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FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES OF INVESTMENT COMMITTEES

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FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES

OF INVESTMENT COMMITTEES

Investment committees face more and increasingly complex challenges today than they did even a decade or two ago. Twenty years ago, for example, many of our clients employed only a handful of managers in their portfolios. On average, our clients would have exposure to U.S. large cap equity, U.S. small cap equity, interna-tional equity, and fixed income. They may have had one or two managers for each mandate, but most would employ fewer than ten managers. Typically, our clients would conduct searches to hire the managers, inter-viewing the candidates before selecting the most appropriate manager for each particular mandate. Once the manager was hired, investment committees often would perform their own additional due diligence by meet-ing with the managers once every year or two.

Over time we recommended further diversification, which increased the complexity of our clients’ portfo-lios. For instance, we recommended exposure to mid cap, emerging markets, international small cap, real estate investment trusts, high yield, and inflation protected bonds. Furthermore, we recommended hedge fund strategies and private capital strategies, such as venture capital, buyouts, distressed debt, timber, energy partnerships, and private real estate. This further diversification meant an increase in the number of manag-ers, as demonstrated in the 2013 NACUBO-Commonfund Study of Endowments (NCSE), where the average number of investment managers per participating institution reached over 26. This increase in the number of managers is consistent with other types of institutions (e.g., community foundations, pension plans, etc.), as well as our experience with institutional investors.

“To avoid implementation shortfall and remove the

barriers to excellence, we believe that all fiduciary roles

must be clearly defined.”

FOCUS TOPIC B R I E F

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The increased complexity of institutional portfolios over the last two decades has definitely changed how committees approach their roles. With this changing dynamic, we summarize in this focus topic the chal-lenges confronting committees, review oversight structures, and discuss the rationale for outsourcing portfolio implementation.

Challenges Confronting Investment Committees

BARRIERS TO EXCELLENCE

In their book Pension Fund Excellence, Keith Ambachtsheer and Don Ezra identified barriers to excellence for pension funds. In a survey of 50 senior pension executives, 98% cited poor process (decision structure, communication, and inertia) as a major hurdle to achieving investment goals.

Other factors cited were inadequate resources (cited by 48%), lack of focus on mission (43%), conserva-tism (35%), and insufficient skills (35%). Although focused on pension funds, its findings apply to other institutional investors. Many pension plan committees are staffed by employees who spend only a few days a year on investments, as they have other full-time responsibilities. This is not unlike endowment/ foundation committee members, who are volunteers, typically meeting four times a year.

COMMITTEE PROCESS

In our experience, the typical committee is comprised of 7-15 individuals with varying degrees of invest-ment knowledge, who meet quarterly, seek consensus, and base their decisions on comfort. By meeting quarterly, committees may miss opportunities to act on investment opportunities, or on the other hand, believe they must act when action is not warranted. Because the committee members either work togeth-er (pension plans) or are voluntetogeth-ers (endowments and foundations), they are usually collegial and avoid confrontations. Rarely have we seen decisions reached on a contentious 5-4 vote. In fact, we rarely see 8-1 votes either, as a general consensus is usually reached before acting. With varying degrees of

invest-Data source: Pension Fund Excellence, Keith P. Ambachtsheer and D. Don Ezra

BAR R I E R S TO E XCE LLE N CE

98%

48%

43%

35% 35%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Poor Process Inadequate Resources

Lack of focus on Mission

Conservatism Insufficient Skills

Barriers to Excellence

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By investing with the “herd”, committees seek to limit reputation risk. In order to achieve superior returns, however, an investment committee must be willing to invest differently than their peers. Once an invest-ment strategy has become “mainstream”, the exceptional returns have been realized.

In many cases the major hurdle to achieving superior performance is the committee process, which leads to implementation shortfall. Implementation shortfall includes delays in decisions due to lack of informa-tion, insufficient knowledge, failure to reach a consensus, inability to schedule a meeting, and lack of ac-countability (no one is solely accountable for performance).

Additionally, with the proliferation of managers and new investment strategies, investment committees have been unable to spend as much time interviewing and performing ongoing due diligence on the man-agers. Thus, committees have had to rely more on staff, consultants, or fund of funds managers to perform this due diligence. Furthermore, some committee members are not as knowledgeable about a number of the non-traditional investment strategies, leading to less robust discussions about these strategies. Recognizing their limitations, boards and investment committees have focused more of their attention on governance, their fiduciary responsibilities, and the appropriate structure for their particular institutions.

Oversight Structures

LEVELS OF FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY

In their book Pension Fund Excellence, Keith Ambachtsheer and Don Ezra describe three levels of fiduciary responsibility:

1. Governing – mission and objectives 2. Managing – portfolio implementation 3. Operating – administration and execution

Understanding these responsibilities helps to define the roles of each fiduciary and ensure an effective governance structure.

3-TIER CAPTIVE

For many larger institutions (assets over $1 billion), the board or investment committee serves as the gov-erning fiduciary. They establish the mission and objectives, define the liquidity and risk tolerances for the plan/fund, and set the asset allocation and investment policies.

The managing fiduciary is the chief investment officer (and staff), who determines the asset allocation within the policies established by the governing fiduciaries, selects the investment managers, and pro-vides day-to-day supervision of the assets.

The operating fiduciaries include the investment managers, who select securities and manage the portfo-lios, the custodians, who hold the assets and collect dividends and interest payments, as well as actuaries, administrators, and other vendors.

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2-TIER COMMITTEE DRIVEN

For institutions unable to hire investment staff, a common structure is to combine the governing and managing fiduciary roles, with the investment committee serving both roles. Thus, they set policy and also implement decisions by hiring managers, determining the asset allocation within the policy parameters, deciding when to rebalance, and when to terminate managers.

