2. OVERVIEW OF CON EDISON SYSTEM AND LIC NETWORK 2.1. Electrical System Overview
2.1.1. Power Delivery System
Con Edison delivers electricity to 3.2 million customers in New York City and Westchester County – a service territory of 660 square miles with a population of approximately 9 million people. Electricity is delivered through approximately 94,000 miles of underground cable and almost 37,000 miles of overhead cable. As shown in Figure 2-1, the Con Edison electric power delivery system is comprised of three distinct sub-systems: generation, transmission, and distribution.
Figure 2-1: The Power Delivery System
Connection to Other Systems/Utilities Generating Station Overhead Transformer 4kV Unit Substation Distribution Feeders Transmission Substation Area
Substation Network Customers
Apartment House School Commercial Hospital Financial Residential and light commercial customers 120 / 208 Volt Network 265 / 460 Volt Network Transformers
Central power plants1 generate electricity that is transmitted over high-voltage transmission lines (69,000, 138,000, and 345,000 volts) that have the capability of delivering electricity over long distances.2 These transmission lines supply the
distribution substations – known as area substations – where the voltage is reduced to primary distribution levels of 27 kV for Brooklyn and Queens, 33 kV and 13 kV for Staten Island, and 13 kV for Manhattan, the Bronx, and Westchester County.
From the area substations, high-voltage primary feeders distribute the power and feed a secondary system of low-voltage cables. In Figure 2-1, two different types of distribution systems (network and overhead) are shown. One type of secondary system is the
underground network system in which each feeder supplies transformers located throughout local streets. These network transformers reduce the primary distribution voltage to a level used by customers.
The network transformers supply a network grid of low-voltage (120-volt) cables located underground. There are 46 area substations in New York City. These area substations serve 57 networks in New York City with 1,070 primary feeders. A network may have from 8 to 28 primary high-voltage feeders connecting the area substation to the network. Both primary feeders and secondary cables run through underground electrical structures (such as manholes and service boxes) that are interconnected by an extensive conduit system. The Con Edison system has approximately 274,000 underground structures.
1 Since the restructuring of the industry in the late 1990s, Con Edison has sold most of its large electric
generating plants.
2 The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) administers the delivery of power through the
bulk power transmission system from generating plants to the distribution systems of the state’s electric utility companies.
Approximately 86% of the electricity delivered by Con Edison is carried by the
underground network distribution system. The remaining 14% consists of non-network distribution systems, which include radial and primary auto-loop systems, underground residential distribution (URD) systems, and 4 kV supply. The network system (which includes approximately 80,000 miles of underground cable in New York City) provides superior reliability when compared to the overhead non-network system because there are multiple and alternative paths for the electricity to flow through and reach customers and it is largely located underground where it is shielded from the effects of wind, trees, ice, lightning, and damage from vehicles. In addition, each network is designed to operate independently of every other network. As a result of this design, a problem in one network cannot affect customers in another network.
2.1.2. Primary Feeders
This diagram displays eight 27,000-volt primary feeders delivering electricity to a
network. The primary feeders supply electricity to numerous transformers (shown as blue boxes) that supply electricity to most customers via the low-voltage secondary grid. Large industrial and commercial customers of more than one megawatt (MW) are often supplied directly by several primary feeders.
Underground networks are designed to provide uninterrupted service to customers even when any two of the primary feeders supplying the network are out of service. This is known as a second contingency design criterion. The second contingency design criterion applies to all networks. It allows feeders to be removed from service for maintenance, modification, and additions without any impact on service. In addition, if cable and equipment failures occur, repairs or replacements can be implemented without affecting customers.
2.1.3. Secondary Grid Network
Figure 2-3 is a simplified diagram that shows the secondary grid overlay (in blue) in a network.
Figure 2-3: Illustration of Con Edison’s Primary and Secondary Network System
The secondary grid consists of multiple sets of low-voltage cables installed in ducts under the streets and connected in manholes and service boxes. Customers’ service lines are connected to these cables. The diagram illustrates how each secondary grid is a network of cables that allows the electricity to flow over numerous alternative paths, providing a very high level of reliability. Unlike an overhead radial system, where the electrical path
to the customer is known, in a network system, because of the degree of interconnectivity, the exact path to the customer is not known.
2.2. Overview of the Long Island City Network 2.2.1. Long Island City Network Description
The Long Island City (LIC) network is one of seven networks supplying Queens County. It serves northwest Queens and includes the neighborhoods of Long Island City, Astoria, Sunnyside, Woodside, and Hunters Point. The LIC network is bounded by the East River on the west and north, the Brooklyn-Queens Expressway on the east, and Newtown Creek on the south (see Figure 2-4). It delivers power to approximately 115,000 customers.
When compared with Con Edison’s other distribution networks, the LIC network has the highest capacity and demand for a network3 and the highest connected capacity and
demand per feeder. It also has the second highest number of customers and the third highest number of primary feeder cable miles.
