1=2: When a Singular Experience Leads to Dissociated Evaluations

1=2: When a Singular Experience Leads

to Dissociated Evaluations

HONEA, MORALES, FITZSIMONS DISSOCIATED EVALUATIONS

Heather Honea

Andrea C. Morales

Gavan J. Fitzsimons

Duke University

This research examines how a single experience with a salesperson can lead to the formation of dual representations of the salesperson resulting in opposing spontaneous and deliberative fective responses and dissociated evaluations. Consumers may either use their spontaneous af-fective reactions to form an evaluation or may respond more deliberately using information that contradicts this initial affect. As a result, they can hold 2 evaluations of the same salesperson— one that is more spontaneously generated and one that is more deliberate. The 2 cognitive bases for these evaluations can coexist in memory even when they are opposite in valence, and con-sumers switch back and forth between the 2 evaluations, depending on the level of cognitive ac-tivity in which they engage.

George Orwell’s (1977) novel 1984 linked the concept of doublethink—the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them— to life in a mind-controlling totalitarian society. Such dire cir-cumstances, however, are not required for an individual to hold at least two alternate versions of something in his or her mind. Consumers might feel negatively toward a company that collects data about their spending habits because their privacy has been invaded. At the same time, they might ap-preciate the company’s knowledge of their tastes and service they receive. Likewise, diners might have positive reactions to a delicious dessert when they focus on taste but negative reactions to the same dessert when they consider their health.

Previously, researchers assumed that such conflicts pit heart against mind (Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). However, consumer preferences are not simply a function of whether emotion wins over cognition. Even when consumers rely on affect to perform evaluations (e.g., Pham, 1998), contradic-tions arise because lower-order (spontaneous) versus higher-order (controlled or specific) affective responses can

result in very different judgments (Giner-Sorolla, 1999; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 2002). When spontaneous versus deliberative processes generate conflicting reactions to the same object, consumers may end up with contradictory mental representa-tions of that object (Brendl, Markman, & Messner, 2003). And if level of processing impacts which representation is in-terpreted, it may also determine whether consumers sponta-neously use affect as a basis for judgment independent of subsequent affective information that calls the implications of this initial affect into question. Thus, consumers may not only make decisions on the basis of information they have previously discredited, but may also switch back and forth between contradictory positions. This means that impulsive purchase decisions could have entirely different outcomes than those made with deliberation, even when consumers have recently analyzed their preferences. Moreover, prod-ucts, salespeople, or companies that generate two contrasting representations may create “schizophrenic” consumers whose evaluations are inconsistent from 1 min to the next.

Although consumer research has documented divergent evaluations of a single object (Brunel, Tietje, & Greenwald, 2004), the possibility that a consumer can have contradictory evaluations and accept both of them has not been directly ad-dressed in the marketing literature.

Correspondence should be addressed to Heather Honea, College of Business Administration, San Diego State University, San Diego, CA 92182. E-mail: [email protected]

A number of studies have verified that spontaneous and deliberative attitudes can be quite contradictory (e.g., Green-wald & Banaji, 1995). Some research has even bolstered the concept of dual attitudes, theorizing that spontaneous and de-liberate evaluations of the same object can coexist in memory (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). Work on the psychol-ogy of attitudes, however, has not considered the relation of mental representations and their associated affective reac-tions with regard to disassociation.

If representations of an object are formed at lower versus higher levels of processing and consequently are applied in-dependently at the time of judgment (Wyer & Srull, 1989), this could lead to dissociated evaluations. Previous research has indicated that two independent representations of an ob-ject can be formed and sampled independently for use in sub-sequent judgments (Carlston, 1980). Kardes (1986), for in-stance, found that consumers retrieve initial stimulus-based versus attribute-based representations of a product independ-ently. This indicates that individuals’ earlier reactions to a product may or may not influence their subsequent evalua-tions. However, neither of these studies addressed how level of processing determines which representation influences judgment. Nor did they connect affective reactions associ-ated with these representations to evaluations or consider the circumstances under which earlier affect may influence sub-sequent evaluations.

This research explores the potential for a single object to generate dual representations that result in conflicting affec-tive reactions and considers the circumstances under which initial affective reactions continue to impact evaluation. In conceptualizing the influence that different representations can have on judgments, we made the following assumptions. First, an encounter with an object may result in the formation of a mental representation. If this object generates a socially ingrained, spontaneous affective reaction, this affect will be-come associated with the representation. Later, the individual may need to use this information in a manner he or she did not anticipate, such as making a judgment regarding the ob-ject. If at that time his or her level of processing is con-strained, he or she will simply rely on that representation and its associated affect to make a judgment. When processing is not constrained, however, the individual may have the oppor-tunity to retrieve that representation and construe its implica-tions in the context of additional situational information. This deliberate, cognitive activity may result in the formation of a second representation in which the evaluative implica-tions differ from those of the first. These two representaimplica-tions, although formed at different times, may coexist in memory.

Second, the level of processing will determine which repre-sentation influences judgment. If an individual has to make a quick judgment, the first representation is likely to be retrieved and the affect it elicits may provide the basis for the judgment. Although the second representation might also be retrieved, its implications for judgment take time to compute. If an individ-ual has sufficient time to perform these computations, the

ef-fects of these implications could override the efef-fects of the af-fective reaction elicited by the first representation alone and be used as a basis for judgment. If processing time is limited, however, the affective reactions elicited by the first representa-tion may dominate. In other words, the second representarepresenta-tion and its associated affective reactions are only applied to judg-ment when the opportunity to think about the judgjudg-ment is fairly unrestricted. If restrictions exist, individuals are likely to apply the first representation to subsequent judgments, even if the second representation is accessible.

