Five Facets of Performance Testing
•
What is Performance Testing
•
Scope of testing
•
Purposes
•
Tools
•
1) Verification vs Validation
•
2) Simulation/Life Testing
•
3) Testing to Failure
•
4) Parameter/Feature Testing
•
5) How to synthesis a performance test
•
Failure is good
Scope and Purposes
•
Performance - The way in which a product functions.
•
Applies to all products that have an expected function and
duration.
•
Types of Performance:
•
Function: the operation of a product
•
Time: how fast or how long something functions
•
Stress/noise factors: source of damage/interference to a product
•
Accuracy: how close to the desired value the function is
•
Precision: how repeatable the function is
•
Information Goal: The key piece of information about the
Performance Testing-Tools
Infant Mortality: Production
errors, material flaws
Environmental Testing
•
Exposing materials, components,
sub-systems or full product to conditions that
may be found in their end-use environments.
•
Temperature (Hot, Cold, Ramp)
•
Humidity, non-Condensing Humidity,
Condensing Humidity
•
Radiated (UV or Heat Lamp)
•
Sunlight (Carbon Arc and Xenon exposure)
•
Salt mist, Salt Spray
•
Dust
•
Chemical Attack
Material Testing
•
Measuring the Physical, Chemical or
Mechanical properties of material
•
Material can be raw, fabricated into a
product, taken from field returns, etc.
•
Physical Properties
•
Color, density, thermal expansion, Glass Transition Point
•
Chemical Properties
•
Molecular make up
•
Molecular structure (micro structure)
•
Contaminants
•
Flammability
•
Melt Point
•
Mechanical Properties
Mechanical/Durability Testing
•
Exposing a product to cyclic mechanical
loads in order to measure or
demonstrate life.
•
Measure or Demonstrate:
•
Measuring life means running to failure
•
Demonstrate life means running to a
target with no failures (more common)
Vibration Testing
•
Exposing a product to vibration energy in order to measure or
demonstrate life.
•
Measure or Demonstrate:
•
Measuring life means running to failure
•
Demonstrate life means running to a target with no failures (more
common)
•
This type of test is often done in conjunction with Environmental
exposures (Temperature, Relative Humidity, Dust, Ultraviolet)
and functional testing (while the product is functioning)
•
Vibration can be:
•
Single-axis (most common) sometimes called 3-axis but only one
axis at a time
•
Six – Axis or 6–dof (degree of freedom).
Electrical Testing
•
Measure a product’s performance at the system,
sub-system or component level.
•
Measurements can include
•
Current, voltage and power draw
•
Audio performance
•
Product functionality
•
Temperature rise in system component or location
•
Resistance or Impedance changes
•
This type of test is often done in conjunction with
Lighting Testing
•
Light quality, brightness, color, pattern and
durability.
•
Automotive, Consumer, Airport
•
Only approved lab - Airport Lighting Equipment
Certification Program
•
Testing to FAA, ICAO, IEC, NATO, and military
•
To ensure that airport lighting equipment meets
the applicable FAA standards for safety,
performance, quality and standardization
How do you show that you’re the best choice?
•
How do you translate your key differentiators to
your customer as they make their purchase
decision?
•
How do you help customers navigate product
features?
•
How do you justify pricing for on-the-spot
pricing comparisons?
In a world of product recalls, feature creep
and supply chain issues, quality is top of
mind.
Intertek’s Quality & Performance Mark has been
created to help our customers
demonstrate their
commitment to quality.
To consumers the mark is third party, validated
proof that a product meets or exceeds key
What Goes Into the Mark?
Third party verified testing
What Goes Into the Mark?
Third party verified testing
“Independently tested for Quality and
Performance”
•
“Baseline” quality tests
•
(1 to 5 tests are performed to
•
expert specifications)
•
Durability: Evaluates range of conditions
product can handle and continue to function
•
Functionality: Performance of product’s
functions & features under normal use
•
Life Cycle: Evaluates how long product
lasts in normal operation
•
Usability: Ease of use for intended tasks
What Goes Into the Mark?
•
“Above and Beyond” tests
•
Manufacturers Claims: (Optional 6
thtest
highlights manufacturer’s differentiators.
Test results on swing tags, POP,
website)
Third party verified testing
“Independently tested for Quality and
Performance”
•
“Baseline” quality tests
•
(1 to 5 tests are performed to
•
expert specifications)
•
Durability: Evaluates range of conditions
product can handle and continue to function
•
Functionality: Performance of product’s
functions & features under normal use
•
Life Cycle: Evaluates how long product
lasts in normal operation
•
Usability: Ease of use for intended tasks
•
Workmanship: Verifies product’s physical
What Goes Into the Mark?