The LIC network is supplied by the North Queens substation, which is capable of supplying 483 MW of electric power, or 122% of the network’s 2006 forecast peak summer demand. This supply capacity is well above the actual demand recorded during the summer of 2006 up to the time of the outage. The substation supplies 22 primary network feeders, totaling approximately 290 circuit miles in length, and 1,198 network transformers. These feeders and transformers supply electricity through and in an
3 While the Jamaica network has a larger total station capacity and demand, a portion supplies non-network
extensive underground system of 4,400 manholes, 11,000 service boxes, and 1,700 miles of secondary cable and an overhead system of 3,000 utility poles.
Figure 2-4: Map of Con Edison’s Long Island City Network Boundaries
The 2006 forecast peak demand for the LIC network was 395 MW. Commercial customers’ electric demand was estimated to be 300 MW and residential customers’ electric demand was estimated to be more than 100 MW. Commercial and residential peak demands, however, occur at different times of the day. In addition, there is a sharp distinction between weekday and weekend use in both the commercial and residential sectors. The weekday demand cycle seen in Figure 2-5 shows that the network generally
peaks at 395 MW, between 14:00 and 18:00. Weekend customer demand in the network was estimated to be 269 MW, approximately 68% of the weekday peak. The hourly demand cycle reflects the change in consumption over the course of a given weekday or weekend as customers use more or less electricity. The following graphs reflect the combined usage of business and residential customers.
Figure 2-5 Long Island City Network Hourly Demand Cycle on a Peak Demand Day
2.2.2. North Queens Area Substation
The North Queens area substation is a five-transformer substation whose supply is provided from the Astoria East 138 kV transmission substation. The station has five transformers rated at 93.33 Mega Volt Amperes (MVA) each. The five North Queens substation transformers convert the 138 kV transmission voltage to 27 kV distribution voltage. The 27 kV transformers in turn supply an “H” configured distribution bus within
the substation. The bus is divided into four main load sections that supply the 22 Long Island City primary network feeders. The feeders are connected to these load bus sections via circuit breakers as shown in Figure 2-6.
Figure 2-6: One Line Diagram of North Queens Substation
Note: ‘C’ indicates a closed circuit breaker and ‘T’ indicates an open circuit breaker
Each bus section contains eight circuit breaker positions that can be used to supply either network or non-network demand. The substation has three spare breaker positions to accommodate future network growth. Each of the station’s circuit breakers is capable of being operated either via local substation controls or remotely from the Con Edison Energy Control Center.
In order to facilitate feeder maintenance and to process feeders that may require repair, the substation is equipped with a test bus. The test bus is used to apply various test voltages and identification signals to the outgoing distribution feeders and to provide
protective grounding to facilitate safe working conditions for field crews. The test bus configuration as originally installed at the North Queens substation provided a way to process feeders during single contingency events. In the event the test bus was in use, feeder processing could be accomplished by connecting the test voltage and ground leads directly to the outgoing feeder potheads (a pothead is the point where the feeder
transitions from solid copper bus in the substation to underground distribution cable). This process requires additional coordination and incrementally increases the time needed to process feeders.
When originally placed into service, the 27-kV circuit breakers were fixed-position air-blast type. The company has a project to retrofit the circuit breakers with rack-out type breakers to improve operational flexibility and resolve breaker fault duty limitations. To date, 13 of the 22 existing network feeder breakers have been converted. For those breaker positions that have been converted, an additional means of applying test voltages and grounding for feeder processing will be available through the use of a ground and test device (G&T). To use the G&T device, the normal breaker element is withdrawn (racked out) and replaced with a G&T device. The G&T device has the ability to apply a ground to the associated feeder, and to provide connection points where test voltages can be applied via a flexible cable connection from one or more test sets located within the substation. This minimizes the delays encountered when connecting to the outgoing feeder potheads when the test bus is in use.
2.2.3. Network Distribution System
Con Edison’s regional Electric Operations organizations operate regional control centers. The LIC network is served by the Brooklyn/Queens Regional Control Center, which is responsible for the engineering, design, construction, maintenance, and operations of Con Edison’s electric distribution system in the boroughs of Brooklyn and Queens, including the LIC network.
Con Edison currently has in use three types of primary feeder cable: ethylene propylene rubber (EPR); cross-linked polyethylene (XLP); and paper-insulated lead-covered (PILC). The entire Con Edison distribution system has approximately 27% PILC cable, with the remainder equally divided between EPR and XLP cable. The average age of feeder cables is 25 years, broken down as follows: EPR cable with an average age of 10 years; XLP cable with an average age of 22 years; and PILC cable with an average age of 46 years. In the LIC network, EPR makes up 47% of the primary feeder cable, XLP makes up 40% of the primary feeder cable, and PILC makes up 13%. The LIC network primary feeder cables have an average age of 19 years.
A primary feeder comprises hundreds of sections of cable that are connected by splices (joints) in underground manholes. There are approximately 5,000 primary feeder splices in the LIC network. Fourteen percent, or nearly 700, of these splices connect PILC cable with either XLP or EPR cables. These splices are often referred to as transition splices or stop joints. At the time of the outage, the LIC network contained approximately 66 Elastimold 2W-1W and approximately 300 3W-1W Raychem stop joints. This compares
to almost 1,000 Elastimold stop joints and 11,000 Raychem stop joints system wide. The significance of these joints will be discussed in a later section.
