Email: gfraser@hpdt.org.nz Website: www.hpdt.org.nz
DECISION NO: 391/Mrt11/178P
IN THE MATTER of the Health Practitioners
Competence Assurance Act 2003
AND
IN THE MATTER of MICHAEL JOHN
SELLWOOD, medical radiation
technologist of Auckland
BEFORE THE HEALTH PRACTITIONERS DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL
HEARING in Auckland on 20 June 2011
TRIBUNAL: Mr Bruce A Corkill QC (Chairperson)
Ms Adriana Gunder, Ms Heather Gunn, Mr Peter Gene and Dr B Allen (Members)
Ms G Fraser (Executive Officer)
APPEARANCES: Ms A Miller, for the Professional Conduct Committee
Introduction:
1. Mr Sellwood is a medical radiation technologist of Auckland.
2. On 29 March 2011, a Professional Conduct Committee (PCC) laid a disciplinary charge against him under the Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003 (the Act).
The Charge:
3. The form of the charge is as follows:
“Pursuant to section 81(2) of the Act, the Professional Conduct Committee lays the following charge under section 100(1)(c) of the Act:
PARTICULARS OF CHARGE
That Michael John Sellwood, registered Medical Radiation Technologist of Auckland, was convicted and sentenced in relation to the following offences that occurred on 2 June 2008, each of which being an offence punishable by imprisonment for a term of three months or longer:
1. In the Auckland District Court on 23 July 2009, in respect of: (a) one charge of resisting arrest (section 23(a) Summary Offences Act
1981)
(b) one charge of driving with excess blood alcohol (section 56(2) Land Transport Act 1998); and
(c) one charge of driving while suspended (sections 32(1)(c) and 32(3) Land Transport Act 1998);
2. In the Auckland District Court on 18 May 2010, in respect of: (a) one charge of aggravated assault on a police officer (section 192(2)
Crimes Act 1961; and
(b) one charge of common assault (section 196 Crimes Act 1961).
…
In the circumstances those convictions, either separately or cumulatively, reflect adversely on Mr Sellwood's fitness to practise as a medical radiation technologist.”
Legal Principles:
4. The burden of proof was on the PCC.
5. As to standard of proof, the appropriate standard is the civil standard, that is proof to the satisfaction of the Tribunal on the balance of probabilities, rather than the criminal standard. The degree of satisfaction called for will vary according to the gravity of the allegations. The greater the gravity of the allegations the higher the standard of proof. 6. In the decision of Z v Complaints Assessment Committee [2009] 1 NZLR 1, a majority of the Supreme Court stated that in civil proceedings in New Zealand (including disciplinary proceedings) there is a civil standard, the balance of probabilities, which is applied flexibly according to the seriousness of matters to be proved and the consequences of proving them. The Court endorsed the classic passage of Dixon J in Brigginshaw v Brigginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336, 361-362 to the effect that the affirmative of an allegation must be made out to the reasonable satisfaction of the fact finder. Reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequence of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, and the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the Tribunal.
7. Section 100(1)(c) of the Act provides that a registered health practitioner may be disciplined by the Tribunal where “… the practitioner has been convicted of an offence that reflects adversely on his or her fitness to practise”.
8. In Pittwood (84/Ost06/42P), there is a careful review of the second limb of the phraseology, “reflects adversely”, which this Tribunal adopts.
9. In Re Zauka (Decision 236/03/103C, 17 July 2003) the Medical Practitioners
of the Medical Practitioners Act 1995. That Tribunal, guided by observations of the District Court in CAC v CM [1999] DCR 492, stated:
“It was not necessary that the proven conduct should conclusively demonstrate that the practitioner is unfit to practise. The conduct will need to be of a kind that is inconsistent with what might be expected from a practitioner who acts in compliance with the standards normally observed by those who are fit to practise medicine. Not every divergence from recognised standards will reflect adversely on a practitioner’s fitness to practise. It is a matter of degree. ”
10. In Murdoch (Phys06/45P), the Tribunal stated:
“Fitness to practise cannot, in the context of a conviction, relate only to the practitioner’s clinical ability. It must also involve the moral consideration and conduct which offends the law or is immoral or unethical, must reflect adversely on the practitioner’s fitness to practise. Registration carries with it obligations to behave in a way which is ethical, honest and in accordance with the law. Failure to uphold the law or dishonesty must adversely affect a practitioner’s fitness to practise.”
