The Philosophy for Children program

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Ann Gazzard teaches in the Department of Educational Foundations at l\/lontclair State University. She has published previously in Thinking. This paper is part of a more compre- hensive document which also analyzes the extent to which other programs for teaching philosophy in the schools incorporate the many aspects of the discipline of philosophy into their practice.

Philosophy for Children and the Discipline of Philosophy

Ann Gazzard

T

he Philosophy for C h i l d r e n program is examined here i n terms of its ability to teach philosophy to children or, as the advocates of Philosophy for C h i l d r e n would prefer to say, 'to b r i n g philosophy to children', 'to do philosophy with children', or indeed, 'to engage i n philosophic inquiry with children'. However, the nature of philosophy itself first needs clarification. Given that even the professional philosophers disagree about its nature and purpose, we need) i f possible, an account of it that accom- modates these various interpretations and we need then to delineate the components necessary for its success- f u l instruction. H a v i n g then a m o d e l by which to evaluate programs that hope to teach it, we can turn to the Philosophy for C h i l d r e n program and see to what extent it lives up to the proposed theoretical ideal .

The Nature of Philosophy

'Philosophy' lends itself to many interpretations, and over time, this i n itself has become a respectable domain of inquiry for professional philosophers. T h e literature yields three interpretations under which a variety of other views can however be success- fully subsumed.

There is the understanding of p h i - losophy as a type of striving associated with seeking to know how to live a bet-

ter life suggested by expressions like 'the search for meaning,' 'the pursuit of truth,' 'the desire for wisdom,' and 'the search f o r the r a t i o n a l l i f e ' . Secondly, there is a view which renders it a specific body of problems and/or the history of the ideas of past and pre-

sent philosophers. O n this account, the philosopher is one who exhibits a special competence with the traditional philosophical methods and con- tents. T h i r d l y and more recently, there is the view that philosophy is a particular way of thinking most often cast as reflective thinking, something of a meta-discipline which makes possible the elucidation and critical appraisal of virtually any problem f r o m any discipline. L o o k i n g at each of these a little more closely we find the following.

'The Search for Wisdom': Philosophy as a Striving to Live a More Reasonable, More Meaningful Life

O n this view, philosophy involves not only 'knowing' i n the sense of understanding or appreciating the circumstances that render knowledge meaningful, but also a disposition to act i n accordance with that way of knowing. In other words, it is not enough to know what one must do but one must also have a disposition to act i n accordance with that way of knowing. A philosophy program intending to teach this view of philosophy then would need to generate two qualities i n its students: first, a capacity for generating the truth-value of propositions as well as a capacity for evaluating different sets of circumstances i n order to find those that render the propositions most m e a n i n g f u l ; a n d second, an awareness o f the behavior whose appropriateness can be inferred f r o m these deliberations together with the realization that its execution is prefer- able to any other action.

W h i l e not w a n t i n g to deny the importance of the first set of qualities

to this view, it is important here to highlight that feature of this interpretation of philosophy that renders it unique, namely, its behavioral component. Recommendations for teaching practices that might foster the requisite behavioral disposition or indeed any others are not easy to formulate. It does seem evident, however, that, no matter what else might be involved, the execution of t h o u g h t f u l action demands a role model. That is, exposure to persons who themselves act i n accordance with their considered beliefs is surely useful for developing action based on sound practical reasoning. A t the same time, teaching philosophy; on this account of it, also suggests that teachers be able to share with the students a love of the enter- prise i n which they are engaged, for it is only i n this way that they can trans- mit to their students a real sense that it is worth the effort to strive to live with a greater understanding of themselves and the world.

With respect to the history of philosophy and the traditional philosophic problems, there is no logical reason why philosophy i n the sense of know- ing about these things would alone make a person wise, more reasonable, or his/her life more meaningful. In other words, the teaching of philosophy on this first interpretation of it need not utilize the history of philosophy or the particular problems which it treats. O f course, an acquaintance with this subject-matter should not detract f r o m the understanding being sought but the point is that it alone will not necessarily generate that same understanding .

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Academic Philosophy: Philosophy as the History of Philosophy or Philosophy as the Traditional Problems of Philosophy

Now let us turn to the second interpretation o f 'philosophy,' namely, p h i - losophy as a body of content or subject-matter. T h e subject-matter

referred to here covers the history of philosophy or philosophical thought on the one hand, and the classical problems of philosophy o n the other.

That is to say, o n this view a comprehensive understanding of philosophy cannot be reduced merely to an historical account of philosophy. T h e view of philosophy as content admits of a less myopic construal than the mere ren- dering of what this or that philosopher has said; it is also substantive i n the sense of an appreciation of the traditional problems of philosophy.

