“ISAGANI CRUZ AND CESAR EUROPA vs. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT AND CHAIRMAN AND
COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES”
CASE NO.: G.R. 135385, 347 SCRA 128,
CHAPTER: REGISTRATION UNDER THE INEDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT, p. 117-134 PONENTE: Per Curiam
FACTS:
Cruz and Cesar, as taxpayers, challenged the constitutionality of RA 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Rights Acts of 1997) on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the state’s ownership over lands of public domain, in violation of the Regalian Doctrine (Sec. 2 Art. 12 of the Constitution)
7 Justices voted to deny and 7 voted to grant the petition. After deliberation, the result remained the same. Pursuant to Rule 56 Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court, petition dismissed.
ISSUE:
WON the Regalian was violated? RULING:
RA 8371or the IPRA is constitutional
• Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples’ existence.
• Carino vs. Insular gov’t.: exception to the Regalian Doctrine native title :
The Court laid down the presumption of a certain title held: (a) as far as testimony or memory went, and (b) under a claim of private ownership. Land held by this title is presumed to “never have been public land.”
• Right of ownership and possession is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
• Ancestral domain is owned in common by the ICCs/IPs and not by any particular person. It is private simply because it is not part of the public domain. The property held in common “cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed” because it was meant to benefit the whole indigenous community and not merely the individual member.
• But while ancestral domains and ancestral lands are considered private in character, it does not necessarily mean that natural resources found therein belong to the ICCs/IPs as private property.
• Held not only by the present possessors but extends to all generations of ICCs/IPs
• Ownership over national resources in the ancestral domains remains with the state and the ICCs/IPs is merely granted the right to manage and conserve them for future generations.
CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee. CASE NO: GR NO 8936
CHAPTER: GENERAL PROVISION PURPOSE OF TORRENS SYSTEM P.8 PONENTE: JHONSON
FACTS:
The plaintiffs and defendants occupy as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in Manila. There exist for number of years a stone wall between the lots and located on the lot of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed a petition in Court of Land Registration for the registration of the lot and it was granted including the wall,under the Torrensa System (1906). Thereafter the predecessor of defendant in 1912 also presented petiton in the Court of Land Registration for the lot occupied by them. The court decreed the registration of said title but it also included the said wall and the labd it was occupying. The plaintiffs upon knowledge sought for the correction .
ISSUE:
Who is the owner of the wall and land occupied by it? RULING
: 1) The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate. "if it can be very clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to written documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be conclusive.
BECAUSE:
1)Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened, for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud.
2.) primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose within the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title, they had mortgaged or sold their right, what would be the position or right of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them. In the present case, the appellee was the first negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration in the name of the appellants.
3.)The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. 4.)Effect of Registration of Title: It does not give the owner any better titile than he had. he does not obtain the title by virtue of a certificate. He secures certificate by virtue that he has e fee sample tit****The Plaintiffs are the owner, being prior party who registered
ALFREDO CHING, petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS & PEDRO ASEDILLO, respondents CASE NO: G.R. No. L-59731 January 11, 1990
CHAPTER: GENERAL PROVISIONS PONENTE: J. PARAS
FACTS:
Spouses Maximo Nofuente and Dominga Lumandan registered a parcel of land situated at Sitio of Kay-Biga Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality of Paranaque, Province of Rizal. In August 1960, 5/6 portion of the property was reconveyed by said spouses to Francisco, Regina, Perfects, Constancio and Matilde all surnamed Nofuente. By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng the reconveyance with the Nofuente’s were cancelled. On October 19, 1965, Ching Leng died. His legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (a petition for administration of the estate of deceased Ching Leng. Notice of hearing on the petition was duly published. No oppositors appeared at the hearing, consequently after presentation of evidence petitioner Alfredo Ching was appointed administrator of Ching Leng's estate. Thirteen (13) years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was commenced on by private respondent Pedro Asedillo for reconveyance of the abovesaid property and it was given to Ching Leng's last known address is No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City (not No. 441 Libertad Street, Pasay City, as alleged in private respondent's complaint). An amended complaint was filed by private respondent against Ching Leng and/or Estate of Ching Leng alleging "That on account of the fact that the defendant has been residing abroad up to the present, and it is not known whether the defendant is still alive or dead, he or his estate may be served by summons and other processes only by publication;" Summons by publication to Ching Leng and/or his estate was directed by the trial court. Despite the lapse of the sixty (60) day period within which to answer defendant failed to file a responsive pleading and on motion of counsel for the private respondent, the court, allowed the presentation of evidence ex-parte. A judgment by default was rendered in favor of the plaintiff declaring Pedro Asedillo to be the true and absolute owner of the property covered.