11. In Professional Conduct Committee v Martin (Gendall J, 27 February 2007, CIV-2006-485-1461) the Court stated:
“Fitness often may be something different to competence. … aspects of general deterrence as well as specific deterrence remain relevant. So, too, is the broader consideration of the public or community’s confidence in the upholding of the standards of the nursing profession.” (paragraph [46])
12. The Tribunal accepts and applies the above principles, in this case.
The Hearing:
13. Mr Sellwood did not appear. The Executive Officer produced a schedule of contacts and correspondence sent to Mr Sellwood from the Tribunal, from which it was clear that notice of intention to bring the charge had been served on him at his last known address by signature required courier on 2 April 2011; and that on 6 May 2011 he spoke briefly to the Executive Officer and advised that he did not intend to attend or participate in the process.
14. The PCC also produced affidavits of service – one from a process server who had attempted to personally serve Mr Sellwood with documents relating to the hearing, but
the person who was present at Mr Sellwood’s address refused to accept any documents and behaved in a threatening manner; and two affidavits from a legal secretary who deposed as to the sending of documents from the PCC’s solicitors to Mr Sellwood, those documents being documents relating to the hearing. It was confirmed that no communications had been received from Mr Sellwood by the PCC’s solicitors, in response to the documents which were sent to him.
15. The Tribunal was satisfied that service of the charge had occurred in accordance with the requirements of section 156 of the Act; and that Mr Sellwood was well aware of the fact that the charge was being heard, but had elected to take no part in the process. 16. The hearing consisted of the PCC receiving affidavit evidence from Ms M A Doyle,
Chief Executive of the Medical Sciences Secretariat and Registrar of the New Zealand Medical Radiation Technologists Board (the Board); and receiving a bundle of documents, all of which related to the matters which were the subject of the convictions referred to in the disciplinary charge.
17. Although Mr Sellwood was not present, and the prosecution of the disciplinary charge proceeded on a formal proof basis, the Tribunal nonetheless had to satisfy itself that the elements of the disciplinary charge were established.
Chronology:
18. Included in the documents which were placed before the Tribunal were certified copies of the entry of convictions of the offences referred to in the disciplinary charge, summary of facts, the Judges’ sentencing notes, and correspondence relating to the referral to the PCC; and a copy of the PCC’s report, following a meeting it held with Mr Sellwood on 6 September 2010.
19. From those documents, the PCC derived the following chronology which the Tribunal accepts as accurate:
19.1. In early 2008 Mr Sellwood’s long term relationship with his partner came to an end. He found this hard and his consumption of alcohol increased. Throughout April and May 2008 whenever he was not required to be at work or on call, Mr Sellwood was drinking.
19.2. On 16 May 2008, during a period of rostered days off, Mr Sellwood had a period of drinking with a friend. He subsequently drove to a dairy, and on his return home he was pulled over by an unmarked Police car and breath tested. Mr Sellwood failed the breath test and was taken to the Police Station and processed for drink driving. As a result, he was suspended from driving for a period of 28 days, and a date was set for him to appear in Court in June 2008. 19.3. On Queen’s Birthday weekend 2008 Mr Sellwood was rostered off work. On
Saturday, 31 May and Sunday, 1 June he helped a friend with some gardening work. His friend gave him a bottle of whiskey as a gift. Mr Sellwood stayed up drinking whiskey until around 5.00am on 2 June 2008.
19.4. Mr Sellwood woke up at about 3.00pm on 2 June 2008 with a hangover. He decided to drive to the local shops on a 1000cc motorcycle that he had borrowed from a friend. The Court later found the motorcycle was around four times more powerful that Mr Sellwood was permitted to ride on his learner’s licence.
19.5. At the local shop Mr Sellwood bought pizza and half a dozen beers. On the way home from the shops he had a road accident. The Court found that Mr Sellwood’s motorcycle collided with a car in a merging lane. As a result, he lost his balance and the motorcycle started to wobble uncontrollably and hit a traffic island. Having hit the traffic island, the motorcycle “upended” and slid diagonally across the other side of the road, being struck in the process by
an oncoming car and ending up on the verge.
19.6. Mr Sellwood has stated that he suffered a closed, comminuted fracture of the right tibia and fibula. He has described the limb as having an angulation of greater than 90 degrees laterally. Upon seeing his injury he panicked and immediately reduced the limb himself. In response to significant pain he says he reached for “the only type of pain relief” he had, namely the beer he had purchased: he opened a beer and drank it on the roadside.