In any given period, certain problems come to be identified as peculiar- ly philosophical problems. For example, i n our own historical era, there are such dominant problems as free will and determinism, the mind-body rela- tion and personal identity. If one con- strues philosophy as a discipline atten- tive to such problems a n d the world-views to which they give rise, it would follow that a course i n philoso-

phy would need to treat precisely these issues.

Moreover, one would expect that the more lucid the presentation of these problems, the better would be the philosophic education. T h e p r o g r a m need not, however, have a h i g h level of sophistication i n all areas of philosophy, nor even i n one. Indeed, this expectation is seldom, i f ever, satisfied, even i n the case o f p r o f e s s i o n a l philosophers whose specialist areas accumulate literature so quickly that its absorption requires more attention than can be given. Nevertheless, enough substantial i n f o r m a t i o n about the traditional problems of philosophy is needed to foreclose the possibility of either a biased or a too-narrow cover- age of them. T h e good teacher of p h i - losophy then would educate for understanding philosophy with breadth as well as depth. His/her task would be to create an intellectual climate that not only is conducive to student contribution, but one that also provokes students into stretching their t h i n k i n g at

least one step further. T h e teacher of philosophy, that is, is not so m u c h required to cultivate and produce professional philosophers as to nurture an appreciation of what it is about philosophy that makes it worthy of professional pursuit.

Critical Analysis: Philosophy as a Meta- Discipline of Intellectual Reflection

N o w let us turn to the third concept of philosophy and determine the extent to which it demands a curriculum consistent or otherwise with the foregoing. Philosophy is often regarded as simply a reflective turn of m i n d : that is, it is presented as a predisposition to intellectual reflection where the subject of the reflection is most often the

conceptual framework i n which the problem or issue i n question happens to be. For example, to think philosophically about the problem of abor- tion would entail reflection u p o n and analysis of global concepts like 'the right to life,' 'the ownership of choice,' 'the morality of murder,' etc. Scientific reflection, i n contrast, would focus u p o n issues like probability of fetus survival, the adoption rate after birth of unwanted child, etc., that is, u p o n issues f o r m u l a t e d by and large i n terms of statistical realities. O n this view of philosophy, virtually any problem can be treated philosophically, and viewing problems philosophically, i n c l u d i n g the traditional problems, usually signifies an analysis of the language i n terms of which the problems are themselves f o r m u l a t e d . ' P h i l o - sophy' here is concerned with m a k i n g explicit the assumptions and implica- tions concealed i n the questions and answers that the problems invoke.

To be able to practice this type of philosophy students would need to be taught two things. Insofar as philosophy rests heavily u p o n the distinction between e m p i r i c a l a n d conceptual matters, part of what students would need to know is how to make this distinction. A n d inasmuch as philosophy is here concerned to circumscribe the domain of possible states of affairs and events f r o m those that are not possible, students would need the skills for not only discriminating conceptual possibility f r o m empirical possibility but also for ascertaining the limit-points

within each of them. Basic to all these higher-level deliberations, however, is the ability to know what constitutes a coherent description of events, for this ability transcends the empirical- con- ceptual boundary. T h a t is to say, the philosophy student would need also to know how to determine when an account of a matter reflects a coherent description of events irrespective of whether the d o m a i n of inquiry be the nature of a particular empirical impos- sibility or of a conceptual possibility. It is not sufficient, however, that students merely do this. They need also to be able to articulate for others what they have done, that is, to be able to delineate the features of the matter which constitute its coherency, and accord- ingly, they would need practice i n the verbal and/or written articulation of their thinking.

T h e traditional problems of philosophy are i n themselves of little use i n acquiring these skills of analysis familiar to contemporary philosophy. T h e so-called traditional problems, however, do admit o f the contemporary approach and m u c h recent literature is i n this vein. A l t h o u g h a study of the traditional problems does not i n itself advance the teaching o f philosophy as a method of analysis and reflection, the application of the contemporary approach to the traditional problems does. T h e student of philosophy might well benefit, therefore, f r o m exposure to the contemporary dialogue. It would afford a familiarity with the tools o f conceptual analysis as well providing a unique opportunity to experience the intellectual inheritance of the past. Such an approach to teaching philosophy represents one way of inte- grating the second and third conceptions of philosophy presented here.

The Proposed Model for Teaching Philosophy (Ix edited)

T h e proposed m o d e l is that the successful, i f not ideal, practice of teach- i n g philosophy requires components drawn f r o m each of the three conceptions of philosophy presented above.

By considering the consequences of excluding pedagogy that is peculiar to any one of these interpretations, the necessity of their inclusion i n the practice of philosophy should be ratified.

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First, let us consider the effects of a philosophy program that fails to generate i n its students the desire to know how to live a more meaningful life.

Three possibilities suggest themselves.

