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IoT  Developers  Conference  2015  

Security  Unintended  Consequences:  

The  Backdoor  of  Embedded  Devices  

 

IOTD-­‐08    

 

(2)

Security  Decisions  in  IoT  

Created  by:      Clay  Melugin,  Senior  Partner  

 

Wireless  Strategy  &  Business  Development  for  the  Connected  World  

(3)
(4)

Why  Security  is  Important

 

Dark  Forces    

InSecure  Consequences  

Public  PercepQon  

Industry  Liability  

Value  to  Users  

Value  to  the  IoT  EcoSystem  

Security  Priori<es

 

Regulatory  

User  Privacy  

Data  Security  

Device  Security  

Security  Strategy  &  

Technology

 

Security  Ownership  &  

Responsibility  

The  IoT  Security  Layers  

Technologies  Available  

Hackers  

Why  they  Hack  

How  they  Hack  

Inside  compromise.  

Outside  compromise.  

Primary  target  

à

 OS  &  User  

Interfaces  

Secondary  targets  

à

 

Hardware  &  Network  

Hacker  Rewards  

Fortune  &  Fame  

EducaQon  

Challenge  

Hacker  Friends  or  Foes  

(5)

 

Security:    

The  state  of  being  free  from  danger  or  threat.  

   

Cybersecurity:  

The  state  of  being  protected  against  the  criminal  or  

unauthorized  use  of  electronic  data,  or  the  measures  taken  to  

achieve.    

 

Cyberwarfare:  

The  use  of  computers  to  disrupt  the  acQviQes  of  an  enemy  

country,  especially  the  deliberate  aZacking  of  communicaQon  

systems  and  infrastructure.  

 

Security  cri<cal  system:

   

A  system  whose  failure  could  enable,  or  increase  the  ability  of  

others  to  harm  us.  

(6)

Fred  Chang  –  Director  

Darwin  Deason  InsQtute  for  Cyber  Security   Southern  Methodist  University  

(7)

Why  Security  is  Important  

 

       Benefits

 

 

         

 

Privacy  

Device  Control  

Confidence  

Assets  

 

Consequences  

 

Liability  

InvesQgaQons  

ReputaQon  

Customer  Loss  

(8)

Privacy  

While  the  US  is  becoming  aware  of  the  need  for  

a  Privacy  Policy  to  protect  people  from  risk  it  is  

important  to  know  that  other  countries  have  

Privacy  regulaQons  in  place.  

 

Experts  in  the  Security  industry  recommend  

Canadian  Privacy  Laws  as  a  best  pracQce.  

hZp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Canadian_privacy_law

   

(9)

Data  Breach  vs.  Hacked  

Data  Breach  

 

IdenQty  is  exposed  

+    

(any  1  item)  

Social  Security  Number  

Medical  Record    

Financial  record    

Credit  or  Debit  number  

 

Hacked  

 

When  you  no  longer  have  

exclusive  access  &  control    

over  your  product.  

 

Whether  you  know  it    

our  not.  

(10)

Invest  in  Security  

 

 

Legal  Obliga<ons  

ü

Regulatory  

ü

Privacy  

 

ê

 

Liability  Costs  

ü

Data  Breach  

ü

Damages  

ü

Negligence  

   

Price  the  Solu<on  

including    

Liability  Cost  

 

ê

 

Invest  in  Security  

to  reduce    

Cost  

 

(11)

Value  the  Database  

(Range  typically  $40  -­‐  176  /  user)  

Replacement  Method  

 

The  cost  to  rebuild  the  database    

if  it  were  totally  lost.  

Income  Method  

   

Discounted  Cash  Flow  of    

revenue  generated  from    

database  sales,  licenses,  royalQes  

 

Royalty  Method  

 

NPV  of  licensing  an  equivalent    

database  at  market  pricing.  

 

 

 

Fair  Market  Value  

 

Market  data  on  equivalent    database  

sales.  

OR  

Price  of  Database  if  sold  to  a  free  

buyer,  by  a  free  seller,  of  equal  

knowledge.  

$

(12)

Value  Liability  &  Damages  

Data  Breach  

#  of  Records  

$    NoQficaQons  

$    VicQm  CompensaQon  

$    Regulatory  Cost  

 

RemediaQon  

$    InvesQgaQon  Process  

$    Security  Repair/Replace  

$    Data  Recovery  ?  

