National Tax Journal Vol. LII, No. 3
Abstract - We examine preretirement lump sum distributions (LSDs) from pension plans, which have grown significantly in recent years. Most LSD recipients do not roll over the funds into qualified accounts, but the likelihood of rollover rises for larger distributions. We find evidence suggesting that tax penalties im-posed in 1986 on nonrollovers by people younger than 55 raised the likelihood of rollovers among this group, but had much less ef-fect on the likelihood that such households saved the funds, where saving includes investing in taxable assets and paying off debt. We estimate that cashouts reduce annual retirement income by up to $1,000–3,000.
A
major objective of public policy toward pensions is to ensure adequate retirement income for as many work-ers as possible. The best way to achieve this goal, however, is often uncertain. In this paper, we examine the role of one aspect of pension policy—the tax treatment of lump sum dis-tributions (LSDs) that are taken from pension balances be-fore a worker reaches retirement age. Upon changing jobs, many workers can choose between leaving their existing, vested pension balances in the pension plan they had been enrolled in previously or taking the funds as an LSD. If taken as an LSD, the funds may be “rolled over” to another quali-fied plan (typically, either the defined contribution (DC) plan at the worker’s new employer or an Individual Retirement Account (IRA)), or used for some other purpose.Public policy currently encourages workers to roll over their pension balances. Funds that are not rolled over are subject to taxation as ordinary income, as are all pension ben-efits. In addition, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 required that, if a worker is under age 55, funds that are not rolled over are also subject to a 10 percent penalty tax. The penalty tax ap-plies up to age 59 1/
2 if the distribution is taken prior to job termination. Since 1993, the employer must assess a with-holding tax of 20 percent on any cash distribution not trans-ferred into a qualified account. Also, employers are required to offer departing employees the option of directly transfer-ring lump sum and certain other distributions into another qualified retirement plan or IRA.
Lump Sum Distributions from Pension
Plans: Recent Evidence and Issues
for Policy and Research
Leonard E. Burman Department of Treasury, Washington, D.C. 20220 Norma B. Coe Department of Treasury, Washington, D.C. 20220 William G. Gale The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. 20036
Lump sum distributions are sizable and have grown rapidly in recent years. Moreover, a variety of trends, including the shift toward DC plans, suggest that distri-butions will become even larger in the future. Thus, researchers and policymakers must address several impor-tant positive and normative questions. What is the impact of penalty and with-holding taxes on rollover behavior, retire-ment wealth accumulation, and broader measures of saving? Do these effects differ across demographic groups who also vary in their preparation for retirement? Does the availability of early, albeit penalized, LSDs increase pension participation by making pensions more attractive to work-ers—because the money is portable and ac-cessible for nonretirement purposes? How do LSD rules interact with withdrawal rules for other tax-preferred saving incen-tives? How should LSD rules be designed? This paper explores some of these is-sues. The first section discusses available data sources and information on the mag-nitude and growth of LSDs. The second section examines recent research and pre-sents some additional evidence on the de-terminants of LSD disposition, including the tax treatment of distributions. The third section reviews recent research and provides additional evidence on the mag-nitude of the decline in retirement wealth directly caused by LSDs. These findings and issues should help frame the policy debate and motivate future research, items that we discuss in the fourth section.
MAGNITUDE AND GROWTH OF LSDs
Data on LSDs are available from sev-eral sources. The Employee Benefits Supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS) in 1983, 1988, and 1993
con-tain data on whether workers are eligible for an LSD at their current jobs, whether they have received LSDs in the past, and if so, the date, amount, and disposition of the most recent LSD received. The Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) contains similar, but more detailed data on LSDs for households aged 51–61 in 1992. The HRS contains data on up to five LSDs re-ceived in the past and also has informa-tion on whether the employee chose to leave the pension at a previous employer or roll over the funds directly into the new employer’s pension plan.
Both surveys are useful in that they pro-vide significant amounts of demographic and economic data and provide informa-tion on LSDs over time periods that span different tax regimes. A problem with sur-vey data, however, is that distributions that occurred in the past may not be re-called well by respondents, and respon-dents may not report every event that might be considered an LSD.