T h e program would be reduced to either mere t h i n k i n g skill development, the history o f intellectual thought, or some c o m b i n a t i o n o f them, h i any case, two undesirable outcomes are invoked. First, the processes o f critical t h i n k i n g a n d reflection are likely to become ends i n themselves. Sophism is a good example here. W h e n students are not taught to use their intellectual processes i n the context of the search for understanding and meaning, they are open to acquiring the mindless habit of applying them i n the manner of a rit- ual to all problems they confront.

While t h i n k i n g processes might be developed i n this way to a h i g h level of excellence, the unreflective application of the respective corporate skills defies the 'true' nature of the philosophic spirit. Moreover, the practice of ritualized application closes minds on issues that are fundamentally open.

For example, it does not allow for the reassessment of thinking strategies i n light of die intricacies and nuances of each situation and u p o n the acquisi- tion of new i n f o r m a t i o n . In other words, students may i n the absence of the search for meaning have as their goal skill proficiency. T h i s is unfortunate primarily because it serves to cur- tail the other uses to which t h i n k i n g can be put, and it is problematic because it fosters the formulation of problem solutions based on reason alone, that is, upon reason i n the absence of experience, the meaning of that experience, and the consequences both potential and actual thereof

T h e second undesirable outcome of programs inadequately generating the desire for meaning is that students are unlikely to display much incentive to search for the meaning i n their everyday lives. Philosophy programs need to impart a love of knowledge and understanding. W i t h i n the context of the classroom, any lack of incentive for understanding or grasping the mean- i n g o f i n f o r m a t i o n will not be so apparent. However, outside the classroom where the motives o f pleasing

the teacher and passing examinations are no longer relevant, students are less likely to be concerned with reflection u p o n and interpretation of everyday experience. Consider, for example, a child who i n the context of the classroom applies his critical thinking skills to a passage i n his textbook, yet who outside the classroom does not think to apply the same thinking skills to the discourse of a f r i e n d . While he can ascertain the validity, worth and meaning of his textbook, he is not a f f o r d e d the same o p p o r t u n i t y i n respect of his friend's dialogue. It is not that the friend's discourse fails to admit of such analysis. T h e point is that without the motivation to p e r f o r m reflective analysis, the range of possible meanings that this child could extract f r o m the interaction with his f r i e n d is curtailed. W h e n the desire for u n d e r s t a n d i n g remains u n t a p p e d , children are often left i n a state of cognitive dissonance, namely, between how to think about classroom material and how to think about the rest of their lives.

Programs which do not attempt to generate the desire for understanding, therefore, relegate education to something that happens only i n the context of the classroom. Insofar as all aspects of our lives need understanding, however, it seems unreasonable to construe the pursuit of meaning as merely a function of in-school education. Every aspect of our daily lives admits of a philosophic interpretation and any program which fails to encourage this could not, therefore, with good reason, claim to teach philosophy.

Let us now turn our attention to those p h i l o s o p h y programs w h i c h exclude f r o m their design the traditional subject matter of philosophy, whether it be the historical study or classical problems of the discipline.

Programs which generate an understanding o f p h i l o s o p h y as certain processes of t h i n k i n g and/or the search for meaning alone, deny students an appreciation of the great tradition of intellectual thought that has come to be known as philosophy. In so doing, children are denied access to a rich source of ideas and meanings that might contribute to their understand- i n g of themselves and their world.

T h i s orientation to philosophy also imputes little worth to the interests of key concern to professional philosophers and the ways of approaching problems that philosophers use. For children, this is unfortunate. O n the one hand, it is a familiarity with these intractable problems o f philosophy a n d the philosopher's u n r e l e n t i n g pursuit of them that might encourage them to confront the perplexities and apparent irresolvable difficulties of everyday life. O n the other, it is the same familiarity that develops an attitude less concerned with closure and more concerned with clarification and understanding. Moreover, the philosophic literature exemplifies different ways of confronting problems that children could assimilate; they could find dispositions and processes of thinking to meet their own needs. In short, the respect and involvement that the seemingly recalcitrant problems o f philosophy engender i n professional philosophers and others can help students recognize that the problems worth attempting and those that it is plausible to attempt are not only the ones whose solutions are guaranteed ,

O f course anyone familiar with the classical philosophic problems is aware that the amount of relevant data that can be accumulated i n respect of any one problem is boundless. Therefore, the amount of philosophic subject- matter that needs to be included i n a philosophy course for it to be considered successful i n this regard needs also to be considered. Two criteria for making this assessment present themselves: the intricacy and intractability of the philosophic issue under consideration; and, the prior experience with and competency for dealing with the philosophic issues that the prospective students already have. Requisite to all variants on either of these dimension s, however, is the provision of at least that amount of subject-matter which would serve to prevent philosophic indoctrination or indoctrination into a particular p h i l o s o p h i c viewpoint.

