UNIVERSIDAD DE CÓRDOBA
FACULTAD DE FILOSOFÍA Y LETRAS
Departamento de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades
Programa de Doctorado “Lenguas y Culturas”
TESIS DOCTORAL
LA SUBJETIVIDAD “ANTI-EDÍPICA” DEL “SURREALISMO
ESPAÑOL”. UNA ONTOLOGÍA HECHA ESTÉTICA
María del Carmen Molina Barea
Dirección del Prof. Dr. D. Ramón Román Alcalá
(Dpto. Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades)
Y
Coodirección del Prof. Dr. D. Pablo Rabasco Pozuelo
TITULO: La subjetividad "anti-edípica" del "surrealismo español". Una ontología
hecha estética.
AUTOR: María del Carmen Molina Barea
© Edita: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Córdoba. 2015
Campus de Rabanales
Ctra. Nacional IV, Km. 396 A
14071 Córdoba
www.uco.es/publicaciones publicaciones@uco.es
1
UNIVERSIDAD DE CÓRDOBA
TESIS DOCTORAL
La subjetividad “anti-edípica” del “surrealismo español”.
Una ontología hecha estética
The “Anti-Oedipal” Subjectivity of “Spanish Surrealism”.
An Ontology made Aesthetics
María del Carmen Molina Barea
Becaria F. P. U.
TÍTULO DE LA TESIS:
LA SUBJETIVIDAD “ANTI-EDÍPICA” DEL “SURREALISMO ESPAÑOL”.
UNA ONTOLOGÍA HECHA ESTÉTICA
DOCTORANDA: María del Carmen Molina Barea
INFORME RAZONADO DEL/DE LOS DIRECTOR/ES DE LA TESIS
La tesis doctoral que se presenta constituye un excelente estudio que persigue como objetivo configurar una lectura ontológica del movimiento surrealista, concediendo particular énfasis a su vertiente española. En concreto, se busca arrojar luz sobre una posible vinculación entre esta corriente artística de vanguardia y el corpus estético-ontológico formulado por los pensadores franceses Gilles Deleuze y Félix Guattari a partir de dos obras principales: L’Anti-Œdipe (1972) y Mille Plateaux (1980); volúmenes que integran el proyecto subtitulado Capitalismo y esquizofrenia. La hipótesis de partida es que las técnicas surrealistas, en especial las correspondientes a los surrealistas españoles, guardan numerosos aspectos en común con la propuesta conceptual de Deleuze y Guattari referida con el término “esquizoanálisis”. En esta línea, la tesis presenta una perspectiva muy original e innovadora que invita a analizar la ambigua y poderosa relación entre surrealismo y psicoanálisis.
El trabajo realizado ha sido un acierto, no sólo por la elección del tema y su orientación, sino por el interés que el mismo suscita, ya que no abundan los estudios sobre arte con una perspectiva tan enriquecedora, con un estilo evocativo, que conecte conceptualmente términos artísticos, literarios o cinematográficos, bajo el paraguas y horizonte del proyecto filosófico “deleuzoguattariano”. Así, la noción de deseo según Deleuze y Guattari, planteada sobre todo como una cuestión de producción, y no tanto como la consecuencia de una falta o carencia, tal y como acostumbra a verse debido a la influencia de la teoría freudiana, da forma a una nueva visión ontológica adecuada a la idea de producción subjetiva –subjetividad como el resultado de una creación “autopoiética”, esto es, como algo que debe ser creado, proporcionando una visión radicalmente nueva de la obra, a partir de la cual pueden abrirse distintas vías de investigación.
Uno de los valores fundamentales de la tesis radica en el minucioso esfuerzo investigador que contiene. Un esfuerzo que ha permitido recoger, de forma prácticamente exhaustiva, las fuentes “anti-edípicas” de las estrategias surrealistas, marcadas por la influencia de Sigmund Freud como su “santo patrón”; si bien, curiosamente, el propio Freud dejó claro su rechazo e incomprensión para con el surrealismo. Mención especial merecen las incursiones investigadoras referidas a los sueños; pues aunque los surrealistas se vuelcan en los sueños como la ruta principal hacia el inconsciente, el psicoanálisis busca la codificación de las producciones oníricas por medio de la “cura del habla” y la interpretación edípica. Y es que en opinión de Freud, los sueños son, por así decirlo, mensajes encriptados que deben ser traducidos para comprender correctamente el inconsciente. Sin embargo, para los surrealistas, los sueños son por encima de todo una sugerente forma de producir “cartografías deseantes”.
El mencionado trabajo de investigación es importante, en fin, no sólo porque permite la profundización en un aspecto poco conocido y muy relevante de la estética del arte contemporáneo, sino porque recupera la obra de Buñuel, Dalí y Lorca, especialmente, desde una perspectiva que genera una relectura particularmente novedosa y significativa. Conforme a este estudio, Buñuel, por ejemplo, ataca las “máquinas sociales" represivas, sobre todo la familia tradicional, lo que le acarrea una situación de alta complejidad con su propia esposa e hijos; mientras genera “máquinas de guerra” articuladas en torno al “amour fou” (el mecanismo perfecto para destrozar la sociedad, la burguesía, y la religión) y a las perversiones, que son muy frecuentes en la obra del realizador aragonés. Dalí, quien a diferencia de Buñuel asume un método de subjetivación eminentemente paranoico, responde a un proceso “rizomático” generado a través de diversas “líneas de fuga”, que sin embargo, pasado el tiempo, desembocan en prácticas despóticas y estructuras edípicas condicionadas por la influencia de su amada Gala. Y Lorca, si bien el poeta no es en realidad un miembro oficial del movimiento surrealista, despierta, de hecho, considerable ambigüedad, en el sentido de que la poesía y el teatro lorquianos manifiestan una remarcable estética surrealista. De la investigación se extrae que el eco surrealista en la obra de Lorca no es solamente cuestión de estilo literario, como muchas veces se ha argumentado, sino que se trata, por encima de todo, de una cuestión ética –una cuestión derivada del “paradigma ético-estético”, que señalaran Deleuze y Guattari. De ahí que la subjetividad lorquiana pueda ser analizada en función de nociones propiamente
surrealistas, dado que al poeta se deben también abundantes “máquinas de guerra” encaminadas hacia la liberación del deseo inconsciente.
