CIVIL LAW REVIEW 2 Notes [ATTY. CRISOSTOMO A. URIBE] I. OBLIGATIONS
[June 18, 2008] A. IN GENERAL: 1. DEFINITION:
Article 1156. an obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do.
• Defines CIVIL Ø; “JURID. NECESSITY” makes it enforceable by court action;
Balane: Book IV starts w/ an inaccuracy. It gives the impression that obligations & contracts are of the same status, w/c they are not. A contract is only one of the sources of obligations. Book IV should have been simply titled "Obligations."
Etymology – two Latin words, ligare, meaning "to bind" & ob w/c is a proposition used to intensify a
verb.
Literally obligare means "to bind securely." Tolentino: the juridical tie between two or more persons, by virtue of which one of them, the creditor or oblige, has the right to demand of the other, the debtor or obligor, a definite prestation.
Manresa: legal relation established between one party and another whereby the latter is bound to the fulfillment of a prestation which the former may demand of him.
Arias Ramos: [more complete definition, accdg to T, whch gives the element of responsibility essential to an Ø]
An Ø is a juridical relation whereby a person (called the creditor) may demand from another (called the debtor) the observance of a determinate conduct, and in case of breach, may obtain satisfaction from the assets of the latter.
Where there is a right or power to demand, there is a correlative Ø or an imposition upon a person of a definite conduct.
Balane: A better definition would be,
An obligation is a juridical relation (bec. there are 2 parties) whereby a person should engage or refrain fr. engaging in a certain activity for the satisfaction of the private interests of another, who in case of non-fulfillment of such duty may obtain fr. the patrimony of the former through proper judicial proceedings the very prestation due or in default thereof, the economic equivalent (damages) that it represents. (Diaz Piero.)
Obligation (Ø) – is a juridical relation whereby a person (called the creditor) may demand from another (debtor) the observance of determinate conduct, and in case of breach, may obtain satisfaction from the assets of the latter.
Characteristics of an Obligation:
It represents an exclusively private interest It creates ties that are by nature transitory
It involves the power to make the juridical tie effective in case of non-fulfillment through an economic equivalent obtained fr. the debtor's patrimony.
Essential Elements of an Obligation:
(1) Active Subject – This refers to the creditor or the obligee. A creditor generally used in an obligation to give while obligee is used in an obligation to do
(2) Passive Subject – This refers to the debtor or the obligor. debtor is used in an obligation to give
while obligor is used in an obligation to do
The first two elements must be determinate or determinable. The following are possible combinations:
Both parties are determined at the time of the execution of the obligation.
one party is determined at the constitution of the obligation & the other to be determined subsequently in accordance w/ a criteria that is previously established.
the subject is determined in accordance w/ his relation to a thing & therefor it changes where the thing passes fr. one person to another. This is a property-linked obligation.
(3) Object of the obligation - the conduct or activity that must be observed by the debtor, this is always an activity or conduct, the prestation.
Requisites of an object: It must be licit. It must be possible.
It must be determinate or determinable.
It must have pecuniary value so that if not performed it is converted into damages.
(4) Vinculum juris - the legal tie, whereby upon default or refusal of the debtor to perform, the creditor can go to court.
When a person says "I promise to pay you when I like to," there is no obligation here bec. there is no vinculum juris.
Juridical tie, the efficient cause established by the various sources of Ø’s
> by virtue of which the debtor is bound in favor of the creditor to perform the prestation.
Efficient cause / vinculum may either be relation established by:
1. Law (e.g. marital relation giving rise to Ø for support;
2. Bilateral acts (e.g. contracts give rise to the Øs stipulated therein)
3. Unilateral acts (e.g. crimes and quasi-delicts) ** All the above 3/4 elements are agreed upon by commentators as essential elements. The following two are being debated.
(i) Causa debendi/ obligationes (Castan) – This is what makes the obligation demandable. This is the proximate why of an obligation.
(ii) Form - This is controversial. This is acceptable only if form means some manifestation of the intent of the parties.
[TOLENTINO:
Ø “to give” prestation consists in the delivery of a movable or an immovable thing in order to create a real right, orfor the use of the recipient, or for possession, or to return to its owner; e.g. Ø to deliver the thing in a © of sale, deposit, lease, antichresis, pledge and donation.
Ø “to do” incl. all kinds of work or services. E.g. © of employment or professional services.
Ø “not to do” consists in abstaining from some act, e.g. duty not to create a nuisance;
Requisites of a prestation:
1. it must be possible, physically and juridically 2. it must be determinate, or atleast determinable; and 3. it must have a positive equivalent in money.
(susceptible of pecuniary appreciation)
Positive Law – valid legal laws enacted by the legislative department;
Natural Ø – not sanctioned by any action but have a relative juridical effect;
do not grant the right of action to enforce their performance but after voluntary fulfillment by their obligor, they authorize the retention of what has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof (Art. 1423); 2. KINDS OF OBLIGATIONS AS TO BASIS & ENFORCEABILITY
(a) NATURAL OBLIGATIONS
Article 1423. Obligations are civil or natural.
Civil obligations give a right of action to compel their performance.
Natural obligations, not being based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of action to enforce their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the retention of what has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof. Some natural obligations are set forth in the following articles. (Arts. 1423 – 1430 not exclusive enumeration; some others…)
Requisites of Natural Ø:
1. there is a juridical tie between two persons 2. the tie is not given effect by law
an Ø w/o a sanction, susceptible of voluntary performance, but not thru compulsion by legal means.
