Milton and the Problem of Divorce in Protestant England By

“A perilous and terrible medicine”:

Milton and the Problem of Divorce in Protestant England By

Alexandria Morgan Andrews

Honors Thesis

Department of English and Comparative Literature University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill

2020

Approved:

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This project was supported by the Kimball King Undergraduate Research Fund administered

by Honors Carolina.

Introduction

Between 1643-1645, John Milton established an opinion on divorce that had never before been explicitly developed and circulated throughout early modern England.

Milton envisioned divorce for incompatibility with the option to remarry, a far cry from the marriage legislation of the time period that only allowed separation from bed and board with continued sexual fidelity.

The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce (1643) kicked off Milton’s four divorce treatises, and he released an expanded edition of the text the following year. This work combines biblical and legal interpretation with social arguments linking the lack of divorce legislation to a greater emotional and spiritual degradation of English citizens. Upon discovering the divorce opinions of a famous reformer, Milton sought to authenticate The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce by connecting his arguments to the writings of Martin Bucer. In 1644, Milton published The Judgment of Martin Bucer, a partial English translation of Bucer’s De regno Christi. Milton’s third and fourth divorce pamphlets, Tetrachordon and Colasterion, were published together in 1645. While Tetrachordon presents as an orderly biblical exegesis on marriage and divorce structured around verses in Genesis, Deuteronomy, Matthew, and 1 Corinthians, Colasterion is a vicious attack on the nameless author of An Answer to a Book, intituled, The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce. Milton’s passion for divorce reform is evident from the number of treatises he published as well as the multiple angles he exhausted to defend divorce; the motivation behind his strong feelings on the subject, however, is more frequently debated.

Milton’s own marriage may have provided a personal and somewhat urgent tone to his writings on divorce, but more significant catalysts were extremely confining marriage laws coupled with discrepancies between the treatment of divorce in England and the rest of reformed

1 Quotations from Milton’s divorce tracts are taken from The Divorce Tracts of John Milton: Texts and Contexts edited by Sara J. van den Berg and W. Scott Howard.

Europe. Milton was deserted by his first wife Mary Powell for a number of years soon after their marriage, which scholars place around June 1642. It was within this time period of marriage and desertion that Milton published his divorce tracts. However, Milton had been gathering sources on marriage and divorce in his commonplace book during the years prior to Powell, which demonstrates that the divorce tracts are not solely a response to a bad marriage, but that Milton had been interested in the subject before he had personal stake in the outcome (Poole 381).

Based on the content of Milton’s pamphlets, this interest in marriage and divorce likely stemmed from stifling marriage laws in England that made divorce with remarriage virtually impossible.

England was alone among Protestant nations in its strict ban on divorce, leading Milton to argue that if England were to be truly reformed and freed from Catholic tradition, then it would first address its marriage laws.

Despite Milton’s bold, polarizing arguments for divorce, his tracts nonetheless engage with discussions of marriage from prior decades. These contemporary discussions take the broad form of marital advice, but the texts range from sermons on the godly way to contract and maintain a marriage to fictional dialogues exploring strategies to improve relations between husband and wife. Directly or indirectly, these works bear evidence of a struggle with

indissoluble marriage. Unlike Milton and other polemical pamphleteers who published works to specifically support or refute divorce, the purpose of these texts is to give domestic guidance to the laypeople. Because addressing divorce is not the primary goal of these authors, any sort of commentary reveals that divorce was a topic that could not be avoided when discussing

marriage. The dilemma of indissoluble marriage is a source of anxiety for pamphleteers, and the

sheer breadth of the commentary within these texts suggests that marriage was suffering a crisis

with no easy answer.

A close examination of these pamphlets reveals that many of Milton’s arguments about marriage, especially the nature and consequences of bad marriages, were already in circulation;

however, Milton takes these claims about marriage and uses them as evidence for the right to divorce. One example of many is the problem of domestic despair. While some pamphleteers warn readers of the futility and danger of regretting their marriage and falling into sorrow, Milton reasons that if a marriage causes spouses to commit the sin of despair, then the marriage is not supported by God and should be abolished. These parallels indicate that Milton’s divorce treatises tapped into a marital discourse familiar to some readers. His call for divorce and

remarriage for incompatibility was largely unprecedented, but Milton’s arguments and analogies demonstrating the severity of a bad marriage were not new.

Milton presents the perfect opportunity to depict divorce within a narrative with his tragic play Samson Agonistes, which is why it is so astonishing that divorce is named nowhere in the text. While the divorce tracts unequivocally argue for divorce as a human liberty, Milton swerves in his approach to bad marriages in Samson Agonistes. Published in 1671, Milton’s text hinges on the marriage between biblical characters Samson and Dalila. When comparing passages between the divorce tracts and verses from Samson Agonistes, it becomes apparent that Dalila fulfills nearly every aspect of an unfit spouse that Milton outlined in his treatises. However, instead of bringing his divorce tracts to life with a dramatic example of a divorce, divorce is instead treated in a circumspect manner. Milton’s cryptic hints about the relationship between Samson and Dalila are more akin to the divorce commentary of marriage pamphlet authors than to his own divorce treatises. Samson Agonistes becomes the heart of England’s divorce debate:

despite the strict divorce ban, indissoluble marriage was a problem that writers could not ignore,

but struggled to address concretely.

I.

Even after England’s return to Protestantism under Elizabeth I following Catholic Mary I’s death in 1558, the nation deviated sharply from standard Protestant divorce law by

maintaining Catholicism’s indissoluble marriage mandate as well as removing some of the impediments to marriage that qualified for annulment. Unlike England’s European Protestant neighbors, this anomaly resulted from political upheaval, thus making divorce virtually impossible for lawfully wed English citizens. One of the reasons as to why this irregularity occurred was that marriage was left in control of the ecclesiastical courts instead of being shifted to the civil, as was the case in most Protestant countries after the Reformation (Donahue Jr. 43).

By leaving marriage under Church jurisdiction, England refused to categorize marriage as a civil matter to be supervised by civil authorities. The many impediments to marriage that made nullities possible under the Catholic Church were reduced to incest and failure to consummate within two years due to impotence or frigidity (Stone 44).

England’s single proposal for reformed marriage and divorce legislation was written by Italian reformer Peter Martyr (MacCulloch 660; McGregor 7). This document, published in 1552 titled Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum, recommended that the ecclesiastical courts eliminate separation of bed and board and allow divorce for adultery, desertion, marital violence, and endangerment of life, in which case only the innocent party could remarry and neither party could remarry if both were found guilty (MacFarlene 224; McGregor 7). These conditions were more or less standard to the rest of Protestant Europe. However, the death of Edward VI and ascension of Catholic Mary I to the throne in 1553 halted any progress the document made; it was then discarded completely under Queen Elizabeth after Mary’s death (MacCulloch 660;

McGregor 7). Because Mary had removed most Protestant members from the House of Lords, or

the parliamentary group that Elizabeth had to consult for new legislation, reformed marriage and divorce laws were not revived (Areen 59). This ill-timed political disruption taxed England with marriage laws more stifling than any Christian nation in the world, Protestant or otherwise.