•
“Above and Beyond” tests
•
Manufacturers Claims: (Optional 6
thtest
highlights manufacturer’s differentiators.
Test results on swing tags, POP,
Researchable results
•
Model & certification #’s
•
Intertek website link
Third party verified testing
“Independently tested for Quality and Performance”
•
“Baseline” quality tests
•
(1 to 5 tests are performed to
•
expert specifications)
•
Durability: Evaluates range of conditions
product can handle and continue to function
•
Functionality: Performance of product’s
functions & features under normal use
•
Life Cycle: Evaluates how long product
lasts in normal operation
•
Usability: Ease of use for intended tasks
•
Workmanship: Verifies product’s physical
Verification Vs. Validation
•
Verification: Proving that the out put of the
design process achieved the desired
parameters: Did we hit the target?
•
Validation: Proving that the product is capable
of meeting the requirements for the intended
use. Do we have the right target?
•
Example: Tightening Torque
•
Parameters:
•
Torque on a Fastener
•
Verification – Can the device achieve the
correct torque? Does the production process
provide the correct torque?
•
Validation – does the product perform as
Simulation – Life Testing
•
Simulation-•
Goal is to simulate end use conditions precisly in
the laboratory setting
•
Requires:
•
Knowing with a high degree of accuracy what
the end use conditions are.
•
Knowing what is ment by failure.
•
Knowing what the end usage rate is.
•
Life Testing
•
Simulate the end use conditions
End Use Conditions
•
What are the end use conditions? What
do you expect the product to see?
•
Make sure to ask about conditions in
four areas
•
Electrical
•
Mechanical
•
Environmental
•
Chemical
•
Quantify:
•
Value, range
•
Duration, usage
•
Modes:
•
In Use
•
Storage
•
Shipping
•
Maintenance
•
Voltage
•
Current
•
Pressure
•
Velocity
•
Flow rate
•
Force
•
Duty Cycle
•
Temperature
•
Hot, Cold, Ramp
•
RH%
•
Sunlight
Demonstrate Life Vs. Measure Life
Demonstrate
•
Beat a target value.
•
Typically a truncated
test.
•
Shorter and easier
•
Reliability and
Confidence only.
•
Measure
•
Must go to
•
End of life
•
Measurable point
•
Unknown time period
MTBF – Life Test
•
Mean Time Between Failures
•
MTBF =
∆
T / (ln ( 1-Nf/Ndut))
•
Delta T = Change in Time
•
Nf = Number of failed units
•
Ndut = Total number of units under test
•
OR
•
MTBF must be 2000 hrs or more
•
Ndut = 20 samples available
•
Test for 2000*(ln(1-1/20)) = 102 hrs with no more then 1 failure
Single Stress Model
•
Determine stress to apply
•
Determine service levels
•
Estimate maximum levels
•
Test at maximum levels until half fail
•
Choose a lower stress level
•
Test until half fail
Spring Force
2 N
Acceleration and Shape Coefficients
•
The rate at which life is
shortened by the increase in
stress is expressed by a
coefficient in the math model.
•
The shape of the distribution is
Example Math Models
•
Arrhenius-Weibull Model
•
F(t;T) = 1 -exp{-[t exp[-
γ
0
-(
γ
1
/T)]]
β
•
Power-Lognormal Model
•
F(t,V)=
Φ
{[log(t)-
µ
(x)]/
σ
}
•
Cox (Proporational Hazards) Model
•
R
0
(t) = exp[-
∫
0
t
h
0
(t)dt]
•
All models from “Accelerated Testing”, Wayne Nelson, 1990
Testing to Failure
•
Why?
•
Find and fix the root cause of failure
•
Faster and easier to get meaningful data
•
How?
•
Elevated sources of stress
Typical Procedure in Failure Analysis
•
Inspection
•
Visual, Optical microscope,
Electronic microscope.
e.g.
Fractography
•
Material identification
•
Atomic/Molecule, Chemical
composition, Microstructure,
Contamination,
e.g. Infrared
Spectroscopy
•
Property evaluation
•
Chemical, Physical, Mechanical,
Thermal, Electrical,
e.g Tensile Test
Where is Failure Analysis Typically
Utilized?
•
Primary process problems:
•
Material flows incorrectly through process
•
Visual defects observed
•
Performance parameters do not meet
expectations (or specifications)
•
Transport related failures:
•
Breakage
•
Contamination from environment
(dirt, transfer of materials from
dunnage, moisture, etc.)
•
Heat or vibration damage
•
Secondary process problems:
•
Breakage or irregularities that interfere
with assembly.
