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Maciej Brzeźniak, Norbert Meyer,

Michał Jankowski, Gracjan Jankowski

Supercomputing Department, PSNC

This work is funded under

National Data Storage 2 project (2011-2013), Project number NR02-0025-10/2011.

http://nds.psnc.pl

Full Polish name of the project: System bezpiecznego

przechowywania i współdzielenia danych oraz składowania kopii zapasowych i archiwalnych w Krajowym Magazynie Danych

National Data

Storage 2

Secure sharing, publishing

and exchanging data

(2)

2

• Context: NDS1 & PLATON Popular Archive Service

• Why version 2 of NDS needed?

• NDS2:

– New functionality:

• secure sharing, publishing and exchanging files

• versioning, point in time recovery

– New features:

• enhanced security,

• performance scalability,

• multi-user readiness

• Some observations / open issues

(3)

2

Projects – where we are?

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Tenders...

Production Tests with users

Internal tests of NDS system

POPULAR ARCHIVE SERVICE

R&D: NDS Design

& implementation

Deployment

of NDS in the infrastructure & the service operation

2

R&D: NDS2 Design

(4)

2

High-level aim:

To support scientific and academic community

in protecting and archiving the data

Detailed aims:

– Adressing

secondary storage

applications:

• Long-term data

archival

• Short-term

backup

– Assumptions:

• people do have

their own primary storage

• people use another tools

for data exchange and CM

Local storage

User Network NDS system

NDS1 – aims and focus

CMS black box Data exchange

(5)

2

NDS1 Design assumptions

• Focus on specific system features

and functionality:

– Long-term data durability and consistency:

• Physical protection of the data • Replication + safe storage

• Keeping consistency of the data

– Confidentiality and safety of the data

• To be supported (not able to solve all issues)

– Easy usage:

• standard access methods

• possible integration with existing tools • Transparent data replication

– Stable & reliable product and service!

(6)

2

NDS1 – Features & challenges

• HA:

– Geographically distributed system

– Synchronous and asynchronous replication

(reliability vs performance)

• Scalability:

– performance,

– storage capacity,

– number of users

• Challenges:

– fault tolerance

– Consistency vs high performance

(7)

2

NDS1 - Architecture

HSM System

Storage Node file system

Replica access methods servers

Storage Node NDS system logic

Virtual filesystem for data and meta-data (FUSE)

Access Node Database

Node

Access Methods Servers (SSH, HTTPs, WebDAV...)

Meta-data DB Users DB Accounting & limits DB Storage Node HSM System Replication Slave Meta-data DB NDS1 user application

(8)

2

NDS system – Architecture comments

Data durability and service availability

– Sync & async replication

– Multiple data access & storage sites

– Monitoring & faults detection

– Limits: no data consistency

checking inside the system

at the moment

Storage Node Access Node User

Meta-data durability and consistency:

– Multiple meta-data databases instances

– Semi-synchronous replication of meta-data

Master Meta-data DB Slave Meta-data DB NDS mechanisms Synchronous operation logs replication Asynchronous transaction replication

(9)

2

NDS– Architecture comments/limits

• Data confidentiality

– Dedicated name spaces

– Data sharing possible among designated users,

limited to a given institution/profile

– Limit:

• No support for sercure data sharing among institutions

– NDS1 uses encryption where possible;

means: not everywhere!

• Data access:

– Scp/Sftp, httpS, WebDAV over httpS

• Storage:

– Encryption-enabled tapes (in fact external to system)

– Encryption outside the system:

• supported by client application (details later)

– System-side encryption & data consistency checks to be

considered to increase the security of data not encrypted by user

Meta-data DB1 User1 Meta-data DB2 User2 Logical or physical separation

(10)

2

NDS– Architecture comments/limits

• Client side encryption & automation

User data

NDS B/A application (on-the-fly encryption

and checksums)

User’s

data copy NDS/PLATON-U4service

– User side B/A application that supports security and automation

– Limits: user side encryption is CPU intensive

– Some hardware-aid solutions might be necessary for users having a lot of data – Additional tools needed:

– Management features for keys

(11)

2

NDS – Architecture comments/limits (3)

• Scalability:

– performance:

• Many ANs, SNs

• Many storage devices

• Data access

optimisation:

– Load balancing – Monitoring

– Limits:

• Metadata handling is... centralised for a given logical name space!

• Consistency vs performance...

