Chapter 19: Workmen's Compensation

Volume 1960

Article 22

1-1-1960

Chapter 19: Workmen's Compensation

Maurice F. Shaughnessy

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CHAPTER 19

Workmen's Compensation

MAURICE F. SHAUGHNESSY

§19.1. General. During the 1960 SURVEY year several unusual cases in the field of workmen's compensation were presented to the Supreme Judicial Court. In this field of social legislation administered by a quasi-judicial board, the Court for the most part reiterated prin-ciples determined in many previous decisions, to wit: the court must sustain the findings of the reviewing board unless they are wholly lack-ing in evidential support or are tainted by error of law;l when medical evidence is conflicting it presents a question of fact to be determined by the board;2 the board is free to accept such portions of testimony as they believe credible;3 whether the employee's death was caused by gradual deterioration or was accelerated by working conditions is a question of fact;4 the decision rendered by the board must include specific and definite findings upon the evidence reported that will enable the court to determine if correct rules of law have been applied;1I a decision upon the question of causation is one of fact that is within the province of the board to determine and unless lacking in eviden-tial support cannot be disturbed by the court;6 when a pre-existing heart disease of an employee is accelerated by the employment, there may be found to be an injury arising out of and in the course of the employment.7

§19.2. Injuries to which act applies. In Messersmith's Case,1 the employee, while on a trip for his employer, collapsed and died while playing golf. A claim was made by his widow for workmen's compen-sation benefits for herself and a minor child. The single member awarded compensation, and his findings and decision were adopted by the reviewing board. In the Superior Court a final decree was entered that the deceased did not receive an injury arising out of and in

MAURICE F. SHAUGHNESSY is a partner in the firm of Parker, Coulter, Daley and White, Boston.

§19.1. 1 Hartman's Case, 336 Mass. 508, 5II, 146 N.E.2d 509, 5II (1957).

2 Murphy's Case, 328 Mass. 301, 304, 103 N.E.2d 267, 269 (1952).

3 Luczek's Case, 335 Mass. 675, 677-678,141 N.E.2d 526, 528 (1957).

4 Brzozowski's Case, 328 Mass. 113, 116, 102 N.E.2d 399,400 (1951).

II Judkin's Case, 315 Mass. 226, 227, 52 N.E.2d 579, 580 (1943).

6 Mahoney's Case, 337 Mass. 629, 632, 150 N.E.2d 729, 731 (1958).

7 McMurray's Case, 331 Mass. 29, 32-33,116 N.E.2d 847, 849-850 (1954). §19.2. 1340 Mass. II7, 163 N.E.2d 22 (1959).

§19.2 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 209

the course of his employment, and that his death was not causally related to any injury and dismissed the widow's claim. The widow appealed. The death certificate stated the cause of death as "probable coronary thrombosis." Messersmith worked for the company as an engineer and "key salesman." He traveled a great deal in business even though he had known arteriosclerotic heart condition. While in South Carolina, accompanied by the majority stockholder of the company by which he was employed, they were invited to play golf with two customers. Because of inclement weather conditions the match was not played, but in the afternoon they did play golf with a third person. While playing golf Messersmith had a heart attack and died.

The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case to the reviewing board for proper subsidiary findings. The question whether injuries sustained in the course of recreational activities connected in some way with the employment are within the scope of the Workmen's Compen-sation Act has before Moore's Case2 never been raised in this Com-monwealth, except perhaps in McManus' Case.3 _{McManus, a caddy}

employed by a golf club, was struck while standing on the tee by a golf club swung by another caddy who was about to play. The ac-cident occurred at a time when the caddies were allowed to use the course. The board found, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of the employ-ment. In Moore's Case, the Court was presented an opportunity to re-examine the position previously taken in McManus on recreational activities. Not every injury suffered by one who is in the employ of another falls within the purview of the act. It is limited to injuries arising out of and in the course of the employment.4 _This

require-ment imposes a burden upon the employee of showing that his injury and his employment are causally related. As was said in Caswell's

Case, "[i]f it [the injury] arises out of the nature, conditions,

obliga-tions or incidents of the employment; in other words, out of the em-ployment looked at in any of its aspects," 5 the statutory requirement

is satisfied. Whether Messersmith, by playing golf on Sunday with his employer's majority stockholder, was occupying himself consistently with his contract of hire was a factual question for the board to de-termine. The decision of the single member and the reviewing board was in part based upon a subsidiary finding that was unsubstantiated by the evidence; therefore, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the de-cree entered by the lower court and recommitted the matter for further findings by the board.