2.2.4. Network Operating Tools
The Con Edison control centers are equipped with a wide array of tools and computer systems that provide alarms and visual displays to notify operators of changes in
equipment conditions. Operating personnel can coordinate responses based on telemetry, field information, and system impact. Listed below are some of the systems that Con Edison operators and engineers monitored to make decisions during the LIC network outage:
• The Distribution Information System, which shows feeder loading versus ratings.
• The Rapid Restore system, which sends and tracks operating orders electronically to selected operating personnel.
• The Feeder Management System, which tracks the status of distribution feeder processing and gathers information from the rapid restore system.
• The network Remote Monitoring System (RMS), which provides status, loads, adjacent transformer information, and demand-cycle graphs for network transformers.
• The Emergency Control System (ECS), which tracks emergency calls, including customer outages, manhole events, low-voltage complaints, and flickering-lights calls.
• The Outage Manager program, which is a Web-based application that presents information from the ECS in a format that operators use to monitor the total number of customers out of, and restored to, service during an event.
• Poly voltage load flow, which is a load flow program that models primary feeders and transformers and is used for engineering analysis. Similarly, WOLF is a load flow program that uses real time data and serves as an operating tool.
• System Operations Computer Control System – Expansion, which provides a graphical display of the equipment status at area substations, including breaker position, and feeder loads and voltages.
• Alarm Monitor, which sends alarms from various sources to provide operators with both visual and auditory indication of changes in system conditions. A more complete list with examples of screen displays is provided in Appendix B: Information Systems Descriptions.
2.3. Long Island City Network Reliability
Con Edison’s reliability exceeds, by a wide margin, that of all other utilities in the country. According to PA Consulting’s 2005 survey of 32 utilities across the country, Con Edison’s electric service was more reliable than any other utility in the survey and more than seven and one-half times more reliable than the average utility based upon customer interruption rates.
In 2005, LIC network customers experienced service reliability of less than three interruptions per thousand customers served per year, which is in the top quartile of the Con Edison networks, and is more than 400 times better than the average customer experience in New York State. Our average interruption time for all customers in the LIC network was less than one minute in 2005. By this measure, the LIC network performed better than our average network in 2005 and better than our average network in each of the past five years. This performance is also 138 times better than the rest of New York State, which averaged approximately two hours for all customers in 2005.
2.4. Long Island City Investments – Capital and Operations and Maintenance Expenditures 2.4.1. Capital Expenditures Overview
From 2000 through 2005 (see Figure 2-7), Con Edison spent more than $6.7 billion on capital improvements to its electric system. Of this amount, $4 billion, or 60%, was allocated for capital improvements to the electric transmission and distribution (T&D) system. And $2.8 billion of the $4 billion was spent for improvements to the electric distribution system. Of the $2.8 billion, 29% ($0.8 billion) was invested in the Brooklyn/Queens distribution system.
Consolidated Edison Company of New York Summary 2000 – 2005
($ Millions) Capital Expenditures
Year Total T&D
Electric Distribution Brooklyn/ Queens Queens 2005 1,542 1,008 651 211 101 2004 1,234 755 496 166 71 2003 1,164 654 406 120 54 2002 1,097 581 416 127 58 2001 966 536 428 112 56 2000 762 478 376 96 46 Total (2000 – 2005) $6,765 $4,012 $2,773 $832 $386
Figure 2-7: Con Edison of New York’s Capital Expenditures 2000-2005
Con Edison’s 2006 capital forecast (see Figure 2-8) for T&D is approximately $1.2 billion. Through June 2006, the year-to-date capital expenditures for electric distribution
were $401 million, of which $119 million was invested in the Brooklyn/Queens distribution system.
Figure 2-8: Capital Expenditures
Electric distribution capital investments are grouped into three categories:
• New business (increased customer demand, new customer demand), failures, system reinforcement (including load relief and reliability programs), and public improvement projects
• purchase of electrical distribution equipment
• purchase of meters $102 $376 $104 $71 $109 $108 $428 $111 $135 $184 $165 $416 $148 $156 $212 $248 $406 $155 $263 $92 $259 $496 $148 $250 $81 $357 $651 $176 $189 $169 $541 $657 $180 $118 $229 $0 $200 $400 $600 $800 $1,000 $1,200 $1,400 $1,600 $1,800 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Capital Expenditures ($Millions)
2000 - 2005 ACTUAL & 2006 Forecast
Transmission Distribution Gas Steam Other
Note : Excludes Nuclear Production
$762 $966 $1,097 $1,164 $1,542 $1,234 $1,725
Expenditures for these three categories are tracked as follows:
• New business expenditures, which reflect the costs to install or upgrade equipment to serve specific new customers or increased customer demand that can be specifically identified in the next 6 to 12 month period, plus additional unidentified growth based on the load growth forecast.
• Replacement expenditures, which reflect the costs to repair or replace cable sections and components that fail over the course of the year.