Voluntary fulfillment – may be understood as spontaneous, free from fraud or coercion or it may be understood as meaning without knowledge or free from error;
- w/knowledge that he cannot be compelled to pay Ø; RATIO: “reputation” (clan)
Natural Ø vs. Moral Ø:
Natural Ø Moral Ø
Juridical tie Exists none
Performance by
debtor legal fulfillment of an Ø act of pure liberality which springs from blood, affection or benevolence Basis of existence of Ø Within the domain of law entirely domain of morals
Enforceability True Ø but for certain causes cannot be enforced by law moral duty is inexistent in the juridical point of view Examples of natural Ø’s: • Support of a natural child
• Indemnification of a woman seduced
• Support of relatives, by consanguinity or affinity
CIVIL Ø’s NATURAL Ø’s
Source of binding
force & effect From positive law from equity and natural justice
Enforceability
can be enforced by court action or the coercive power of public authority
cannot be
compelled by court action but depends upon good conscience of the debtor
Illicit Ø’s Ø’s which are contrary to morals and good customs do not constitute natural Ø’s, whatver is paid under such Ø’s can be recovered, (apply Art. 1414, 1411, 1412.) (b) CIVIL OBLIGATIONS:
Article 1157. Obligations arise from: (1) Law; (Ø’s ex lege) (2) Contracts; (3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts. SOURCES OF Ø’s:
1. LAW:
Article 1158. Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those expressly determined in this Code or in special laws are demandable, and shall be regulated by the precepts of the law
which establishes them; and as to what has not been foreseen, by the provisions of this Book.
an agreement is not necessary in order that a party may demand from another the fulfillment of an Ø arising from the application of a law in the circumstances; Balane: Law as a source of obligation – It is my opinion that there is an overlap in the enumeration bec. all obligations arise fr. law. Law is the only source of obligation, in the ultimate sense. But, as a proximate source, there are five sources of obligations. Law is both the ultimate & a proximate source of obligations.
Sources of Obligations according to Sanchez Roman.-- Law & Acts. The latter are further classified, as follows:
(1) licit acts created by concurrence of wills (contracts);
(2) licit acts either voluntary or involuntary w/o concurrence of wills (quasi-contract);
(3) illicit acts of civil character w/c are not punishable, voluntary or involuntary (torts & all damages arising fr. delay);
(4) illicit acts w/c are voluntary & are punishable by law (crimes) Baviera: When the source of the obligation is Law, there is no need for an act or omission for the obligation to arise.
CASE:
SAGRADA ORDEN VS. NACOCO [91 P 503]
Plaintiff owned disputed property in Pandacan, Mla whc was acquired during the Japanese occupation by Taiwan Tekkosho with TCT. When RP was ceded to USA, the same was entrusted to Alien Property Custodian, APC by the US govt. APC took possession, control and custody under the Trading with the Enemy Act. APC allowed Copra Export Management Co. to occupy the property for a fee. RP later made representation with APC to use the same property with warehouse. The warehouse was repaired by NACOCO and was leased to Dioscoro Sarile. The latter failed to pay rentals on the property.
In an action to recover possession of the property, the court nullified the sale to T.Tekkosho and cancelled its TCT and ordered reversion of title to plaintiff, and right of recovery from NACOCO of rentals to the property.
ISSUE: WON NACOCO is liable to pay back rentals?
HELD: If def.-appellant (NaCoCo) is liable at all, its obligations must arise fr. any of the 4 sources of obligations, namely, law, contract or quasi contract, crime, or negligence. (Art. 1089, OCC.)
As to crimes: Def.-appellant is not guilty of any offense at all, bec. it entered into the premises & occupied it w/ the permission of the entity w/c had the legal control & admin. thereof, the Alien Prop. Admin. (APA)
As to QD: Neither was there any negligence on its part. As to Contract: There was also no privity (of contract or obligation) bet. the APA & Taiwan Tekkosho, w/c had secured the possession of the prop. fr. the pltff-appellee by the use of duress, such that the Alien Prop. Custodian or its permittee (def.-appellant) may be held responsible for the supposed illegality of the occupation of the prop. by said Tekkosho. The APA had the control & admin. of the prop. not as successor to the interests of the enemy holder of the title, the T. Tekkosho, but by express provision of law.
Neither is it a trustee of the former owner, the pltff-appellee herein, but a trustee of the US Govt., in its own right, to the exclusion of, & against the claim or title of, the enemy owner. From Aug. 1946, when def.-appellant took possession, to the date of the judgment on 2/28/48, the APA had the absolute control of the prop. as trustee of the US Govt., w/ power to dispose of it by sale or otherwise, as though it were the absolute owner.
Therefore, even if def. were liable to the APA for rentals, these would not accrue to the benefit of the pltff., the old owner, but the US Govt.
Balane: Is the enumeration in Art. 1157 exclusive or merely illustrative?
Doctrine: The sense that the case of Sagrada Orden tells us is that the enumeration is exclusive.
In resolving the issue of whether the def. should be liable to pay rentals, the SC used the process of exclusion. For there to be an obligation to pay rentals, that obligation must arise fr. either of the five (5) sources of obligations. If it does not, then there is no obligation. The clear implication of this ruling is that, these five (5) are the only sources of obligations. The problem w/ Art. 1157 is that it might not cover all situations. For example: Carale uses Dove as his soap. He then hears an advertisement fr. Proctor & Gamble that it is offering a nice tumbler for those who can collect 30 wrappers of Tide before Feb. 29, 1996. So, Carale stopped using Dove & started using Tide. He was able to consume all 30 wrappers on Feb. 29, 1996. He then went to Proctor & Gamble (P & G) to exchange the 30 Tide wrappers for a tumbler. But P & G told Carale that their tumblers run out of stock. Carale contracted a skin allergy as a result of using Tide in taking a bath. The question is: Does P & G have any obligation to Carale. If we look at Art. 1157, this situation does not fall in any of the five sources. So, we know have a problem. The German Civil Code (BGB) covers this situation. The BGB has a sixth source of obligation, the Auslobung, w/c means a unilateral offer.
