new intermediate structures would significantly shorten the existing spans, greatly reducing the sagging of the existing catenary while providing the shorter spans necessary for future conversion to a constant tension system. These shorter spans could also allow interim increases in speeds above 135 mph (possibly up to 150 mph) with the existing catenary system, producing immediate benefits prior to the installation of constant tension catenary that would allow speeds greater than 150 mph to be achieved.
Constant-tension catenary was installed in the 1990s between New Haven and Boston as part of the NHRIP program. It is also being installed on Metro North’s New Haven Line territory under the currently underway program to upgrade the catenary system on that line. The approach Amtrak plans to utilize to upgrade the catenary system between New York and Washington would provide some immediate trip time benefits with the existing variable tension catenary, while initiating the process for conversion to a constant tension system.
Bridge and Tunnel Improvements
As noted previously, a number of major movable bridges and tunnels on the Northeast Corridor must be replaced to bring the corridor to a state of good repair. In conjunction with replacing these bridges, the bridge heights can be raised to minimize openings to boat traffic and increase track speeds. Planned bridge replacements with the potential for increased speeds include the Connecticut River, Pelham Bay and Portal Bridges, along with several major movable bridges in northern Maryland. Also, the Baltimore and Potomac Tunnel is due for replacement, with the potential to significantly increase speeds immediately south of Baltimore that are currently restricted to as low as 30 mph.
Rolling Stock and Signal Improvements
Additionally, signal and rolling stock improvements could help achieve reduced running times. Today, speeds in some sections of the Northeast Corridor are unnecessarily restricted because the spacing of signals is not optimized for current operations. Furthermore, up to five minutes of additional trip time improvements could be realized through deployment of modified or new equipment capable of operating at higher speeds through curves using tilt technology. As noted in the trip time goals section, current Acela Express equipment operates at more restrictive speeds through curves than originally envisioned due to car body width and truck stability issues. For the purpose of this analysis, estimated costs (discussed in the following section) assume
replacement of the existing Northeast Corridor fleet with newer equipment designs certified for both higher overall speeds and improved speeds through curves.
Figure 5: Major Projects That Directly Reduce Travel Times on the NEC*
Providence New Haven New Rochelle NY Penn Trenton Phila 30th Street Wilmington Baltimore Boston South Maryland District of Columbia New Jersey New York
Connecticut Rhode Island Massachusetts
Pennsylvania
New Hampshire
Delaware Station Center Platform - BWI Tunnel Replacement
-Baltimore Maryland Bridge
Replacements - Susquehanna, Bush and Gunpow
Track Realignment - Shore to 30th Street Track Realignment - Northeast Phila
NJ Track Realignment - Elizabeth / Lincoln
Bridge Replacement - Portal Bridge Replacement - Pelham Bay
Bridge Replacement -Connecticut River
New York to Washignton -Constant Tension Catenary To Operate 150+ mph Metro North Railroad
-Curve Modifications and Bridge Improvements
New Jersey Line - Signal Improvements
Washington
*Note: Projects shown above are not exhaustive of all projects required to reduce trip times on the corridor. For full listing, see Appendix Table A-1.
Deployment of next generation equipment, which will need to be developed in
partnership with the supply industry and the FRA over the coming years, will also help sustain reliable operations by minimizing disruption due to mechanical failures.
Estimates assume the next generation of equipment operates at 180 mph to 200 mph, compared to a maximum operating speed today of 150 mph, with no significant
potential requirement when trains operate at very high speeds above track class 7 / 160 mph.
Estimated Costs
Over the past two years, Amtrak has worked closely with its state and commuter partners to define a set of projects necessary to ensure reliable service, sufficient capacity for all users and improved trip times. Initial trip time goals were set at 3 hours and 15 minutes on the North End between Boston and New York, and 2 hours and 15 minutes between New York and Washington. These goals represent approximately 15 and 30 minutes of trip time improvements, respectively, for the two major segments after temporary allowances for construction activity due to replacement of defective concrete ties are removed from the schedule.