A study of the Massachusetts cases indicates that not everything that may be considered an incident of the employment is necessarily com-pensable. Some of those cases that have been held to be compensable

2330 Mass. I, llO N.E.2d 764 (1953). 3289 Mass. 65,193 N.E. 732 (1935).

4 G.L., c. 152, §6.

210

1960

§19.2

shed light on the nature of the incidents: the employee injured while walking down a stairway on his way to lunch;6 a compositor killed in a fall from the roof of the employer's building after seeking fresh air on a hot night;7 a bridge welder killed in a fall from a bridge while answering a call of nature;8 death resulting from a fall while arising from lunch on the employer's premises;D a fall on a stairway at the close of the noon hour.l0 Similarly, the following are illustrative of cases in which recovery has been denied: a road laborer killed when he fell from a steam roller owned by another contractor while discussing personal business with another employee;l1 an employee sitting with a girl on his knee during lunch hour on the employer's premises and injured by a machine when he arose to return to work;12 a dishwasher injured when he fell in the locker room where he had gone to get a newspaper. IS

An analysis of the decisions in the Moore14 and Messersmith 1fl cases indicates a disposition on the part of the Supreme Judicial Court to look more favorably upon the claims arising out of injuries occurring during recreational activities.

The heart cases, so called, are composing a larger and larger per· centage each year of the total cases presented to the Industrial Ac-cident Board. Nearly all physicians are in agreement that arterio-sclerosis is not caused by the ordinary industrial employment. In nearly every heart case decided by the Supreme Judicial Court the medical experts assumed that arteriosclerosis was present. The issue in these heart cases is whether trauma, either emotional or physical, is sufficient to cause damage to the heart. Although the board for over a quarter of a century has been awarding or denying compensation in this type of case, the medical profession is divided as to whether any physical trauma, other than a penetrating wound, actually causes cardiovascular damage. Since there is nothing more firmly established in our compensation law than the ruling that on questions of fact there is no appeal from a finding of the board, the Court continues to reaffirm this basic principle. In recent years the Court has, on numer· ous occasions, adhered to the basic principle that there is no appeal from a finding of fact by the board, but has tended to look more closely at the subsidiary findings upon which the board predicates its finding of fact. In Messersmith,16 the Court remanded the case to the

6 Sundine's Case, 218 Mass. I, 105 N.E. 4l1l1 (1914).

7 Von Ette's Case, 2211 Mass. 56,111 N.E. 696 (1916).

8 Haskins' Case, 261 Mass.4l16, 158 N.E. 845 (1927). D Holmes' Case, 267 Mass. lI07, 166 N.E. 827 (1929).

10 Nagle's Case,lIOll Mass. lI84, 22 N.E.2d 475 (19l19).

11 O'Toole's Case, 229 Mass. 165,118 N.E.lIOll (1918).

12 Rochford's Case, 2114 Mass. 9l1, 124 N .E. 891 (1919). 18 Horton's Case, 275 Mass. 572, 176 N.E. 648 (19l1l). 14l1l10 Mass. I, 110 N.E.2d 764 (195l1).

151140 Mass. 117, 1611 N.E.2d 22 (1959).

16 Ibid.

§19.3

₂₁₁

reviewing board for proper subsidiary findings; in Ackroyd's Case,17 also decided during the 1960 SURVEY year, the Court remanded the case to the board to enlarge the record; in Crawford's Case,18 again decided this year, the Court remanded for proper subsidiary findings.

It is of interest to note that during the 1960 SURVEY year every heart case in which an award was made to the employee was either reversed or remanded by the Supreme Judicial Court.

§19.3. Incapacity. It is well established that the Supreme Judicial Court must sustain the findings of the board of review unless they are lacking in evidential support.1 In Hachadourian's Case,2 the Court reversed the findings of the board as it was of the opinion that there was no evidential support because the medical expert for the employee found only a possibility of causal relationship.

The employee was injured on April 10, 1952, when struck on the shoulder by a bundle of heavy wire. On April 16, 1954, he filed a claim for compensation alleging partial disability from that date. The single member rendered a decision in favor of the employee, and the reviewing board affirmed and adopted the findings and decision of the single member except as to the duration of the employee's incapacity. There was a dispute between the medical experts whether the in-jury of April 10, 1952, was causally related to the partial disability of the employee, which first manifested itself immediately after April 12, 1954. The Court indicated that the testimony of the medical ex-pert for the employee indicated only a possibility of the existence of a causal connection between the injury and the claimant's disability, and on this ground it reversed the decision of the Industrial Accident Board.