As a result, there appears to be signifi-cant under-reporting of LSD aggregates in the survey-based data.1 Based on the CPS, we find that LSDs totaled about $20 billion in 1992, with 1.5 million workers receiving an average LSD of about $13,900. Alternative estimates, using a variety of data sources, including tax records, place the total at about $75–80 billion (Sabelhaus and Weiner, 1999; Woods, 1996; Yakoboski, 1997). Thus, the CPS may understate the aggregate dollar volume of LSDs by as much as 70 percent. The CPS data indicate that the preva-lence of LSDs increased significantly be-tween 1988 and 1993. The proportion of workers with pensions who said they would be eligible for LSD if they left their current job was 56 percent in 1988, com-pared to 68 percent by 1993.2 The number
1 The underreporting of aggregates could also be aggravated by top coding in the surveys.
2 These estimates exclude the 16–18 percent of workers who did not know whether they would be eligible,
which may explain some of the differences with LSD eligibility rates reported in other studies. Scott and Shoven (1996) report that 87 percent of participants in DC plans and 64 percent of those with DB plans had the option of taking a LSD in 1993. See Fernandez (1992) for data from earlier years.
of respondents who had received LSDs rose by over 60 percent, and the average real LSD received—among recipients— rose by almost 40 percent. Thus, reported total distributions received more than doubled between 1988 and 1993 based on these surveys.
Table 1 shows that, in 1993, among workers who have pensions, the availabil-ity of an LSD is substantially higher for workers with DC pensions plans, work-ers in the service industry and wholesale or retail trade industries, managers, sales and technical workers, clerical workers, workers with family income of more than $10,000, and workers with at least a high-school education. There is no signifi-cant pattern of LSD availability with
re-spect to age, race, gender or coverage under a union contract. The rise in avail-ability of LSDs from 1988 to 1993 can be attributed largely to two factors: the pro-portion of workers with DC plans rose, and the proportion of defined benefit (DB) and DC participants who could take LSDs if they left their jobs rose as well.
THE DISPOSITION OF LSDs
Evidence from the 1993 CPS on empiri-cal patterns of LSD disposition is reported in Table 2 and is consistent with empiri-cal findings in the literature.3 The vast majority of people who receive LSDs do not roll over the funds into qualified ac-counts. However, a much larger portion
3 See, for example, Andrews (1991a); Chang (1996); Fernandez (1992); Korczyk (1996); Poterba, Venti, and Wise
(1998); Sabelhaus and Weiner (1999); Scott and Shoven (1996); U.S. Department of Labor (1995); and Yakoboski (1997).
TABLE 1
PERCENT OF WORKERS WITH PENSIONS ELIGIBLE FOR LSDs, 1993
Percent Eligible for LSD Worker Characteristic
Percent Eligible
for LSD Worker Characteristic
All With DC plan With DB plan Age Under 35 35–44 45–54 55–64 65 and over Household income Under 10,000 10,000–19,999 20,000–29,999 30,000–39,999 40,000–49,999 50,000–74,999 75,000 and over Union Contract Covered Not covered Gender Males Females Occupation Manager/Professional Sales/Technician Clerical Services Farm/Fishing/Forestry Craft/Production Operator/Laborer Industry Agriculture/Mining/Construction Manufacturing Transportation/Public Utilities/ Communication
Wholesale and Retail Trade/FIRE Services
Education
Less than high-school diploma High-school graduate Some college, no degree Four years college completed Four-plus years college
Race White Nonwhite 68 79 58 70 70 65 64 69 56 64 66 70 66 70 68 71 67 66 70 71 71 73 64 68 61 57 66 64 62 72 70 60 66 67 71 70 68 68 Note: The sample is restricted to workers participating in a pension plan on their current job and excludes the 15.6 percent of the respondents who report not knowing whether they would qualify for a distribution. Source: Authors’ computations of the 1993 Employee Benefits Survey of the CPS.
of dollars received are rolled over. The CPS data, however, do not include work-ers who chose to leave their pensions with previous employers. Using HRS data, Hurd, Lillard, and Panis (1998) find that a significant portion of workers do leave their pensions with previous employers. Thus, the proportion of LSD recipients that retain their funds in qualified plans and the proportion of LSD dollars so re-tained are higher than reported in the CPS. Controlling for other factors, the likeli-hood that a worker will roll over the LSD rises with age, income, and the size of the distribution. There is some evidence that variables that may be proxies for finan-cial sophistication or “tastes for saving”— such as education, interest income, and IRA ownership—increase the likelihood that distributions are rolled over (Andrews, 1991a).