ISSUES:
1 .Whether or not a dead man Ching Leng and/or his estate may be validly served with summons and decision by publication. And 2. Whether or not an action for reconveyance of property and cancellation of title is in personam, and if so, would a dead man and/or his estate be bound by service of summons and decision by publication.
HELD:
An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an action in rem or an action against the whole world, like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an action in personam, so much so that a judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. Actions in personam and actions in rem differ in that the former are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments, while the latter are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world. An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing. Private respondent's action for reconveyance and cancellation of title being in personam, the judgment in question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng. Verily, the action was commenced thirteen (13) years after the latter's death.The decision of the lower court insofar as the deceased is concerned, is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical personality, that is fitness to be subject of legal relations, was lost through death (Arts. 37 and 42 Civil Code).The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein (Section 49, Act 496). A strong presumption exists that Torrens titles are regularly issued and that they are valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any "information possessoria" or title existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the title
SPOUSES GREGORIO DE GUZMAN, JR. and CORAZON QUINTO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and RAYMUNDA RINGOR QUIRIMIT
CASE NO.: L-46935. December 21, 1987. 156 SCRA 701
CHAPTER: CHAPTER I General Provisions
PONENTE: FERNAN, J.:
FACTS:
Deogracias Queriza, owner of an unregistered land executed a Deed of Pacto de Retro sale in favor of his niece, Quirmit, with the stipulation that the "vendor a retro may exercise the right of repurchase and failure to take advantage of the right, then the contract shall acquire the character of absolute sale. Respondent did not register the Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale, but took possession of the land by building her house. D. Queriza mortgaged the same parcel of land to the Manaoag Rural Bank; it was allegedly redeemed on his behalf by his nephew Miguel Queriza. D. Queriza, without exercising his right to repurchase, executed over said parcel of land a Deed of "Rimunitary Inter-vivos Donation in favor of Miguel Queriza, who declared the land in his name for taxation purposes and registered the Deed of Donation. Miguel Queriza sold the land to Gregorio de Guzman, Jr. and Corazon Quinto. Petitioners sent private respondent written notice to vacate the land in question, and upon refusal by the latter, instituted a case for Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession. The trial court declared petitioners’ owner. CA reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Spouses De Guzman has the better right to the property in dispute. Whether or not the action for quieting of title and recovery of possession should prevail.
RULING:
The transaction between Deogracias Queriza and private respondent was a true Pacto de retro sale. The essence of a pacto de retro sale is that title and ownership of the property sold are immediately vested in the vendee a retro, subject to the resolutory condition of repurchase by the vendor a retro within the stipulated period. Failure thus of the vendor a retro to perform said resolutory condition vests upon the vendee by operation of law absolute title and ownership over the property sold and failure of the vendee a retro to consolidate his title under Article 1607 of the Civil Code does not impair such title or ownership for the method prescribed there under is merely for the purpose of registering the consolidated title. In the case at bar, absolute ownership of the land in question was vested on private respondent upon failure of Deogracias Queriza to repurchase said land. Thus when he allegedly donated the same to Miguel Queriza, he was no longer the owner thereof. Settled is the rule that a donor cannot lawfully convey what is not his property. There being no title to the property which Deogracias Queriza could convey to Miguel Queriza, it necessarily follows that no title to the property could be conveyed by the latter to petitioners. Registration does not vest title. It is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of such title over a particular property. It does not give the holder any better title than what he actually has. Besides, petitioners' registration of their deed of sale was done in bad faith. The effect is that it is as if no registration was made at all in so far as private respondent is concerned. Conversely, actual knowledge of petitioners of the sale to private respondent amounted to registration thereof. Petition Denied, decision affirmed.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner vs
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents
CASE NO: 384 SCRA 152
CHAPTER: GENERAL PROVISIONS, ORIGINAL REGISTRATION, NON REGISTRABLE PROPERTIES PONENTE: JUSTICE CARPIO
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks to annul the contract (JVA or Joint Ventured Agreement) entered into by the PEA and AMARI, a private corporation that will develop the freedom islands and will reclaim hectares of submerged areas surrounding this islands to complete the coastal road project.
Petitioner contends that the government will lose billions in this deal and assails that the sale to AMARI of lands of public domain is a violation of Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of public domain to private corporations.
HELD:
The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose "object or purpose is contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the commerce of men," are "inexistent and void from the beginning." The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
ON CHO, applicant and appellee, vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor and appellant
DATE: AUGUST 31, 1946
FILE: GR NO. 48321 75 PHIL 890 PONENTE: JUSTICE PADILLA
FACTS:
On Cho, a citizen of the Republic of China, purchased in 1938 from Antonio, Luis and Rafael Lagdameo, a parcel of land located in the residential districts of Guinayangan, Tayabas, which has been in the continuous, public and adverse passion of their predecessors and interest as far back as 1880. on June 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for the registration of the parcel of land. The Director of Lands opposed the application because, among other grounds, the constitution prohibits aliens from acquiring public or private agricultural lands.
