Inquiry-Based Science Education: A Pedagogical Framework from
Philosophy of Science
Jonas Robert L. Miranda
Surigao State College of Technology, Surigao City, Philippines, 8400
Date Submitted: September 5, 2014 Originality: 92%
Date Revised: December 20, 2014 Plagiarism Detection: Passed
ABSTRACT
This article attempts to elucidate the claim that philosophy of science provides framework for science educators by presenting fundamental insights from philosophers of science relevant in making sure that science subjects in line with the newly implemented K-12 Program will be taught in the most effective ways possible. The K-12 Program of the Department of Education prescribed four pedagogical approaches namely constructivists, inquiry-based approach, reflective, collaborative and integrative that must be used in science classrooms as well as in any other subjects required by the new curriculum. However, teaching science gives premium on inquiry-based with an objective of bringing students awareness on what scientists do. Meanwhile, the nature of scientific inquiry is a significant foundation of the entire inquiry learning and teaching. With this in mind, this paper looks into the history of philosophy of science and brings out ideas of influential philosophers that discussed the nature of scientific inquiry and their informative categorical distinctions of what is scientific from the unscientific
namely; Carnap’s inductivist empiricism, Popperian hypothetical-deductive approach and Kuhnian research puzzles. These philosophical thoughts are concrete guideposts on how to start the entire inquiry learning inside science classrooms. Science teachers and students can ask similar questions used by philosophers of science to scrutinize the veracity of scientific theories in store for the students to learn in science classes.
Keywords: Inquiry Based Learning, Philosophy of Science, Empiricism, Deduction
INTRODUCTION
The K-12 Program of the Department of Education (2012) prescribed four pedagogical approaches namely constructivist, inquiry-based, reflective, collaborative and integrative that must be used in science classrooms as well as in any other subjects required by the new curriculum. However, teaching science gives premium on inquiry-based with an objective of bringing students awareness on what scientists do. But, it should be emphasized that science education is not up to this solely.
only on the content but more on the process or method. Furthermore, Dewey stressed the idea that familiarization of scientific method is more important than content, especially for those who would not become scientists.
Inquiry Based Learning
Foremost, inquiry is an activity with a definite end of knowing the truth more than what has been known popularly. But what is inquiry based learning? The National Science Education Standards note:
“Inquiry is a multifaceted activity that involves making observations; posing questions; examining books and other sources of information to see what is already known; planning investigations; reviewing what is already known in the light of experimental evidence; using tools to gather, analyze, and interpret data; proposing answers, explanations, and predictions; and communicating the results. Inquiry requires identification of assumptions, use of critical and logical thinking, and consideration of alternative explanations. (p. 23)
From the foregoing description of inquiry-based learning it follows that students should be active and engaged. Inquiry learning is not only up to familiarization of scientific theories rather students are encouraged to become active probers and verifiers of the veracity of scientific theories at hand. Inquiry based learning encourages students to doubt and ask questions hence never it will become an indoctrinating experience.
From the article Inquiry and the National Science Education Standards: A guide for teaching and learning the inquiry based learning takes inspiration from John Dewey’s (1910) notion of inquiry learning that
starts with student’s perplexing situation; how they formulate their own hypothesis and conduct experimentation to test the hypothesis; come up with a solution and finally act on the solution they discovered. Likewise, this notion is aligned to Herbart’s (1901) ideas about a teaching strategy that harnesses students’ experiences in their engagement to the world and interaction with others. Moreover, Piaget’s cognitive development supports this idea especially that students are limited to their cognitive capacity to learn.
Hence, inquiry based learning go beyond what have been termed science “process” skills, such as observation, inference, and experimentation. (Olson, S., & Loucks-Horsley, S., 18)Inquiry based learning then facilitates and encourages students to participate in evaluating existing scientific knowledge.
Inquiry abilities require students to mesh these processes with scientific knowledge as they use scientific reasoning and critical thinking to develop their understanding of science. The basis for moving away from the traditional process approach is to encourage students to participate in the evaluation of scientific knowledge.
Philosophical Categories of Scientific Inquiry
(Hodson D., 34) Philosophers of science offer several elucidations regarding the characteristic nature of scientific inquiry. The explanations can be categorized from Carnap’s inductivist empiricism to Popperian hypothetico-deductive approaches and Kuhnian research puzzles. These philosophical thoughts for testing whether an idea is scientific or unscientific are helpful to science teachers in inciting inquiry to the scientific theories in store for students to learn. Science classrooms will have concrete guideposts on how to start the entire inquiry learning by using the same approaches of testing used by the philosophers of science. The philosophy of science is so rich and ideas are too diverse to capture in a short yet concise discussion but these philosophies of science are chosen purposively to create a cohesive narrative conveying the significant message of the constantly evolving and revolutionizing nature of science.