To understand Protestant England’s perspective on divorce, it is necessary to review the historical rule of indissoluble marriage under the Catholic Church. Marriage was considered one of the seven sacraments, or visible signs of divine grace and rites observed and regulated by the Church, including rituals such as baptism and the Eucharist. Early church fathers, most notably Saint Augustine, considered Paul’s verses in Ephesians as the basis for the sacramental status of marriage (Olsen 2-4). Paul likens the husband’s relationship to his wife as Christ’s relationship to the Church and also states that marriage transforms two spouses into one flesh, referring to the act as “a great mystery” (King James Version Ephesians 5:23-25, 31-32). Through marriage, God unites husband and wife using means that are unknown to believers; therefore, the marriage bond cannot be broken by any being other than God, and “what therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder” (Mark 10:9). A complete divorce with the possibility of remarriage while the first spouse lives, even in the case of adultery, was impossible. After the Reformation, England rejected marriage as a sacrament in favor of the Protestant idea of marriage as a contract. However, marriage was not considered a contract solely between two human

individuals because there was always a third party: God. The divine nature of marriage meant that spouses could never wield the power to dissolve the bond. Thus, marriage as a sacrament in Catholicism and marriage as a contract in Protestant England functioned very similarly; marriage was made utterly binding because of spiritual involvement.

Despite the strict prohibition on divorce, two alternative methods of separation were

available to Catholic spouses as well as preserved in Protestant England. Annulment and

separation from bed and board, though both forms of conditional separation for married couples, operated very differently. A marriage that was annulled was not considered a marriage at all.

God did not join husband and wife and form that mysterious, unbreakable bond; the marriage was false from the start. After the ecclesiastical court granted a couple a nullity, the two

individuals could legally seek another spouse, provided their choice of partner did not fall under the impediments to marriage that cancelled their previous arrangement. These impediments included consanguinity, precontract, religious vows, impotence, and other similar, sometimes disputed, conditions (Erasmus mentions eighteen impediments in his Christiani matrimoni institutio). Consanguinity in particular was a serious limitation; the Church outlawed marriage between related persons ranging from the seventh to the fourth degree, including god-parent and in-law relations. In less populated areas where travel was either impractical or impossible, consanguine may have described most, if not all, of local married couples. Crafty spouses could investigate their pedigrees and petition for an annulment based on some distant link (McGregor 2-4; Phillips 1-4). Though it is easy to imagine that this extensive system of impediments substituted divorce with the freedom to remarry, annulments were more available in theory than reality, as successfully securing an annulment to a sexually consummated marriage was rare.

The alternative was separation from bed and board, which did not allow remarriage, but acted as an avenue of escape available to unhappy Catholics. This law released spouses from the obligation of living together, but avoidance of cohabitation was the extent of relief it could provide, and sexual fidelity was still expected. In order to win a ruling for separation of bed and board, the afflicted spouse had to prove sufficient cause for judicial separation to the

ecclesiastical court. Accepted causes included adultery, heresy, and physical harm, but in

practice separations were typically only approved in cases of life-threatening cruelty. In this

case, the separation was awarded for the spouse’s own protection (Phillips 6-7). Protestant England maintained this practice for adultery and cruelty, but ultimately separations were to be decided by the ecclesiastical courts.

The indissolubility of marriage insisted upon by the Catholic Church was not universally supported. One notable challenger to this concept of marriage was humanist Desiderius Erasmus, who would go on to influence the writings of later Protestants on this subject. Erasmus, a

Catholic priest and prolific author, initially clashed with Church doctrine in his praise of marriage over celibacy (Payne 109-12). However, it was not until he wrote Annotations on the New Testament that Erasmus attracted significant criticism. Annotations, first published in 1516 and expanded later into Paraphrases, consists of Erasmus’s lengthy opinions and expositions of the New Testament. In his sections on 1 Corinthians, Erasmus offers “a long doctrinal and ethical discussion of marriage and divorce” (Olsen 17). He spins the judicial separation of bed and board into full divorce with the option for the innocent party to remarry on the grounds that charity, or “God’s love to man,” should be considered before any human institution (OED,

“charity,” n.). Erasmus’s interpretation of charity means that divorce should be allowed for spouses trapped in grave circumstances placing their life or soul in jeopardy. His examples include cruelty and adultery, but he resists making direct statements on divorce to avoid

offending the Church. His opinions are framed as suggestions to spark thought, not demands for

reform. However, Erasmus’s cautious tone did not save him from heavy criticism. Natalis Bedda,

a theology professor at the Sorbonne, published his own annotations, in which he labels Erasmus

a heretic for his views on divorce (Olsen 32). Erasmus’s reply to this public reprimand is anxious

and apologetic as he seeks to clarify that he does not wish to go against the Church but rather to

instigate a discussion of potential meanings of the divorce passages. Erasmus later becomes an important figure to Milton and is included in several of his divorce tracts.

While Erasmus raised questions of divorce through biblical commentary, his fellow humanist Thomas More took a more direct approach to divorce in the fictional world of Utopia (1516). The divorce comments in this text are unique in the sense that they are given as the ideal method to govern marriage in a fictional community. The passages are not presumably meant to apply to More’s Catholic world, unlike Erasmus’s pragmatic suggestions for review of the indissolubility doctrine. The shield of fiction allows More to make bald statements on marriage and divorce with much less area for repercussion. Utopians may divorce for “adultery or insufferable perverseness,” in which case “the Senate dissolves the marriage and grants the injured person leave to marry again, but the guilty are made infamous and are never allowed the privilege of a second marriage” (More 105). This sentiment, though contrary to Church doctrine, was offered in several European countries following the Protestant Reformation, which will be discussed in more detail later. However, More goes on to extend Utopia’s grounds for divorce beyond those terms: “When a married couple do not well agree, they, by mutual consent, separate, and find out other persons with whom they hope to live more happily,” following a

“strict inquiry” from the Senate, because “too great easiness in granting leave for new marriages

would very much shake the kindness of married people” (106). Thus, More proposes two kinds

of divorce for Utopians: fault and no-fault divorce with the option to remarry. Though Utopia is

a satirical text and these laws do not necessarily represent More’s personal beliefs on divorce, the

passages would have highlighted to Catholic readers the extent to which they are deprived of any

and all divorce legislation.

The Church of Rome reasserted the doctrine of indissolubility during the Council of Trent (1545-1563) in response to the Reformation’s reinterpretation of marriage as a civil contract. Martin Luther spearheaded Protestant arguments through his reevaluation of marriage, determining that marriage is not a sacrament and therefore should be able to be overturned by man. Luther reasons that marriage extends to non-Christians, and thus cannot be considered a special and exclusive demonstration of God’s grace. More technically, he attacks a common Catholic interpretation of Paul’s verses in Ephesians, claiming that the Greek term mysterion, or

“mystery” is confused for sacramentum and that a mystery in scripture does not always signify a sacrament (Olsen 44; O’Reggio 204). Luther removed the control of marriage from the hands of his church, declaring it “a worldly business” and urges readers that the Protestant churches “not attempt to order or govern anything connected with it” (Luther 225). Without the blanket protection of sacrament, marriage became a human contract that could be corrupted by adultery and willful desertion, which Luther believes commonly included adultery. Luther supports divorce with remarriage in these cases in Wittenberg, though he stresses that divorce should be the last option when all hopes of reconciliation are lost (Phillips 14-15).