19.7. The driver of the car that had struck Mr Sellwood went up to where Mr Sellwood was lying. Mr Sellwood was drinking beer and told her to “fuck off” because he did not want to talk about the damage to her car when he was in pain.
19.8. An ambulance was called and attended the accident scene. Mr Sellwood’s recollection is that, having smelt the alcohol on his breath and seeing the open bottle of beer, the ambulance officers “became noticeably disparaging, condescending and patronising”. The ambulance officers gave Mr Sellwood nitrous-oxide (laughing gas). Due to the ambulance officers restricted qualifications full pain relief (ie morphine) was not immediately available to him.
19.9. Police at the accident scene saw Mr Sellwood being treated by ambulance officers. Police reported that they saw him being abusive to those trying to help him, and that he was using expletives in doing so.
19.10. Mr Sellwood objected to the way in which he was put on to a stretcher by an ambulance officer. He has said that the ambulance officer tightened the stretcher strap which caused him to yell out in pain and that the officers were “clearly annoyed at being thwarted in [their] efforts to restrain [him]”. Mr Sellwood became abusive to the ambulance officer, and then kicked the
ambulance officer three times, twice on the leg and once in the groin (without shoes).
19.11. The ambulance officer reported the incident to Police at the scene, and a Police officer advised Mr Sellwood that he was under arrest for assault. It appears than an exchange took place in which Mr Sellwood ended up calling the Police officer “a fucking pig” and whacking the officer’s notebook out of his hand; when the officer bent down to pick up the notebook Mr Sellwood knocked the officer’s hat off his head and laughed at him. There was an attempt to handcuff Mr Sellwood, at which point he punched the Police officer heavily in the face, causing the officer’s nose to bleed. It was accepted by the Court that the Police officer punched Mr Sellwood back.
19.12. Mr Sellwood says that the incident started because of the Police officer’s behaviour, that he did not knock the officer’s notebook to the floor, but flicked the top of the notebook to see what he was writing, at which point Mr Sellwood says the Police officer punched him twice in the head as he lay strapped to a gurney. Having regard to the Court’s findings, Mr Sellwood’s version of events cannot be accepted.
19.13. Mr Sellwood was taken to Auckland Hospital. He was unhappy with the treatment he received, and with being put in a hard collar. He objected to a particular medical radiation technology student who he had little confidence in being involved in his care. Mr Sellwood’s own account (given to the PCC) was that he caused a ruckus, and did not treat with respect those involved at the accident scene or at the hospital. He spent over three weeks in hospital. 19.14. Shortly after his discharge from hospital Mr Sellwood appeared in Court on a
charge of driving with excess breath alcohol (arising from the incident on 16 May 2008). Mr Sellwood was convicted with driving when the proportion
of alcohol in his breath exceeded 400mcg per litre of breath (he was recorded at 748mcg per litre) and fined $750.00, and disqualified from driving for six months.
19.15. He underwent a number of surgeries to his fractured leg, and spent over a year off work recovering from his injuries.
19.16. On 23 June 2009, Mr Sellwood appeared in a defended hearing before the Auckland District Court, and was convicted of:
19.16.1. One charge of resisting arrest (section 23(a) Summary Offences Act 1981).
19.16.2. One charge of driving with excess blood alcohol (where the proportion of alcohol in his blood exceeded 80mg per 100mls of blood in that it was 127mg per 100mls of blood) (section 56(2) Land Transport Act 1998); and
19.16.3. One charge of driving while suspended (sections 32(1)(c) and 32(3) Land Transport Act 1998).
20. Each of these offences is punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding three months. He was sentenced as follows:
20.1. for resisting arrest: a fine of $150.00;
20.2. for driving with excess blood alcohol: disqualification from driving for nine months and a fine of $400.00; and
20.3. for driving while suspended: disqualification from driving for six months, a fine of $400.00, and an order prohibiting him from holding an interest in a motor vehicle.
21. Following a trial by jury on 11 March 2010 Mr Sellwood was found guilty of:
21.1. one charge of aggravated assault on a Police officer (section 192(2) Crimes Act 1961); and
21.2. one charge of common assault (section 196 Crimes Act 1961).