The infrastructure-related cost of achieving these trip times, in combination with needed reliability and capacity improvements, was estimated at $10.2 billion in 2008 dollars, including required investments on the non-Amtrak owned portions of the Northeast Corridor in New York, Connecticut and Massachusetts. A detailed listing of projects and order of magnitude estimated costs is shown in Appendix Table A-1, and summarized in Table 2 below under capital costs for infrastructure from FY 2010 through FY 2023.
Subsequent analysis by Amtrak suggests achieving 2 hour and 15 minute service between New York and Washington in the long-term by 2030 will require modifications to existing equipment, or deployment of next generation rolling stock, to allow required speeds through curves, as well as expansion of capacity into and through Manhattan, NY. Table 2 includes estimates of costs required to replace Amtrak’s existing NEC fleet with next generation equipment. As discussed above, this next generation of equipment has the potential to be lighter, and thus faster, than the current generation. However, performance specifications for such equipment will need to be developed and will depend in part on emerging standards for positive train control (PTC) and crash avoidance systems.
On the North End from Boston to New York, an additional five minutes of trip time reductions (from 3:15 to 3:10) are potentially available with the deployment of modified or new equipment. However, three hour trip times between Boston and New York using the existing right-of-way will likely require major track realignments and capacity expansion on Amtrak and non-Amtrak owned territory. As previously noted, the scope and costs of these potential improvements have not been fully evaluated and may not be feasible on the existing route, given previously discussed problematic alignments and the potential need to expand track capacity through very densely populated urban areas.
Investment alternatives to achieve less than 3 hour and 10 minute service on the North End are expected to be evaluated as part of the next phase of the planning process, including an alternatives analysis to be undertaken as part of the environmental documentation for the Northeast Corridor. Potential alternatives include diversion of
high speed trains to an alternative route using existing or new rights-of-way. Because of these uncertainties, Table 2 on the following page does not include costs to achieve trip times of less than three hours and 10 minutes between New York and Boston.
It is important to note that costs shown in table 2 are order-of-magnitude estimates expressed in 2008 dollars, and assume funds are expended in the periods shown. Most of the funds in the period from FY 2019 to FY 2023 would have to be committed, or “obligated”, in the prior period by 2018 to meet the goals shown. This is because many of the projects that would be done in the period from 2018 to 2023 are major programs, such as bridge and tunnel replacements, that require several years to complete and a multi-year commitment of funds.
Total obligation requirements through 2018 are estimated at approximately $11.8 billion, including equipment replacement, or an average of about $1.3 billion annually, including backlog, growth and trip time requirements. Including ongoing requirements for
normalized replacement brings the total average annual requirement to about $1.6 billion annually (in 2008 dollars) through 2018. This analysis does not attempt to determine an appropriate “share” of such costs between Amtrak and commuter
operators, an issue that will need to be addressed to achieve a uniform cost allocation methodology on the Northeast Corridor as required by Section 212 of PRIIA.
Table 2: Northeast Corridor Trip Time Goals and Estimated Costs Current (a) 2018 2023 2030
TRIP TIME GOALS
Boston - New York 3:34 3:25 3:15 3:00 (b)
New York To Washington 2:52 2:35 2:30 2:15
CAPITAL COSTS (MILLIONS)(c)
2010-18 2019-23 2024-30
Infrastructure (d)
Boston - New York 2,248 1,500 NA (b)
New York To Washington 3,455 3,000 0
Penn Capacity Expansion 7,000 (e)
Equipment (f) 860 720 720
6,563 5,220 7,720
a Current trip times include minutes added to the schedule as a temporary measure for replacement of defective concrete ties. It is assumed these are removed from the schedule when work is complete. See also Appendix Table A-2.
b Achieving 3-hour service on the North End will require major track realignments and capacity expansion on Amtrak and non-Amtrak owned territory. The scope and costs of these potential improvements have not been fully evaluated and may not be economically feasible given problematic alignments and existing and forecast train services.
c Figures shown are order of magnitude estimates subject to future analysis.
d Capital costs for infrastructure include state of good repair backlog projects and capacity improvements needed to ensure reliable service and accommodate the needs of all users while simultaneously improving trip times.
e Assumes new Hudson and/or East River tunnels and additional track capacity in Penn Station.
f Equipment costs represent the estimated replacement costs of Amtrak's NEC fleet with next generation equipment capable of 180 - 200 mph operations compared to current Acela Express equipment which operates at a maximum of 150 mph between Boston and New York and 135 mph between New York and Washington due to catenary restrictions.