El interés que la tesis tiene para la comunidad científica se empieza a comprobar en las publicaciones de la doctoranda derivadas de la investigación: citaremos los artículos “Dalí y la Hypnerotomachia Poliphili” (Cuadernos de Arte e Iconografía, Fundación Universitaria Española, XXI, 42–2º Semestre, 2012, pp. 355-409); “Buster Keaton y el surrealismo de la Residencia de Estudiantes. Razones de una confluencia” (Archivo Español de Arte, CSIC, LXXXVI, 341, Enero-Marzo 2012, pp. 29-48); “Sexo y destrucción en el surrealismo español: Buñuel, Dalí y Lorca según la pulsión de muerte” (Anales de Historia del Arte, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 22, 2012, pp. 167-192); “Ese ojo sin moral: las repercusiones estéticas del cine como ‘ojo mecánico’ desde el ultraísmo al surrealismo” (De Arte. Revista de Historia del Arte, Universidad de León, 13, 2014, pp. 192-215); y la comunicación al VI Encuentro Complutense de Jóvenes Investigadores en Historia del Arte, titulada “Buñuel a través de Fellini. Un lectura surrealista de Ocho y medio”, (Anales de Historia del Arte, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, en prensa).
La tesis ha cumplido así todas las expectativas que se anunciaron en el proyecto original y que se detallaron en sucesivos planes de investigación. Por todo ello, se autoriza la presentación de la tesis doctoral.
Córdoba, 16 de marzo 2015
Firma del/de los director/es
Le SURREALISME n’est pas un moyen d’expression nouveau
ou plus facile, ni même une métaphysique de la poésie.
Il est un moyen de libération totale de l’esprit
et de tout ce qui lui ressemble.
Antonin Artaud
(«Déclaration du 27 janvier 1925», Bureau de Recherches Surréalistes).Comme ce sera drôle, voyez-vous, si ce vrai
ESPRIT NOUVEAU se déchaîne!
Jacques Vaché
(Carta de 19 de febrero de 1918 a André Breton, Lettres de guerre).‘Ah! Qui délivrera mon esprit des lourdes chaînes de la logique?’
André Guide
(Les Nouvelles Nourritures).To think surrealism is to rethink the self.
Mary Ann Caws(The Surrealist Look. An Erotic of Encounter).
Le surréalisme reste «un pôle incombustible»,
au-delà de tout échec et de tout succès.
Michael Löwy
(Prefacio a Moments du Surréalisme, de Vincent Bounoure).7
INDICE
- Agradecimientos. 12
- Introduction. 13
I. Statu quo: hypothesis, justification and theoretical objectives. 13
II. Framework, methodology and critical procedure.
17
III. Structure and summary of contents.
19
PARTE I
“Anti-Edipo” vs. “Edipo”. Por la liberación de la subjetividad
- CAPÍTULO 1. “Edipo”, o el control de la subjetividad.
1.1. La visión psicoanalítica del inconsciente: Freud, el “Complejo de Edipo” y la
“codificación” del deseo.
26
1.1.1. Radiografía del inconsciente freudiano.
26
1.1.2. Diseccionando el “Complejo de Edipo”.
31
1.1.3. Deleuze y Guattari contra Edipo.
37
1.2. El inconsciente según Deleuze y Guattari: “máquinas deseantes”.
46
1.2.1. “El deseo no carece de nada”: el inconsciente como “fábrica” de deseo. 47
1.2.2. ¿Qué son las “máquinas deseantes”?
49
1.2.3. Hacia la aparición del sujeto: las tres síntesis deseantes.
53
1.3. El inconsciente “edipizado/capitalizado”: “máquinas sociales”.
66
1.3.1 La “edipización” de las “máquinas sociales”.
67
1.3.2. Las tres tipologías de “máquinas sociales”.
73
1.3.3. El Edipo “macrofascista”: Imperio.
84
- CAPÍTULO 2. El programa del Anti-Edipo: ¿Cómo producir una subjetividad
alternativa?
8
2.1.1. Marco contextual de la dominación “edípico-imperial”: de la “sociedad
disciplinaria” a la “sociedad de control”.
91
2.1.2. La alternativa “deleuzoguattariana”: “rizomas”, “líneas de fuga” y
cartografías.
99
2.1.3. Los “devenires” del “nómada”. 107
2.1.4. La molecularización del “yo”: “cyborgs”, “grupos-sujeto”, “multitud”. 113
2.2. “Devenir-esquizo” o cómo construirse un “Cuerpo sin Órganos”: la opción de la
subjetividad esquizoanalítica.
119
2.2.1. La importancia de fabricarse un “CsO”.
120
2.2.2. ¿Qué significa “devenir-esquizo”?
127
2.2.3. Esquizofrenia frente al capital: “esquizoanálisis”.
137
2.3. “Agenciamientos” sociales y artísticos: de la “máquina abstracta” a la “máquina de
guerra”.
144
2.3.1. “Agenciamientos colectivos”: de los “grupos-sujeto” a las “máquinas
abstractas”.
144
2.3.2. Del arte como “máquina de guerra”.
150
2.3.3. El “paradigma ético-estético”: la vida como “obra de arte” y arte como
“trabajo vivo”.
159
- CAPÍTULO 3. Hacia una visión “anti-edípica” del surrealismo: la des-organización de
Antonin Artaud.
3.1. Los prolegómenos del surrealismo “anti-edípico”.
168
3.1.1. La modernidad de la posmodernidad.
168
3.1.2. La pervivencia del surrealismo en tiempos posmodernos.
176
3.2. Antonin Artaud, el “Cuerpo sin Órganos” y el “Teatro de la Crueldad”.
185
3.2.1. La guerra contra los “órganos”; la guerra contra el “rostro”.
186
3.2.2. Artaud, “suicidado” de la sociedad.
193
3.2.3. La lengua del “atletismo afectivo”.
201
3.2.4. Artaud y el “Théâtre de la Cruauté”.
212
3.3. La “lengua minoritaria” y la “literatura menor”.
223
3.3.1. El “devenir-menor” de la lengua.
223
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PARTE II
Los valores “anti-edípicos” del “surrealismo español”
- CAPÍTULO 4. Modos ontológicos del surrealismo.
4.1. Ontología del “surrealismo bretoniano”: un sistema de “raicilla”.
242
4.1.1. La trayectoria reterritorializadora del “surrealismo francés”.
242
4.1.2. De Dadá al Surrealismo.
249
4.1.3. La controversia “Breton-Artaud”.
258
4.2. La “reterritorialización” del surrealismo a partir del Segundo Manifiesto (la
alargada sombra de André Breton).
270
4.2.1. La “etapa razonada” del surrealismo y la deserción de “Un cadavre”.
270
4.2.2. El reinado de Breton, el déspota.
275
4.2.3. La organización “molar” del “surrealismo bretoniano”.
285
4.3. ¿Surrealismo o surrealismos? La debatida existencia del “surrealismo español”, o
su causa “molecular”.
296
4.3.1. ¿Es posible hablar de “surrealismo español”?
297
4.3.2. La des-organización “molecular” del “surrealismo español”.
301
4.3.3. El “surrealismo español”: un conjunto de constelaciones.
312
4.3.4. “Le surréalisme est avant tout un état d’esprit”.