22. Each of these offences is punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding three months (three years and one year respectively). On 18 May 2010 he was convicted and sentenced as follows:
22.1. one year’s supervision and 300 hours of community work; and
22.2. special conditions requiring him to undergo an anger management programme as directed by his Probation Officer, and to undertake alcohol and drug assessment, counselling or treatment as directed by his Probation Officer, and to attend counselling or programmes directed by his Probation Officer.
23. Mr Sellwood’s lawyer advised the Court at sentencing that Mr Sellwood had undergone an assessment for counselling and anger management, and that he was due to start a 20 week programme in June 2010. The PCC did not, however, have any information as to whether or not Mr Sellwood participated in and/or completed that programme.
24. The PCC met Mr Sellwood on 6 September 2010, when he described the events which led to his convictions and further advised that:
24.1. He now identifies himself as an alcoholic, and that he had only drunk alcohol on two occasions since the events that led to his convictions. He would not, however, provide access to his medical records in relation to his alcohol consumption.
24.2. He underwent a competence review with the Board, and had conditions imposed on his practice, including supervision. As a result of those conditions, which he said made it very difficult to keep working, he had resigned from the Auckland DHB. He wants to continue practising as an MRT, but sees it more as a means to finance other studies rather than as a career in MRT.
24.3. The names of referees were provided, and they provided information to the PCC. One of the comments that was made by a senior MRT at Auckland DHB was that most MRTs found Mr Sellwood “very difficult to work with”, although she did not.
Qualifying Convictions:
25. Section 100(2)(b) of the Act provides that a disciplinary charge may be brought under section 100(1)(c), if a conviction “has been entered by any Court in New Zealand or elsewhere from an offence punishable by imprisonment for a term of three months or longer”.
26. The charges at paragraph 19.16 above were all charges punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding three months; which thus qualify. The charges referred to at paragraph 21. are charges which are punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding three years (in the first instance) and not exceeding one year (in the second instance). Accordingly those charges also qualify.
27. All the charges referred to in the disciplinary charge are therefore qualifying charges; the Tribunal is satisfied therefore that the first limb of section 100(1)(c) is made out: five qualifying convictions have been entered.
28. Turning to the issue of fitness to practise, the following is to be noted:
28.1. The offences of assault and aggravated assault were serious offences. They involved a health professional (the ambulance officer) who was performing his duties in attempting to assist Mr Sellwood; and a Police officer who was also going about his lawful duties. The sentencing Judge observed that “… ambulance officers and Police officers should be able to go about their lawful activities without being assaulted”; that these assaults were on persons who were in “vulnerable positions”; and that the ambulance officer had said at the trial that “he had never met somebody as difficult” as Mr Sellwood. The fact
that Mr Sellwood hit out at persons who were going about their lawful activities could never be justified; those actions brought significant discredit to Mr Sellwood and to his profession and reflected adversely on his fitness to practise.
28.2. The conviction of driving with excess blood alcohol is also a significant concern. This followed an earlier incident (that of 16 May 2008), where he was also charged with driving with excess blood alcohol. As a health professional, he should have been well aware of the inappropriate actions he was taking and that he was breaking the law.
28.3. A related aspect is the conviction of driving whilst suspended. By electing to drive when he was not legally permitted to do so, there was a flagrant breach of the legal requirements; Mr Sellwood must have done so deliberately. 28.4. These convictions under the Land Transport Act indicate that Mr Sellwood’s
conduct did not conform to the standards that would be expected of him as a health professional. Health professionals are expected to behave to a high standard in their private and professional lives, and obey the law. This did not occur.
28.5. Unfortunately his offending involved what must be regarded as a deliberate decision on his part to drive following a heavy drinking session, and at a time when he had already faced a charge of driving with excess blood alcohol and his licence was suspended. The offending involved the abuse of alcohol. 29. Mr Sellwood’s actions were in breach of his professional obligations:
29.1. Principle 1 of the Board’s Code of Ethics, which provides that medical radiation technologists (MRTs) will act in such a manner that will justify public trust and confidence.
29.2. Principle 7 of the Board’s Code of Ethics, which provides that MRTs will be respectful of fellow workers.
30. Whilst Mr Sellwood was in pain at the time and had suffered a significant injury, as a health professional Mr Sellwood should have demonstrated insight in the circumstances, rather than placing himself in a situation where he was in deliberate breach of the law; and then lashing out at a fellow health professional and a Police officer who were going about their duties.
