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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. Nr.20, June 2013

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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. Nr.20, June 2013

Volume 21: September 2013

Academic year 2013-2014

Editor in Chief

Rodrigo Vaz

Catholic University of Portugal

Portugal

Editorial Board

Caitlin Bagby, USA

King’s College, London, United Kingdom

Péter Király, Hungary

Central European University, Budapest, Hungary

Andrijana Nikic, Montenegro

University of Montenegro, Montenegro

Reint-Jan Groot Nuelend, The Netherlands

University of Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

Vit Simral, Czech Republic

IMT, Lucca, Italy / Charles University, Prague / Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic

Advisory Board

Manuel Garreton, Chile,

João Carlos Espada, Portugal,

Carole Pateman, England,

Leonardo Morlino, Italy,

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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. Nr.20, June 2013

Content

Editorial Message…...……….4

Rodrigo Vaz

When nationalism meets electoral schemes: the intricate situation of the

Aromanian minority from Romania………5

Sergiu Delcea

American policy on the Balkans: Sucessful story or a diplomatic

failure?.………...12

Frosina Doninovska

 

Rentier state as an obstacle to development in the Middle East……….20

Andrzej Guzowski

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Politikon:IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 21, September 2013  

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Editorial  Message  

 

Dear Reader,

Let me start by welcoming you to yet another issue of POLITIKON. In this issue we publish the papers selected from the submissions we received to our call for papers.

Very soon, in November, we will celebrate the first anniversary of the re-publishing of POLITIKON, which undoubtedly fills all IAPSS members with joy, particularly the ones directly contributing to the success of the journal. November also promises to be a celebrating moment to IAPSS as in this month our organization turns 15 years old. This marking moment will be integrant part of the program of our upcoming Academic Conference and General Assembly in Bucharest, Romania, from the 19th to the 24th of November. More information on the Conference Website. Feel very much invited to join us!

I am also very happy to inform you that observing the challenges that Political Science students and young scholars may face while submitting an article, the Editorial Board is currently working in the preparation of some guidelines on how and what to submit – and how and what not. Those guidelines will be published soon in the POLITIKON page of IAPSS website. Together with, the call for papers for the next issue will also be issued.

For now, I will leave you with the selected articles. Should you have any questions, please feel free to contact me directly at academic@iapss.org.

Enjoy!

Best wishes,

Rodrigo Vaz

POLITIKON, Editor in Chief

Head of Academic Department

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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 21, September 2013

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When  nationalism  meets  electoral  schemes:  the  intricate  situation  of  

the  Aromanian  minority  from  Romania  

 

Sergiu DELCEA1, Central European University, Budapest

Abstract

he resurgence of ethno-centered, exclusionary types of nationalisms in Eastern Europe after the fall of the communist regimes in 1989 represents a multi-layered phenomenon with complex ramifications. The aim of this paper is to delve into an extremely complicated case surrounding a very peculiar minority - the Aromanians living in Romania. This analysis aims to show that although Romania's approach to minority representation is a non-essentialist one on paper, the reserved seat system is sometimes still laced with nationalistic overtones. As a minority with a highly debated historical legacy, the Aromanians lack legal recognition and are subjected to an assimilation process that is not always as soft as it might seem. If Romania is to continue its already protracted democratic transition solving the puzzle surrounding the Aromanians seems to be a key stepping stone.

1 Sergiu Delcea is a second year MA student in the Nationalism Studies Programme, Central European University, Budapest, with a previous background in Political Science (graduated BA studies in 2012) from the University of Bucharest. He is currently a member of the editorial board for the IAPSS blog A Different View, where he is exploring his current research interests that revolve around linking nation-building processes and welfare-regime construction (with a focus on Eastern Europe).

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Sergiu DELCEA When nationalism meets electoral schemes

46 espite a rather tumultuous start in

the early 90s Romania has been slowly improving its institutional approach to minority protection (Bernd Rechel(ed), 2009: Ch. 13 M. Ram), owing in no small part to its growing international commitments. However, there are still rather blurry lines when it comes to defining who gets to be declared a minority and gain political representation. Furthermore, language rights packages represent a very contentious issue that are generally transcribed into public debate as threats to national integrity (as they are generally show-cased around the Hungarian minority). What seems to emerge is a rather fuzzy picture, that leaves room for potentially problematic case around minorities with very intricate backgrounds.

This paper will provide a case-study of a rather small minority that stands at a crossroads between multiple discourses and competing claims: the Aromanians2 living in Romania. There is an interesting paradox at play surrounding the recognition of this minority3: recognized as a cultural minority by the Council of Europe in 1997 (which Romania has ratified in 2007), the Aromanians are subject to a soft assimilation process via an indigenization discourse, without being recognized as a minority of any sort by the Romanian state. Despite having sued the Romanian state as early as 2005, grass-roots organizations (mostly uniting around CAR - Council of Aromanians from Romania4) have failed to

2 Methodologically, throughout this paper I

have used "Aromanians" as an umbrella term. However, it must be clearly stated that a wide body of literature shows a very high degree of cultural and linguistic

fragmentation within this community 3 According to Romanian sources about

26.000 individuals in 2006

4 Throughout this paper I will mostly use

CAR as a reference point as it is not only the most vocal grass-roots organization, but also well-connected in an international network of Aromanian bodies.

secure any kind of legal recognition for the Aromanians.

The contentious stake here is that vocal Aromanian grass-roots organizations are striving for recognition as a "national minority" (Kymlicka&Opalski,2001:13-107) arguing that under the blurry Romanian legislation only this legal status will ensure cultural and linguistic protection (which is the aim of Romania's minority legislation projects5). Romania's monolithic approach is grounded in a historicist discourse claiming that the Aromanians are an integral part of an organically defined nation hence making their claim illegitimate for a number of reasons: Parliamentary representation is done through the regular channels (since they are equated to the bulk of the nation), language rights are not necessary since Aromanian is a dialect of Romanian and for the groups of Aromanians that are claiming descent from other nations representation is done indirectly via minority representations of those respective states. In addition, the Romanian politicians' second core argument is that since mass migration towards Romania in the interwar era was voluntary, the second/third/fourth generation Aromanians today cannot claim national minority status.