319
4.3.5. La Residencia de Estudiantes: un contexto decisivo.
325
- CAPÍTULO 5. “Agenciamientos maquínicos” del surrealismo (español). Una
ontología hecha estética.
5.1. Por Freud y contra Freud: el surrealismo y el inconsciente liberado.
336
5.1.1. Puntos de unión y desunión entre el psicoanálisis y el surrealismo.
337
5.1.2. El psicoanálisis, el surrealismo y el sueño.
342
5.1.3. André Breton y la interpretación como forma de “reterritorialización”. 352
5.2. Dinamitando el “Complejo de Edipo”.
357
5.2.1. El deseo no asiste al “teatro edípico”.
357
5.2.2. Los surrealistas contra la institución familiar.
361
10
5.2.4. El deseo es “incivilizado”.
371
5.3. El imperio de los locos (la identidad anulada, o el sueño de la esquizofrenia). 378
5.3.1. Destruir el “yo”: la locura como disolución de la identidad “molar”.
378
5.3.2. Soñar es una forma de “devenir-loco”. Sobre alucinaciones y ensueños. 384
5.3.3. Los surrealistas, entre la esquizofrenia y la histeria.
388
5.3.4. La sistematización del “ojo clínico” como “codificación” del deseo. 395
5.4. “Devenir-otro”, “devenir-rizomático”: nomadismos y “derivas” (una nueva
cartografía del inconsciente).
403
5.4.1. El “yo” multiplicado.
404
5.4.2. La fuga del “devenir-colectivo”; el paseo del “devenir-andrógino”.
410
5.4.3. Las “derivas” surrealistas: cartografías deseantes urbanas.
414
5.5. Escritura automática y otras formulaciones de “literatura menor”.
424
5.5.1. “Devenir-loco” en la lengua.
425
5.5.2. El inconsciente hecho escritura.
429
5.5.3. “La parole hors sujet”. Escritura sin autor.
435
5.5.4. Otras formas de “literatura menor”: del “cadavre exquis” al “anaglifo”. 441
- CAPÍTULO 6. Dispositivos “anti-edípicos” de subjetivación en el surrealismo
español. Tres casos de “máquinas abstractas”.
6.1. Buñuel, el “esquizo”.
452
6.1.1. Surrealista sin etiqueta.
452
6.1.2. Revolución onírica.
457
6.1.3. “No interpretar”: Buñuel contra el psicoanálisis.
462
6.1.4. “Complejo de Edipo”, familia y matrimonio.
469
6.1.5. Contra el Edipo social: civilización, burguesía e Iglesia.
481
6.1.6. La doble personalidad buñueliana.
493
6.1.7. Cine: “máquina de guerra” (1). Fetiche e “imagen-pulsión”.
497
6.1.8. Cine: “máquina de guerra” (2). La quiebra espacio-temporal; la
“imagen-tiempo”. 508
6.2. Dalí, el “esquizo” abortado, o el triunfo de la paranoia.
513
6.2.1. Preludio esquizoide de Dalí.
513
11
6.2.3. Dalí, “Gala-Gradiva” y el nuevo Narciso.
522
6.2.4. Dalí doble, “Gala-Leda” y la “reterritorialización” de las perversiones. 527
6.2.5. Conquistando lo irracional: Dalí freudiano y el método “paranoico-crítico”.
533
6.3. El nomadismo identitario: las ambivalencias del “yo” en García Lorca.
544
6.3.1. Pero, ¿Lorca es surrealista?
545
6.3.2. Más allá del “nombre”.
554
6.3.3. Deshacer el “rostro” a través de las “máscaras”.
561
6.3.4. La molecularidad de la subjetividad lorquiana: metamorfosis e
intersexualidad.
568
6.3.5. La identidad “menor” de Lorca.
578
6.3.6. Pulsión de muerte y disolución del “yo”.
587
- Coda: In what sense is Surrealism still alive?
593
- Conclusions.
601
- Bibliografía.
611
12
AGRADECIMIENTOS
En primer lugar, quiero expresar mi gratitud al Profesor Dr. D. Ramón Román
Alcalá, así como al Profesor Dr. D. Pablo Rabasco Pozuelo, por haber aceptado dirigir y
codirigir, respectivamente, esta tesis doctoral. A ambos adeudo un especial
agradecimiento por la confianza mostrada desde un principio en los objetivos de la tesis,
y por secundar sin reservas, compartiendo con ilusión igual a la mía, los interrogantes
que en su día me propuse indagar por medio del presente trabajo. La ayuda y el
seguimiento prestados por su parte han constituido un respaldo fundamental en el marco
más adecuado para el desarrollo de mi investigación. Su colaboración a lo largo de estos
años ha sido motivo de aprendizaje a nivel académico y también personal. En este
sentido, mi agradecimiento al Profesor Dr. D. Ramón Román por el magisterio del día a
día y las fructíferas conversaciones en ratos robados al estrés laboral.
Quisiera igualmente manifestar mi agradecimiento a la dirección, profesorado y
personal de administración del Departamento de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades de la
Universidad de Córdoba, que tan grato me han hecho este periodo de trabajo, y por el
inigualable trato recibido tanto en lo profesional como en lo personal. Mi
agradecimiento va dirigido también a aquellos profesores del Departamento de Historia
del Arte, Arqueología y Música de la Universidad de Córdoba, de cuya mano tuve
oportunidad de recibir una intachable formación durante mis años de licenciatura.
Por otra parte, es de recibo hacer constar que este proyecto doctoral no se habría
llevado a cabo de la misma manera de no haber recibido una ayuda del Programa de
Formación de Profesorado Universitario del Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y
Deporte, ni tampoco sin la subvención concedida por la Universidad de Córdoba para la
obtención de la Mención Internacional en el Título de Doctor, que me ha permitido
disfrutar de una estancia en el École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales de París.
Finalmente, quiero dedicar un necesario agradecimiento a mis padres, maestros de
la vida y del compromiso con el trabajo bien hecho, a mi hermana y al resto de mi
familia, por su presencia incondicional, comprensión solícita y apoyo; por haberme
acompañado admirablemente en esta etapa de esfuerzo y maduración. Imposible olvidar
tampoco a mis queridos amigos y compañeros, que han seguido como propia la
realización de esta tesis doctoral. A todos ellos, mi sincero agradecimiento.
13
INTRODUCTION.