2. CONTRACTS: ©
Article 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. Article 1305. A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.
Negotiation of © is initiated by an OFFER;
Autonomy of Will supposing the contract is valid and enforceable, the terms of © not contrary to law, morals, GC, PP or PO, the stipulations therewith shd be given effect. (one of fundamental principles of ©’s)
Balane: There are two parts in Art. 1159.
obligations derived fr. contract has the force of law bet. the contracting parties (jus civili ) there must be compliance in good faith (jus
gentium.) CASE:
PEOPLE'S CAR VS. COMMANDO SECURITY [51 SCRA 40] Pltff. (People's Car) was in law liable to its customers for the damages caused the customer's car, w/c had been entrusted into its custody. Pltff. therefore was in law justified in making good such damages & relying in turn on def.(Commando Security) to honor its contract & indemnify it for such undisputed damages, w/c had been caused directly by the unlawful & wrongful acts of def.'s security guard in breach of their contract. WON commando security is liable to damages in accordance w/ provisions of ©/ whc provision/
3. QUASI-CONTRACTS:
Article 1160. Obligations derived from quasi-contracts shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter 1, Title XVII, of this Book.
QUASI-CONTRACT is a juridical relation which arises from
certain unlawful, voluntary and unilateral acts, to the end that no one may be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another.
The act must be:
(1) Lawful – thus different from delict which is unlawful;
(2) Voluntary – thus different from quasi-delict which is based on fault or negligence or lack of foresight;
(3) Unilateral – thus different from contract, in which parties agree.
e.g. in negotiorum gestio:
Benefits Conferred Voluntarily
For preservation of Property or Business EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
(Øs without an agreement / based in IMPLIED CONSENT) Q: HOW MANY?
A: In NCC, 2 nominate and “some” innominate QC’s a. Quasi-contracts
Article 2142. Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another.
Article 2143. The provisions for quasi-contracts in this Chapter do not exclude other quasi-contracts which may come within the purview of the preceding article.
b. Negotiorum Gestio
Article 2144. Whoever voluntarily takes charge of the agency or management of the business or property of another, without any power from the latter, is obliged to continue the same until the termination of the affair and its incidents, or to require the person concerned to substitute him, if the owner is in a position to do so. This juridical relation does not arise in either of these instances: ELEMENTS –
(1) When the property or business is not neglected or abandoned;
(2) If in fact the manager has been tacitly authorized by the owner.
In the first case, the provisions of articles 1317, 1403, No. 1, and 1404 regarding unauthorized contracts shall govern.
In the second case, the rules on agency in Title X of this Book shall be applicable.
NEGOTIORUM GESTIO – juridical relation which
arises whenever a person voluntarily takes charge of an agency or management of the business or property of another without any power or authority from the latter.
c. Solutio indebiti
Article 2154. If something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises.
SOLUTIO INDEBITI – juridical relation which arise
whenever person unduly delivers a thing through or by mistake of another who has no right to demand it.
4. ACTS OR OMISSIONS PUNISHED BY LAW (DELICT or CRIMES but not Felony whc is ltd. To those punished under RPC ):
Article 1167. If a person obliged to do something fails to do it, the same shall be executed at his cost.
This same rule shall be observed if he does it in contravention of the tenor of the obligation. Furthermore, it may be decreed that what has been poorly done be undone.
Balane: Crime as a source of obligation – There are many crimes fr. w/c, civil liability arises in their commission, in addition to the criminal penalty attached to them. This underlines the two aspects in a crime: one, as an offense against the state, & two as an offense against the victim. It is in the latter case that civil liability is recoverable.
As far as crime is concerned, civil law is not concerned w/ the penal liability but only w/ the civil liability.
Performance at debtor’s cost non-compliance with Ø to do, creditor may do it himself or get a 3rd person at the expense of the debtor;
when Ø to do can only be performed by debtor he cannot compelled to do so by force, the only remedy is damages;
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
TITLE V - Civil Liability, RPC: CHAPTER ONE - Persons Civilly Liable for Felonies
Article 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. - Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
[CHAPTER 2, RPC: What Civil Liability Includes] Article 104. What is included in civil liability. – The civil liability established in articles 100, 101, 102, and 103 of this Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused; 3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
Baviera: Requisites of enforcing the subsidiary obligation of the employer under the RPC:
criminal case was filed against the EE
the act or negligence arose during or in connection w/ the performance of the latter’s employment
the EE is found guilty of criminal negligence
a writ of execution has been returned unsatisfied, i.e. EE has been found to be insolvent.
There is no res judicata as regards the ER as there is a difference in the COA. Quasi-delict (QD) differs fr. an action based on delict on the following grounds:
QUASI DELICT DELICT
it is subsidiary (imputed) ER’s liability is primary in RPC Diligence of good father of the
family may be set up by the ER as a defense
In RPC, such defense of GFF is not available
A person while not criminally liable may still be civilly liable Failure of the plaintiff to reserve in the criminal
case his right to file a separate civil action is not fatal to the civil action after the acquittal of the accused.
When the acquittal is based on ground that the guilt of the accused has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, plaintiff has the right to institute a civil action for damages (culpa aquiliana).