The Court is to be congratulated for its decision in Hachadourian, for it indicates that in the so-called heart cases, the medical evidence upon which findings are predicated will be closely scrutinized in the future.

This question of causal relationship is a matter beyond the com-mon knowledge of the ordinary layman, and it has consistently been held that proof of it must rest upon expert medical testimony. The Court will not attempt to determine whether the opinion of a physi-cian is medically sound.s A decision upon the question of causation is one of fact that rests entirely upon medical knowledge and is for the board to determine, and, unless lacking in evidential support, will not be disturbed.4 _{The Court will sustain the general findings of the board}

if possible.5 In Fennell's Case,6 the Court first laid down the rule that

17340 Mass. 214, 163 N.E.2d 271 (1960). 18340 Mass. 719,166 N.E.2d 724 (1960).

§19.3. 1 Karelis' Case, 328 Mass. 224,102 N.E.2d 773 (1952). 2340 Mass. 81, 162 N.E.2d 663 (1959), also noted in §12.5 supra.

3 Murphy's Case, 328 Mass. 301, 304, 103 N .E.2d 267, 269 (1952). 4l\1ahoney's Case, 337 Mass. 629, 632,150 N.E.2d 729,731 (1958).

212

§19.3

if an employee is able to do some type of work and is unable to obtain the type of work he is able to do, a finding of incapacity would be warranted. The Massachusetts Workm.en's Compensation Act is in many respects much broader in scope than compensation acts of many other states. Chapter 152 uses the word "incapacity" for work rather than "disability." The word "incapacity" has been judicially inter-preted far more broadly than the word "disability."

It is well established in the body of the Workmen's Compensation Act that the findings of the board of review must be sustained unless tainted by error of law;7 it is equally well founded that the opinion of a medical expert, however phrased, that amounts to no more than an expression indicating the possibility or chance of the existence of a causal connection between the accident and the disability is not enough to establish the accident as a cause and the disability as the effect.8 The Court will not attempt to determine whether the opinion of a doctor is medically sound.9 _{But if the only evidence to support}

the claim of the employee is that of a medical expert whose testimony is equivocal, contradictory, and confusing, the finding of the board will be reversed.

During the past several years there has been a substantial increase in the number of claims for "cardiac injuries." This trend will un-doubtedly continue because of the number of older workers covered by the more liberal definition of compensable heart injuries. The basic philosophy of the Workmen's Compensation Act is that the cost of injuries sustained in the course of employment is in actuality an expense of production and, therefore, should be borne by industry and not by the employee nor by welfare agencies. This proposition has never seriously been questioned in recent years. The vexing problem facing the board in cardiac injuries, however, is in determin-ing the pathophysiological sequence of events. There is frequently a strong difference in expert medical opinion as to the actual presence or absence of a cardiac injury, the exact time of onset, the length of disability, and in cardiovascular injuries resulting in death it is not unusual to have different diagnoses by opposing medical experts. It

is generally conceded by physicians specializing in the field of cardi-ology that stimuli of occupational origin will in certain instances cause, hasten, or precipitate cardiac lesions. Apart from industrial origin there are many other factors that may cause the same type of cardiac injury, such as heredity, diet, body structure, tobacco, choles-terol and metabolic disorders, although, at present, there is not suffi~

cient medical research to determine what role these play in an indi-vidual patient. The task of ascertaining the cause and effect relation-ship between an industrial stimulus and a cardiac disorder or lesion is generally a factual question for the board's determination.

Ordi-7 Hartman's Case, 336 Mass. 508, 511,146 N.E.2d 509, 511 (1957).

8 Josi's Case, 324 Mass. 415,418,86 N.E.2d 641, 643 (1949).

9 Murphy's Case, 328 Mass. 301, 304,103 N.E.2d 267, 269 (1952).

§19.4 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 213

narily this finding of fact by the board is not open to review by a court unless the board's decision is lacking in evidential support.