•
Visual defects observed
•
Adhesion problems with mating
components (blocking, welding, or
adhesion failures depending on desired
assembly behavior)
•
Failure due to contact with incompatible
materials
•
End-use failures:
•
Incompatibilities with end-use
environments
•
Abuse
•
Slow failures (repeated cycling,
oxidation, fatigue, etc.) from
processes or environments
unanticipated in design
•
Other failures observed in
If all failure modes were intuitive…
•
Tests would simulate what we expect.
•
Tests would instrument for what we expect.
• The human ability to ignore the unexpected
can be profound.
Le
ad
s to
wa
rra
Stress
Product
Specs
Margin Discovery Process...
Table 4. Hot Survey
7xiv sample reads 52.74 ohms. Soft Failure
Vpdiag function check.
Boot Script error. Observation.
2. XXXXXXX
Sample 1 30 40 TSDSP function check.
Functioned properly
Vpdiag function check.
Boot Script error. Observation.
3. XXXXXXX
Sample 1 30 50 TSDSP function check.
Functioned properly
Vpdiag function check.
Boot Script error. Observation.
4. XXXXXXX
Sample 1 30 60 TSDSP function check.
Functioned properly
Vpdiag function check.
Boot Script error. Observation.
5. XXXXXXX
Sample 1 30 70 TSDSP function check.
Functioned properly
Vpdiag function check.
Boot Script error. Observation.
6. XXXXXXX
Sample 1 30 80 TSDSP function check.
Functioned properly
Vpdiag function check.
Boot Script error. Observation.
7. XXXXXXX
Sample 1 30 90 TSDSP function check.
Functioned properly
Vpdiag function check.
DSP error code 707. Observation. Boot Script error. Observation.
8. XXXXXXX
Sample 1 30 100
TSDSP function check.
Functioned properly
Vpdiag function check.
DSP error code 707. Observation. Boot Script error. Observation.
9. XXXXXXX
Sample 1 30 110
TSDSP function check.
Functioned properly
Vpdiag function check.
DSP error code 707. Observation. Boot Script error. Observation.
10. XXXXXXX
Sample 1 30 120
TSDSP function check.
Functioned properly
Vpdiag function check.
Boot Script error. Observation.
11. XXXXXXX
Sample 1 30 130 TSDSP function check.
Functioned properly
12. XXXXXXX
Sample 1 30 140
Mounted Sample in chamber to start Step 12. Sample would not turn on. Removed sample from chamber and made several
SUMMARY OF THE HOT SURVEY
•
After completing the function checks for
Table 5. Thermal Cycle (Transition)
Table 5. Thermal Cycle (Transition)
Step
Sample
Time in
minutes
Temperature
(
oC)
Observations
1A
30
-80
Vpdiag function check.
DSP error code 707. Observation.
Boot Script error. Observation.
1B
XXXXXXX
Sample 2
30
100
TSDSP function check.
Functioned properly
2A
30
-80
Vpdiag function check.
Boot Script error. Observation.
2B
XXXXXXX
Sample 2
30
100
TSDSP function check.
Functioned properly
3A
30
-80
Vpdiag function check.
Boot Script error. Observation.
3B
XXXXXXX
Sample 2
30
100
TSDSP function check.
Functioned properly
4A
30
-80
Vpdiag function check.
Boot Script error. Observation.
4B
XXXXXXX
Sample 2
30
100
TSDSP function check.
SUMMARY OF THE THERMAL
TRANSITION SURVEY
•
Sample 2 only exhibited one (1) Soft
Table 6. Vibration
Table 6. Vibration
Step Samples Time in minutes
Vibration
(G’s) Observations
Vpdiag function check.
Boot Script error. Observation. 1. XXXXXXX
Sample 2 30 5 TSDSP function check.
7xiv sample reads 45.39 ohms. Soft Failure
Vpdiag function check.
DSP error code 707. Observation. Boot Script error. Observation. 2. XXXXXXX
Sample 2 30 10
TSDSP function check.
7xiv sample reads 45.39 ohms. Soft Failure
Vpdiag function check.
DSP error code 707. Observation. Boot Script error. Observation. 3 XXXXXXX
Sample 2 30 15
TSDSP function check.
Functioned properly
Vpdiag function check.
Boot Script error. Observation. 4. XXXXXXX
Sample 2 30 20 TSDSP function check.
7xiv sample reads 47.46 ohms. Hard Failure
Vpdiag function check.
Boot Script error. Observation. 5. XXXXXXX
Sample 2 30 25 TSDSP function check.
7xiv sample reads 47.46 ohms. Hard Failure
Vpdiag function check.
