COLD WAR
SUBMARINES
The Project 941/Typhoon was the largest undersea craft ever built. These two—of six completed—are at their remote base of Nerpichya, about six miles from the entrance to Guba Zapadnaya Litsa on the Kola Peninsula, close to the borders with Finland and Norway.(Rubin CDB ME)
Other Submarine-Related Books by Norman Polmar
The American Submarine Atomic Submarines Death of the Thresher
Guide to the Soviet Navy (4 editions)
Rickover: Controversy and Genius with Thomas B. Allen Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet (7 editions)
Submarines of the Imperial Japanese Navy with Dorr Carpenter
Copyright © 2004 by Norman Polmar.
Published in the United States by Potomac Books Inc. (formerly Brassey’s, Inc.). All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission from the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Polmar, Norman
Cold War submarines: U.S. and Soviet design and
construction / Norman Polmar and Kenneth J. Moore—1st ed. p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-57488-594-1
1. Submarines (Ships)—United States—History. 2. Submarines (Ships)—Soviet Union. 3. Cold War. I. Moore, Kenneth J., 1942– II. Title.
V858.P63 2003
359.9'383'094709045—dc21 2003013123
ISBN 978-1–57488–530–9 (paperback) ISBN 978-1-57488-594-1 (hardcover)
Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper that meets the American National Standards Institute Z39–48 Standard.
Potomac Books, Inc. 22841 Quicksilver Drive Dulles, Virginia 20166 First Edition
It is the nature of human memory to rid itself of the superfluous, to retain only what has proved to be most important in the light of later events. Yet that is also its weak side. Being biased it cannot help adjusting past reality to fit present needs and future hopes.
—Milovan Djilas
Conversations with Stalin
Epigraph
This book is dedicated to the officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men who served in Soviet and U.S. submarines during the Cold War. They did their duty courageously and steadfastly. Although no shots were fired, many of these sub-mariners lost their lives to fires, flooding, and other accidents. It was the price paid for 45 years of Cold War confrontation and for the rapid development and application of technology.
Perspective
xi
Acknowledgments
xv
Glossary
xix
1
|
Genesis
1
2
|
Advanced Diesel Submarines
11
3
|
Closed-Cycle Submarines
33
4
|
U.S. Nuclear-Propelled Submarines
49
5
|
Soviet Nuclear-Propelled Submarines
71
6
|
Cruise Missile Submarines
85
7
|
Ballistic Missile Submarines
103
8
|
“Polaris—From Out of the Deep . . .”
115
9
|
The Quest for Speed
127
10
|
Second-Generation Nuclear Submarines
147
11
|
The Ultimate Weapon I
167
12
|
The Ultimate Weapon II
183
13
|
“Diesel Boats Forever”
201
14
|
Unbuilt Giants
221
15
|
Aircraft-Carrying Submarines
245
16
|
Midget, Small, and Flying Submarines
255
17
|
Third-Generation Nuclear Submarines
267
18
|
Submarine Weapons
293
19
|
Fourth-Generation Nuclear Submarines
307
20
|
Soviet Versus U.S. Submarines
323
Appendixes
A
|
U.S. Submarine Construction, 1945–1991
335
B
|
Soviet Submarine Construction, 1945–1991
337
C
|
U.S. Submarine Reactor Plants
339
D
|
Soviet Submarine Design Bureaus
341
E
|
Soviet Ballistic Missile Systems
345
Notes 347
Selected Bibliography
385
Index
395
Perspective
S
ubmarines had a vital role in the 45 years of the Cold War—1946–1991. Throughout that con-flict, U.S. and Soviet submarines carried out intelli-gence collection operations and sought out and prepared to destroy opposing surface ships and submarines. In addition, from the early 1960s missile-carrying submarines threatened nuclear attacks on their opponent’s homeland.The possibility of Soviet submarines near Amer-ican coasts firing ballistic missiles, with a much shorter time of flight than missiles launched from the Soviet Union, presented a direct threat to U.S. command centers, bomber bases, and even land-based strategic missiles, thereby forcing major changes in the U.S. strategic posture. Similarly, U.S. missile submarines forced major changes in Soviet naval development and strategic forces deployments. Soviet and U.S. submarines of the Cold War era had the same origins: Their antecedents were German U-boat developments of 1943–1945, especially the Type XXI, the most advanced sub-marine to go to sea during World War II. The U.S. version of the Type XXI was the Tang (SS 563) class, with similar features being incorporated in the K1-class “killer” submarines and 52 conver-sions of war-built submarines in the so-called GUPPY program.1The Soviets adopted Type XXI features in the Whiskey and Zulu designs and their successors.2 The U.S. and Soviet (as well as British) submarine communities also had major interest in German closed-cycle, or “single-drive,” submarine propulsion systems, with these sub-marines being evaluated in the postwar period by Britain and the Soviet Union.
But the undersea craft produced by the respec-tive navies rapidly diverged in their designs from the Type XXI model. In 1985 the U.S. Assistant Sec-retary of the Navy for Research, Engineering, and Systems Melvin R. Paisley observed:
The Soviet submarine technological advan-tages for quieting, strengthened double hulls, higher speed, higher reserve buoyancy, and deeper operations are advances which are by and large not stolen or bought from the United States. Some technologies [classi-fied deletion] are Soviet design decisions which are different from our decisions. Other technologies . . . are the result of Sov-iet engineered high-power-density material and hull strength material. The Soviets are ahead of us in these technologies.3
By the end of the Cold War, U.S. and Soviet submarines were radically different in design and capabilities. In view of the importance of undersea craft—both torpedo/cruise missile attack and strategic missile submarines—it is useful to exam-ine how and why this divergence occurred. The causes of this divergence in submarine design can be found in (1) differing naval missions, (2) differing technical/operational priorities, (3) dif-fering levels of industrial competence, and (4) differing approaches to submarine design organi-zations and management.
Significantly, for much of the Cold War the U.S. Navy had a highly centralized, authoritarian organization. The head of Naval Nuclear Propul-sion held de facto control of submarine develop-ment, with virtually unqualified power to veto—if not enforce—key design decisions.4 Indeed, the incumbent of this position, Admiral H. G. Rick-over, by the early 1960s was able to deter any infu-sion of design ideas or concepts from outside of the senior officers of the nuclear submarine com-munity—the so-called submarine mafia—unless it corresponded with his views and goals. Those goals were based largely on a U.S. Navy plan of 1950 to develop a series of submarine propulsion plants
progressing from the 13,400-shaft-horsepower plant of the pioneer Nautilus (SSN 571) to 30,000, 45,000, and, ultimately, 60,000 horsepower.5
In contrast, the Soviet Union had several design bureaus engaged in submarine development during the Cold War (see Appendix D). Those bureaus were, to a large degree, in competition in submarine design, although ostensibly each specialized in dif-ferent types of submarines. Further, the Soviet regime pursued to various stages of fruition inno-vative proposals from qualified (and at times unqualified) submarine designers and naval offi-cers. This, in turn, led to the examination of innu-merable submarine designs and concepts, which contributed to the highly innovative submarines produced by Soviet design bureaus and shipyards.
Innovation in itself does not necessarily result in quality or capability. This volume seeks to examine the process of submarine design and the results of those efforts to produce submarines by the two super powers during the Cold War, and to assess their success in translating innovation into capability.
During the 45 years of the Cold War (1945– 1991) the United States and the Soviet Union put to sea a combined total of 936 submarines, of which 401 were nuclear propelled (see table 1). The Sov-iet regime allocated considerably more resources to the design and construction of submarines during the Cold War than did the United States. This Sov-iet emphasis on undersea craft continued after the 1970s, when major efforts were undertaken to con-struct large surface warships, including nuclear-propelled missile cruisers and aircraft carriers.