• System reinforcement expenditures, which are divided into load relief and
reliability. Load relief expenditures are based on the forecast of customer demand for the upcoming summer peak period and the cost to reinforce existing
distribution equipment to meet that demand. Equipment requiring reinforcement, including primary feeders, secondary systems, and transformers, are identified each fall and equipment reinforcement projects are planned for completion before June of the following year. Reliability expenditures reflect the cost of programs, such as cable replacement, that reduce the potential for equipment components to fail.
• Public improvement expenditures, which reflect the costs to enhance, relocate, and/or support cable and equipment to accommodate municipal and public authority capital improvement projects.
• Electrical equipment expenditures, which are principally transformers and related equipment and expenditures for meters, reflect the projects defined under the above programs.
2.4.2. Operations and Maintenance Expenditures
Con Edison’s Operations and Maintenance (O&M) expenditures since 2000 were almost $6 billion (see Figure 2-9). Of this amount, Electric T&D spending represents nearly $1.9 billion, including $1.2 billion for electric distribution O&M. O&M spending in the Brooklyn/Queens distribution system accounted for approximately one third of the company’s Electric Distribution O&M spending, with approximately half of that amount spent in Queens.
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. Summary 2000 – 2005
($ Millions)
Operations and Maintenance
Year Total T&D Distribution Brooklyn/QueenElectric
2005 1,057 332 $202 $70 2004 972 311 $199 $71 2003 929 293 $178 $59 2002 961 309 $182 $61 2001 1,002 309 $191 $60 2000 1,013 329 $201 $61 Total (2000 – 2005) $5,934 $1,883 $1,153 $382
Figure 2-9: Con Edison of New York’s Operations and Maintenance Expenditures 2000-2005
Con Edison’s O&M spending is characterized by the following distribution.
Approximately 40% of the O&M spending is for activities related to outages, manhole events, and equipment failures. Another 45% is incurred for inspections; repairs of distribution equipment, including transformers, unit substations, underground structures and equipment, overhead conductors and equipment; and other maintenance related activities. Meter and customer equipment inspections and testing represent approximately 9%. Maintenance associated with capital projects represents the remaining 6%.
2.4.3. LIC 2006 Capital Investments
From 2000 through 2005, the company invested approximately $50 million to upgrade approximately 520 primary cable sections as part of 40 projects in the LIC network. Included in this work was a major network reliability program that eliminated more than
400 sections of PILC cable and more than 200 targeted stop joints. Cable section
replacements on failures during this period have eliminated an additional 442 sections of PILC cable and approximately 1,400 sections of secondary cable. More than 350 new network transformers and more than 100 associated secondary mains were installed over this period. As part of Con Edison’s summer preparation programs, 73 primary feeders were tested, a process that eliminated 126 weak components on feeders.
Requests to provide new service to customers resulted in 21 major construction projects. The installation of new or upgraded services to new or existing customers entailed installation of new service entrance cable in either existing or newly constructed service ducts. Furthermore, many of these projects required upgrading or reinforcing distribution equipment (primary and/or secondary cable sections, transformers, etc.) in order to meet demand requirements in the LIC network.
Capital investments in the LIC network that are affected by New York City and state authority capital improvement plans include the reconstruction of five bridges over the Brooklyn-Queens Expressway. These five projects are as follows: from Broadway to 61st Street (in progress); Woodside Avenue Bridge over the LIRR at 63rd Street (funded, not
started); 11th Street and 53rd Avenue relocation due to construction of the New York State Department of Transportation’s storage garage (in progress); Honeywell Street Bridge over LIRR yard (completed); and Steinway Street Bridge over Grand Central Parkway (in progress). To accommodate such public improvement projects, the company is typically required to relocate and/or support its cable and equipment at its own expense.
Through June 2006, prior to the outage, capital spending in the LIC network represented 27% of the total spending in Queens. In comparison, the peak demand for electricity in the LIC network, as compared to all of Queens, is approximately 18%. Through June 2006, Con Edison had upgraded approximately 169 primary cable sections on 18 feeder projects. This work included the elimination of 32 paper PILC sections and eight targeted stop joints. To increase secondary system capability, 18 network transformers have been added or replaced and 16 associated secondary mains installed. As part of Con Edison’s system reinforcement programs, eight feeders were high-potential tested, eliminating 13 weak primary feeder components. Also, more than 80 secondary mains have been replaced and upgraded.
In addition, a variety of 2006 programs, including emergency response, new business, and other maintenance work, resulted in the replacement of feeder cable sections of all types. For example, more than 37 primary PILC cable sections and 360 secondary cable sections and services have been replaced during emergencies.
2.4.4. LIC Network Operations and Maintenance Expenditures
From 2005 through June 2006, O&M expenditures in the LIC network (estimated to be $11.3 million) represented approximately 21% of the total O&M spending in Queens (estimated to be $52.2 million) for this period. These LIC network O&M expenditures include approximately $4.5 million in expenses related to emergency response; $5.1 million for inspections and repairs of distribution equipment, including transformers, unit substations, underground structures and equipment, overhead conductors and equipment, and other maintenance related activities; approximately $1.0 million for meter and
customer-equipment inspections and testing; and approximately $0.7 million in maintenance costs associated with capital projects.
