• No results found

Antitrust, Privacy & Big Data Seminar

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2021

Share "Antitrust, Privacy & Big Data Seminar"

Copied!
13
0
0

Loading.... (view fulltext now)

Full text

(1)

Antitrust, Privacy & Big Data Seminar

Concurrences Law & Economics Seminar Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

Brussels, Belgium February 3, 2015

Pamela Jones Harbour, SVP & Legal Officer Global Member Compliance & Privacy, Herbalife Ltd

(2)

Privacy & Competition Trends

4 Trends

1. User data -- including personal data -- is

becoming an increasingly important asset for

many businesses

2. Major Internet companies increasingly compete

in multiple product and service markets

3. Mobile computing gives firms new,

location-based data streams

4. Large firms that collect data are seeking new

ways to monetize data -- including ways that

potentially reinforce their dominance

(3)

European Commission

• European Commission considered customer privacy in its review of TomTom/TeleAtlas case

• TomTom proposed acquisition of TeleAtlas

• provider of digital maps with complete coverage of Europe and North America.

• Commission noted “confidentiality concerns can be considered as similar to product degradation”

• Case No COMP/M.4854 TomTom/Tele Atlas, paras.

(4)

DOJ Comcast/ NBC Universal

Consent Decree

• 2011 Consent Decree Focused on Keeping Pathways open for Innovation

• Innovation occurred because of the Disruptive Potential of the Internet

• DOJ’s focus was on the Threat of Exclusionary Conduct by Incumbents.

• The New Form of Competition was in the Early Stages • DOJ Alluded to Recognition of the Threat.

• United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001)

(5)

European Data Protection Supervisor’s

Preliminary Opinion

March 2014

“Privacy and Competitiveness in the Age of Big Data: The Interplay between Data Protection, Competition Law and Consumer Protection in the Digital Market”

Former European Data Protection Supervisor, Peter Hustinx:

– EC applied “a purely economic approach to the case, [and] did not consider how the merger could have affected the users whose data would be further processed by merging the two companies’

datasets…that were not envisioned when the data were originally submitted.”

– EC therefore “neglected the longer term impact on the welfare of millions of Users in the event that the combined undertaking’s

information generated by search (Google) and browsing (DoubleClick) were later processed for incompatible purposes.”

(6)

Privacy & Competition

-Theories

Theory #1: Competition in Privacy Protections

– Firms compete on price, and on non-price dimensions that are important to consumers and may influence their purchasing decisions

– European Commission Guidelines on the assessment of

horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, [2004] OJ C 31/5, para. 8.

(7)

Privacy & Competition – Theory #2

Theory #2: Competition in Privacy-Enhancing

Technologies

• Privacy-related competition to strengthen user privacy. Examples:

– DuckDuckGo - search engine promises no tracking – Sgrouples - social networking site promises “no

spying, no tracking, no stalking.” – Do Not Track – opt-in or opt-out?

(8)

Privacy & Competition – Theory #2

• A dominant firm might not have same incentives

to invest in adopting

– privacy-enhancing business practices or – developing privacy-enhancing technologies

• If firm feels confident that the lack of competitive

alternatives for consumers gives firm a higher

“tolerance” for

(9)

EDPS Preliminary Opinion

March 2014

• Preliminary Opinion identifies an

“underdeveloped market” for privacy enhancing

services:

– “Despite this heightened risk [for personal data] the market for privacy-enhancing services in the digital economy remains weak”.

– “Privacy and Competitiveness in the Age of Big Data: The Interplay between Data Protection, Competition Law and Consumer Protection in the Digital Market”

(10)

Privacy & Competition – Theory #3

Theory #3: Defining a Product Market for

Data

• Firms continue to develop new products and

services based on new ways of monetizing

databases of user data and/or user profiles

• Competition regulators should consider defining

a product market for user data, not just a product

market for products or services fueled by the

(11)

Privacy & Competition – Theory #3

• A product market for data would also better account for the fact that firms are constantly finding new ways to use data, far beyond the initial purposes for which the data was initially collected.

– e.g., Historical ticketing data — initially collected for the purpose of selling tickets to concertgoers

• is useful for concert promoters who need to decide which artists to book, when to schedule concerts, how to set prices, etc.

(12)

Privacy & Competition - Remedies

• When crafting remedies, competition regulators might consider

– extent to which a dominant firm might be able to maintain or extend monopoly through its control over user data, and ensure that any remedies address this risk.

• Competition Law and Consumer Protection Law have complementary goals:

– Competition Law strives to ensure that consumers have a range of choices;

– Consumer Protection Law aims to ensure that consumers have truthful and accurate information when making choices.

(13)

TREND: CALL FOR MORE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN AREA OF BIG DATA, PRIVACY & COMPETITION • Former EDPS Hustinx Report Suggestions for Further

Study

• Understanding the Value of Personal Data

– How can the value of personal data be assessed as a currency and an asset in competition analysis?

– To what extent is “big data” composed of personal data?

• Reviewing Approaches to Market Analysis Where Personal Data are an Asset

– How can we apply the parameters of competition (especially price, quality and choice) in explaining the impact on privacy and data protection?

• Competition Law Enforcement: Wider Issues

– Is there a case for wider study to inform regulators dealing with antitrust and merger cases in the digital economy

– One recommendation: Carry out retrospective/ex post analysis of the impact of competition decisions

• Weak Markets for Privacy Enhancing Services

References

Related documents

many organisms the functioning, regulation, and adaptation of circadian time is effected at the cellular level, including of course all circadian clocks in

In their study on the impact of control mechanisms on external embeddedness, Andersson, Björkman, and Forsgren (2005) also examined the influence of subsidiary embeddedness in

Having considered the papers filed by the Lead Plaintiff Massachusetts Laborers' Pension Fund ("Mass Laborers' Pension Fund") for an Order Approving Final

In a recent survey sent out in September 2011 to the Leeward Community College (Leeward CC) students taking business courses (Accounting, Business

Key components within FEM include cropping systems (crop yields, field operations, nutrient requirements, input and output prices, etc.), livestock systems (livestock types,

DNDi will build on its collaborative R&D model, retaining the core focus on some of the most neglected diseases while provid- ing flexibility to extend its disease scope

From the ranking for customer buying behavior variables the customers agree that the demo which they provide to the bike intends me to purchase it is very dominant than other