Until the 1970s and the initiation of large war-ship programs, the Soviet Union committed far fewer resources to surface combatants and aircraft carriers than did the United States. The subsequent Soviet carrier construction and the nuclear “battle cruisers” of the Kirov class required a commitment of resources to surface warships of the same order-of-magnitude as that of the U.S. Navy, while con-tinuing to emphasize submarine construction.
It is convenient to address nuclear-propelled submarines of the Cold War in terms of “genera-tions” (see table 2). While this categorization is not precise, it is a useful tool.
Many individuals and organizations assisted in the writing of this book. They are gratefully acknowledged in the following pages. But all opin-ions and conclusopin-ions—and such errors that may appear—are the responsibility of the authors.
—Norman Polmar Kenneth J. Moore TABLE1
Cold War Submarine Construction*
United States Soviet Union
World War II programs completed Aug. 1945–1951
diesel-electric 23 61
closed-cycle — 1**
total 23 62
Cold War programs completed 1945–1991
diesel-electric 21 399
closed-cycle — 31
nuclear-propelled 170 231
total 191 661
Cold War programs completed 1992–2001
diesel-electric — 3***
nuclear-propelled 22# 17##
total 22 20
Notes: * Does not include two Soviet midget submarines (Project 865) and the single U.S. Navy’s midget submarine X-1 (SSX 1). Submarines built by both nations specifically for foreign trans-fer are not included.
** Project 95 closed-cycle propulsion submarine. *** All SS Project 636 (Kilo).
# 15 SSN 688 (Improved) Los Angeles. 5 SSBN 726 Ohio.
2 SSN 21 Seawolf.
## 1 SSBN Project 667BDRM (Delta IV). 1 SSN Project 671RTM (Victor III). 1 SSN Project 945A (Sierra II). 5 SSGN Project 949A (Oscar II). 5 SSN Project 971 (Akula I/II). 2 SSAN Project 1083 (Paltus). 2 SSAN Project 1910 (Uniform).
TABLE2
Nuclear-Propelled Submarine Generations (Major Combat Designs)
Generation United States Soviet Union (NATO name)
I SSN 571 Nautilus SSN Proj. 627 (November)
SSN 575 Seawolf SSN Proj. 645 (mod. November)
SSN 578 Skate SSBN Proj. 658 (Hotel)
SSRN 586 Triton SSGN Proj. 659 (Echo I)
SSGN 587 Halibut SSGN Proj. 675 (Echo II)
II SSN 585 Skipjack SSGN Proj. 661 (Papa)
SSN 593 Thresher SSBN Proj. 667A (Yankee)
SSN 597 Tullibee SSBN Proj. 667B (Delta I)
SSBN 598 Geo. Washington SSBN Proj. 667BD (Delta II) SSBN 602 Ethan Allen SSBN Proj. 667BDR (Delta III)
SSBN 616 Lafayette SSGN Proj. 670 (Charlie)
SSN 637 Sturgeon SSN Proj. 671 (Victor)
SSN 671 Narwhal SSN Proj. 705 (Alfa)
III SSN 685 Lipscomb SSBN Proj. 667BDRM (Delta IV)
SSN 688 Los Angeles SSN Proj. 685 Komsomolets (Mike)
SSN 688I Imprv. Los Angeles SSBN Proj. 941 (Typhoon)
SSBN 726 Ohio SSN Proj. 945 (Sierra)
SSGN Proj. 949 (Oscar) SSN Proj. 971 (Akula)
IV SSN 21 Seawolf SSN Proj. 885 Severodvinsk
M
any individuals contributed to the prepara-tion of this book, which originated during discussions of Academician Igor Spassky and his friend and colleague Viktor Semyonov with Nor-man Polmar at the Rubin Central Design Bureau in St. Petersburg in 1992.Mr. Polmar was most fortunate in having many hours of discussions about submarine design and development with Academician Spassky, chief designer and head of the Rubin design bureau, as well as several hours of discussions with Academi-cian Anatoly V. Kuteinikov, chief designer and head of the Malachite design bureau. Both men facili-tated interviews with the senior designers and engineers from their respective bureaus as well as from other Russian institutions and agencies.
Their subordinates—Semyonov at Rubin and Alexandr M. Antonov at Malachite—were invalu-able to this project with respect to the time and effort they took to help educate the authors in the history of Soviet submarine design and construc-tion.
Mr. K. J. Moore also has been a guest of the Malachite design bureau for technical discussions as well as several Russian and Ukrainian research institutes.
A special debt is owed to Larry Lynn, who encouraged the undertaking of this project.
In the following listing, asterisks indicate per-sons interviewed by Polmar for previous submarine projects, with some of the material provided by them having been used in this volume.
Interviews and Correspondence
Germany
Prof. Fritz-Folkmar Abels, senior designer, IKL design bureau
*Dr. Ernest A. Steinhoff, Peenemünde rocket research center
*Hellmuth Walter, engineer and developer of closed-cycle submarine propulsion plants
Great Britain
Comdr. Richard Compton-Hall, RN, submarine commander, author, and Director of the Royal Navy Submarine Museum
Comdr. Michael Davis-Marks, RN, Staff Officer Submarines, British Defence Staff, Washington, and commanding officer of HMS Turbulent Commo. Robin W. Garson, RN, Staff Officer
Sub-marines, British Naval Staff, Washington, and submarine commander
Rear Adm. John Hervey, RN, naval attaché in Washington, submarine commander, and author Comdr. Jonathan (Jonty) Powis, RN, Staff Officer
Submarines, British Defence Staff, Washington, and commanding officer of HMS Unseen,
Resolution, and Victorious
Capt. Gordan A. S. C. Wilson, RN, head of Defence Studies (Royal Navy)
Michael Wilson, commanding officer of HMS
Explorer and author
Netherlands
*Comdr. Jurrien Noot, RNethN, naval analyst and submarine historian
Acknowledgments
The beginning of this book: Academician I. D. Spassky makes a point to Norman Polmar, coauthor of this book, during their first meeting, which took place at the Rubin Central Design Bureau in St. Petersburg in 1992. Michael Polmar is seen between them.(Rubin CDB ME)
Russia
Capt. 1/Rank I. P. Bogachenko, Admiralty supervi-sor for Project 971 (Akula) and Project 945 (Sierra) submarines
Alexandr Churilin, senior counselor, Embassy of the Russian Federation in Washington, D.C., and senior Soviet strategic arms negotiator
Fleet Adm. V. N. Chernavin, CinC Soviet Navy and submarine commander
L. P. Chumak, director, Admiralty Shipyard museum V. G. Davydov, technical director, Admiralty
Shipyard
Capt. 2/Rank Vasiliy V. Doroshenko, commanding officer of a Project 675 (Echo II) submarine Sergei N. Khrushchev, missile guidance engineer in
the Chelomei bureau, historian, and biographer for his father, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev L. Y. Khudiakov, Chief Scientist, First Central
Research Institute (Naval Shipbuilding) Dr. Eugene Miasnikov, Russian political scientist Capt. 1/Rank V. Nikitin, staff, Pushkin Higher
Naval School
Capt. 1/Rank B. Rodionov, historian and subma-rine commanding officer
Dr. George I. Sviatov, submarine designer, political scientist, and historian
Yuri Shestakov, curator, Admiralty Shipyard museum Capt. 1/Rank Nikolai Vorobjev, submarine designer
Rubin Central Design Bureau for Marine Engineering
(Saint Petersburg, née Leningrad) E. A. Gorigledzhan, Chief Designer O. A. Gladkov, chief designer
Anna Kipyatkova, director of the bureau’s muse-um
Academician S. N. Kovalev, general designer and chief designer of strategic missile submarines
Guri Malafeyev, designer
Capt. 1/Rank S. A. Novoselov, history staff; sen-ior designer
A. Pinégin, senior designer
D. A. Romanov, deputy chief designer of the submarine Komsomolets
Malachite Marine Engineering Bureau
(Saint Petersburg, née Leningrad) Dr. V. I. Barantsev, chief designer B. F. Dronov, head, Design Department V. V. Kryov, chief designer
G. D. Morozkin, chief designer Y. K. Mineev, chief designer
L. A. Samarkin, deputy chief designer R. A. Shmakov, chief designer
Lazurit Central Design Bureau
(Nizhny Novgorod, née Gor’kiy) N. I. Kvasha, general designer A. A. Postnov, chief designer
Natalia Solbodyanyuk, assistant to the general designer
United States
*Capt. William R. Anderson, USN, who
commanded the USS Nautilus on her historic voyage to the North Pole
*Rear Adm. Dean A. Axene, USN, first command-ing officer of the USS Thresher
A. D. Baker III, naval analyst and author of the ref-erence book Combat Fleets of the World
Anthony Battista, senior staff member, House Armed Services Committee; member of Aspin panel
Capt. Edward L. Beach, USN (Ret), first
commanding officer of the USS Triton, histori-an, and novelist
Richard J. Boyle, U.S. submariner and historian; engineer and, subsequently, officer-in-charge midget submarine X-1
Capt. Richard Brooks, USCG (Ret), submarine technology analyst
Rear Adm. Thomas A. Brooks, USN (Ret), Direc-tor of Naval Intelligence
*Vice Adm. James F. Calvert, USN, who
commanded the USS Skate on her first two Arc-tic voyages
Capt. Myron Eckhart Jr., USN (Ret), head of pre-liminary ship design, Naval Sea Systems Com-mand
Alan Ellinthorpe, technical consultant Rear Adm. Thomas W. Evans, USN (Ret),
commanding officer of the USS Batfish, Deputy Commander for ASW and Undersea Warfare Programs and, subsequently, and Deputy Com-mander for Submarines, Naval Sea Systems Command
Dr. John Foster, Director Defense Research and Engineering.