2.5. Ongoing Preparation for Heat Waves
2.5.1. General Heat Wave Classification and Escalation
Con Edison personnel monitor the electric system and anticipate weather conditions 24 hours a day, 365 days a year throughout the company’s service territory. The company carefully monitors the weather forecast for periods of hot weather, since the resulting high demand for electricity during such periods increases the operating temperatures of distribution system components. Heat places stress on the distribution system and its components and, at high levels, can cause components to fail.
The company classifies heat events in three categories. The first category is when the system peak demand is expected to be greater than 10,500 MW. When this occurs, the System Operations department declares an “extreme weather criteria” heat event. In preparation for such anticipated high demand, the following actions are taken:
• No primary feeders are removed from service for scheduled work, ensuring that the primary distribution system has the maximum capacity available.
• All feeders that are out of service are returned to service as quickly as possible, which also maximizes primary distribution system capacity.
• Work on equipment is not scheduled, except for work that does not reduce the capability of the distribution system and does not increase the
possibility of feeder outage.
The second, more serious, category of heat event is a weather forecast that indicates hourly wet/dry bulb average temperatures (temperature variable) greater than 80 degrees
Fahrenheit for three consecutive hours, for a period of two or more consecutive weekdays. When these conditions occur, the following additional actions are taken:
• The Distribution Engineering Command Post (DECP) is activated and acts as a centralized coordination center to monitor system conditions, provide engineering support, coordinate response with regional control centers, and provide periodic system updates.
• The regional control centers and DECP are placed under the Incident Command System (ICS), as shown in Figure 2-9.
• The Call Center is staffed to manage increased call volumes.
• There is additional staffing of field personnel, such as substation
operators, switching personnel, field operators, splicers, supervisors, and other groups participating in repairs and restoration.
• A dedicated communicator from Substation Operations is assigned to each regional control center to assist in the rapid restoration of equipment by acting as a liaison between the regional control center and the area distribution stations.
During a corporate emergency, such as the LIC network outage, Con Edison escalates the ICS structure by expanding the DECP and ultimately mobilizing the Corporate
Emergency Response Center (CERC).
The third most serious category of heat wave is a full scale incident. It is declared when one of the following occurs: equipment is significantly overloaded (exceeding emergency rating); 15,000 customer outages or more exist; or an entire network is out. The CERC supports and supplements the regional control centers as follows:
• Providing strategic management of an emergency incident from a central location.
• Bringing all of the resources of the corporation to bear on the emergency.
• Coordinating Con Edison’s regional control centers for information and decision making.
• Coordinating company forces, including Environment, Health and Safety (EH&S), Customer Operations, Public Affairs, and Logistics.
• Coordinating with outside agencies, including the New York City Office of Emergency Management (NYCOEM), the New York City Police Department (NYPD), the Fire Department of New York (FDNY), and the Department of Public Service (DPS).
• Coordinating crewing needs from all company areas (such as
Brooklyn/Queens, Staten Island, Bronx/Westchester, and Manhattan).
• Coordinating external crewing resources, including outside contractors, mutual assistance from other utilities, and mobile generator related personnel.
2.5.2. Emergency Response Structures
Managing the flow of information and establishing a centralized command structure for decision making is critical to effective emergency response. Con Edison utilizes an Incident Command System (ICS) at both the corporate and regional levels to respond to system emergencies. Figure 2-10 provides an overview of the ICS positions at the CERC.
In addition, Con Edison’s Regional Electric Operations organizations operate regional control centers with emergency plans. The LIC network is served by the
Brooklyn/Queens Regional Control Center, which is responsible for the engineering, design, construction, maintenance, and operations of Con Edison’s electric distribution system in the boroughs of Brooklyn and Queens, including the LIC network. The Brooklyn/Queens Emergency Plan contains a “Decision Matrix” to guide actions in the regional control room by the shift manager and other control room positions during each of the events described above. The emergency plan also establishes an ICS structure and required levels of control room and field crew staffing during each event. Figure 2-11 shows the Brooklyn/Queens ICS organizational structure.
