Cloud Computing Security in the Tactical Environment the Difference a Year Makes

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Cloud Computing Security in the Tactical

Environment – the Difference a Year Makes

“This document does not contain technical data as defined by the International Traffic

in Arms Regulations, 22 CFR 120.10(a), or technology as defined by the Department of

Commerce Export Administration Regulations, and is therefore authorized for

publication.”

Copyright © Raytheon Company. All rights reserved.

Panel Coordinator / Moderator:

Noel Ellis (Eli) Johnson

260-429-5457

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Panel Topic & Members…

Panel Topic: Cloud Computing Security in the Tactical Environment, the Difference a

Year Makes



Panel Coordinator / Moderator, Noel Ellis (Eli) Johnson – Raytheon



Sr. Principal Systems Engineer, CISSP-ISSEP, CSSLP, Tactical Communications Solutions,

multiple program supports as a Cybersecurity Subject Matter Expert,



Dr. Jeff Boleng, Carnegie Mellon University, Software Solutions Division, Software

Engineering Institute,



Principal Research Scientist



Professor; Elisa Bertino , Purdue University,



Professor CS, Research Director of CERIAS, Director of Cyber Center,



Mr. Randall Brooks, Raytheon, Raytheon Engineering Fellow,



Member of the Technical Staff



Mr. David A. Smith, Raytheon Certified Architect, Chair Cloud TIG



C4I Business Area Technical Lead

UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

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Panel Format…

Panel Topic: Cloud Computing Security in the Tactical Environment



Each panel member will have 3-5 minutes to provide an initial position statement,



Discussion based on initial position statements & moderator questions,



Half hour will be reserved for questions from the audience,



Each panel member will be provided 5 minutes final remarks,



Noel Ellis (Eli) Johnson – Raytheon



Provide the context of challenges and opportunities of Cloud Computing Security in the

Tactical Environment



Opening position statements.



Dr. Jeff Boleng, Carnegie Mellon University, Software Solutions Division, Software

Engineering Institute,



Professor; Elisa Bertino , Purdue University,



Mr. Randall Brooks, Raytheon, Raytheon Engineering Fellow,



Mr. David A. Smith, Raytheon Certified Architect, Chair Cloud TIG

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What is Cloud Computing ?



NIST SP 800-145, Mell and Grance, 2011



Cloud computing is a model for enabling

ubiquitous, convenient,

on-demand network

access

to a

shared pool of configurable computing resources

(e.g., networks, servers,

storage, applications, and services) that can be

rapidly provisioned and released

with

minimal management effort or service provider interaction

. This cloud model is composed

of five essential characteristics

,

three service models, and four deployment models.



Essential Characteristics,



Rapid Elasticity



Resource Pooling



Measured Service



Broad network access



On-demand self-service



Service Models



Software as a Service (SaaS)



Platform as a Service (PaaS)



Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)



Deployment Models



Public Cloud,



Hybrid Cloud,



Private Cloud,



Community Cloud,

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Cloud Computing Security in the Tactical Environments,

Not all Tactical Environments are the Same !

• Types of Cloud Computing Services

• Software as a Service (SaaS) • Platform as a Service (PaaS) • Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS),

• Core Advantages

• Flexibility,

• Highly automated, • Shared Resources, • Increased storage, • Pay for what your use, • Back up and restoration,

• Easy installation and maintenance,

• Core Disadvantages

• Cost,

• Limited flexibility,

• Data security and privacy, • Knowledge and integration,

• Dependence on outside agencies, • Network connectivity and bandwidth, • Long term stability of service provider,

• Service unavailability due to a variety of reasons,

UNCLASSIFIED

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USG & DoD Transitioning to the Cloud…

The Transition has begun: Is it secure? Will it meet the goals?

UNCLASSIFIED



FedRAMP – Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program – Cloud computing for USG



DoD Cloud Computing Security Requirements Guide (SRG) Version 1, Release 1, 1/13/2015



National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

 Cloud Computing Strategy working paper, April 2011

 USG Cloud Computing Technology Roadmap Volume 1 Release 1.0 (Draft) November 2011

 NIST Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) and Special Publication (SP) Relevant to Cloud Computing

 FIPS 199; Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems

 NIST SP 500-291; NIST Cloud Computing Standards Roadmap, Version 2.0, July 2013

 NIST SP 500-292; NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture, September 2011,

 NIST SP 800-37; Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal Information Systems; A Security Life Cycle

Approach;

 NIST SP 800-53 Rev.4; Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information systems and Organizations;

 NIST SP 800-53A Rev.3; Assessing Security and Privacy Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations: Build

Effective Assessment Plans; June 2010;

 NIST SP 800-92; Guide to Computer Security Log Management; September 2006

 NIST SP 800-125; Guide to Security for Full Virtualization Technologies; January 2011

 NIST SP 800-137; Information Security Continuous Monitoring for Federal Information Systems and Organizations;

September 2011;

 NIST SP 800-144; Guidelines on Security and Privacy Issues in Public Cloud Computing, December 2011

 NIST SP 800-145; The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing; September 2011

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The Solution must address…

UNCLASSIFIED

Timely Keep Bad Guys

& Malware Out

Cloud Computing,

COTS & GOTS Device(s)

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Cloud Security at the Edge

Jeff Boleng, PhD

Principal Research Scientist



Dr. Jeff Boleng, Carnegie Mellon University,

Software Solutions Division, Software Engineering

Institute,

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This material is based upon work funded and supported by the Department of Defense under Contract No. FA8721-05-C-0003 with Carnegie Mellon University for the operation of the Software Engineering Institute, a federally funded research and development center.