Q: Is it possible that even if there is a contract bet. the parties, a quasi-delict can still be committed by one against the other regarding the area covered by the contract? A: Yes, according to the case of Araneta v. de Joya, 57 SCRA 59. The same act can give rise to obligations arising fr. different sources.
For example, Alinea is the owner of a bus co., the Alinea Bus Co., Molina is a driver of one of the buses of Alinea Bus Co. Lagdameo rode the bus being driven by Molina. As a result of the reckless driving of Molina, Lagdameo suffered injuries. In this case, Lagdameo has a choice-- he can sue on either contract, quasi-delict or on crime. If he decided to sue on the breach of the contract of carriage, all he has to prove is the (existence of the contract) & that it was not performed. In this case, he can sue the common carrier but not the driver bec. he has no contract w/ the driver. If he sues on quasi-delict, he can sue both the common carrier & the driver. The defense of the driver would be diligence in driving (or fortuitous event.) The defense of the common carrier would be diligence in the selection & supervision of employees. If he sues under crime, he has to sue the driver. In case the driver is convicted & has been sentenced to pay civil liability, the employer (Alinea Bus Co.) is subsidiarily liable. If Molina is insolvent, Alinea Bus Co. will pay.
Notice that the choice of cause of action will determine three things: the theory of the plaintiff, the defense of the def. & the question of whom to sue.
Again, remember that in this case, the victim has a
choice. Provided that he is consistent w/ his theory & provided, further, that he cannot recover damages twice for the same injury.
Baviera: The terms of the contract cannot be against mandatory & prohibitive laws. And if the contract is valid, it shall have the force of law between the contracting parties.
5. QUASI-DELICTS: (culpa aquiliana / negligence / torts*) [NCC, CHAPTER 2 - Quasi-delicts]
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (memorize!)
Article 1162. Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, and by special laws.
* Torts is seldom used by SC in juris., it is broader term for actionable wrong whc may not be negligence, may be malicious tortuous act whc is not anymore QD.
QUASI-DELICTS – the fault or negligence of a
person who, by his act or omission connected or not with, but independent from any contractual relation, causes damage to another person;
The omission to do something which ordinarily reasonable men guided by those considerations whch ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do; or doing something which prudent and reasonable men would not do.
Liability on QD is based on Equity, man is responsible not only for acts conscious and intentional acts but also for his lack of foresight, care and diligence which may cause harm to another.
ELEMENTS:
(1) A duty on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from the injury of which the latter complains;
(2) A failure to perform that duty, and
(3) An injury to the plaintiff through such failure.
TEST OF NEGLIGENCE: Would a prudent man, in the position of the person on who negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? KINDS OF NEGLIGENCE:
(1) Culpa aquiliana, also known as culpa extra-contractual, or negligence as a source of Ø, QUASI-DELICT;
Governed by Arts. 2176-2194 NO contractual relation at all
(2) Culpa contractual, or negligence in the performance of a contractual Ø.
Governed by Art. 1179 (common carrier), & all on contracts
PERSONS LIABLE: (IMPUTED/vicarious LIABILITY, 2180) 1. father / mother 2. guardians 3. owners/managers 4. employers 5. the State 6. teachers
The responsibility shall cease if they can prove that they have observed diligence of good father of the family to prevent damage;
REQUISITES OF LIABILITY (IMPUTED):
1. the fault of negligence of the defendant 2. the damage suffered or incurred by the plaintiff 3. the relation of the fault or negligence and
damage incurred by the plaintiff Balane:
The Code Commission did not choose to use tort. This is bec. tort does not exactly have the same meaning as delict. Tort [BROADER] covers intentional torts w/c in quasi-delict is considered as civil liability arising fr. acts or omissions punishable by law. There are some QD w/c are not covered by tort. Dean Bocobo suggested the ancient term culpa aquiliana. But this did not merit the approval of the Code Commission.
A TORT is a civil wrong (an actionable wrong) consisting of a violation of a right or a breach of duty for which the law grants a remedy in damages or other relief. The right is created by law in favor of a person called a creditor to compel another called a debtor to observe duty or a prestation either to render what is due him or to refrain from causing him injury. Classes of Torts According to Manner of Commission
1. Intentional Torts
a. tortfeasor desires to cause the consequences of his act, or b. tortfeasor believes that the
consequences are substantially certain to result from it
c. ex. Art. 26, 32 & 33 (CC) 2. Negligent Torts:
d. tortfeasor’s conduct merely creates a forseeable risk of harm which may or may not occur
e. Art. 2176 (CC) 3. Strict Liability Torts:
f. ex. Art. 2183 & 2187 (CC)
Q: If there is a contract bet. the parties, can there be a quasi-delict committed by one against the other regarding the area covered by the contract?
A: If you look at Art. 2176, you get the impression that if there is a contract bet. the parties, they cannot be liable for quasi-delict on an area covered by the contract. The case of Cangco has not really resolve this controversy.
Case:
CANGCO VS. MANILA RAILROAD CO. [38 P 768] - Balane: There are two important principles that we learn fr. this case:
The difference in concept bet. contract & quasi-delict is that in a contract, there is a pre-existing juridical tie bet. the parties. Violation of the contract gives rise to liability but not to the juridical tie. Juridical tie is not borne by a violation. In quasi-delict, it is precisely the wrongful act
w/c gives rise to the juridical tie. Liability & juridical tie are simultaneous.
Contracts & quasi-delicts create two concentric circles w/ quasi-delict as the bigger circle.
[Note: There is a little mistake in Cangco. The SC said that the driver can be sued under culpa contractual. This is wrong. The driver cannot be sued as he has no privity of contract w/ the passenger.]