EH&S OFFICER LIAISON OFFICER
INFORMATION OFFICER CUSTOMER OPS OFFICER
ENERGY SERVICES OFFICER LAW OFFICER
PUBLIC AFFAIRS / MEDIA RELATIONS
OPERATIONS CHIEF
ENGINEERING STAFF
SITUATION
UNIT LEADER DOCUMENTATION
RESOURCE UNIT LEADER
OPERATIONS UNIT LEADER PLANNING CHIEF
STAFF BRANCH DIRECTOR
LOGISTICS CHIEF ADMINISTRATION/
FINANCE CHIEF INCIDENT COMMANDER
Figure 2-11: Brooklyn/Queens Control Center Incident Command System
2.5.3. Electric Operations Emergency Plan
Con Edison’s Electric Operations Emergency Plan directs overall storm response, including heat wave preparation and restoration. The scope of Con Edison’s Electric Operations Emergency Plan has several key areas that specifically apply during a heat wave:
• Incident Command Structure (discussed above)
• Underground Contingency Plan
• Recovery Preparedness/Readiness Incident Commander Operations Section Chief Information Officer EH&S Desk Logistics Section Chief Administration / Finance Section Chief Mutual Aid Administration Unit Leader Air Branch Director Specimen Control Planning Section Chief SSO Representative
Time / Cost Unit Leader Facilities Branch Director Procurement Branch Director Central Field Services Branch Director Damage Assmt Unit Leader Liaison Officer / Energy Services Officer
EIC Unit Leader Control Center Unit Leader Trouble Analysis Unit Leader Construction Mgmt Branch Director Overhead Ops Branch Director Underground Ops Branch Director Tool Room Director
Cable & Splicing Division Supv
I&A Division Supv
UG / Ladder Line Division Admin Supv 4kV Maintenance Division Supv Flush Division Supv OH Restoration Division Admin Supv Ladder Line Division Supv OH Restoration Division Supv OH Restoration Division Supv Compensation & Claims Unit Leader
Line Clearance Division Supv
Contractor Support Non-Network Feeder Analysis Network WOLF Analysis Transformer Analysis 4kV Analysis OH Trouble Analysis Feeder Cell OH Emergency Division Supv Feeder Planning / Stats Site Assessment Supv
Site Safety Supv
FOD/SSO Supv
#9 Supv
Feeder Control Rep
ICS Emergency Response Organization IR Unit Supv EIC Staff De-mobilization Unit Supv Customer Advocacy Group EH&S Officer Customer Operations Officer
Call Center Unit Leader
Special Services Branch Director
In addition to the overall emergency plan, the company maintains emergency plans for the regional Electric Operations organizations. Con Edison’s emergency plan for its Brooklyn/Queens region provides planning guidance to all personnel having a role in emergency response. The mission is to maintain the integrity of the distribution system and respond to any emergency with the aim of prompt service restoration and continuous information flow, both internally and externally. The plan provides for public safety requirements and a hierarchy of critical needs directed at facilitating permanent restoration. Personnel requirements, organizational structure, work flow and
coordination, communications, material requirements, and environmental responses are detailed in the emergency plan. The Brooklyn/Queens Electric Operations emergency response plan is reviewed and updated annually.
2.6. 2006 Summer Heat Event Preparations
Every year, prior to the summer peak demand period, Con Edison reviews and completes a number of tasks and initiatives in preparation for extreme weather conditions and peak system demand. These include drills; training; feeder, transformer and substation
readiness through inspections, planned maintenance and replacements; materials and tools inventory readiness; and customer communications. The following sections describe these efforts and include specific actions taken in preparation for the 2006 summer.
2.6.1. Drills
Con Edison conducts drills throughout the year to help personnel prepare for various events that may arise. In advance of the summer period, each regional operating area in the Con Edison service territory conducts heat event drills that simulate the operation of
the distribution system under contingency conditions. The main participants in these drills are System Operations, Substation Operations, Electric Operations, Customer Operations, and the Distribution Engineering Command Post (DECP). The drill scenario covers a multi-contingency event and evaluates each department’s response to the scenario. Drills are generally conducted before June 15.
Prior to the 2006 summer, Con Edison’s Brooklyn/Queens Engineering and the Brooklyn/Queens Regional Control Center reviewed the company’s heat storm plan (HSP) for heat waves through tailboard discussions and a tabletop drill. The
Brooklyn/Queens region conducted a heat wave drill on May 11, 2006 that simulated a fourth contingency in a network with equipment overloads. Management employees who would assume positions in the Incident Command System (ICS) participated in the drill. Other company employees acted as facilitators and observers to make sure the drill objectives were met and that issues that arose were captured for a review. Following the drill, participating employees reviewed a formal critique.
2.6.2. Training
Con Edison provides training for employees with underground emergency
responsibilities to prepare them to implement the Emergency Response Plan. Training requirements are designed to enable emergency response participants to be effective in performing their assigned duties. Con Edison’s Regional Control Centers and field crews routinely perform emergency response work for conditions such as equipment failure and manhole events. The company also provides training for these employees. Field
hands-on training in splicing methods. The employee must then pass both a written and practical test to qualify as a splicer. Ongoing and refresher training includes splicing in primary and secondary underground systems, troubleshooting, carbon monoxide
procedures, manhole events, fire protection and prevention, electrical safety, respiratory protection, and personal protective equipment.
Control Center personnel are trained in communication and reporting techniques, including emergency communication, and in control center emergency management. Experienced field people are brought into the Control Center and receive formal training and are mentored by experienced Control Center personnel until they are qualified to fill a specific position.
Each year, Con Edison conducts a review of the company’s feeder process activities to identify actions that can minimize the amount of time required to restore a feeder. This review, which the company conducts before each summer, has resulted in substantial improvements since 1999 in the average amount of time required to restore a feeder. In preparation for the summer of 2006, Con Edison district operators received refresher training to prepare for work during periods of peak demand. District operators are responsible for the operation of the distribution system. The refresher training included drills on the application and removal of portable grounds, and reviews and updates of the feeder management system (FMS) and the transmission operation management system (TOMS). In addition, prior to the summer period, district operators reviewed system-operation procedures and completed a quarterly load-management training module,
which includes the system-operation computer (SOCCS-X) startup and shutdown process for area stations.