To evaluate these possibilities in a consumer context, we considered the different interpretations that consumers might give to a salesperson’s behavior (e.g., whether the salesper-son’s attention to them is manipulative or sincere) and the dif-ferent evaluations that result from this interpretation. We iden-tify an event that is likely to elicit a spontaneous positive reaction based on its social value; namely, a salesperson exert-ing extra effort in servexert-ing a customer. This reaction, in turn, be-comes associated with a global feature of the salesperson. If in-dividuals are later asked to make a quick judgment about the salesperson, they may base their evaluation on this representa-tion and its associated affect. However, suppose customers have time to consider the motives that underlie the salesper-son’s behavior and have the objective of forming an impres-sion. Then they might perceive the exertion of effort to be ma-nipulative, and might form a second representation that contains the implications of this perception. This latter repre-sentation may elicit mistrust. We show that even though this second representation has negative reactions that drive judg-ment when processing is unconstrained, the representation that is formed on the basis of an individual’s initial spontane-ous reaction continues to drive judgment when time con-straints exist. Thus, if dual impressions of an object are formed, not only do the situational conditions surrounding an evaluation determine which impression informs judgment, but individuals may actually switch back and forth between conflicting judgments, depending on the situation at hand.

SPONTANEOUS AND DELIBERATIVE PROCESSES

Evaluation

Spontaneous evaluations classify stimuli as good or bad without requiring extensive thinking (Chen & Bargh, 1999). Under some circumstances, however, this initial evaluation can be overridden by more deliberative thought processes. Such deliberative processes require time and ability, and they can serve to correct spontaneous judgments by incorporating the implications of additional situational information (Gilbert, 2002). Johar and Simmons (2000), for example, found that even if consumers pay attention to a product dis-closure, the disclosure will only influence their opinion if they have sufficient time to think about it. Similarly,

Camp-bell and Kirmani (2000) found that when consumers have limited time and mental resources available to process infor-mation, they perceive a sales agent’s flattery as sincere. When they are able to deliberate on the motives underlying the behavior, however, they perceive it as insincere and up-date their judgments accordingly.

In certain situations, however, deliberative inferences may not actually correct initial evaluations. For instance, studies have examined race- or gender-based stereotypes that were supposedly replaced by more positive or egalitarian views. However, these views continued to hold power when people were not consciously monitoring their responses (Banaji & Greenwald, 1995; Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993; Devine, 1989; Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 2002). This suggests that circumstance determines whether implicit (spontaneous) or explicit (deliberative) evaluations are applied to an object (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991).

Dissociated Evaluations

Studies of both implicit and explicit evaluation measures often find inconsistent correlations between the two (e.g., Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997). This discrepancy is labeled dissociation, because when spontaneous and deliberative measures are uncorrelated, they tend to predict qualitatively different behaviors and preferences (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). For example, Caucasians show a spontaneous preference for advertise-ments that feature a Caucasian over an African American spokesperson, although their deliberative attitudes toward each spokesperson are equivalent. African Americans, in contrast, display a more positive deliberative attitude for advertisements featuring a African American over Cauca-sian spokesperson although their spontaneous preferences for each spokesperson are similar (Brunel et al., 2004). The lack of correlation between these preferences suggests that dissociated attitudes toward a single object coexist (Wilson et al., 2000).

Dissociation also appears to be a possibility in the forma-tion of attitudes toward newly encountered individuals. Wil-son, Lindsey, and Anderson (1998 as cited in WilWil-son, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000) examined whether individuals can erase an initial attitude that was generated in an experi-mental setting once they determine that their attitude is inac-curate. Although individuals who are not under time pressure reported corrected attitudes, individuals under time pressure did not. In addition, the latter individuals’ responses to a set of implicit measures suggested that they were still relying on their “noncorrected” attitude.

Affect and Dual Representations

Dissociated evaluations require some form of duality dur-ing encoddur-ing or interpretation of information, or both. This

indicates that dissociated evaluations may be driven by the presence of dual representations. Dual representation is im-plied by the Wyer and Srull (1986, 1989) bin model. The model suggests that information can be interpreted at dif-ferent levels of abstractness and that processing will deter-mine the nature of the representation that is formed. Lower-level or more general encoding will occur relatively spontaneously at the initial comprehension stage of pro-cessing and a representation of this information may be formed on the basis of this encoding. A second, higher-level encoding may take place at a later stage of pro-cessing, depending on the objectives that exist at the time, and an additional representation might be formed on the ba-sis of this encoding. Thus a representation formed at one level of processing may be available independently of the representations formed at other levels (Wyer & Srull, 1986). As a result, spontaneous or preconditioned affective reactions may be associated with a representation that is separate from the representation that results from delibera-tive processing of the available information.