Despite the apparent robustness of most of these findings, there has been little for-mal modeling of LSD choices (although see Hurd, Lillard, and Panis, 1998). In Burman, Coe, and Gale (1999), we derive a simple model that is consistent with all of the well-established findings in the lit-erature and draws several new implica-tions regarding the disposition of LSDs.
Chang (1996) estimates that the tax changes introduced in 1986 raised the probability of rollovers by about six per-centage points, but less attention has been paid to uses of distributions other than rollovers. This could be an important is-sue, however, because funds that are not rolled over may nevertheless be saved. Thus, the impact of tax policy on rollovers and the determinants of rollover behav-ior may be interpreted differently, and may lead to different policy conclusions,
TABLE 2
ROLLOVERS BY HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS AND LSD SIZE
Distribution of Recipients Distribution of Dollars
Rolled All
Rolled All Rolled
Some RolledSome
Rolled
None RolledNone
All LSD recipients Household income Under 10,000 10,000–19,999 20,000–29,999 30,000–39,999 40,000–49,999 50,000–74,999 75,000 and over Age Received Under 25 25–34 35–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 LSD size (1993$) 0–500 501–1,000 1,001–5,000 5,001–15,000 15,000+ 16.2 4.2 7.0 12.8 18.9 27.4 35.1 32.4 4.7 12.3 21.3 27.9 28.7 46.4 3.8 7.5 12.5 21.9 24.2 2.3 0.8 1.5 3.6 1.7 3.6 2.3 3.7 0.1 1.5 3.0 4.9 8.2 5.1 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.9 4.6 81.5 95.0 91.5 83.6 79.4 70.0 62.6 63.8 95.1 86.2 75.6 67.1 63.2 48.5 96.2 92.5 86.5 74.3 71.2 33.1 4.5 13.4 30.1 34.0 40.1 57.2 49.1 4.4 18.5 35.7 48.6 39.6 59.3 3.4 7.3 13.4 21.6 41.9 7.3 8.6 4.1 7.9 3.8 12.8 5.4 9.6 1.6 3.3 8.2 10.4 15.4 6.4 0.0 0.0 1.2 4.3 9.8 59.6 86.9 82.6 70.0 62.2 47.1 37.4 41.3 94.1 78.3 56.1 41.0 45.0 34.2 96.6 92.7 85.4 74.2 48.4 Note: The sample is restricted to respondents under age 60 who have received a LSD.
depending on whether the items that change rollover behavior also change broader measures of saving out of the LSD.
The CPS contains detailed data on the reported uses of distributions. Respon-dents’ answers must be taken with a grain of salt, because the question “what did you do with the money” is difficult to an-swer once it is recognized that money is fungible. Nevertheless, we take the sur-vey response as a reasonable guide to how the distribution affected the household’s saving and consumption. We define a nar-row measure of saving to allow for roll-ing the funds into an IRA or purchasroll-ing an annuity. We refer to either of these as a rollover. Our intermediate definition of saving also allows funds to be invested in other ways, or used to buy a business or a home. Our broad measure of saving in-cludes debt repayment.
Table 3 reveals interesting patterns of disposition of LSDs by year received, age received, and definition of saving. The probability of rollover increased by ten percentage points for households aged 25–54 from 1981–6 to 1987–93. In contrast, the probability of rollover actually fell slightly after 1986 for households aged 55 and older, who were not subject to the ten percent penalty imposed in 1986. The pro-portion of funds rolled over suggests an
even larger impact of the 1986 tax changes. For households aged 25–54, the propor-tion of funds rolled over nearly doubled, rising from 25 to 44 percent. For older households, the proportion fell by 17 per-centage points.
Trends using the broadest definition of saving, however, appear to be signifi-cantly different. For young households, the proportion of recipients saving the LSD, in the broadest sense, rose by less than two percentage points, while for older households, the proportion of recipi-ents saving the funds fell by two percent-age points. Thus, of the 12 percentpercent-age point relative change in the proportion of young recipients rolling over funds com-pared to older recipients rolling over funds after 1986, only 4 percentage points of that change showed up as relative changes in the likelihood of broader sav-ing measures.
Similarly, the proportion of LSD funds saved, using the broad measure, rose by eight percentage points for younger households after 1986 and fell by ten per-centage points for older households. Thus, of the 37 percentage point relative change in the proportion of funds rolled over by young recipients compared to older recipi-ents after 1986, about 18 percentage points showed up as relative changes in the pro-portion of funds saved.