2.6.3. Feeder and Transformer Readiness
Before the start of each summer peak demand period, Con Edison prepares the system for forecasted electric demand growth by performing a series of maintenance and
reinforcement activities including: (1) primary feeder cable upgrades; (2) transformer upgrades; and (3) the Reliability Program. These summer preparation activities are described below.
(1) Primary feeder cable upgrades. System demand is reviewed at the end of each summer and portions of feeders requiring increased reinforcements, based on demand growth and forecast demand, are identified and upgraded prior to the next summer. In Brooklyn and Queens, for summer 2006, 591 sections of underground primary cable, 251 spans of overhead cable, and 27,817 feet of conduit were installed. In addition, 73
primary feeders were deloaded.
(2) Transformer upgrades. Similarly, transformer capability is reviewed at the end of each summer. Increased demand needs are met by upgrading existing transformers or adding new transformers to increase capacity to meet the forecast peak demand for the network. Through this program, 87 new transformers were installed in Brooklyn, and 79 new transformers were installed in Queens for summer 2006. Over 230 sections of underground cable were installed associated with this transformer work.
(3) Reliability Program. The feeder reliability program replaces portions of the system with better performing components and performs high potential (hi-pot) testing of feeders to identify weak components. The feeder reliability work for summer 2006
involved work on 14 Brooklyn and 6 Queens primary feeders. The company installed 605 sections of underground cable and 210 spans of overhead cable on feeders. For the
summer 2006 hi-pot program in the Brooklyn/Queens region, Con Edison tested 68 feeders and replaced 141 components identified during these tests.
Overall, between September 2005 and May 2006 in Brooklyn/Queens, Con Edison repaired or replaced 1,952 secondary cable (mains), 486 transformers, and 436 cable joints in preparation for the summer.
Specifically for the LIC network, Con Edison visually inspected 355 transformers and network protectors before June 1, and another 102 transformers between June 1 and July 16. These inspections resulted in the replacement of 38 transformers and network
protectors. The company also installed six transformers of additional capacity in the LIC network as part of the 2006 load-relief program, and upgraded 12 transformers to provide additional reinforcement in critical areas of the network. The company also installed cathodic protection, a corrosion prevention measure, on 74 transformers and completed remote monitoring system (RMS) repairs to 94 units in the LIC network before the summer of 2006.
2.6.4. Substation Operations Readiness
Substation Operations implements special programs for a period when high customer demand and loads are predicted. These programs include inspections and testing of key station components, such as breakers, transformers, and capacitor banks.
Several specific steps are taken when a heat event is forecasted. These steps include increased staffing of qualified substation operators and maintenance crews as well as added supervision.
In addition, a dedicated communicator from Substation Operations is assigned to each regional control center to assist in the rapid restoration of equipment. The
communicator’s role is to act as liaison between the regional control center and the area distribution stations. The communicator adjusts staffing at distribution stations to accommodate feeder processing needs in anticipation of changing conditions. The Substation Operations communicator monitors the estimated times of completion for work in the field by staying in direct communication with the feeder boss and the shift managers on duty at the regional control center.
In advance of the summer period and prior to each high-demand period, all test
equipment used for the processing of distribution feeders is verified as operational and available for use. This includes equipment such as:
• Station high-voltage test sets to locate faults and perform dielectric proof testing
• Low-voltage test sets to perform phase identification testing
• Portable grounds to provide safe working conditions
The stations also are checked to ensure that the proper personal protective equipment is available for personnel to use during the processing of distribution feeders.
2.6.5. Materials and Tools Inventory Readiness
Central Field Services (CFS) and Purchasing departments manage all emergency logistics support. In a corporate emergency, large-scale purchase and delivery functions are
directed by the logistics desk at the CERC.
CFS support encompasses garages for vehicle repair and maintenance, storerooms for daily and critical inventory needs, fleet operations for transportation and field deliveries of materials and equipment, protective equipment testing, capital tools, and
waste-management operations. On an emergency basis, many services may be scaled up to meet increased volume and expanded requirements. Specific additional emergency
responsibilities may include, but are not limited to, ice and dry ice distribution to customers, emergency generator procurement and deployment, meal deliveries, staging, hotels and transportation for mutual assistance crews, and management of the mobile command buses. As required, overtime and emergency duty call-in lists are utilized to scale up resources for unanticipated events.
Purchasing maintains lists of suppliers and commodities with emergency vendor contact information. In the event of an emergency, Purchasing contacts major suppliers to alert them that emergency requests may be forthcoming. During an emergency, Purchasing monitors the situation and stays in contact with operating departments to better determine immediate needs and to arrive at forecasted needs for materials, equipment, and services.