Benefits of Investment
Based upon the trip time and reliability improvements described above, Amtrak intercity ridership on the main line of the Northeast Corridor between Boston and Washington is expected to increase by more than 70%, from 9.9 million riders currently to 17.1 million by 2030. These figures represent an increase in Amtrak’s share of the total travel market (auto, air and rail) from 5.8% to 7.3% by 2030.
With this ridership and market share growth, the benefits of Amtrak's intercity passenger rail service within, and extending beyond, the Northeast Corridor would materially
increase. Reductions in air and highway congestion, transportation-related emissions, and energy consumption; contributions to economic growth and the development of livable communities; and other public benefits are expected to be very significant, and will require future study to properly estimate. Additionally, it is anticipated that
significant revenue gains would accompany increases in ridership and market share, as intercity passenger rail's value in the marketplace is enhanced by the higher-quality service offering.
This trend is well-illustrated by the market share advancements accompanying the introduction of the Acela Express service. Prior to the Acela Express startup, Amtrak had 37% and 20% of the combined air-rail market shares between New York and Washington and New York and Boston, respectively. In 2008, Amtrak carried 63% and 49% of passengers in these markets.
Furthermore, Northeastern states will also derive other benefits from substantial
improvements made in the Northeast Corridor to achieve faster trip times for high speed intercity trains. These investments will provide faster trip times for other passenger train services on the Northeast Corridor, and produce capacity improvements that facilitate growth in commuter and freight operations. State-supported corridor services in
particular benefit from linkages to the main line of the Northeast Corridor and access to core urban markets in the Northeast. Without such linkages, many intercity corridor services, operating on NEC branch lines or emerging high speed corridors, would not be economically viable.
More broadly, however, the benefits of increased rail investment in the Northeast Corridor flow broadly throughout the region in the form of increased mobility and sustainable economic growth.
Risks, Opportunities and Challenges Ahead
Investment requirements to meet future goals for reliability, capacity and trip time on the Northeast Corridor are significantly higher than the level of funding that has been made available to Amtrak in the recent past. Underfunding of capital needs on the Corridor continues to be the major risk to achieving trip time goals. A stable, multi-year funding source provides the foundation of reliable infrastructure and sufficient capacity for all users.
One of the major issues that has contributed to the underfunding of Northeast Corridor infrastructure is reliance on the Federal annual appropriations process to provide needed, long-term investment. Major capital investment typically requires a multi-year commitment of funds, and such commitments cannot be routinely entered into when the level of funding from one year to the next is uncertain. Reaching a state of good repair on the Northeast Corridor after years of deferred investment and adding needed
capacity to the Corridor will be expensive. Currently, there is no obvious existing mechanism to provide the required level of investment resources.
In Amtrak’s view, continued reliance on annual appropriations to fund the Northeast Corridor capital program will continue to frustrate efforts to achieve a state of good repair and meet capacity and trip time goals for the corridor. Adequate levels of stable, multi-year funding will significantly improve passenger rail service and facilitate
development of new and expanded speed corridors that link to an existing high-speed network. This existing network expands the market reach of “core” services and vastly improves the economics of new and emerging corridors.
Other significant challenges include coordinating among numerous owners, operators and other stakeholders and developing and apportioning sufficient financial resources to improve the infrastructure and sustain growth. The Northeast Corridor passes through or links twelve Northeast states from Maine to Virginia, plus the District of Columbia. The Corridor itself is owned by five separate entities and eight passenger and seven freight railroads operate over it. The FRA, Amtrak, Northeast states and other railroads must collectively act to support local development and interests while addressing the broader needs of the region in a very complex political, financial, and operating environment.