Instruction, that is, which fails to com- municate accurately the range of opin- ions concerning a particular philosophic issue or which involves the assertion of controversial philosophic views without reasoned consideration

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of the broadly h e l d contending views, can be indicted for inculcating biased views. O f course, there are those persons who consciously seek to teach i n this way primarily f o r the purpose of instilling i n the y o u n g a specific ideol- ogy. Notwithstanding the seriousness of this malpractice, there is also the p r o b l e m o f inadvertent i n d o c t r i n a - tion; that is, the inculcation of beliefs which occurs as a result o f the teacher's ignorance about the particular philosophic point under consideration. For example, a teacher who comes to a place i n the lesson where the m i n d - body problem arises without having p r i o r exposure to the centuries o l d debate about this problem, may react so adversely to any account of, say, dualism that intellectual inferiority is automatically i m p u t e d to it. Insuf- ficient attention to the subject-matter of philosophy, therefore, can trans- mute readily i n the context o f the classroom to unintentional indoctrination. Ignorant of the range and the subtlety o f arguments that accrue i n respect of any philosophic viewpoint, teachers may remain closed to the philosophic vitality o f their students and may unwillingly discourage its advancement. B o t h teachers and students, therefore, need to be educated i n philosophic subject-matter so that the possibility o f philosophic indoctrination is greatly reduced.

Finally, let us consider the outcomes of philosophy programs which fail to develop the reflective habit of m i n d . T h r e e consequences present themselves. First, a student's role i n learn- i n g is relegated to that of passive recip- ient o f such i n f o r m a t i o n as the educational system chooses to commu- nicate. I n other words, students remain ill-equipped or at least they are not encouraged to assess and make meaningful the diverse i n f o r m a t i o n with which they are bombarded daily both within and without the school context. Second, pupils are denied the joy and satisfaction that the t h i n k i n g through of issues both philosophical and otherwise engenders. A n d third, they are left frustrated i n their love of learning and pursuit of truth since the skills w h i c h w o u l d allow t h e m to achieve these ends are left unstimulat- ed. Without a component designed to

encourage the reflective habit of m i n d , therefore, philosophy programs may amount to little more than descrip- tions of the different philosophical viewpoints wherein the opportunity to participate i n the practice of philosophy and the kinds o f t h i n k i n g that, i n the first place, generated those viewpoints, is not provided.

Again, the amount of emphasis that any philosophy program should place u p o n the development of the reflective habit of m i n d as opposed to any other aspect of philosophy deserves consideration. It seems uncontroversial that the reflective habit of m i n d should be developed i n students to its fullest potential. So the question then turns to the goal at which this development is aimed. To educate reflective think- i n g to its fullest potential seems desir- able up to, but not including, the point that t h i n k i n g becomes an end i n itself To discourage students, that is, f r o m b e c o m i n g avid little analyzers who analyze ' everything to death ' seems a more appropriate goal and one more i n keeping with the philosophic spirit discussed earlier. T h a t is to say, the search for more meaning and a better understanding o f it needs to be encouraged simultaneously, so as to tem- per the predisposition to chronic ana- lycity. It orients the capacity f o r reflective criticism so that it can function as a tool i n pursuit o f meaning, and a tool of service to m a n k i n d rather than as an isolated, critical, yet shallow perspective u p o n reality. Socrates reminds us of the importance of this framework i n the following passage:

Even i f we knew how to t u r n stones into gold, such knowledge w o u l d be worthless. F o r i f we d i d not know how to use gold, it w o u l d do us no good.... E v e n i f there were some knowledge that w o u l d make us deathless, i f we d i d not know how to use our deathless- ness, even that w o u l d do us n o good.^

O n e aspect o f teacher performance stands above others as being crucial to the successful development of reflective thinking. T h e teacher must be adept i n the skills that he/she is attempting to teach. For example, a teacher who is not proficient him/her- self i n assessing coherency would not be able to assist students i n recogniz- i n g the incongruities i n the expression of others, he/she could not help further the students own analytic skills

nor could he/she recognize and correct specious reasoning when it d i d occur.

In conclusion then, programs for teaching p h i l o s o p h y w h i c h do not include practices b e f i t t i n g each o f these three interpretations of philosophy fail to make use of the wealth of knowledge that has come to be known as philosophy. As a result, students are d e n i e d access to many sources of knowledge that can help them with both their academic pursuits and the fulfillment of their everyday lives. I do not wish to suggest that the exclusion of any one of these components f r o m a course will serve necessarily to vitiate any contribution it might otherwise make to existing educational practice.

T h e p o i n t is rather that, i n their absence, a course entitled 'philosophy' does not afford a contribution to education sufficiently comprehensive to do justice to that discipline. Moreover, a course lacking i n any one of these three dimensions is not really teaching philosophy since it misrepresents the discipline by denying its richness, its complexity, and the value it can have to the education of all persons.