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UNIVERSITY MAKES NO WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, AS TO ANY MATTER INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR PURPOSE OR MERCHANTABILITY, EXCLUSIVITY, OR RESULTS

OBTAINED FROM USE OF THE MATERIAL. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DOES NOT MAKE ANY WARRANTY OF ANY KIND WITH RESPECT TO FREEDOM FROM PATENT, TRADEMARK, OR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT.

This material has been approved for public release and unlimited distribution. This material may be reproduced in its entirety, without modification, and freely distributed in written or electronic form without requesting formal permission.

Permission is required for any other use. Requests for permission should be directed to the Software Engineering Institute at [email protected].

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•

Dr. Jeff Boleng, PhD, Principal Research Scientist, Software

Solutions Division, Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie

Mellow University

•

Since 2012, Advanced Mobile Systems Team

•

Co-PI of Tactical Computing and Communications and Tactical

Analytics research at SEI

•

Research areas: Context Computing, Mobile Ad Hoc

Networks, Scientific Computing, Parallel and Distributed

Systems

•

BS in CS from US Air Force Academy 1991, MS and PhD from

Colorado School of Mines (1997 and 2002) in Mathematical

and Computer Sciences

•

25 years experience as AF Cyber Operation Officer, deployable

networks, command post integration, 21

st

_{Mission Support}

Squadron Commander

•

8 years on faculty at USAFA as Associate Professor, 4 years as

Deputy Computer Science Department Head

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Securing the cloud

• Tail of two layers

– Infrastructure

– Services

• Securing each is different

• Infrastructure

– Largely virtualized

– Depends on security of every VM

• Services

– “Secured” by numerous external administrators

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Securing the Services*

• Simplify!

• Simple, well defined, and enforced interfaces

• “Do one thing and do it well” --

Doug McIlroy

• Favor composability over monolithic design

• Assume components are compromised

– Use fail-safe/fail-secure design

– Never implicitly trust the results of another service

– Always ask “What will my service do when it fails?”

*Note: these ideas aren’t new or mine. Thanks to Ken Thompson, Dennis Ritchie,

Brian Kernighan, Rob Pike, Doug McIlroy, Eric Raymond and others…

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Piping diagram of a Westinghouse Air Brake System - 1909

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Elisha Otis’s elevator patent drawing, 15 January 1861

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Microservice architectures

• Modular operating system containers

– Docker and LXC

– OSv

– Unikernels and MirageOS

– CoreOS

– Intel Clear Containers

• Small, lightweight, typically single process,

multi-threaded VMs built with only the OS and library

components necessary to support the code

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Microservice architectures

• Our experience on an embedded robotics sensor system

– OSv with nanoMsg and protocol buffers on Xen

– ≈12Mb VM on disk, ≈60Mb VM when running

– Redis benchmark ≈30% faster in OSv container

– No other OS service running (i.e. only 1 or 2 ports open at all)

• Pros

– ↑ cohesion ↓ coupling

– Forces rigorous commitment to interfaces and standardization

– Small size on disk and in RAM

– Faster startup and migration

– Reduced attack surface and complexity

– High availability (redundancy, load balancing, fail over) techniques from data center

experience directly applicable

• Cons

– Timing, network latency, etc. (all the distributed computing challenges)

– Startup and shutdown orchestration

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Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication

-Leonardo da Vinci

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Sensor-Cloud:

Opportunities and Research Directions

Elisa Bertino

Purdue University

Cyber

Center



Professor; Elisa Bertino , Purdue University,



Professor CS, Research Director of CERIAS, Director of Cyber

Center,

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Definitions and Conceptual Architecture

Military Target Tracking Natural Disaster Relief

What is a Sensor-Cloud?

An Infrastructure supporting pervasive computation based on:

• sensors as an interface between physical and cyber

worlds

• the cloud as the cyber backbone

• the Internet and wireless technologies as the

communication medium

IoT and NoT

These recent trends will further accelerate the deployment of sensor networks and sensor-based applications

Drones and UAV

The use of these devices will multiply the opportunities for collecting data from (possibly mobile) sensors on-the-ground and for managing these sensors

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Research Directions

Diagram from: A. Alamri et al. A Survey on Sensor-Cloud: Architectures, Applications, and Approaches, 2013.