All things being equal, the most recently formed represen-tation should be most accessible (Wyer & Srull, 1986). Nev-ertheless, level of processing can also determine which repre-sentation and its associated affect informs judgment. Devine’s (1989) two-stage model of evaluation suggested that individuals’ initial responses to certain objects are a function of their social experience. Thus, a representation of an object that is consistent with a stereotype or based on a common social interpretation (or both) can be processed im-mediately with minimal cognitive effort, thereby motivating spontaneous evaluations. Because such processing involves minimal cognitive activity, the affective reactions that result are likely to be relatively generalized positive or negative re-sponses (Cohen & Areni, 1991; Leventhal, 1980). At a later point, in the second stage of evaluation, individuals can ei-ther rely on their initial response or, if they are motivated, fo-cus on a more detailed representation that resulted from de-liberation. An evaluation of the implications of this latter representation will generally take time and resources. How-ever, these more controlled cognitive processes will result in more discriminated affective reactions or specific emotions (Frijda & Zeelenberg, 2001).

This suggests that when thinking is constrained, individu-als are likely to rely on a representation in which the implica-tions can be processed quickly (e.g., a representation that spontaneously elicits affective reactions), and the implica-tions of this representation will inform judgments (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Wilson et al., 2000). When individuals have an opportunity to deliberate, however, they are likely to assess the implications of a representation that differs from those of the first, and the affective responses that result from this more deliberative assessment may inform their judgments. As a re-sult, when a “deliberate” representation has implications that differ from those of its “spontaneous” counterpart, different levels of processing can result in different judgments.

In summary, we propose that certain objects often gener-ate dual representations, each of which may have different implications for judgments. On one hand, a spontaneous af-fective response can become associated with a characteristic of an object through learning, and this reaction can also be-come associated with the representation that is formed. In ad-dition, more deliberate responses to the same characteristic might generate a different representation with implications that contradict those of the spontaneous reaction. Further-more, the implications of this second representation for judg-ment require time to evaluate. Thus, the use of a representa-tion and its associated affective reacrepresenta-tions that inform judgment depend on the level of processing at the time of judgment. As a result, as level of processing changes, indi-viduals may switch between judgments.

Alternative Conceptualizations

Although a dual-representation conceptualization is consis-tent with previous work in impressions and judgment (e.g., Adaval & Wyer, 2003; Kardes, 1986), alternative possibili-ties should be considered. Theoretically, dissociated evalua-tions could result in the absence of any mental representa-tions of an object. For example, every piece of encoded information about the object might have its own memory trace (Hintzman, 1986). Then, if certain encoded pieces of information have different implications, judgments might be determined by whatever comes to mind most easily. Dissoci-ation could also result if informDissoci-ation is organized into a sin-gle mental representation. Theory and research in person memory (Srull & Wyer, 1989), for example, assumes that the representation of a person consists of a central evaluative concept to which a number of specific behaviors are periph-erally linked. Some of these behaviors, however, may have implications that are evaluatively inconsistent with the con-cept with which they are associated, and may often be easier to recall than the consistent ones (Srull & Wyer, 1989). When processing time is limited, individuals might use the central concept of this representation as a basis for judgment. When they have more time, however, they might consider features of the associated behaviors and thus make judgments that dif-fer from those they might make on the basis of the central concept alone.

Although these alternatives might account for the phe-nomena to be investigated, the dual-representation concep-tion seems viable on a priori grounds. The dual-representa-tion conceptualizadual-representa-tion can be tied specifically to degree of processing—in which the implications of a spontaneously formed representation can be interpreted and applied imme-diately, whereas the implications of a deliberatively formed representation require processing and are only understood when there is sufficient time. This parallels the fact that level of processing impacts the type of information used in con-sumer judgments (e.g., Campbell & Kirmani, 2000; Johar & Simmons, 2000). For the purposes of this research we

ex-plore the implications of a dual-representation conceptual-ization without specifically precluding the possibility of the no-representation or single-representation alternatives. These alternative conceptualizations will be evaluated fur-ther after the results are reported.

Dissociation in Salesperson Judgment

Salesperson effort represents a referent characteristic that can elicit a highly positive generalized spontaneous reaction. People who grow up in a community that emphasizes the value of hard work are likely to have a spontaneous positive reaction to effort. Exerting effort is viewed as a valuable trait, and it is generally rewarded regardless of how that effort pays off (Cameron, 1989; Haas & Deseran, 1981; Struthers, Weiner, & Allred, 1998; Weiner, 1980; Weiner, Heckhausen, & Meyer, 1972). Consequently, consumers may typically have more positive evaluations of salespeople who put forth more effort to market their products, regardless of the actual quality of the products. However, this impression can be al-tered depending on how consumers feel about the motives or intentions surrounding the effort (Morales, 2005). That is, if people take time to think about the salesperson’s intentions and conclude that they are probably self-serving, their im-pressions are likely to be negative.

To examine the implications of dual representations for reactions to the effort exerted by a salesperson, we ran two experiments. Experiment 1 establishes that when individuals experience a single incident that has multiple implications, they can experience contradictory responses to that incident based on level of processing. Experiment 2 demonstrates that these contradictory responses are not necessarily integrated into an overall judgment because they are actually driven by different representations. More important, the impact of ini-tial affect does not necessarily abate. In Experiment 2, we in-troduced constraints on the time to make a judgment to influ-ence which representation would drive consumers’ responses and influence judgments. Regardless of the order in which judgments were measured, there was a difference between individuals’ judgments when they were under time con-straints than when they were not.

EXPERIMENT 1

Experiment 1 was designed to demonstrate that consumers can experience both spontaneous and deliberate responses to a salesperson based on the salesperson’s effort, and that these responses inform subsequent judgments of the salesperson. This study established that salesperson effort can elicit con-tradictory spontaneous and deliberate responses. That is, it can either elicit a generalized positive reaction or the more specific negative reaction of mistrust.