FACTS: Cangco was an EE of MRR Co. He takes the train going home from work. That day he alighted from the train while it was still slightly in motion. He landed on the elevated platform on top of some sacks of watermelon which made him fall violently, rolled away from the platform under the moving train where he badly crashed and lacerated his right arm. It happened at night bet 7-8pm and d station was poorly lit.
Cangco’s arm was amputated twice. The seriousness of his injury made him file a case for damages vs MRR Co.
HELD:
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform in the manner above stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train; and that they therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence.
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, [RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR], which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. (presumption juris tantum, rebuttable). Imputed liability in NCC is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations, or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual.
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or extra-contractual. Extra-extra-contractual obligation has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon it members, or which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certain members of society to others, generally embraced in the concept of status.
The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (contract of carriage). That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants.
The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a
complete stop before alighting (Doctrine of comparative negligence, Rakes doctrine). If the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is, therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence.
The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury." (Thompson, Commentaries on Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010.)
RULING: …that the train was barely moving when plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six meters from the place where he stepped from it. Thousands of person alight from trains under these conditions every day of the year, and sustain no injury where the company has kept its platform free from dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to believe that plaintiff would have suffered any injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not been for defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a safe alighting place.
CASE: Where there could still be QD even when there is contract of carriage –
GUTIERREZ VS. GUTIERREZ [56 P 177] FACTS:
A truck and a car collided on a narrow bridge. A passenger of the truck was injured and filed a case. The owner of the truck was made defendant although his driver was driving the truck at that time and he was not a passenger of the truck. The owner of the car was also made defendant although the driver of the car at the time of the collision was his son, 18 yrs. of age, w/ other members of the family accommodated therein, but not the car owner.
HELD: The court found both drivers negligent. The owner of the truck was made liable for culpa contractual, under the contract of carriage. The owner of the car was made liable under Art. 2180, imputed liability for culpa aquiliana.
FRAUD NEGLIGENCE
dolo Culpa
Nature of Act involves
willfulness or deliberate intent to cause damage or injury to another
mere want of care or diligence, not voluntary act or omission
Gives rise to Ø the act itself the want or care or diligence
A single act may be a crime and a QD
at the same time; (Art. 100, RPC) Injured party cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of defendant; (must choose 1 Rem.)
QUASI-DELICT CRIME
As to nature of Right violated
private right public right
Is a
Wrong against
the individual the State
Criminal
Intent not needed Necessary
Legal Basis for
Broad penal law necessary
liability Liability for Damage s
every QD gives rise to liability for damages
there are crimes without civil liability
Form of Redress
reparation for injury suffered/indemnification/co mpensation punishment/fine/impr isonment Quantu m of Evidenc e
preponderance beyond reasonable doubt
Compro
mise can be compromised criminal liability can never be compromised
REQUISITES FOR LIABILITY: (onus)
(1) Wrongful act or omission imputable to the defendant by reason of his fault or negligence; (2) Damage or injury proven by the person claiming
recovery;
(3) A direct causal connection between the negligent act and the injury.
DOCTRINE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE is that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury and without which the result would not have occurred.
The exemplification by the Court in one case is simple and explicit; viz: "(T)he proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately affecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom."
C. COMPLIANCE WITH OBLIGATIONS:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 1163. Every person obliged to give something is also obliged to take care of it with the proper diligence of a good father of a family, unless the law or the stipulation of the parties requires another standard of care.
Article 1164. The creditor has a right to the fruits of the thing from the time the obligation to deliver it arises. However, he shall acquire no real right over it until the same has been delivered to him.
Article 1165. When what is to be delivered is a determinate thing, the creditor, in addition to the right granted him by article 1170, may compel the debtor to make the delivery.
If the thing is indeterminate or generic, he may ask that the obligation be complied with at the expense of the debtor.
If the obligor delays, or has promised to deliver the same thing to two or more persons who do not have the same interest, he shall be responsible for any fortuitous event until he has effected the delivery.
Article 1166. The obligation to give a determinate thing includes that of delivering all its accessions and accessories, even though they may not have been mentioned.
Balane:
Three types of obligations.-- (1) obligation to give; (2) obligation to do; & (3) obligation not to do.
I. Obligation to give A. Specific thing B. Generic thing II. To do
III. Not to do (this includes all negative obligations like obligation not to give.)
Kinds of performance.--
1. specific performance - performance by the debtor himself ( applies only to Ø to give ) 2. substitute performance - performance at the
expense of the debtor
3. equivalent performance - grant of damages Articles 1163 - 1166 cover obligation to give.
Three Accessory Obligations:
1. Art. 1163.-- To take care of the thing w/ the diligence of a good father of a family until actual delivery.
2. Art. 1164.-- To deliver the fruits to the creditor (fruits produced after obligation to deliver arises.) 3. Art. 1166.-- To deliver accessions & accessories. Balane:
From the time the obligation arises, the creditor has a personal right against the debtor as to the fruits. But he has no real right over them until actual delivery.
Real right is a right w/c is enforceable against the whole world. He has only the personal right against the debtor w/ regard to the undelivered fruits.
This is bec. of the principle Non nudis pactis, sed traditione, dominia rerum transferentur (It is not by mere agreement, but by delivery, is ownership transferred.)
Personal right arises fr. the time the obligation to deliver arises whereas the real right does not arise until actual delivery.
Articles 1165 - 1167.-- Remedies Available to the Creditor (specific performance, substitute performance, equivalent performance.)
A. In obligations to give 1. A determinate thing
a. Specific performance b. Equivalent performance
2. A generic thing, all remedies are available
B. In an obligation to do , make a distinction:
In obligation to do, w/c is purely personal only equivalent performance is available
In an obligation to do w/c is not personal: a. substitute performance b. equivalent performance
Note: In obligations to do, specific performance is not available. The reason for this is that specific performance will give rise to involuntary servitude.