Boot Script error. Observation. 6. XXXXXXX
Sample 2 30 30 TSDSP function check.
7xiv sample reads 47.46 ohms. Hard Failure Following step 7 component C904 was separated from the
PCB. Hard Failure. Reference Appendix A Figure 3 for photograph.
Vpdiag function check.
DSP error code 705. Hard Failure Boot script error. Observation. 7. XXXXXXX
Sample 2 30 35
TSDSP function check.
7xiv sample reads 47.46 ohms. Hard Failure
Vpdiag function check.
DSP error code 705. Hard failure Boot Script error. Observation.
8. XXXXXXX
Sample 2 30 40
TSDSP function check.
After selecting the TSDSP icon to launch the program a window popped up displaying “DSP is not present”. Hard
Failure.
Table 6. Vibration Cont.:
Table 6. Vibration Cont.:
Step Samples Time in minutes
Vibration
(G’s) Observations
After completing Step 9 both CF card were dislodged
Vpdiag function check
DSP error code 705. Hard Failure Boot script error. Observation.
.
9. XXXXXXX
Sample 2 30 45
TSDSP function check.
The display is solid blue could not perform function checks. After completing Step 10 both CF card were dislodged
Vpdiag function check
DSP error code 705. Hard Failure Boot script error. Observation. CF2 error code 703. Hard Failure
10. XXXXXXX
Sample 2 30 50
TSDSP function check.
SUMMARY OF THE VIBRATION SURVEY
•
During the Vibration Survey, sample 2 had compact flash cards installed in
both Slot 1, and Slot 2 bays.
•
Sample 2 exhibited the same Hard Failure multiple times during the TSDSP
function check 7xiv. The sample was out of tolerance.
•
Sample 2 exhibited a Hard Failure following Step 7 component C904
separated from the circuit board. Reference Appendix A Figure 3.
•
Sample 2 exhibited a Hard Failure after completing Step 8. After selecting
the TSDSP icon for the TSDSP function check a window popped up
displaying an error message “DSP is not present”. The error window was
closed by selecting “ok” and the functional checks were continued. During
TSDSP 5iii, another window popped up displaying an error message
“EEPROM Read Failure”. This message showed up every time the “Select
Show ADC Counts” was selected. The Vibration Survey was continued and
the sample was removed from testing after completing the Vibration Survey.
How to design an FMVT
•
Hypothesis: A good design accumulates damage
(wears out) uniformly throughout the product
How to design an FMVT
•
Hypothesis: A good design accumulates
damage (wears out) uniformly throughout
the product
•
To test the hypothesis all of the sources
How to design an FMVT
•
What can break (wear out)
the product?
Operation
How to design an FMVT
•
Hypothesis: A good design accumulates
damage (wears out) uniformly throughout the
product
•
To test the hypothesis all of the sources of
damage (stress sources) should be identified
•
Service conditions of each stress source
S
tr
e
s
s
A
m
p
li
tu
d
e
S
tr
e
s
s
A
m
p
li
tu
d
e
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
1
10
FMVT Test Level
(
C
,
C
)
0
5
10
15
20
25
(
g
R
M
S
,
V
)
C (hot)
C (cold)
other(s)
gRMS
V
Expected
Maximum
Service
Conditions
Expected
Maximum
Test Conditions
(maximum design
or test equipment
capability)
Example Test Plan
Random Target Test Conditions:
Relative Humidity Slam Inducing Random Vibration Door Assembly Slams units = C C C/minute % grms Maximum Service = -30 80 10 75 1.5 36,000 Maximum Test = -60 115 10 95 2.5 360,000 Number of Steps = 10 10 10 10 10 10
EVENT LOG TEST PLAN:
fixed level length
fixed dwell
length Minimum Maximum Ramp Rate
C C C/minute % RH g g
Op-0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1 120 88.3 -30 80 10 75 1.5 36,000
Op-1 45 45 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2 120 88.3 -30 80 10 77 1.6 72,000
Op-2 45 45 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
3 120 88.8 -33.3 83.9 10.0 79 1.7 108,000
Op-3 45 45 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
4 120 89.3 -36.7 87.8 10.0 81 1.8 144,000
Op-4 45 45 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
5 120 89.8 -40.0 91.7 10.0 83 1.9 180,000
Op-5 45 45 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
6 120 90.3 -43.3 95.6 10.0 85 2.1 216,000
Op-6 45 45 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
7 120 90.8 -46.7 99.4 10.0 87 2.2 252,000
Op-7 45 45 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
8 120 91.3 -50.0 103.3 10.0 89 2.3 288,000
Op-8 45 45 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
9 120 91.8 -53.3 107.2 10.0 91 2.4 324,000 Slam Inducing Random Vibration Estimated Number of 5 /2 0 /0 2 5 /2 1 /0 2
Environmental Chamber Temperature
5 /2 2 /0 2 5 /2 3 /0 2 Event Number
Parameter/Feature Testing
•
Tests to check on particular parameters
Design Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
DFMEA
What are the Functions, Features or Requirements? What are the Effect's)? What can go wrong? No Function Partial/Over/ Degradation Function Unintended Function How Bad is it? What are the Cause's)? How often does it happen ?