PRIIA provided a mechanism for addressing these issues in mandating that the FRA establish an NEC Infrastructure and Operations Advisory Commission (NEC
Commission). The NEC Commission members will include representatives from the Northeast states, US DOT, Amtrak and non-voting representatives of the NEC freight railroad operators. The NEC Commission, which has not yet been created, will be charged with setting goals and defining funding needs; establishing guidelines for improving coordination among states and rail operators; and developing equitable financing mechanisms and cost sharing formulas.
One of the first tasks of the NEC Commission will be to set goals for the Northeast Corridor, and begin the scoping and other foundational work for the environmental review process required to move forward on a major program of improvements. This environmental process, which the FRA, affected states and Amtrak will be jointly
supporting, will encompass the Northeast Corridor projects required to replace obsolete infrastructure, reach a state of good repair, and provide sufficient capacity for growth for all users of the corridor, including projects required to meet trip time goals outlined in this report. It will include an evaluation of alternatives, potentially including alternative alignments that may be necessary to achieve 3-hour service on the North End of the Corridor between Boston and New York and, particularly, the need for additional capacity into and through Manhattan, NY.
In the meantime, Amtrak is working closely with individual states in the Northeast to advance ARRA high speed and intercity passenger rail grant program applications for individual projects with “independent utility.” Amtrak is supporting state-led efforts to develop feeder corridors such as the Harrisburg, Albany and Springfield Lines; the
Downeaster route to Maine; and Vermont, Virginia and North Carolina services that link to, or operate on, the Northeast Corridor. Amtrak is also leading efforts, in conjunction with the states and the FRA, to develop a set of common specifications for next
generation rolling stock, including the next generation of high speed equipment that could be used on the Northeast Corridor.
Amtrak intends to continue working closely with the Northeast states, Northeast Corridor commuter and freight operators, FRA and the NEC Commission, when established, to ensure the Northeast Corridor continues to be an engine of sustainable economic growth for the Northeast region and local communities.
Appendix Table A-1
NEC Main Line: Detail of Order-of-Magnitude Infrastructure Improvements Needed to Meet Trip
Time Goals
Requesting
Agency Project / Program ($ Millions)
Corridor-Wide
Amtrak North End Alignment and Programmatic EIS Update 6
Massachusetts / Rhode Island
MA Boston South Station Capacity Improvements 150
MA Readville to Canton - 3rd Track 80
MA Ruggles Street - Congestion Mitigation 12 RI Kingston Capacity and Track Improvements (MP-157-159) 16
Connecticut
Amtrak Clinton - Universal Interlocking 5 Amtrak Palmers to Groton - 3rd Track Upgrade 7 Amtrak Conn River Bridge Replacement - High Level 250 CT Shore Line East High Platfoorms / Pedestrian Overpasses 40 CT Guilford Station - Tracks 3 and 4 Upgrade 27 CT Old Saybrook Track and Catenary Improvements 15 CT New London Layover Yard (Electrified) 55 CT Branford Interlocking Reconfiguration 5
CT Waterford Passing Siding 15
CT Shoreline Junction Interlocking Reconfigurations 10 CDOT / MTA New Haven Line Improvements
CT Replacement of the Walk and Sage Bridges 600 CT New Haven Line Catenary Replacement 280
CT Signal Up-grade, including PTC 300
CT New Haven - Devon 4th Track 15
Amtrak Metro North Curve Mods / Ballast Deck Bridge Improvements 60
New York
Amtrak Pehlam Bay Bridge Replacement and Hell Gate Curve Mods 500 NY / PA of NY
