SECTION 1.
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER SHALL BE VESTED IN THE CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES WHICH SHALL CONSIST OF A SENATE AND A HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT RESERVED TO THE PEOPLE BY
THE PROVISION ON INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM.
GARCIA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (237 SCRA 279) FACTS:
• In Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) in accord with RA no. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion Development Act of 1992.
• May 24, 1993: Petitioners filed a petition to annul the Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. In the said petition, they set some conditions which they want to be complied with before they include their municipality with SSEZ.
• Municipality of Morong did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its submission, which prompted the petitioners resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991 whereby they started to solicit the required number of signatures to cause the repeal of said resolution.
• Hon. Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice- Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan
Morong, wrote a letter to the Executive Director of COMELEC requesting the denial of the petition for a local initiative as it will just promote divisiveness, counter productive and futility.
• July 6, 1993: COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative on the ground that its subject is “merely a resolution” and not an ordinance
• July 13, 1993: COMELEC further resolved to direct Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty.
Benjaminn Casiano, to hold on the authentication of signatures being gathered by the petitioners ISSUE:
Is Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong Bataan the proper subject of an initiative? (i.e. Whether or not the power of initiative can be exercised even what is
questioned is only a resolution and not an ordinance?) HELD:
Petition is GRANTED and COMELEC Resolution 93-1623 are ANNULED and SET ASIDE. RATIO:
• In a Republican system, there are 2 kinds of legislative power:
1.
ORIGINAL- possessed by the sovereign people2.
DERIVATIVE- delegated by the sovereign people to legislative bodies and is subordinate to the original power of the people.• One of the lessons the people learned is the folly of completely surrendering the power to make laws to the legislature. Thus, in the new Constitution, a system of people’s initiative was thus installed which endows the people with the power to enact or reject any act or law by congress or local legislative body.
• COMELEC was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an initiative and referendum. Thus, on Aug 4, 1989, it approved RA no. 6735 entitled “An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating
Funds Therefor.” Which spelled out the requirements for the exercise of the power of initiative and referendum; procedure of the local initiative and referendum; and their limitations. It was also intended for the acts to be included as appropriate subjects of local initiatives.
•
LOCAL INITIATIVES- legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. It does not, however, deal with the subjects or matters that can be taken up in a local initiative.• The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinance but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local initiative. An act includes a resolution. Black defines an act as "an expression of will or purpose...it may denote something done...as a legislature, including not merely physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgments, resolves, awards and determinations." The law should be construed in harmony with and not in violation of the Constitution.
• Jan 16, 1991: COMELEC also promulgated RA 2300 where it was stated in Sec 5, Art 1 that the power of initiative may be exercised to amend the Constitution, or to enact a national legislation, a regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
• Sec 124 of the Local Government Code of 1991 does not limit the application of local initiatives to ordinances, but to all subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the Sanggunians to enact.
• Resolution vs. Ordinance
•
RESOLUTION- used whenever the legislature wishes to express an opinion which to have only a temporary effect•
ORDINANCE- intended primarily to permanently direct and control matters applying to persons or things in general.• Considering the lasting changes that will be wrought in the social, political, and economic
existence of the people of Morong by the inclusion of their municipality in the SSEZ, it is logical to hear their voice on the matter via an initiative.
RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO ( 39 PHIL. 660 ) FACTS:
The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It was alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. The petitioners were said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro and one Dabalos is said to be under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison of Calapan for having run away from the reservation.
In a resolution adopted by the provincial board of Mindoro it was stated that several attempts and schemes have been made for the advancement of the non-Christian people of Mindoro which were all a failure, and that unless other measure is taken for the Mangyan work of the province, no successful result will be obtained toward educating those people, and that it is deemed necessary to oblige them to live in one place, designated in Tigbao, in the interest of law and order .. It was also provided that any mangyan who shall refuse to comply with the order shall be imprisoned upon conviction. The said resolution has been duly approved by the Secretary of Interior and subsequently, the provincial governor approved of the same pursuant to Administrative Order of 1917, enacted by the legislature, ordering the non-Christians to take up their habitation on the site provided and their failure to abide shall be a ground for imprisonment. Petitioner Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwellings within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable in accordance with Sec. 2759 of Act 2711. The provincial governor and the provincial board directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao. Petitioner however, challenges the validity of the said Administrative Code. It shall be noted that that the substance of the law in question is not new to Philippine law. Antecedent laws make use of the term non-Christians with reference to uncivilized elements of the islands.
The court made a long enumeration of antecedent laws before and after the acquisition of the United States of the Philippine Islands. These laws denote an anxious regard for the welfare of the non Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and settled and consistent practice with reference to the method to be followed for their advancement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Whether or not Sec 2145 of Administrative Oreder of 1917 is valid.