Luther’s ideology of marriage and divorce was bolstered by other Protestant leaders such as John Calvin and Huldreich Zwingli, and divorce legislation was subsequently enacted

throughout much of Protestant Europe. Protestant communities throughout Germany, Sweden,

Denmark, Iceland and Norway followed Luther’s example of divorce for adultery and desertion

(Phillips 15). In Geneva, Calvin treated marriage mostly in concord with the doctrines that

Luther had already proposed. He considered the umbrella cause of divorce to be adultery, but

impotence, desertion, and religious differences were also admitted (Olsen 99). Calvin’s

judgments of divorce spread to Protestant communities in Scotland, the Netherlands, and

Switzerland, where similar legislation was passed. As leader of the Reformation in Switzerland, Zwingli considered adultery as “the most minor offense that might justify dissolving a marriage,”

with other potential causes including disease, endangerment of life, and mental instability (Phillips 17). In all of these examples, the Catholic concept of indissolubility is thoroughly rejected in favor of fault divorce.

Martin Bucer, celebrated Reformer and scholar, was even more liberal than his Protestant years in his published opinions on divorce. While Luther and Calvin still stressed the procreative importance of marriage, Bucer leaned toward favoring domestic companionship, which heavily shaped his own divorce doctrine. Bucer wrote On Marriage and Divorce According to Divine and Roman Law in 1533, which Milton would partially translate into English and publish in his treatise The Judgement of Martin Bucer Touching Divorce years later (Areen 55). Bucer reasons that God created marriage as a solution to human loneliness and isolation. The union of the minds is just as fundamental as the union of bodies in the making of a marriage. Therefore, if spouses are unable to fulfill their martial duties toward one another because of incompatibility, then they are no longer considered married and could enact a no-fault divorce by mutual agreement. Bucer also allows for fault divorces, such as in the event of adultery, impotence, leprosy, witchcraft, and domestic violence (MacCulloch 649; Olsen 82-83; Phillips 19).

Interestingly, both spouses could remarry in either case of divorce (MacCulloch 654). Bucer’s

argument against the prohibition of remarriage hinges on his distaste for forced celibacy. If

divorced spouses cannot remarry, then they have no choice but to endure celibacy. Even in cases

of fault divorce for Bucer, guilty spouses were allowed repe remarry if they expressed sufficient

regret (Selderhuis 317).

Milton relied on Bucer’s status as a highly respected champion of the Reformation to justify his own publications on divorce. The significance of Bucer as well as the communities and leaders mentioned previously lies in the glaring absence of divorce legislation in England.

English scholars and clergyman were left to grapple with the obvious differences between their country’s divorce laws and those of the rest of Protestant Europe. England was not isolated from the writings and doctrines of these famous Protestant leaders. Milton felt the contrast keenly and punctuated his divorce tracts with mentions of Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, Martyr, among others.

His explicit motioning for divorce aroused ire that other authors, especially those authors of

domestic pamphlets, wished to avoid. Instead of Milton’s firm conviction, the contemporary

literature offers a hesitant, contradictory, and often roundabout discussion of divorce and

separation that reflects the tangled state of divorce. Marriage seems to be in crisis, and while

European Protestants support limited divorce, England sees no clear way to resolve the deadlock.

II.

Between the late 1590’s and early 1640’s, marriage pamphlets written by Church of England clergymen demonstrate an inconsistent range of attitudes toward divorce and separation.

These men who preached to countless English citizens considered their thoughts on marriage capable of benefiting the larger populace, but their treatment of marital discord betrays a general sense of confusion about how English Protestantism relates to divorce. Marriage is not being dealt with adequately, and authors must take on the task of remedying this problem. Ministers Daniel Rogers, William Gouge, and William Whately are three such authors who published treatises solely discussing the topic of marriage in the early seventeenth century. Though these men express the same purpose of teaching a misguided nation the correct way to approach marriage, the way these authors grapple with divorce is indicative of a nationwide dilemma.

In response to the perceived degradation of marriage throughout England, Matrimoniall Honor, published in 1642 and 1650, concerns the honor and maintenance of marriage. Written by Daniel Rogers, this work takes up the cause of defending and improving the institution of marriage through detailed instruction. Rogers refers to his advice on the title page as “The right way to preserve the Honour of Marriage unstained,” and, anticipating reader objections, he resolves to answer “Questions concerning this Argument.” In an appendix, Rogers adds a section

“describing the just and terrible judgments of God upon all that dare violate the Honour of

Marriage.” What remains implied is that Roger’s text will help save readers who may not be

aware of all the subtle ways they could stain the honor of marriage. Rogers smoothly assumes

authority on the topic by insisting his way is “right” and issuing a warning of damnation to those

who may dismiss his instruction.

Rogers uses his prefatory chapters to harshly criticize the state of marriage in England. In his dedication to “the Right Honourable…Robert Earle of Warwicke,” he refers to “the many complaints of the married” as well as “those notorious errours and corruptions which (through sin and Satan) have insinuated, nay pierced the very entrals of this State,” likely referring to the legal right to seek a separation of bed and board (A2r). The abuse of marriage is the inspiration for the treatise, and it is a topic he sees as a reprieve from the more explicitly spiritual matters he had written on previously. The marital problems that he discusses range from the minor concerns of unhappy married couples to the larger body of English law. Addressing the reader, he thanks God for the opportunity to publish his treatise in “these sad times” because “as barren as the world is of good persons, and good couples, yet here and there are scattered many of a tractable and docible disposition, to doe well, and to order their marriage course aright” (Ar-Av). It is for these particular couples that Rogers is penning his treatise. They are lacking only the necessary information to turn their poor marriage into one that can give “the Tythe of comfort, and content, which this estate might affoord them” (A2r). Rogers’s judgment on the state of marriage is bleak;

only those spouses who have compliant and teachable minds are capable of heeding his advice and have a chance at experiencing the benefits of marriage. Unfortunately, those readers who do not have a malleable disposition, and are likely not reading the treatise, will not benefit from this knowledge and are without hope.

The first chapter of the treatise is dedicated to proving that marriage is an honorable

institution. Rogers contrasts the spiritual integrity of marriage with the low and offensive way

that it is treated in the world. He blames the trend of avoiding marriage and praising the single

life on spouses who dishonor their marriage by bringing prostitutes and bastards into their

homes, by marrying irreligious partners, and by leaving their yoke-fellows. These sins, he

argues, are both common and visible. Rogers asks how men can wish to be married when they witness couples “abandoning each other by Law, or lawlesse divorces, from bed, board, and affection,” which he clarifies in parentheses, “I meane by wilfull separating themselves” (13). He lumps divorce and separation into the same category as adultery and prostitution, which attests to his consideration of its offense. The reference to abandonment by law is legal separation, while the illegal abandonment is desertion. Rogers asserts that both cases besmirch the honor of marriage and occur frequently enough to discourage single men to marry.