I. Statu quo: hypothesis, justification and theoretical objectives.
Under the title The “Anti-Oedipal” Subjectivity of “Spanish Surrealism”. An Ontology made Aesthetics, the present research addresses the objective of establishing an ontological reading of Surrealist movement with a particular eye on the so-called “Spanish Surrealism”. Specifically, I want to cast light on the relation between the aforementioned avant-garde movement and the aesthetic-ontological corpus formulated by French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, mainly contained in two books: Anti-Oedipus (1972) and A Thousand Plateaus (1980); the two volumes which comprise the co-written project Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Basically, I suggest that Surrealist techniques, in particular those of the Spaniards, have plenty of aspects in common with the conceptual proposal which Deleuze and Guattari generally refer with the term “schizoanalysis”, which alludes to a specific ontological frame designated as “anti-Oedipal”. Most notably, the machinic production of desire, the idea of unconscious as “factory”, as well as the “rhizomatic” metamodelisation of subjectivity constitute the principal points that make possible to get a sense of Surrealist aesthetics in terms of “anti-Oedipal” processes. Indeed, the status of desire within Surrealism, along with the relevance conferred to unconscious procedures (automatism, dreams, hypnosis, hallucinations, madness), allows the effective articulation of an “anti-Oedipal” way of understanding the production of the subjectivity, as we will see later on. Likewise, the devastating critique of the Freudian “Oedipus Complex” made by Deleuze and Guattari invites us to analyse, from a similar perspective, the highly ambiguous relation between Surrealism and psychoanalysis, and the consequences that it may have from the point of view of such “autopoietic” ontology.
Gilles Deleuze, philosopher of “immanence” and “affects”, well-known thanks to celebrated works as Difference and Repetition (1968), Cinema 1. The Movement Image (1983) and Cinema 2. The Time Image (1985), and his books about different philosophers -Nietzsche, Bergson, Hume, Spinoza-, met dissident psychoanalyst and activist Félix Guattari in the late 60s; since then, they both collaborated together in the elaboration of a new ontology which, contrary to classical psychoanalysis, bases its principles on a pioneering notion of unconscious, basically understood as “desiring production”. That is why their work is rightly labelled as “anti-Oedipal”. According to this, it is not, then, the Oedipal conception of the psyche what ensures the formation of identity, what canalises unconscious desire, or even stipulates who is sane or mad. In fact, in this context, Deleuze and Guattari look at mental pathology and claim that it is absolutely necessary to set up a new consideration of schizophrenia, inasmuch as they
14 find in the “schizo” the perfect example of autoproduced subjectivity. In short, from the “deleuzoguattarian” standpoint the “schizo” is always-in-process, always-in-motion, escaping from Freudian subjugation and ontological standardisation. Thus, in Deleuze and Guattari’s view, as the “schizo” is constantly producing desire away from psychoanalytic schemas, he constitutes the referential model of unconscious production –in other words, the model of “anti-Oedipal” subjectivation. So, the ontological theory of Anti-Oedipus is based precisely on this revalorisation of the “schizo”. As psychoanalyst, Guattari himself already had some pragmatic experience in this field thanks to his work at La Borde: the main aim at this clinic was to abolish the traditional doctor-patient hierarchy in order to put into practice a collaborative system of transversal actions in which mental patients could freely develop their impulses.
Now, taking into account these guidelines, it is possible to specify the fundamental leitmotif of the research I am outlining here. In brief, the working hypothesis boils down to the idea that, among Surrealists, we are able to find relevant cases of desiring production and important examples of “schizo”. To put it in a different way, among Surrealists, I explicitly locate important examples of “anti-Oedipal” unconscious. Hence, as we shall see, what I will try to develop throughout the following chapters consists of a systematic analysis of Surrealism, driven to elucidate what kind of “anti-Oedipal” technologies can be found within Surrealist procedures. My conclusion is that both Deleuze and Guattari and the Surrealists pursue the same horizon, which is none other than the liberation of unconscious. So it could be said that they look for the same ontological revolution: the production of an “anti-Oedipal” subjectivity. Thus, I sustain that the Surrealists and Deleuze and Guattari share the same vision about the unconscious and they both want the same revolution of desire. Consequently, pursuing the evidence of such connection, my objective is to confer a specific conceptual reading on Surrealism, in the attempt to provide an innovative and more accurate framework for thinking Surrealism in the era of diluted postmodernism and “Integrated World Capitalism”. The origin of this idea could be traced back to preceding papers on Surrealism I have recently published in diverse art journals. However, theoretically speaking, it goes back to the MA Contemporary Art Theory I took at Goldsmiths College (University of London) during the academic year 2010-2011, and particularly to the Special Subject “Thinking the Sensuous. Ethics, Aesthetics and the Production of the Subjectivity” taught by Professor Simon O’Sullivan. In this challenging and highly intellectual environment I first had the opportunity to dive into Deleuze and Guattari’s suggestive work and pay particular attention to the aesthetic dimensions of their philosophical programme. Critical tools obtained in that milieu, together with my previously acquired background in Art History, helped me to come to the conclusion that it could be possible to draw a strong parallelism between Surrealist art and “deleuzoguattarian” ontology.
15 Such combination becomes evident if we look at the “ethico-aesthetic paradigm” which Deleuze and Guattari situate at the basis of “schizoanalysis”, whose implications directly influence contemporary art practice. In recent times, many are the authors who have shown that Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical trace can be found in a wide range of artistic manifestations, and it is my conviction that it can be seen in Surrealist art as well. In this context, it is particularly relevant to point out the growing interest that Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy is awaking nowadays among researchers in the fields of Art Theory, aesthetics and contemporary art. In fact, Deleuzian thinking is having a significant impact on research. This is not surprising. As it has been observed by Spanish philosopher José Luis Pardo in his book El cuerpo sin órganos. Presentación de Gilles Deleuze (2011), Deleuzian philosophy is progressively increasing its influence in different areas of knowledge, and art is perhaps the most significant one. Thus, the consequences of such phenomenon fundamentally embrace the creation of novel academic approaches to contemporary art and ontology, to name just a few.1 Indeed, this critical fortune spreads an exceptionally large radius of action which concerns ontology from diverse points of view related to art. In this situation, it is worth highlighting that such theoretical reception is currently gaining a widely accepted position at the same time that Surrealism strengthens its place in present-day society through a sort of trending upward. This revival of Surrealism is being materialised in the form of numerous publications and books, conferences, seminars and exhibitions; for instance, Surrealism: Desire Unbound organised in 2001 at Tate Gallery (London), the exhibition La Révolution Surréaliste curated by Werner Spies in 2002 for the Centre Georges Pompidou (Paris), also El Surrealismo y el Sueño, commissioned by José Jiménez in 2013 at the Thyssen-Bornemisza Museum (Madrid), and Dalí. Todas las sugestiones poéticas y todas las posibilidades plásticas, arranged at Reina Sofía Museum (Madrid) in 2014. Going back in time, it is possible to find the precedents of such accused tendency in the year 1972, when the Haus der Kunst (Munich) inaugurated the exhibition Le Surréalisme (1922-1942).
1‘El pensamiento de Gilles Deleuze ha sido uno de los grandes acontecimientos filosóficos de la
segunda mitad del siglo XX: hoy ya no puede cabernos duda de eso, debido a la amplitud de la influencia de su obra, a la consistencia con la cual su pensamiento resiste los envites del presente, a su constante reaparición en cada recodo del camino intelectual de nuestro tiempo y, por si esto fuera poco, a la incesante marea bibliográfica que crece alrededor de su nombre a ambos lados del Atlántico.’ (Pardo, 2011: 11).