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Philosophy for Children and the Proposed Ideal Method for Teaching Philosophy

Now, let us turn to consider the relationship that exists between Philoso- phy for C h i l d r e n and the three conceptions o f p h i l o s o p h y discussed earlier.

T h e Philosophy f o r C h i l d r e n pro- g r a m represents the one serious attempt to conflate into a single cur- r i c u l u m these three conceptions of philosophy, namely, the notion of p h i - losophy as a specific body of problems, the notion of it as a particular mental methodology, and the notion of it as a way of b r i n g i n g more meaning to the thoughts and deeds of one's life. In what follows, I shall discuss the extent to which the program meets each of these ends.

Philosophy for Children and Academic Philosophy

There are those who have objected to Philosophy for C h i l d r e n o n the grounds that it is too limited i n terms

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of philosophic content to be considered seriously as a philosophy program. T h e claim is that the program does not do justice to the discipline of philosophy because it does not deliver to its students the arguments of the professional philosophers i n the elabo- rate and intricate terms i n which they themselves cast them. T h e aspersion is that Philosophy for Children, at its best, is only 'watered-down' philosophy. T h e significance of this objection, however, is given relief by recognizing the two specious assumptions u p o n which it rests. O n the one hand, the position implies a myopic view of the nature of philosophy itself, and o n the other, it represents either a naive or a mistaken understanding of the role that traditional philosophic content plays within Philosophy for C h i l d r e n .

First, the view of philosophy f r o m which this objection stems is one which denies philosophy its role both as a technique of intellectual reflection and inquiry and as a tool i n service of meaning. That is to say. Philosophy for C h i l d r e n even i f it d i d not include the subject-matter of academic philosophy could be said to teach philosophy with richness and depth by virtue of its teaching thinking and the disposition to search for meaning. Such an exposi- tion of its philosophic worth, however, would not be credited on the narrow conception of the discipline which has furnished this 'watered-down' objection. Second, the objection suggests that philosophy as a subject-matter is something one learns about, and as such, it is not actually relevant to Philosophy for C h i l d r e n because the latter is founded on the view that p h i - losophy is something one does. T h e view that professional philosophers are the purveyors o f p h i l o s o p h y a n d philosophic ideas is also embedded i n this objection, and, i n this respect also, the program is understood. It is not that the P h i l o s o p h y f o r C h i l d r e n approach imputes disrespect or disre- gard to the writings of professional philosophers but its particular approach considers the musings of children no less important, insightful, or philosophical than those of professional philosophers or adults. In the Philosophy for C h i l d r e n program, the ideas of philosophy are used as spring-

boards for developing along the lines o f sound reasoning the children's thinking that is stimulated by them.

Philosophy for C h i l d r e n is founded o n the view that philosophy helps teachers, c h i l d r e n , and the teachers o f teachers alike to broaden their understanding of the world by forcing them to c o n f r o n t well-thought-out viewpoints different f o r m their own and by persuading them to appreciate each one i n terms of the foundations of good t h i n k i n g u p o n which it rests. So, the traditional subject-matter is i n - cluded i n the program. Moreover, it is included with these ends i n m i n d .

T h e question now then becomes, 'To what extent are a variety of philosoph-

ic views canvassed i n the Philosophy for C h i l d r e n curriculum, and to what extent is each one elaborated?' Events that lend themselves to analysis along the lines o f academic p h i l o s o p h y u n f o l d systematically throughout the novels.(7) I n keeping with his/her characteristic style of thinking, the characters i n the novels tend, for the most part, to adopt a standpoint consistent with a traditional school of philosophic thought. (8) T h e ensuing dialogue portrays children involved i n the rational arbitration of these views.

T h e arbitration usually draws u p o n the discovery of the problems that each view classically evokes together with the types of reasoning each requires for its elucidation and validation. Each philosophic viewpoint, traditional and otherwise, is elaborated to the extent that it provides a meaningful point of view to children the same age as the readers for w h o m it was intended. A t the same time, the views are expressed i n the novels i n the language of the prospective readers so as to ensure that the readers have access to the patterns of thinking entailed by them.

Academic philosophy then has two roles i n this curriculum. O n the one hand, it guarantees the reader exposure to many viewpoints different f r o m his/her own, and on the other, it dis- closes the patterns of t h i n k i n g needed to support these views. T h e selection of philosophic views that are presented for any issue is made according to the criteria of meaningfulness and reasonableness. T h e first criterion for the selection of viewpoints f r o m the philo-

sophic literature is that they be mean- i n g f u l to the child i n terms of shed- d i n g light o n his/her experience of the world. That is, viewpoints are selected on account of their being relevant to the contemporary world of the child and not because they espouse this or that particular conception of things.