Inductivist Empiricism
This perspective is characterized by its stress of empirical verification of scientific propositions. Every scientific idea will undergo empirical verification before it can be adopted as true. The essence of this approach is caught in the philosophy of science promoted by Rudolf Carnap.
Every assertion P in the wide field of science has this character, that it either asserts something about present perceptions or other experiences, and therefore is verifiable by them, or that propositions about future perceptions are deducible from P together with some other already verified propositions (Carnap, 1935).
The proposition, for example, that there is a levitational field could not satisfy as a scientific claim because it has no observable effect or there is no deducible perceptive proposition. Levitation could be an idea with a mental image but if it could not be verified in reality; it is categorically unscientific. In fact, there are many theories in physics without an actual image. For example, the electro-magnetic and the gravitational fields though it could not be seen directly using our naked eyes but there are perceptive propositions that can be deduced from these ideas. ‘All metallic objects are attracted to magnetism’ and ‘All objects thrown in the air will eventually fall down’ are propositions deduced from electro-magnetic and the gravitational fields. By no means, Carnap’s objection to the proposition just mentioned about a levitational field is that we are not told how to verify it. The primary significance of inductivist empiricism’s philosophy towards science education classrooms is the attitude of making every possible scientific theory subject to empirical testing. Hence, theories are not only meant to be familiarized and memorized but it should be tested through experimentations so that learners can see the empirical verification of the claim made by the scientist-proponent.
Popperian hypothetico-deductive approach
Popper is distinctively different as he emphasizes the value of theoretical falsifiability over verification. He believes that theories in order to qualify as scientific need not only be verifiable but falsifiable as well. There is no sense if theories could be verified in all instances and it does not provide room for falsifiability. Let us start on the considerations done by Sir Karl Popper regarding theories of Marxism, Freudian Psychoanalysis and Adlerian psychology.
I (Karl Popper) found that those of my friends who were admirers of Marx, Freud, and Adler, were impressed by a number of points common to these theories, and especially by their apparent
explanatory power. These theories appear to be able to explain practically everything that happened within the fields to which they referred. The study of any of them seemed to have the effect of an intellectual conversion or revelation, open your eyes to a new truth hidden from those not yet initiated. Once your eyes were thus opened you saw confirmed instances everywhere: the world was full of verifications of the theory. Whatever happened always confirmed it. Thus its truth appeared manifest; and unbelievers were clearly people who did not want to see the manifest truth; who refuse to see it, either because it was against their class interest, or because of their repressions which were still "un-analyzed" and crying aloud for treatment.(Popper, 1963)
The common factor among the three theories is the incessant stream of confirmations which verify the theories in
question. The fact that theories provide evidence of verification does not give it more credence rather the fact that it is always confirmed in the eyes of their admirers is a manifestation of weakness. In contrast to the theories of Marx, Freud and Adler, Popper gives Einstein’s theory more weight.
With Einstein's theory the situation was strikingly different. Take one typical instance — Einstein's prediction, just then confirmed by the finding of Eddington's expedition. Einstein's gravitational theory had led to the result that light must be attracted by heavy bodies (such as the sun), precisely as material bodies were attracted. As a consequence it could be calculated that light from a distant fixed star whose apparent position was close to the sun would reach the earth from such a direction that the star would seem to be slightly shifted away from the sun; or, in other words, that stars close to the sun would look as if they had moved a little away from the sun, and from one another. This is a thing which cannot normally be observed since such stars are rendered invisible in daytime by the sun's overwhelming brightness; but during an eclipse it is possible to take photographs of them. If the same constellation is photographed at night one can measure the distance on the two photographs, and check the predicted effect. (Popper, 1963)
without the support of empirical verification and Einstein willingness to embrace the possibility that his theory, theory of relativity in this case, would be rejected. “Thus in 1919 Popper concluded that the critical attitude, which does not look for verifications but rather looks for crucial tests that can refute the tested theory, is the correct attitude for science, even though the crucial tests can never establish the theory. This is Popper's falsificationist philosophy of scientific criticism, the central thesis of his philosophy of science.”(Hickey, 2005).
The idea of Karl Popper has a major significant bearing in the modern day science classrooms by informing students that every scientific theory is vulnerable for falsification. Hence, no theory is absolute. Scientific theories are there and recognized because so far nobody has ever falsified its claim but it does not mean that it stays forever. Scientific theories like anything else are subject to changes. This is actually what makes science very dynamic and that is why it never runs out of surprises even to students who are willing to join in the entire inquiring of possible loopholes of existing scientific theories.