Gilles Deleuze’s thinking has been one of the greatest philosophical events of the second half of the XX century: today there is no doubt about it, due to the breadth of his work, the consistency with which his thought withstands every jolt of present times, the frequency with which it constantly emerges along the intellectual way of our time and, as if this were not enough, the incessant bibliographic tide which grows up around his name on both sides of the Atlantic. (My translation).
16 In 1993, American art critic Hal Foster echoed this renewed attention on Surrealism in his book Compulsive Beauty, remarking that Surrealism has returned more potent than ever, and that it has become the focus of numerous studies and debates. Certainly, we are still witnessing a powerful recovery of Surrealist aesthetics, and it is no coincide that today the philosophical corpus of Anti-Oedipus has so good reception. Then, here I would like to propose that this contingency presupposes an intimate correlation between Deleuze and Guattari’s work and Surrealism, to the extent that this avant-garde movement constitutes a productive environment, even a breeding ground, for the development of “schizoanalysis”, thus connecting such specific ontological apparatus with art tools. So, my point is that these two phenomena cannot be understood separately. Moreover, as I see it, the ties between them intersect so tightly that we are able to wonder, as Professor Bernardo Pinto de Almeida already does in “El sueño como metáfora. La producción de lo imaginario en el surrealismo” (2013): What would happen if, in order to fully understand Surrealism, we look at Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus instead of Freud’s psychoanalysis, as it has been for the last few decades? In other words, what would happen if we try to understand Surrealist aesthetico-ontological resources according to a different model of unconscious –unconscious as desiring production?2 In my opinion, this consideration is increasingly pertinent in today’s critical revision of Surrealism, inasmuch as it provides a more accurate picture of Surrealist art, emphasising its values as production of desire and not only as symbolic transpositions of psychoanalytic elements.3 It is precisely this new conception of Surrealism what must be investigated in much greater depth that has until now been the case. And this is what the present dissertation intends to do.
2 In Pinto’s words: ‘¿Y si el inconsciente pudiera ser, más bien -al contrario de como Freud quiso
definirlo y pensarlo, y tal como lo describieron, en cambio, Gilles Deleuze y Félix Guattari-, fábrica, gestión, maquinación de producción subjetiva … y, como tal, campo de producción subjetiva y espacio de experimentación de nuevas subjetividades, jamás experimentadas?’ (Pinto de Almeida, 2013: 132).
What if the unconscious could be -contrary to Freud’s definition and more accurately as Deleuze and Guattari’s designation- factory, management, mechanic production of the subjectivity (…) and as such, a field for subjective production and a space for the experimentation of new subjectivities, never experienced before? (My translation).
3 As Bernardo Pinto says: ‘Lo cierto es que, si tomamos al pie de la letra … la radical
proclamación deleuziana de la producción de inconsciente -o de un inconsciente por siempre inaprensible y en sí mismo nunca anterior a las formaciones del sujeto …-, podríamos afirmar tal vez, sin alejarnos de su pensamiento y planteando una hipótesis interesante desde el punto de vista conceptual, que la pintura surrealista fue, esencialmente, una extraordinaria fábrica de inconsciente y de imaginario, poderosa productora de inconsciente, engendrada en alguna zona remota de la mente.’ (Pinto de Almeida, 2013: 141).
The fact is that, if we take the Deleuzian radical motto at face value (…) regarding unconscious production -an elusive unconscious, never precedent to the subject formation (…)-, we could probably state, without detaching us from his thinking, and also proposing an interesting hypothesis from a conceptual point of view, that Surrealist painting was, essentially, an extraordinary factory of
unconscious and imaginary, a powerful producer of unconscious, engendered in some remote area of the
17
II. Framework, methodology and critical procedure.
In relation to what has been exposed above, this doctoral research pursues to contribute to the development of a theoretical exercise in the realm of contemporary aesthetics, mainly in what respects the ontological construction of Surrealism. So, in the attempt to articulate a critical framework, and bearing in mind current intellectual trends regarding Surrealism, I particularly follow the achievements made in many fronts by the Association pour la Recherche et l’Étude du Surréalisme (Université Sorbonne-Paris III) through the journal Mélusine, and also the Centre for the Study of Surrealism and its Legacies (University of Manchester) via its publication Papers of Surrealism, not only discussing the academic aspects of Surrealism as art-historical movement, but also its engagement with desiring practices and “affects”. In fact, Surrealism might be considered as a remarkably liberating “state of mind”, which has more to do with the production of intensities rather than with the historical periodisation of a delimited stage in Art History. Professor Michael Löwy has also insisted in the urgency of this substantial change in the academic approach towards Surrealism.4 Furthermore, in the task of delineating the specific methodology of this doctoral dissertation, it is of utmost importance to take into account Hal Foster’s harsh critique of Surrealism’s general historiography. In formulating his opinion about scholarly research on Surrealism, Foster states that the majority of theories formulated over of the past few decades have got stuck between two polarised directions: on the one hand, the abstractionist line which connects Cubism and Abstract Expressionism, forgetting irreverent and pungent movements in-between such as Dada and Surrealism; and on the other hand, Anglo-American formalist theories and their short account of Dada and Russian Constructivism, the only grounds on which they are based. Therefore, Foster emphasises the importance of raising awareness to encourage the creative side of Surrealism beyond delimited approaches and partial viewpoints.
Hence, the present research takes over Löwy and Foster’s suggestions and does its best to design a new model for thinking Surrealism nowadays, trying to overcome the deficiencies of stylistic and historic studies, which completely disregard philosophical problems affecting upon artworks. Consequently, the main endeavour in this respect is to solve these lacks in order to
4 ‘Too often, Surrealism has been reduced to paintings, sculptures, and collections of poetry. It
certainly includes all these manifestations but in actuality it remains elusive, beyond the rational understanding of appraisers, auctioneers, collectors, archivists, and entomologists. Surrealism is above all a particular state of mind –a state of insubordination, negativity, and revolt that draws positive, erotic, and poetic strength from the depths of the unconscious: that abyss of desire and magic well -the pleasure principle- in which we find the incandescent music of the imagination. For Surrealism, this mental transformation is present not only in the “works” that are found in museums and libraries, but also and equally so in its games, strolls, attitudes, and activities.’ (Löwy, 2009: 2).