Rogers explains his reasoning behind the strict ban of divorce in a discussion of

uncleanliness before marriage. He is firm in his conviction that the engagement contract should be broken if one or both of spouses “defile themselves by incontinence” before they are wed (120). However, he is more ambiguous in opinion on sexual infidelity that is discovered after the marriage. In this case, the marriage “seems to disanull,” or nullify the betrayal. Rogers deduces that the act of marriage clears spouses of infidelity during engagement; there is no way to go back on the bond when it is created, even if spouses discover that partners were previously unfaithful. By prohibiting the innocent spouse from marrying again, Rogers makes marriage

“more solemne” with “the honour of an ordinance” valued above the “content” of the innocent spouse. In plainer terms, the protection of marriage as a holy and honorable institution is more important to uphold than assuaging the grievance of a person already married. According to Rogers, if divorce with remarriage were allowed in this case, then marriage as an institution would be threatened. He goes on to ask the reader’s pardon in his decision to “say not any thing”

on divorce, for “it would be as death in the pot,” or too contrary to his topic of the honor of

marriage (121). This request is somewhat confusing, as it is written immediately after Rogers has

expressed his opinion on divorce. He views divorce as a threat to his purpose of defending the honor of marriage, but cannot seem to completely avoid the issue.

Though Rogers’s thoughts in the contract chapter seem firmly against divorce, in another section he claims that marriage is “not to be dissolved till death, except uncleannes divorced it”

(150). Several pages later, he clarifies that “no other fault (if once the marriage be lawfully consummated) doth inferre just separation…save this of uncleannesse” (167). In light of his earlier arguments against second marriages, it is likely that Rogers is blending the terms divorce and separation to mean the legal separation of bed and board in which neither party can remarry.

According to Rogers, if either spouse commits adultery, then they can lawfully proceed to a separation of bed and board, but no other cause can warrant a separation.

Divorce and separation in Matrimoniall Honor are regarded with contempt, yet also some apparent confusion. Rogers openly states his hesitation to speak on divorce then seems to

contradict himself by naming divorce throughout the text. He mentions lawful separation of bed and board with prostitution, while also claiming that separation is a just response to adultery.

Roger’s views on divorce and separation, scattered throughout hundreds of pages of text, do not easily cohere. While his certainty that marriage is being degraded on a massive scale never wavers, Rogers struggles with how to address divorce. He ultimately cannot keep silent on the issue, even when he says that he will.

Of Domesticall Duties, a much larger text, addresses similar concerns and anxieties about

the correct actions to take in the case of adultery. Of Domesticall Duties is a massive conduct

book containing eight total treatises on the particular duties of members of the household,

making it one of the largest and most comprehensive works of its kind (Dolan 179). The over

700-page treatise was first published in 1622, included in a volume of works in 1627, and

reprinted again on its own in 1634. The multiple reprints of this work are likely linked to famous author William Gouge, whose “pulpit became the most celebrated in London.” Of this

clergyman’s many writings, Of Domesticall Duties remains the most popular (Usher). Despite the work’s size, it is easily navigable thanks to Gouge’s meticulous table of contents breaking apart the individual issues addressed in each treatise. Gouge dedicates three treatises to husbands and wives, with the first addressing married couples as a unit and the remaining two separating gendered duties. Adultery, discontent, hatred, separation, and divorce are among the many sections included within these three treatises; Gouge seems to advocate divorce for adultery—a crime that he believes irreparably damages the health of the marriage—but provides no direction as to how such a divorce would work, and he viciously attacks separation and dislike between spouses.

Like Rogers, Gouge names adultery as the only offense that can warrant divorce. The text gives the issue of adultery five consecutive chapters; the first, “Of Adulterie,” even figuratively names it a capital offense, capable of terminating the marriage by making “way for Divorce: as is cleare and evident by the determination of Christ himselfe.” The adjectives “clear” and “evident”

seem to strike back against arguments that divorce for adultery is not supported by the Bible. The next chapter, “Of pardoning adulterie upon repentance,” calls divorce a “libertie” that the

innocent party has the right to invoke. In the case of adultery, innocent spouses are not forced by

law to divorce partners, but they have the freedom to do so. Interestingly, Gouge begins this

section by stating that the innocent party is not bound to “retaine the delinquent, because of

repentance” (218). He frames divorce as a choice available to the innocent spouse, though in his

section, “Of the hainousnesse of Adulterie,” he argues that adultery alienates marital affection,

and “seldome it is reconciled againe” (220). “Lawfull earnest affection,” as Gouge describes the

term, requires two things: disregard of the other’s faults and consistent displays of esteem and respect (361). Adultery cripples the capacity for the innocent spouse to maintain genuine affection for their yoke-fellow, leading Gouge to assert that divorce for adultery should always be allowed.

Gouge also includes a chapter of “remedies” against adultery; however, these remedies are methods of prevention and do not offer advice to those couples who are already afflicted by infidelity. Gouge places “due benevolence,” or sexual intercourse, as the center of his

instruction. The benevolent act “must be performed with good will and delight, willingly, readily and cheerfully,” while the “due” modifier alludes to the debt that husband and wife owe one another from their marriage contract. Gouge praises due benevolence as the only legitimate strategy to avoid fornication and adultery—fasting and isolation may work for a time, but ultimately cannot fully quash sinful lust (222). To prove lacking in the duty of due benevolence is to expose partners to temptation, while to prove excessive is to provoke instead of alleviate lust (222-23). Though refusing due benevolence to a spouse is “to give Satan great advantage”

and being sexually insatiable may provoke a greater lust in one’s partner outside of the marriage bed, Gouge does not offer help for those who have erred in this area (223).

After the issue of divorce is settled, Gouge moves on to debunking the practice of separation of bed and board as a Catholic creation subverting the will of God. In a section titled

“Of the errour of Papists about husband and wifes separation,” Gouge sorts the Catholic reasons

for separation into two categories: mutual consent and fault. Because God is the creator and third

party of the marriage contract, the fact of two people consenting to separation cannot absolve

them from the marital duty that they owe to God. Gouge then transitions into disproving fault

separation, listing the crimes of adultery, forsaking one’s faith, and “soliciting or impelling unto

sin” as the three primary faults. Gouge first dismisses adultery since he considers it the only true cause of divorce, not separation. To combat the fault of forsaken faith, he directs readers to 1 Corinthians 7:12-14, in which Paul says that unbelieving spouses must be tolerated if they do not desert their partner. Considering Gouge’s brief and confident invalidation of these two faults, his discussion of the charge of sinful temptation is more uncertain. Gouge advises spouses to be cautious around sinful partners, and in extreme circumstances he instructs readers to avoid their company or even report their behavior to the authorities, which will hopefully result in their imprisonment and rehabilitation. These last two strategies do involve a degree of separation, yet Gouge maintains that sinful behavior is “no sufficient cause finally to dissolve marriage in regard of bed and cohabitation” (232-33). Gouge recognizes the spiritual danger of living with a spouse who pushes their faithful partner toward sin, and he seems to struggle with the appropriate means to handle the situation and is unable to give a definitive answer to this issue.