TABLE 3
DISPOSITION OF LSDs, BY YEAR, AGE, AND SAVING DEFINITION
1987–93 Age when LSD received
Year when LSD received Proportion of recipients who saved the LSD
Narrow Intermediate Broad
Proportion of LSD funds saved
Narrow Intermediate Broad 25–54 55–64 1981–86 1987–93 1981–86 0.142 0.439 0.619 0.248 0.574 0.688 0.245 0.485 0.636 0.445 0.700 0.769 0.395 0.689 0.743 0.562 0.832 0.895 0.378 0.702 0.723 0.389 0.792 0.798 Note: Saving definitions provided in the text.
These findings are consistent with the view that the 1986 tax changes raised rollover probabilities, but had less of an impact on the overall probability that LSDs were used for some sort of saving. Thus, while firm conclusions at this stage would be premature, the data point to some interesting hypotheses to confront with formal tests.
LSDs AND RETIREMENT WEALTH
A key question concerns the extent to which LSDs in general and funds that are not rolled over in particular reduce retire-ment wealth accumulation. The typical procedure to measure this effect is simple: the amount of the cashed-out distribution is multiplied by (1 + r)N, where N is the
difference between some target retirement age and the age at which the distribution was received and r is the rate of return on the investment. Engelhardt (1999), using the HRS, finds that for the median house-hold receiving a LSD, the lost accumula-tion is between about 8 and 11 percent of social security and pension wealth. If so-cial security and pensions account for
three-quarters of retirement income for a typical elderly household,4 Engelhardt’s finding would suggest that pension loss from cashed-in LSDs reduces retirement consumption by about 6 to 8 percent.
Gustman and Steinmeier (1998), using the same data set, find that the average respondent has given up about $7,000 of pension benefits that were either received as cash settlements or were forfeited. Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1999) estimate that interactions between job changes and the disposition of LSDs will reduce 401(k) balances at retirement for cohorts retiring in 2025 or 2035 by about five percent. Sabelhaus and Weiner (1999) show that distributions that are not rolled over av-erage about one percent of adjusted gross income in most income classes. This fig-ure includes the adjusted gross income of all households, not just those that received distributions.
We present estimates from the CPS in Table 4, assuming that the real rate of re-turn on the pension balance would have been five percent per year. The table shows that, among those who did not roll over all of their LSD, the average implied
4 About one-sixth of elderly households depend on social security alone for all of their income, and about
two-thirds depend on social security alone for half or more of their income (Aaron and Reischauer, 1998).
TABLE 4
ESTIMATED LOSS OF RETIREMENT WEALTH AT AGE 65 FROM FAILURE TO ROLL OVER DISTRIBUTION (1993 DOLLARS)
Average Estimated Pension Lossa
Average Size of LSD Not Rolled Over
Age at receipt
Under 30 3,062 21,029
30–39 5,733 26,181
40–49 7,330 20,241
50–59 10,617 18,448
Household income at interview
Under 10,000 4,812 15,966 10,000–20,000 5,155 22,055 20,000–30,000 4,668 19,641 30,000–40,000 3,908 19,598 40,000–50,000 6,149 24,561 50,000–75,000 5,679 23,118 75,000+ 7,531 29,520
Note: Pension loss is computed assuming that amounts not rolled over would have otherwise been invested with a real return of five percent per year.
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Employee Benefit Supplement of the 1993 CPS. aThe estimated pension loss is averaged over workers who did not roll over all funds.
loss in pension balances at age 65 ranges from over $26,000 in distributions taken by 30–39 year olds to almost $18,500 for distributions taken by those near retire-ment age. Pension loss ranges from about $16,000 for low-income workers to $29,500 for those with incomes over $75,000. If rates of return on annuities average be-tween six and ten percent (Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, 1997), these pen-sion loss estimates imply reductions in retirement consumption of about $1,000– 3,000 per year among households that did not roll over their LSDs.
But this estimate, and the others above, overstate the pension loss, for several rea-sons. First, none of the estimates indicates the extent to which pension participation is increased due to the increased liquidity created by LSDs. Second, it is unclear what would have happened to the funds if they had not been cashed out. In particular, employees who receive a distribution from a DB pension plan might well have more pension assets if they save the funds than they would have if they left them in their previous employer’s pension plan. Third, as the data in Table 3 indicate, a large proportion of the funds that are not rolled over are nevertheless saved in one form or another, and so may contribute to wealth at the age of retirement, even if that wealth does not show up in qualified retirement accounts.