My main argument is that the Aromanian minority stands at a very dangerous crossroads between a circular legislation that aims to preserve the status quo of reserved seats system and the political value of nationalist rhetoric. Despite creating an over-representation of minorities (with the exception of the Roma, see Protsyk&Matichescu, 2010), the Romanian electoral system disenfranchises minorities from pursuing own agendas. On the other side of the spectrum, although Romania's stance towards minorities is in not an

5

http://www.dri.gov.ro/documents/lege_mi noritati_forma_finala_guvern.pdf Last Accessed: 3rd April 2013 - Art 3-5 enshrined that any individual has the right to self-identification, and the state-mandated protection of identity

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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 21, September 2013

47 essentializing one, there is a very blurry

legislation as to which groups gets to be a minority and enter into either direct electoral competition or the reserved seats system. Although in post-socialist Romania, nationalist rhetoric is not an outward force in electoral competitions, it still seems to be at least a latent hot potato: the 1999 history textbook scandal that lead ultimately to the fall of the Government on grounds of "Anti-Romanian feelings" (TRENCSENYI&

PETRESCU& KANTOR

IORDACHI&Petrescu,2001:Part 1, Ch. Razvan Paraianu) seems to point to an extremely complicated picture. In this equation the Aromanians seem to be torn between multiple stances: accepting assimilation and identifying with the Romanian nation, or pushing forward an agenda of recognition as a minority of some sort.

Competing stances - Are Aromanians in Romania nationals or minority? More importantly, whose nationals and/or minority?

Broadly speaking, there are two individual threads to be pursued here: the direct consequences of the electoral system itself and the impact of the nationalist-oriented rhetoric on an already circular legislation6. What stands out is that in the case of the Aromanians both seem interwoven in a very distinct fashion: essentialization not directly via state-definition of minorities, but by excluding Aromanians as a separate ethnic category in the census, and putting them under the

over-arching category of

"Romanians"(Tircomnicoiu,2011). This creates a very blurry classification that the Aromanians are a kind of a minority of the "homeland itself" due to particular historical contexts, a narrative that could adequately be labeled as a paradox between free choice of

6 As of 2008, minorities that have a reserved seat are those represented in the National Council for Minorities. However, the minorities that are represented in this body are those who get Parliamentary representation in the elections!

identity and the objective requirements for considering the group as completely distinctive (K. Henrard (ed),2013-forthcoming: ch. by Andras Pap).

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Sergiu DELCEA When nationalism meets electoral schemes

48 The state's secondary core argument

revolves around the fact that voluntary migration makes it illegitimate to request minority status. Although not framed as a nationalistic type of argument, this narrative points to a clear direction: while first/second generation immigrants might be acceptable as non-integrated, third/fourth generation ones, particularly those with a loose common descent, are forcefully assimilated. There are two important issues though at play within this secondary argument: firstly, the very nationalistic argument that common Latin descent, which implies a perceived facilitation towards assimilation, is taken to mean automatic desire for assimilation; secondly, in the case of the Hungarian minority non-integration is tolerated because this particular group has concrete political value as a show-case example for Romanian towards fulfilling its policy goals towards the EU and other international bodies. This type of argument, backed up by the historicist discourse of the Romanian Academy, seems to have gotten some firm ground with grass-roots Aromanian organizations that espouse the following view: if the Aromanians are a minority in their Romanian "home-land", hence non-assimilated, they would become "wanderers", which is normatively inconceivable!7 This line of thought clearly reveals the nationalistic rhetoric: nationhood and national affiliation taken as salient is the only normatively desirable legal existence. The striking paradox at play here is that this indigenization discourse revolves around the Aromanians as part of the ancestral core of the nation, which would, at least a theoretical level, make them somewhat suitable for indigenous people status! However, as they were not settled on the territory of Romania that line of thinking seems to be completely futile and not at all pursued not even by the most radical grass-roots organizations.

Moving on, I will now briefly outline some of the legal and political consequences

7 Declaration of Aromanian NGO,

http://www.scribd.com/doc/49694825/Problema-aromanilor, Last Accessed: 23rd April 2013

of this approach to the Aromanian minority, in the context of Romanian electoral legislation. Although the Romanian electoral system was not enshrined as an essentialist

one with regards to minorities

(King&Marian, 2012), the Aromanians were simply taken as an integral part of the Romanian Kulturnation, a view that was not challenged by any competing organizations. This approach seemed to have some sort of popular legitimacy within the Aromanian community itself, as one of the few existing large-scale surveys point towards a strong majority that self-identified with the Romanian nation (Kahl, 2006). However, some consideration must be given to the broader issue of self-identification in the particular case of the Aromanians. Although the legislation enshrines a purely individualistic approach to ethnic affiliation, Aromanian organizations that could provide sufficient data in order to register a minority party are faced with a daunting challenge: legally, they can only be ethnic-Romanian minorities. If an individual declares himself to be Aromanian, the census counts him/her automatically as a Romanian, making it impossible to claim Aromanian-Macedonian or Aromanian-Greek descent. This legal reality translates not as an essentialist approach to minority definition, but creates a salience of Romanian nationhood: by the proxy of common Latin descent, Aromanian identification cannot exist in the framework of any other national identity (taken also as salient), than the Romanian one.

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49 logically is that such a grass-roots

organization is stuck between Scylla and Charybdis: registration as an Aromanian representative body means going into main-stream electoral competition, registration as a minority unit within existing recognized ethnic groups is technically impossible, or would imply the fragmentation of the NGO/Party itself into small factions molded on some intra-minority ethnic boundaries. There is one more contentious point to be noted here about the Romanian electoral system: it seems to rest on the

assumption that minorities are

homogeneous and will always be represented by one political group (King&Marian, 2012:568). This mechanism transfers electoral thresholds on a proportional basis within minority groups creating the perverse effect that in the case of sharp intra-minority competition representation might be completely lost (King&Marian, 2012:565-570). Consequently, the aforementioned fragmentation of a hypothetical Aromanian NGO/Party in small-scale ethnic units would not gain much ground with minority constituencies that would fear losing representation at all. To further complicate the problem, national minorities such as the Greek one might not even recognize the existence of an internal Aromanian community, as this identity does not legally exist at all in Greece!