HELD:
The SC ruled that the Petitioners were not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberlty. More so, Sec. 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
RATIO:
***Constitutional Issues*** Delegation of Legislative Power.
Petitioner contends that the order of the governor, directing the Maguianes to habitate themselves in Tigabo, is an undue delegation of legislative power.
The maxim of constitutional law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously protected. Judge Ranney in the case of Ohio stressed that: “The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law which necessarily involveds a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and pursuance of the law. The first cannot be delegated; the latter no objection can be made. As held in Wayman vs. Southard, Discretion may be committed by the legislature to an executive department or official. In the case at hand, the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board, and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law and such discretion is indeed necessary. Furthermore, an exception to the general rule, sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative to delegate powers to local authority. As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, they are better fitted to select sites which are favorable for improving the people who have misfortunes of being backward in the society.
Religious Discrimination
The words non-Christian have a clear, definite and well settled signification when used in the Philippines statute books as a descriptive adjective applied to tribes, people, or inhabitants dwelling in more or less remote districts and provinces throughout the islands. It denotes low grade of civilization of the individuals included in the class to which they apply.
Liberty: Due Process of Law; Equal Protection Clause
Liberty includes the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, an for that purpose to enter into contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion. Liberty as understood in democracies is liberty regulated by law. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizens would, if exercised without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally natural, such as assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. The authority conferred upon executive officials by the law in question does not unduly interfere with the liberty of the citizen when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered.
wich is reasonable; it is enforced according to regular methods of procedure; and it applies to all members of the same class.
Slavery and Involuntary Servitude
Slavery and Involuntary Servitude denote a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another. Confinement in the reservations in accordance with the said Administrative Code of 1917 does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude.
Police Power
The police power of the State is a power coextensive with self preservation. The Philippines has both on reason and authority the right to exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. Sec. 2145 of the Administrative Order of 1917 is a pure exercise of police power and the court cannot declare that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority in enacting the said law.
Legislative Intent
The fundamental objective of government policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called non-Christians and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic development and advancement in civilization. In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purposes of bthe Government are to gather together the children for educational purposes, and to improve the health and morals—to begin the process of civilization. In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the Stae is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature in enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are to protect the settlers in Mindoro and to develop the resources of the great Island.
PELAEZ VS. THE AUDITOR GENERAL (15 SCRA 569) FACTS:
• September 4 to October 29, 1964: President of the Philippines issued EO Nos. 93- 121, 124 and 126- 129 which created 33 municipalities.
• November 10, 1964: Emmanuel Pelaez, Vice President of the Philippines, instituted a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against Auditor General, to restrain him from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities
ISSUE:
EO Nos. 93- 121, 124 and 126- 129 are null and void upon the ground that said Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.
• January 1, 1960: RA No. 2370 was enacted. This act states that barrios may ‘not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed’ except by an Act of Congress or of the
corresponding provincial board “upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected” and the recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated
• Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed executive orders are based, provides:
The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, separate or merge any province, name any new subdivision created and change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the
Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the new districts so formed.
Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing authority, an equitable distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions thereby affected shall be made in such manner as may be recommended by the (Insular Auditor) Auditor General and approved by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines.
• The power to fix common boundaries may partake of an administrative nature since it involves the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities.
• But the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature.
• Although the Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of the law, it is essential that said law should be:
1. Complete in itself
o must set forth the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate
2. Fix a standard
o The limits of which are sufficiently determinate must conform in the performance of his functions.
• Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.
• if the validity of the delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring about a total collapse of the democratic system established by our Constitution, which it is the special duty and privilege of this Court to uphold.
•
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executivedepartments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments
are concerned.
• Thus, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority.
•
Also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices implies no more than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise of discretion by its officials.•
Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.EASTER SHIPPING LINES, INC. vs. POEA (166 SCRA 533) FACTS:
• Private respondent’s husband, Vitaliano Saco, was the chief officer of M/V Eastern Polaris. He was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan. His widow sued for damages with the POEA under EO No. 1985 and Memorandum Circular No. 2. Thus, she was hereby awarded the sum of P192, 000.
• The owner of the vessel, Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. (ESLI), argued that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband wasn’t an overseas worker but a domestic employee and consequently, his widow’s claim should have been filed with SSS, subject to appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the memorandum circular issued by the POEA on which they based their decision in favor of private respondent, a valid delegation of legislative power?
HELD:
The petition is DISMISSED.
RATIO:
• Legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforces, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
• There are 2 accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power.
1.
COMPLETENESS TEST- the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegates the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.2.