$    Process  updates  

$    Public  RelaQons    

$    MarkeQng  Offensive  

Negligence  

Damages  

$  Lawsuit/Class  AcQon  

$  Regulatory  InvesQgaQon  

$  Regulatory  Oversight  

Other

 

Company  DevaluaQon  

Device  Recall/Retrofit  

Design  Updates  

Staff  RetenQon  or  Increase  

New  Product  Delays  

 

(13)

Data  Breach  -­‐  Cause  

(14)

19%    

Probability  of  a  

Data  Breach

 within  24  months  

(15)

Data  Breach  by  Industry  

Source:    “2014  Cost  of  Data  Breach  Study:  United  States”    by  IBM  and  Ponemon  InsQtute  

19%

(16)

                   Data  Breach  -­‐  Impact  

Source:    “2014  Cost  of  Data  Breach  Study:  United  States”    by  IBM  and  Ponemon  InsQtute  

(17)

                               

Data  Breach  –  Cost  by  Industry  

(18)

More  Liability  

Asset  Damage:

 

Database  

(CorrupQon,  DeleQon  or  DestrucQon)  

System-­‐wide  internal  infecQon  

(aka  Sony)  

Implanted  Security  Breaches  

Consumer  Ac<ons:  

Lawsuits  

(individual,  class  acQon)  

Social  Media  

Government  Ac<ons:  

Government  InvesQgaQon  

Mandated  Oversight  for  20  years  

(19)

Dark  Forces

 

.  

 

exist

               

  .     .     .     .   .   .   .  

.  

.

 

Dark  Forces  don’t  always  aZack  

 

(20)

                         Damages  

Electrical Event

•  20 problems in 11-minutes

•  5 electric grids down

•  12 hour power outage

Impact

•  7 million people

•  Traffic gridlocked

•  Multiple car accidents

•  2 nuclear reactors force to shutdown

•  3.5 million gallons of sewage spilled

•  Water safety – Boil water ordered

•  Businesses closed – no systems

•  Gas stations closed

•  Cellular service down

•  Public transportation stopped

•  41 airline flights cancelled

Damage

•  No damage to Grid was found.  

(21)

TransportaQon  

CriQcal  Infrastructure  -­‐  IoT  Targets  

(Electric,  Gas,  Water,  TransportaQon)  

Electric  

Natural  Gas  

(22)

Electrical  -­‐  Hacking  

(23)

Natural  Gas  -­‐  Hacking  

(Done)

 

?  

(24)

Water  -­‐  Hacking  

(Unknown)

 

?

?

(25)

TransportaQon  -­‐  Hacking  

(26)
(27)

 25  Security  VulnerabiliQes  

per  IoT  Device  on  Market  

Source:    HP  Internet  of  Things  Research    Study  

IoT  Devices  

Evaluated  

• Door  Locks   • IoT  Hubs   • Thermostats   • Remote  Power   Outlets   • Sprinkler   Controllers   • Bathroom  Scales   • Garage  Door   Openers   • Home  Alarms   • Webcams   • Smart  TVs  

(28)

OWASP  -­‐  IoT  Top  10  List  

Open  Web  ApplicaQon  Security  Project  

I1 Insecure Web Interface

I2 Insufficient Authentication/Authorization

I3 Insecure Network Services

I4 Lack of Transport Encryption

I5 Privacy Concerns

I6 Insecure Cloud Interface

I7 Insecure Mobile Interface

I8 Insufficient Security Configurability

I9 Insecure Software/Firmware

I10 Poor Physical Security

 

Source:    hZps://www.owasp.org/index.php/

(29)

When  to  Implement  Security  

Concept  

Design  

Prototype  TesQng    

Field  TesQng  

ProducQon  Release  Process  

Pilot  ProducQon  

ProducQon  

DistribuQon  

IniQalizaQon  &  Set-­‐up  

OperaQon  &  Monitoring  

(30)

What  to  Secure  

I/O    

Sensors  

•   Objects  that  

connect  to  Device   to  provide  info  or   to  act  under   control  of  the   device.   •   Wired  or   Wireless   • Example   •   Temp  Sensors   Device  

• The  main  control  

element  (the  box)   on  locaQon  that   collects  the  data   and  controls  the   acQon.  