To evaluate this possibility before receiving information about the salesperson’s effort, some participants were

ex-posed to information that activated the concept that business activities can be somewhat underhanded. Other participants were not exposed to this material. We expected that all partic-ipants would experience a spontaneous, positive response to the salesperson’s effort. Therefore, we predicted that when participants were under time pressure, this initial, positive re-action to effort should inform their evaluation, and so their evaluations would be quite favorable regardless of whether suspicion was primed. However, we expected that when par-ticipants were not under time pressure, priming suspicion would lead them to attribute the salesperson’s effort to self-serving motives, leading to lower evaluations of the salesperson than would otherwise be the case.

Method

Participants. A total of 77 undergraduate students

par-ticipated in the study as partial fulfillment of a course re-quirement. Experiment 1 was a 2 (Effort: High vs. Low) × 2 (Processing Conditions: Constrained vs. Unconstrained) be-tween-subjects design, and it was run in a behavioral lab us-ing a Visual Basic computer program.

Stimuli and procedure. At the beginning of the

ses-sion, participants were informed that they would be partici-pating in two separate computer-based research activities and would be completing a series of ostensibly unrelated tasks. Furthermore, they were informed that to simulate reality, some aspects of these tasks might have time restrictions. (In fact, these restrictions were only imposed under constrained processing conditions.) With this preamble, participants were told they would be using a computer to read several business industry articles and would be asked to answer questions about each article. They then read two filler articles and one target article. The target article was designed to prime suspicion by discussing ethical issues in pricing. Spe-cifically, it indicated that some businesses engage in ques-tionable behaviors and practices when it comes to pricing. Consistent with the guise for the first part of the study, partic-ipants were asked at the end of each article to respond to questions regarding the industry that was discussed in the ar-ticle. The questions were general inquiries regarding the con-tent of the article unrelated to the suspicion prime.

After completing the first set of questions, participants were introduced to the second activity. Participants were asked to imagine that they were going shopping for a Mother’s Day present for their mom. They were told that they had decided to buy her a pair of earrings from a local jewelry store. On arriving at the store, they see a pair that they think their mom might like. They ask to look at the earrings and de-scribe their mother’s general style to the salesperson. In the high-effort condition, the salesperson was described as hav-ing spent 50 min with them discusshav-ing the artist who created the earrings, the meaning behind them, and how they would look on their mom. In the low-effort condition, the

salesper-son was said to have spent only 5 min describing the same things. All participants were then told to assume that they had been in the store for 1 hr in total and had to make a decision.

Measures. To assess consumer judgment, participants

after reading the scenario were asked whether they would recommend the salesperson to a friend. Furthermore, one half of the participants were told they had only 5 sec to re-spond to the question. To emphasize the time limit, the screen blinked as each second passed and showed the remaining seconds in bright red numerals in the center of the screen. This time-constrained measure has been used in previous re-search to impact level of processing (e.g., Wilson, Hodges, & LaFleur, 1995) and captures the impact of participants’ spon-taneous reactions on judgment (Wilson et al., 2000). Partici-pants in the unconstrained processing condition had 1 full min to respond to the same question and this measure served as the deliberative judgment measure.

In addition to providing their judgments of the salesper-son, participants were also asked to report the specific affec-tive responses they experienced when thinking about the salesperson in the store. A series of positive and negative af-fect terms were compiled from afaf-fect-related articles and em-bedded in this list were two items intended to measure feel-ings of mistrust—specifically distrust and suspicion. All items were measured on a sliding bar scale, with the cursor positioned at the midpoint. The endpoints “not at all” and “to a great degree” were subsequently translated to a 1 to 100 scale.

Results

The percentage of participants who recommended the sales-person under each experimental condition is shown in the top half of Table 1. Results of a 2 (Effort: High vs. Low) × 2 (Pro-cessing Conditions: Constrained vs. Unconstrained) logistic regression show that when participants were under time pres-sure, they were more likely to recommend the salesperson to a friend when the salesperson exerted a great deal of effort (89.5%) than when the salesperson had not (65.0%),χ2_{(1, N}

TABLE 1

Recommendation of Salesperson and Feelings of Mistrust as a Function of Level of Processing:

Experiment 1

Salesperson Effort Measure and Processing Condition High Effort Low Effort Percentage recommending salesperson

Constrained processing condition 89.5a _65.0b Unconstrained processing condition 20.0b _61.1c Feelings of mistrust

Constrained processing 50.5 49.9

Unconstrained processing 73.3 52.7

= 77) = 6.2, p = .01. In the absence of time constraints, how-ever, they were substantially less likely to recommend the salesperson in the former condition than the second (20% vs. 61.1%),χ2_{(1, N = 77) = 3.0, p = .08. The interaction implied} by these data was significant,χ2_{(1, N = 77) = 8.52, p = .004.}

To explore the role of specific affective responses, a com-bined measure of mistrust was created by averaging the dis-trust and suspicion responses from the affect item list (r = .81). As shown in the bottom half of Table 1, participants re-ported greater mistrust when the time to respond was not constrained (M = 63.0) than when it was constrained (M = 50.2), F(1, 73) = 8.71, p = .004, and greater mistrust when the salesperson exerted effort (M = 61.9) than when the salesper-son did not (M = 51.30), F(1, 73) = 5.95, p = .02. As ex-pected, however, the effect of effort was only evident when judgment time was unconstrained (73.3 vs. 52.7, respec-tively); when participants were under time pressure, the ef-fect of the salesperson’s effort on judgments was negligible (50.5 vs. 49.9). The interaction of Time Pressure × Salesper-son Effort was significant, F(1, 73) = 5.33, p = .02.