This legal reality greatly hinders the Aromanian cause as the state has the straight-forward argument of indirect representation. What CAR and other organizations are striving for is recognition of the Aromanians as a "minority of a Balkan regional people"8, by arguing that migration towards Romania was done more on economic grounds, rather than some nationalist ethos. It is exactly here that the Romanian arguments blend become very blurry: although acknowledging that the Aromanians are clearly distinct from the Balkan nationalities, they are not granted any special status, but rather forcefully assimilated into Romanian main-stream

8

http://www.scribd.com/doc/49694825/Problema-aromanilor, Last Accessed: 23rd April 2013

electoral legislation. One interesting parallel can be drawn that shows the very specific nature of the Aromanian case: when the Tartar minority representatives separated from the Turkish ones in the early 90s, they were granted reserved seats. Outwardly, the Tartars seem to be in a comparable position: a regional identity without a kin-state, but a clearly delineated language, inhabiting a plurality of states with existing minority representation in Romania (such as Russia and Ukraine). However, this group was acknowledged as being different from the Russian minority and granted its own channels of representation. This points clearly towards the direction that in the case of the Aromanians there are more important factors outside the voting system itself (for in-depth analysis Reynolds, 2006) - i.e. some sort of assimilation.

Last but not least, some attention must be given to the issue of political entrepreneurship. King and Marian argue that one of the key perverse effects of the Romanian minority representation legislation is that it allows great maneuvering room for crafty, well-connected politicians aiming to secure a comfortable seat in Parliament

(King&Marian, 575). Although

acknowledging the validity of this argument, in the case of the Aromanians I argue that it holds no bearing: the singular case of the PD-L member Costica Canacheu (which has proven Aromanian descent!) does not make CAR's case an instance of political entrepreneurship. For instance, the documented case of George Becali who did

indeed pursue minority-politics

(King&Marian, 2012:581), but via the Italian minority rather than the Aromanian minority (which he proudly claims descent from) inside which he would probably have enjoyed even more popularity and gained more support, clearly indicates that CAR is not pursuing some entrepreneurial agenda. Furthermore, since the Romanian law permits any citizen to cast a vote for any political organization, if CAR were indeed

just an instance of

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Sergiu DELCEA When nationalism meets electoral schemes

50 personalities gain representation through the

main-stream national channels. However, such a project seems to be completely absent from the agenda of Aromanian grass-roots organizations.

Conclusions

The situation of the Aromanian minority in Romania seems to be at a crossroads between a plethora of issues: internal division of the community itself, nationalist rhetoric pervading Romanian politics, unclear scientific conclusions on the history of the minority and unclear places within other minorities. Competing stances towards this minority seem to be the common denominator, prompting various legal statuses throughout the plethora of states the Aromanians inhabit: forceful assimilation in Greece hence barred identity, soft assimilation in Romania, partial recognition in Albania, national minority status in FYROM and so on.

Despite the fact that the Council of Europe recognized the Aromanians as a cultural and linguistic minority, the vagueness of this document with regards to defining "national minorities" put this particular group in a problematic position. In the case of Romania there seem to be two intertwining arguments: a nationalistic argument, grounded in a historicist discourse, claiming assimilation into the Romanian nation, which has been legally enshrined in the census by denying the possibility of self-affiliation to alternative groups such as Macedonian-Aromanian,

Albanian-Aromanian etc. Although

boundaries of the minority are not directly drawn by the abusers themselves in the case of Romania, the Aromanians seem to have less of a freedom of choice when it comes to self-ascribed identity (K. Henrard (ed), 2013-forthcoming: ch. by Andras Pap). This case seems to be less a direct consequence of the electoral system, as is the case of some small-scale Hungarian organizations, but more linked with a soft assimilation process made by a particular way of conceptualizing the census. When it comes to an in-between

recognition such as cultural-linguistic minority, the Romanian state's argument seems even more fraught with nationalism - the Aromanian dialects are purportedly systematized under the templates used for the Romanian language hence cannot be granted distinct rights. The common Latin descent seems to be a catch-phrase used to legitimized almost every kind of discrimination.

All things considered, breaking out of this intricate equation seems a daunting challenge for Aromanian grass-roots organizations. Political lobby seems to be insufficient, and needs to be joined with a growing body of scholarly studies in order to stand any chance of success.

Short personal description

Sergiu Delcea is a second year MA student in the Nationalism Studies Programme, Central European University, Budapest, with a previous background in Political Science (graduated BA studies in 2012) from the University of Bucharest. He is currently a member of the editorial board for the IAPSS blog A Different View, where he is exploring his current research interests that revolve around linking

nation-building processes and welfare-regime

construction (with a focus on Eastern Europe).

Bibliography

Djuvara, N. (ed.) (2012), Aromanii.

Istorie. Limba. Destin [The

Aromanians. History. Language. Destiny. - own translation], Humanitas: Bucharest

o M. Caragiu-Marioteanu, Un dodecalog al aromanilor [A 12-point Decalogue of the

Aromanians - own

translation],

o Max Demeter Peyfuss, Aromanii in era nationalismelor balcanice [The Aromanians in the age of Balkan nationalisms - own translation]

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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 21, September 2013

51 history of an identity building, published

in Transylvanian Review, Vol. 20

Kahl, T. (2006)Istoria Aromanilor [History of the Aromanians - own translation], Edit. Tritonic: Bucharest • King, R., Marian, C. (2012)

Minority Representation and Reserved Legislative Seats in Romania, published in East European Politics, Vol. 36, No. 3,

Kymlicka, W., Opalski, M (eds) (2001), Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Oxford University Press: Oxford

K. Henrard (ed.),(2013, forthcoming, Brill), in use the chapter by Pap, A.,Murphy's Law on free choice of identity? Legal and Political difficulties in defining minority communities and membership boundaries

TRENCSENYI, B., PETRESCU,

D. , PETRESCU, C.,

IORDACHI, C. , KANTOR, Z. (2001)Nation-Building and Contested Identities: Romanian and Hungarian Case Studies, Regio Books, Budapest), in use the chapter by Paraianu, R. , National Prejudices, Mass Media and History Textbooks: The Mitu ControversyProtsyk, O., Matichescu, M. L.