•   Sensors  and  

controls  may  be   integrated  inside.   Transport   •   Local-­‐Area   • BT  or  BLE   • Zigbee   • WiFi   •   Wide-­‐Area   • Cellular   • Private  Network   • Satellite   •   Hardwired   • Ethernet   • PLC   Network   Infrastructure   •   Access  Control   •   AuthenQcaQon   •   AuthorizaQon   •   Provisioning   •   Data  Transport   Data   ConnecQon   •   Internet   •   VPN  

• Point  to  Point  

Host  Systems   •   Servers   •   Corp  Network   •   Access  Control   Recipient   •   Humans   •   Processes   •   AutomaQon   <-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐Encrypted  data  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐>  

(31)

AZack  from  the  BoZom  

hZps://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-­‐14/materials/us-­‐14-­‐Jin-­‐Smart-­‐Nest-­‐Thermostat-­‐A-­‐Smart-­‐Spy-­‐ In-­‐Your-­‐Home.pdf  

1.

User  credenQals  stored  unencrypted  

2.

Firmware  not  encrypted  

3.

USB  open  port  for  any  USB  connecQon  

4.

Firmware  upload  from  any  computer  

(32)

AZack  @  Devices  

I/O    

Sensors  

Device  

Transport  

I/O  Sensor  Connec<on  

Hack:    

1.  SubsQtute  I/O  item  

2. Sniff  protocol  for  keys  

3. Change  operaQon  

Result:  Modify  device  operaQon  

by  changing  Sensor  data   or  Servo  response.  

 

Value:    Varies  widely  based  on  

criQcal  nature  of  device.  

 

Device  Level  

Hack:    

1.  Access  ports    

2. Download  code  base  

3. Find  User    

•  IdenQty  &  Password  

•  EncrypQon  Key    

•  Network  protocols  

4. Upload  new  code  

 

Result:  Steal  Data,  Take  Control  

 

Value:    Varies  widely  based  on  

criQcal  nature  of  device.    

Weather  Sensor,  Smart  TV,  

Thermostat,  Traffic  Light  

Device  

à

 Transport  

Hack:    

1.Transport  Analyzer  

2. Sniff  Protocol  

3. Find  Keys  &  Data  

4. OTA  Updates  

Result:  Spoofing  Database,  

OTA  Control  &  SW   updates.  

 

Value:    High

 

(33)

Other  AZacks  @  Devices  

Design  Phase  

Hack:    

1.Test  Protocol  in  Code   2. Non-­‐consumer  ports  

labeled  on  PCB  

3. DocumentaQon  Thew  

4. Auto  Boot  Loader  on  

Power-­‐up  

5. Open  OS  &  Tools  

6. No  EncrypQon  or  

Crypto  Controller   7. No  Security  Reviews  

8. DocumentaQon  

9. Espionage  

Result:  Design  leaves  openings  

for  Hackers.     Value:    

Priceless  

 

Distribu<on  

Hack:    

1.Unauthorized   reprogramming    

2. Retail  Return  Process  

3. Online  Resellers   4. Awermarket   “Refurbished”    

 

 

Result:  Compromised  Devices  

 

Value:    

High  

Produc<on  

Hack:    

1.  Malware  on  Test  or      Device  Programmer  

 

2. Loose  SW  Quality  &  

ConfiguraQon  Control       3. Change  operaQon            

Result:  Compromised  Devices  

 

 

Value:    

Priceless  

(34)

Hyper-­‐AZacks  @  Secured  Devices  

Crypto  Breaking  

Methods:    

    •  Data  Bus  Sniffing  

•  Die  Probing  

•  Spike  Glitching  

•  Power  Analysis  

•  OpQcal  EB  Scanning  

•  Alpha  RadiaQon  

•  EMA/DEMA  

 

Goal:    Get  the  Private  Key  

 

Time:  Months  à  Years  

 

Cost:      $300K  -­‐  $1  Million    

Value:    Depends  on  target  

 

Chip  Replacement  

Methods:    

 

•  Memory  chip  exchange  

•  Processor  exchange                

Goal:  Get  a  compromised  

Device  into  Network  

Time:  Hours  

 

Cost:    <    $200    

Value:    High  (only  if  successful)

 

(35)

Secure  Hardware  Hack  Methods  

Development:

Months

Execution:

Minutes

> 100

Example:

Spike Attack

Development:

Months

Execution:

Days

> 100.000

Example:

Microprobing

Development:

Days

Execution:

Hours

> 10.000

Example:

Power Analysis

Manipulating

Observing

Semi-Invasive

(36)

Lessons  from  the  PC  Ecosystem  

1.