The final goal of this study was to establish that there is a relation between the specific affective responses generated and the deliberate evaluation formed of the salesperson. That is, feelings of mistrust were expected to mediate the effect of effort on salesperson judgments in the unconstrained pro-cessing conditions. Because there was no difference between the high- and low-effort mistrust responses in the constrained processing condition, a mediation analysis was only per-formed on the two cells in the unconstrained processing con-dition. When mistrust was used as a covariate in an analysis of salesperson evaluations in these conditions, the effect of this covariate was significant,χ2_{(1, n = 38) = 4.10, p = .04,} and accounted for .21 of the variance. However, the previ-ously significant effect of effort on salesperson judgments disappeared (p > .10), and the proportion of variance ac-counted for by the effort variable was reduced from .17 to .05. Thus, feelings of mistrust mediate the effect of effort on salesperson judgments.

Discussion

This study confirms that individuals indeed have different re-sponses to effort depending on level of processing. When processing was constrained, individuals respond positively to high levels of effort. However, when they are primed with suspicion and deliberate on high levels of effort they appear motivated to generate more discrete negative emotions re-lated to mistrust. The mediation analysis indicates that feel-ings of mistrust inform deliberative judgments. Thus, we can confirm that when processing is unconstrained, individuals rely on more specific negative affective reactions to make their judgments, whereas when processing is constrained, in-dividuals appear to rely on their initial generalized positive reactions. The study demonstrates that people report differ-ent judgmdiffer-ents of salesperson effort depending on processing

conditions and as a result a different representation may be formed at lower levels of processing than at higher levels. However, the between-subjects design does not indicate the implications when dual representations are actually avail-able. Experiment 2 investigates these matters.

EXPERIMENT 2

Experiment 1 established that a salesperson exerting effort can elicit a spontaneous positive affective reaction, but when individuals are able to deliberate on that effort, they are likely to generate more specific affective responses. The spontane-ous reactions that have become associated with the salesper-son may be elicited merely by mentioning his or her name, independent of other information about him or her. If this happens, and if individuals have to make a quick judgment, they should base their judgment on their reactions to the salesperson’s name alone. If individuals have time to deliber-ate, however, they will be able to perform the computations required to assess the implications of the representation that carries information related to salesperson motives, and they will base their evaluation on this representation instead.

If deliberation results in positive feelings such as appreci-ation, the representation that is formed should have similar implications for judgments of the salesperson, even if it is in-dependent of the representation that is formed on the basis of spontaneous reactions to his or her behavior. If deliberation results in specific negative feelings, however, evaluations will be higher when they are based on the representation that elicits spontaneous positive affect than when they are based on the representation that was formed through deliberate cognitive processing.

To produce a difference between a judgment based on spontaneous responses to effort and a judgment based on a representation that requires more time to evaluate, we asked some participants to perform an ostensibly unrelated task that primed concepts associated with suspicion after receiv-ing the effort information. Other participants were primed with neutral concepts unrelated to suspicion. Information that the salesperson has expended high effort should result in the spontaneous activation of a positive response regardless of which prime is applied. Furthermore, in the absence of priming concepts associated with suspicion, deliberation on the implications of this information is likely to generate spe-cific, positive responses that are consistent with the general-ized, spontaneous response. As a result, judgments are likely to be similar regardless of whether spontaneous or specific responses dominate. When participants are primed with sus-picion, however, the opportunity to deliberate may lead them to interpret the salesperson’s behavior unfavorably, leading to a representation that has negative implications. Conse-quently, judgments based on this representation should be more negative than corresponding judgments by participants who received the neutral prime.

We used a timed response task to measure spontaneous judgments and an untimed rating task to measure deliberate judgments. Furthermore, we varied the order in which these judgments were made. We assumed that if separate represen-tations toward the same object differentially inform judg-ments, judgments made under different processing conditions should differ regardless of which evaluation is measured first.

Method

Participants. A total of 154 undergraduate students

par-ticipated in the study to fulfill a course requirement. Experi-ment 2 was a 2 (Effort: Low vs. High) × 2 (Prime: Neutral vs. Suspicion) × 2 (Measure Order: Spontaneous Judgment First vs. Deliberative Judgment First) mixed design, and was run in a behavioral lab using a Visual Basic computer program.

Stimuli and procedure. At the beginning of the

ses-sion, participants were informed that they would be partici-pating in a set of studies investigating visual and verbal com-prehension in computer-mediated environments, and as a consequence, they would be completing a series of seem-ingly unrelated tasks.1_{In the first part of the computer} pro-gram, participants were trained on a timed good–bad re-sponse task used to measure spontaneous judgments. They were told that they would be required to participate in this same task several times during the session and that this first section was designed to allow them to practice the basic re-sponse. Single words were presented on the computer screen and participants were asked to indicate whether they thought the word was good or bad. They were asked to be as accurate and as fast as possible by pressing the appropriate key. Partic-ipants were then told to place their left index finger on the “1” key and their right index finger on the “0” key. They were in-structed to press 1 if the word they saw was a good or positive word and 0 if it was a bad or negative word to them.