(2010)Electoral rules and minority representation in Romania, published in Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 43, Issue 1,

Rechel, B. (2009) Minority Rights in Central and Eastern Europe.

Routledge:London, chapter in use Ram, M. Romania. From laggard to leader?

Reynolds, A. (2006)Electoral systems and the protection and participation of minorities, Minority Rights Group International available online

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American  policy  on  the  Balkans:  Successful  story  or  a  diplomatic  

failure?  

 

Frosina DONINOVSKA1, National Democratic Institute, Skopje

Abstract

he United States of America is a country which left a significant mark and still has a strong influence on the world political scene and the changes in the international relations especially in building the strategy of worldwide foreign policy.

The paper will try to give an overview of the events that marked the 1990’s of the last century, with an accent on the breakup of Yugoslavia and the role of U.S. foreign policy in this period. The paper will especially focus on the process of the dissolution of Yugoslavia as well as the role of the United States in the Dayton Agreement and the ways of implementing the peace through the assets of diplomacy.

Dayton differed from the traditional methods of negotiation in a way that included the U.S. leadership and its implementation depended on the will of the international community, especially the United States who led the efforts.

1Frosina Doninovska, 25 is a graduate who received her Bachelor degree in Political Science at

the University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius in 2010. In 2013 she obtained her MA degree in Diplomacy and International Relations at the faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus at the department od International relations. At the moment she works at the office of the National Democratic Institute office in Skopje, Republic of Macedonia as a program assistant in the field of elections. Her interests include rule of law, integrity of the electoral and political process, democratic governance, citizen participation, etc.

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he end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a new chapter in the world politics that the previous stable and predictable system of international relations replaced by a insecure international framework which was characterized by fragmentation in the international relations and the emergence of strong nationalist tendencies within the states. The end of the Cold War was manifested through certain events that prevailed on the international political scene at that time. The defeat of Communism, manifested by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union imposed the need for redefining the relations on a global level.

The United States from the Second World War emerged as one of the strongest countries. Characteristic of the United States in the period after the Second World War was the opposition of the relations with the Soviet Union, a period known as the Cold War.

In the years that followed the Second World War, the US foreign policy relied on the power of the nuclear weapon. The nuclear weapon was a helpful way to ensure that the Western Europe will rely on the United States as a guarantee of their own security rather than looking for external adjustment with the the Soviet Union (Office of the Historian. US Department of State).

The beginning of the Cold War was an expression of the failure to implement the principles agreed on the conferences in Yalta and Potsdam (Scott 2007). Soon, The United States started again to confront with the Soviet Union militarily, economically and politically.

After the Cold War, the United States enjoyed a degree of world hegemony. The French often critically disposed towards the United States, invented a new word -

superpower, to describe the American status without precedent (Safire 2003).

Within a short period in the early 90 - es, peace and world order seemed achievable. The end of the Cold War and the sudden defeat of the Soviet Union eliminated the major reasons for national tensions and reduce the threat of nuclear disaster. President George Bush proclaimed a new world order led by the United States. Fukuyama welcomed the "end of history", the absolute triumph of capitalism and democracy over fascism and communism ( Fukuyama 1992). Despite all these event, from today's perspective, it is important to note that the end of the Cold War caused an explosion of ethnic regional conflicts in the South Eastern Europe.

At the end of World War II, Yugoslavia emerged as it was conceived in Jajce. By 1948 Yugoslavia was the best student of the Soviet Union (Dokmanovic 2005). However, during the time the relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR were deteriorated as a result of the desire of the USSR to dominate with the communist countries by underestimating them economically (Dedier 1953). It is important to note that Stalin systematically and cold prepared the subordination of Yugoslavia, as the central point in South Eastern Europe. He profusely used the fact that Yugoslavia was under threat from the other great powers in the early years of the war and USSR were trying to complicate those relations in order Yugoslavia to become their prey (Dedier 1953). These were the immediate causes of conflict between these two countries.

The interests of the United States in the Balkans

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During the Cold War, the American - Yugoslav relations were defined within the broader context of relations East - West. The United States supported Yugoslavia in its independent course since decided to go to the way of self-governing socialism, separated from the USSR with the Resolution from the Inform bureau in 1948. Relations between Yugoslavia and the United States basically remained good over the years due to the fact that the United States respected Tito in order to prevent any association of Yugoslavia to the Soviet Union. In other words, the United States needed an ally in the region in order to prevent penetration of the USSR to the heart of Europe.

Nationalism as a destiny of the Yugoslav Peoples

Besides the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States faced new problems in the region of South Eastern Europe, especially in the Balkans (Cox; Stokes 2008). With the end of the Cold War, the ethnic hatreds reached the boiling point and the state began to fall apart. Among the other factors, the disintegration of Yugoslavia was caused primarily by nationalist tensions among the two biggest nations, Serbian and Croatian. Serbian nationalism was embodied through Milosevic's efforts to create a Greater Serbia, and the thesis of supporters of Milosevic that they were the last line of defense and rescue of Yugoslavia as an equal union of all Yugoslav nations in which the Serbian people should get an equal position. The Croatian nationalism unlike Serbian was dedicated to the creation of a new independent state that was largely distinct from those of the other Yugoslav peoples. The supporters of Tudjman developed discourse in which Croatian nationalism constituted contrary to the others, especially

against the Serbs / Yugoslavs, which hampered the real development of the Croatian people. The Croats communist system interpreted as something that is imposed from the outside - by Serbia in this particular case, not by the Soviet Union.

The Dissolution of Yugoslavia and the administration of the President George Bush

George Bush was the 41th President of the United States. The function President he performed from 1989 to 1993, when inherited Ronald Reagan. The period in which the president George Bush led the United States signifies quite turbulent chapter in the world history. Precisely in his time, major changes have occurred on the international political arena. In these years, the world was facing with the collapse of the Soviet Union, which in some way signified the end of the policy of balance between the two superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union.

George Bush took the office in a time when the Soviet Union was disintegrating and when Moscow was looking for a new framework of understanding with the West. The question is: "What was the position of the United States in the new world order?" Given the fact that the future of the Soviet Union was clear, even clearer was the role of the United States in the new world order. After the Cold War the United States were the most powerful country on the world’s political scene militarily as well as economically and politically.