How can this be
prevented and detected?
How good is this method at preventing and/or detecting
What are the Functions, Features or Requirements? What are the Effect's)? What can go wrong? No Function Partial/Over/ Degradation Function Unintended Function How Bad is it? What are the Cause's)? How often does it happen ?
How can this be
prevented and detected?
How good is this method at preventing and/or detecting
Function Item Potential Failure Mode Potential Effect(s) of failure S e v e ri ty C ri tic a lit y Potential Causes(s) / Mechanism(s) of Failure O c c u rr e n c e D e te c ta b ili ty R P
N Recommended Action Respons-ibility Target Date
steam
generator plug
diminished steam
production 10 10 calium build up 8
Inspection periodicly during operation 7 5 6 0 0 n/a
Current Design Controls Prevention Detection
With permission from:
Function Item Potential Failure Mode Potential Effect(s) of failure S e v e ri ty C ri tic a lit y Potential Causes(s) / Mechanism(s) of Failure O c c u rr e n c e D e te c ta b il ity RP N Recommended Action Respons-ibility Target Date
Handle split in grip insert area
Loss of rubber grip 3 3 impact 8 Impact resistant plastic FEA model of impact from 3 likely directions 3 216 3 3 thermal cycle 8
thermal set plastic with stable material properties from -30 deg C to 100 deg C Thermal cycle testing 3 216 3 3 chemical attack/material incompatibility 8 chemically inert plastic to mild alkali's and acids
chemical exposures 2 144 3 3 fatigue 8 FEA model of maximum loading: stress must be below 1/3 material yield. load testing to verify models 1 72 3 3 Sharp radius 5
All design radius must be greater
then 1 mm 2 90
Current Design Controls Prevention Detection
Potential Failure Vibration High Temperature Cold Temperature Temperature Ramp Humidity Salt air Torque Filiment loss of continuity
Vibration will not cause Filiment loss of continuity
High Temperature will not cause Filiment loss of continuity
Cold Temperature will not cause Filiment loss of continuity
Temperature Ramp will not cause Filiment loss of continuity
Humidity will not cause Filiment loss of continuity
Salt air will not cause Filiment loss of continuity
Torque will not cause Filiment loss of continuity FMVT HALT ST ST CM FC
Propritary life durability test FMVT HALT ST ST CM FC
Propritary life durability test FMVT HALT ST ST CM FC
Propritary life durability test FMVT HALT ST ST CM FC
Propritary life durability test FMVT HALT ST ST CM FC
Propritary life durability test N/A N/a
Corrosion
Vibration will not cause Corrosion
High Temperature will not cause Corrosion
Cold Temperature will not cause Corrosion
Temperature Ramp will not cause Corrosion
Humidity will not cause Corrosion
Salt air will not cause Corrosion
Torque will not cause Corrosion N/A FMVT HALT ST ST FC
ASTM cyclic Corrosion Propritary life durability test
FMVT HALT ST ST FC
ASTM cyclic Corrosion Propritary life durability test
FMVT HALT ST ST FC
ASTM cyclic Corrosion Propritary life durability test
FMVT HALT ST ST FC
ASTM cyclic Corrosion Propritary life durability test
FMVT HALT ST ST FC
ASTM cyclic Corrosion Propritary life durability test N/a
Seal loss between glass and base
Vibration will not cause Seal loss between glass and base
High Temperature will not cause Seal loss between glass and base
Cold Temperature will not cause Seal loss between glass and base
Temperature Ramp will not cause Seal loss between glass and base
Humidity will not cause Seal loss between glass and base
Salt air will not cause Seal loss between glass and base
Torque will not cause Seal loss between glass and base
FMVT HALT ST ST CM FC
Propritary life durability test FMVT HALT ST ST CM FC
Propritary life durability test FMVT HALT ST ST CM FC
Propritary life durability test FMVT HALT ST ST CM FC
Propritary life durability test FMVT HALT ST ST CM FC
Propritary life durability test FMVT HALT ST ST FC
Propritary life durability test FMVT HALT ST ST CM FC
Propritary life durability test
Base Thread does not match receptical
Vibration will not cause Base Thread does not match receptical
High Temperature will not cause Base Thread does not match receptical
Cold Temperature will not cause Base Thread does not match receptical
Temperature Ramp will not cause Base Thread does not match receptical
Humidity will not cause Base Thread does not match receptical
Salt air will not cause Base Thread does not match receptical
Torque will not cause Base Thread does not match receptical
Functional Test N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Base di-electric allows current flow
Vibration will not cause Base di-electric allows current flow
High Temperature will not cause Base di-electric allows current flow
Cold Temperature will not cause Base di-electric allows current flow
Temperature Ramp will not cause Base di-electric allows current flow
Humidity will not cause Base di-electric allows current flow
Salt air will not cause Base di-electric allows current flow
Torque will not cause Base di-electric allows current flow
Mechanism of Failure
Hypothesis Matrix
Function Item Potential Failure Mode Potential Effect(s) of failure S e v e ri ty C ri tic a lit y Potential Causes(s) / Mechanism(s) of Failure O c c u rr e n c e D e te c ta b ili ty R P N Recommended Action
Respons-ibility Target Date Current Design Controls
Prevention Detection
Functional Item: The
functional feature or
design feature from the
BOM (Bill of Material)
Potential Failure Mode:
Key word is POTENTIAL.