§19.4. Postponement of hearing due to engagement of counsel. One of the most interesting workmen's compensation cases of first im-pression to come before the Supreme Judicial Court during the 1960 SURVEY year is Ackroyd's Case.1 _{This involved an appeal from the}

denial in the Superior Court of the insurer's motion to recommit a workmen's compensation proceeding to the Industrial Accident Board for an extension of the record or a new trial. The report of the single member showed that he heard the case in the absence of the insurer's designated counsel. The single member's decision in which he awarded compensation stated that the attorney for the insurer did not appear, and counsel for the claimant would not agree to a post-ponement of the case. The insurer did have an attorney present who represented the company at two conferences earlier in the morning and who sat through the proceedings, but declined to file an appear-ance and stated to the single member that he had no authority to represent the insurer in the Ackroyd matter.

Before the reviewing board, the insurer filed a motion to recommit the case to the single member to permit the insurer to present its evi-dence and for an extension of the record to show that the insurer's designated counsel was engaged in Superior Court on the morning the case was heard before the single member. The reviewing board denied the insurer's motion, principally for the reason that it was not neces-sary that a specific attorney act as trial counsel on the date in question. The decision of the reviewing board further indicated that the in-surer was extensively engaged in workmen's compensation insurance in the Commonwealth and had available a number of compensation trial attorneys. Before the Superior Court, in support of its motion to recommit the case to the board, the insurer filed affidavits of five attorneys, employed by the insurer. Two made oath that on the day in question they were actually engaged in trial. One was under medi-cal care and forbidden by his doctor to engage in a triali of cases. A Mr. Herman stated that although he was an attorney, he was employed by the insurer as a claims adjuster and that he had "not engaged in the practice of law," and had "no trial experience." Herman was in-structed by Attorney Dymsza to request a continuance fr~m the single member or have the case stand until he completed his eqgagement in Salem. When these requests were denied by the single ~ember, Her-man telephoned Dymsza at the Salem courthouse and was told by the latter that "he would hurry to Lawrence as soon as his engagement was completed." This information was relayed to the commissioner. Trial proceeded in the Ackroyd case in the absence' of Attorney Dym-sza, and the case was concluded and all left the hearing room before 12:45 P.M. The Superior Court denied the insurer's motion to

re-commit.

214

§19.4

Mr. Justice Cutter carefully pointed out in the decision that "[t]he single member, in refusing a continuance, may have. relied upon cir-cumstances which do not appear in the board's decision." 2 The

rec-ord contained evidence that the employee was a very sick man and undoubtedly the single member and the claimant's counsel were con-cerned about this circumstance. The Court went on to state: "Noth-ing in the record shows that this insurer was habitually short of avail-able trial counsel or that it had been warned, even once, to increase its staff of available trial lawyers. . .. There is no showing that the insurer had sought any prior continuance in this case." S

The Court found that the reviewing board and single member made inadequate findings concerning the refusal of a continuance. It should be noted that the Industrial Accident Board has no written rules rela-tive to engagement of counsel. The essence of Mr. Justice Cutter's statement was that without adequate findings the Court could not de-termine with reasonable certainty whether there had been an abuse of discretion. Although not specifically mentioned in the single mem-ber's decision, the congestion of the list at the Industrial Accident Board was probably one of the primary reasons for proceeding to trial on the case. It is unfortunate that an injured employee must wait for nearly one year for an adjudication as to the merits of his claim. It is equally a denial of justice to compel the insurer to wait that length of time for a formal hearing to terminate compensation payments. Many steps have been taken by the present board to alleviate this con-dition. In addition, there have been several bills filed in the General Court that, if enacted, will expedite the hearing of cases.

The granting of a continuance because of an engagement of counsel is a matter within the sound discretion of a court or an administrative board, subject to any applicable statutory provisions and court or ad-ministrative rules.4 _{The trial judge or administrator will be reversed}

only for error of law or abuse of discretion,!1 In the Festo case,6 refer-ence was made to the repeal by Acts of 1912, c. 542, of G.L., c. 173, §81,

which formerly gave greater protection than now exists to counsel actually engaged in court; it was pointed out that leaving the matter of continuances to the sound discretion of the court was "the only way in which the trial of cases can proceed in an orderly and expeditious way." The Court in Festo found it was not an abuse of discretion to refuse a continuance because the defendant's counsel was engaged in another case in the Superior Court. But a careful reading of that case indicates that the defendant was represented throughout the

2114O Mass. at 220, 1611 N.E. at 275. SIbid.

