To what extent has the accession process of the Western Balkans contributed to the fight against organized crime within their interior?

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LEIDEN UNIVERSITY,

FACULTY OF GOVERNANCE AND GLOBAL

AFFAIRS,

MSc CRISIS AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT,

MASTER THESIS

Research question: To what

extent has the accession process

of the Western Balkans

contributed to the fight against

organized crime within their

interior?

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INTRODUCTION:

MASTER THESIS’ TOPIC AND MAIN QUESTIONS:

This master thesis will approach the topic of organized crime in the Western Balkans in the light of their European Union membership perspective; namely the actions and policies that both EU and Western Balkans’ countries have put into practice in order to address this alarming threat. To begin with, it can be claimed that the stabilization of the European Union’s close neighbourhood, namely the Western Balkans’ area, will contribute to the enhancement of EU’s internal security as well. In order for this goal to be achieved though, a lot of progress has to be made; the Western Balkans ought to create a strong institutional background within their interior and finally tackle corruption as well as organized crime. Towards this direction the EU has undertaken plenty operations under the prism of the Western Balkans’ European perspective. These operations generally focus either on the training and modernization of the police bodies or on the creation of stronger rule of law, as their aim remains to assist the region in the control of organized crime. As for the Western Balkans themselves, policies which have been put into action, will be analyzed to facilitate academic scrutiny of the current status of Western Balkans in terms of their compliance with such EU requirements and standards. With regard to the above, three countries’ policies, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and Serbia, will be researched in depth.

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decide to exchange reliable and timely information, share their expertise and portray true willingness to co-operate. Another reason behind this situation is the timing of the financial crisis, which has certainly played a key role in delaying the creation of a strategic dogma from the EU’s side. As in 2016 the EU has to deal with the management of a serious migration crisis, the situation in Syria as well as the one in Ukraine remain high on its agenda. Bearing all these into consideration, the EU alongside with the Western Balkans should show strong commitment and willingness to address the problem of organized crime in close collaboration with each other. The Southern Neighbourhood issues will be further discussed by the European Council in October1, which is a good starting point. Until today, although the EU has contributed to the fight against organized crime in this region, the results remain insufficient. To sum up, on the one hand the Western Balkans should take further measures in order to reform their law enforcement agencies and enhance their rule of law. On the other hand, EU’s constructive ambiguity and use of vague goals is of major importance as well, with regard to the slow integration procedure of the Western Balkans.

So, the main thesis questions, which have to be answered, are the following; under the prism of their European perspective what is the current situation in Western Balkans in terms of organized crime; moreover what are the current trends; what is the threat perception of this region; what are the EU actions and policies in its attempt to tackle this phenomenon in the region; in addition to the above what are their own policies at the moment; finally what is respectively the current status of Western Balkans in terms of their compliance with such EU requirements and standards. Hence, the aim of this thesis is to shed some light on this area, since with regard to organized crime in Western Balkans, a recent research of this kind seems unavailable, while the older ones have been rather outdated and therefore do not follow the latest trends and turns of events.

1_{For more information in regards with the European Council of March 19}th_{– 20}th_{2015, please visit;}

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DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS:

a. ORGANIZED CRIME:

During the 21st century, organized crime constitutes one of the most significant threats to the international community alongside with terrorism. Although this form of criminal activity was known to governments prior to that, its true potential was still not acknowledged. Some decades ago, for instance during the Cold War era, it would be very hard for any international security scholar to foresee that after less than half of a century later the biggest security threat, that the international system should cope with, would emerge from non-state actors. However, due to a combination of factors, such as globalization, the vibrant introduction of the market economy and the commercialization of technological achievements2, the rise of organized crime became uncontrollable.

To begin with, this thesis sheds some light on the term ‘organized crime’ in order to define the researched term. The basic characteristics of organized crime therefore include “extreme violence, corruption of public officials, including law enforcement and judicial officers, penetration of the legitimate economy […] and interference in the political process”3_{. Organized crime can be regarded as an enterprise orchestrated} by criminals, who intend to take part in an illegal activity most of the times incited by the gain of monetary profit. Organized crime “poses a direct threat to national and regional security and constitutes one of the basic factors, that contribute to the malfunction of the political and socioeconomic structure of the countries involved”4_. In addition to the above, it should be highlighted that it is directly linked with other topics, such as weapons smuggling, drugs and human trafficking, political corruption, illegal activities and the failure of rule of law. It becomes evident then that organized

2_{For more information about organized crime especially in the region of Balkans, please read;}

Giatzides A., (2010) “Organized crime in South-eastern Europe”. From Balkans to South-eastern Europe; Challenges and Prospects in the 21st_{century (edited by Armakolas I., Dokos T.), Sideris}

Publications, pp. 293-322

3_{Van Dijk J. (2008)}_{“The World of Crime; Breaking the Silence on Problems of Security, Justice, and}

Development Across the World”. Sage Publications, p.146

4_{Giatzides A., (2010)}_{“Organized crime in South-eastern Europe”.}_{From Balkans to South-eastern}

Europe; Challenges and Prospects in the 21st_{century (edited by Armakolas I., Dokos T.), Sideris}

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crime doesn’t only pose “a threat to national security”5_{, but it also affects “human} security at a sub-national level”6.