After completing the training session, participants were asked to imagine the same Mother’s Day scenario used in Ex-periment 1. The only difference was that in this scenario, the specific name Morgan was used to refer to the salesperson so that we could use this name in the good–bad spontaneous judgment measure in a manner to be described.2

Once participants had finished reading the scenario, they were given the priming task. We expected that a spontaneous reaction toward the salesperson would be generated simply on reading the scenario and would be associated with the global features of the salesperson (i.e., the salesperson’s

name). However, motivation is required to make the attribu-tions that elicit specific affective responses. As a result, we assumed that participants would not form this second repsentation until they were asked to make a judgment. In re-sponse to this request, we predicted that participants would retrieve the initial episode and, during their deliberation, would apply any concepts that appeared to be relevant at the time. This cognitive activity would lead them to form a sepa-rate representation. However, this representation should in-fluence their later judgments only if they have time to assess its implications.3_{If participants’ level of processing is once} again constrained, they should rely on their “first” represen-tation and its associated spontaneous affective reactions when making a judgment.

The supraliminal prime was accomplished using a scram-bled-sentence completion task (Srull & Wyer, 1979). In line with the cover story that the set of studies investigated visual and verbal comprehension in computer-mediated environ-ments, participants were told that this particular study would be used to examine their linguistic and cognitive abilities. The instructions told them that they would see five lists each containing a total of six words on the screens that followed, and that at least one sentence could be formed using five of the words. They were asked to rearrange five of the words into a sentence, ignoring the sixth word, and to write the sen-tence underneath the list of words in the box provided. Partic-ipants in the suspicion-prime condition saw lists containing these target words: suspicious, shady, dubious, distrust, and wary. Participants in the neutral-prime condition saw lists containing neutral target words such as these: healthy, bright, vegetable, and scary. An example of a sentence used in the priming task is “stones suspicious moss no rolling gather,” where the constructed sentence is “rolling stones gather no moss” and the excluded target word, “suspicious,” is the prime. In some lists, the target word was the sixth word and was ignored, whereas in other lists the target word was actu-ally included in the five words used to create the sentence.

After completing the scrambled sentence-priming task, participants completed the spontaneous and deliberative judgment measures. Across subjects, the order of the sponta-neous and deliberative judgment measures was rotated, with each measure appearing first one half of the time. For the spontaneous measure, we used the good–bad timed response task on which participants trained at the beginning of the ses-sion. Although they were given a long list of words, includ-ing several other proper names, the actual spontaneous

mea-1_{A pretest of the experimental design confirmed that participants found} the explanation for differential activities in the study very consistent with the guise that the research purpose was to examine visual and verbal compre-hension in computer-mediated environments.

2_{Morgan was selected because it did not appear in the 1990 Census} most-common name listing and because it did not indicate a specific gender for the salesperson.

3_{Some research on impression formation has indicated that once} infor-mation is encoded, individuals do not reinterpret or recode the originally en-coded information in terms of concepts that are accessible at the time of making a judgment (Srull & Wyer, 1980). However, in cases when the pur-pose of information is introduced after the information is received and coded, rendering it inadequate for making a judgment, individuals may en-gage in recoding based on concepts that are salient at the time. This was the case in this study.

sure was how they responded to the name Morgan. Participants with a favorable judgment of the salesperson presumably responded with a 1 when they saw the name Morgan, whereas those with a less favorable judgment re-sponded with a 0. For the deliberate judgment measure, par-ticipants were asked to respond to an untimed rating question about Morgan. Specifically, they were asked to give the salesperson, Morgan, a rating on a sliding bar scale defaulted at the midpoint, with endpoints “very low” to “very high” (subsequently translated to a rating from 1–100).

In addition to these measures, participants were asked to respond to questions regarding the specific affective re-sponses they experienced in thinking about Morgan while they were shopping. The series of valenced terms was the same as the series used in Experiment 1, with items embed-ded in the list that referred to feelings of mistrust. All these items were measured on a sliding bar scale and were subse-quently translated to a 1 to 100 scale.

Results

The proportions of positive responses to Morgan in the timed judgment task were analyzed using logistic regression as a function of priming conditions, salesperson effort, and mea-surement order. Data relevant to this analysis are summarized in the top half of Table 2. The effects of salesperson effort did not depend on measurement order (χ2_{< 1). That is,} partici-pants showed the same pattern of responses to the name Mor-gan regardless of whether they generated these responses be-fore or after the rating task. Pooled over order conditions, participants were more likely to respond positively to Mor-gan in the high effort condition (76.7%) than in the low effort condition (61.0%),χ2_{(1, N = 154) = 4.29; p < .05.} Further-more, this difference did not depend on whether suspicion was primed (73.7% vs. 60.5%) or not (79.5% vs. 61.5%),χ2 < 1, and did not depend on whether responses were assessed before the spontaneous measure (81.6% vs. 63.4%) or after-ward (71.8% vs. 58.3%),χ2_{< 1. The main effects for order} and prime are also insignificant.

The effects of priming and salesperson effort on delibera-tive responses showed a different pattern, as indicated in the

bottom half of Table 2. In neutral prime conditions, partici-pants rated the salesperson more favorably when the effort expended was high (M = 67.2) than when it was low (M = 56.4), F(1, 150) = 4.95, p < .05. When participants were primed with suspicion, however, the reverse was true; that is, they rated the salesperson less favorably when the effort ex-pended was high than when it was low (50.3 vs. 60.2), F(1, 150) = 4.03, p < .05. The interaction of Priming × Salesper-son Effort was significant, F(1, 150) = 8.95, p < .01, and did not depend on measurement order (F < 1).