18 avoid the temptation of biased contents or one-sided focuses upon a single angle, as it is also the case with Freudian or Marxist readings on Surrealism. In our present days it is absolutely necessary to study Surrealism beyond these limitations. As it has been already said, here I promote a new starting point for thinking Surrealism, giving priority attention to all those aesthetico-ontological issues that this movement may involve. In such a context, Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy then becomes the key point in the endeavour to properly approach Surrealism from a transversal perspective. “Anti-Oedipal” devices will also be crucial to articulate the structure and even the writing style of the present thesis, in the sense that it acquires a strongly metaphorical and conceptual influence derived from “deleuzoguattarian” principles. In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari clearly state that writing a book is a question of “machinic assemblages” and “rhizomatic” activity; a key formulation which gives the clue to a new kind of literary model freed from univocal authorship, linearity and fixed arguments. As Guattari once said, the books he wrote in collaboration with Deleuze are supported by what he called “idea-thief”; according to which the act of writing consists of recollecting already invented terms and adapting them into a new personal work. What is more, Deleuze himself said that philosophy is the labour of creating concepts, so he spread a quite poetic and even artistic conception of academic investigation: philosophy as creation. As can be seen, this modality of theoretical writing entails transdisciplinary skills, so much so that Deleuze and Guattari’s books continuously make nods to different arts, specially cinema, music, and literature, quoting for example Kafka, Proust, Beckett, Carroll, and above all, Surrealist poet Antonin Artaud. So, in reading Deleuze and Guattari, we are never really sure if we are reading philosophy, psychiatry, literature, or art critique.
Then, throughout the following pages, it would not be unusual to employ an evocative, undetermined writing style, or connect conceptual terms to art, literature or cinema, because, after all, the precedents of such dynamics are to be found in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical project. Not surprisingly, Deleuze and Guattari claim to put into practice the so-called “fractal writing”, or more generally, “nomad thought”. The “deleuzoguattarian” writing is then characterised by its internal dissidence, as it were. Following such mechanism -the mechanism of the “writing machine”-, it is my intention to forge a doctoral dissertation under the stimulus of this idea, precisely bearing in mind that it does not come into contradiction with Surrealism; quite the opposite. For instance, Jack J. Spector has remarked the heterodox nature of Surrealism in his book Surrealist Art and Writing, 1919-1939. The Gold of Time (1997). In particular, he alludes to the difficulty which must be coped with by researchers due to the intertextual heterogeneity of Surrealist techniques. In his opinion, Surrealism is not merely an art movement but a space of aesthetic confusion; a space where all the artistic disciplines come
19 together –painting and poetry, engravings and “collages”, cinema and “dérives”. This complexity comes from the transformational experiences of Surrealist art, which thus becomes a milieu for experimenting with “affects” using different ways of expression. As all of this suggests, Surrealism is actually an effervescent “state of the spirit” focused on desiring politics through artistic means. Finally, this conceptual approach entails an ambitious bibliographic research in the attempt to achieve some convergence between art-historical and theoretic and aesthetical positions. For that reason, apart from Deleuze and Guattari, I will pay closest attention to the work of Sigmund Freud, Antonio Negri, Michel Foucault, but also André Breton, Antonin Artaud, Luis Buñuel, and Salvador Dalí, among many others.
III. Structure and summary of contents.
In what respects the development of contents, the thesis is divided into two different parts: First Part, which encompasses Chapter 1, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3; and Second Part, which comprises Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. To begin with, the First Part is mainly dedicated to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of desire, basically understood as a matter of production; not as the consequence of a specific lack or wish, as we are used to see it, due to the influence of Freudian understanding of unconscious. In brief, what Deleuze and Guattari state is that desire is above all a sort of connective process, which thus destroys psychoanalytic prejudices about unconscious and gives form to a new ontological vision, according to the idea of subjective production –subjectivity as the result of an “autopoietic” creation; that is, as something that must be created. As Guattari says, we do not really stand before a subjectivity already given; rather, we are called to produce it. So, in the first section of the dissertation we will see that such ontological production functions in a quite machinic fashion (“desiring machines”), obtaining irregular identities which -using the term derived from Antonin Artaud- Deleuze and Guattari call “Bodies without Organs”, or simply, “schizo”. More accurately the “BwO” is an expanded “body” traversed by multiple “affects”, which produce dysfunctional “organisms”; or in other words, broken machines that connect and interrupt desiring fluxes. In brief: ‘The BwO is desire; it is that which one desires and by which one desires.’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 165). Thus, Deleuze and Guattari manage to elaborate a strong critique of Oedipal unconscious; instead, they provide a radically new conception of desire, which is not desire for an object, but unconscious production.5
5
In his book Soft Subversions, Guattari explains: ‘For Gilles Deleuze and me desire is everything
that exists before the opposition between subject and object, before representation and production. It’s everything whereby the world and affects constitute us outside of ourselves, in spite of ourselves. It’s everything that overflows from us. That’s why we define it as flow. Within this context we were led to forge a new notion in order to specify in what way this kind of desire is not some sort of undifferentiated
20 In Chapter 1 it will also be discussed another important aspect related to the libidinal machines which have been already commented. It is the double-faced gesture whereby “anti-Oedipal” desire not only bears directly on individual subjectivity but on social infrastructures as well. Deleuze and Guattari coin the expression “social machines” to mean the social milieu machinically produced according to immanent desire. However, “social machines” are not freed from stratification. In fact, they share with “desiring machines” a dangerous risk of oedipalisation that must be avoided by all means. In the present research, this danger, which is to be found at the heart of the socius, will be designated “Empire”, and it constitutes a sort of equivalence of Oedipus’s dominant power over unconscious. The sense of this particular focus is, as I will try to show hereafter, that the repressive action undertaken by Oedipus within libidinal realm is correlative to that of Empire and its “civilised-capitalist” socius. Not in vain, Deleuze and Guattari speak of “the imperialism of Oedipus”. The main source which inspires this connection is the book Empire (2000), written by Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, followed by two volumes: Multitude (2004) and Commonwealth (2011). Likewise, such analysis will be raised according to Foucault’s study on “Panopticism” and “disciplinary institutions”, since it is very timely in this context. Ultimately, it will be considered the essential role of “contra-power”; the desiring force against Empire that Negri defines as resistance, insurrection and constituent power, also linked to the epiphany of the “monstrosity”: a “multitude of nomads” which attack Empire from within using creativity and “affects”; in other words, the “potenza” of multitude’s “General Intellect”.
In this battle against “Oedipus-Empire”, the “multitude” of “Bodies without Organs” employs a specific strategy, precisely named “schizoanalysis”. Broadly speaking, the schizoanalytic functioning is inspired by schizophrenic features, but, as it will be carefully analysed in Chapter 2, this is not the idea of schizophrenia as such, but a metaphorical conception of its psychological implications. Deleuze and Guattari come back to the “schizo” just because the schizophrenic identity is the perfect example of fluctuating subjectivation, whose limits have been completely blurred; so the “schizo” provides the subjective model upon which Oedipal schemas have no influence at all. As a result, Deleuze and Guattari claim that the “schizo” entails the fundamental tools for producing ourselves in a “nomadic” way, just flowing, affecting and being affected. Thus, subjectivity is not the property of a subject already existent; on the contrary, the subject becomes. The “schizo” is then the key for understanding magma, and thereby dangerous, suspicious,or incestuous. So we speak of machines, of “desiring-machines”, in order to indicate that there is as yet no question here of “structure” –that is, of any subjective position, objective redundancy, or coordinates of reference. Machines arrange and connect flows. They do not recognize distinctions between persons, organs, material flows, and semiotic flows.’ (Guattari, 1996: 142).