SUFFICIENT TEST- there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delagate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
• The principle of non- delegation of powers is applicable to all the 3 major powers of the
instances when its delegation is permitted. Thus the delegation of the legislative has become the rule and its non- delegation the exception.
• The reason for the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding it attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary.
•
Reasons for delegation of legislative powers are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. Delegated power to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the stature is called power of subordinate legislation.• With such power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in” the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations. These regulations have the force and effect of law. Thus, Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by the POEA, is an exercise of administrative regulation wherein the POEA is mandated to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to fair and equitable employment practices.
• It was also contended that ESLI has been denied due process because of POEA’s Memorandum sustained and applied it as an uninformed criticism of administrative law itself. Administrative agencies are vested with 2 basic powers,
1. quasi- legislative- enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations 2. quasi- judicial- enables them to interpret and apply such regulations.
Such arrangement cannot be considered violative of due process as long as the cardinal rights in the ANG TIBAY vs CIR case are observed.
• Whatever doubts regarding the rights of the parties are resolved in favor of private respondent under the principle that those with less in life should have more in law.
ARANETA vs. GATMAITAN (101 SCRA 329) FACTS:
• On account of the belief of sustenance fishermen that using a trawl in fishing caused the
depletion of the marine resources of that area. There arose a general clamor among the majority of the inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay.
• Dec 18, 1953: Municipal Mayor’s League passed a resolution condemning the operation of trawls as the cause of the wanton destruction of the shrimp specie and resolving to petition the
President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay by declaring it closed for trawl fishing at a certain period of the year.
• March 27, 1954: Municipal Mayor’s League sent another resolution praying that the President to protect them and the fish resources of San Miguel Bay by banning the operation of trawls therein.
• As a response, President issued the following:
EXECUTIVE ORDER DATE PURPOSE
EO no. 22 April 5, 1954 Prohibits the use of trawls in
San Miguel Bay
EO no. 66 (amended EO no. 22) September 23, 1954 Prohibits the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, EXCEPT during the typhoon season EO no. 80 (revived EO no. 22) November 2, 1954 (to take effect after Dec. 31,
1954) ISSUE:
1. Whether the Secretary of an Executive Department and the Director of a Bureau, acting in their capacities as such Government officials, could lawfully be required to post a bond in an action
against them;
2. Whether the President of the Philippines has authority to issue Executive Order Nos. 22, 66 and 80, banning the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay;
3. Whether Executive Order Nos. 22, 66 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the President.
HELD:
Declared EO Nos. 22, 66 and 80, series of 1954, valid for having been issued by authority of the Constitution, the Revised Administrative Code and Fisheries Act.
RATIO: [Issue # 1]
• There are 2 requisites to be satisfied if an injunction is to issue: 1. The existence of the right sought to be protected
2. Acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right.
• The action being one against the petitioners as such Government officials, is essentially one against the Government, and to require these officials to file a bond would be indirectly a requirement against the Government, for as regards bonds or damages that may be proved, if any, the real party in interest would be the Republic of the Philippines.
[Issue # 2]:
• Agriculture and Natural Resources, an executive department and which by law, is placed under the direction and control of the Secretary, who exercises its functions subject to the general supervision and control of the President.
• Executive orders, regulations, decrees and proclamations relative to matters under the supervision or jurisdiction of a Department, the promulgation whereof is expressly assigned by law to the President of the Philippines, shall as a general rule, be issued upon proposition and recommendation of the respective Department.
• Consequently, the promulgation of the questioned executive orders was upon the proposition and recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
• Thus, SC declare that EO Nos. 22, 66 and 80, series of 1954, of the President, are valid and issued by authority of law.
[Issue # 3]:
DELEGATION OF THE POWER TO
LEGISLATE CONFERRING OF AUTHORITY OR DISCRETION AS THE EXECUTION OF THE LAW CONSISTS Involves a discretion as to what the law shall be The authority or discretion as to its execution has to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law
Can’t be done No valid objection can be made
• From the provisions of Act no. 4003 as amended by Commonwealth Act no. 471, Congress 1. Declared it unlawful to “take or catch fry or fish eggs in the territorial waters of the
Philippines
2. It authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by the regulations such restrictions as may be deemed necessary to be imposed on the use of any fishing net or fishing device for the protection of fish or fry eggs.
3. It authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to set aside and establish fishery reservations or fish refuges and sanctuaries ot be administered in the manner to be prescribed by him and declared it unlawful for any person to take. Destroy or kill in any of the said places, or in any manner disturb or drive away or take therefrom, any fish fry or fish eggs
4. Penalize the execution of such acts declared unlawful and in violation of this Act (no. 4003) or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.