4 See. e.g .• Superior Court Rule 57A.

1\ Mowat v. DeLuca, llSO Mass. 711, 712, 116 N.E.2d 1122. 11211 (1953); Common-wealth v. Festo. 251 Mass. 275. 277-278, 146 N.E. 700, 701 (1925); Noble v. Mead-Morrison Manufacturing Co., 237 Mass. 5. 16, 129 N.E. 669, 670 (1921); Davis v. Boston Elevated Ry .• 235 Mass. 482. 496-497,126 N.E. 841, 843-844 (1920).

6251 Mass. 275,146 N.E. 700 (1925).

§19.4

trial by his original counsel, and consequently the decision in Festo should not be held controlling of the Ackroyd case, in which the facts are entirely dissimilar. The hard and fast rule indicated by the de-cision in the Festo case should probably not be extended beyond its true intent when viewed in the light of the facts revealed by the record of that case.

In general, when there is no evidence of bad faith, lack of diligence, unscrupulous tactics, prior postponements, negligence, failure to notify the trial court or other counsel seasonably of the situation, or some other fault, the appellate tribunal will generally reverse the lower court's action under its discretionary power.7 _{The usual basis for}

a reversal of the lower court is on the ground that there has been an abuse of discretion. However, the word "abuse" connotates some de-liberate dereliction. The pertinent decisions indicate that a better word would be "error" in the use of discretion. The word "abuse" connotes malice, whereas lower tribunals in these situations have been reversed without any evidence of malice being shown.

Refusal of the opportunity to have a case tried by counsel with knowledge of the case has been regarded in some circumstances as a denial of due process in a criminal prosecution.s Since time im-memorial the right of a party to have his day in court has been jeal-ously guarded. In a Texas case, it was stated that

such hardships [continuances] are frequently necessary incidents to the best system of judicial procedure and do not furnish the sole test in determining the merits, either of a motion to continue, or a motion for a new trial. . . . The right of a party to a reason-able opportunity to appear in court upon the trial of a case and present his side of the controversy is fundamental. Of course, if he is given that opportunity and through negligence or willful omission fails to take advantage of it, he cannot be heard to com-plain. But, if such failure occurs by reason of circumstances which repel any presumption of negligence and which constitute an equitable excuse for such failure, then he has not forfeited his right to his day in court.9

Necessity has given rise to the rule that a party to an action is not entitled, as a matter of absolute right, to a continuance of the cause on account of the absence of his counsel. If the rule were otherwise, a party seeking delay could, by using the absence of his counsel, com-pletely thwart the business of the courts. All jurisdictions grant to

7 Knapp v. Graham, 320 Mass. 50, 67 N.E. 2d 841 (1946); Tierney v. Coolidge, 308 Mass. 255, 32 N.E.2d 198 (1941); Thompson v. Thornton, 41 Cal. 626 (1871); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Taylor, 52 Cal. App. 307, 198 Pac. 651 (1921); Johnson v. State, I Ga. App. 729, 57 S.E. 1056 (1907); Cox v. Spears, 181 Ky. 363, 206 S.W. 20 (1918); Sussman v. Silverman, 199 N.Y. Supp. 419 (Sup. Ct. 1923); Modern Woodmen of America v. Floyd, 213 S.W. 1085 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).

8 Lindsey v. Commonwealth, 331 Mass. 1,4,116 N.E.2d 691, 692 (1954).

216 1960 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSEITS LAW §19.5

the trial court the discretion to grant or to deny a continuance that is requested because of the absence of the applicant's counsel. This discretionary power will not be reversed unless it is clearly shown that the power has been wrongly exercised to the palpable injury of the complaining party. Massachusetts subscribes to this general rule.10

In a fairly recent criminal case, the defendant requested a continuance that was refused; in reversing the action of the lower court the Supreme Judicial Court said, "A reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel, if possible, and to prepare a defence is of the very substance of due process of law." 11 Here again, the appellate tribunal felt that justice

required the reversal of the exercise of the lower court's discretion. An analogous situation was presented in another criminal case in which the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the lower court on the matter of continuance.12 _{Other jurisdictions have consistently reversed lower}

courts' refusals to grant continuances because of the engagement of counsel.13

§19.5. Benefits. During the past several years, including the 1960 SURVEY year, the benefit structure of the Workmen's Compensation Act has been extensively revised. Less than twenty-five years ago the weekly compensation to an injured employee was as little as $9 per week, whereas today it is as much as $45. At one time $1500 compen-sated an employee who lost his vision; today it is $10,000. No pay-ments were made to dependents before 1945; now each dependent of an injured employee is entitled to $6 per week.