At an internal security level, police, customs, border control and intelligence agencies play the biggest part in operations designed to address organized crime, as over the years they have acquired a lot of experience as well as expertise in tackling such threats. Some other actors, which are able to cooperate too, but in a lower and perhaps less effective level of contribution, are the local authorities, other agencies and last but not least individual citizens. At the external level, organizations such as the European Union, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and others have decided to participate actively in operations around the world in order to tackle organized crime activities.

b. WESTERN BALKANS:

Having defined organized crime, the term of ‘Western Balkans’ ought to be addressed as well. To begin with, the term ‘Western Balkans’ includes Kosovo and also the following countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. Croatia belongs to Western Balkans geographically, but since it acceded as a member of the European Union on July 1st_of 2013, the decision was made to exclude Croatia from this research. The same applies to Slovenia, which assumed EU membership on May 1st_{of 2004.}

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LINK WITH PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT:

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ACADEMIC RELEVANCE:

According to Olsen7, the ‘Europeanization’ theory faces some difficulties in compliance with “the language of dependent and independent variables”8_{. It is also} evident that the connection between the EU and national level appears sometimes as shadowy and lacks flawless clarity. For instance, a policy that follows the path of ‘Brusselization’ might be adopted at a national level, but the causal relationship between the adoption of this policy and the influence of the strict core of ‘Europe’ can remain weak. Olsen advances his train of thought in the same manner, admitting that this political strategy can derive from “a multitude of co-evolving, parallel and not necessarily tightly coupled processes”9_{. This is what Goetz}10_{describes as the “missing} link”11_{between pressures from ‘Brussels’ on one hand and the perceived domestic} adjustments on the other. As a consequence of the above, it becomes evident that the research of such an interactive relationship is a big challenge for the study of ‘Europeanization’ theory in general and perhaps constitutes a serious drawback for its application and analysis.

These operational issues, which arise here, have been highlighted by Featherstone as well. This interactive relationship between ‘Brussels’ and countries that wish to attain an EU membership status remains foggy, since “it begs a 'chicken and egg' question; which comes first, or who is affecting whom?”12. To these questions, the answers remain blurry, as Dyson similarly explained during the previous decade. For him,

7_{For more information, please see;}

Olsen, J. P. (1996). “Europeanization and Nation-state Dynamics”, in S. Gustavsson and L. Lewin (eds), ‘The Future of the Nation-State’ (Stockholm: Nerenius and Santerus Publishers).

8_{Olsen, J. P. (1996).}_{“Europeanization and Nation-state Dynamics”}_{, in S. Gustavsson and L. Lewin}

(eds), ‘The Future of the Nation-State’ (Stockholm: Nerenius and Santerus Publishers). p.271

9_{Olsen, J. P. (1996).}_{“Europeanization and Nation-state Dynamics”}_{, in S. Gustavsson and L. Lewin}

(eds), ‘The Future of the Nation-State’ (Stockholm: Nerenius and Santerus Publishers). p.271

10_{Goetz K. (2000).}_{“European Integration and National Executives: A Cause in Search of an Effect?”}

West European Politics23(4): pp.211-240.

11_{Goetz K. (2000).}_{“European Integration and National Executives: A Cause in Search of an Effect?”}

West European Politics23(4): p.222

12_{Featherstone K. (2003).}_{“Introduction: In the name of ‘Europe’.”}_{in Featherstone K., Radaelli C. K.}

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‘Europeanization’ as a rather new theoretical concept “has produced more questions than answers”13_.

In an attempt to overcome this theoretical obstacle and bridge the aforementioned gap, this thesis will strictly research into EU’s actions, which promote the fight against organized crime in Western Balkans, and afterwards into these countries’ domestic policies, which emerged throughout the years as an outcome of the interactive relationship between them and ‘Europe’. In addition to the above, as this topic has not been touched for some serious time now, the aim of this thesis is to shed some light to the novelties and fresh turns of events with regard to the Western Balkans’ attempts to control organized crime. Furthermore, this thesis takes into account the fact that the process of tackling organized crime in general is continuous and therefore ought to be academically updated. Otherwise, studies remain vulnerable to the inevitability of time and unfortunately they are soon bound to be characterized as out-of-date. So, in order to tackle these problems, a fresh and up-to-date approach to this topic is presented.

13_{Dyson, K. (2002). “}_{Introduction: EMU as Integration, Europeanization and Convergence”}_{in Dyson, K.}

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SOCIETAL RELEVANCE:

The key geographic position of the Balkans, being a natural bridge between three continents, played a big part in the organized criminal activities’ boom during the 1990s. This region is well-known for being a crossroad for drug trafficking from Afghanistan through Turkey14, not to mention human trafficking. This criminal hub is also “a transit and destination region for trafficked human beings […] exploited in prostitution” according to Europol15_{. Another reason for the creation of such activities} is of course “the effect of geopolitical factors, but primarily the resurgence of nationalism, the conflicts and last but not least the Yugoslav wars”16_{. As a result of} the latter, the states of Western Balkans that came to birth after the wars, suffered “from chronic political instability”17_{. This instability had as an aftereffect the} weakening of the rule of law and has also given rise to increasing levels of citizens’ mistrust towards the state function. Therefore, this region became an ideal place for smuggling, profiteering, delinquency and for a lot of other illegal activities that were previously mentioned. Sometimes, corrupted governments of the region participated in such illegal activities as well, which had as an either direct or indirect result the “state capture by corrupted oligarchic circuits”18_.