ISSUE:
Whether or not On Cho has an imperfect title over the land that may be confirmed under the Land Registration act.
Whether or not On Cho is entitled to a decree of registration of the land under the Public Land Act.
HELD:
1. On Cho has no imperfect title over the land.
“the applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under the Land Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in interest had acquired the lot from the government, either by purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders and decrees promulgated by the Spanish government in the Philippines or by possessory information under the Mortgage Law.”
“All lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. The applicant does not come under the exception for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880”
2. On Cho is not entitled to a decree of registration under the PLA
“ under the provisions of the act, he is not entitled to a decree of registration of the lot, because he is an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.”
MANUELA GREY ALBA VS.ANACLETO DE LA CRUZ CHAPTER: GENERAL PROVISIONS
Facts:
The petitioners sought to have parcels of land registered. After hearing the proofs presented, the court issued a certificate of title. Respondent filed a motion in the Court of Land Registration asking for a revision of the case including the decision upon the ground that he is the absolute owner of the two parcels of lands decreed to the petitioners. The Land Court modified the decision by awarding the two parcels of land to respondent.
The petitioners appealed. The respondent was made a party defendant by publication and not personally served with notice.
Issue:
Whether or not notice by publication is sufficient? Held:
The proceedings for the registration of land are in rem and not in personam . A proceeding in rem dealing with a tangible res may be instituted and carried judgment without personal service upon the claimants within the State or notice by name to those outside of it. Jurisdiction secured by the power of the court over the res . Such a proceeding would be impossible were this not so, for it would hardly do to make a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those ho were not known to the plaintiff.
“IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF LAND. LEONOR DE LOS ANGELES, FEDERICO DE LOS ANGELES, ET AL. vs. ISIDRO O. SANTOS, ANTONIO ASUDILLO, ET AL., THE DIRECTOR
OF THE LANDS AND THE PROVINCE OF RIZAL” CASE NO.: No. L-19615, 12 SCRA 22
CHAPTER: GENERAL PROVISIONS, p. 25-26 PONENTE: Bengzon
FACTS:
An application for registration of title to 12 parcels of land was filed by Leonor de los Angeles and 7 co-applicants. Among other things it alleged that “applicants are owners pro-indiviso and in fee simple of the aforesaid land.” The required notices were given. Dir. of Lands filed an opposition stating that the land “is a portion of the public domain.” The court dismissed the application. The motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON a land registration court which has validly acquired jurisdiction over a parcel of land for registration of title thereto could be divested of said jurisdiction by a subsequent administrative act consisting in the issuance by the Dir. of Lands of a homestead patent covering the same parcel of land?
RULING:
Orders appealed from set aside
• Director of lands’ jurisdiction, administrative supervision and executive control extend only to lands of the public domain and not to lands already of private ownership. Accordingly, a homestead patent issued over land not of the public domain is a nullity, devoid of force and effect against the owner.
• Proceedings for lands registration are in rem, whereas proceedings for acquisition of homestead patent are not. A homestead patent, therefore, does not finally dispose of the public or private character of the land as far as courts acting upon proceedings in rem are concerned.
TOMAS AVERIA, JR. vs. MILAGROS V. CAGUIOA CASE NO.: G.R. No. L-65129 December 29, 1986
CHAPTER: CHAPTER 1, P. 23
PONENTE: CRUZ, J.
FACTS:
The oppositor, petitioner herein, refused to participate in the hearing of the registration proceedings below, claiming the respondent court, acting as a cadastral court, had no competence to act upon the said case under Section 112 of Act 496, otherwise known as the "Land Registration Act." it is argued that the lower court had no competence to act on the registration sought because of the absence of unanimity among the parties as required under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act.
In a long line of decisions dealing with proceedings under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act, it has been held that summary relief under Section 112 of Land Registration Act can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise, the case becomes contentious and controversial which should be threshed out in an ordinary action or in any case where the incident properly belongs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court has jurisdiction to order the registration of a deed of sale which is opposed on the ground of an antecedent contract to sell.
HELD:
While this was a correct interpretation of the said provision, the same is, however, not applicable to the instant case. The reason is that this case arose in 1982, after the Land Registration Act had been superseded by the Property Registration Decree, which became effective on June 11, 1979.