C. Obligation not to do
1. substitute performance 2. equivalent performance.
In all these cases, the creditor has the option of resolution or rescission under Art. 1191. In addition, he can also claim damages.
Article 1244. The debtor of a thing cannot compel the creditor to receive a different one, although the latter may be of the same value as, or more valuable than that which is due.
In obligations to do or not to do, an act or forbearance cannot be substituted by another act or forbearance against the obligee's will.
Article 1245. Dation in payment, whereby property is alienated to the creditor in satisfaction of a debt in money, shall be governed by the law of sales.
Article 1246. When the obligation consists in the delivery of an indeterminate or generic thing, whose quality and circumstances have not been stated, the creditor cannot demand a thing of superior quality. Neither can the debtor deliver a thing of inferior quality. The purpose of the obligation and other circumstances shall be taken into consideration.
Article 1460. A thing is determinate when it is particularly designated or physical segregated from all others of the same class.
The requisite that a thing be determinate is satisfied if at the time the contract is entered into, the thing is capable of being made determinate without the necessity of a new or further agreement between the parties
Article 442. Natural fruits are the spontaneous products of the soil, and the young and other products of animals.
Industrial fruits are those produced by lands of any kind through cultivation or labor.
Civil fruits are the rents of buildings, the price of leases of lands and other property and the amount of perpetual or life annuities or other similar income
NATURE AND EFFECTS OF Ø’s OBJECT OF THE Ø:
1. to give real Ø determinate (specific) or indeterminate (generic) 2. to do
3. not to do personal Ø positive (to do) or negative (not to do) REAL Ø:
a. DETERMINATE Ø – particularly designated from a particular class;
PRINCIPAL Ø – to give (to deliver) a determinate thing;
ACCESSORY Ø – exists even when not expressly stipulated;
(1) Art. 1163 – to take care of the thing with proper diligence of a good father of the family;
(2) Art. 1164 – to deliver the fruits; (441) natural / industrial / civil the Ø to deliver arises only if the creditor is entitled;
(3) Art. 1166 – delivery of the accessions and of the accessories (Art 440);
b. GENERIC THING is one that is indicated only by its kinds, without being distinguished from others of the same kind. (indeterminate)
In an Ø to deliver a generic thing, the object is determinable; when delivered it becomes determinate.
DELIMITED GENERIC not totally generic nor specific; oblig. To deliver one of SEVERAL things; does not have designation nor physical segregation; Rule re Fortuitous Events still apply. DETERMINATION OF DILIGENCE REQUIRED:
(1) LAW e.g. extra ordinary diligence required in Common carriers
(2) Stipulation of Parties
(3) Presumed: diligence of a Good father of the Family if none is specified/expressed by law or agreement.
REAL RIGHT is the power by a person over a specific thing, susceptible of being exercised against the whole world. PERSONAL RIGHT belongs to a person who may demand from another, as a definite passive subject, the fulfillment of a prestation.
From the moment the Ø to deliver a determinate thing arises, the creditors earns a personal right over the thing and its fruits, but only delivery or tradition transfers ownership that is a real right over the thing against the whole world.
For failure to deliver, the creditor’s remedy is not reivindicacion but specific performance.
[CHAPTER 2: Right of Accession – GENERAL PROVISIONS]
Article 440. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.
Kinds of Fruits;
1) CIVIL – derived by virtue of juridical relation
2) Natural – spontaneous products of the soil and the young and other products of animals;
3) Industrial – produced by lands of any kind through cultivation or labor or by reason of human labor.
D. KINDS OF CIVIL OBLIGATIONS:
1. AS TO PERFECTION & EXTINGUISHMENT: a. PURE –
(CHAPTER 3) Different Kinds of Obligations SECTION 1 - Pure and Conditional Obligations Article 1179. Every obligation whose performance does not depend upon a future or uncertain event, or upon a past event unknown to the parties, is demandable at once.
Every obligation which contains a resolutory condition shall also be demandable, without prejudice to the effects of the happening of the event.
Article 1197. If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof.
The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon the will of the debtor. In every case, the courts shall determine such period as may under the circumstances have been probably contemplated by the parties. Once fixed by the courts, the period cannot be changed by them.
A pure obligation is one w/c is not subject to a condition or a term.
CASE: re Art. 1179, par. 2
PAY V. PALANCA [57 SCRA 618]
From the manner in w/c the P/N was executed, it would appear that petitioner was hopeful that the satisfaction of his credit could be realized either through the debtor sued receiving cash payment fr. the estate of the late Carlos Palanca presumptively as one of the heirs, or, as expressed therein, "upon demand." (ALTERNATIVE Ø)
There is nothing in the record that would indicate whether or not the first alternative was fulfilled. What is undeniable is that on 8/26/67, more than 15 yrs. after the execution of the P/N on
1/30/52, this petition was filed. The defense interposed was prescription. Its merit is rather obvious. Art. 1179, par. 1 says so. xxx
The obligation being due & demandable (bec. Of the phrase “upon demand”), it would appear that the filing of the suit after 15 yrs. was much too late. PURE Ø demandable at once running of Rx.pd. starts immediately upon creation of the Ø;
Article 1179. Every obligation whose performance does not depend upon a future or uncertain event, or upon a past event unknown to the parties, is demandable at once.
Q: Does the happening of a condition give rise to the Ø? A: Not necessarily, only if suspensive condi.; if resolutory condi, the happening exctinguishes the Ø;
Q: In an Ø with a TERM will the answer above be the same? A:
b. CONDITIONAL
Article 1181. In conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition.