Dr. H. H. Gaffney, analyst and team leader, Center for Naval Analyses; CNA liaison to the Russian Institute of USA Studies
*Adm. I. J. Galantin, USN, submarine commander and Director of the Special Projects Office Dr. Paris Genalis, director, Naval Warfare, Office
of the Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology)
Peter Gorin, Russian missile historian
*Ross Gunn, Navy scientist and the first man to explore the potential of employing nuclear ener-gy to propel a submarine
*Vice Adm. Frederick J. Harlfinger, USN, submarine commander and Director of Naval Intelligence Dean A. Horn, senior U.S. submarine designer Mark R. Henry, head of preliminary design,
Sub-marine Branch, Naval Sea Systems Command Capt. Harry Jackson, USN (Ret), senior U.S.
sub-marine designer
Capt. Donald Kern, USN (Ret), head of the sub-marine design branch in the Bureau of Ships *Dr. Donald Kerr, director, Los Alamos National
Laboratory
Capt. Richard B. Laning, USN (Ret), first command-ing officer of the USS Seawolf (SSN 575)
*Rear Adm. George H. Miller, USN, Director of Navy Strategic Systems
Michael Neufeld, curator at the National Air and Space Museum and V-2 missile historian *Vice Adm. Jon H. Nicholson, USN, who took the
USS Sargo on her remarkable Arctic cruise Ambassador Paul H. Nitze, Secretary of the Navy,
Under Secretary of Defense, and senior U.S. strategic arms negotiator
Ronald O’Rourke, senior naval analyst, Congres-sional Research Service, Library of Congress *Melvyn R. Paisley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Research, Development, and Systems)
*Dr. D. A. Paolucci, submarine commanding offi-cer and strategic analyst
Robin B. Pirie, commanding officer of the USS
Skipjack, Under Secretary of the Navy, and
Act-ing Secretary of the Navy
Capt. John P. Prisley, USN (Ret), submariner and intelligence specialist
Raymond Robinson, intelligence specialist
Dr. David A. Rosenberg, distinguished naval histo-rian and biographer of Adm. Arleigh A. Burke Jeffery Sands, naval analyst, Center for Naval
Analyses
Thomas Schoene, senior analyst, Anteon Corp., and editor par excellance
Rear Adm. Edward Shafer, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence
Frank Uhlig, senior editor of the U.S. Naval Insti-tute and editor, Naval War College Review Dr. William Von Winkle, leading U.S. Navy sonar
expert
Dr. Edward Whitman, Assistant Secretary of the Navy and senior editor, Undersea Warfare John Whipple, managing editor, Undersea Warfare Lowell Wood, physicist; member of the Aspin panel Bruce Wooden, naval architect and engineer Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, USN (Ret), Chief of
Naval Operations
Ms. Irina Alexandrovna Vorbyova of the Rubin bureau provided outstanding service as an interpreter during several visits to St. Petersburg. George E. Federoff, Andrew H. Skinner, and Jonathan E. Acus as well as Dr. Sviatov have provided translations in the United States. Samuel Loring Morison and Gary Steinhaus undertook research for this project.
Many individuals at the Operational Archives of the U.S. Naval Historical Center (NHC) have pro-vided assistance and encouragement for this proj-ect, especially Bernard F. (Cal) Cavalcante, Kathy Lloyd, Ella Nargele, and Mike Walker; and Richard Russell, long the Russian expert of the NHC staff, provided special help and, subsequently, as acquisi-tions editor of Brassey’s USA, had a key role in bringing this book to fruition.
David Brown, late head of the Naval Historical Branch, Ministry of Defence, and Capt. Christo-pher Page, RN, his successor, also were helpful in this project as was Comdr. W. J. R. (Jock) Gardner, RN, of their staff. Page previously served as head of Defence Studies (Royal Navy), and Gardner is a dis-tinguished naval author.
Providing photographs for this project, in addi-tion to the Rubin and Malachite design bureaus, were Capt. Ian Hewitt, OBE, RN; Capt. A. S. L. Smith, RN; and Capt. Simon Martin, RN, at the Ministry of Defence. Also, the late Russell Egnor of the U.S. Navy Office of Information and his most able assistants—Lt. Chris Madden, USN, his suc-cessor; Journalist 2d Class Todd Stevens, USN; Henrietta Wright; and Diane Mason. Charles Haberlein, Jack A. Green, Ed Feeney, and Robert Hanshew of the U.S. Naval Historical Center searched out and provided several important his-torical photos, while Dawn Stitzel and Jennifer Till
of the U.S. Naval Institute were always ready to assist in photo research.
Chapter 15,“Aircraft-Carrying Sub-marines,” benefited from a review by aviation writer Peter B. Mersky.
Jeffrey T. Richelson, leading intelli-gence writer, has kindly shared with us the voluminous fruits of his efforts to have appropriate official documents declassified. Similarly, Mr. and Mrs. Armin K. Wetterhahn have made avail-able their voluminous files on Soviet submarines and weapons.
The U.S. Naval Institute (USNI), the professional association of the U.S. Navy, made its oral history collection available through the auspices of Paul Stillwell, director of history, USNI; that collection includes numerous interviews with senior U.S. sub-marine officers.
Materials used in the creation of the drawings by A. D. Baker were from various unclassified U.S. and Russian publications and from material provided by
Richard J. Boyle, Jim Christley, Nor-man FriedNor-man, and David Hill.
Lt. Jensin W. Sommer, USN, Lt. Rick Hupt, USN, and Lt. Brauna R. Carl, USN, of the U.S. Navy’s Office of Information sought out numerous answers to inquiries, a pleasant con-trast to the U.S. Navy’s usual attitude toward inquiries about submarine issues.
Teresa Metcalfe did an excellent job of shepherding the book through the Brassey’s publishing complex, and Margie Moore and Pepper Murray of the Cortana Corp. provided valuable editorial assistance. And, a special thanks to Michael Polmar for his research activities in support of this book.
Finally, the authors are also are in debt to those in the West who earlier wrote about Soviet submarines, generally with very limited information available to help them, especially Claude Hahn, Michael MccG-wire, and Jurrien Noot.