NJ
Moynihan Station / Farley Redevelopment 1,300
3,748
Corridor-Wide
Amtrak South End Alignment Study and Tier 1 Programmatic EIS 10 Amtrak Constant Tension Catenary (High-Speed Territory) 500
New York
NY / PA of NY/NJ
Moynihan Station / Farley Redevelopment 0
Amtrak Penn Station NY - Capacity / SOGR and ADA improvements 10
New Jersey / Pennsylvania
NJ Portal Bridge Project 1,800
NJ NEC Signal System Upgrade - Newark to Trenton 50 Amtrak New Jersey / Pennsylvania Curve Realignments 500
Delaware / Maryland
DE Wilmington 3rd Track 40
DE / MD Prince to Bacon - New 3rd Track 200 Amtrak Northern Maryland Bridge Replacements and Track Capacity Upgrades 2,000
Amtrak B&P Tunnel Replacement 1,000
MD BWI - Phase I - Center Island Platform / Pedestrian Overpass 35 MD BWI - Phase II - 4th Track Winans to Grove / New Station 135 Amtrak NEC Signal System Upgrade - Baltimore to Washington 25 Amtrak New Carrollton - High Level Center Platform and Station Track 50
Washington, DC
Union Station Access and Capacity Improvements 100 DC Parking garage escalator replacement
DC Circulation and capacity improvements to the Metrorail station at Union Station DC Intercity passenger rail customer amenity improvements including circulation,
waiting areas and bathrooms MARC Platform upgrades
6,455 BOSTON - NEW YORK (3:10)
NEW YORK - WASHINGTON (2:20)
Note: Trip time goals shown above assume deployment of next generation equipment to improve maximum operating speeds and allowable speeds through curves. Project list was developed by Amtrak in cooperation with Northeast states and includes projects needed to simultaneously deliver improved reliability, capacity and trip-times on Amtrak and non-Amtrak owned portions of the
Appendix Table A-2
NEC Main Line: Estimated Trip Time Savings by Initiative to Meet Long-Range Goals
Minutes of Trip-Time Improvement
Current Trip Time (hours, minutes) 3:34
Reduce Construction PAD (Corridor-Wide) 4
Boston to New Haven
Improved Unbalance (7" to 9" through curves) 4 Connecticut River Bridge Replacement 1 Next Generation Equipment 3
New Haven to New Rochelle (Metro-North)
Metro North Track / Capacity Improvements (90-110 MAS; 3" to 5"
Improved Tilt with PAD reduction) 5
New Rochelle to New York
Hell Gate Line curve modifidations / track upgrade 2 East Side Access - Harold / Shell Interlocking Improvements 2 Pehlam Bay Bridge Replacement 1 Next Generation Equipment 2 Other (Unidentified) 10
Revised Trip Time Goal (hours, minutes) 3:00
Current Trip Time 2:52
Reduce Construction PAD (Corridor-Wide) 7
New York to Philadelphia
Improved Unbalance (6" to 9" unbalance through curves) 2 Constant Tension Catenary, Track and Signal Upgrades 5 Curve Modifications (Elizabeth, Lincoln, Croyden, Torresdale, Frankford 2 Portal Bridge Replacement 1 New Hudson River Tunnel / Reduced PAD 2 Next Generation Equipment 2
Philadelphia to Washington
Improved Unbalance (6" to 9" unbalance) 2 Constant Tension Catenary, Track and Signal Upgrades 5 BWI Center Platform / Schedule Adjustment 2 Baltimore Tunnel Replacement 2 Maryland Bridge Replacements (Susquehanna, Bush, Gunpow) 2 Next Generation Equipment 3
Revised Trip-Time Goal (hours, minutes) 2:15
BOSTON TO NEW YORK
NEW YORK TO WASHINGTON
Source, Amtrak analysis.
Notes: Initiatives listed above do not include reliability and capacity improvements to
simultaneously accommodate higher speeds and growth requirements for all users of the corridor. Estimates assume minutes added to the schedule as a temporary measure for replacement of defective concrete ties are removed when the work is complete. Appendix Table A-1 contains a detailed listing of infrastructure projects needed to achieve trip-time goals. Improved unbalance / curve speeds require modifications to existing Acela Express equipment or deployment of next generation equipment.