Storage Node Access Node User

– Storage capacity:

• Many SNs

• Many storage devices

• Cost-effective approach:

HSM as the storage backend

(12)

2

NDS – Architecture comments/limits (4)

• Scalability:

– Number of users

• We can configure

multiple system

instances when the single

system limit is reached

• Architecture is

virtualization-ready

– Limits:

• The more users, the more metadata

and more complicated user management

• No real experince from the production system yet

(13)

2

NDS – Architecture comments/limits (5)

• Ease of integration / usage:

– Standard user interfaces:

• We support:SCP, HTTP/WebDAV, GridFTP

• Integration with existing tools easy • NDS logic details

hidden from the user

– Limitations:

• No ‘special features’

for users through standard interfaces (except meta-data fs)

• Extra features are to be provided by additional tool / interface:

• Client backup/archive applicaiton • Web/GUI Interface

• E.g. No advanced tools to manage ACLs and sharing

NDS system logic

Virtual filesystem for data and meta-data (FUSE)

Access Node Access Methods Servers (SSH, HTTPs, WebDAV...)

User

User backup/archive software

User data

– Single sign-on:

• Based on X.509 certificates stored in LDAP • Keys and certificates distributed automatically

to access methods servers (sshd, apache, gridftp) and converted to appropriate format on-the-fly by KeyFS solution

X.509 KeyFS

Access Node

(14)

2

NDS2 - summary of issues to address

• In NDS2 we need to address (functionalities):

Advanced features for long-term B/A:

• Versioning – point in time recovery • Security and data safety related:

• Data consistency checks

• Strong and efficient encryption:

• on the client side (hardware aid, automated + tools) • Sharing:

• Inside NDS (some trust to users assumed)

• NDS <-> external world (one side of sharing not trusted) • Publishing data using our infrastructure:

• e.g. for Digital Libraries

• they store archives in the in NDS already

Extra functionalities to be offered by extended (non-standard) interface

• e.g. versions management

(15)

2

NDS2 - summary of issues to address

• We need to address (features):

• Scalability:

• Deal with metadata handling scalability

• but keep consistency untouched!

• common logical view is needed for all users going

to share data

• => De-centralise logical name space management:

• De-centralise users management:

(16)

2

NDS1 – Scalability improvements

• De-centralised logical name space management:

• Step 1: divide the namespace into parts distributed

across multiple metadata DBs

(dCache-like approach?)

Database Node Meta-data DB Users DB Accounting & limits DB Meta-data DB B Meta-data DB C Meta-data DB A

/

++ load distribution ++ consistency

(17)

2

NDS1 – Scalability improvements

• De-centralised logical name space management:

• Step 2: combine distribution with replication

Database Node Meta-data DB Users DB Accounting & limits DB Meta-data DB B instance 1 Meta-data DB C instance 1 Meta-data DB A instance 1

/

++ load distribution ++ consistency

++ no single point of failure

SSR – Semi Synchronous Replication of meta-data Meta-data DB B instance 2 Meta-data DB instance 2 SSR SSR

(18)

2

NDS1 – Scalability improvements

• De-centralised logical name space management:

• Step 3: combine distribution with replication

+ provide automated failover

Database Node Meta-data DB Users DB Accounting & limits DB Meta-data DB B instance 1 Meta-data DB C instance 1 Meta-data DB A instance 1

/

++ load distribution ++ consistency

++ no single point of failure ++ automated failover SSR – Semi Synchronous Replication of meta-data Meta-data DB B instance 2 Meta-data DB instance 2 SSR SSR

(19)

2

NDS2 – New functionalities

• In NDS2 we need to address (functionalities):

Advanced features for long-term B/A:

• Versioning – point in time recovery • Security and data safety related:

• Data consistency checks

• Strong and efficient encryption:

• on the client side (hardware aid, automated, + tools) • Sharing:

• Inside NDS (some trust to users assumed)

• NDS <-> external world (one side of sharing not trusted) • Publishing data using our infrastructure:

• e.g. for Digital Libraries

• they store archives in the in NDS already

Extra functionalities to be offered by extended (non-standard) interface

• e.g. versions management

(20)

2

NDS2 – Versioning + Point-in-time recovery

/

NDS virtual filesystem structure

open (..., ..., O_RDWR)

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

a

b

c

d

e

f

g

h

d

/

NDS virtual filesystem structure

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

a

b

c

e

f

g

h

H’

d’

Versioning is: • Transparent to users

• they may access to old versions through a special directory or mountpoint; similarly (protocol, access point) as the current replica

• Efficient:

(21)

2

NDS2 – Security and data safety functions

Data consistency checks:

Cryptographics shortcuts calculated for replicas and put to Metadata DB

Can be presented to users (to be compared – manually or automatically)Background checks made periodically

(at least while storing and retrieving the file) • Shortcuts calculated close to data

(on the storage nodes)

Redundany coding to be considered

HSM System

Storage Node file system

Replica access methods servers

Storage Node NDS system logic

Virtual filesystem for data and meta-data (FUSE)

Access Node `

Database Node

Access Methods Servers (SSH, HTTPs, WebDAV...)