Anatoly V. Kuteinikov (Malachite SPMBM)
AEC Atomic Energy Commission (U.S.; 1948-1974)
AGSS auxiliary submarine (non-combat)
AIP Air Independent Propulsion
Alberich anechoic hull coating used for German U-boats
AN/ Prefix for U.S. electronic equipment
anechoic coating coating on submarines to reduce the effectiveness of an enemy’s active sonar by absorbing acoustic energy to reduce the reflection; on Soviet submarines also used between double hulls to absorb internal noise. May be a rubber-like coating or tiles.
AOSS submarine oiler (also SSO)
APS transport submarine (also APSS, ASSP, LPSS, SSP)
APSS transport submarine (also APS, ASSP LPSS, SSP)
ASDS Advanced SEAL Delivery System
ASSA cargo submarine (also SSA)
ASSP transport submarine (also APS, APSS, LPSS, SSP)
ASTOR Anti-Submarine Torpedo (U.S. Mk 45)
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare
beam maximum width of hull; control and stern surfaces may be of greater width
BuShips Bureau of Ships (U.S. Navy; 1940 to 1966)
cavitation formation and collapse of bubbles produced in seawater as a result of dissolved gases being released in low-pressure regions such as those produced by the high velocity of propeller or propulsor blades
CEP Circular Error Probable (measure of weapons accuracy)
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.)
CNO Chief of Naval Operations (U.S.)
conning tower see sail
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (U.S.)
depth Working depth is the Russian term for the normal maximum operating depth,
approx-imately 0.8 times limiting depth. Test depth is the deepest that a submarine is
designed to operate during trials or in combat situations; the Russian term is limiting
depth. Repeated submergence to that depth can take place only a limited number of
times (estimated at about 300 times for the entire service life of a submarine).
Collapse depth is the deepest that a submarine’s pressure hull is expected to survive; in
the U.S. Navy this is 1.5 times the submarine’s test depth; it is approximately the same in the Russian Navy.
dimensions U.S. submarine dimensions are based on the English system (i.e., feet, inches); Soviet submarine dimensions are based on the metric system, with English measurements approximated.
displacement U.S. submarine displacements in long tons (2,240 pounds); Soviet submarine displace-ments are based on metric tons (1,000 kg or 2,205 lb). In Russian terminology the term
normal is used for surface displacement and water for submerged displacement.
DoD Department of Defense
double hull Submarine hull configuration in which a non-pressure hull surrounds all or portions of the inner pressure hull. The between-hull volume may be free-flooding or contain bal-last tanks, fuel tanks, and possibly weapons and equipment (at ambient sea pressure).
draft maximum draft while on surface
EB Electric Boat (shipyard)
fairwater see sail
FBM Fleet Ballistic Missile (early U.S. term for Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile [SLBM])
fin see sail
GAO General Accounting Office (U.S.)
GIUK Gap Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (passages between those land masses) GUPPY Greater Underwater Propulsive Power (the letter y added for pronunciation)
HEN Hotel-Echo-November (NATO designation of first-generation of Soviet
nuclear-propelled submarines and their propulsion plants)
HF High Frequency
HMS His/Her Majesty’s Ship (British)
hp horsepower
HTP High-Test Peroxide
HTS High-Tensile Steel
HY High Yield (steel measured in terms of pounds per square inch in thousands; e.g., HY-80, HY-100)
kgst kilograms static thrust
KT Kiloton (equivalent of 1,000 tons of high explosive)
lbst pounds static thrust
length length overall
limber holes holes near the waterline of a submarine for draining the superstructure when on the surface
LOA Length Overall
LPSS transport submarine (also APS, APSS, ASSP, SSP)
LST tank landing ship
MIRV Multiple Independently targeted Re-entry Vehicle (warhead)
Mk Mark
MG Machine Gun(s)
MRV Multiple Re-entry Vehicle (warhead)
MT Megaton (equivalent of 1,000,000 tons of high explosive)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NavFac Naval Facility (U.S. Navy)
NavSea Naval Sea Systems Command (U.S. Navy; from 1974)
NavShips Naval Ship Systems Command (U.S. Navy; 1966–1974)
NII scientific research institute (Soviet)
n.mile nautical mile (1.15 statute miles)
OKB Experimental Design Bureau (Soviet)
ONR Office of Naval Research (U.S.)
polymer fluid ejected from a submarine as a means of reducing skin friction drag pressure hull submarine hull that provides protection against pressure for crew, machinery,
weapons, and equipment; it may be encased within an outer, non-pressure hull, that is, double hull configuration
PWR Pressurized Water Reactor
RN Royal Navy
rpm revolutions per minute
sail Upper appendage or fairwater of a submarine. The sail replaced the conning tower of earlier submarines, which was a watertight compartment placed on top of the hull, usually serving as the attack center. There is a small bridge atop the sail, with the structure serving as a streamlined housing for periscopes, masts, and snorkel induc-tion tube; in some submarines the forward diving planes are mounted on the sail. Also called bridge fairwater (i.e., a streamlined structure to support the bridge); called
SA-N-( ) U.S./NATO designation for a Soviet/Russian naval surface-to-air missile
SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar
SKB Special Design Bureau (Soviet)
shp shaft horsepower
shutters closing over torpedo tube openings, hull-mounted forward diving planes, and (on Soviet submarines) over limber holes to enhance hydrodynamic and acoustic perform-ance of submarine
SKB Special Design Bureau (Soviet)
SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SM minelaying submarine (also SSM)
snorkel intake and exhaust tubes to permit the operation of a diesel engine from a submerged submarine (operating at periscope depth)
sonar Sound Navigation And Ranging
SOSUS Sound Surveillance System (U.S.)
SPO Special Projects Office (U.S.)
SS SSN attack (torpedo) submarine (N suffix indicates nuclear propulsion)
SSA SSAN (1) auxiliary (special-purpose) submarine
(2) cargo submarine (later ASSA) (N suffix indicates nuclear propulsion)
SSAG auxiliary submarine (retains combat capability)
SSB SSBN (1) bombardment submarine
(2) ballistic missile submarine (N suffix indicates nuclear propulsion)
SSC coastal submarine
SSE (1) ammunition submarine
(2) electronic reconnaissance submarine
SSG SSGN guided (cruise) missile submarine (N suffix indicates nuclear propulsion) SSK SSKN hunter-killer submarine (N suffix indicates nuclear propulsion)
SSM minelaying submarine (also SM)
SS-N-( ) U.S./NATO designation for a Soviet/Russian naval surface- or subsurface-to-surface missile, either tactical or strategic; NX indicates a missile estimated to be in develop-ment and not in service
SSO submarine oiler (also AOSS)
SSP submarine transport (also APS, ASSP, LPSS)
SSPO Strategic Systems Project Office (U.S.)
SSR SSRN radar picket submarine (N suffix indicates nuclear propulsion)
SST target-training submarine
SSV submarine aircraft carrier
SSX submarine with undefined propulsion system
SubDevGru Submarine Development Group (U.S.)
SUBROC Submarine Rocket (U.S.)
SUBSAFE Submarine Safety (U.S. modification program)
SUBTECH Submarine Technology (U.S. program)
TEDS Turbine Electric-Drive Submarine (USS Glenard P. Lipscomb/SSN 685)
TASM Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile
TLAM Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile
TsKB Central Design Bureau (Soviet)
TTE Tactical-Technical Elements (requirements)
USN U.S. Navy
USNR U.S. Naval Reserves
1
Genesis
T
he Second World War was in large part anaval war. In every theater of the war, sub-marines played major roles, especially Sovi-et and German submarines in the Northern regions; German submarines in the Atlantic; British, German, and Italian submarines in the Mediterranean; and U.S. and Japanese submarines in the Pacific theaters.