DISCUSSION
The results above raise a number of in-teresting issues concerning the costs and benefits of LSDs, but the effects of relevant policies remain unanswered.
Effects on Saving
The evidence to date suggests that the tax penalty encourages rollovers into qualified accounts, but that does not im-ply that it has encouraged saving over consumption. The preliminary evidence
in Table 3 suggests that a large portion of the increase in rollovers has occurred at the expense of other forms of saving, at least in the short term.
As noted above, the magnitude of lost pension benefits due to LSDs does not appear to be huge and is overstated for several reasons. A perhaps equally impor-tant question concerns the distribution of losses in pension wealth due to LSDs. The data show that households that are younger, have lower income, or have less formal education are more likely to con-sume their LSDs rather than save them. These households, however, are also the ones for whom pensions are most likely to represent new saving. Gale (1998) finds that households that are young, borrowing-constrained, or have low wealth are least likely to reduce other wealth to finance their pension—that is, pensions have the biggest impact on over-all wealth for these households.
Thus, it could be that precisely the households for whom pensions are most likely to represent additional saving are also the ones that are most likely not to re-tain that saving, given the chance to opt out of the pension system. Understanding the interactions between heterogeneity in levels and tastes for saving, and in how pensions affect saving on the one hand and the disposition of LSDs on the other, would appear to be an important avenue for fu-ture research. Although the literafu-ture to date has given a significant amount of at-tention to the effects of placing money into tax-preferred accounts, much less attention has been given to implications about when and how funds are removed from the sys-tem. It is fair to say that currently no link has been established between retirement saving adequacy and LSD behavior.
Trade-Offs Between Pension Portability, Liquidity, and Retirement Income Security
It is sometimes claimed that pension policy faces a trade-off between pension
portability and job mobility on one hand and retirement income security on the other hand, and that LSDs subject to a penalty are the effect of a compromise among these goals. This claim, however, overlooks the fact that pension portabil-ity and job mobilportabil-ity can be provided without allowing workers to cash-in their LSDs before retirement. A simple rule that allowed complete port-ability of pension balances across jobs but required that pensions be rolled over would resolve this dilemma. Andrews (1991b) notes that Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands strictly regulate the extent to which em-ployees can receive preretirement distri-butions.
However, there is a clear trade-off be-tween encouraging saving for retirement and saving for other goals. When a worker has, say, $100,000 in a pension or IRA, but loses a job and is about to default on a mortgage, the correct policy might not be to require households to maintain pension balances until retirement. Thus, under-standing the impact of allowing consump-tion out of tax-preferred accounts for nonretirement purposes is another crucial task for future research.
Interactions with Other Policies
The 1997 Tax Act allows taxpayers to withdraw from any IRA, without penalty, up to $10,000 for a down payment on a home or an unlimited amount for educa-tional expenses. The Act also raised the amount of DB or DC balance that depart-ing employees could be compelled to take as an LSD from $3,500 to $5,000; this will confront more employees with decisions about lump sums. These provisions clearly intend to further other policy ob-jectives or ease hardship. However, each provision reduces the likelihood that
amounts in pension accounts and IRAs will survive intact until retirement.
Contributions to Roth IRAs are not de-ductible from taxable income, but earnings are exempt from tax. Conversions of IRAs to Roth IRAs and deposits of qualified LSDs into Roth IRAs are exempt from the ten-percent penalty for early withdrawals.5 The money, once in the Roth IRA, may be withdrawn for any purpose after five years without recapture of the ten percent pen-alty. Those who want to spend their LSD without paying a penalty can transfer it to a Roth IRA, pay income tax on the distri-bution, and wait for it to be subject to the more generous rules that apply. Thus, the presence of Roth IRAs might dilute the ef-fect on any effort to encourage rollovers.
CONCLUSIONS
The effects and issues raised above do not point consistently to a single, unam-biguously optimal policy for LSDs. Changing the tax penalty or the rate of withholding, having those rates vary with age, requiring some minimum proportion of the distribution to be rolled over, and providing financial education to potential recipients of distributions are examples of options that warrant further study.
It is clear, however, that these issues will need to be addressed. Low levels of mea-sured U.S. personal and national saving have raised concerns about the adequacy of households’ preparations for retire-ment. The shift toward DC plans provides workers with more discretion over partici-pation, contribution, investment, and withdrawal decisions regarding their pen-sions. The aging of the baby boom gen-eration will focus more attention on retire-ment issues. For all of these reasons, the treatment of early withdrawals from pen-sions promises to become an increasingly important issue.