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Frosina DONINOVSKA American policy on the Balkans

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to this, the Bush administration was engaged in war with Iraq known as the Gulf War. The administration of the President George Bush supported the promotion of democratic - liberal values around the world, especially in the countries that emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and the new states in Eastern and Central Europe. Perhaps the greatest triumph of the Bush administration aimed at spreading democracy worldwide, was the moment of spreading democracy in Latin America, especially with the election of Violeta Chamorro as president of Nicaragua, which marked the end of the eleven years of governance of the regime of Sandinista. The winter 1990 -1991, the Bush administration was concerned about the resistance to changes in the Soviet Union. The situation became especially alarming when Eduard Shevardnadze resigned from the position of Foreign Affairs Minister, accusing Gorbachev that he was moving too much to the right and its approach to the right could result in reforming the Communist Party, or worse with preparing a military coup. In such a situation, Washington had to recognize that its impact on Moscow was limited, given the fact that certain events on the domestic political scene in the USSR, might have a negative outcome for U.S. policy in the region. Perhaps the biggest failure of the Bush administration was the failure to comply with the European Union on the issue of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, since they were engaged with the events in the Middle East, or the development of the situation that culminated with the attack of United States on Iraq as a result of the Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Where the American interests were threatened, the ultimate asset of diplomacy was used. Thus, the United States used force to deal with the problems that emerged in

the Middle East. Through the launch of "Operation Desert Storm", U.S. foreign policy was focused on events related to the Gulf War ( (Office of the Historian. US Department of State).

The Relations Between the United States and Yugoslavia during the dissolution

This section will cover the views of U.S. diplomats and officials about the question of dissolution of Yugoslavia.

During the whole period since the start of the crisis until the final outcome, the position of the United States regarding the question of dissolution was unchanging. The United States advocated for united Yugoslavia.

Since the start of fueling the crisis, the United States condemned the use of force as a tool for achieving political goals and undermining the democratic process of peaceful dialogue.

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imagined. Zimmerman said that democracy and unity were inseparable principles upon which the American foreign policy toward Yugoslavia was based (Zimmerman 1999). One of the most important events in this period was the visit to Yugoslavia of the Secretary of State James Baker. James Baker visited Belgrade on 21 June 1991. The visit was aimed to confirm the position of the United States in order to support the united and democratic Yugoslavia. According to him, this should be achieved through dialogue, without violence and bloodshed. Baker believed that opportunities for dialogue aimed at resolving the crisis have not been exhausted yet. In other words the republics still could agree on a peaceful resolution of the crisis.

Dissolution of Yugoslavia

In 1991, Yugoslavia amid fierce ethnic fighting faced with the collapse of the long-standing common state. The conditions for collapse of the political regime of "self-governing socialism" and the conditions for failure of his model "real socialism", among other factors, should be sought in the immanent weakness of this regime, which among other things also belonged: institutionalized political monopoly of the Communist Party (SKJ), permanent inferiority of the "self-governing social economy" compared to the market economy in terms of meeting the material needs of members of society, the growing deficit, as well as the legitimacy of the regime ( Goati 1996).

The dissolution of Yugoslavia was the final outcome of the open hostilities between the member states of the Yugoslav federation. What all feared, yet there was to happen. In less than four years the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed as a result of the three year exhaustive war on the territory of

Bosnia and Herzegovina with which two entities were established: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.

Several years after the Dayton agreement, Kosovo was the flash point of a new conflict. The situation once again required a long standing political, financial and even military assistance from the Western countries. The reason for such set of circumstances, inevitably leads to the question about the quality of the policy of the Western countries in this region (Meier 1999).

Dayton

In the period between 1991-1995, Bosnia represented the chaos that many feared after the Cold War. After the breakup of Yugoslavia in Bosnia as ethnic composed state the violence reached a shocking degree of brutality. Thousands of people, mainly Muslims were kidnapped from their homes to be subjected to violence and terror. Influential at that time was the comment of Robert Kaplan who noted that: "Such bloodshed can only be explained as the release of old ethnic hatreds between Serbs, Muslims and Croats that Cold War pushed in the shadow“ (Kaplan 1993).

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Frosina DONINOVSKA American policy on the Balkans

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intervention. Others, including Christopher, wondered whether it is worth their effort and believed that the United States only retained the problems rather than solving them.

In the summer 1995, the number of victims in Bosnia reached 300,000 and more than a million people have fled. As the conflict took a larger scale, Islamic extremists from the Middle East arrived in Bosnia in order to help the endangered Muslim population (Chollet 2005).

In July 1995, Serb forces flooded the small town of Srebrenica and thousands of Muslim men and boys were massacred. This genocide was one of the greatest horrors in the history since the Second World War. This situation has strengthened the position of America towards intervention.

Clinton's new policy was aimed at implementing the strategy of NATO airstrike over Bosnian Serbs if they continue to attack the Croatian and Muslim population. In this way, the UN officials had first to identify the targets before any air attack. The bombing by NATO coincided with sending new diplomatic support in order to conclude a peace treaty. A key figure in this diplomatic support was Richard Holbrooke, tireless negotiator who understood the connection between military force and diplomacy. In November 1995, a delegation of Holbrooke managed to bring the warring parties to negotiate in Dayton, Ohio. Twenty-one day the representatives of the international community and the representatives of the warring sides in Bosnia, negotiated to reach an agreement in order to stop the war. At the end of 1995, sixty thousands NATO troops, including twenty thousands Americans were present on the territory of Bosnia in order to begin the process of implementation of the agreement (Warren 1998).

Dayton and the future of the Balkans

The Dayton Agreement introduced a different way of resolving violent conflicts. In the past, the success or failure of peace negotiations depended on whether a conflict was ready for resolving. The maturity of the negotiation process depended on a number of factors including the common perception of the parties that an agreement through bargaining is desirable. (Haass 1990). Dayton differed from the traditional methods of negotiation in a way that included the U.S. leadership as well as pushing the opposing sides to negotiate. This approach not only had a profound impact on the stability of the agreement that was reached, but the implementation depended on the will of the international community, especially the United States who led the efforts (Daalder 2000).