What failure modes could
the feature experience.
Source for this is
engineering experience,
warranty data and pure
imagination.
Potential Effect(s) of failure: What are the results
of the failure on the function or behavior of the
product. Often the failure itself is not visible but
the functional effect will be apparent. For
example a sealed bearing may have excessive
wear, but the failure is not visible externally. The
effect of increased fiction is a slowing of the
motor or an increase in the power draw. The
effects are key to designing instrumentation and
operational checks for tests to verify the
existence of failure modes.
Potential Causes: Key
word here is mechanism.
What can break the
product.
Current Design Controls:
What is the current
design effort to prevent
the design from failing,
and how will the success
be detected.
Recommended Action:
What action should be
taken to improve the
PRN.
Responsibility: Who will
take responsibility for
implementing the
recommended action.
Target Date: When will
the recommended action
Function Item Potential Failure Mode Potential Effect(s) of failure S e v e ri ty C ri tic a lit y Potential Causes(s) / Mechanism(s) of Failure O c c u rr e n c e D e te c ta b ili ty R P N Recommended Action
Respons-ibility Target Date Current Design Controls
Prevention Detection
Traceability:
(Drop dead rule)
Can a reasonably educated engineer,
regardless of experience, read what is written
and apply the knowledge?
Traceability:
(Drop dead rule)
Can a reasonably educated engineer,
regardless of experience, read what is written
and apply the knowledge?
Traceability:
(Drop dead rule)
Can a reasonably educated engineer,
regardless of experience, read what is written
and apply the knowledge?
Traceability:
(Drop dead rule)
Can a reasonably educated engineer,
Function Item Potential Failure Mode Potential Effect(s) of failure S e v e ri ty C ri tic a lit y Potential Causes(s) / Mechanism(s) of Failure O c c u rr e n c e D e te c ta b ili ty R P N Recommended Action
Respons-ibility Target Date Current Design Controls
Prevention Detection
Severity: How bad are the
consequences of the
failure.
Criticality: How critical to
the function of the device
is the failure mode.
Occurrence: What is the
likelihood of failure.
Detectability: How well
can the failure mode be
detected if it exists.
RPN: Risk Priority
Number is the multiple of
www.intertek.com
1
No discernible effect
None
2
Aesthetics, workmanship – defect noticed by less
then 25% of users.
Very Minor
3
Aesthetics, workmanship – defect noticed by more
then 50% of users.
Minor
4
Aesthetics, workmanship – defect noticed by more
then 75% of users.
Very Low
5
Operational – but convenience or ease of use has
reduced function
Low
6
Operational – but convenience or ease of use is not
functional.
Moderate
7
Reduced level of performance
High
8
Loss of primary function
Very High
9
Very high severity ranking when a potential failure
mode effects desired function and/or
noncompliance with regulations without warning
Hazardous with warning
10
Very high severity ranking when a potential failure
mode effects desired function and/or
noncompliance with regulations without warning
Hazardous without warning
Ranking
Criteria: Severity of Effect
Effect
Function Item Potential Failure Mode Potential Effect(s) of failure S e v e ri ty C ri tic a lit y Potential Causes(s) / Mechanism(s) of Failure O c c u rr e n c e D e te c ta b ili ty R P N Recommended Action
Respons-ibility Target Date Current Design Controls
Prevention Detection
•
Classification: This column may be used
to classify any special product
characteristics:
•
Examples: Regulated, Europe Only,
Ranking
Likely Failure
Rates over
Design Life
Probability of
Failure
1
<0.01 per
Thousand
Remote: Failure is
Unlikely
3
2
0.5 per Thousand
0.1 per Thousand
Low: Relatively
Few Failures
6
5
4
5 per Thousand
2 per Thousand
1 per Thousand
Moderate:
Occasional
Failures
8
7
20 per Thousand
10 per Thousand
High: Frequent
Failures
10
9
>100 per thousand
50 per thousand
Very High:
Persistent Failures
1
Almost Certain chance the control will detect a potential
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
Almost Certain
2
Very High chance the control will detect a potential
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
Very High
3
High chance the control will detect a potential cause/mechanism
and subsequent failure mode.