In Section 2 of the said P.D. No. 1529, it has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for "original registration" but also "over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions." The court is no longer fettered by its former limited jurisdiction which enabled it to grant relief only in cases where there was "unanimity among the parties" or none of them raised any "adverse claim or serious objection." Under the amended law, the court is now authorized to hear and decide not only such non-controversial cases but even this contentious and substantial issues, such as the question at bar, which were beyond its competence before.
INTESTATE ESTATE: DON MARIANO E. SAN PEDRO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL CASE NO: G.R. No. 103727 December 18, 1996
CHAPTER: GENERAL PROVISIONS P 29 PONENTE: HERMOSISIMA, JR
FACTS:
The most fantastic land claim in the history of the Philippines is the subject of controversy in these two consolidated cases. The heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban laid claim and have been laying claim to the ownership of, against third persons and the Government itself, a total land area of approximately 173,000 hectares or "214,047 quiniones," 1 on the basis of a Spanish title, entitled "Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136" dated April 25, 1894. The claim, according to the San Pedro heirs, appears to cover lands in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna and Quezon; and such Metro Manila cities as Quezon City, Caloocan City, Pasay City, City of Pasig and City of Manila, thus affecting in general lands extending from Malolos, Bulacan to the City Hall of Quezon City and the land area between Dingalan Bay in the north and Tayabas Bay in the south
G.R No. 103727, an appeal by certiorari, arose out of a complaint 6 for recovery of possession and/or damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. This was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region. This case for so many years was not laid to rest by the many appeals, motion for econsideration etc.. ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners' Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is null and void and of no legal force and effect RULING:
The Land in dispute belongs to the the government, the titulo propriedad was now null and void for failure of the parties to register it in the new law. Moreover they were not able to present sufficient evidence to prove their claim lacking such certificate
We now focus on the core issue of whether or not the lower court in G.R No. 106496 committed reversible error in excluding from the inventory of the estate of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 primarily on the ground that the said title is null and void and of no legal force and effect. Juxtaposed with this is the issue of whether or not the appellate court, in both cases, G.R. Nos. 103727 and 106496, erred in not recognizing Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as evidence to prove ownership by the Late Mariano San Pedro of the lands covered thereby.
1) It is settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which took effect on February 16, 1976, the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or grants should cause their lands covered thereby to be registered under the Land Registration Act 53 within six (6) months from the date of effectivity of the said Decree or until August 16, 1976. 54 Otherwise, non-compliance therewith will result in a re-classification of their lands. 55 Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership. 56
In the case of Director of Lands v. Heirs of Isabel Tesalona, et al., 57 we took cognizance of this Decree and thus held that caution and care must be exercised in the acceptance and admission of Spanish titles taking into account the numerous fake titles that have been discovered after their supposed reconstitution subsequent to World War II.
2.)In both cases, petitioners-heirs did not adduce evidence to show that Titulo de Propriedad 4136 was brought under the operation of P.D. 892 despite their allegation that they did so on August 13, 1976. 58 Time and again we have held that a mere allegation is not evidence and the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it Proof of compliance with P.D. 892 should be the Certificate of Title covering the land registered.
This Court can only surmise that the reason for the non-registration of the Titulo under the Torrens system is the lack of the necessary documents to be presented in order to comply with the provisions of P.D. 892. We do not discount the possibility that the Spanish title in question is not genuine, especially since its genuineness and due execution have not been proven. In both cases, the petitioners heirs were not able to present the original of Titulo de
document known as "hypoteca" (the Spanish term is 'hipoteca') allegedly appended to the Titulo. However, the said hypoteca was neither properly identified nor presented as evidence. Likewise, in the action for recovery of possession and/or reconveyance with damages, the petitioners-heirs did not submit the Titulo as part of their evidence. Instead, only an alleged illegible copy of the Titulo was presented.
The Best Evidence Rule as provided under Rule 130, section 2 of the Rules of Court is stated in unequivocal terms. Subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule read:
Sec. 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. — There can be no evidence of a writing the contents of which is the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely substitutionary in its nature, such as photocopies, as long as the original evidence can be had. In the absence of a clear showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, the photocopy submitted, in lieu thereof, must be disregarded, being unworthy of any probative value and being an inadmissible piece of evidence.
Hence, we conclude that petitioners-heirs failed to establish by competent proof the existence and due execution of the Titulo. Their explanation as to why the original copy of the Titulo could not be produced was not satisfactory. The alleged contents thereof which should have resolved the issue as to the exact extent of the subject But if more were needed, we have the Maura Law (Royal Decree of February 13, 1894), published in the Gaceta de Manila on April 17, 1894 (Ibid., p. 26; Venture, op. cit., p. 28). That decree required a second petition for adjustment within six months from publication, for those who had not yet secured their titles at the time of the publication of the law (Ibid.). Said law also abolished the provincial boards for the adjustment of lands established by Royal Decree of December 26, 1884, and confirmed by Royal Decree of August 31, 1888, which boards were directed to deliver to their successors, the provincial boards established by Decree on Municipal Organization issued on May 19, 1893, all records and documents which they may hold in their possession (Ramirez v. Director of Land, supra, at p. 124). Doubt on Piadeco's title here supervenes when we come to consider that title was either dated April 29 or April 25, 1894, twelve or eight days after the publication of the Maura Law.
AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY, petitioner, vs. LAURENCIO AYING, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF EMILIANO AYING, PAULINO AYING, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF SIMEON AYING, AND WENCESLAO SUMALINOG, IN HIS OWN BEHALF
AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF ROBERTA AYING, respondents CASE NO: G.R. No. 144773. May 16, 2005
CHAPTER: LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION AND ITS REGISTRIES OF DEEDS AND CITED IN PAGES 337, 348 AND 350
PONENTE: J. AUSTRIA MARTINEZ
FACTS: Crisanta Maloloy-on petitioned for the issuance of a cadastral decree in her favor over said parcel of land. After her death in 1930, the Court issued a Decision directing the issuance of a decree in the name of Crisanta Maloloy-on’s eight children, namely: Juan, Celedonio, Emiliano, Francisco, Simeon, Bernabe, Roberta and Fausta, all surnamed Aying. The certificate of title was, however, lost during the war.Subsequently, all the heirs of the Aying siblings executed an Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the subject parcel of land to herein petitioner Aznar Brothers Realty Company. Said deed was registered with the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City, and since then, petitioner had been religiously paying real property taxes on said property.In 1991, petitioner, claiming to be the rightful owner of the subject property, sent out notices to vacate, addressed to persons occupying the property. Unheeded, petitioner then filed a complaint for ejectment against the occupants before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Lapu-Lapu City.the MTC ordered the occupants to vacate the property. Meanwhile, herein respondents, along with other persons claiming to be descendants of the eight Aying siblings, all in all numbering around 220 persons, had filed a complaint for cancellation of the Extra-Judicial Partition with Absolute Sale, recovery of ownership, injunction and damages with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City. RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioner and CA affirmed its decision.
RATIONALE:
1. REGISTRATION OF INSTRUMENTS AFFECTING TITLED LANDS UNDER ACT NO. 3344 INEFFECTIVE AGAINST THIRD PERSONS
The registration of instruments must be done in the proper registry in order to bind the land. Where property registered under the Torrens system is sold but the sale is registered not under the Property registration decree but under Act no. 3344. the sale is considered not registered and effective for purposes of Art. 1544 of the Civil Code on Double sales.
2. ACTION TO QUIET TITLE WHERE PLAINTIFF IS IN POSSESSION IMPRESCRIPTIBLE
The ten year prescriptive period begins to run from the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property. But if the person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet the title to the property, does not prescribe.
3. CONCEPT OF TRUSTS
A deeper analysis of Article 1456 reveals that it is not a trust in the technical sense for in a typical trust, confidence is reposed in one person who is named a trustee for the benefit of another who is called the cestui que trust, respecting property which is held by the trustee for the benefit of the cestui que trust. A constructive trust, unlike an express trust, does not emanate from, or generate a fiduciary relation. While in an express trust, a beneficiary and a trustee are linked by confidential or fiduciary relations, in a constructive trust, there is neither a promise nor any fiduciary relation to speak of and the so-called trustee neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the property for the beneficiary. Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties. In turn, implied trusts are either resulting or constructive trusts. These two are differentiated from each other as follows: Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature of circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. On the other hand, constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good
PO SUN TUN vs. W. S. PRICE and THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF LEYTE
CASE NO.: G.R. No. L-31346 December 28, 1929
CHAPTER: The Land Registration Commission and its Registries of Deeds
PONENTE: MALCOLM, J.:
FACTS:
On November 29, 1921, Gabino Barreto P. Po Ejap, the owner of land, sold the land to Po Tecsi. Po mortgaged the land to W. S. Price. Po executed a deed of sale of the land to Price. Price in turn, sold the land on February 16, 1927, to the Province of Leyte. Returning again to the original date of November 29, 1921, on that date Po Tecsi gave a general power of attorney including the right to sell to Gabino Barreto P. Po Ejap. Gabino sold the land on November 22, 1923,to Jose H. Katigbak. In turn Jose H. Katigbak transferred the property to Po Sun Tun on October 12, 1927.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property first sold to a person who only secures a receipt would prevail over where that same property sold to another person who records his documents in the registry of deeds.