Purchasing reviews the on-hand quantities of material in inventory and, if required, places replenishment orders on an expedited basis. In addition, the company relies on its cross-docking procedures, whereby material and equipment are delivered directly from vendors and issued to field crews, eliminating the need to maintain certain inventory levels.
If contracted vendors are unable to meet increased needs, Purchasing seeks other distributors, manufacturers, and service providers to obtain the required materials or services. Purchasing works with Engineering and Environment, Health and Safety (EH&S) to ensure that the technical and environmental needs of the organizations are met.
Before a CERC is established, both CFS and Purchasing participate in a pre-event conference call to plan for required coverage. CFS also establishes a presence at the DECP to act as a liaison and coordinate and track emergency generator activities. CERC logistics personnel contact various vendors to monitor adequate supplies and services and expedite deliveries for such items as underground cables, connectors, splices, safety equipment, cable reels, dry and wet ice, emergency generators, and contractors to assist in restoration activities.
CFS establishes an on-site ICS to coordinate with the logistics desk at the CERC, as well as to respond to any emerging needs from other regions. During emergencies, CFS provides 24/7 coverage at its facility in Astoria (the main warehouse and field command post site), as well as in regional locations. The Emergency Operations section of CFS implements all generator deployment and fueling activities. CFS augments its workforce
with employees from other departments to complete the wide range of emergency functions previously listed.
Purchasing assigns buyers and managers to the CERC on a 24/7 basis and has additional buyers and managers in the office supporting the effort. Purchasing personnel at the CERC desk work with CFS to be sure vendors are prepared to meet emergency needs.
2.6.6. Pre-Summer Customer Communications
Con Edison provides information to its customers to help them prepare for emergencies. The company’s Customer News is sent to all customers six times a year. Each year, several issues include articles that inform customers how to prepare for an emergency involving the loss of electricity and who to contact at Con Edison for assistance. The company’s Web site also includes important information for customers on storm
preparations, including pre-storm preparations, safety precautions, storm tips, and the use of generators. Topics covered include:
• Keeping safe from fallen power lines during storms
• Disconnecting appliances and electric circuits during power outages
• Using emergency generators safely
• Handling food and water safely in an emergency
• Using a checklist to prepare for a storm
• Reporting outages and fallen power lines to Con Edison at 1-800-75-CONED
2.7. Long Island City Event Pre-Event Response
The electric demand forecast for July 17 to July 21, 2006 was expected to be greater than 10,500 MW. As a result, the System Operations department declared an “Extreme
Weather Criteria” heat event. In preparation for this demand, no work that would reduce the capability of the distribution system or increase the possibility of feeder outages was
permitted. Equipment used for processing of distribution feeders was checked as operational.
Because the extended weather forecast for July 17 to July 21 indicated hourly wet/dry bulb average temperatures greater than 80 degrees Fahrenheit for three consecutive hours, for a period of two or more consecutive weekdays, as described earlier, the company activated the DECP on July 16, placed the DECP and the regional control centers under the ICS, increased field personnel staffing, and assigned a dedicated communicator from Substations Operations to each regional control center.
2.7.1. System Operations Pre-Event Actions
Prior to the heat-wave period, System Operations adjusted the staffing requirements for a forecasted demand of more than 12,000 MW. A dedicated feeder boss and an associate chief district operator were assigned to each shift in the company’s Energy Control Center in Manhattan for the duration of the anticipated heat wave. This staffing increase resulted in doubling the typical number of district operators on each shift, including two upper-level managers in the control room overseeing the operation. The company also assigned support staff responsible for maintaining Feeder Management System (FMS) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems to provide 24-hour coverage in the event of a system problem.
2.7.2. Brooklyn/Queens Pre-Event Actions
Beginning Wednesday, July 12, Brooklyn/Queens Electric Operations took several actions to prepare for the period of extreme weather and high demand that was predicted for the following week. These actions included conducting an operational review of the
Brooklyn/Queens distribution system and reviewing and prioritizing the steps to be taken to restore any primary voltage distribution equipment that was out of service.
The Brooklyn/Queens region mobilized at 18:00 on Sunday, July 16, following the guidelines outlined in the HSP. Brooklyn/Queens held its initial status update meeting on Monday, July 17, at 07:30. The organization adjusted its work schedule from a Monday-to-Friday schedule to a round-the-clock schedule to increase support during critical periods and reduce response time to events during the critical, high-demand periods. The schedule was designed to provide additional coverage on the off-shifts and the weekend.
2.7.3. Substation Operations Pre-Event Actions
The staffing in Queens was increased to prepare for the expected high system demand prior to the incident, beginning on Monday, July 17. Each of the area distribution stations in Queens (Jamaica, Corona, Glendale, and North Queens) were staffed with two
operating crews, a maintenance crew, and a supervisor. This doubled the area’s normal staffing of distribution station operators.
In anticipation of the extreme heat and system loading expected during the week of July 16, 2006, a Substation Operations communicator was assigned to the Brooklyn/Queens Control Center at 07:00 on Saturday, July 15. This position was staffed continuously throughout the event. Additionally, Substation Operations provided increased staffing at the Energy Control Center in Manhattan. This provided additional focus on the needs of the various area stations.