5 Individuals who converted IRA balances to Roth IRAs in 1998 benefited further by being able to pay the tax in four annual installments.
Acknowledgments
We thank Michael Doran and Lowell Dworin for helpful comments. The opin-ions expressed are our own and should not be taken to represent the views of the Treasury Department, the Administration, or the staff, officers, or trustees of The Brookings Institution. William Gale grate-fully acknowledges financial support from the National Institute on Aging and the Department of Labor.
REFERENCES
Aaron, Henry J., and Robert D. Reischauer. Countdown to Reform: The Great Social
Secu-rity Debate. New York: The Century Foun-dation, 1998.
Andrews, Emily.
“Retirement Savings and Lump-Sum Distri-butions.” Benefits Quarterly No. 2 (Second Quarter, 1991a): 47–58.
Andrews, Emily.
“Pension Portability in Five Countries.” In Pen-sion Policy: An International Perspective, edited by John Turner and Lorna Dailey. Washing-ton D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, 1991b. Burman, Leonard E., Norma B. Coe, and William G. Gale.
“What Happens When You Show Them the Money: Lump Sum Distributions and Re-tirement Security.” Department of Treasury and The Brookings Institution. Mimeo, 1999. Chang, Angela.
“Tax Policy, Lump-Sum Pension Distribu-tions, and Household Saving.” The National Tax Journal 49 No. 2 (June, 1996): 235–52. Engelhardt, Gary V.
“Pre-Retirement Lump Sum Distributions and Retirement Income Security: Evidence from the Health and Retirement Survey.” Dartmouth College. Mimeo, 1999. Fernandez, Phyllis.
“Pre-Retirement Lump-Sum Distributions.” In Trends in Pensions 1992, edited by John Turner and Daniel Beller. Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, 1992.
Gale, William G.
“The Effects of Pensions on Household Wealth: A Reevaluation of Theory and Evi-dence.” Journal of Political Economy 106 No. 4 (August, 1998): 706–23.
Gustman, Alan, and Thomas Steinmeier. “Effects of Pensions on Saving: Analysis
with Data from the Health and Retirement Survey.” NBER Working Paper No. 6081. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Eco-nomic Research, August, 1998.
Hurd, Michael, Lee Lillard, and Constantijn Panis. “An Analysis of the Choice to Cash Out, Maintain, or Annuitize Pension Rights At Job Change or Retirement.” RAND Institute. Mimeo, August, 1998.
Korczyk, Sophie.
“Pre-Retirement Pension Distributions in a Lifetime Perspective.” The Public Policy Institute, Washington D.C.: American Association of Retired Persons, April, 1996.
Mitchell, Olivia S., James M. Poterba, and Mark Warshawsky.
“New Evidence on the Money’s Worth of In-dividual Annuities.” NBER Working Paper No. 6002. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April, 1997. Poterba, James, Steven Venti, and David Wise.
“Lump-Sum Distributions from Retirement Saving Plans: Receipt and Utilization.” In Inquiries in the Economics of Aging, edited by D.A. Wise, 85–105. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.
Poterba, James, Steven Venti, and David Wise. “Pre-Retirement Cash Outs and Fore-gone Retirement Saving: Implications for 401(K) Asset Accumulation.” Mimeo, June, 1999.
Sabelhaus, John, and David Weiner.
“Disposition of Lump-Sum Distributions: Evidence from Tax Returns.” Congressional Budget Office. Mimeo, April, 1999. Scott, Jason, and John Shoven.
“Lump-Sum Distributions: Fulfilling the Portability Promise or Eroding Retirement Security?” EBRI Issue Brief. Washington D.C.: Employee Benefit Research Institute, October, 1996.
U.S. Department of Labor.
“Retirement Benefits of American Workers: New Findings from the September 1994 Current Population Survey.” Washington D.C.: Pension and Welfare Benefits Admin-istration, 1995.
Woods, John R.
“Pension Benefits Among the Aged: Con-flicting Measures, Unequal Distributions,”
Social Security Bulletin 59 No. 3 (Fall, 1996): 3–30.
Yakoboski, Paul.
“Large Plan Lump-Sums: Rollovers and Cashouts.” EBRI Issue Brief. Washington D.C.: Employee Benefit Research Institute, August, 1997.