31. The Tribunal has no hesitation in concluding that these actions, which involved serious breaches of the law, reflect adversely on fitness to practise.
32. Accordingly the charge is made out, and this was announced at the hearing.
Penalty:
33. As to penalty the PCC submitted:
33.1. Cancellation of registration was the appropriate starting point.
33.2. A detailed submission was made in support of the proposition that the offences were at the serious end of the spectrum, both in relation to the assaults which occurred, and in relation to the breaches of the drink driving legislation.
Legal Principles:
34. In determining the appropriate penalties, the Tribunal recognised the following functions of disciplinary proceedings:
34.1. To protect the public – this object is reinforced by section 3 of the HPCA Act; 34.2. to maintain professional standards – this object is emphasised in Taylor v
General Medical Council [1990] 2 All ER 263; Ziderman v General Dental Council [1976] 2 All ER 344 and Dentice v The Valuers Registration Board [1992] 1 NZLR 720;
Registration Board and Patel v Complaints Assessment Committee (CIV-2007-404-1818, 13 August 2007 Lang J);
34.4. where appropriate, to rehabilitate the practitioner, as referred to in J v Director of Proceedings (CIV-2006-404-2188, 17 October 2006, Baragwanath J), and Patel (supra).
35. In A v PCC (5 September 2008, Keane J, CIV-2008-404-2927), the Court discussed carefully the range of sanctions available to the Tribunal, particularly cancellation and suspension.1 The Court stated that four points could expressly be derived from the authorities, and implicitly a fifth:
“[81] First, the primary purpose of cancelling or suspending registration is to protect the public, but that “inevitably imports some punitive element”. Secondly, to cancel is more punitive than to suspend and the choice between the two turns on what is proportionate. Thirdly, to suspend implies the conclusion that cancellation would have been disproportionate. Fourthly, suspension is most apt where there is “some condition affecting the practitioner’s fitness to practise which may or may not be amenable to cure”. Fifthly, and perhaps only implicitly, suspension ought not to be imposed simply to punish.
[82] Finally, the Tribunal cannot ignore the rehabilitation of the practitioner: B v B (HC Auckland, HC4/92, 6 April 1993) Blanchard J. Moreover, as was said in Giele the General Medical Council [2005] EWHC 2143, though “… the maintenance of public confidence … must outweigh the interest of the individual doctor”, that is not absolute – “the existence of the public interest in not ending the career of a competent doctor will play a part”.”
36. In numerous cases, the need to consider and explain why lesser options have not been adopted is emphasised. But the Tribunal has to proceed on the basis of what is appropriate having regard to the public interest, and the need to maintain public confidence in the profession.2 Randerson J put the matter in this way:
“[30] The consequences of removal from a professional register are ordinarily severe and the task of the Tribunal is to balance the nature and gravity of the offences and their bearing on the dentist’s fitness to practise against the need for removal and its consequences to the
1
Paras 77-82.
2 Patel, supra, para 30 per Lang J; L v The Director of Proceedings, Woodhouse J, 25 March 2009, CIV-2008-404-2268
individual: Dad v General Dental Council [2002] 1 WLR 1538. As the Privy Council further observed at 1543:
Such consequences can properly be regarded as inevitable where the nature or gravity of the offence indicates that a dentist is unfit to practise, that rehabilitation is unlikely and that he must be suspended or have his name erased from the register. In cases of that kind greater weight must be given to the public interest and to the need to maintain public confidence in the profession than to the consequences of the imposition of the penalty to the individual. [31] I respectfully adopt the observations of the Privy Council and would
add that it is incumbent on the Tribunal to consider carefully the alternatives available to it short of removal and to explain why the lesser options have not been adopted in the circumstances of the case. As well, while absolute consistency is something of a pipe dream, and cases are necessarily fact dependent, some regard must be had to maintaining reasonable consistency with other cases. That is necessary to maintain the credibility of the Tribunal as well as the confidence of the profession and the public at large.”3
Penalty – Discussion:
37. The Tribunal accepts the submission that on any view the conduct which gave rise to the convictions was very serious – particularly the assaults. Those actions raised significant questions about Mr Sellwood’s respect for others, particularly at times of stress, and impacts on the trust and confidence the public and the profession may place in his ability to act with propriety and self control.