Article 1182. When the fulfillment of the condition depends upon the sole will of the debtor, the conditional obligation shall be void. If it depends upon chance or upon the will of a third person, the obligation shall take effect in conformity with the provisions of this Code.
Balane: We are talking here of a suspensive condition. First sentence of Art. 1182.--
The condition must be suspensive, potestative & depends on the sole will of the debtor.
EXAMPLE: "I promise to sell you my car for P1.00 whenever I like."
Q: Why does it make the obligation void?
A: Bec. such an obligation lacks one of the essential elements of an obligation, the vinculum juris, the binding force-- the means by w/c it is enforceable in court. In this case, there is no binding force. There is no obligation. It is a joke.
Potestative Condition is one w/c depends solely on the will of either one party.
EXAMPLE: " I will give you my plantation in Davao provided you reside in Davao permanently."
Casual Condition is one where the condition is made to depend upon a third person or upon chance.
EXAMPLE: "I will give you my land in Floridablanca if Mt. Pinatubo erupts this year."
Mixed Condition is one w/c depends partly upon the will of one of the parties & partly on either chance or the will of a third person.
Q: What if the condition is suspensive, potestative & depends solely on the will of the creditor, is the conditional obligation valid?
A: Yes. In fact, the obligation is not even a condition obligation. It is a pure obligation, binding at once.
CASE: the term whc parties attempted to fix were so uncertain it must be regarded as condition
SMITH BELL V. SOTELO MATTI [44 P 874]
Where the fulfillment of the condition does not depend on the will of the obligor, but on that of a 3rd person who can, in no way be compelled to carry it out, the obligor's part of the contract is complied w/, if he does all that is in his power, & it then becomes incumbent upon the other contracting party to comply w/ the terms of the contract.
FACTS: Øs in ©s entered bet. Plaintiff Corp. as seller and defendant as buyer:
© constituted on August 1918:
2 steel tanks 21K to be shipped fr NY delivered to Mla “w/in 3 or 4 mos.”
(Delivered; April 27, 1919)
Two expellers 25Kea to be shipped fr SF in Sept.1918 or ASAP (Delivered:Oct. 26. 1918)
2 electric motors 2K ea “Approx.delivery w/in 90days – This is not guaranteed.” (Feb. 27, 1919)
defendant refused to accept and pay deliveries b/c of delay HELD: At the constitution of the ©, the 1st W.War was still ongoing and the US govt was rigid on exportation of machinery such as the subjects of this ©; the term whc parties attempted to fix were so uncertain it must be regarded as condition, their fulfillment depended not only upon the effort of plaintiff Co. but upon that of the US govt, or 3rd person who could in no way be compelled to issue certificate of priority and permission. Thus the obligor will be deemed to have sufficiently fulfilled his part of the Ø if he has done all that is in his power even if condi.,in reality was not fulfilled. And when time of delivery is not fixed, stated in general terms or is indefinite, time is not of the essence- delivery must be made w/in a reasonable time.
Record shows that plaintiff did all w/in its power to have machinery arrive in Mla. ASAP, and notified defendant of such arrival STAT, court considered such as reasonable time. Plaintiff was ordered to pay.
Article 1183. Impossible conditions, those contrary to good customs or public policy and those prohibited by law shall annul the obligation which depends upon them. If the obligation is divisible, that part thereof which is not affected by the impossible or unlawful condition shall be valid.
The condition not to do an impossible thing shall be considered as not having been agreed upon. Balane:
This refers to a suspensive condition. There are 2 classes of impossible conditions:
1. Impossible in fact
EXAMPLE: "I promise to sell my car to Mr. M for P2 if he can swim across the Pacific Ocean for 2 hours." 2. Impossible in law or one w/c attaches an illegal
condition
EXAMPLE: "I promise to sell my car to Mr. M for P2 on condition that he burns the College of Law."
Effect of Impossible Condition It annuls the obligation w/c depends upon them.
The entire juridical tie is tainted by the impossible condition. Correlate this w/ Articles 727 & 873. Art. 727. Illegal or impossible conditions in simple & remuneratory donations shall be considered as not imposed.
Art. 873. Impossible conditions & those contrary to law or good customs shall be considered as not imposed & shall in no manner prejudice the heir, even if the testator should otherwise provide.
Tolentino:
In contracts, an impossible condition annuls the contract.
In gratuitous dispositions, the impossible condition is simply disregarded.
Balane: The first statement is inaccurate bec. donation is a contract & in a donation, the impossible condition does not annul the contract. It is simply disregarded. The proper way to say it is that:
In an onerous transaction, an impossible condition annuls the condition obligation.
In a gratuitous disposition, as in a donation or testamentary disposition, an impossible condition attached to the disposition is simply considered as not imposed.
Q: Why is there a difference?
A: Bec. in a donation as well as in a testamentary disposition, the causa or consideration is the liberality of the donor or testator, as the case may be. Even if you take away the impossible condition, there is still a reason for the disposition to exist-- liberality. They (donation & testamentary disposition) have both their underpinnings, liberality.
But in an onerous transaction, since an onerous prestation w/c is reciprocal requires concomitant performances, that impossible condition becomes part of the causa. Therefore, if the condition is impossible, there is failure of causa. In no causa, there is also no contract.
Paras:
Positive suspensive condition to do an impossible/ illegal thing The obligation is void (Art. 1183, par. 1.)
A negative condition (not to do an impossible thing) Just disregard the condition (Art. 1183, par. 2.)