3-TIER OUTSOURCED

Some institutions unable to hire investment staff have moved to outsourcing the managing fiduciary role in order to overcome the challenges of the 2-tier committee driven approach. The advantages to this ap-proach, versus the 2-tier committee driven structure, are:

• increased oversight of the assets • more flexible decision making • clear accountability for performance

• better allocation of the governing fiduciaries’ time

INCREASED OVERSIGHT

With the proliferation of investment managers in portfolios, most investment committees do not have the time to monitor all of the managers. Furthermore, with the increased allocations to hedge funds and private capital strategies, many investment committee members do not have the expertise to select and monitor these strategies. Outsourced advisory firms, on the other hand, can employ research staffs who conduct due diligence on hundreds, if not thousands, of managers. Thus, they can provide increased over-sight serving in this managing fiduciary role.

3-TIER CAPTIVE

2-TIER COMMITTEE DRIVEN

3-TIER OUTSOURCED

Governing Fiduciaries Investment Committee Investment Committee

Managing Fiduciary CIO and Staff Staff and Outsourced CIO

Operating Fiduciaries

Investment Managers Custodian Actuaries Other Vendors

Investment Managers Custodian

Actuaries Other Vendors

Investment Managers Custodian Actuaries Other Vendors Investment Committee, Staff,

and

Consultant - Supporting Fiduciary

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INCREASED FLEXIBILITY

In today’s ever increasingly complex and changing investment world, an outsourced advisory firm is struc-tured to provide more flexibility in the decision making process. Coupled with the increased oversight and daily monitoring of the asset mix and investment managers, outsourced advisory firms can exploit op-portunities that would be difficult for committees to implement. For example, under the 2-tier approach, the committee would need to be informed (or identify) an opportunity, schedule a meeting or conference call, review the research, discuss the opportunity, reach a decision, and then implement the decision. An outsourced advisory firm, who is monitoring the markets and the portfolio on a daily basis, is better posi-tioned to implement these opportunities.

CLEAR ACCOUNTABILITY

Under the 2-tier approach who is ultimately responsible for performance? The committee chair? Consul-tant? Staff? The entire committee? The committee chair runs the meetings and sets the agenda, but has only one vote. Consultants and staff may provide recommendations, but they are not always accepted. The entire committee ultimately is responsible, but as the governing fiduciaries, placed in the awkward po-sition of assessing themselves as the managing fiduciaries. Thus, there is a lack of true accountability with the 2-tier structure. Outsourced investment advisory firms, on the other hand, accept this responsibility and are held accountable for performance.

BETTER ALLOCATION OF TIME

Finally, outsourcing leads to better allocation of the governing fiduciaries’ time. By delegating the manag-ing fiduciary role, the board/committee can spend more time on the governmanag-ing fiduciary role. Too often committees are involved in the details of the investment portfolio, such as selecting specific managers and rebalancing, and unable to spend the necessary time on the mission of the institution, defining the port-folio’s risk tolerance and long-term strategy, and establishing the investment policies that will ultimately drive the long-term success of the portfolio.

Conclusion

Today’s fiduciaries oversee portfolios more complex than ever before. What may have worked years ago, may not work as well today. Consequently, fiduciaries are assessing their governance structures and seek-ing to improve their processes. To avoid implementation shortfall and remove the barriers to excellence, we believe that all fiduciary roles must be clearly defined. The first step is to determine the appropriate oversight structure.

For larger institutions, we are seeing many hire chief investment officers to serve in the managing fidu-ciary role. For those unable to hire investment staff, we are seeing an increased interest in outsourcing the managing fiduciary role. Even those who continue with the 2-tier committee driven structure are review-ing roles and governance, with several relyreview-ing on sub-committees to more efficiently manage the process.

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DISCLOSURES

This report was prepared by Fund Evaluation Group, LLC (FEG), a federally registered investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended, providing non-discretionary and discretionary investment advice to its clients on an individual basis. Registration as an invest-ment adviser does not imply a certain level of skill or training. The oral and written communications of an adviser provide you with information about which you determine to hire or retain an adviser. Fund Evaluation Group, LLC, Form ADV Part 2A & 2B can be obtained by written request directly to: Fund Evaluation Group, LLC, 201 East Fifth Street, Suite 1600, Cincinnati, OH 45202, Attention: Compliance Department.

The information herein was obtained from various sources. FEG does not guarantee the accuracy or completeness of such information provided by third parties. The information in this report is given as of the date indicated and believed to be reliable. FEG assumes no obligation to update this information, or to advise on further developments relating to it. FEG, its affiliates, directors, officers, employees, employee benefit programs and client accounts may have a long position in any securities of issuers discussed in this report.

Index performance results do not represent any managed portfolio returns. An investor cannot invest directly in a presented index, as an invest-ment vehicle replicating an index would be required. An index does not charge manageinvest-ment fees or brokerage expenses, and no such fees or expenses were deducted from the performance shown.

Neither the information nor any opinion expressed in this report constitutes an offer, or an invitation to make an offer, to buy or sell any securities. Any return expectations provided are not intended as, and must not be regarded as, a representation, warranty or predication that the investment will achieve any particular rate of return over any particular time period or that investors will not incur losses.

Past performance is not indicative of future results.

Investments in private funds are speculative, involve a high degree of risk, and are designed for sophisticated investors.

This report is prepared for informational purposes only. It does not address specific investment objectives, or the financial situation and the par-ticular needs of any person who may receive this report.

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