In the Atlantic the German U-boats by them-selves came very close to defeating Britain. Winston Churchill, Britain’s wartime Prime Minister, said of the Battle of the Atlantic: “The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril. . . . I was even more anxious about this battle than I had been about the glorious air fight called the Battle of Britain.”1And “The U-boat attack was our worst evil. It would have been wise for the Ger-mans to stake all upon it.”2
In the spring of 1943 the U-boats brought Britain perilously close to defeat. British cabinet
historian S. W. Roskill, describing the situation in March 1943, related:
‘It appeared possible’ wrote the Naval Staff after the crisis had passed, ‘that we should not be able to continue [to regard] convoy as an effective system of defence’. It had, during three-and-a-half years of war, slowly become the lynch pin of our maritime strat-egy. Where could the Admiralty turn if the convoy system had lost its effectiveness? They did not know; but they must have felt, though no one admitted it, that defeat then stared them in the face.3
But the Allies did triumph over the U-boats in May 1943, driving them from the major North Atlantic shipping lanes. In the period 10 April to 24 May 1943, when German naval commander-in-chief Karl Dönitz withdrew his U-boats from the Atlantic The German Type XXI was the most advanced combat submarine to go to sea during World War II. A single Type XXI began an abortive war patrol shortly before the conflict in Europe ended. Type XXI features would have a major impact on Cold War submarine design.(Imperial War Museum)
convoy routes, the German submarine command had lost 22 U-boats, while sinking only 28 Allied merchant ships and one destroyer, an unacceptable exchange ratio. (Many other U-boats were damaged in that period and forced to return to port.)
But the defeated submarines were little more than updated World War I–era undersea craft. The principal U-boat of World War II was the 770-ton Type VIIC, essentially an updated and slightly larger version of their Type UBIII that first went to sea in 1917.4German shipyards produced 661 of the Type VIIC from 1940 to 1944. The Type VIIC variant could travel 6,500 nautical miles (12,045 km) at 12 knots on the surface, being propelled by two diesel engines (maximum surface speed was 17 knots); underwater, on battery-supplied electric motors, the VIIC could travel only 80 nautical miles (148 km) at four knots; top underwater speed was 7.5 knots.5
Despite these and other U-boat limitations, it had taken 44 months of war at sea to clear the North Atlantic of Dönitz’s U-boats.6 The limita-tions of these U-boats were long understood by the German naval high command. As early as 1936, the year after Germany was “legally” allowed to possess submarines, German engineer Helmuth Walter proposed a revolutionary underwater warship.7 “Submarines” of the era were in reality surface ships that could submerge for a few hours at a time, oper-ating underwater on electric motors with energy provided by storage batteries. Those batteries could provide propulsion for only a few hours at relative-ly slow speeds.
After perhaps a half hour at maximum sub-merged speed, or a day at “creeping” speeds, the submarine had to surface to recharge the battery, using diesel engines, which also propelled the sub-marine while on the surface. Walter would achieve greater underwater endurance and higher speeds through the use of hydrogen-peroxide propulsion. Under his scheme submarines would have a streamlined hull and would be propelled by a closed-cycle turbine plant using the thermal energy produced by the decomposition of a high concen-tration of hydrogen peroxide (perhydrol). It was a complex system that enabled a turbine to be oper-ated in a closed (submerged) atmosphere to pro-vide sustained high underwater speeds. At the urg-ing of Walter, an experimental submarine, the V-80,
was built in 1940 with such a turbine plant. That submarine reached more than 26 knots submerged for short periods of time—by a significant margin the fastest speed achieved to that date by a manned underwater vehicle. In 1942 several Type XVIIA Walter experimental boats were ordered and plans were drawn up for building 24 operational Type XVIIB submarines. The bureaucracy of the German military establishment slowed the program, while skepticism among many naval engineers and others led to further delays. In November 1943 the first two Walter Type XVIIA submarines, the U-792 and
U-794, were commissioned for sea trials. They
attained 25-knot underwater speeds for short peri-ods; their longest fully submerged run was 51⁄
2hours
at 20 knots (twice the underwater speed of U.S. fleet submarines, which could maintain their maximum speed of nine knots for about one hour).
Even before the massive U-boat losses of the spring of 1943, Admiral Dönitz realized that it was only a matter of time until his existing U-boats would be driven from the sea, primarily, he believed, by radar fitted in surface escorts and air-craft. Radar deprived a submarine of its surface mobility and hence effectiveness, even at night.
In November 1942 Dönitz convened a conference at his command post near Paris to determine how soon Walter U-boats could become available for combat. In addition to Walter, the senior German U-boat constructors attended—Fritz Bröcking, propul-sion expert, and Friedrich Schürer, hull designer.
In his memoirs, Dönitz wrote:
At this conference I learnt to my regret that the Walter U-boat was nowhere ready for service. . . . To U-boat Command, who
Helmuth Walter (Courtesy Fritz-Folkmar Abels)
viewed with anxiety the clearly recognizable extent to which the enemy’s defensive mea-sures [radar] against ‘the surface U-boat’ were being further developed, this came as a great disappointment.8
As a near-term substitute for the Walter sub-marines, Bröcking and Schürer proposed adopting Walter’s streamlined hull, which had been fully test-ed, and doubling the number of electric storage batteries. While such a submarine would fall short of the Walter U-boat performance, it would provide greater underwater speed and endurance than con-ventional submarines. Its huge electric battery gave rise to the term “electro” U-boat.
At the same time Walter proposed fitting the electro submarine with a schnorchel (snorkel) device that could draw in air from the surface for the diesel engines and expel the diesel exhaust gases just below the surface. This would permit the oper-ation of diesel engines while submerged, to propel the boat and recharge the batteries, giving the U-boat the possibility of sustained underwater opera-tions. Further, the head of the snorkel induction mast could be coated with radar absorbent materi-al to prevent detection of the snorkel mast extend-ing above the surface.9
A Revolutionary Submarine
Design began on what would evolve as the Type XXI U-boat—the most advanced undersea craft of
the war. According to the U-Boat Command’s man-ual for employing the electro submarine:
Type XXI is a boat with strongly pronounced underwater fighting qualities which are capable of largely eliminating the superiority of the enemy’s A/S [Anti-Submarine]
A Type XXI hull section awaiting assembly at the Deschimag shipyard. The hull sections arrived at the assembly yards in an advanced state of fitting out. The similarity to an invert-ed figure eight and three deck levels are evident.(U.S. Navy, courtesy Capt. H. A. Arnold, USN Ret)
Bow sections of Type XXI sub-marines on the assembly ways in the Deschimag shipyard in Bremen at the end of the war. The shutters for the bow torpedo tubes and the under-keel “balcony” housing for the GHG sonar are visible. (U.S. Navy, courtesy Capt. H. A. Arnold, USN Ret)
operations, resulting from his command of air and surface radar. With this boat and [Walter] types, it will be possible to start a new successful U-boat war.10
The Type XXI was a large submarine, displac-ing 1,621 tons on the surface, more than twice the displacement of a Type VII. The Type XXI has a streamlined hull, devoid of protuberances such as chocks, cleats, or gun mounts. Instead of a large conning tower with gun platforms and an internal pressure chamber that served as an attack center, the Type XXI had a streamlined sail, or fairwater, around the shears that supported the periscopes and other masts and antennae. These features reduced the drag above the waterline to about one-sixth that of earlier submarines. The openings in ballast tanks were reduced to further reduce drag. These modifications, coupled with improve-ments in batteries and increasing the voltage to the main motors, resulted in a near doubling of the Type XXI underwater speeds over previous U-boats:
16 knots for 25 n.miles (46 km) 12 knots for 60 n.miles (111 km)
6 knots for 280 n.miles (520 km)
Beyond two standard electric motors, the Type XXI submarine had two “crawling” (schleich) motors for quiet operation. These could propel the submarine at 51⁄
2 knots for 320 nautical miles (595 km), an
unprecedented underwater endurance for a subma-rine. The creeping speed motors were mounted on bonded rubber mounts and had other features to reduce noise output. Even when using its standard electric motors, the Type XXI was significantly quieter than contemporary U.S. submarines.