T h e second criterion, reasonableness, is used i n the sense that the philosophic positions are selected and elaborated i n a way that assumes that readers are intelligent persons capable of reasonable behavior. T h i s is done by modeling the children of the novel along these lines. T h e Philosophy for C h i l d r e n curriculum has been criti- cized o n these grounds.^ T h e criticism is that the c u r r i c u l u m is suitable, therefore, only for select groups o f children, namely, the middle-class, or the gifted. T h e indictment misunder- stands, however, the intention of the model. T h e point is not that there are only some children who are intelligent and reasonable and that Philosophy for C h i l d r e n is thus for them. It is rather that, i n order to encourage all children to behave more reasonably and more intelligently, it is necessary to show them what reasonable and intelligent behavior entails and that it is not beyond their capability. That is, Philosophy for C h i l d r e n works f r o m the principle that children need m o d - els of young persons similar to themselves who behave or think i n ways that evidence intelligence, reflection and reasonableness. That is to say, children are not unlike adults i n that they often only live up to our expectations of them.

T h e amount of p h i l o s o p h y i n Philosophy for Children, i n the sense of philosophy as a subject-matter is not, moreover, restricted to what is given i n the novels. T h e Philosophy for C h i l d r e n curriculum provides two further sources of materials rich i n the subject matter of the discipline. First, there are the Teachers' Manuals, and second, there are bibliographies, some complete, some still i n progress, which provide the philosophic and literary sources for the ideas raised i n each chapter of each novel." T h e manuals expand u p o n the philosophic views contained i n the novels providing the teachers with a brief analysis of the

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issues. Exercises and discussion plans are also included to help them tease out the relevant intellectual intricacies of the views i n the classroom. T h e bibliographies, o n the other hand, Ust those classical a n d literary sources which have been considered responsi- ble for the inception of the views and which have served as catalysts for the f u r t h e r r e f o r m u l a t i o n s o f them.

Philosophy for C h i l d r e n considers it the teachers' responsibility to acquaint themselves with the intricacies of the philosophic debates f r o m these bibliographies. For it is only i n this way, its advocates claim, that they can f u r n i s h the necessary next steps to further their student's t h i n k i n g about them.

It is easy to see f r o m the foregoing that Philosophy for C h i l d r e n is not remiss i n the respect that it shows academic philosophy either as a system o f ideas worthy of pursuit for its own sake or as a body of knowledge relevant to the contemporary world.

Philosophy for Children and the Reflective Habit of Mind

T h e Philosophy for C h i l d r e n cur- r i c u l u m is designed with one of its m a i n aims the development of children's thinking, i n particular reflective thinking. In the context of contemporary education. Philosophy for C h i l - dren is not unique i n having the development of t h i n k i n g skills a primary objective. What makes this program unique, however, is the context i n which t h i n k i n g is taught, namely, the interplay between p h i l o s o p h y a n d everyday life. Students learn, that is, to develop and refine their t h i n k i n g by discussing with their peers the classical problems of philosophy as they manifest themselves i n everyday life.

T h e distinction between analytic and/or creative t h i n k i n g and reflective thinking should serve to make more perspicuous what is taught i n this pro- g r a m . Reflective t h i n k i n g entails processes that are both analytic and creative i n k i n d , yet its meaning is not satisfied i n these terms alone. As problematic as any account o f analytic t h i n k i n g and creative t h i n k i n g might be, it is generally agreed that analytic t h i n k i n g dissects a n d reconstructs issues i n terms of the logic o f their assumptions and imphcations and it

searches for the rational i n terms that best approximate coherency and con- sistency. Above and beyond any other cognitive demands that the analytic process might make, it requires the ability to reason systematically adher- i n g whenever possible to the principles of f o r m a l and i n f o r m a l logic. Creative thinking, o n the other hand, is generally understood as that t h i n k i n g which generates new ideas and connects o l d patterns o f ideas i n new ways. It is t h i n k i n g that is itself readily to finding new problems, reconceptualizing o l d problems and producing innovations whether it be i n art, i n science or i n the home. Perhaps most peculiar to this process is the ability to play with ideas;

to use objects and ideas i n ways, that is, that are unfamiliar, illogical, non-func- tional and/or symbolic. T h e reflective process of t h i n k i n g makes use of both critical and creative processes, yet it is not circumscribed by them. Reflective t h i n k i n g is aimed primarily at a deep- er insight and a more comprehensive understanding of whatever it attends to. To think reflectively implies, i n part, the ability to distance oneself cognitively f r o m the issue at h a n d while simultaneously r e m a i n i n g engaged by it. T h e thinker needs to consider the issue f r o m a perspective broader than that afforded by the specific dynamics that constitute it.

He/she must not only review the issue i n terms of the current circumstances that afford its meaning and the consequences thereby i m p l i e d , but he/she must also formulate alternative circumstances and consider what mean- i n g the same issue would then have.

Moreover, the issue itself needs to be recast i n various forms so that the different sets of circumstances that such alterations w o u l d generate can be apprehended.