To explore the role of more specific affective responses, distrust and suspicion were averaged to form an indicator for feeling mistrust (r = .75). Mistrust was low in the neutral prime condition regardless of whether the salesperson’s ef-fort was high (M = 38.6) or low (M = 44.0), F < 1. When sus-picion was primed, however, mistrust was greater when the salesperson expended high effort than when the salesperson expended low effort (54.7 vs. 39.5, respectively), F(1, 150) = 8.70, p < .01. The interaction of Priming × Salesperson Effort was significant, F(1, 150) = 8.10, p <.01.

We expected the deliberative judgment (salesperson rat-ing) to be mediated by the mistrust evoked by high effort. In fact, when mistrust was used as a covariate in the initial anal-ysis, its effect was significant, F(1, 149) = 37.2, p < .001, and accounted for .18 of the variance. Furthermore, the previ-ously significant interaction between the Prime × Effort was reduced to nonsignificance, and the proportion of variance it accounted for was reduced from .05 to .01. Thus, feelings of mistrust mediate the effect of priming suspicion and sales-person effort on salessales-person ratings.

Discussion

Consistent with predictions, spontaneous responses to the salesperson, as inferred from the timed response task, in-creased with the salesperson’s effort level. This was true re-gardless of whether participants were primed with suspicion. In contrast, untimed judgments of the salesperson only in-creased with the effort the salesperson expended as long as participants were not stimulated to feel concerned about the salesperson’s motivation. When participants were primed TABLE 2

Spontaneous and Deliberate Evaluations of the Salesperson as a Function of Priming, Salesperson Effort, and Measurement Order: Experiment 2

Deliberate Measure First Spontaneous Measure First Measure and Priming Condition High Effort Low Effort High Effort Low Effort Percentage spontaneous positive reaction

Suspicion prime 68.2a _56.3b _81.3b _63.6a Neutral prime 76.5c _60.0d _81.8a _63.2e Deliberate evaluations Suspicion prime 49.3 54.9 51.8 64.0 Neutral prime 69.6 53.1 65.4 59.9 a_{n = 22.}b_{n= 16.}c_{n = 17.}d_{n = 20.}e_{n = 19.}

with suspicion, they made lower ratings of the salesperson when he or she had exerted extra effort than when he or she had not.

The difference in evaluations for the neutral- versus suspi-cion-prime conditions can be attributed to the difference in feelings of mistrust. No differences in mistrust were evident in the neutral prime condition. When suspicion was primed, however, feelings of mistrust were much higher when the salesperson had exerted extra effort than when he or she had not.

In addition to demonstrating a different pattern of results for spontaneous versus deliberative judgments in the suspi-cion-prime condition, the lack of order effects in our analyses indicates that initial affect can continue to influence evalua-tions independent of more deliberate information that calls this initial affect into question. Regardless of whether indi-viduals report their spontaneous or deliberate judgment first, subsequent judgments still appear to be a function of level of processing. Specifically, the reporting of a spontaneous judg-ment displays the same pattern whether it precedes or follows the reporting of a deliberate judgment.

Note that if only one representation had been constructed and used as a basis for judgment, such order effects are un-likely to be observed. Specifically, if participants based their initial judgments on responses to information that is consis-tent with social learning but updated their subsequent judg-ments based on responses to information inconsistent with social learning, under time pressure individuals would not re-vert back to their initial judgments. This was not the case. Specific affective responses only impacted judgments when level of processing was high. This suggests that level of pro-cessing not only drove differential responses to a single inci-dent but this single inciinci-dent was most likely stored as sepa-rate representations.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Dual representation appears to drive contradictory responses to salesperson effort. Individuals experience a spontaneous, positive response to salesperson effort that can inform their judgment of a salesperson. When sufficient processing re-sources are available, however, individuals are able to under-take the cognitive computations necessary to elicit more spe-cific valenced responses. Therefore, judgments informed by these responses are not necessarily consistent with spontane-ous responses. However, even when individuals have re-ported a deliberate judgment, they still revert back to their spontaneous judgment when the level of processing is low. Such responses suggest that separate representations of the salesperson exist and can generate contradictory reactions. It is important to note that when spontaneous and deliberate judgments are inconsistent, individuals do not reconcile this apparent conflict. The dual representations that inform evalu-ations coexist, and depending on circumstances, individuals

rely on one representation or the other, and its associated re-actions, when forming judgments.

This study also suggests that it is not only possible, but ap-propriate, to draw a specific connection between primary and secondary affective responses and dissociated evaluations. Even when specific affective responses are elicited that con-tradict spontaneous affect, spontaneous affect may continue to impact judgments. Theoretically, this indicates a particular uniqueness to judgment. Certain contextual factors may be better able to impact spontaneous versus deliberate judg-ments because their influence operates at a primary versus secondary level. If this is so, the key to influencing judgment may be quite complex. Changing specific affective responses may do little to change judgments informed by spontaneous processes (e.g., Shiv & Fedorikhin, 2002). And even if a situ-ation dictates that a more deliberative judgment drives pref-erence, consumers may switch back to their more spontane-ous judgment as soon as processing conditions change and a different representation is driving their response. In fact, this switching back and forth between deliberative and spontane-ous judgments may be unavoidable so long as information with a common social interpretation or learned cultural reac-tion is available.