While Gouge forbids separation of bed and board as a Catholic concept denounced in scripture, his treatment of desertion reveals even more uncertainty about the correct actions to take in the event of a sinful spouse. Matrimonial unity is the “first, highest, chiefest, and most absolutely necessarie common-mutuall dutie betwixt Man and Wife,” betraying this duty means

“renouncing each other, and making the matrimoniall bond frustrate” (214). Gouge labels this

renouncement as desertion, which is when one of the spouses “through indignation of the true

religion, and utter detestation thereof, or some other like cause” removes themselves completely

from their partner and retreats to a place where their abandoned yoke-fellow “with safetie of life,

or a good conscience cannot abide.” After an earnest period of trying and failing to win them

back, the innocent party is freed from the marriage bond, for which Gouge cites 1 Corinthians

7:15, “If the unbeleeving depart, let him depart. A brother or sister is not under bondage in such

cases” (215). However, Gouge recognizes that the doctrines of “many reformed Churches beyond the seas” determine that desertion destroys the marriage bond and allows the innocent party to remarry. He ends with the admission, “because our Church hath no such custome, nor our lawe determined such cases, I leave them to the custom of other Churches” (215-16). Gouge uses no grounds, spiritual or otherwise, to argue against this liberty; he only acknowledges that the Protestant church of his country does not have laws in place to allow remarriage after desertion. This admission is crucial in demonstrating that English authors and clergyman were aware of the ways in which other reformed churches were dealing with separation and divorce, and it also shows that they compared these treatments to their own laws and customs in their writings.

Gouge then moves to the “unlawfull absenting” of the husbands and wives of Protestant England, which he contrasts with warranted separations. “The practise of many men” is to send their wives away to make their homes in the country, while they themselves remain in the city,

“never caring to come at them…but are then most merrie, when their wives are farthest off.” If

sending her away is not possible, then these husbands choose to travel abroad, considering “their

owne house is as a prison to them.” If the wife instead is guilty of this crime, she sneaks away

from the house when her husband is absent, or merely feels relieved or happy when her husband

has to travel. Gouge argues that these habits are only more subtle methods of “the forenamed

kinde of unlawfull separation.” Spouses who live in one home still commit sin if they secretly

delight in staying away from each other. By having separate bed-chambers or several beds in the

same room, spouses “expose themselves to the devils snares” (235). The only “Just causes” for

living separately (and only for a finite length of time), include urgent matters necessary to the

greater good of the Church or England, such as going to war, and necessary duties related to

one’s profession, such as merchant trips (231-232). However, these separations are only free of sin if the couple mutually consents to the separation, hates to be separated, and sends love tokens back and forth while attempting to be reconciled “with all the speed they can” (232).

Gouge’s thoughts on hatred between husband and wife are heavily agitated, and he

regards intense dislike in married couples as something of a recent scourge on England. “There is

a generation of so crabbed and crooked a disposition” that they hate their spouse only because

they are married and not for any other discernable reason. He recounts a scenario in which a

spouse says they cannot love their partner, but they think they could love them if they were not

married. Gouge vehemently pushes back against these feelings, “O more then monstrous

impudience! Is this not directly to oppose against Gods ordinance, and against that order which

he hath set betwixt man and woman?” (227). A few pages later, Gouge laments “those direfull

and hellish imprecations and execrations, which ordinarily doe passe out of the mouthes of many

husbands and wives against one another.” He gives examples of verbal berating, such as spouses

voicing their regret that they met and even spouses wishing for their own death or the death of

their yoke-fellow. Gouge also claims that there are many spouses who secretly harbor these

feelings but are too ashamed to say them out loud. Their pretense of wanting to enjoy the eternal

joys of heaven in wishing for death is a cover for wanting “to be loosed and freed” from their

spouse (237). In a later chapter on the hatred particular of husbands toward their wives, Gouge

elaborates on marital discord: the “neerer and dearer any persons be, the more violent will that

hatred be which is fastened on them.” He connects this violent ill will to Moses’s allowance of

divorce for “the hardnesse of your hearts.” Divorce without adultery was a safety precaution for

hated wives who were in physical danger from their husbands, but Christ ultimately eliminated

this liberty (352).

Gouge, like Rogers, advocates for divorce in the event of adultery, but does not broach the topic of remarriage after divorce. He defends the right to marry again once a spouse has died, even to marry a third or fourth time in these cases, but says nothing of remarriage if the divorced spouse is still alive (187). It could be the case that his divorce is more akin to a formal separation of bed and board. However, because he does not clarify what his “divorce” actually entails, there is no way of knowing.

Rogers and Gouge’s hesitation to elaborate on divorce for adultery is more

understandable considering William Whately’s troubles. Whately was not only a well-known puritan preacher whose style of sermonizing earned him the nickname the “Roaring Boy of Banbury,” he was also a popular author who wrote on topics ranging from using one’s time wisely to improving the state of marriage (Dolan 171). His treatises were highly admired by contemporaries and often went through multiple editions, with The Redemption of Time being printed six times, God’s Husbandry three, The New Birth seven, and so on (Eales). In total, Whately published twelve titles, excluding reprints, with two of his treatises addressing marriage. A Bride-Bush was first published in 1617 and reprinted in 1619 and 1623, while A Care-Cloth’s only edition was printed in 1624.

A Bride-Bush was a source of ire for Whately on two accounts: a personal betrayal and a

public reprimand. The content of the treatise came from a wedding sermon written down and

delivered years previously. Whately lent a copy of this sermon to a friend who published it

without his consent (Auchter 51). Whately considered this published version incomplete because

he had since taken many more notes on the subject of marriage in the years after giving the

original sermon. But because this treatise was already in circulation and generally well-received,

Whately published a second, greatly augmented edition. In 1621, however, Whately was also

forced by the Court of High Commission to recant part of the treatise. On the title page of both editions, Whately includes a verse from Hebrews: “Marriage is honourable among all men, and the bed undefiled: but whoremongers and adulterers God will judge” (13:4). This verse signals Whately’s views on divorce elaborated within the text, namely that divorce was legal in the event of adultery or desertion, which differed from accepted doctrine and was therefore seen as a threat to the Church of England.

The sense of widespread marital breakdown is strong in the beginning of the treatise; in both editions, Whately includes a subtitle appealing to readers stricken with a bad marriage. He advertises his text as a problem-solver, promising to describe “the duties of married persons: By performing whereof, marriage shall be to them a great help, which now find it a little hell.” The popularity of the treatise indicates that many readers did experience the problem of a bad marriage and were interested in ways to remedy it. Continuing in this vein, Whately gives a small address “To the Reader” prior to the main body of text. He starts by chastising those who

“enter into this estate, and beeing entred complaine thereof” and states that his purpose is to

“plead the cause of marriage…by directing the married to the knowledge and practice of their duties, which would mend all” (A2r). Whately urges readers to turn inward to examine and improve their own marriage instead of denouncing marriage altogether.