38. As was submitted to the Tribunal, Mr Sellwood’s verbal and physical abuse of those who were trying to assist him does not reflect the core competencies and professional standards of a registered MRT.
39. Similarly, breach of the laws relating to drink driving are of concern particularly where there had been a previous incident also involving alcohol; this calls into question the practitioner’s respect for the law and for the public safety and public interest factors which underlie such legislation.
3
40. The Tribunal does not overlook the mitigating factor that Mr Sellwood’s offending occurred when he was in pain and had suffered a significant injury. There is also the broader context of the offences, which involved the breakdown of a long term relationship and that the use of alcohol was related to the consequences of that breakdown. But these factors are significantly outweighed by the seriousness of the offences.
41. Of concern to the Tribunal is the fact that Mr Sellwood did not engage in the disciplinary process, that is by attending the Tribunal and explaining to it his current circumstances and what steps if any have been taken to deal with the issues arising from the offending. The Tribunal notes information conveyed to the Board that in October 2008 Mr Sellwood sought assistance from a psychotherapist which had been positive; but the Tribunal has also been informed that Mr Sellwood felt unable to work under supervision at the DHB and resigned.
42. There are thus many unanswered questions as to Mr Sellwood’s willingness to uphold the proper standards of his profession, in light of the events he faced as well as a significant period away from practice.
43. In previous cases, practitioners have engaged fully in the disciplinary process and have been able to satisfy the Tribunal that constructive steps have been taken to deal with all aspects of the problems that have given rise to relevant convictions. In those circumstances, it has been possible for the Tribunal to consider options short of cancellation of registration, often with the checks and balances available through a combination of suspension and the imposition of conditions.
44. That is not possible in the present case. The only reasonable response in the present circumstances having regard to the health and safety of the public is to cancel Mr Sellwood’s registration; if he chooses subsequently to apply to the Board for re-registration (as section 102 of the Act permits), then the full array of checks and
balances that are available when a person applies for registration will come into play. It would be for the Board, in that circumstance, to satisfy itself that Mr Sellwood was at that time a fit and proper person to resume practice in his profession.
45. An order of censure is also made. The Tribunal considers that a formal statement must be made to the effect that conduct of the kind that occurred on this occasion is entirely unacceptable.
46. Turning to costs, the Tribunal was advised that the PCC’s costs were approximately $45,000.00, and the Tribunal’s costs approximately $10,800.00 (both figures exclusive of GST).
47. At a fairly high level of generality (because no financial information as to Mr Sellwood’s circumstances was available to the Tribunal), on the basis of comments made to the PCC, it would appear that Mr Sellwood does have financial pressures. However, the Tribunal cannot take this factor very far in the absence of proper information.
48. Given the fact the case proceeded on a formal proof basis – in other words that the charge was not opposed – the normal level of costs would have been 35%.
49. The Tribunal, however, is concerned at the quantum of costs for the PCC (recognising that those costs relate both to the PCC hearing, and the representation of the PCC at the Tribunal’s hearing).
50. In all the circumstances it determined that a fair contribution to costs by Mr Sellwood would be:
50.1. 25% of the PCC’s costs, being $11,250.00. 50.2. 50% of the Tribunal’s costs, being $5,400.00.
50.3. Thus, the total costs sum to be paid is $16,650.00, with no payment of GST being payable.
51. If there is any issue of hardship, Mr Sellwood may wish to consider discussing with the Board whether there is a proper basis for payment over time, although that will of course be a matter for the Board in light of such information as is provided to it. 52. There was no application for an order of non-publication of name. The Tribunal
confirms however that there would have been no possible basis for such an order – particularly since the District Court charges proceeded without name suppression.
Conclusion:
53. The professional disciplinary charge is established. 54. Mr Sellwood’s registration is cancelled.
55. There is an order of censure: the Tribunal must express its strong disapproval for the conduct described in the charge.
56. There is an order that Mr Sellwood pay costs as follows:
56.1. In respect of the costs of the PCC, the sum of $11,250.00. 56.2. In respect of the costs of the Tribunal, the sum of $5,400.00.
57. The Tribunal directs that a copy of this decision and a summary be placed on its website. It further directs that a copy of the decision be placed on the Board’s website and such other publications in the profession as the Board considers appropriate.
DATED at Wellington this 14th day of July 2011
... B A Corkill QC
Chairperson