L i k e most other programs that attend to the development of t h i n k i n g skills. Philosophy for C h i l d r e n provides countless opportunities to enhance children's analytic and creative a b i l i t i e s . U n l i k e these other program, however. Philosophy for C h i l - d r e n considers the cultivation o f reflective processes one of its primary goals, and it uses dialogue as the cor- nerstone of this process. Resting o n the assumption that t h i n k i n g is p r i -

marily internalized dialogue, Philo- sophy for C h i l d r e n aims to produce reflective thinkers as a consequence of their participation i n a reflective community o f inquirers. N o t only do children have the opportunity to reflect there u p o n issues that are of interest to them, but they also learn what it is to reflect u p o n their own t h i n k i n g by virtue of seeing how the other participants think about the very same issues.

A t the same time as this is taking place, the communit)^ as a whole is engaged i n the complex, interpersonal dynamic of reflection. Different points of view are put up against one another, and the community considers each f r o m this eclectic perspective. As the participants internalize this process, therefore, they come to acquire a more comprehensive mode o f reflection T h e participants are no longer limited to the ways of t h i n k i n g that are peculiar to their own intellect but, as individuals, they come also to reflect i n ways that are characteristic of the group as a whole. O f course, the strength of this paradigm of education for reflective t h i n k i n g depends u p o n the extent to which the claim that t h i n k i n g is internalized dialogue, is true. While there is a strong intellectual tradition support- i n g this view,^^ it is well to remember that the nature of t h i n k i n g is not an uncontroversial issue. There are different conceptions of t h i n k i n g and, for the most part, they engender different practices i n respect of its teaching. For example, there are the popular views, namely, that t h i n k i n g is produced by cognitive structures, and that think- i n g functions as computers do;^^ and there are the less popular views like the view that t h i n k i n g is i n t e r n a l i z e d a c t i o n . T h e s e different views also have a substantial history of intellectual support, and as such, they provide a challenge to the view i n which Phi- losophy for C h i l d r e n is couched. T h e relative strength of the assumption u p o n which Philosophy for C h i l d r e n rests, therefore, needs to be weighed against these competing claims f r o m academic psychology.

Inasmuch as t h i n k i n g actually is i n - ternalized dialogue, however. Philo- sophy for C h i l d r e n by way of the community of dialogical inquiry provides a suitable means for advancing thinking.

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i n particular for advancing reflective thought. In other words, it offers a pedagogy that provides well for the teaching o f that particular way o f thinking that has come to characterize philosophy and that promises to have solid theoretical u n d e r p i n n i n g s i n contemporary academic psychology.

Philosophy for Children and the Search to Know How to Live Better

In 'Philosophy i n the Classroom,' L i p m a n writes at great length about the importance of meaning to the integrity of life, and he cites many reasons for studying philosophy i n this vein.'^ T h e children's novels and the teacher's Manuals i n and of themselves, however, focus more u p o n the development of thinking skills and the development of reasons for belief.

That is to say. Philosophy for C h i l d r e n would provide an adequate method for generating the search f o r a more meaningful life i f it were undoubtedly the case that clear and valid t h i n k i n g and the establishment of sound reasons were the sole purveyors of meaning. However, the relationship between reasons f o r belief a n d knowledge is controversial and the relationship between knowledge and its meaning is not symmetrical. T h e search for meaning is, therefore, not as straightforward as the earlier writings of L i p m a n and his co-workers suggest.

Manifesting itself as 'education for reasonableness,' Lipman's later writings focus more intently u p o n philosophy as the search for meaning. H i s notion of 'education for reasonableness' is complex. T h e aspects of it that are relevant to our present discussion, however, are the intricate connections between good reasoning and the more meaningful life that he unveils. H i s central contention is that it is not until individuals can think reasonably, that is, reason soundly, with good j u d g - ment, a sense of proportion, and i n a way that is humane, and can do this for

themselves that they can hope to come to terms with the reasonableness of their own lives, of the society and of the institutions i n which they find t h e m s e l v e s . I n order to find the meaning that lies within these various aspects of reality, that is, and i n order to make the changes that are necessary

to invest these things with more meaning, the notion is that one must first be able to think clearly and reasonably about them.

O f course i n this regard, the success of the program rests heavily u p o n the teacher's awareness of such connections and his/her ability to convey i n the context of the classroom the value of them. Here, more than i n any other area o f teaching philosophy, is the success of this program or any other p h i - losophy program teacher dependent.