14_{For more information, please see;}

https://www.rt.com/news/326731-turkey-afghanistan-heroin-europe/ (last accessed on January 9th_{, 2016)}

15_{Europol knowledge product, (2011).}_{“Trafficking in Human Beings in the European Union”}_,

https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/trafficking-in-human-beings-in-the-european-union-2011.pdf (last accessed on November 1st_{, 2015)}

16_{Giatzides A., (2010).}_{“Organized crime in South-eastern Europe”.}_{From Balkans to South-eastern}

Publications, 295

17_{Anastasijevic, D. (2006).}_{“Organized Crime in the Western Balkans”}_{, First Annual Conference on}

Human Security, Terrorism and Organized Crime in the Western Balkan Region, HUMSEC (23-25 November 2006 – Ljubljana),

http://www.humsec.eu/cms/fileadmin/user_upload/humsec/Workin_Paper_Series/Working_Paper_ Anastasijevic.pdf (last accessed on May 26th_{, 2015)}

18_{Giatzides A., (2010).}_{“Organized crime in South-eastern Europe”.}_{From Balkans to South-eastern}

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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:

PRESENTATION OF THE THEORY THROUGH THE PRISM OF A QUICK LITERATURE REVIEW:

This thesis will try to answer the following question; «to what extent has the admission process of the Western Balkans contributed to the fight against organized crime in that particular region». For this topic, the theory of ‘Europeanization’19 seems to be the most appropriate amongst all the available options. According to Radaelli, Europeanization consists of processes of “construction, diffusion and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things', shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies”20_{. As a} consequence of the above, this theoretical framework is chosen, because it highlights two important features of the relationship that will be researched; first, the one of continuous interaction and second, the one of creative adaptation; both characteristics of the Western Balkans’ admission process to the EU.

‘Europeanization’ is a two-way street, where both ‘Europe’ and domestic political structures evolve throughout the years. “It entails a ‘bottom-up’ and a ‘top-down’ dimension”21_{, from Börzel’s}22_{point of view. On one hand, the ‘bottom-up’} perspective deals with the creation of EU policies as well as the new norms, while this perspective has been predominant in the academic literature. The ‘top-down’ dimension on the other hand has inspired a new direction of academic analysis, as such literature has emerged to a great extent recently. It emphasizes on the impact of

19_{For more information about the ‘Europeanization’ theory, please see;}

Featherstone K., Radaelli C. K. (2003). “The politics of Europeanization”. Oxford University Press

20_{Radaelli C. K. (2004).}_{“Europeanization: Solution or problem?”}_{European Integration online Papers}

(EIoP) Vol. 8 (2004) N° 16; http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-016a.htm (last accessed on November 2nd_{, 2015)}

21_B_ö_{rzel T. (2002).}_{“Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence-Sitting: Member State Responses to}

Europeanization”. Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol.40. No.2. p.193

22_{For more information in regards with member states’ responses to ‘Europeanization’, please see;}

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these institutional policies on political processes of either member states or countries that are on an EU membership orbit.

With regard to the impact of EU policies and measures, it is apparent that they have a direct as well as long-term effect on member states’ political, financial and social life. For countries, which still have not entered the EU, the previous statement can be regarded as controversial. However, it is a basic requirement for candidate states to respect and apply the ‘acquis communautaire’; namely to adopt, implement and enforce in practice all current EU rules, which have been divided into 35 policy fields23_{. Therefore, the EU may have an influence on countries, which seek to acquire} EU membership.

To receive the status of EU membership is not an easy task for countries, that are still in the pre-accession process, since their governments have to meet a lot of institutional, organizational and managerial criteria, which have been negotiated with the EU. This process of interactive adjustment is rigorous and challenging, while these countries engage in a “continuous policy making process of both an active and reactive nature”24_{. As a result, they “find themselves subject to varying […]} demands”25_{and have to put in practice a set of policies and structures in accordance} with the standards of ‘Europe’. As far as the Western Balkans are concerned, this is an “increasingly demanding process”26_{, the success or failure of which both depend} on “their ability and willingness to change” 27 _{. When referring to the} “Europeanization, South East European style” 28 _{, Anastasakis points out the} complexity and particularity of this special relationship.

23_{For more information about the chapters of the acquis, please visit;}

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/chapters-of-the-acquis/index_en.htm (last accessed on November 14th_{, 2015)}

24_{Wright, V. (1996}_{). “The National Co-ordination of European Policy-Making Negotiating the}

Quagmire”. in Richardson J. (ed). European Union. Policy and Policy-Making (London: Routledge). p.149

25_{Kassim H. (2003).}_{“Meeting the Demands of EU Membership: The Europeanization of National}

Administrative Systems”. in Featherstone K., Radaelli C. K. (ed). ‘The politics of Europeanization’. Oxford University Press. p. 84

26_{Anastasakis O. (2005).}_{“The Europeanization of the Balkans”.}_{Brown Journal of World Affairs (12):}

p.77

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In regards with the operationalization of concepts, the term ‘Europeanization’ is very broad in the academic literature of public administration and therefore it has received a plethora of definitions. This statement does not imply the vagueness or the degradation of its significance, but rather a constructive ambiguity in regards with its meaning. ‘Europeanization’ has been described as “a fashionable but contested concept”29_{, while perhaps the most unambiguous definition of the term is the one of} Radaelli, which was used in the beginning of this chapter. Hence, the fact that it is a dynamic and asymmetric process has to be underlined; each state faces a unique linear process of adaptation to ‘Europe’, while they all make their efforts to adjust their national policies with the ones of ‘Brussels’ to a different extent.

Ten years before Radaelli, it was Ladrech30 who attempted to define this term in quite a similar manner. From his point of view, ‘Europeanization’ was “a process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy making”31_{, which portrays in a clear manner the characteristic of creative} adaptation to ‘Europe’.