Conclusion

The fact that in Yugoslavia there was an opportunity for a different political outcome is an indisputable. Only if the political elites took a different position in terms of the common good, not in order to satisfy their own appetites and desires the chaos could be prevented. Until the outbreak of the civil war in Slovenia in June 1991, the position of the international community was to preserve Yugoslavia. After the outbreak of the war, the process of disintegration of Yugoslavia became inevitable, and the international community played a less important role than internal factors.

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Unfortunately, the administration of the President George Bush did not deal with the problem. Moreover, this condition was inherited by the next President of the United States Wiliam Jefferson Clinton.

The fact that the administration of the President Clinton used force aimed at ending the war in former Yugoslavia, raises the question of the quality of the American foreign policy in the Balkans and the fact that if they reacted on time, the disaster might be prevented. Transferring the responsibility from one to another, the European Union and the United States failed to deal with the problem in the former Yugoslavia respectively.

This entails another question: If we make a comparison between the approach of the Bush administration and that of Bill Clinton, we can not say which of them was successful. We can not claim that the approach of the Bush administration was wrong, nor to claim that Clinton was successful only because he put an end to the war in Yugoslavia. The approach of the administration of the President Clinton aimed at using force to deal with the situation caused by the civil war, is marked as a failure of this administration, and thus for the President himself. The fact that the United States used military force to achieve results is a clear indication of the inconsistency of the foreign policy of the United States in the region, if you take into account the commitments of the United States for a peaceful resolving of the Yugoslav crisis.

The success of the U.S. administration in Dayton had a great influence on the American foreign policy. Three areas were particularly emphasized: First, the way in which the Dayton Agreement was reached retreated primary responsibility of United States for the future of Bosnia. As a result of this the United States were engaged in

Bosnia and in the next few years that followed the Dayton Agreement, American soldiers were present on a Bosnian soil. The only question was: Why would United States accept engagement for such period of time? The answer would be: to ensure that violence will not be repeated, and in order to build a multiethnic, democratic and prosperous Bosnia. Second, the U.S. policy toward Bosnia in 1995 had a major impact on how the Clinton administration and others saw the connection between the diplomacy and the power. Finally, the war in Bosnia has proved essential for the return of the United States foreign policy towards Europe on the right track. Within a few years after Dayton, the vision of Clinton for Europe is that of a undivided, peaceful, democratic was on the right direction to become a reality.

The crisis in Bosnia was of great importance for the United States because they helped to continue the process of integration into NATO, a policy that continued into the next administration. Providing security, NATO has given support through the necessary reforms that have been allowed to enter the Warsaw Pact countries into NATO. The policy of expanding NATO, promoted by Clinton, was a significant factor in creating a peaceful, undivided and democratic world. The end of the war in Bosnia represented a turning point for the American foreign policy. The experience with the war in Bosnia had an impact long after the finishing of the war. This experience has shown that America used military force to achieve results.

References

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52

http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/Atomic (accessed December 8, 2012).

Scott, Leon. International History 1945 – 1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Safire, William. “On Language”. New York Times Magazine, 2003.

Fukuyama, Francis. The end of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press, 1992.

Dokmanovic, Miso. Independence of the Republic of Macedonia. Skopje: Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus, 2005.

Dedier, Vladimir. Josip Broz Tito. Skopje: Misla, 1953.

Cox, Michael and Stokes, Douglas. US Foreign Policy in the Post- Cold War Era

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Smith, Tony. America’s Mission: The United States and the World Wide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Office of the Historian. “1990 – 2000: The Post Cold War Era”. Office of the Historian –

Milestones. May 21, 2002.

http://history.state.gov/milestones/1990-2000. (Accessed: December 24, 2012)

Goati, Vladimir. “Politicke Elite, Gradjanski Rat I Raspad SFRJ”. Republika, 1996: 2-5.

Meier, Victor. Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise. London: Routledge, 1999.

Robert, Kaplan D. Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Trough History. New York: Vintage Books, 1993.

Chollet, Derek. The Road to the Dayton Accords: A Study of American Statecraft New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2005.

Warren, Christopher. In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era. Bringing Peace to Bosnia. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998.

Haass, Richard N. Conflicts unending: The United States and Regional Disputes. New Heaven:Yale University Press, 1990.

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Rentier  state  as  an  obstacle  to  development  in  the  Middle  East  

 

Andrzej GUZOWSKI, University of Warsaw

Abstract

any Middle Eastern countries, especially the ones in Arabian Peninsula, are well-known for being rich with oil and gas. While it could be considered a blessing by many, it is becoming more and more apparent that the abundance of natural resources in the region is a double-edged sword and a form of a natural resource trap. Many countries have become so-called “rentier states”, funding their operations and their very structures by renting their resources to external actors. While it may seem like a profitable political move at first, said overreliance conserved the structure of economies in the Middle Eastern, never forcing the countries to develop effectively, thus making most of the produced goods, other than oil and gas, uncompetitive on the international market. Long term, it may prove disastrous for the Middle East as eventually the resources are going to get exhausted and said countries will be left with nothing but an economic structure unadjusted to the 21st century.

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il has long been called “the black gold”. Along with natural gas it has been one of the most important energy sources in the world in the last decades and has served as a necessary tool to economic growth in many countries. With the oil prices having long been on the rise, it might seem like the abundance of oil (and, to a lesser extent, gas) should be considered a blessing. Countries rich with these natural resources have the opportunity to sell them to external actors and fund their own development from the profits. While this might seem like a perfect scenario without any downsides, the reality proves that this is not always the case. This paper aims to present how natural resources in some Middle Eastern countries might actually be a trap and how in long term they might actually pose a serious threat to their economic growth and stability.

What is a “rentier state”?

The theory of the “rentier state” was first presented by Hossein Mahdavy, an economist, in a 1970 article “The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: the Case of Iran”. Therein, taking Iran as a model, he identifies rentier states as “those countries that receive on regular basis substantial mounts of external rent … [which can be defined as] rentals paid by foreign individuals, concerns or governments to individuals, concerns and governments of a given country”1. It is

obvious that in the case of Middle Eastern countries most rents come from oil sales. Later in the article the economist argues that the period 1950-1956 constitutes a turning point in the economic history of the Middle East – during that period the political changes enabled the governments of many countries in the region to capture a larger share of the rents which previously accrued to the oil companies. With such

1 H. Mahdavy, The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: the Case of Iran, [in:] Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, M. A. Cook (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford 1970, p. 428.

contribution, the governments could embark on large-scale public expenditure programmes without the need to tax their own people; they also would not suffer from imbalance of payments or high inflation2.