That is to say, the successful teaching of philosophy, o n this account of it, rests entirely u p o n the teacher having a certain attitude to knowledge or disposition to the philosophical. Inas- m u c h as attitudes and dispositions may be cultivated, teachers can be t r a i n e d a l o n g these lines. Yet the processes for doing so are not all that clear cut. Whatever else might be involved, however, it seems that at least a persistent and ongoing struggle with philosophic notions both with oneself and with others is needed, and this takes time. It is perhaps for this reason that most of the teacher-trainers i n Philosophy for C h i l d r e n are 'hand-picked.'^^ T h e written prerequi- site to become a teacher-trainer for the program is a doctorate i n philosophy together with some experience o f teaching. Yet the requirement is actually more than this. T h e prospective teacher-trainer must evidence a particular attitude or disposition; an attitude that transmutes readily i n an educational setting to teaching that is 'peda- gogically strong, yet philosophically self-effacing.'^^ Generally speaking, the expression is used to refer to teaching that, o n the one hand, abides closely by the practices of philosophic inquiry and, on the other, does not afford the teacher's own particular viewpoints to affect his/her students' t h i n k i n g any- more than any other participant's might.

N o doubt the criticism w i l l be averred that these practices of teacher- training amount to little more than 'a one-man show.' In logical terms alone, there is no counter response. From a more practical point of view, however, it may be well to admit that selection procedures for most professions entail the consideration of personal attribut-

es such as dispositions and attitudes.

In terms of enabling Philosophy for C h i l d r e n to function according to its intended design, therefore, one could do much worse than have the selection of prospective teacher-trainers carried out by persons with a lifetime of experience i n p h i l o s o p h y a n d e n o u g h understanding of and commitment to its practices to generate an extensive school curriculum.

Notwithstanding this, teacher-train- i n g at this point i n time presents two major problems for the Philosophy for C h i l d r e n program. First, the method of training teacher-trainers does not yield many new trainers i n any one year. T r a i n i n g involves participation i n at least two 20-day workshops,^^ and these are only held twice per yean Moreover, the number of actual participants at any one time is limited to ensure an engaging level of philosophic inquiry. While the procedures are admirable, alternative models need to be developed: (i) to accommodate the growing number of teachers that now need training as a result of the growth of the program itself; and (ii) to provide refresher sessions for teacher- trainers apart f r o m the two expensive and time-consuming workshops cur- rently available.

Second, there are as yet no written guidelines or manuals for the teacher- trainers. Granted that participation i n numerous workshops constitutes the central necessary core of training, it would be advantageous to have a com- p e n d i u m of guidelines that could serve both as reminders to teachers of the various teaching strategies appropriate to philosophy and of the subject- matter of philosophy itself. For example, such a manual c o u l d include things like: (i) background reading o n different philosophic problems, together with some general suggestions for the amount of reading useful for the teachers of different age groups;

(ii) a list of literary works specifying the philosophic topics to which they pertain and the lines of relationship between them. Ideally, works suitable for different age groups would be part of this delineation; and (iii) a list of different procedures that have been f o u n d useful i n establishing classroom environments supportive of p h i l o -

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sophic inquiry.

Taking all of the foregoing into consideration, however, the p r o g r a m remains better equipped to teach p h i - losophy than any other method cur- rently available. T h e other methods.

that is, tend to exaggerate even further the problem o f teacher-dependency based success. For example, programs i n elementary philosophy designed by individual teachers are likely to generate a love of the discipline and an

understanding o f its imports to the life of the m i n d . Yet the individual teachers' interests and abilities that generated their enthusiasm to do this are equally likely to define the scope of the philosophy taught i n the program.

T h a t is to say, the philosophical subject-matter covered will be a function

of two things. First, it will manifest the teacher's knowledge o f the range of p h i l o s o p h i c problems that actually exist. A n d second, it will manifest the philosophic problems i n which he/she is most interested and feels most com- petent to teach. T h e extent to which the program develops t h i n k i n g and the disposition appropriate to conceptual analysis will similarly manifest the teacher's interests and abilities. To cir- cumvent this p r o b l e m , the teacher must be aware that this aspect of philosophic practice actually exists and that it is a worthwhile activity. Moreover, he/she must be knowledgeable about thinking as well as adept i n its skills.

Without the former, t h i n k i n g could not be included i n the program and without the latter, it could be included but it would likely fail. In other words, p h i - losophy programs designed by i n d i - vidual teachers can only hope to incorporate dimensions f r o m the three conceptions o f p h i l o s o p h y to the extent that the teacher is aware of their existence and has the interest and ability to teach them. P h i l o s o p h y f o r C h i l d r e n , o n the other hand, provides adequate prescriptions f o r each o f these.

In c o n c l u s i o n . P h i l o s o p h y f o r C h i l d r e n is at present a superior program for teaching philosophy to children by virtue of its strict pedagogical requirements, its systematic curriculum, and the depth and breadth with which it spans the traditional philo-

sophical material. O f course the program is not without its problems. Yet the preceding discussion indicates that Philosophy for C h i l d r e n obviates many of the problems that the other programs face by virtue of its systematic curriculum and pedagogy, and its extensive foundations i n its f o u n d i n g discipline, namely, philosophy.