High
4
Moderately High chance the control will detect a potential
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
Moderately High
5
Moderate chance the control will detect a potential
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
Moderate
6
Low chance the control will detect a potential cause/mechanism
and subsequent failure mode.
Low
7
Very low chance the control will detect a potential
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
Very Low
8
Remote chance the control will detect a potential cause/mechanism
and subsequent failure mode.
Remote
9
Very remote chance the control will detect a potential
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
Very Remote
10
Controls will not and/or can not detect a potential cause/mechanism
and subsequent failure mode; or there is no control
Absolute Uncertainty
Ranking
Criteria: Likelihood of Detection by Design Control or
Detection Method
Detection
Synthesis a Performanc Test Plan
Function Item Potential Failure Mode Potential Effect(s) of failure S e v e ri ty C ri tic a lit y Potential Causes(s) / Mechanism(s) of Failure O c c u rr e n c e D e te c ta b il ity RP N Recommended Action Respons-ibility Target Date
Handle split in grip insert area
Loss of rubber grip 3 3 impact 8 Impact resistant plastic FEA model of impact from 3 likely directions 3 216 3 3 thermal cycle 8
thermal set plastic with stable material properties from -30 deg C to 100 deg C Thermal cycle testing 3 216 3 3 chemical attack/material incompatibility 8 chemically inert plastic to mild alkali's and acids
chemical exposures 2 144 3 3 fatigue 8 FEA model of maximum loading: stress must be below 1/3 material yield. load testing to verify models 1 72
All design radius
Current Design Controls Prevention Detection
www.intertek.com
Potential Failure Vibration High Temperature Cold Temperature Temperature Ramp Humidity Salt air Torque Filiment loss of continuity
Vibration will not cause Filiment loss of continuity
High Temperature will not cause Filiment loss of continuity
Cold Temperature will not cause Filiment loss of continuity
Temperature Ramp will not cause Filiment loss of continuity
Humidity will not cause Filiment loss of continuity
Salt air will not cause Filiment loss of continuity
Torque will not cause Filiment loss of continuity FMVT HALT ST ST CM FC
Propritary life durability test FMVT HALT ST ST CM FC
Propritary life durability test FMVT HALT ST ST CM FC
Propritary life durability test FMVT HALT ST ST CM FC
Propritary life durability test FMVT HALT ST ST CM FC
Propritary life durability test N/A N/a
Corrosion
Vibration will not cause Corrosion
High Temperature will not cause Corrosion
Cold Temperature will not cause Corrosion
Temperature Ramp will not cause Corrosion
Humidity will not cause Corrosion
Salt air will not cause Corrosion
Torque will not cause Corrosion N/A FMVT HALT ST ST FC
ASTM cyclic Corrosion Propritary life durability test
FMVT HALT ST ST FC
ASTM cyclic Corrosion Propritary life durability test
FMVT HALT ST ST FC
ASTM cyclic Corrosion Propritary life durability test
FMVT HALT ST ST FC
ASTM cyclic Corrosion Propritary life durability test
FMVT HALT ST ST FC
ASTM cyclic Corrosion Propritary life durability test N/a
Seal loss between glass and base
Vibration will not cause Seal loss between glass and base
High Temperature will not cause Seal loss between glass and base
Cold Temperature will not cause Seal loss between glass and base
Temperature Ramp will not cause Seal loss between glass and base
Humidity will not cause Seal loss between glass and base
Salt air will not cause Seal loss between glass and base
Torque will not cause Seal loss between glass and base
FMVT HALT ST ST CM FC
Propritary life durability test FMVT HALT ST ST CM FC
Propritary life durability test FMVT HALT ST ST CM FC
Propritary life durability test FMVT HALT ST ST CM FC
Propritary life durability test FMVT HALT ST ST CM FC
Propritary life durability test FMVT HALT ST ST FC
Propritary life durability test FMVT HALT ST ST CM FC
Propritary life durability test
Base Thread does not match receptical
Vibration will not cause Base Thread does not match receptical
High Temperature will not cause Base Thread does not match receptical
Cold Temperature will not cause Base Thread does not match receptical
Temperature Ramp will not cause Base Thread does not match receptical
Humidity will not cause Base Thread does not match receptical