Networks  have  unavoidable  risk

 

 

2.

Tradi<onal  defenses  revolve  around    

Access  control  

Monitoring  traffic  

3.

Next  level  defense  built  on  “root  of  trust”    

Trusted  ExecuQon  only  valid  with    

HARDWARE  ROOT  OF  TRUST  

(37)

Trusted  Compu<ng  

1.

The  primary  role  of  a  TPM  is  to  provide  trust  

Want  to  establish  an  expectaQon  of  behavior  

Cryptography  provides  methods  but  is  not  the  purpose  of  a  TPM  

2.

Adesta<on  is  the  founda<on  for  trust.  Adest  before  we:  

release  the  memory  encrypQon  key  

allow  it  on  the  corporate  network  

3.

For  network  applica<ons,  we  also  want  iden<ty  

Not  just  any  trustworthy  machine  on  the  corporate  network  

Not  just  any  trustworthy  machine  to  make  charges  to  an  account  

Specific  Authorized  and  Uncompromised  Machines.  

4.

TPM  uses  cryptographic  means  for  adesta<on  and  iden<ty  

Never  listen,  follow  or  engage  an  element  you  do  not  trust.  

(38)

Requirements  for  Hardware  Security  

New requirements for the hardware

ü 

Few Restrictions for Software

Developers

ü 

Strong Hardware Security

ü 

Easy-to-Use Security Features

ü 

Autonomous Security

ü 

Self-Checking Hardware

ü 

Robust Design

ü 

Security Simulation

(39)

Crypto  Controllers  

(Trusted  Friends)  

hZp://www.infineon.com/cms/en/ applicaQons/chip-­‐card-­‐security/ embedded-­‐security/   hZp://www.atmel.com/ products/security-­‐ics/   hZp://www.nxp.com/secure-­‐ connecQons/cyber-­‐ security.html  

In  an  increasingly  mobile  and  connected  

digital  world  data  security,  data  integrity  

and  data  availability  are  the  prerequisites  

for  sustainable  consumer  confidence  and  

successful  business  models,  especially  in  

the  context  of  an  increasing  number  of  

aZacks  

(40)

AZacks  from  the  Top  

Apps  &  Web  

 

XSS  (Cross  Site  ScripQng)  

Weak  Passwords  

Single  Layer  

AuthenQcaQon  

EnumeraQon  

Unencrypted  Database  

IdenQty  Data  

Humans  

 

Customers  

Overloaded  

ImpaQent  

Remote  

Assuming  

TrusQng  

Non-­‐Tech  

 

 

(41)

What  to  Secure  

Network  

Infrastructure  

Data  

ConnecQon  

Host  Systems  

Recipient  

Host  or  Admin  

Hack  

XSS  

Phishing  

EnumeraQon  

(42)
(43)

EnumeraQon  Hacking  

Vulnerable  Web  interfaces  allow  Users  

Simple  passwords    (123456,  Password,…)  

Unlimited  guessing  on  the  password  

(44)
(45)
(46)
(47)
(48)
(49)
(50)
(51)
(52)
(53)
(54)

Secure,  Private    

and    

a  

Success  Story  @  CES  

 

(55)

Boiler/Water  Heater  

Connected  via  WiFi  

HW  secured  with  Crypto  

Controller  

Only  Encrypted  Data  stored  

or  transmiZed  

EncrypQon  Keys  only  

available  to  Owner.  

Customer  owns  the  Key  

Customer  owns  the  Data  

(56)

Thank  you.

 

 

PresentaQon  material  will  be  provided  in  PDF  form  by  IoT  EvoluQon  2015.  

 

A  wriZen  report  will  be  published  in  Feb  2015  free  of  charge  

 

Guide  Report™:    Security  Decisions  in  IoT  

by  

www.RMACtechnologypartners.com  

 

 

(57)

IoT  Security  -­‐  

Take  Away  

1.

Security  lowers  Product  Cost.  

2.

Security  is  part  of  the  total  system,  

designed  appropriately  at  every  step  

and  element  in  delivering  an  IoT  

soluQon.  

3.

Security  can’t  be  added  on  later.  

Clay  Melugin,  Senior  Partner  

858-­‐945-­‐5610  

[email protected]  

References

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