Whately tackles divorce almost immediately following his advertisement to the reader.

The duties of marriage are divided into principal and less principal categories, with the violation of the two principal duties rendering the “knot [of marriage] dissolved and quite undone.”

Fidelity is the first principal duty, or “the chaste keeping of each ones body for the other,” with

adultery being the violation. Adultery breaks “the covenant of God” and removes “the yoke from

the yoke fellowe’s neck.” Those who commit adultery make themselves vulnerable to the death

penalty, “if the Magistrate did as Gods law commands” (2). Whately’s second principal duty is

“cohabitation, or dwelling together.” A prolonged absence away from a partner due to necessary circumstances like service to England and “needefull private affairs” does not qualify as

abandonment, but “a wilfull and angry separation of beds or houses must not be tollerated.”

Whately reasons that desertion negates the “purpose and end” of marriage and is almost always accompanied by adultery (3). However, neither of these causes could justify full divorce with remarriage in England under the law, which is much to the contrary of what Whately boldly asserts.

Whately uses scripture to legitimize his arguments for divorce with remarriage. He cites

his assertion that adultery condemns the offending spouse to death by listing “Lev. 20. 10” in the

margin. This verse commits both adulterer and adulteress to death, and if the offending spouse is

considered deceased, then the innocent spouse is free to remarry. Whately similarly cites 1

Corinthians 7:15 in the margin beside his desertion argument, but he also includes the verse itself

in his paragraph, calling it “cleare direction from the holy Ghost” that “if the unbeeleever depart,

let him depart: a brother or sister is not bound in such thing” (4). However, Whately seems to

extend this verse to desertion in general, not necessarily desertion by an unbeliever. In cases of

spouses withdrawing from their yoke-fellow, “so that there is no hope to recall them,” they “may

lawfully (after an orderly proceeding with the Church or Magistrate in that behalfe) joyne him or

her selfe to another” (4). There was no such proceeding through either the ecclesiastical or civil

courts that allowed divorce and remarriage at the time of this publication. Both the 1617 and

1619 edition of the treatise include these arguments. Whately adds that “it is unlawfull for any to

forsake a yoke-fellow, and marry another, but for the cause of fornication: and yet it is lawfull

for any being causelesly or wrongfully forsaken, or put away by the yoke-fellow to marry

another” (27). This is unmistakable evidence of support of divorce and remarriage, contrary to Rogers and Gouge who never discuss remarriage while the spouse is alive. A Bride-Bush confidently instructs readers to seek a reprieve that did not exist in canon law.

Whately was summoned before the Court of High Commission two years after publishing the second edition of A Bride-Bush. This treatise on the “duties of married persons” addressed a common enough topic for the era, but its blunt and expansive stance on divorce warranted legal action. The Court of High Commission was founded in the sixteenth century for the purpose of

“enforcing religious conformity to the laws of the Reformation settlement in England” (Auchter 38). Whately was to be brought before an ecclesiastical court that had “gained a reputation as an instrument of repression, capable of ruining a person who did not submit to its commands”

(Auchter 51). Records of proceedings reveal a curious assortment of cases, ranging from very serious to quite ludicrous. On 16 April, 1632, a minister was brought before the court for christening a cat, while on 21 June 1632, a clerk was fined for “speaking scandalous words against the King and Queen’s majesties” (Burn 46, 48). However, policing marriage was within the rights of the Court, and it exercised the “power to punish incest, adultery, fornication, with all misbehaviour and disorders in marriage” (Burn 11). Offenders were fined or imprisoned for being found guilty of adultery, forging marriage licenses, and even marrying against the will of parents. Whately’s case entry is brief: “1621, May 4. Whately, Vicar of Banbury, revokes the assertions in his work called ‘Bride Bush,’ that either adultery or long desertion dissolves marriage: he is convinced by the reasons alleged in the High Commission Court, of their

falsehood” (Burn 39). He was spared from a harsher punishment by signing a formal recantation

of these views (Auchter 51).

Two years later, Whately published a final edition of A Bride-Bush with an

“advertisement of the author to the reader” addressing his recantation. Though he maintains that his views on divorce have changed, a supposed printing mishap combined with suspect wording casts doubt on his change of heart. The only difference between the 1619 and 1623 version of A Bride-Bush is the addition of the advertisement; the 1623 edition contains the complete and unedited passages in favor of divorce for adultery and desertion. However, Whately admits that he was “forced to acknowledge the former opinions to be false.” He claims that he was planning to leave out the divorce sections in the reprint and had sent an edited copy to the printer, who then lost the new manuscript and printed the older version without informing him. Whately uses the advertisement to briefly refute his previous assertions, conceding that the addition of a printed retraction “may serve better” than if he had only omitted or edited the sections in question (Ff2v). The end result, however, is a treatise with lengthy chapters condoning divorce and a page and a half preface dismissing it. Readers could weigh both arguments and draw their own conclusions.

Whately’s dismissal of divorce is brief and incomplete. He says that adultery “committed by either one or both of them [husband and wife]” does not dissolve the marriage bond “for who can doubt, but that a man or woman, having secretly sinned in this kind, repenting of the sinne, and keeping his or her owne counsell, may lawfully continue to give due benevolence unto the yoke-fellow? Wherefore betwixt man and wife, after the sinne of adultery committed, the band of matrimonie remaineth undissolved: and therefore the contrary opinion is false” (Ff2r). His proof lies in deceit, making an impossible jump from a specific circumstance to a universal rule.

If a spouse does not know that their partner committed adultery, and the partner repents of their

secret betrayal and continues to treat their spouse as the marriage bond requires, then the bond is

still lawfully intact. Whately deduces that adultery cannot dissolve the marriage bond because if it did, then the couple described would cease to be married. This is a weak argument that does not address the possibilities of unrepentant spouses, repeat offenders, and any reason as to why the marriage bond would not be dissolved in the case of adultery, even if it is kept hidden from the innocent partner. Whately also neglects to use scripture to support this claim, which is noticeable considering he enlists a verse allowing divorce for adultery to negate his following claim that divorce for desertion is unlawful.

Whately’s rejection of divorce for desertion is similarly weak. A few sentences after claiming that couples cannot divorce for adultery, he begins his second argument with the statement that “to put away a man’s wife not for Adultery, is wilfull desertion,” which bears close similarity to Matthew 19:9, “whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for

fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery” (Ff2r). Whately’s statement implies that divorce for adultery is not desertion and therefore warranted. He then compares physical and emotional desertion—“for is it not all one whether he depart from her with a minde of never returning to her, or put her away from him with a minde of never re-accepting her?”—but then quickly reminds readers that “such causelesse putting away a mans wife doth not dissolve the bond of matrimony betwixt them.” He cites Matthew 19:9 in the margin, and deduces that a man

“which marrieth a woman so put away, doth commit Adultery; which could not be, if the bond of matrimony betwixt her and the former husband were thereby dissolved, wherefore at least some wilfull dissertion doth not dissolve the bond of matrimonie” (Ff2v). The “at least some”

qualification is suspect; Whately does not elaborate on other desertions not included in this

group. The advertisement, which Whately calls “sound reasoning,” seems to be a superficial

appeasement of the Court that does not fully disprove anything (Ff2r).