The more important monetary benefits provided by C.L., c. 152, are as follows:

Total disability.l While the employee is totally incapacitated for work, he is entitled to two-thirds of his average weekly wage, not to exceed $45 per week.

Partial disability.2 While the incapacity for work is partial, the em-ployee is entitled to the entire difference between his average weekly wage before the injury and the average wage he is able to earn there-after, but not more than $45 per week.

Dependency payments.3 When the employee has persons conclu-sively presumed to be dependent upon him, $6 per week is added to the weekly compensation payable to the employee totally, partially, or per-manently disabled.

10 Commonwealth v. Festo, 251 Mass. 275,146 N.E. 700 (1925).

11 Jones v. Commonwealth, 331 Mass. 169, 171, 117 N.E.2d 820, 822 (1954).

12 Lindsey v. Commonwealth, 331 Mass. I, 116 N .E.2d 691 (1954).

13 See, e.g., Richardson v. Boyd, 69 Ark. 368,63 S.W. 798 (1901); Bartel v. Tierman, 55 Ind. 438 (1876); Rice v. Melendy, 36 Iowa 166 (1872); Myers v. Trice, 86 Va. 835, 11 S.E. 428 (1890).

§19.5. 1 C.L., c. 152, §34; the amount was last increased by Acts of 1959, c. 566. Citations to sections in the following notes refer to sections of C.L., c. 152, and citations to amendments refer to the last act in point of time that increased monetary benefits.

2 §35, as amended by Acts of 1959, c. 566.

3 §35A, as amended by Acts of 1959, c. 566.

§19.5

217

Permanent and total disability.4 When the employee is permanently

and totally disabled, he is entitled to two-thirds of his average weekly wage, but not more than $45 per week during the period of incapacity.

Death benefits to unmarried widow or widower.!' The unmarried

widow or widower is entitled to $30 per week as long as she or he re-mains unmarried. The total amount of payments under this section, however, may not be more than $14,000. In addition, each child of the deceased employee under the age of eighteen is entitled to $5 per week.

Specific compensation.6 _{In cases of the following specified injuries,}

in addition to all other compensation, compensation at the rate of $20 per week is payable for a prescribed number of weeks, the total dollar amount of which is indicated below:

(a) for the total loss of use of both eyes, $10,0007

(b) for the total loss of use of one eye, $40008

(c) for the permanent reduction in vision in either eye below nor-mal but not to 20/70ths, a proportional payment is now al-lowed9

(d) for the loss of hearing in both ears, $600010

(e) for the loss of hearing in one ear, $200011

(f) bodily disfigurement, up to $2500 at the discretion of the In-dustrial Accident Board12

(g) loss of bodily fmiction or senses, up to $2000 at the Board's dis-cretion13

(h) loss of right or major arm at the shoulder, $350014

(i) loss of left or minor arm at the shoulder, $300015

(j) loss of both arms at the shoulder, $800016

(k) loss of right or major hand at the wrist, $250017

(1) loss of left or minor hand at the wrist, $200018

(m) loss of both hands at the wrist, $600019

(n) loss by severance of either leg at hip, $350020 4 §34A, as amended by Acts of 1959, c. 566.

5 §32, as amended by Acts of 1959, c. 530.

6 §36. Unless otherwise indicated in notes 7·24 infra, the last amendment af-fecting compensation was made by Acts of 1953, c. 64.

7 §36(a).

8 §36(d), as amended by Acts of 1959, c. 230, to modify definition of loss of vision in one eye.

9 §36(e).

10 §36(f), as amended by Acts of 1959, c. 545.

11 36(g). 1236(h). 13 §36(i). 14'§36(j). 15 §36(k).

16 §36(t), added by Acts of 1959, c. 545, §3. 17 §36(1).

18 §36(m).

218 1960 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW

(0) loss by severance of both legs at the hip, $800021

(p) loss of either foot above the ankle, $250022

(q) loss by severance of both feet, $650023

§19.4

(r) if the member is not lost by severance, but is so injured as to be permanently incapable of use, the same amount as though it were severed24

In case of death, reasonable burial expenses, not exceeding $1000,25 are awarded.

21 §36(n), this new coverage being added by Acts of 1959, c. 545.

22 §36(O).

23 §36(o), this new coverage being added by Acts of 1959, c. 545.

24 §36(q).

25 §33, as amended by Acts of 1960, c. 246, increasing the basic amount from $500.