For Anastasakis, it is clearly even more than that. From his perspective, ‘Europeanization’ is not only a rather complicated process, but a final goal as well. This approach is the one, which the author of this thesis believes that illustrates the bigger picture as it also manages to entail the most truth in it. Under this prism, ‘Europeanization’ is both “a means and an end; it is method as well as substance; it is a project and a vision. It signifies a certain political, socioeconomic, and cultural reality, but it is also an ideology, a symbol, and a myth”32_{. Moreover, it is directly} linked with “convergence and transition”33_{, modernization of domestic policies,} serious democratization and also marketization of the economy. Finally, the

29_{Olsen J. (2002).}_{“The many faces of Europeanization”.}_{Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol 40.}

No 5. p.921

30_{Ladrech, R. (1994).}_{“The Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France”,}

Journal of Common Market Studies 32(1): pp.69-88.

31_{Ladrech, R. (1994).}_{“The Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France”,}

Journal of Common Market Studies 32(1): pp.69

p.78

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understanding of ‘Europeanization’ is “dynamic, multifaceted, and malleable”34_and so it should be cautious. To the same wavelength is the opinion of Flockhart, who underlines the fact that ‘Europeanization’ is “in a permanent state of reconstruction and reconstitution”35_.

Bearing into consideration the previously-mentioned definitions and explanations of the key parameters of ‘Europeanization’, it is now time to dive into a theoretical framework, that Knill and Lehmkull36_{constructed in 1999. According to this, three} different relationships are portrayed between ‘Brussels’ and countries that pursue an EU membership status. The first mechanism is defined as ‘positive integration’ and introduces a new institutionalist perspective on adaptation, according to Featherstone37. Furthermore, it serves to describe a situation, where countries adjust their institutions and policies to the commitments of EU with a small possibility of maneuvering from their part. According to the second mechanism of Knill’s and Lehmkull’s theoretical model, “EU legislation alters the domestic rules of the game”38_{, with an example being the one of the single market. This mechanism can be} linked to multilevel bargaining games and rational choice. By using the term ‘negative integration’, Knill and Lehmkull describe this mechanism by underlining the fact that major changes at the distribution of power between domestic actors are inevitable. The final mechanism is where ‘Europe’ changes “the beliefs and expectations of domestic actors”39_{. As a result, a plethora of changes in regards with} these actors’ priorities, strategies and policies take place, and therefore institutional adaptation is also achieved. This mechanism is named ‘framing integration’ and can be linked to sociological institutionalism, according to Featherstone40.

p.80

35_{Flockhart T. (2010).}_{”Europeanization or EU-ization? The Transfer of European Norms across Time}

and Space”. Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol 48. No 4. p.805

36_{Knill, C., Lehmkuhl, D. (1999).}_{“How Europe Matters: Different Mechanisms of Europeanization”,}

European Integration Online Papers 3(7)

(ed). ‘The politics of Europeanization’. Oxford University Press, p. 14

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However, from his own point of view, ‘Europeanization’ does not coincide entirely with “European regional integration or even convergence, though it does overlap with aspects of both”41. From a short-lived perspective, the goal of ‘Europeanization’ is a simple influence of EU policies on a domestic level, while from a long-term perspective the goal is the complete modulation with them.

To sum up, ‘Europeanization’ introduces the interactive relationship between EU and the domestic level of states, which are focused on a European perspective. Moreover, it stresses out the adjustment of these countries’ institutional functions and policies to the checks of ‘Europe’ in response to the dynamics of adaptation. It also highlights the emergence of new actors or the shift of power amongst the old ones at a domestic level. Besides, the pre-accession process is of great importance for the theory of ‘Europeanization’, since it creates a fertile ground for the roots of democratization and general development to emerge.

The author of this thesis feels that in addition to the theory of ‘Europeanization’, the one of ‘multi-level governance’ is also useful in regards with the current approach to this topic’s thesis. In brief, ‘multi-level governance’ (MLG) theory was formulated after the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which introduced new structures at a European level. This particular theoretical framework remains central to the one of ‘Europeanization’ and underlines the fact that a plethora of authority structures are able to interact with themselves and produce numerous results in all levels of governance. From another point of view, MLG initially “emerged as a vertical arrangement”42_{while it now serves to highlight the complicated involvement of both} domestic and international levels of authority, as their distinctive lines become blurry especially in this context of European integration43_{. As a result, policy-making at} several political levels; namely from supra-national to local, is generally examined under the prism of MLG.

42_{Stephenson P. (2013).}_{“Twenty years of multi-level governance: ‘Where Does It Come From? What Is}

It? Where Is It Going?’”. Journal of European Public Policy, 20:6, p.818

43_{For more information in regards with multi-level governance at a European level, please visit;}

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A TYPOLOGY OF ‘EUROPEANIZATION’ FOR THIS PARTICULAR THESIS:

In regards with a typology of ‘Europeanization’, Featherstone44_{has presented an} approach, which perceives ‘Europeanization’ as comprising four categories; namely the historical, the cultural, the one of institutional adaptation and finally the one of policy and policy processes adaptation.

To begin with, the historical process attempts to analyze how ‘Europe’ throughout the centuries has succeeded in an “export of cultural norms and patterns”45_{, common} practices, shared values as well as beliefs.