The rentier state theory was later expanded upon by many other analysts and scholars, including Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani3. It must be noted that former

created a definition of a rentier state that is more precise than Mahdavy`s and as such it will be applied to this paper. Beblawi argues that 4 characteristics are required for a country to be called “a rentier state”: rent situations predominate the economy; the economy relies on substantial external rent; only a small percentage of the population is involved in the generation of the rent; the government is the principal recipient of the external rent4. Although many points of the

rentier state theory are still being debated to this day, most of the theorists seem to agree that the rentier state (or “rentier economy” as some prefer) poses several risks. Firstly, the citizens of such countries are virtually dependant on the government and the public structures as they hold all the keys to prosperity. This in turn creates proper conditions for the rise and preservation of authoritarianism. Secondly, the reliance on external rents does not force the countries to undergo significant economic changes and industrialization. This lack of innovation and initiative may cause trouble for future generations.

Oil, gas and state in contemporary Middle East

Over 40 years after the rentier state theory was first presented, it still holds a great significance for the Middle East and its people. The region remains home to some

2 Ibidem, p. 431-432.

3 See: The Rentier State: Nation, State and the

Integration of the Arab World, H. Beblawi, G. Luciani (eds), Croom Holm, London 1987.

4 H. Beblawi, The Rentier State in the Arab World,

[in:] The Arab State, G. Luciani (ed.), University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1990, p. 87-88.

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of the world`s biggest oil (and natural gas) producers, as presented in the tables below.

Co un try Pro ven oil rese rves (tho usa nd mill ion barr els) Perc enta ge of glob al oil rese rves Dail y pro duct ion tho usa nd barr els (201 2) Perc enta ge of glob al oil dail y pro duct ion Da ily ex po rts (2 01 2) Perc enta ge of glob al oil exp orts Ira n 157. 0 9.4 %

3680 4.2 %

- -

Ira

q 150.0 9.0% 3115 3.7% - - Ku

wai t

101.

5 6.1% 3127 3.7% - -

O ma n

5.5 0.3 %

922 1.1 %

- -

Qa

tar 23.9 1.4% 1966 2.0% - - Sau di Ar abi a 265. 9 15.9 % 1153 0 13.3 % - - Syr

ia 2.5 0.1% 164 0.2% - - U.

A. E

97.8 5.9 %

3380 3.7 %

- -

Ye me n

3.0 0.2

% 180 0.2% - -

Ot her s

0.6 <0.1 %

206 0.2 % - - Th e Mi ddl e Ea st 807.

7 48.4% 28270 32.5% 1969 9 35.6 % as a wh ole

[source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy

June 2013,

http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf /statistical-review/statistical_review_of_world_energy_ 2013.pdf] Co un try Pr ov en ga s res erv es (tri llio n cu bic me tre s) Perc enta ge of glob al gas rese rves Pro duct ion billi on cubi c met res (201 2) Perc enta ge of glob al gas pro duct ion Ex po rts bill ion cu bic me tre s (20 12) Perc enta ge of glob al gas exp orts Ba hra in

0.2 0.1

% 14.2 0.4% - -

Ira

n 33.6 18.0% 160.5 4.8% - - Ira

q 3.6 1.9% 0.8 <0.1% - - Ku

wai t

1.8 1.0

% 14.5 0.4% - -

O ma n

0.9 0.5

% 29.0 0.9% - -

Qa tar 25. 1 13.4 % 157. 0 4.7 % 12 4.6 12.1 % Sau di Ar abi a

8.2 4.4

% 102.8 3.0% - -

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Andrzej GUZOWSKI Rentier state as an obstacle to development in the Middle East

48

ia % %

U. A. E

6.1 3.3

% 51.7 1.5% - -

Ye me n

0.5 0.3 %

7.6 0.2 %

- -

Ot her s

0.2 0.1

% 2.7 0.1% - -

Th e Mi ddl e Ea st as a wh ole

80. 5

43.0 %

548. 4

16.3 %

15 8.9

15.4 %

[source: BP Statistical Review of World

Energy June 2013,

http://www.bp.com/content/dambbp/pdf

/statistical-review/statistical_review_of_world_energy_ 2013.pdf]

As one can clearly notice, countries located in the Persian Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, U.A.E., Qatar and Oman) benefit greatly, at least in financial terms, from the abundance of oil (together they produce as much as 31.7% of all the oil in the world). One must remember however, that even though the ratio of production-to-consumption of oil in the Middle Eastern countries is 3.56:1, in the case of natural gas it is only 1.42:1. This means that most of the oil produced in the Middle East is exported to other regions, while most of the gas is consumed by the countries themselves. The only notable exception to this rule is Qatar, who is one of the biggest exporters of gas in the world5. To fully understand the

5 In 2012 Qatar produced 157 billion cubic

metres of gas. Only 26.2 billion (less than 17%) were consumed by Qataris themselves, while 130.8 billion were exported to other countries,

economic situation of those countries as well as their attachment to the production of oil and gas, one must also take into consideration the prices of these resources. The graphs below present the fluctuation of both of those values in the last 20 years.

[source: BP Statistical Review of World

Energy June 2013,

http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/stati

stical-review/statistical_review_of_world_energy_2013 .pdf]

[source: BP Statistical Review of World

Energy June 2013,

http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf

including Japan (21.3 billion), India (16.1 billion) and South Korea (14.2 billion).

Oil prices (Brent crude, $/

barrel), 1993, 16,97

Oil prices (Brent crude, $/

barrel), 2008, 97,26

Oil prices (Brent crude, $/

barrel), 2009, 61,67 Oil prices (Brent crude, $/barrel)

Natural gas prices (average

German import price, $/ million Natural gas prices (average German import

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Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal Vol. 21, September 2013

49

review/statistical_review_of_world_energy_ 2013.pdf]

While in the 1990s, both prices were mostly steady, since the beginning of the new millennium, they have been on a sharp rise, with a small exception in 2009 (and 2010 in case of natural gas), which was one of the effects of the global economic crisis. The opportunity to sell natural resources at very high prices has been of great benefit to the countries in the Persian Gulf and has been the biggest contributing factor to their prosperity. In fact, most of them have a high GDP per capita, especially when compared to the poorest countries in the region, like Afghanistan or Syria.