• Act no. 4003 is complete in itself and provides sufficient standard to guide the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in implementation of the said law.
• When the President issued EO No. 80, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of San Miguel Bay and dispose of issues of general concern which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law.
SECTION 5.
1.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE COMPOSED OF NOT MORE THAN TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY MEMBERS, UNLESS OTHERWISE FIXED BY LAW, WHO SHALL BE ELECTED FROM LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS APPORTIONED AMONG THE PROVINCES, CITIES, AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NUMBER OF THEIR RESPECTIVE INHABITANTS, AND ON THE BASIS OF A UNIFORM AND PROGRESSIVE RATIO, AND THOSE WHO, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, SHALL BE ELECTED THROUGH A PARTY-LIST SYSTEM OF REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR
ORGANIZATIONS.
2.THE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY PER CENTUM OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES INCLUDING THOSE UNDER THE PARTY LIST. FOR THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION, ONE-HALF OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE FILLED, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR ELECTION FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR.
3. EACH LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT SHALL COMPRISE, AS FAR AS PRACTICABLE, CONTIGUOUS, COMPACT, AND ADJACENT TERRITORY. EACH CITY WITH A POPULATION OF AT LEAST TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND, OR EACH PROVINCE, SHALL HAVE AT LEAST ONE
REPRESENTATIVE.
4. WITHIN THREE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RETURN OF EVERY CENSUS, THE CONGRESS SHALL MAKE A REAPPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS BASED ON THE STANDARDS PROVIDED IN THIS SECTION.
MARIANO vs. COMELEC (242 SCRA 211) FACTS:
1. Two petitions assailing certain provisions of RA No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City) as unconstitutional.
2. GR No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief, and assailing the statute as unconstitutional on the following grounds:
a. Section 2 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code.
b. Section 51 attempts to alter or restart the ‘three-consecutive term’ limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
c. Section 52:
i. Increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter) – violates the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three years following the return of every census ii. The increase in legislative district was not expressed in the bill title
iii. The addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accordance with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution – the population of Makati is 450,000 3. GR No. 118627 involves a petition which assails Section 52 as unconstitutional on the same
grounds as aforestated. ISSUE:
Whether or not the questioned provisions are constitutional. HELD:
Yes. Petitions dismissed. RATIO:
a. D: The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local government
unit cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction.
Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries.
D: The existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty
which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit.
Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati.
b. D: The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are: (1) there
must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events (i.e. Mayor Binay will run again, etc.)
Petitioners merely posed a hypothetical issue.
Petitioners (residents of Taguig) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. c. D: Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the
charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law.
This is exactly what the Congress did in enacting RA No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati’s legislative district.
D: The policy of the Court favors a liberal construction of the “one title one subject” rule so as not
to impede legislation. The Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, it should be sufficient
compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject.
D: Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at
least one representative. Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than 250,000 shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative.
Although Makati has a population of 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of 250,000.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY VS. COMELEC (404 SCRA 719) FACTS:
• COMELEC issued the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 ON March 26, 2001 where it approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties in the 2001 party- list elections.
• April 10, 2001: Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed a petition praying that the names of some herein respondents be deleted from the Certified List of Political parties/ Sectoral Parties/ Organizations/ Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections. Also asked as an alternative that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvasses, and that latter’s nominees not be proclaimed
• April 11, 2001: Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna- Youth also filed a petition for Cancellation of Regisration and Nomination against some of herein respondents.
• April 17, 2001: Bayan Muna filed a Petition challenging COMELEC Omnibus Resolution no. 3785
• May 9, 2001: Court ordered a consolidation of the 2 Petitions before it ISSUES:
1. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party- list elections
2. Whether or not the party- list system is exclusive to ‘marginalized and underrepresented’ sectors and organizations
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
HELD:
This case is REMANDED to the COMELEC, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party- list participants.
RATIO: [for issue # 1]
• Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party- list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties.
• Section 3 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that the members of the House of
Representatives may “be elected through a party- list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
• Under sections 7 and 8 of Article XI(C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party- list system.
• During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian Monsod pointed out that the participants in the party- list system may “be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao.
o
Comm. Monsod stated that the purpose of the party- list provision was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place 3rd or 4th incongressional district elections to win a seat in Congress and consequently, have a voice in the Assembly.
• RA 7941 provides us with the definitions of the following:
o POLITICAL PARTY- an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology, or platform, principles or policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
o SECTORAL PARTY- an organized group of citizens belong to identifiable sectors, such as those enumerated in Art. 6 Section 5(2) of the Constitution, which includes labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities and women and those added by RA 7941 like the fisherfolk, elderly, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers and
professionals.
o SECTORAL ORGANIZATION- a group of citizens who share the same or similar attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns
o COALITION- an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral perties or organizations for election purpose.