RULING:
Registration in general, as the law uses the word, means any entry made in the books of the Registry, including both registration in its ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation, annotation, and even the marginal notes. In its strict acceptation, it is the entry made in the Registry which records solemnly and permanently the right of ownership and other real rights. It results as a matter of course since the deed made by Gabino Barreto P. Po Ejap in favor of Jose H. Katigbak was not only not first recorded in the registry of deeds but never legally so recorded, and since the purchaser who did record his deed was Price, who secured a Torrens title and transferred the same to the Province of Leyte, that Po Sun Tun, the holder of a defensible title, has no legal rights as against Price and the Province of Leyte, the holders of indefeasible titles. Also, if necessary, it could be ruled that within the meaning of section 38 of the Land Registration Law, Price and the Province of Leyte are innocent purchasers for value of the disputed property.Where a piece of property is first sold to a person who only secures a receipt for the document evidencing the sale from the office of the Register of Deeds and where the piece of property is later sold to another person who records his document in the Registry of Deeds as provided by law and secures a Torrens title the property relays to the later person.
EDUARDO S. BARANDA vs. HON. TITO GUSTILO CASE NO.: G.R. No. 81163 September 26, 1988
CHAPTER: CHAPTER 2, P.54
PONENTE: GUTIERREZ, JR., J. FACTS:
A parcel of land was in Iloilo was the subject of a petition for reconstitution of title. Respondents refused to honor the writ of possession saying that they also have a TCT. But the Court found such TCT fraudulently obtained and so issued a writ of demolition.
RTC Judge Gustilo issued an order declaring Baranda's TCT as valid. This was set aside by Reg. of Deeds saying that there was a pending case before the court.
Thereafter, Reg of Deeds cancelled the TCT of respondents and issued new TCTs to Baranda. A notice of lis pendens was annotated in the TCTs. Baranda filed another motion to reinstate the Feb 1987 order directing the Reg of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens in the new TCT. Judge Gustilo denied the motion.
ISSUE:
WON the pendency of a civil case with the CA prevents the court from cancelling the notice of lis pendens in the TCTs which were declared valid & subsisting.
HELD:
The purpose of a notice of lis pendens serves as a warning to a prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that the particular property is in litigation; and that he should keep his hands off the same, unless of course he intends to gamble on the results of the litigation. The private respondents are not entitled to this protection.
While ordinarily a notice of pendency which has been filed in a proper case, cannot be cancelled while the action is pending and undetermined, the proper court has the discretionary power to cancel it under peculiar circumstances, as for instance, where the evidence that the purpose is for molesting the adverse party.
The function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land.
TEODORO ALMIROL, petitioner-appellant, vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN, respondent-appellee DATE: MARCH 20, 1968
FILE: GR NO. L-22486 22 SCRA 1152 PONENTE: JUSTICE CASTRO FACTS:
On June 28, 1961, Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land situated in the Municipality of Esperanza, Agusan. Sometime in May 1962 Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds (RD) of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to secure in his name a transfer certificate of title. Registration was refused by the RD on the ground that the property covered by the OCT was a conjugal property, therefore both spouses must sign the document and since his wife is already dead when the sale was made, the husband must first liquidate the conjugal property. In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the CFU of Agusan on a petition for mandamus to compel the RD to register the deed of sale and to issue to him the corresponding TCT.
Almirol agued that the registration is but a ministerial duty of the RD to perform the acts required of him
The lower court then made a decision dismissing the case holding that mandamus does not lie to compel the RD to effect the registration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the duty of the RD to register title is Ministerial AND whether of not mandamus may lie to compel it act on its function.
HELD:
The duty of the RD is only ministerial. Mandamus may not lie to compel the RD to exercise its function.
RATIO:
Although the reasons relied upon by the RD evince a sincere desire on his part to maintain inviolate the law on succession and transmission of rights over real properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register the deed. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the RD to determine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction.
Before recourse to courts a party must, in the event that he does not agree with the RD … the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration who thereafter shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made which shall be conclusive and binding upon all RDs . This administrative remedy must first be resorted to before any action is to be instituted in the regular courts.
GABRIEL VS. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL Chapter: The Land Registration Commission and its Registries of Deeds.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed with the Register of Deeds of Manila, an Adverse claim against the properties of respondent. The respondent presented an opposition, claiming that the Adverse claim was instituted for 1. harassment; 2. had no legal basis; and 3. Had done and will do irreparable loss to her. The register of deeds of manila elevated the matter to the Land registration Commission en consulta . The Register of Deeds denied the registration of the Notice of Adverse claim . Petitioner appealed the decision to the land Registration Commission .
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Land Registration Commission has the authority to decide if an Adverse claim is valid or merely intended to harass?
HELD:
Where the documents containing the notice of adverse claim are sufficient in law and drawn up in accordance with the existing requirements, it becomes incumbent upon the Register of Deeds to perform his ministerial duty.