The submarine had a designed operating depth of 440 feet (135 m), slightly greater than its foreign contemporaries. However, the Type XXI had a safe-ty factor of 2.5—that is, a crush depth predicted at almost 1,110 feet (340 m), far greater than any other submarine.
The basic Type XXI hull design differed great-ly from conventional submarines. For part of its length the pressure hull was like an inverted figure eight and for the remainder cylindrical.11It had a rounded bow for enhanced underwater perfor-mance, unlike the ship-like prows of conventional submarines, which were intended for high surface speeds. The Type XXI stern was very deep and very narrow, with no stern tubes fitted because of the fine lines. The extremity formed the vertical stabilizer/rudder, called the schneiden, or “cut-Type XXI U-boat. LOA 251 ft 7 in (76.7 m) (©A.D. Baker, III)
ting” stern, also referred to as a “knife” configura-tion.
The purpose of the Type XXI was to destroy Allied merchant shipping. In both World Wars submarines destroyed shipping with deck guns and torpedoes. Deck guns were useful against unarmed merchant ships and trawlers, with a couple of dozen shells being much cheaper than a torpedo. The Allied convoys of World War II, well protected by radar-equipped surface escorts and aircraft, made surface attacks deadly for the U-boat. During World War II submarines also car-ried light anti-aircraft guns—up to a caliber of 40 mm—to fight off hostile aircraft.
The Type XXI—intended for completely sub-merged war patrols—carried no deck guns except for light anti-aircraft guns, fitted in power-operated tur-rets at the forward and after ends of the sail struc-ture. These guns were for use against attacking air-craft only as the U-boat was transiting to and from its protected, bomb-proof shelter to deep water.12 (Although designed to mount twin 30-mm gun tur-rets, all Type XXIs were completed with 20-mm guns.)
The Type XXI’s attack weapon was the torpedo: Six torpedo tubes were fitted in the bow; the torpe-do room, the forwardmost of the six compart-ments, could accommodate 17 reload torpedoes. However, because of the need on long patrols to extract torpedoes from the tubes to check and maintain them, a loadout of only 20 torpedoes would be normal. While comparable to the number of torpedoes in a U.S. fleet submarine of the era (which had ten tubes), the Type XXI used hydraulic power to move the torpedoes from their stowage position into the tubes at a time when U.S. and other submarines used rollers and manpower to move torpedoes.
A semi-automatic, hydraulic reloading system enabled a Type XXI, after firing six torpedoes in one salvo, to fire a second salvo after only ten minutes, and a third salvo after a period of half an hour. This was a far faster firing rate than previous sub-marines; U.S. fleet boats of the war era required 35 to 40 minutes to reload the six bow torpedo tubes. Modified Type XXI designs—never completed— had differing arrangements: The Type XXIC had 6 bow torpedo tubes plus 12 amidships tubes firing
aft; a total of 18 torpedoes would be carried, that is, no reloads. Such a “convoy killer” would only have to penetrate a convoy escort screen once to deliver a devastating attack with 18 torpedoes.
The Type XXI’s torpedoes consisted of the Lüt, a pattern-running torpedo, and the T11, a passive acoustic homing weapon. The latter was believed to be immune to the “Foxer” and other acoustic decoys used by the Allies. Under development for future U-boat use were active acoustic homing and wire-guided torpedoes. To help the Type XXI detect hostile ships, the submarine was fitted with radar and the so-called GHG sonar, the most advanced acoustic detection system in service with any navy.13The sonar was mounted in an under-keel “balcony,” and hence was referred to as Balkon.
The GHG was key to an advanced fire control system fitted in the Type XXI. The submarine’s echo-ranging gear and plotting table, specifically designed for such attacks, were linked to a special device for so-called “programmed firing” in attacking convoys. As soon as a U-boat had succeeded in getting beneath a convoy, data collected by sonar was con-verted and automatically set in the Lüt torpedoes, which were then fired in spreads of six. After launch-ing, the torpedoes fanned out until their spread cov-ered the extent of the convoy, when they began run-ning loops across its mean course. In this manner the torpedoes covered the entire convoy. In theory these torpedoes were certain of hitting six ships of from 197 to 328 feet (60 to 100 m) in length with the theoretical success rate of 95 to 99 percent. In firing trials such high scores were in fact achieved.
The crew of 57 officers and enlisted men lived in accommodations that were—by German naval standards—“virtually palatial.”14 Intended for long-range operations, the Type XXI represented an attempt to improve living conditions, and while many of the objectionable features of the previous designs were retained, the net results are in certain aspects superior to those on contemporary U.S. submarines. Some privacy was provided for crew-men by eliminating large sleeping compartcrew-ments and by dividing the off-watch personnel into fairly small groups, each within its own quarters that were segregated from passageways. Against these features there were bunks for only 47 men, mean-ing that ten men had to have hammocks or some
crew members had to share the same berth. The galley represented an improvement over earlier sub-marines. The cooking range permit-ted a greater variety of foods to be served, and twin sinks made it possi-ble to get the mess and galley gear cleaner after use.
Still, the sanitary arrangements were inadequate by U.S. standards. Further, because of the interconnec-tion of the washing and drinking water systems, the latter was considered unsafe by U.S. submarine experts.15
An important aspect of the revolutionary nature of the Type XXI was its production. Initial Type XXI production plans provided for two pro-totypes to be completed at the end of 1944, with mass production to begin the following year. The first Type XXIs were to be ready for combat at the end of 1946. This plan was based on the assump-tions that German dictator Adolf Hitler would give U-boat construction priority over all other military programs, that all materials would be available, and that Allied air raids would not interfere with con-struction. All of these assumptions were flawed.
Such a schedule was unacceptable to Admiral Dönitz. He took the Type XXI production issue to Albert Speer, Hitler’s personal architect, who, since January 1942, had astutely performed the duties of Minister of Armaments and Munitions. Speer, in turn, put Otto Merker, the managing director of the Magirus Works—who had absolutely no knowl-edge of the shipbuilding industry—in charge of the program. Merker had been highly successful in applying mass-production methods to the manu-facture of automobiles and fire trucks. Dönitz would later write:
Merker suggested that the U-boats should not be built on the slipways of the
shipbuilding yards as had hitherto been done, but should be built in sections at other suitable industrial plants and then sent to the yards for final assembly. (This method was then being successfully applied by the American, [Henry] Kaiser, to the mass-production of merchantmen in the
United States.) The method had the advantage of saving a great deal of time. Later, we found that boats of the size of Type XXI could be completed by mass-production methods in from 260,000 to 300,000 man-hours, whereas under the old method a boat of similar size required 460,000 man-hours. Under the Merker plan the first Type XXI boat was to be ready by the spring of 1944. Merker was also prepared to accept responsi-bility for putting these boats into mass-production at once. This meant that large numbers of them would be ready in the autumn of 1944.16
The ambitious Type XXI construction program—to provide a monthly output of 40 submarines—was personally approved by Hitler on 29 July 1943. Con-struction of a Type XXI submarine was to have taken six months from the start of rolling steel for the pres-sure hull to completion. The first stage in fabrication of the Type XXI hull was done at steel works, which rolled and cut the necessary steel plates and manu-factured the pressure hull sections. The sections were assembled at 32 factories that specialized in steel and boiler production. These section assembly facilities were selected not because of their prior experience in shipbuilding or from considerations of their dis-persed locations, but because of their having access to the inland waterways, as the large sections had to be transported by barge.