The second aspect of ‘Europeanization’ deals with the phenomenon of transnationalism, while “the usage of 'Europeanization' under the prism of this category tends to be very broad”46_{. According to this aspect, the spread of cultural} ideas, norms and behavior patterns, has affected European states as far as their social and political sphere. For example, changes in a plethora of fields; namely from education to political culture, can be understood via this perspective.

Next, the third category of ‘Europeanization’ is the one of institutional influence and adaptation to the entry requirements, that ‘Brussels’ have posed in order for the EU membership status to be acquired. These requirements were defined in the European Council of 1993 and are the following three; stable institutions, which guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces; and finally, administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement the ‘acquis communautaire’ and ability to take on the obligations of membership47_. However, according to Featherstone the focus of this approach is more “on how EU policies develop and the role of EU actors in the process, rather than domestic impacts

(ed). ‘The politics of Europeanization’. Oxford University Press

47_{For more information please visit;}

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and response”48_{. For this particular reason, this approach will function as a starting} ground for the research that is presented in the next chapter of this thesis; namely, the EU measures, policies and strategies towards tackling organized crime in the Western Balkans’ region.

The final aspect of ‘Europeanization’ entertains the idea of the public policy impacts of EU membership at a national level. This impact on the domestic level of a candidate country can be either direct or indirect, while the final aim is to create similar or even to “establish common policies”49_{with ‘Brussels’. Therefore, the} reason why this approach characterizes ‘Europeanization’ as “a process of domestic adaptation”50_{to ‘Europe’ under certain EU pressures towards this direction becomes} clear. As a result, this approach serves to portray the theoretical framework behind the relevant chapter of this thesis, where national strategies of the Western Balkans that aim towards the fight of organized crime are made subject of empirical research. To be more precise, the countries of Albania, Bosnia and Serbia will be studied and their policies, which are either under the influence or under the command of ‘Brussels’ with regard to the serious fight against organized crime, will be carefully assessed.

49_F_{eatherstone K. (2003).}_{“Introduction: In the name of ‘Europe’.”}_{in Featherstone K., Radaelli C. K.}

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METHODOLOGY:

The topic of this thesis will be approached through the theory of ‘Europeanization’51. According to Radaelli, Europeanization consists of processes of “construction, diffusion and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things', shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies”52_{. This framework is therefore chosen, because of its potential application in} the understanding and analysis of the governance of organized crime control in the selected Balkan countries, since it underlines two important characteristics; the one of continuous interaction and creative adaptation. These two features are of major importance for this research, as the Western Balkans are constantly adapting to the requirements, which ‘Brussels’ have highlighted for their EU accession. As a result, the theory of ‘Europeanization’ contributes to a considerable extent to the operationalization of the main questions.

To continue, both the EU strategies and national policies will be researched, as it was previously mentioned. The me.hod, that will be used, is the one of triangulation. A plethora of qualitative researchers mainly choose this methodology in order to enhance confidence in the research and establish validity in their researches, according to Bryman53. It involves the use of different sources of information and the author will apply it to his own research as well. Moreover, the methods of verification and cross-checking will be used in regards with document analysis. To be more precise, in the first part of the thesis, the methods of document analysis and desktop research will be used and in regards with the second part, a questionnaire analysis will take place. During this research, the author will use these methods in order to research

51_{For more information about the ‘Europeanization’ theory, please see;}

Featherstone K., Radaelli C. K. (2003). “The politics of Europeanization”. Oxford University Press

52_{Radaelli C. K. (2004).}_{“Europeanization: Solution or problem?”}_{European Integration online Papers}

(EIoP) Vol. 8 (2004) N° 16; http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-016a.htm (last accessed on November 2nd_{, 2015)}

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the connection between the fight against organized crime in the Western Balkans and the influence, which their European perspective had to it.

As far as the first method is concerned, plenty European documents, such as annual progress reports of the last years as well as EU agendas and strategies, for example the EU Enlargement Strategy of 2015, are investigated in depth. So, in the fourth chapter of this thesis, countries reports’ findings will be presented. Moreover, Frontex publications will be researched thoroughly. Frontex is a European Union agency, the aim of which is the management of external border control of the EU. This agency publishes once a year its Risk Analysis for the Western Balkans region and within that document the progress of the region in regards with the fight against organized crime, as well as the majority of current threats, trends and risks that Kosovo and the Western Balkan countries face, are portrayed. Therefore, these annual publications will also be addressed. In addition to this, Europol’s co-operational agreements with third states and non-EU related bodies are also of major importance and as a result ought to be reviewed too. Such agreements have been signed with Western Balkans countries and are significant for the topic of this thesis. The reason behind this is the fact that such agreements’ goal is to reform and restructure the law enforcement agencies of non-EU actors and so, to this direction, the Western Balkans attempt to create effective police bodies that will be able to prevent, detect, suppress and investigate numerous forms of organized crime. Finally, at the end of this chapter, the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina will be approached, since it was the first mission of the EU under its Common Foreign and Security Policy umbrella. Furthermore, its meaning becomes clear, if one underlines the fact that it remains an EU long-lasting mission. That also serves to highlight the commitment that member states show in regards with the stabilization of the country and in general of the whole region, as a requirement prior to its EU accession route.

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considered as a corrupted and fragile country, whose ethnic groups – mainly Bosniaks and then Serbs, Croats and others - pose certain challenges to its stability. Serbia and Albania are on the other hand both candidate countries and seem to have achieved more progress in the fight against organized crime. Especially the latter has been thought of as a more stable country, although its crime rates are still very high and drug trafficking remains a tough struggle.