[for issue # 2]
• The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party- list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941.
• Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ration, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party- list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations
(2) The party- list representatieves shall constitute 20% of the total number of representatives including those under the party- list. For 3 consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, ½ of the seats allocated to party- list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
• Said provision on the party- list system is not self- executory and is thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves:
The key words in this policy are “proportional representations”, “marginalized and underrepresented” and “lack of well- defined constituencies”
♦ PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION refers to the representation of the “marginalized and underrepresented” as exemplified by the enumeration in Sec. 5 of the law.
The party- list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Sec. 5.
The persons nominated by the party- list candidate organization must be “Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties”
♦ LACK OF WELL- DEFINED CONSTITUENCEY refers to the absence of traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the “marginalized and underrepresented”
Role of the COMELEC is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are
“marginalized and underrepresented” become members of Congress under the party- list, Filipino- style
Intent is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves.
Thus the policy of the implementation of the law will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, to become members of the House of Representatives.
♦
Sec 5 of RA 7941 demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party list system.The Party- list System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions
RA no. 7941 “does not limit the participation in the party- list system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society”
It contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Sec. 6 of RA no. 7941 may participate in the elections.
The assertion of the OSG that the party- list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear statutory principle. Its claim that even the super- rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the paty- list system.
The OSG’s position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. While the mega- rich and overrepresented are numerically speaking, a tiny minority,
they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented.
Allowing the non- marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party- list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalize and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it.
The party- list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore cannot allow the party- list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented.
[for issue # 3]
• What is needed under the present circumstances is a factual determination of whether respondents therein and all the 154 previously approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate in the party- list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
• The court deems it proper therefore to remand the case to the Comelec to determine after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations comply with the requirements of law.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY VS. COMELEC (404 SCRA 719) FACTS:
• Motion for proclamation filed by various party-list participants.
• 4 unique parameters of the Philippine party system:
o
1st, the twenty percent allocation -- the combined number of all party-list congressmenshall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party-list.
o
2nd, the two percent threshold -- only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent ofthe total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives. chan robles virtual law library
o
3rd, the three-seat limit -- each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes itactually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.
o
4th, proportional representation -- the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled toshall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.
• June 26, 2001; the Court promulgated a decision requiring Comelec to commence hearings following the guidelines stated in the said decision. They are also directed by the court to start the hearing of those who look like they have garnered a certain number of votes to qualify for a seat. Furthermore, they directed to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice. Finally, the May 9, 2001 resolution refraining comelec from declaring any winner shall remain in force until after the comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance.
• July 27, 2001; Comelec recommended certain parties have passed the 8 point guideline and certain parties disqualified.
• Aug 14, 2001; court issued a resolution partially lifting the may 9, 2001 TRO to proclaim BAYAN MUNA as the first winner in the party list election.
• Aug 24, 2001; court again issued a resolution partially lifting the may 9, 2001 TRO to proclaim AKBAYAN and BUTI as winning party list groups.
• Jan 29, 2002; court agreed to qualify APEC and CIBAC, which had previously been disqualified by Comelec in its First Compliance Report. Thus, court lifted the may 9, 2001 TRO to proclaim apec and cibac as winners. To summarize, after the Court had accepted and approved the First Partial Compliance Report and its amendments, the following nominees were validly proclaimed winners: BAYAN MUNA (Satur C. Ocampo, Crispin B. Beltran and Liza L. Maza), AKBAYAN (Loretta Ann P. Rosales), BUTIL (Benjamin A. Cruz), APEC (Ernesto C. Pablo) and CIBAC (Joel J. Villanueva).
• Comelec amended its Compliance Reports by adding 4 more party-list participants (BUHAY, COCOFED, NCIA and BAGONG BAYANI) to the list of qualified candidates for the May 14, 2001 elections.
• Nov 25, 2002; OSG contended that NCIA is not a qualified party under the july 27, 2001 report. ISSUE:
Aside from those already validly proclaimed pursuant to earlier Resolutions of this Court, are there other list candidates that should be proclaimed winners? Does the clause "total votes cast for the party-list system" include only those ballots cast for qualified party-party-list candidates?
DECISION:
Having obtained at least two percent of the total valid votes cast in the last party-list elections, the following qualified participants are declared elected with one nominee each: BUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS and ABANSE! PINAY.