21 “becoming” as the dynamics of “anti-Oedipal” automodelisation. ‘Schizophrenia in Deleuze and Guattari’s is not a malady; it is a process (that of becoming).’ (Masummi, 1992: 179). Finally, schizophrenia will be studied as the process of the “rhizome” (which is neither a “tree” nor a “root”) inasmuch as it connects and interrupts desiring fluxes. For that, as it is presented by Deleuze and Guattari, the schizophrenic action is also a “line of flight” which gives form to “collective assemblages”, “abstract machines” and “war machines”, among which I highlight art practice, because ‘every production of a work of art follows a line of flight, escaping dominant presuppositions.’ (Goodchild, 1996: 187). As this reveals, art is an effective instrument in order to produce subjectivity in an “anti-Oedipal” way. At this point it will be crucial to cast an eye over the figure of Antonin Artaud and his “Theatre of Cruelty”, particularly in relation to the subjective effects of “minor literature”, as it will be carefully studied in Chapter 3.
Now concerning Part II, if the previous chapters were about detailing the “anti-Oedipal” nature of desire and the mechanisms of schizoanalytic production, the following sections will be dedicated to the comparison of such strongly theoretical framework with Surrealist art’s specific procedures. So, the main purpose in the Second Part is to analyse Surrealism according to the “deleuzoguattarian” principles. So here the methodology tries to be simultaneously historical and philosophical, insofar as it will be required to contrast the origin and stages of Surrealist movement, but also it will be equally important to reflect upon the vast complexity of Surrealist convictions and commitment in what respects aesthetics and politics. However, it must be noted that such combinatory analysis pursues a concrete objective, which is basically orientated to make clear the ontological processes developed by Surrealist, stressing the similarities with the “anti-Oedipal” praxis. Consequently, in this section I want to explore aspects related to the history of Surrealism, its constitution and evolution, and of course, its aesthetic values, because if we study these elements in light of “schizoanalysis” we will realise, as I will try to show, that Surrealism has a strong correlation with “deleuzoguattarian” production of the subjectivity. However, not all Surrealists have the same characteristics. In particular, it is relevant to make a distinction between “French Surrealism” and “Spanish Surrealism” due to their radical differences in terms of structural composition, organisation, and aesthetic normativity, which obviously determine the specificities of both Surrealist factions. In relation to this, the point of departure in Chapter 4 will be like an x-ray of “French Surrealism”, the group led by André Breton, the “Pope of Surrealism”; group which will be studied from the point of view of “molar aggregates”, quite different from the rhizomatic nature of “molecular groups” which will be considered in discussing “Spanish Surrealism”.
22 As we will see, the group fiercely governed by Breton suffers the despotic action of an undisputed leader -Breton himself-, who at first fought for the liberation of unconscious (he was interested in automatism, dreams, hypnosis, etc.) but progressively, at the same time that he gradually acquired a sense of his own figure as foundational leader, Breton started to retrace his steps and, finally, he established a quite dogmatic organisation, fixing Surrealism around his central power. This paradoxical positioning paints a clear picture of “French Surrealism” as a controlling entity, subsumed within the straitjacketed schema of unconscious oedipalisation. This has little in common with “Spanish Surrealism”. Unlike French Surrealist, Spaniards have nothing to do with an organised structure, normative programme and leader; and their artistic proposals, liberated from Breton’s commandments, are essentially directed to provoke desiring outbreaks in everyday life. These circumstances will be studied in detail throughout an exhaustive comparison between both types of Surrealism. As far as “Spanish Surrealism” is concerned, the dissertation will be focused on authors belonging to the Generation of ’27 and young artists enrolled within the environment of Residencia de Estudiantes in Madrid. Theoretically speaking, my approach to “Spanish Surrealism” will be articulated according to the work of consolidated experts in the field such as Giovanni Morelli, C. Brian Morris, Paul Ilie, and other hispanists. Finally, it should be remarked that I necessarily sift the specific object of study that I want to submit under consideration, and I willingly push away other potential focal points of Surrealism in Spain, whose characteristics are of no particular interest in the present research; for instance, the Surrealist Group of the Canary Islands and certain artists from Catalonia -especially Joan Miró-, as well as Surrealist female artists, what clearly deserves a wider study which exceeds this one.
Once the differences between both “types” of Surrealism have been established, Chapter 5 will develop the characteristics of “Spanish Surrealism” in greater depth, without losing sight of the general Surrealist frame. The purpose is to map the “ethico-aesthetic” praxis of Surrealists through different aspects, from artistic creation to revolutionary techniques. First of all, I will look into the influence of Freud’s work upon Surrealism, because, as it is well known, Surrealism and psychoanalysis share an intriguing relation of comings and goings which must be clarified, because, as I see it, the points on which there is dissent reveal reasons against Freud’s oedipalisation. A clear similarity is to be found at the heart of the opposition against social institutions (family, bourgeoisie, religion...), which Surrealists consider part of the codifying structure at the service of “Oedipus-Empire”. That is why, looking for the revolution of desire, Surrealism wants to explode every single organism of control. Precisely, the liberation of unconscious will be the key point for understanding Surrealist taste in dreams, hypnosis, hallucinations and, of course, mental disturbance. Hysteria and schizophrenia are
23 pathologies appreciated by Surrealists, since dementia was for them the main path for provoking desiring production and unconscious cartographies. For this reason, Surrealists also attack unitary literary models, and cultivate a kind of “minor literature” nurtured by unconscious methods, such as “automatic writing”, “exquisite corpses”, and “caligrammes”, in order to demolish the idea of author as Subject. Thus, it is not surprising to find many coincidences between Surrealism and “schizoanalysis”. Not for nothing, the aim of this doctoral research is to demonstrate that Spanish Surrealists are, so to speak, “schizos”.