[source: World Bank,

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.G DP.PCAP.CD]

It should be noted that out of 7 Arab states that are above the “Arab World average” only Lebanon is not a major oil/natural gas exporter. Moreover, in case of GDP per capita, Qatar and Kuwait are among the top 10 countries in the world. While on the

surface, it may seem like oil- and gas-exporting countries in the Middle East do not have anything to worry about, as far as economic indicators are concerned, the real picture is far from perfect, due to the nature of the rentirer state itself.

The problems

The biggest problem for the rentier states in the Middle East (which we could now narrow down to the countries located

in the Persian Gulf), as mentioned before, is their utter dependence on oil exports as their major source of revenue. Let us look at some examples. In Saudi Arabia, oil and oil-based products constitute approximately 94% of all exported goods (or 85% of all exports, including services), 92.5% of government revenue6 and 50% of the GDP7.

6 48. Annual Report. The Latest Economic

Developments, Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, p.

GDP per capita (US$) [Middle East]

Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Rank (in the world, either 2010, 2011 or 2012)

Arab World (average) 6105,42 5162,56 5867,56 7017,67 - -

Afghanistan 376,98 450,66 561,20 619,59 - 172.

Bahrain 19625,58 16213,34 18334,17 - - 43.

Egypt 2156,76 2461,53 2803,53 2972,58 3187,31 123.

Iran 4899,31 4931,28 5674,92 6815,57 - 80.

Iraq 4472,06 3701,86 4375,91 5686,61 6454,62 89.

Israel 27591,62 26032,16 28522,41 31281,47 - 30.

Jordan 3797,41 4027,05 4370,72 4665,94 4945,13 100.

Kuwait 54548,62 37160,54 41566,10 56514,16 - 9.

Lebanon 7185,61 8159,02 8551,85 9148,13 9705,39 68.

Oman 23353,17 17597,49 20640,01 23731,21 - 34.

Qatar 84628,50 62390,28 72773,31 90523,53 - 5.

Saudi Arabia 18064,87 14057,62 16537,74 20777,67 - 40.

Syrian Arab Republic 2584,38 2564,46 2746,85 - 3289,06 122.

United Arab

Emirates 46309,98 35025,10 35259,99 40363,16 - 25.

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Andrzej GUZOWSKI Rentier state as an obstacle to development in the Middle East

50

In Iran oil exports make up about 80% of the country`s total export earnings, 60% of its government revenue8 and 25% of its

GDP9. Lastly, in Qatar, the export of oil and

gas constitutes 85% of all its export earnings, 60% of its GDP and 50% of government revenue10. This has several

important consequences.

Firstly, the elites and rulers in the Middle Eastern rentier states have grown accustomed to the fact that they can rely on the external demand for oil (and gas) and that the money gained from the export of these resources is enough to ensure their endurance and control over the country. To this end, many of them have provided welfare and wealth to their citizens, demanding little to nothing in return, other than that they agree to a non-explicit “social contract”, which stipulates that they give up their political ambitions and rights11. The

notion of “no taxation, hence no representation”12 is not an exaggeration. In

fact, in Oman the revenue from taxes

24,

http://www.sama.gov.sa/sites/samaen/Reports Statistics/ReportsStatisticsLib/5600_R_Annual_ En_48_2013_02_19.pdf.

7Saudi Arabia – National Accounts Indicators 2012,

http://www.cdsi.gov.sa/pdf/GDP2012report.p df.

8 Sanctions reduced Iran`s oil exports and revenues in

2012,

http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?i d=11011.

9 Iran Investment Monthly, April and May 2012, p.

8,

http://www.turquoisepartners.com/iraninvestm ent/IIM-AprMay12.pdf.

10 Qatar facts and figures,

http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/ 168.htm.

11 One needs to remember that the situation in

Iraq is slightly different - since the 2003 war the country has been trying to become more democratic, with results leaving much to be desired.

12 R. Schwarz, The political economy of state-formation

in the Arab Middle East: Rentier states, economic

reform, and democratization, “Review of

International Political Economy” 15, No. 4, October 2008, p. 607.

constitutes only 2.2% of the GDP and in Kuwait barely 0.7% of the GDP (to put these numbers in context, in the US it is 10.1%, in France – 21.3% and in the UK – 27.4%)13. As Terry Lynn Karl rightly points

out, this means that the governments have no need to build the institutional capacities that have historically been required in resource-scarce countries due to harsher conditions. Moreover, dependence on high oil revenues allows the states to enter and maintain control over many areas of civil life while at the same weakening opportunities to strengthen administrative capacities, merit-based civil services and the rule of law — all of which are indispensable in building efficient state structures and prosperous economy14. While authoritarianism in itself is

not necessarily harmful to a country`s economic performance (which has been proved by many historic examples, such as China or South Korea), it has to be supported by adequate, stable and reliable administrative structures. These are seldom developed in rentier states.

Secondly, oil dependence has a great impact on the citizens. Although the aforementioned welfare and state-controlled distribution of wealth in the Middle Eastern rentier states do sound promising, it must be remembered that major inequalities do persist. Unfortunately, due to lack of sufficient data it is not possible to come up with the Gini coefficient, which demonstrates how the income distribution among the citizens deviates from perfect equality (results above 0.35 should be considered a significant inequality), for all of these countries. It can be measured, however, for at least some of them: Iraq – 30.9 (2007), Iran – 38.3 (2005) and Qatar –

13 Tax revenue (% of GDP), World Bank,

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX. TOTL.GD.ZS.

14 T. L. Karl, Oil-Led Development: Social, Political,

Figure

Table 1: South Korea's Investment in Russia

Table 1.

South Korea s Investment in Russia . View in document p.33
Table 2: GDP of the Russian Federation (1991-2000)

Table 2.

GDP of the Russian Federation 1991 2000 . View in document p.34

References

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