RATIO:
• Comelec made a mistake in disqualifying COCOFED and BUHAY. COCOFED and BUHAY are qualified. Comelec report on BUHAY was merely anchored on conjectures or speculations. On COCOFED, the bylaws making the chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority an automatic member of the COCOFED National Board has already been deleted as early as May, 1988. The primary purposes of COCOFED's Articles of Incorporation authorize the organization to help explore and obtain possible technical and financial assistance for industry development from private or governmental sources, this statement does not by itself constitute such substantial evidence to support a conclusion that the COCOFED is an entity funded or assisted by the government.
•
The votes obtained by disqualified party-list candidates are not to be counted in determining the total votes cast for the party-list system. In the present cases, the votes they obtained should be deducted from the canvass of the total number of votes cast during the May 14, 2001 elections. Consequently, following Section 12 of RA 7941, a new tally and ranking of qualified party-list candidates is now in order, according to the percentage of votes they obtained as compared with the total valid votes cast nationwide. The votes for these disqualified groups total 8,595,630. Subtracting this figure from 15,118,815 (the total votes cast as reported in the Compliance Reports) will result in a new total of 6,523,185 valid votes cast for the May 14, 2001 party-list elections. This new figure representing the votes cast for the 46 qualified party-list participants will now be the basis for computing the two-percent threshold for victory and the number of seats the winners are entitled to.• To repeat, there are only 46 qualified party-list participants. The Commission recommended for qualification only 42 party-list candidates in its three Compliance Reports. To this figure should be added the two participants that were approved in our January 29, 2002 Resolution, plus another two (BUHAY and COCOFED).
• The court found that only 12 of the 46 qualified parties obtained at least two percent of the 6,523,185 total valid votes cast.
NO PERSON SHALL BE A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES UNLESS HE IS A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES AND, ON THE DAY OF THE ELECTION, IS AT LEAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF AGE, ABLE TO READ AND WRITE, AND, EXCEPT THE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES, A REGISTERED VOTER IN THE DISTRICT IN WHICH HE SHALL BE ELECTED, AND A RESIDENT THEREOF FOR A PERIOD OF NOT LESS THAN ONE YEAR IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE DAY OF THE ELECTION.
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC
[G.R. 119976/ SEPTEMBER 18, 1995/ JUSTICE KAPUNAN] FACTS:
•
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy for representative of the 1st district ofLeyte.
•
Private respondent, Cirilo Roy Montejo, incumbent Representative of the 1st district of Leyte, fileda petition for Petitioner’s disqualification, alleging that she did not meet the Constitutional requirement for residency.
•
Petitioner the 1yr residency required as her Certificate of Candidacy showed “____ years andseven months”.
• Petitioner then filed with the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry “seven” months to “since childhood”. This was not accepted for it was filed out of time.
•
It was then filed to COMELEC, where the 2nd Division, by a vote of 2:1, came up with theresolution:
1. Finding the private respondent’s Petition for Disqualification meritorious
2. striking off petitioner’s Corrected/Amended Cert. of Candidacy of March 31, 1995 3. Canceling her original Cert. of Candidacy
• Even the MR to COMELEC was denied.
• Petitioner’s reasons for the change:
o It should be noted that she was born and raised in Leyte.
o She moved to Manila to pursue her studies as well as work. She met Ferdinand Marcos who was then the representative of Batac, Ilocos Norte. When they got married, she followed her husband throughout his political career.
o Her husband fixed their residence in Batac but during his presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace.
o After the death of her husband and her exile, she was not allowed to return to her ancestral home as it was sequestered by the PCGG, forcing her to live in different residences. Eventually she returned to Leyte and settled there.
ISSUES:
• Whether or not petitioner met the 1yr residency qualification for election purposes.
• Whether or not COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction before and after the elections. HELD:
1. Qualification on 1 yr residency
• No. Depending on the justice, there are multiple reasons or opinions. First, the SC said that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous to domicile.
•
In the case Ong vs. Republic, the Court’s concept of domicile is to mean an individual’s “permanent home”.she got married, the husband has set their domicile and she lost her domicile of Leyte by operation of law but regained such domicile when her husband died. It was further decided that when her husband died, the return to her original domicile was as if there was no interruption. Furthermore, on basis of another opinion, upon the death of her husband, she had the freedom to choose her domicile.
• An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes.
• To effect a change in domicile, one must demonstrate: 1. an actual removal or an actual change of domicile
2. bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose
• The absence of any, residence of origin is deemed to continue. 2. Qualification on 1 yr residency
• The contention of the petitioner is that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House Representatives in accordance with Art. VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution
• Doctrine: a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory, “so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result, it would have clearly indicated it.”
• Mandatory vs. Directory provision
o Difference lies on grounds of expediency; less injury results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law
o Statute is construed to be merely directory when “the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act.”