Whether or not the Adverse claims, the notice of which are sought to be registered, are merely intended to harass, and such other litigious matters are raised by the protagonist, are for a court of competent jurisdiction and not for the Land Registration Commission, to decide.
Registration of an adverse claim should not be confused with its validity. The registration of an adverse claim will not by itself make it valid. Its validity will be determined in a separate proceeding.
AURELIO BALBIN, ET AL. vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS SUR. CASE NO.: G.R. No. L-20611 May 8, 1969
CHAPTER: CHAPTER 2, P. 56 PONENTE: MAKALINTAL, J. FACTS:
Petitioner presented to Reg of Deeds of Ilocos an OCT and requesting that a Donation Inter Vivos be annotated on the title, Cornelio Balbin having donated 2/3 of the lot to Aurelio Balbin. Reg. of Deeds denied it because there were 3 previous separate sales of undivided portions of the land earlier by Balbin and the co-owners copies of the TCT were not presented as well.
LRA Commissioner upheld the Reg of Deeds saying that the 3 co-owners duplicates must be surrendered. ISSUE:
WON the co-owner TCTs should be surrendered HELD:
There being several copies of the same title in existence, it is easy to see how their integrity may be adversely affected if an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the others. The law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued as a duplicate of the original, which means that both must contain identical entries of the transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting the land covered by the title. If this were not so, if different copies were permitted to carry differing annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would cease to be reliable.
BENIN ET.AL., ALCANTARA ET.AL., PILI ET.AL., VS. TUASON (EN BANC)
CASE NO:57 scra 531 june 28, 1974
CHAPTER: P 329 ORIGINAL REGISTRATION AND REMEDIES PONENTE J. Zaldivar
FACTS
3 sets of plaintiffs field 3 separate complaints containing substantially the same allegations. They alleged that the defendants has dispossessed and deprived the plaintiffs of the parcels of land which they claimed as their own and of which they had been in actual, open and continous possession, and that their land was wrongfully included in the certificate Tittle #735 obtained by the detendants. They further alleged that the certificate of tittle was procurred invalidly bec it resulted from an invalid decree bec. of irregular registration proceeding. As it failed to satisfy the pub.requirement under Act 496. Further, the alleged that they were not notified of the registration proceedings. the lower court sustained the petitioners. The defendants on appela posed the A; Argument:4. Requirements for valid registration of tittle wer complied 5. Buyers of good faith Alleged irregularity in Pub. requirement: 1. Amended plan of the parcel of land in ques. was not pub.2. Description of the land in the decree not identical with the one published3. Transcription of the decree was not made in accordance with the law
Issue:
Won amendment of the application for registration requires pub.
Won a disorderly transcription of the decree of registration invalidates the same RULING:
1. It depends. If the amendments consists in the inclusion of an area or parcel of land not included in the original. Applications published. A new publication of the amended application must be made to give notice to all persons that may be affected who may have the opportunity to present thesis claims which might be prejudice. But if the amendment consist only in the exclusion of a portion of the area covered. A new publication is not necessary. In the case at bar, the amendment in the original application showed that such amendment was made to exclude certain areas of land in question. Since no new parcel of land was included, the publication is not necessary. In order to vest the LRC with jurisdiction to hear and decide the application for registration. And to order the issuance of a decree of registration upon which a certificate of title was based. Thus, the lower court used in declaring the OCT null and void. 2. The lower court also based its discussion on the fact that the description of the land area in the application for registration and that published in OG is not identical in that there is a 27.10 sq. meter inc. in the application than that published. Even in granting that the registration court had no jurisdiction over the inc. area of 27.10 sq. meters. the most that the lower court could have done was to nullify the decree and the certificate of title in solar as that area of 27.10 is concerned.
If it shal be later shown that the decree of registration had included land or lands not included in the original application as published, then the registration proceedings and the decree of registration shal/must be declared null and void but only in solar as the land not included in the publication concerned bec. the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the land not included in the publication the pub. being the basis of the jurisdiction of the court. Registration does not vest title nor is it a mean of acquiring one. It is merely for evidential, documentation purposes. * Transcription of decree of registration although disorderly doe not invalidate the decree of registration so long as the necessary inputs are found therein to satisfy the purpose of said transcription.
Rule regarding reconveyance of land: (when he claims it was wrongly registered in the name of another) 1. Recognize the validity of the certificate of title of the latter
2. Can only be had if the same is still registered under the name of the person who procured the wrongful registration. 3. No action for reconveyance can be placed as against a thieved person who acquired the same in good faith and for value.