A condition not to do an illegal thing (negative) This is not expressly provided for in the provision but is implied. The obligation is valid.
EXAMPLE: "I will sell you a piece of land provided you do not plant marijuana on it."
Article 1184. The condition that some event happen at a determinate time shall extinguish the obligation as soon as the time expires or if it has become indubitable that the event will not take place.
Balane: This article refers to suspensive conditions. If the condition is resolutory, the effect is the opposite.
Article 1185. The condition that some event will not happen at a determinate time shall render the obligation effective from the moment the time indicated has elapsed, or if it has become evident that the event cannot occur.
If no time has been fixed, the condition shall be deemed fulfilled at such time as may have probably been contemplated, bearing in mind the nature of the obligation.
Balane: This article refers to a suspensive condition.
Article 1186. The condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment.
Balane: This article refers to a suspensive condition.
Doctrine of Constructive Compliance There are three requisites in order that this article may apply:
1. Intent on the part of the obligor to prevent fulfillment of the condition. The intent does not have to be malicious.
2. Actual prevention of compliance (by the obligor) 3. Constructive compliance can have application only
if the condition is potestative. It can also apply to Mixed condition as to that part w/c the obligor should perform.
Kinds of Conditional Obligations: a.
Suspensive Condition (Condition precedent) Article 1187. The effects of a conditional obligation to give, once the condition has been fulfilled, shall retroact to the day of the constitution of the obligation. Nevertheless, when the obligation imposes reciprocal prestations upon the parties, the fruits and interests during the pendency of the condition shall be deemed to have been mutually compensated. If the
obligation is unilateral, the debtor shall appropriate the fruits and interests received, unless from the nature and circumstances of the obligation it should be inferred that the intention of the person constituting the same was different.
In obligations to do and not to do, the courts shall determine, in each case, the retroactive effect of the condition that has been complied with.
Balane:
This article refers to suspensive condition.
This article sets forth the rule of retroactivity in an obligation to give. This rule is logical but impractical. Many modern Civil Codes have discarded it.
No Retroactivity as to the Fruits Notice that there is no retroactivity w/ respect to the fruits. The fruits are deemed to cancel out each other. If only one of the thing produces fruits, there is no obligation to deliver the fruits.
Article 1188. The creditor may, before the fulfillment of the condition, bring the appropriate actions for the preservation of his right.
The debtor may recover what during the same time he has paid by mistake in case of a suspensive condition.
Balane: This article refers to suspensive conditions.
Bring the appropriate actions According to JBL Reyes, the phrase "may xxx bring the appropriate actions" is inaccurate. To bring action is to file a suit. But the creditor is not restricted to filing a suit.
The proper verb is not "bring" but "take." For example, in a sale of land subject to suspensive condition, the creditor should have the suspensive condition annotated on the title of the land. This is not bringing an appropriate action but taking an appropriate action.
The principle in this article is: Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt w/c means that the laws aid those who are vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights.
Q: Why does Art. 1188 give the creditor a recourse although technically the creditor still have no right?
A: Bec. as a matter of fact, although technically the creditor still have no right, he is already expecting a right. You cannot let the creditor sit & fold his arms & wait for his right of expectancy to be rendered illusory.
Article 1189. When the conditions have been imposed with the intention of suspending the efficacy of an obligation to give, the following rules shall be observed in case of the improvement, loss or deterioration of the thing during the pendency of the condition:
(1) If the thing is lost without the fault of the debtor, the obligation shall be extinguished; (2) If the thing is lost through the fault of the debtor, he shall be obliged to pay damages; it is understood that the thing is lost when it perishes, or goes out of commerce, or disappears in such a way that its existence is unknown or it cannot be recovered;
(3) When the thing deteriorates without the fault of the debtor, the impairment is to be borne by the creditor;
(4) If it deteriorates through the fault of the debtor, the creditor may choose between the rescission of the obligation and its fulfillment, with indemnity for damages in either case;
(5) If the thing is improved by its nature, or by time, the improvement shall inure to the benefit of the creditor;
(6) If it is improved at the expense of the debtor, he shall have no other right than that granted to the usufructuary. (1122)
(b) Resolutory Condition (Condition subsequent)
Balane: Art. 1190 refers to resolutory conditions. This is just the opposite of Art. 1189.
Article 1190. When the conditions have for their purpose the extinguishment of an obligation to give, the parties, upon the fulfillment of said conditions, shall return to each other what they have received.
In case of the loss, deterioration or improvement of the thing, the provisions which, with respect to the debtor, are laid down in the preceding article shall be applied to the party who is bound to return. As for the obligations to do and not to do, the provisions of the second paragraph of article 1187 shall be observed as regards the effect of the extinguishment of the obligation.
Balane: A condition is a future & uncertain event upon w/c an obligation or provision is made to depend.
Tolentino: xxx Futurity & uncertainty must concur as characteristics of the event.
A past thing can never be a condition. A condition is always future & uncertain.
Past event unknown to the parties It is really the knowledge of the event w/c constitutes the future. It is the knowledge w/c is future & uncertain.
EXAMPLE: " I will treat you for lunch if you get the highest score in the Civil Law Final Exams (on the assumption that Prof. Balane has already finished checking the papers.)" Here, the event (getting the highest score) is already a past event, yet the knowledge is future & uncertain.
Condition compared to a term
Condition Term
As to element of
futurity Same, may be past event unknown to parties
Same, always future
in the aspect of
certainty uncertain certain
Conditions can either be:
1. Suspensive condition (condition precedent) wherein the happening of the event gives birth to an obligation
2. Resolutory condition (condition subsequent) wherein the happening of the event will extinguish the obligation.