Despite his marriage treatise becoming a source of significant trouble, Whately chose to write a second pamphlet on the subject. The only edition of A Care-Cloth was published in 1624.

Its full title, like A Bride-Bush, offers more information on the contents of the treatise, though A Care-Cloth seems to take a more negative approach to marriage than its predecessor. This treatise discusses “the cumbers and troubles of marriage” and is “intended to advise them that may, to shun them; that may not, well and patiently beare them.” In a preface “to the courteous reader,” Whately says he wants to address a problem he has observed in England. People are rushing into marriage for the pleasure of consummation and then, upon realizing they are unprepared for the lifelong commitment, they bitterly regret their decision. Husbands and wives are “almost always…cursing their Wedding-day…and thirsting after divorce” (A2v). Whereas A Bride-Bush covers marital duties, Whately now instructs readers on marital difficulties. He points out the folly of those who imagine marriage “a very Paradise” and instead “find thick mire and dirt there” (A3v). A person who is aware of potential troubles beforehand has a great

advantage over this dangerous idealism. Whately’s aggressive tone points to frustration at the state of marriage in England.

Another “advertisement to the reader” prefaces the main body of the text and revokes the divorce arguments using nearly the exact wording from A Bride-Bush. Whately refers to his earlier treatise by name and repeats his previous position that adultery and desertion dissolve the matrimonial bond. He refers to these arguments against divorce as “reasons, as have been

objected unto me against these two positions.” The rationales are the same as A Bride-Bush, with

the exception of Whately adding the scriptural example of David’s dalliance with Bathsheba to

his adultery argument. He asks the rhetorical question, “For who can thinke, that David sinned,

in knowing any other of his wives, after his offense with Bathsheba?” (A8r). Once again,

Whately uses a specific event to establish a general rule. He assures readers that he is “sweyed by these arguments” to which he “cannot make a satisfying answere” and thus renounces his previous opinion (A8v). His restatement on the unlawfulness of divorce functions in multiple ways in this context. Whately is taking an extra precaution against retaliation from the Court of High Commission; a treatise dealing with the troubles of marriage would logically address divorce, and the advertisement seems to be a reassurance to readers even before the text officially begins that Whately will keep with his signed recantation. The other, less obvious function of the advertisement is to serve as a warning: marriage is filled with hardship, and it is also inescapable.

Although Whately makes certain to restate his position on divorce early, his pre-marital advice points to an opinion that an ill-advised match should not be considered a true marriage.

He requires that prospective partners “marry with a fit person” and obtain their parent’s consent.

Parental consent was not a requirement for a lawful marriage in England during this time period, leading Whately to argue that “the Scripture doth manifestly give this power to Parents” (33-34).

He claims that couples who are not joined by their parents, “God doth not joyne,” and their cohabitation is therefore sinful (34). In order to purify their marriage, the couple must secure an

“after-consent” from their parents. Whately does not deny the validity of such a marriage, but states that it is sinful and unclean until husband and wife obtain retroactive consent. The other requirement, marital fitness, can be determined by three categories: “sufficient distance in blood and affinitie,” “entire freedome from all other persons,” and “agreement in the same true

Religion.” These conditions are so paramount to Whately that he considers a marriage without the first two “no marriage, but alone in name” (28). He does not use the words “divorce” or

“annulment” in these cases nor does he advise a solution for such a marriage that already exists,

but his insistence that it is not truly a marriage is telling. Annulments were possible in England under the conditions of consanguinity and previous contract, but Whately does not want to refer to the practice directly; this caution likely stems from his earlier troubles with divorce.

While ignoring the first two conditions of a fit match creates a marriage in name only, failing to fulfill the third requirement of agreement of religion is a “great sinne against God”

(28). Whately denounces marriage between Christians and “Turkes or Pagans,” reminding readers that Paul told a widow she could remarry whom she pleases, “but onely in the Lord”

(32). Again, as in the absence of parental consent, Whately labels these marriages as sinful but does not deny their validity. He urges the unmarried to ignore “the finest body, the sweetest face” and the largest portion in favor of “the holiest heart,” as righteousness is the foundation of a successful marriage. Whately instructs husband and wife to pray together frequently and “do much goode to the soules of each other” as a means to breed affection (78-79). He ends his advice on avoiding marital conflict by admitting that “no care will altogether shame” problems that will arise between spouses. In the midst of discord, he instructs the couple to pray for patience and “to looke up to God, as the Author, and Heaven, as the end of your troubles.” An unsatisfied husband should imagine how much another man with “a shrew, a waste-good, an harlot” as a wife would wish to be in his shoes, while an unsatisfied wife should be thankful that she is does not “hath an unthrift, a tyrant, a whoremonger” for a husband (84). Whately does not speak to those readers, at least directly, who do have spouses with these infirmities. In a

fervently Protestant tenor, Whately reminds his readers that the troubles they suffer in life are

much milder than the ones that they deserve, and that they must concentrate on the future joys of

heaven instead of despairing about their life on earth (80-81). This final suggestion seems to be a

consolation for those who have exhausted all other methods.

Although Whately praises marriage and insists upon its sinlessness, he barrages the reader with detailed scenarios to consider carefully before taking a spouse. He rejects the concept of virginity being more holy than marriage, but concedes that virginity is “more easefull,” as the married life contains “more difficulties than the single life” (3). Whately paints a colorful and painful of how these difficulties may manifest. Though bad qualities in men can be hidden by

“nature and education,” every man has his faults and “to obtaine a husband free from all of them…is altogether impossible” (44). Whately provides an exhaustive list of shortcomings:

“some men are churlish, sowre, & unkind; some, wrathfull, passionate, and furious; some hard, miserable, and niggardly; some wastefull, riotous, and unthriftie; some uncleane, unsatiable, and ranging after other women; some suspicious, mistrustfull, and jealous of their owne wives; some rash and hare-brain'd; some fond and giddie; some simple; some subtill; some idle; some

toylesome; some carking; some carelesse” (43). He instructs single women to look inward and consider the “evils that may befall her in marriage” before committing to a husband (47). As with the list of bad qualities, he gives series of questions that women must ask themselves,

“What if mine husband should prove unkinde, and disregardful of me?” and “What if he be a haunter of Alehouses, or Taverns and come home half drunk, halfe mad, and powre forth all his rage upon me and my innocent children?,” among many other possible scenarios (46). Whately repeats this pattern of bad qualities and self-questioning to single men as well. Any reader

contemplating marriage and reading these passages would likely find it daunting. Whately leaves unsaid that if any of these qualities or scenarios proves true, the spouse is stuck.

Whately demonstrates the very real danger that clergymen faced when publishing their

thoughts on marriage and divorce. These treatises can be construed as recorded sermons given by

respected authorities of the Church of England. In the eyes of the legislative power of the

Church, Whately abused his position by writing and distributing such an explicit and radical

stance on divorce. Rogers and Gouge may have toed the line in their views on adultery, but

Whately carried his opinions too far in the eyes of the ecclesiastical courts.