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EU PERSPECTIVE:

COUNTRIES’ REPORTS FINDINGS:

On an annual basis, the Commission prepares six reports on Western Balkans. Each report examines the situation in each country and also in Kosovo. These reports are issued in order to highlight the progress, that has been attained, as well as the further measures and requirements that ought to be taken into consideration by the five countries and Kosovo.

To begin with, for Montenegro the accession route to EU depends a lot on the progress that ought to be made in the rule of law field. Although some progress was made in 2014, especially on “strengthening the legal and institutional framework and operational capacity for the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing”54, progress “will also have to be demonstrated, and assessed, on the basis of credible track records in the fight against corruption and organized crime”55_{. In regards with} drugs and arms trafficking, cybercrime and migrant smuggling, there is satisfactory progress in respective cases, but not to an important degree. For instance, after 250 kg of cocaine were seized from a cargo ship in the port of Bar in 2014, the investigation of this particular case did not succeed in identifying the network, that organized this operation. On the contrary, Montenegro has shown even “little progress”56_{in human} beings’ trafficking and money laundering cases. According to EU Commission, “the system in place to combat money laundering remains weak and lacks strong co-ordination mechanisms between the various players in the chain”57_{. Convictions for} these crimes are still on a low level, while according to the same document of the Commission the efforts to investigate wider criminal networks are rather small.

54_{Commission Staff Working Document, Montenegro 2015 Report accompanying the document}

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, EU Enlargement Strategy 2015, p.18; http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_montenegro.pdf (last accessed on December 5th_{, 2015)}

55_{Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European}

Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, EU Enlargement Strategy 2015, p.16; http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_strategy_paper_en.pdf (last accessed on December 4th_{, 2015)}

57_{Commission Staff Working Document, Montenegro 2015 Report accompanying the document}

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, EU Enlargement Strategy 2015, p.17;

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Nevertheless, an optimistic fact is that an agreement with Europol is active. However, this operational agreement with Europol was signed in September of 2014 and a police liaison officer was appointed seven months afterwards. Furthermore, police and criminal justice reform have gained momentum. All in all, Montenegro is not prepared enough to implement the acquis communautaire correctly in the area of Justice, Freedom and Security.

In contrast, Serbia enjoys a certainly higher level of preparation regarding the control of organized crime. “Fighting organized crime and corruption remains fundamental to countering criminal infiltration of the political, legal and economic systems”58_{of the} country. Nowadays it is actively contributing to international and regional co-operation in the field of drugs, especially after “the 2014 seizure of 168 kg of marijuana jointly with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”59_{. “New DNA} and drug chemistry laboratories became operational”60, while strategies for the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing were introduced. To be more precise, six money laundering cases were brought to justice in 2014; “effective implementation of anti-money laundering legislation by all relevant institutions, including banks is still needed”61_{though. Moreover, a financial investigation strategy} in regards with terrorism financing exists “but it still lacks an overall strategic picture of the organized crime situation on its territory”62. “The number of final convictions for organized crime activities remains low compared to the estimated scale of the regional and domestic criminal market”63_{. All in all, a serious action plan for the fight} against organized crime remains still to be established. Strategies on cybercrime and

58_{Commission Staff Working Document, Serbia 2015 Report accompanying the document}

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, EU Enlargement Strategy 2015, p.63; http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_serbia.pdf (last accessed on December 5th_{, 2015)}

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human trafficking should be introduced as well in the near future. For these next months, according to the Commission document, Serbia should also step up its intelligence-led investigations in order to counter organized crime activities, establish a secure platform to exchange intelligence data between its law enforcement agencies and finally set a legal framework to support the reform of its police body.

In regards with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the inter-ethnic situation is still fragile. After a major police operation in the ethnic Albanian neighbourhood of Kumanovo took place, all political leaders in the country called for restoration of calm and stability, while events have to be further researched. As far as organized crime is concerned, the most cases are about human and drugs trafficking. In regards with these topics, there is a plethora of national strategies that the country has developed; namely for tackling human trafficking and illegal migration (2013-2016), drugs (2014-2020), and terrorism (2011-2015). Several criminal networks and routes in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have been destroyed during the last years, mainly “thanks to co-operation with neighbouring countries and EU Member States through Eurojust”64_{. However, there is still room for improvement. To this direction,} “capacity and expertise to carry out financial investigations and asset confiscations in a systematic manner still needs to be established”65_{. For 2015 the European} Commission believes that “no progress has been made. The legislative framework is broadly in line with European standards”66_{, as a serious policy against money} laundering and a serious track record on combating money laundering ought to be established. Also, co-operation between law enforcement agencies should be strengthened through bringing the National Coordination Centre for the Fight against Organized Crime at a high operational status. Finally, the Commission welcomes the work, which is currently underway in order to “prepare the new cyber-security strategy, along the lines of the EU strategy in this area”67_.