• Network access management

• Encryption techniques for small devices • Sensor software and firmware security • Secure sensor localization techniques • Provenance techniques for sensors • Tools supporting the deployment and

monitoring of sensors, and the design of sensor-based data collection applications • Data fusion techniques to assess and enhance

sensor data trustworthiness

• Fault-tolerant and reliable continuous data acquisition

• Efficient sensor streamed data processing techniques

• Event processing and management

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Introduction & Opening Statement of Panel Member



Mr. Randall Brooks, Raytheon, Raytheon Engineering Fellow,

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Position Statement

• Cloud Security is difficult to achieve in a tactical

environment. It is faced with connectivity issues, a

lack of elasticity and limited Infrastructure as a

Service (IaaS) and Platform as a Service (PaaS)

providers.

Outer Router On Prem Server Farm Firewall Proxy (Deep Packet Inspection) IaaS Server Farm SaaS Provider PaaS Server Farm

Host Operating System

Clo ud App lic ati on (hos ted VM) Cl oud Appli ca ti on (hos ted VM ) Clo ud App lic ati on (hos ted VM) Clo ud App lic ati on (hos ted VM)

App A App A App B App C

Mobile User

Isolated Services

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Cloud Computing

• Essential

Characteristics:

– Rapid Elasticity

– Resource Pooling

– Measured Service

– Broad network access

– On-demand

self-service

PaaS

• NIST SP 800-145, Mell and Grance, 2011

– Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand

network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g.,

networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly

provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider

interaction. This cloud model is composed of five essential characteristics, three

service models, and four deployment models.

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Cloud Computing Models

• Service Models

– Software as a Service

(SaaS)

– Platform as a Service

(PaaS)

– Infrastructure as a

Service (IaaS)

• Deployment Models

– Public Cloud

– Hybrid Cloud

– Private Cloud

– Community Cloud

IaaS Server Farm SaaS Provider PaaS Server Farm

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The Notorious Nine: Cloud Computing Top Threats

• Data Breaches

• Data Loss

• Account Hijacking

• Insecure APIs

• Denial of Service

• Malicious Insiders

• Abuse of Cloud Services

• Insufficient Due Diligence

• Shared Technology Issue

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

Mr. David A. Smith, Raytheon Certified Architect, Chair Cloud

TIG



C4I Business Area Technical Lead

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The Power of Cloud Applications

Instances are added, deleted,

and restarted by the application

itself based on need.

Security is built in, or not, to the

application.

(Mobile) User

Interface

Service

Interfaces

Service

Processing

Data

Cloud Application Designs are Scalable and Resilient – when connected

Cloud Native Applications are

built differently.

Stateless services are composed

of many separate, identical

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The Solution must address…

UNCLASSIFIED

Timely Keep Bad Guys

& Malware Out

Cloud Computing,

COTS & GOTS Device(s)

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

Mr. David A. Smith, Raytheon Certified Architect, Chair Cloud TIG



C4I Business Area Technical Lead



Mr. Randall Brooks, Raytheon, Raytheon Engineering Fellow,



Member of the Technical Staff



Professor; Elisa Bertino , Purdue University,



Professor CS, Research Director of CERIAS, Director of Cyber

Center,



Dr. Jeff Boleng, Carnegie Mellon University, Software

Solutions Division, Software Engineering Institute,



Principal Research Scientist



Panel Coordinator / Moderator, Noel Ellis (Eli) Johnson –

Raytheon



Sr. Principal Systems Engineer,

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Biography

Noel Ellis (Eli) Johnson, CISSP-ISSEP, CSSLP

Information Systems Security Engineer

Business Unit: SAS

Location: Fort Wayne

Email:

[email protected]

Office Phone: 260.429.5457

 Mr. Johnson is a Senior Principal Engineer at Raytheon with over 26 years’ experience in designing security and information assurance (IA) solutions for the Defense and Commercial Telecommunications markets.

 Mr. Johnson recently was the Principal Investigator for secure mobility and supports the development and capture of a wide variety of crypto modern solutions for Type 1 applications as an IA subject matter expert.

 Mr. Johnson holds the following International Information Systems Security Certification Consortium (ISC)2_{certification} credentials:

 Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP)

 Information Systems Security Engineering Professional (ISSEP)

 Certified Secure Software Lifecycle Professional (CSSLP)

 Mr. Johnson supports the International Information Systems Security Certification Consortium (ISC)2_{Information Systems} Security Engineering Professional (ISSEP) credential as a volunteer domain expert to perform Job Task Analyses and writes domain related items for the internationally recognized credential examination.

 Mr. Johnson has published articles relating to Cryptographic Solutions for Mobile Devices and Secure Mobility in 2011 and 2012, presented at MILCOM 2012, panel chair for MILCOM 2014 & MILCOM 2015 relating to Cloud Computing Security.