III.

In one sentence, Gouge mentions an argument that some authors explore for the entirety of their marriage tracts: “In mariage there is a covenant of God (Prov.2.17) as well as of the two parties: the consent therefore of parties is not sufficient to breake it” (232-33). Thomas Gataker, William Vaughan, and co-authors Robert Cleaver and John Dod appeal to ideas of spiritual marriage to navigate their thoughts on marriage and divorce. These authors rely on God’s role as the creator and third party of the marriage contract as well as the holy example of Christ’s marriage to the Church in order to refute divorce.

Gataker (1574-1654), respected minister and highly active writer, published upwards of forty sermons and pamphlets within his lifetime (Willen 343-44). His subjects ranged from a funeral sermon for Lazarus to an attack of the scriptural grounds of transubstantiation. It is not surprising considering the breadth of his sermons and popularity of the topic that Gataker chose to publish his thoughts on marriage. The sermons A Good Wife Gods Gift, A Wife Indeed, and Marriage Duties Briefely Couched Togither appear in several forms between 1620-1624. 1620 saw the publication of Two Marriage Sermons, containing Gataker’s A Good Wife Gods Gift and William Bradshaw’s A Marriage Feast. In the same year, Gataker also published the single title Marriage Duties Briefely Couched Togither. Three years later, Two Marriage Sermons was republished, but Bradshaw’s text was replaced by Gataker’s A Wife Indeed, and this same version was reprinted again the following year. The substitution of another of Gataker’s texts in the place of Bradshaw’s suggests that English audiences valued Gataker’s authority on the subject and preferred his work over others.

A Good Wife Gods Gift places the misfortune of an unsuccessful marriage on the personal

sins of the spouse, making marriage a form of divine retribution. Gataker begins his sermon with

an overview of the hierarchy of a man’s relationships in life, tracing the minor inconvenience of having a bad neighbor to the utter catastrophe of having a bad wife. The structure of a household rests on the relationship between spouses, and as “Husband and Wife are neerer than Frends, and Brethren; or then Parents and Children,” the closer the bond “the greater the evill” when the bond is corrupted (5). Gataker spends pages stressing the horror of having a bad wife, even going so far as to say “it is better to live in the wilderness with the wilde beasts” than with such a woman (6). A good wife is therefore a great blessing from God, a more “speciall” demonstration of his providence than any other, including wealth (9). Gataker uses God’s gift of Eve to Adam as an example of how God grants wives through “meanes.” God gives “good ones in mercy, evill ones in wrath; the one for solace and comfort, the other for tryall, cure, correction, or

punishment.” These lines remove a single person’s agency in selecting a spouse. It is not up to the man whether he marries a good wife or bad; rather, his choice is a sign of God’s favor or lack thereof. Gataker reiterates this powerlessness: “No mariages are consummate on earth that were not first concluded and made up in heaven” (10). A single man who thinks he holds influence over his future marriage is mistaken.

A Good Wife Gods Gift considers God’s role in marriage as twofold: a bad wife is God’s punishment for sin, and a bad marriage is the result of man twisting a good and holy ordinance.

If couples “finde in mariage, inconveniences, hinderances, distractions, disturbances” then they must not blame God, but “mans corruption abusing Gods gift, perverting Gods ordinance, and turning that to his owne evill, that God hath given him for his good” (13). It is their fault that they are in an unsatisfactory marriage because they were the ones who sinned. Gataker

recommends praying to God throughout the search for a wife: “Take God with thee in wooing,

invite him to thy wedding. He, if he be pleased, will turne thy water into wine.” However, “if he

be displeased, he will turne thy wine into vinegar” (16). These views imply a certain opinion on divorce: if a bad wife is sent by God to punish the husband for his wrongdoings, then divorce or separation would be an attempt to evade one’s due punishment.

In A Wife Indeed, the 1623 companion piece to A Good Wife Gods Gift, Gataker

questions whether a wife should be able to rightly call herself a wife if she does not meet certain criteria. This sermon reads as a continuation of the themes of A Good Wife Gods Gift, but is directed toward women and their active role as spouse rather than men and their passive role of receiving a spouse. Gataker draws on the image of the bad wife and the damage she causes to her husband; she is a “corruption in his bones…a continuall dropping in a rainie day” that makes being at home taxing and drives him to other doors (2). Gataker challenges the right for this sort of woman to call herself “wife.” Some believe that a wife should always be considered as such

“so long as she is not disloyall, but is honest…of her bodie,” even though she may be

“contentious, unquiet, or inconvenient otherwise” (3). This belief, Gataker argues, is wrong.

Following some ruminations on Solomon’s verses in Proverbs, Gataker concludes, “She that is

not a good Wife is as good as no Wife” and she that is not a good wife lacks “pietie, honesty,

sobriety, modesty, and wisdome.” God does not consider as a wife the woman who fails to

perform “the Office of a Wife,” which is to be a partner and helpmeet. This woman is supposed

to be the rib of her husband, but is instead a glass eye or ivory tooth, which “beareth the Name of

a limbe or member,” but is only an imitation (9). Gataker worsens the comparisons, calling a bad

wife a “wart…a cancer that consumeth the flesh” (10). Even if a woman is married legally and

publicly with “all ceremonies and circumstances observed,” she is not a wife if she does not

perform her wifely duties (11). This diatribe raises the question of separation from a bad wife. It

seems to follow logically that if a woman cannot claim to be a wife in God’s eyes, then the man she is attached to by ceremony is free to marry a more fit substitute.

Gataker anticipates and rejects the potential conclusion that if a wife neglects her marital duties, then her husband is free from their bond. Gataker allows that “may some say: If such a Wife be no Wife, may a Man then lawfully put away such a Wife?” but quickly answers

“No…There is a knot of God betweene you that cannot be unknit.” Though a marriage may be a sham at its core, the vow between husband and wife invokes God, which cannot be undone. He then raises and answers a similar question: “may not a Man forebeare to doe the Dutie of an Husband to such a one? For why should I…be an Husband to her, if shee be not a Wife to me?”

Again, Gataker answers “No: Thou owest it to God. And it is not default of dutie on her part, that can discharge thee of thy debt to him” (17). God is presented as the third party of the contract.

When married, spouses are placed into eternal debt to God to fulfill their duties; it does not matter if their partner fails, only that they themselves keep their promise. To reconcile the many passages describing the torment that a bad wife can wreak on her husband’s life, Gataker assures the unhappily married that they will be rewarded later for upholding their end of the marriage contract.

An important duty of the marriage contract is cohabitation, and in Marriage Duties Briefley Couched Togither, Gataker admonishes spouses who ignore this obligation as shirking God’s commands. This treatise is directed toward newly married couples and splits the contents between the duties of the wife and the duties of the husband. While the wife’s primary duty is submission, the husband’s charges are to love his wife and not be bitter to her. One of the

“particular effects and fruites of this love” is cohabitation. Drawing on the biblical concept of

husband and wife as one flesh, Gataker maintains that “it is against nature for one body to bee in