64_{Commission Staff Working Document, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2015 Report}

accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, EU Enlargement Strategy 2015, p.18;

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_the_former_yugoslav_rep ublic_of_macedonia.pdf (last accessed on December 5th_{, 2015)}

accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, EU Enlargement Strategy 2015, p.17;

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Albania has made a lot of effort in the control of organized crime. The information, it exchanges with Europol, has played a big part in this attempt, although it still “makes little use of Europol’s strategic intelligence products”68_{. Recently, law enforcement} agencies have conducted several operations towards the destruction of vast cultivations of cannabis. In this fight against drug trafficking, there has been some progress made, while enhancing international police cooperation has played a big part, too. Trafficking in human beings is also a big challenge for Albania, since only a few cases have reached justice. In addition to this, co-operation between the judicial sector and police remains to be further developed, since “the number of final convictions effectively leading to dismantling criminal organizations remains negligible […]. Financial investigations, anti-money laundering measures and asset confiscation remain underused”69_{. The Albanian State Police has almost 10.000 police} officers, “228 per 100.000 inhabitants”70_{. However, the law enforcement authorities} are centralized and therefore it is not an easy task for them to reach remote areas of the country. Bearing this in mind, Albania needs to set up an effective human resources policy, in order to be in able to fight organized crime with success. A revised 2013-2020 inter-institutional strategy accompanied by an action plan on the fight against organized crime, countering terrorism and illicit trafficking is in order. The country needs to further establish a solid basis for proactive investigations, prosecutions and final convictions in cases of organized crime, especially for the ones that concern money laundering, which is a serious problem for the country’s social and economic welfare. “Effective judicial follow-up of organized crime cases and quality of indictments must be ensured”71_{. Then, it would be in a position of power} when attempting to effectively dismantle such criminal networks.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, a potential candidate country, also attained a decent level of progress on the topic. Plenty successful large-scale joint operations took place in 2014 - some including neighbouring countries - , but still there are very few final

68_{Commission Staff Working Document, Albania 2015 Report accompanying the document}

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, EU Enlargement Strategy 2015, p.19; http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_albania.pdf (last accessed on December 5th_{, 2015)}

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, EU Enlargement Strategy 2015, p.18; http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_albania.pdf (last accessed on December 5th_{, 2015)}

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convictions for organized crime cases, while financial investigations remain underused. Bosnia and Herzegovina has still not implemented a legislative framework to tackle effectively money laundering. Moreover, there is “no policy for carrying out serious financial investigations on a systematic basis and the precautionary freezing of assets during the early phase of investigations is not often applied”72_{. Although} “specialized anti-terrorism, human trafficking, drugs, cybercrime and financial investigation units are broadly in place at state and entity level”73, their capacities are generally limited or insufficient. On the other hand, the EU has deployed a large amount of resources under the umbrella of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). To be more precise, mission EUFOR ALTHEA is still present in the country. The number of troops has decreased to 600 since September 1st of 2012, however their focus on capacity-building and training is meaningful. To sum up, the lack of strategic co-ordination at the domestic level, as well as the inadequate co-operation between the country’s agencies are both hampering the effective work of police services. Besides, serious complexity has been identified at the administrative level and therefore command structures are rather not transparent and powers can sometimes be overlapping. For the next months, the Commission feels that Bosnia and Herzegovina should pay more attention to the information exchange between law enforcement agencies on the one hand and prosecution on the other, and finally take measures towards the “effective asset confiscation and recovery systems at all levels”74_{. To this direction, EU is} committed to enhancing the rule of law in the country “through other instruments, including the reinforced EUSR Office and the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA)”75_{as well.}

Last but not least, Kosovo is also a potential candidate for EU accession. Although still at an early stage of preparations in the fight against organized crime, there has

72_{Commission Staff Working Document, Bosnia and Herzegovina 2015 Report accompanying the}

document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, EU Enlargement Strategy 2015, p.18;

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_bosnia_and_herzegovina.p df (last accessed on December 5th_{, 2015)}

75_{European Commission website. European Enlargement Policy. Bosnia and Herzegovina.}

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been some progress in inter-institutional co-operation and information exchange amongst law enforcement agencies on investigations. “However, the number of investigations and final convictions remain low. Asset confiscation is rarely applied”76_{, not to mention the insufficient character of the legislation and regulations} on money laundering and attempt to counter serious financial crimes. Besides, in many criminal cases that include drugs or human trafficking, the number of final convictions is surprisingly low. Kosovo, which is neither a member of Interpol nor has a strategic co-operation with Europol, does not enjoy a period of stability and security due to the organized criminal activities, that take place on a regular basis. To this direction, the EU Commission feels that Kosovo should pay more “attention in beginning to dismantle criminal groups active in Kosovo, […] to increase the number of permanent confiscations and building up expertise at all levels”77_{and finally to} create an intelligence-led policing approach. The events of Kumanovo, that were previously mentioned, and the general involvement of Kosovo citizens in similar incidents in the region underline the intensity and severity, under which armed groups are able to operate. “With military-grade weaponry, military training and command structures, such groups have the capacity to undermine stability”78_{in the Western} Balkans and so the need for a serious approach is needed. Finally, radicalization’s rise within Kosovo poses another serious threat in an already unstable area. To sum up, real results in dealing with endemic organized crime in Kosovo are rather slow, despite the fact that in theory Kosovo has until now “implemented 80% of the action plan to accompany its 2012-2017 national strategy against organized crime”79.

77_{Commission Staff Working Document, Kosovo 2015 Report accompanying the document}

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, EU Enlargement Strategy 2015, p.18; http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_kosovo.pdf (last accessed on December 5th_{, 2015)}

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DOCUMENT ANALYSIS:

In the wake of the violent wars, that took place in the Western Balkans during the 1990s, the European Union has sought to secure the stability of the Balkan region. Committed to further consolidating peace and promoting stability and democratic development, EU has taken serious action, as the Western Balkans’ region is one of the European Union External Action Service priorities. Nevertheless, there is also the opinion that progress is nowadays rather slow, “especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, for reasons that range from sovereignty and border disputes to electoral deadlock”80_{. Moreover,} the timing of this deep and widespread financial crisis has played its part too, since it “has affected both the EU and the enlargement countries”81_{to a certain degree,} especially these countries no longer possess the budgetary surplus to commit to the fight against organized crime.