The 11 fitting-out yards completed the sec-tions—eight per submarine—-and installed all appropriate equipment and machinery, except for those items that were either too heavy (diesel engines) or would extend over two or more sections (main propeller shafting). None of the eight sec-tions could weigh more than 165 tons after com-pletion and fitting because of the capacity of the available cranes. These 11 shipyards all had experi-ence in submarine construction, which was neces-sary because of the installation of wiring and the fitting of main electric motors, gearing, switch-boards, and other specialized submarine equip-ment. The three final assembly yards were Blohm & Otto Merker
Voss in Hamburg; Deschimag AG-Weser in Bre-men; and Schichauwerft in Danzig. The first Type XXI, the U-3501, was launched on 19 April 1944 at the Danzig yard. The craft was incomplete, howev-er, as the openings in the hull had been temporari-ly covered by wooden blocks and she had to be towed into a floating drydock immediately. The
U-3501 was not commissioned until 29 July 1944.
Although mass production of the Type XXI was initiated, through early 1944 it was believed that the available supplies of lead and rubber in Germany would support increased battery production for only some 250 Type XXI submarines, after which produc-tion would have to shift over to Walter boats.
In addition to the Type XXI, production began of a smaller, coastal version of the electro submarine— the Type XXIII—while work was to continue on the ultimate underwater warships to be propelled by Walter closed-cycle turbines. Finally, with increased Allied operations in European coastal waters, Ger-many also commenced the production of large numbers of midget submarines.
Significantly, there was little hesitancy on behalf of Admiral Dönitz and his colleagues to make changes in the U-boat program to meet changing defensive and offensive strategic condi-tions as they arose, with little regard for the conti-nuity of existing construction. According to a U.S. Navy evaluation, “Superseded programs were ruthlessly cast aside to make way for succeeding designs. Several older type hulls were left unfin-ished on the ways when the yard in question was given an assignment in a new program which did not require these ways. In other instances, fabri-cated sections in sufficient number to complete several boats were discarded in order to make way for a new program.”17
A second, exceptionally note-worthy characteristic of the U-boat command was that whenever a new concept was presented, designs were usually solicited from several agencies. Ideas submitted at any time by recognized submarine engineers were given detailed consideration. Actual deliveries of the Type XXI and Type XXIII electro
sub-marines were far short of the numbers planned. Allied bombing raids on German industry increased steadily from the fall of 1943, hence crit-ical materials were not available in the required amounts. Even with a virtual halt in the production of earlier U-boat designs, Type XXI construction lagged because of material problems and Allied air attacks; the numbers of units completed were:
June 1944 1 July 1944 6 Aug 1944 6 Sep 1944 12 Oct 1944 18 Nov 1944 9 Dec 1944 28 Jan 1945 16 Feb 1945 14 Mar 1945 8 Apr 1945 1
Admiral Dönitz demanded extensive training in the Baltic Sea before the submarines could go on patrol. Meanwhile, U.S. and British aircraft were attacking submarines on trials and training, and destroyed several Type XXIs on the assembly ways.
The first operational Type XXI was the U-2511,
commanded by Korvettenkapitän Adalbert
Schnee.18 She sailed from Kiel on 18 March 1945 en route to Norway for final preparations for her first combat patrol, to the tanker shipping lanes of the Caribbean Sea. But upon arrival in Norway, Schnee had to correct problems with a periscope and diesel engines as well as repairing slight dam-age suffered during the U-2511’s deep-diving trials. The U-boat finally went to sea on patrol on 30 April. At the time another 12 Type XXI submarines
were in Norwegian ports being readied for war patrols, while some 50 more were being readied in German ports to sail to Norway for final combat preparations.
At sea on 4 May 1945, the U-2511 received Admiral Dönitz’s order for all U-boats to cease operations, dispose of their weapons, and return to port. According to Schnee:
First contact with the enemy was in the North Sea with a hunter killer-group. It was obvious that with its high under-water speed, the boat could not come to harm at the hands of these killer-groups. With a minor course alteration of 30o, proceeding submerged I evaded the group with the greatest ease. On receipt of order to cease fire on May 4, I turned back for Bergen; a few hours later I made contact with a British cruiser and several destroyers. I delivered a dummy under-water attack and in complete safety came within 500 yards [457 m] of the cruiser. As I found out later during a conversation when I was being interrogated by the British in Bergen, my action had passed completely unnoticed. From my own experience, the boat was first class in attack and defence; it was something completely new to any submariner.19
The first Type XXIII, the U-2324, put to sea in January 1945, and the design proved to be a success. Five of the 300-ton, 12-knot submarines went to sea, carrying out eight short-duration patrols against Allied merchant shipping. These electro boats sank six Allied ships without a loss, a harbinger of what might have been had more of the advanced sub-marines gone to sea. At the end of the war, 63 Type XXIII submarines had been completed, with scores more still on the building ways.
The Type XXI and its diminutive cousin, the Type XXIII, were truly revolutionary undersea
craft. A squadron, flotilla, or even a fleet of these submarines could not have won World War II. However, had they been available in late 1944 or even early 1945 they would have significantly slowed the advance of the Western Allies, per-haps delaying the end of the war in the West by several months or even a year. This, in turn, could have given the Soviet Union a more advan-tageous position in Europe when the fighting ended.
By 1944–1945 the Allied anti-submarine effort was too large and had too much momen-tum to have lost a new Battle of the Atlantic against the Type XXIs, while U.S. shipyards could replace merchant losses at a prodigious rate. Still, such a campaign by advanced U-boats would have seriously hurt the flow of weapons, matériel, and fuels to the Allied forces fighting in Western Europe, possibly opening the way for Red Army advances farther west-ward.
Other factors influencing such a scenario were that British and Soviet troops were rapidly overrunning the U-boat manufacture and assembly facilities in northern Germany, Allied tactical aircraft were denying the Baltic to the U-boats as a training and work-up area, and the overall chaos in Germany was denying supplies and provisions to the new U-boats.
Rather than affect the course of the war, the Type XXI’s place in history was to serve as the progenitor to the Cold War–era submarines designed and produced by the United States and the Soviet Union. U.S. Navy Department histori-an Gary Weir observed of the Type XXI:
For the first time since John Holland’s act of invention [in the late 1800s], a subma-rine had spent more time operating below the waves than on the surface. The para-digm shift completed with the nuclear-propelled USS Nautilus (SSN 571) in 1955 began with the type 21.20
TABLE1-1
1945 Submarine Designs
German German U.S. Soviet
Type XXI Type XXIII Tench SS 417 K Series XIV
Operational 1945 1945 1944 1940
Displacement
surface 1,621 tons 234 tons 1,570 tons 1,480 tons
submerged 1,819 tons 258 tons 2,415 tons 2,095 tons
Length 251 ft 7 in 113 ft 10 in 311 ft 8 in 320 ft 4 in (76.7 m) (34.7 m) (95.0 m) (97.65 m) Beam 21 ft 8 in 9 ft 10 in 27 ft 3 in 24 ft 3 in (6.6 m) (3.0 m) (8.3 m) (7.4 m) Draft 20 ft 8 in 12 ft 2 in 17 ft 14 ft 10 in (6.3 m) (3.7 m) (5.18 m) (4.51 m) Diesel engines 2 1 4 2 horsepower 4,000 580 5,400 8,400 Electric motors 2* 1* 2 2 horsepower 5,000 580 4,600 4,400 Shafts 2 1 2 2 Speed surface 15.6 kts 9.75 kts 20.25 kts 20 kts submerged 17.2 kts 12.5 kts 8.75 kts 10 kts Range (n.miles/knots) surface 11,150/12 2,600/8 11,000/10 submerged 285/6 175/4 96/2 Test depth 440 ft 330 ft 400 ft 330 ft (135 m) (100 m) (120 m) (100 m) Guns 4 x 20 mm nil 2 127-mm** 2 100-mm 2 40-mm 2 45-mm 4 MG Torpedo tubes*** 6 533-mm B 2 533-mm B 6 533-mm B 6 533-mm B 4 533-mm S 2 533-mm S 2 533-mm D Torpedoes 20 2 24 24# Complement 57 14 81 62
Notes: * Plus “creeping” motor.