Meta-data DB Users DB Accounting & limits DB Storage Node HSM System Replication NDS2 user application CC deamon CC deamon CC control

(22)

2

NDS2 – Security and data safety functions

Strong and efficient encryption – on the client side

• Software-based

– application for individual users

• Sardware-aid

– appliance for those having really huge amounts data

• Both approaches automated + tools provided

User data NDS B/A application (on-the-fly encryption and checksums) User’s data encrypted copy NDS2 service S S H , H T T P s, W e b D A V .. .

User data NDS B/A ‘APPLIANCE’(on-the-fly encryption and checksums aided by

hardware) User’s data encrypted copy NDS2 service S S H , H T T P s, W e b D A V .. . D A TA E X P O R T IN G M E T H O D (s a y C IF S /N FS ) Safe key storage

(23)

2

NDS2 – Secure sharing and publishing

Secure sharing the data inside the NDS2 system

/home/maciej

NDS virtual filesystem structure

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

a

b

c

d

e

f

g

h

Maciej – trusted NDS2 user

/home/jan

A

B

D

SHARING

Copy (or link) the file

d

Jan – trusted NDS2 user

SHARING

d

+ set the ACL

C

+ setting the ACLs enables the other user to SEE the file + key exchange needed to really

READ its contents

+ again, we can use multiple

(24)

2

NDS2 – Secure sharing and publishing

Secure sharing the data with the external World

(FileSender-like use case)

/home/maciej

NDS virtual filesystem structure

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

a

b

c

d

e

f

g

h

Maciej – trusted NDS2 user

Copy the file to the publishing sandbox

Brian... – UNTRUSTED user

system side replication and decryption

– user not involved!

+ sharing effective

- Maciej discloses the file vs the system + Maciej’s secret key still not disclosed

Simplified NDS logic

Sandboxed part of the system

d

(‘secured’ or NOT) URL provided to Brian

+ some additional info:

• user/login • key for the file...

(25)

2

NDS2 – Secure sharing and publishing

Secure publishing... (a special case of sharing)

/home/maciej

NDS virtual filesystem structure

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

a

b

c

d

e

f

g

h

Maciej – trusted NDS2 user

Copy the file to the publishing sandbox

Anonymous UNTRUSTED users

system side replication and decryption

– user not involved!

+ publishing effective

+ mulitple replicas can be effectively served

by multiple servers (e.g. Apache) to many users - Maciej discloses the file vs the system

Simplified NDS logic

Sandboxed part of the system

d

Public URL generated

(26)

2

NDS2 – Secure sharing and publishing

Secure publishing...

(practical use case for digital libraries)

NDS2 services

CMS

User / CMS operator Data source MASTER data Meta-data End user (publication reader) MASTER versions STORAGE/ARCHIVAL Presentation versions storage High-res presentation versions ‘publication’

A

‘Regular’ (low-res) presentation versions

2

B

2

NDS2 sandbox

d

HR

LR

HR

LR

HR

+ link to high-res presentation version put to library portal

(27)

2

NDS2 – Secure sharing and publishing

Some observations:

• Proper key management mechanisms needed:

• User (e.g. Maciej) owns the private/public „master” key pair

• Each stored file is encrypted using the a separate file’s symmetric key • Symmetric keys are safely stored in NDS2 Metadata DB

(encrypted by master key known only to the user)

• Sharing steps:

• Sharing file physically (ACL...) – enables to see the file • Retrieving the symmetric file key from the system

• Decrypting the file’s key (on the user side)

• Passing the decrypted file’s key to the target user

• Decrypting the file on the user’s side – enabling to understand the file contents

• Publishing steps:

• Retrieving the file’s symmetric key from the system • Passing the decrypted key back to the system

• The system copies the file to sandbox (and decrypts it) • The others can see the file and understand it

(28)

2

NDS2 – New features vs scalability

Further observations / open issues:

• Improving system scalability is necessary to implement new features

• internal sharing require ‘single’ logical view of the shared structure • additional metadata processing

• Two versions of NDS2 logic:

• Regular – for trusted part of the system, feature-full

• Light – for the sandbox – hack-proof, non feature-full, simple!

• Q: are we going to end-up with two completely different products?

• We have to consider new interfaces:

• Sanbox’s public interface for downloading/uploading data • What about reusing part of Filesender project findings? • New features require going beyond standard interfaces:

• Web GUI

(29)

2

NDS2 – Summary

In NDS 2 we try to:

• Address more sophisticated B/A –related needs

• Provide transparent versioning

• Increased security (encryption) and performance (hardware-aided) • Improve overall system scalability

• Provide sharing facilities:

• Internal sharing – 2 lines of defence – ACLs on file access + keys for contents • File-Sender-like features for NDS users

• Support publishing:

• ‘Private’ publishing use case • ‘Massive’ publishing use case

(30)

2

THANK YOU!

More information: nds.psnc.pl

Note: most of the pictures used in the presentation come from sxc.hu service

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