Salt air will not cause Base Thread does not match receptical
Torque will not cause Base Thread does not match receptical
Functional Test N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Vibration will not cause Base di-electric
High Temperature will not cause Base di-electric allows current
Cold Temperature will not cause Base di-electric allows current
Temperature Ramp will not cause Base di-electric allows current
Humidity will not cause Base di-electric
Salt air will not cause Base di-electric allows
Torque will not cause Base di-electric allows
Mechanism of Failure
Hypothesis Matrix
R
es
ea
rc
h
F
ea
si
b
il
it
y
D
ev
el
o
pm
e
n
t/
d
es
ig
n
D
es
ig
n
v
al
id
at
io
n
P
ro
d
uc
ti
o
n
ra
m
p
P
ro
d
uc
ti
o
n
v
al
id
at
io
n
P
ro
d
uc
ti
o
n
S
er
v
ic
e
Material Sample Compatibility Test- Low Dectability
Cost 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Risk 1 1 2 3 4 5 8 10
Cost 10 9 8 5 3 2 2 2
Risk 1 1 2 3 4 5 8 10
Material Sample Compatibility Test- Low Dectability
FMVT on Production intent with all stresses that could cause elctrolytic reaction - High Detectability
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Research Feasibility Development/ design Design validation Production ramp Production validation Production Service
Material Sample Compatibility Test- Low Dectability Risk
Sweet Spots
Information Timing vs Accuracy
from ACCELERATED TESTING AND VALIDATION with permission
Risk, Cost and Benefit
Mitigate
Hypothesis Matrix
Three Benefits of HM
1)
Double-check on the brainstorming in the
DFMEA – DFMEA is a left-to-right thought
process while the HM cross-references all
potential mechanisms with all potential
failures
2)
Cross-check of current validation plan tests
with the complete hypothesis – exposing
duplicate tests and holes
3)
Provides for identification of the most
Accelerated Validation
hot cold ramp cycle basket dust hardwater rh%
cleaning solution coffe ground level forign in grounds valve stuck
hot will not cause valve stuck
cold will not cause valve stuck
ramp will not cause valve stuck
cycle basket will not cause valve stuck
dust will not cause valve stuck
hardwater will not cause valve stuck
rh% will not cause valve stuck
cleaning solution will not cause valve stuck
coffe ground level will not cause valve stuck
forign
in grounds will not cause valve stuck transportaion test FLST HALT ASTM thermal exposure FMVT hardwater test transportation test TCO
hot will not cause TCO
cold will not cause TCO
ramp will not cause TCO
cycle basket will not cause TCO
dust will not cause TCO
hardwater will not cause TCO
rh% will not cause TCO
cleaning solution will not cause TCO
coffe ground level will not cause TCO
forign
in grounds will not cause TCO
hardwater test
transportation test
Basket overflow
hot will not cause Basket overflow
cold will not cause Basket overflow
ramp will not cause Basket overflow
cycle basket will not cause Basket overflow
dust will not cause Basket overflow hardwater will not cause Basket overflow rh% will not cause Basket overflow cleaning solution will not cause Basket overflow
coffe ground level will not cause Basket overflow forign in grounds will not cause Basket overflow rust
hot will not cause rust
cold will not cause rust
ramp will not cause rust
cycle basket will not cause rust
dust will not cause rust
hardwater will not cause rust
rh% will not cause rust
cleaning solution will not cause rust
coffe ground level will not cause rust
forign
in grounds will not cause rust
ASTM cyclic ASTM cyclic ASTM cyclic
basket cycle
-ASTM cyclic ASTM cyclic ASTM cyclic ASTM cyclic
circuit failure
hot will not cause circuit failure
cold will not cause circuit failure
ramp will not cause circuit failure
cycle basket will not cause circuit failure
dust will not cause circuit failure hardwater will not cause circuit failure rh% will not cause circuit failure cleaning solution will not cause circuit failure
coffe ground level will not cause circuit failure forign in grounds will not cause circuit failure
auto start failed
hot will not cause auto start failed
cold will not cause auto start failed
ramp will not cause auto start failed
cycle basket will not cause auto start failed
dust will not cause auto start failed
hardwater will not cause auto start failed
rh% will not cause auto start failed
cleaning solution will not cause auto start failed
coffe ground level will not cause auto start failed
forign
www.intertek.com