Kuhnian Research Puzzles
Thomas Kuhn idea of scientific inquiry is best elucidated in his arguments regarding how unscientific Astrology is. In the article of Deborah Mayo, “astrology was unscientific according [to Kuhn], not because it failed to be falsifiable nor even because of how practitioners of astrology explained failed predictions. (Mayo, 2012)There are many ways to explain failure. Failure could not be used constructively for improvement.
The occurrence of failures could be explained, but particular failures did not give rise to research puzzles, for no man, however
skilled, could make use of them in a constructive attempt to revise the astrological tradition. There were too many sources of difficulty, most of them beyond the astrologer's knowledge, control, or responsibility. Individual failures were correspondingly uninformative (Kuhn, 1970).
It can be gleaned from the above passages the significance of failures as learning experiences that could provide venues to correct mistakes. If there is nothing to learn from failures the entire system is problematic as it does not open for suggestions and improvements, which is a quality present among unscientific fields of study.
Compare the situations of the astronomer and the astrologer. If an astronomer's prediction failed and his calculations checked, he could hope to set the situation right. Perhaps the data were are fault... Or perhaps theory needed adjustment... The astrologer, by contrast, had no such puzzles (Kuhn, 1970).
science classroom it promises opportunity for inquiry. Existing scientific theories are consistently inviting any interested individual to take on the challenge of presenting alternative proofs or the theory will hang on strong.
Implications to the Pedagogy in Science Classrooms
The foregoing discussions present the real ‘nature of science.’ Science is not and will never be static instead it is constantly evolving due to the introduction of revolutionary ideas from individual scientists. This essential nature of science should be explicitly stated as part of the learning objectives that should be imparted among students by science teachers rather than by making it part of the hidden curriculum. This suggestion implies that science teachers are bound to teach the history of the development of the scientific theories by emphasizing the contexts of the scientist-proponents, the prevailing ideas that the new theory had to disprove in order to emphasize the revolutionary character of science and the significant details of the debate so that students will be exposed to the in-depth arguments of the scientific community. Hence, history in this manner should not be limited to dates and chronological events instead it should be value-laden and the primary value is to make students realize that science is a lively field and it calls everybody’s participation as it undergoes constant revolution and evolution.
Moreover, philosophy of science as a pedagogical framework calls every science
teacher to become competent not only in the content but in formulating historical narratives to materialize the recommendation of this paper. It sounds tedious to the already burdened science teachers but it is possible if the training starts from their bachelor’s degree level and even during their in-service trainings. Science teachers could convene with the guidance of an expert from the field of history, for example, and come up with modules containing historical narratives of several significant scientific ideas. And these modules will become better supplementary instructional materials in different science classrooms. In many ways, this new brand of science pedagogy collaborates with social sciences or even humanities so that it will become interesting not only to a limited number of students especially among the "not would be scientists" group.
CONCLUSION
scientific theories. Without the element of inquiry science classroom discussions become final with little opportunity for the students to question and at most science classes like these are only up to informing students about the nature of theory. This is the main reason why science education pedagogues would want to ensure that the processes of inquiring should be present in science classrooms.
All throughout the history of science, philosophers are always great models in the art of inquiring. Philosophy of science provides detailed discussions on what questions are available to distinguish scientific from unscientific ones. These questions can be utilized by science teachers to inquire current scientific theories and start the inquiry in the entire science learning. Hence, inquiry-based science education pedagogy can only be meaningful under the framework of the Philosophy of Science.
The main contribution of philosophers of science is their rationalizations as they follow through the many revolutions and evolutions of ideas happening in the scientific field. Science teachers and students have many things to learn from their works especially in appreciating the lively nature of science. This can only be appreciated by looking at the history of the development of ideas and theories similar to the method employed by the philosophers of science. Science teachers are then called to include
and up to the wide-acceptance of the scientific community for emphasis that science as a field is not static and beyond question.
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1Derek Hodson (1985) has something to say to an ultimate science curriculum. According to him, “a science education
programme is incomplete if it neglects any of the following: a concern for scientific knowledge (certain facts, principles and theories are worth knowing), a concern for the processes and methods of science (reasoning and investigating), direct experience of science activity, appreciation of the complex relationship between science and society and the fostering of positive attitude towards science. (Hodson, D., 26)
1“Science education in school has to cater for two broad groups of pupils: those who will study science at an advanced
level and those who will not. Thus, the science curriculum must be a sound and adequate preparation for later study and must ensure scientific literacy for those other (the majority) who will opt for alternative pursuits.” (Hodson, D., 28) 1“In his