** Guns varied; the “ultimate” gun armament approved in 1945 is listed. *** Bow + Stern + Deck torpedo tubes.
Advanced Diesel Submarines
2
T
he U.S. Navy constructed a large number of submarines during World War II: 201 sub-marines were delivered between 7 December 1941 and 15 August 1945; another 23 war-program submarines were completed after the war.1These all were “fleet boats,” large, long-range submarines originally designed to operate across the broad Pacific, scouting out the Japanese Fleet and then attriting Japanese capital ships before the major clash of U.S. and Japanese dreadnoughts.Even taking into account wartime losses and immediate postwar disposals of worn out or heavi-ly damaged fleet boats, the U.S. Navy emerged from World War II with about 150 relatively modern, long-range submarines. These fleet boats were of similar design; the principal difference was that the 38 surviving boats of the Gato (SS 212) class had an operating depth of 300 feet (90 m), while the 114 submarines of the similar Balao (SS 285) and Tench (SS 417) classes were known as “thick-hull”
sub-marines and were rated at 400 feet (120 m).2(See table 2-1.)
The depth increase to 400 feet was achieved by shifting from mild steel to High-Tensile Steel (HTS) and increasing the thickness of the pressure hull. HTS provided a yield strength of about 50,000 pounds per square inch. The increase in pressure hull weight was compensated for by meticulous attention to detail in every part of the submarine.3 On an operational basis the value of the depth increase was to evade an enemy depth charge attack, as depth charges were preset to detonate at a specific depth. The stronger hull could help reduce the effects of other ASW weapons—hedgehogs and acoustic homing torpedoes. And, all weapons took more time to reach greater depths. The fleet sub-marine Chopper (SS 342), in 1969, made an uncon-trolled dive off Cuba. The submarine’s bow reached a depth of 1,050 feet (320 m); she was able to make it back to the surface. She suffered some damage, The K1 at New London, Connecticut. She was the lead submarine for a planned massive program to produce small hunter-killer submarines. Her large bow housed the BQR-4 sonar array; the small, BQS-3 “single-ping” ranging sonar was fitted atop the BQR-4 dome.(U.S. Navy)
but the integrity of her pressure hull was intact. The U.S. fleet boat could be considered the most capable long-range submarine of any navy except for the German Type XXI. However, the Type XXI was far superior in underwater performance to the American fleet boat. Beyond the technical obsoles-cence of the fleet boat was the vital question of the role of the U.S. Navy and, especially, submarines in the post–World War II environment. U.S. sub-marines had a major role against Japanese warships and merchant shipping in the Pacific.4With Ger-many and Japan vanquished, only the Soviet Union appeared on the horizon as a potential antagonist of the United States. Soviet Russia had virtually no naval fleet or merchant fleet that would be the tar-gets for the U.S. submarine force. Indeed, seeking a rationale for modernizing the U.S. Navy, in 1947 the Director of Naval Intelligence told a classified meeting of senior officers:
It’s quite conceivable that long before 2000 A.D. Russia may either through military measures or political measures overrun Western Europe and obtain the advantage of the brains and technical know-how [of] the industry of Western Europe, probably including the United Kingdom. If that were to come to pass, thinking 50 years hence, it would change this whole strategic picture. It would bring Russia then into contact with United States seapower, so I don’t feel that we can, without any reservations whatso-ever, accept a situation which you now have where Russia is impotent on the sea and the
United States has potentially complete con-trol of the sea. . . .5[Emphasis added]
The U.S. Navy’s search for roles for submarines could be seen in an earlier memorandum from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations:
In World War II the primary task of our submarine force was the destruction of enemy shipping. The success achieved in this direction should not, however, be allowed to influence our planning for any future war. It is conceivable for example that we might be up against a land power whose economy does not depend on extensive sea-borne commerce. This was more or less the position in which Great Britain found her-self in the last war against Germany. Under these circumstances full use may still be made of the submarine as an instrument of stealth and surprise without regard to its properties as an anti-shipping weapon.6
The memorandum went on to propose the development of five specialized types of sub-marines: (1) torpedo attack, (2) guided missile, (3) cargo-troop carrier, (4) reconnaissance, and (5) midget. In addition, preparations already were under way for the conversion of several fleet boats to a radar picket configuration, intended to provide task forces with early warning of air attacks.
Primary attention, however, centered on the torpedo-attack submarine. With the end of the Pacific War, the Navy’s General Board—the princi-The U.S. Gato and Balao “fleet boats” were the most successful Allied submarines of World War II. princi-The Ronquil of the lat-ter class is shown with two 5-inch guns and two 40-mm guns; the masts aft of the two periscope shears mount the SV air search and (larger) SJ surface search radar antennas.(U.S. Navy)
pal advisory body to the Navy’s leadership—pro-posed the construction of an enlarged fleet-type submarine. Employing the basic fleet boat config-uration, which dated from the 1920s, the General Board’s submarine was to be a simply larger and hence more capable fleet boat. But the submarine community—manifested in the Submarine Offi-cers Conference—opposed the concept of an enlarged fleet boat.7(See table 2-1.)
During World War II several senior U.S. and Royal Navy officials knew of the German efforts to develop advanced, high-speed submarines. The source for this information was primarily Vice Admiral Katsuo Abe, the head of the Japanese mil-itary mission to Germany from 1943 to 1945.
Grossadmiral Karl Dönitz, the head of the German
Navy, personally met with Abe to brief him on new U-boat programs and permitted Abe to visit sub-marine building yards. Abe then sent details of the German programs to Tokyo by radio. Those enci-phered radio messages were promptly intercepted and deciphered by the British and Americans, revealing details of the Type XXI and other U-boat designs and programs.8
Allied knowledge of the Type XXI design was soon exceeded by the actual acquisition of the
advanced submarines. As Allied armies overran German shipyards, submarine blueprints, compo-nents, and other material were scooped up by the victors, as were some German submarine engineers and technicians. Immediately after the war, in accord with the Potsdam Agreement of July 1945, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States each took possession of ten completed U-boats; among those 30 submarines were 11 of the electro boats:
Type XXI Great Britain U-2518,9U-3017 Soviet Union U-2529, U-3035,
U-3041, U-3515
United States U-2513, U-3008 Type XXIII Great Britain U-2326, U-2348
Soviet Union U-2353
The U.S. Navy conducted extensive trials with the
U-2513. Among her passengers were senior naval
officers, including Chief of Naval Operations Chester W. Nimitz, a submariner, as well as President Harry S. Truman. She was operated until 1949. The U-3008 was similarly employed on trials until 1948.
Based on this cornucopia of German subma-rine technology, the U.S. submasubma-riners undertook a TABLE2-1
U.S. Submarine Concepts, 1945–1946
Tench SS 417 General Board Submarine Officers Conference
Displacement
surface 1,570 tons 1,960 tons 800 to 1,000 tons
submerged 2,415 tons
Length 311 ft 8 in 337 ft
(95.0 m) (102.7 m)
Propulsion
surface 4 diesel engines 4 diesel engines diesel-electric or turbine submerged 2 electric motors 2 electric motors
Shafts 2 2 Speed surface 20.25 kts 22.5 kts 14 kts submerged 8.75 kts 9 kts 26 kts Test depth 400 ft 500 ft 800 to 1,000 ft (120 m) (150 m) (240 to 300 m) Guns 2 127-mm 2 127-mm none Torpedo tubes* 6 533-mm B 6 533-mm B** 4 to 6 533-mm B
4 533-mm S 6 533-mm S** plus 533-mm amidships tubes
Torpedoes 24 approx. 30
Notes: * Bow + Stern + Amidships torpedo tubes.
** At the suggestion of the Chief of Naval Operations, 24-inch (610-mm) torpedo tubes to be considered as an alternative to the standard 21-inch (533-mm) tubes.