In this line, excavating Surrealist sympathies with Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, Chapter 6 extends the study to a more specific area, thus following a progression from the general to the concrete, and so I will finally examine three cases of Spanish Surrealists: Luis Buñuel, Salvador Dalí, and Federico García Lorca. Filmmaker, painter and poet met in their youth at the Residencia de Estudiantes, and they began a collaborative friendship celebrated in Art History until today, given the importance of its cultural resonance. It has been the subject of numerous studies –see, for instance Buñuel, Lorca, Dalí: el enigma sin fin (1988) by Agustín Sánchez Vidal. Then, looking for the resources that each of them uses in their own process of subjectivation, it would be necessary to investigate their lives and artistic creation, trying to unveil the “anti-Oedipal” tools they innately develop. In the case of Buñuel, this is not the first time that his cinema is studied from the point of view of “anti-Oedipal” philosophy. In fact, many authors have recently approached Buñuel in terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s work.6
What is more, Deleuze himself already considered Buñuel in his books about cinema, in his own attempt to constitute a sort of “cinematographic philosophy”. Victor Fuentes, the great researcher in Buñuel, has even declared to be convinced of the possibility of finding clear affinities between Buñuel and the authors of Anti-Oedipus. In the same way, recent works such as the collective book Companion to Luis Buñuel (2013) insists on the importance of revisiting Buñuel’s cinema from “deleuzoguattarian” notions.7
According to this, Buñuel will be
6 There are many publications which have recently connected “schizoanalysis” to Buñuelian
cinema. For instance, Marsha Kinder’s paper entitled “Hot spots, avatars and narrative fields for ever:
Buñuel’s legacy for the new digital media and interactive database narrative” (2004) alludes to the
cinematographic aesthetics of Buñuel as an example of “desiring-machines”. In this context, Paul Sandro, author of Diversions of Pleasure: Luis Buñuel and the Crises of Desire (1987), remarks the strong Deleuzian tendency regarding Buñuel’s cinema. Also Julian Daniel Gutiérrez-Albilla, in Queering
Buñuel: Sexual Dissidence and Psychoanalysis in His Mexican and Spanish Cinema (2008), has
established a direct relation between Buñuel and “deleuzoguattarian” parameters.
7 ‘Hence, we may rethink Buñuel’s cinema as a springboard for reflecting upon the subject’s
liberation from his/her neurosis by privileging Deleuze’s and Guattari’s focus on the “schizos/flows” within, between and through partial subjects, thereby transforming the Freudian unconscious from a figurative or structural repository of repressed wishes into a revolutionary interaction of intensities. As a result, it would appear that Buñuel’s films challenge an orthodox psychoanalytic practice and theory that insists on the codification of the unconscious by privileging the productive freedom of the signifier instead.’ (Stone; et.al., 2013: 10-11).
24 discussed as a good example of “schizo”, who escapes from Oedipus’s capture by oscillating between two extremes: the “schizophrenic” pole, and the “paranoiac” pole, which is “despotic” and “racist”. Far from maintaining a relation of similarity with Buñuel, Dalí takes roots in the “paranoiac” side, so the problem here is that, despite having started his own subjectivation in a schizophrenic way, Dalí finally becomes a victim of oedipalisation. Contrary, Lorca, as was the case with Buñuel, adopts a schizophrenic mode; so he is constantly deleting his identity and experiencing different “becomings” (child”, “becoming-gipsy”, “becoming-black”, “becoming-transsexual”, etc.).
To sum up, the question arises as to how Surrealism addresses schizoanalytic modelisation, and how Surrealists, especially Spanish artists, manage to produce themselves as “desiring machines”; or in other words, how they achieve, in Guattari’s terms, the path for “Chaosmosis”. So here it is not intended to draw a history of Surrealism, but to reach the mechanisms according to which Surrealists construct their subjectivity in relation to “anti-Oedipal” desiring production. Indeed, as Deleuze and Guattari make clear, we are “subjects-in-process”. For that, this doctoral dissertation will investigate the issue of such “polyphonic identity” and its “biopolitical” consequences in the task of building up a new desiring power – the power of the “nomad”, the power of the “multitude”; that is to say, the power of unconscious desire freed from Oedipus. Finally, this lets us to consider the interweaving of ethic and art regarding schizoanalytic ontology, insofar as it is sustained by the “ethico-aesthetic paradigm”. Such a connection constitutes the clue for disrupting Oedipus: a combination of art and life through poetic commitment. So it could even be said that ‘Anti-Oedipus is a Utopian book in the strictest sense: it offers a blueprint for a different world, not by describing that world in fantastic terms, but by showing the way out of this one. And that remains a worthwhile but incomplete project.’ (Buchanan, 2008: 139). Not in vain, Anti-Oedipus constitutes a pragmatic programme of “autopoietic” modelisation with an eye on social change; in relation to which it is interesting to note that Surrealism also has a similar intuition: art and life united in the “revolution de l’esprit”. With this aim in mind, it is not my intention here to pronounce a final verdict regarding Surrealism, but to propose a contemporary vision of the movement and, above all, the ontological implications it entails.
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CAPÍTULO 1: “EDIPO”, O EL CONTROL DE LA SUBJETIVIDAD.
‘Les machines désirantes grondent, vrombissent au fond de l’inconscient ….’ Gilles Deleuze y Félix Guattari
(L’Anti-Œdipe, 63)
1.1. La visión psicoanalítica del inconsciente: Freud, el “Complejo de Edipo” y la “codificación” del deseo.
La figura de Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) supone una de las cumbres indiscutibles -y no menos polémicas- del panorama científico e intelectual del siglo XX. A él se debe la formulación de una de las líneas metodológicas de la medicina psicoterapéutica que durante sucesivas décadas experimentaría un significativo auge, llegando a repercutir con poderosa influencia en el ámbito clínico, pero también en diversas ramificaciones del imaginario social, cultural y, por qué no decirlo, artístico: Freud se erige, como es sabido, en el “padre” y fundador del psicoanálisis. En los albores de su formación investigadora, Freud circunscribía, sin embargo, sus intereses profesionales al campo neurológico; parcela que pronto abandonó por la exploración del tratamiento de los llamados “enfermos nerviosos”, a lo que dedicaría desde entonces su vida entera y carrera. Los contactos iniciales de Freud con este tipo de pacientes se concretan especialmente en casos de histeria, enfermedad en la que profundizó de la mano de J. M. Charcot (1825-1893) durante una estancia de estudios en París. En adelante, y con la publicación de obras emblemáticas como La Interpretación de los sueños (1900), Freud avanzaría en la concepción de ese particular, y en muchos sentidos revolucionario, aunque también restrictivo, sistema curativo de las enfermedades mentales que bautizó con el término “psicoanálisis”.
1.1.1. Radiografía del inconsciente freudiano.
Esta disciplina -que Freud consideraba científica, y como tal defendía- sostiene como principio fundamental la existencia de un trasfondo mental en el ser humano, caracterizado por desarrollar un amplio abanico de actividades propias, derivadas en alto grado de las vivencias cotidianas, en especial de las particularmente dramáticas (traumáticas). Esta realidad psicológica es denominada “aparato psíquico”, y se organiza según tres registros que Freud acuñó con marcada diferenciación: el “ello”, el “yo” y el “superyó”. Tal agrupación tripartita