AQUINO VS. COMELEC (248 SCRA 400) FACTS:
• Agapito A. Aquino files his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati. (Note: he stated his residency period as 0 years and 10 months)
• Move Makati and Mateo Bedon (LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP) files petition to disqualify Aquino for lacking residence qualification.
• COMELEC dismissed petition to disqualify
• Move Makati and Mateo files a motion for reconsideration.
• On the election Aquino wins with 38,547 votes over his opponent, Agusto Syjuco, with 35,910 votes.
• COMELEC grants motion for reconsideration declaring Aquino as ineligible and thus disqualified as a candidate and determine the winner from the remaining legible candidates.
ISSUE:
WON Aquino is legible to run for the said position
WON Declaring the winner from the remaining legible candidates is constitutional HELD:
NO to both issues. RATIO:
Sec 6 Art VI of the Constitution provides that a candidate must be a resident of the district he is
representing for at least one year before the elections. Aquino has always been a resident of Conception, Tarlac prior to the elections. Although he leased a condominium unit within the district he will be
representing, mere leasing instead of buying the unit is not evident of a strong intention to establish a domicile.
Declaring the person who garnered the second highest number of votes as the winner because the choice of the majority is disqualified is against the sovereign will of the people.
DOMINO VS. COMMISSSION ON ELECTIONS (310 SCRA 546) FACTS:
Challenged in this case for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction are the Resolution of May 6, 1998 of the Second Division of the COMELEC, declaring petitioner Juan Domino disqualified as
candidate for representative of Sarangani in May 11, 1998 elections and the Decision of May 29, 1998 of the COMELEC en banc denying DOMINO’s motion for reconsideration.
On March 25, 1998, Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of Sarangani, indicating that he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for one year and two months immediately preceding the election. On March 30, private respondents Narcisio Raglifo Jr, Eddie Java, JuanBayonito Jr, Rosario Samson and Dionisio Lim filed with the COMELEC petition to deny due course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy. They alleged that Domino is not a resident much less a registered voter of Sarangani. They had substantiated evidences which include: the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent wherein he claims he have resided in the constituency where he seeks election for one year and 2 months and that he is a registered voter of Sarangani; Voter’s Registration Record dated June 22, 1997 indication registration in Balara, QC. Respondent’s Community Tax Certificate dated Jan 15, 1997. Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for the position of Congressman in the 3rd district if
QC where he stated his residence in the constituency where he seeks to be elected immediately
preceding the election as 3 years, 5 months an d that he is a registered voter in Balara QC; a copy of the application for transfer of registration records due to change of residence and copy of the sworn
application for cancellation of voter’s previous registration.
For his defense, Domino maintained that he had compled with the one year residence requirement and that he has even residing in Sarangani since Jan1997 he showed a copy of the contract lease between Nora Dacaldacal as Lessor and respondent as Lessee executed in January 15, 1997, copy if the application for Transfer of Registration Records due to Change of Residence, CTC of the notice of approval of Application.
On May 6, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution declaring Domino disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of Sarangani for lack of the one year residence
requirement a likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy He negates all his protestations that he established residence in SAranganias early as Jan 1997. He lacks one year residence requirement.
On May 11, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus Resolution 3046 ordering that the cast votes for Domino be counted but to suspend proclamation of winning since the resolution disqualifying him has not yet become final and executor.
On September 15,1998 Lucille Chionbian-Solon, the candidate receiving the second highest number of votes was allowed by the Court to intervene. Intervenor asks the court to uphold Domino’s disqualification and to proclaim her as the representative of Sarangani.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the judgment of MTC of QC declaring the petitioner as resident of Sarangani, not QC is final
2) Whether or not petitioner resided in Sarangani, one year preceding the elections 3) Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition
DECISION:
the petition is DISMISSED
RATIO:
The COMELEC has the jurisdiction to determine whether false representation as to material facts was made in the certificate of candidacy that will include the residence of the candidate. A decision in an exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters, even if final and unappealable, does not acquire the nature of res judicata. The MTC exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared Domino a resident of
Sarangani.
The term residence as used in law means the same thing as domicile which imports not only intention to reside but also personal presence in the place. Three rules must be born in mind,1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; 2) when once established, it remains until new one is acquired; 3)a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time.
Domicile requires not just bodily presence but also a declared probable intent to make it one’s fixed abode. The lease contract entered in Jan 1997 does not support a change of domicile. Domino’s lack of intention to abandon his residence in QC is further that he was a qualified candidate strengthened by his act of registering as voter in QC. Domino still falls short of one year residency requirement.