Before researching on the EU actions towards the tackling of organized crime in this particular region, a historical timeline for the EU accession orbit of the Western Balkans ought to be reconstructed. To begin with, “the conditions for establishing contractual relations with these countries were first laid down in the Council Conclusions of April 1997”82_{. In 1999, EU put into action the Stabilization and} Association Process (SAP) with the Western Balkans and also introduced the Stability Pact, a broader framework, that involved a plethora of international actors. The former is a set of policies based on “bilateral contractual relations, financial assistance, political dialogue, trade relations and regional cooperation”83_{. Such} contractual relations are of significant importance, as they introduce permanent

80_{Gross E., (2014),}_{“Unfinished business in the Balkans”,}_{European Institute for Security Studies,}

Alert, p.1; http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_47_Western_Balkans.pdf (last accessed on December 1st_{, 2015)}

81_{Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council,}_{“Enlargement} Strategy and Main Challenges 2009-2010”;

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0533:FIN:EN:PDF (last accessed on December 1st_{, 2015)}

82_{European Union External Action Service, EU relations with the Western Balkans;}

http://eeas.europa.eu/western_balkans/index_en.htm (last accessed on December 1st_{, 2015)} 83_{European Parliament, Fact Sheets on the European Union - 2015, The Western Balkans; p.1}

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structures, which support measures towards “political and economic cooperation and for the establishment of free trade areas with the countries concerned”84_.

In addition to the above, during the EU Council of Thessaloniki back in 2003, the EU membership perspective of the Western Balkans was highlighted. EU member states decided on strengthening political cooperation, promoting institution-building and creating a variety of trade measures to support the growth of the Western Balkans’ economies.

Nowadays, the Western Balkans still face major challenges. The majority of these regard the rule of law and especially with the fight against corruption and organized crime. Accession negotiations are ongoing with Montenegro and Serbia, since 2012 and 2014 respectively. In regards with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, EU pathway remains narrow, not to say an impasse. Furthermore, Albania enjoys candidate status since 2014, while “a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Bosnia and Herzegovina entered into force in June”85_{of 2015. Finally another} SAA was signed in October of 2015 with Kosovo. Nevertheless, the challenges, which these countries have to deal with, are so important that the EU Enlargement Strategy of 2015 underlined that none of the Western Balkans will be ready to enter the EU “during the mandate of the current Commission, which will expire towards the end of 2019”86_.

This Communication uses only one page in order to highlight EU’s attempts to fight against organized crime and corruption in this region. Namely, it is stated that “law enforcement bodies and prosecution services need to be provided with effective legal and investigative tools to properly fight and sanction organized crime and to ensure proactive investigations. […] Growing threats such as cybercrime or terrorism require a higher degree of specialization. [...] The cross-border nature of many criminal activities and organized crime groups requires enhanced regional and international

84_{European Parliament, Fact Sheets on the European Union - 2015, The Western Balkans, p.1;}

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_6.5.2.pdf (last accessed on December 1st_{, 2015)} 85_{Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European}

Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, EU Enlargement Strategy 2015, p.2; http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_strategy_paper_en.pdf (last accessed on December 1st_{, 2015)}

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cooperation, with improved responses to member states’ requests for police and judicial cooperation. Further operational cooperation with the relevant European agencies, in particular Europol, Eurojust and Frontex is also necessary.” Bearing all these into consideration, two things ought to be underlined; the constructive ambiguity, that is used in this document, and also the vague conditions and terms with regard to the ways in which organized crime is to be controlled. As far as the author of this thesis is concerned, the use of constructive ambiguity is chosen, because even though the EU speaks as one body, its member states have different national interests and strategies, which reflects the assumptions of the realism theory. As a result, EU countries want to engage to a different extent in the political and economic support race of the Western Balkans’ attempt to tackle organized crime. To be more precise, “apart from Austria, Croatia, Greece and Italy, few EU member states are making a case for the admission of the Western Balkans”87. Moreover, behind the vague approach of this issue, lies also the lack of political will amongst the member states to deal with the problems of the region, especially amidst such a financial crisis. Besides, member states are very busy negotiating the common handling of problems, in example the refugee crisis or the new perspectives of the fight against terrorism, that do not engage actively in solving the problems of Western Balkans’ EU perspective. To this point, the absence of political will and perhaps the inability of some of the Western Balkan countries, that wish to enter the EU, to adapt to the standards of ‘Brussels’ should not be overlooked as well.

As far as tackling organized crime is concerned, the fight against the illicit trafficking of firearms and ammunition in the Western Balkans is of major importance. To this direction, the EU – Western Balkans Ministerial Forum on Justice and Home Affairs has agreed on a variety of measures portrayed in the Draft Action Plan for 2015-201988_{. On this basis, the EU – Western Balkans Ministerial Forum on Justice and} Home Affairs, namely the Ministers of the South East Europe region, decided that the enhancement of the intelligence and criminal information exchange is a top priority. Moreover, law enforcement co-operation was addressed and regarded as a significant

87_{Van Ham P. (2014).}_{“Gridlock, Corruption and Crime in the Western Balkans”.}_p.16

http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Gridlock%20Corruption%20and%20Crime%20in%20the %20Western%20Balkans.pdf (last accessed on December 3rd_{, 2015)}

88_{For more details on the Draft Action Plan for 2015-2019, please visit;}