Alternative explanations of our findings should be consid-ered. First, individuals might not form separate representa-tions, but might encode and store each piece of information separately; thus leading every piece of information to have its own memory trace (Hintzman, 1986). In this case, partici-pants would presumably base their judgments on whatever piece of information comes to mind most easily. It is unclear, however, how this conceptualization would account a priori for the effects of levels of processing that we observed in Ex-periment 2. Second, information might be organized into a single mental representation consisting of a central favorable concept of the salesperson to which peripheral concepts of the person’s behavior (in some cases, perceived as manipula-tion) are attached (Srull & Wyer, 1989). Judgments might then depend on whether the central concept or its peripheral associates was identified and used. However, the fact that the spontaneous and deliberative judgments observed in Experi-ment 2 were independent of the order in which these judg-ments were made is difficult to explain on the basis of this conceptualization. That is, once a judgment was formed that incorporated evaluatively inconsistent information, it is not obvious why an individual would switch back to the use of the central concept instead of integrating the inconsistent in-formation and the central concept into a new evaluation. Thus, although this conceptualization cannot be completely discredited, the dual-representation conceptualization we propose provides the most parsimonious a priori account of our results. Future research would benefit from expanding the domain of inquiry. Although our work focused on re-sponses to effort, a number of other firm–salesperson ac-tions, marketing stimuli, and product features might also have the potential to generate dissociated consumer

re-sponses. For instance, the fact that consumers may have con-tradictory evaluations and accept both of them could poten-tially account for situations in which consumers buy products “without thinking,” despite knowledge that the products are inferior or pose dangers to their health. If consumers have spontaneous positive reactions to products that have been discredited, such behavior is likely to occur.

This research focuses on a subset of specific negative re-sponses contrasted to a general positive initial response. It will also be important to show similar effects when a sponta-neous response is negative and more intentional responses are positive. Work in the area of stigmas, for instance, sug-gests that two psychological systems may be involved in re-actions to a stigma—one of which generates an immediate negative reaction and another of which generates a more pos-itive reaction in individuals who delay their response to the stigmatized stimulus (Pryor, Reeder, Yeadon, & Hesson-McInnis, 2004). Additionally, our research indicates that dual representations lead individuals to switch back and forth between judgments. However, we were not able to unequivo-cally verify distinct systems. Implementation of technology such as Functional Magnet Resonance Imaging (fMRI) is in-creasingly able to examine the existence of separate systems (Lieberman, Jarcho, & Satpute, 2004), and this may be an important tool in verifying distinct psychological systems such as those we have presented.

The connection between spontaneous and deliberative re-sponses and judgment may provide insights regarding dual coding in theories of memory and the role of affective infor-mation in judgment. Carlston’s (1980) dual-coding theory suggested that individuals may store two independent repre-sentations of a stimulus, and that each judgment can be sam-pled independently. He found that an inference based on an assessment computed from initial information becomes more accessible than any spontaneous evaluation. However, this finding only holds in the case of a single-implication episode (e.g., an episode implies an individual is either unkind or honest), but not in the case of a multiple-indication episode (a single episode implies both unkindness and honesty). A mul-tiple-indication episode represents a circumstance that more closely mirrors the effort episode in this article. One could speculate that an inference based assessment is not necessar-ily more interpretable than a spontaneous evaluation when an episode has multiple implications. This may be particularly true if the representation that informs the spontaneous evalu-ation represents a common social interpretevalu-ation and the in-ference assessment is inconsistent with this common social interpretation. Perhaps dissociated representations are formed and level of processing determines the representation applied to judgment. Such issues would benefit from further exploration.

In other research, Levine, Wyer, and Schwarz (1994) identified conditions in which descriptive judgment-relevant information took precedence over affect as a basis for judg-ment when it was highly accessible in memory, but affect

took precedence in global judgments of self-esteem. Perhaps certain assessments, such as those related to self-esteem, dis-play similar effects to certain representations formed in sponse to effort (representation containing information re-lated to a common social interpretation) in that both are quite ingrained and habitual. Clearly, additional examination of the relation between higher- versus lower-order responses, consumer memory, and assessments could be a fruitful ex-tension to this research.

The application of dual representation in the consumer context also has the potential to provide important insights regarding the types of responses that might impact attitude change and drive dual attitudes in the consumer context. Consider a case in which consumers change their attitude in response to a persuasive message, but eventually revert back to an originally held attitude. Is it possible that the message generated a new representation, but that the representation containing the “old” attitude and responsible for generating a spontaneous reaction was unaffected? Alternatively, if as-pects of a message or a product elicit spontaneous affective responses (because they are conditioned based on social learning), an associated attitude may be persistent, although it came about through a peripheral route. Even when more deliberate processes generate explicit attitudes, these atti-tudes may fail to impact preference and behavior if consum-ers do not have sufficient processing capacity at the time of judgment or choice.

Finally, future research should continue to investigate the conflict underlying dissociated evaluations. The examination of duality in consumer judgment will benefit from better knowledge of the contextual factors that form representations and elicit spontaneous and deliberative responses, and the manner in which these responses interact and direct evalua-tions. This will promote our understanding of the roles that common social interpretations and social learning play in consumer “doublethink.” More important, it will provide ad-ditional insight regarding whether consumers are really wired to maintain some level of mental contradiction through dual representations.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We would like to thank Patti Williams, Cristel Antonia Rus-sell, and Jaideep Sengupta for their helpful comments on ear-lier drafts of this article.

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Received: July 26, 2003

First revision received: February 21, 2004 Second revision received: April 28, 2005 Accepted: July 26, 2005