The COMELECunder Sec 78 Art 9 of the Omnibus Election Code has jurisdiction over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy and continues even after election, if for any reason no final judgment or disqualification is rendered before the election and the candidate facing the
disqualification received the highest number of votes.
It is now settled that the candidate who received the second highest number of votes MAY NOT BE PROCLAIMED WINNER in case the WINNER IS DISQUALIFIED. Thus the votes cast for DOMINO are presumed to have been cast in the sincere belief.
DOMINO V. COMELEC (310 SCRA 546) FACTS:
This is a special civil action in the Supreme Court where a petition for certiorari is filed. Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections, and won over the petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection. Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz lost his Filipino citizenship when he enlisted in the US Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the US. On March 17,
1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippines Citizenship through repatriation. After losing in the May 1998 elections, petitioner Bengson III filed a case of Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI Sec. 6 of the Constitution, which reads:
“No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.”
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan. Hence, this petition for certiorari. Petitioner Bengson III argue that HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, (1) when it ruled that the private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact the fact that he has ceased being such in view of the loss and
renunciation of such citizenship on his part; (2) when it considered the private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship; (3) when it
dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status. He also asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost his Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the US and had to reacquire the same by repatriation, based from Article IV Sec. 2 of the Constitution, which expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD:
YES. Petition is dismissed. RATIO:
There are 2 ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization, which results to the 2 kinds of citizens – the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person, who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof. On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have been Filipino citizens through naturalization where an applicant has to prove that he possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship become executory only after 2 years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to the a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.
Filipinos who lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in WW II; (3) service in the armed forces of the US at any other time; (4) marriage of a Filipina woman to an alien, and (5) political and economic necessity. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. In the case at bar, respondent Cruz, is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as a son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner’s contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in decision, the term
“natural-born citizen” was first defined in Article III Sec. 4 of the 1973 Constitution where there are two categories of Filipino citizens who are not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. However, in the present Constitution, those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: “those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3, Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. Consequently, under the present constitution, there are two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with the law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e. did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is natural-born Filipino. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through the naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.
CODILLA V. DE VENECIA (150605, 393 SCRA 639) FACTS:
These are petitions for certiorari to review the decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Petitioners, Sixto Balinguit and Antonio Co, and the private respondent Jose Ong Jr. vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar in the May 1987
congressional election. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the said district. Petitioners filed election protests. Petitioners contend his qualification as a member of the House of Representatives on the basis of Article VI Sec. 6 of the present Constitution. The HRET declared that the respondent Jose Ong Jr. is a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was however, denied. Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
On the issue of jurisdiction
The Constitution explicitly provides that the HRET and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the respective members, as stated in Article VI Sec. 17. The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear, and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these tribunals. It has been argued that under Article VI Sec. 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may exist as it exists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided political composition of the two Electoral Tribunals.
On the issue of citizenship
The grandfather of private respondent, Ong Te arrived in the Philippines from China in 1895 and was able to obtain a certificate of residence from then Spanish colonial administration. Ong Te brought the private respondent’s father, Jose Ong Chuan, to Samar from China. The respondent’s father, Jose Ong Chuan filed with Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization, and the same court declared him to be a Filipino citizen. Respondent Ong was then 9 years old. The house of the respondent in Samar was burnt twice and they rebuilt it twice in the same district twice. Ong, after completing his elementary
education in Samar, went to Manila to acquire his secondary and college education. He took and passed the CPA Board Examinations and since employment opportunities were better in Manila, Ong found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked the hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his full brother, Emil Ong, was elected as a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention where his status as a natural-born citizen was challenged. Emil was declared a natural born Filipino.
Respondent Ong’s situation is argued to rest on Article IV Sec. 1(3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that “those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of the majority” are citizens of the Philippines. Section 2 of the same article also reads in its last sentence: “Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens”. There is no dispute that the respondent’s mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Thus, the contention lies on whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen. The aforementioned provision was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where, one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. Under the 1973 Constitution, they were both considered as natural-born citizens with legislative intent to correct an unfair position which discriminates against Filipino women. The petitioners also argue that the respondent’s father was not validly, a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of oath of citizenship.
On the issue of residency
The petitioners argue that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore be a resident of the said place.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion in its decision on the grounds that (1) respondent Ong is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and (2) respondent Ong is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
HELD:
NO. Petition is dismissed. The questioned decision of the HRET is affirmed. Respondent Ong is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
RATIO:
On the issue of jurisdiction
In the exercise of Article VIII Sec. 1 of the present Constitution, the Court is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to the lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET to decide. The degree of judicial intervention should not be made to depend on how many legislative members of the HRET belong to this party or that party. The test remains the same – manifest grave abuse of discretion. In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.
On the issue of citizenship