4. If reconveyance is not available, damages can be demanded fr. the person who procured the wrongful registration. * the petitioners further contends that they have a cause of action against the dependants, that the same has no prescribed and dependants are not parties who acquired the prop. in good faith.
a. The OCt was issued originally to may or as go Tuason which become involved a litigation. During the pending of the case, the BPI administered his prop. and the court ordered that said prop. be transferred and assigned in favor of D.Tuason upon payment of a sum. TCT in favor of D. Tuason and his heirs were issued. This was approved by the court. The heirs then of D. Tuason sold the prop. to S.M. Tuason. This if the heirs of D. Tuason had acquired the land in a transaction authorized by the court for a valuable consideration, thereby acquiring good title, then the same can be said to the acquisition by j.m. Tuason even if the incorporators of the two corporation belong to the same Tuason family as it may happen that they have diff. and distinct and separate assets.
b. They do not have cause of action against defendants bec. J.M. Tuason was /is not one of the original registered owners that procured the registration of the land. They are not parties nor privies to it. They have nothing to with reg. proceedings that led to the issuance of the OCT. the statue of
c. Their action is barred by limitations. The proceeding of the LRC is in the sum in that personal notification is not required bec. Of pub. Notice. And the decree of registration bound that lands covered and quieted title thereto, and conclusive upon and against all persons. And the same can only be reopened within one year after entry of the decree, if it still i[i]has not passed upon the hands of third persons who acquired it in good faith and for value. In the case at bar, no petition for review of decree was filed within 1 yr. aster July 8, 1914, the date it was entered.
ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN VS RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ CASE NO: 29 PHIL 31
CHAPTER: ORIGINAL REGISTRATION P 62 PONENTE JUSTICE JOHNSON
FACTS:
Petitioner Roxas filed in the Court of Land Registration to register her four parcels of land located in Manila. Notice of hearing was sent to all parties in interest ( all individuals named by petitioner to be interested in her land) including the respondents of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez. In addition to that, the Clerk of Court published the said hearing in 2 newspapers of general circulation and the sheriff posted a notice of hearing at the City Hall.
During the hearing the petitioner and the government were represented but the respondents fail to appear. As a result the court then rendered a decision in favor of petitioners due to the failure of the respondents to impugn the application.
In a hearing being conducted to correct the metes and bounds of one of the parcels of land (parcel A ) The respondent or their heirs Antonio Enriquez appeared and apparently made objections to the granting of said motions . They also claimed that they were not personally informed of the original proceeding for the said parcel of land . hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not personal notice to all of the persons interested in an action for the registration of real property under the Torrens System , is an absolute prerequisite to the validity of said registration
RULING:
In favor of petitioner Roxas 1) NOTICE OF APPLICATION
The requirement that personal notice should be a pre-requisite to the validity of registration would absolutely prohibit the foreclosure of unknown claims, for the reason that personal notice could never be given to unknown claimants. Courts have held that actions in rem, personal notice to owners of a res is not necessary to give the courts jurisdiction to deal with and dispose of the res. It is admitted in the case that the pet. is not guilty of fraud. The records show that she named all persons who might be interested in the registration of her land.
2) NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS IN REGISTRATION OF LANDS
The proceedings in reg of land are in rem and not in personam. A proceeding on rem dealing with a tangible res may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon claimants within the state or notice by name to those outside of it. Jurisdiction is secured be the power of the court over the res. Such a proceeding would be impossible were if this not so for it would hardly do to make a distinction between the constitutional rights of the claimants who were known and those not known to the plaintiff when the proceeding is to bar all
3) TORRENS SYSTEM The real purpose of Torrens system is to relieve the land of the burden of known as well as unknown claims. If there exist known and just claims against the title of the applicant for the registration of his lands under he gains nothing in effect by his registration except in the simplicity of subsequent transfers of his title. The reg relieves the land of all known as well unknown claims absolutely or it compels claimants to come to court and make
IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN CALALUNG, respondents CASE NO: 5 SCRA 525
CHAPTER: ORIGINAL REGISTRATION P. 111 PONENTE: J. BARRERA
FACTS:
Petitioners are the owners of land in Municipality of Magsaysay, Isabela whom he inherited from his parents. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration its Northeastern boundary is the Cagayan River. Since then, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by the action of the current Cagayan River, so much so that the back had receded from its original site and an alluvial deposit had been added to the area. Petitioners instituted an action against respondents to quiet title of the area formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint that they were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof when respondents entered upon the land under claim of ownership.CFI rendered a decision ordering respondents to vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to petitioners. CA reversed the CFI decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not respondents have acquired the alluvial property in question through prescription. HELD: CA decision affirmed
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article 366 of the old, petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the land which it adjoins. The question is whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible. The Court of Appeals says that it does not, just as an unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided. The fact remain, however, that petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial property (which was formed sometime after petitioners' property covered by Original Certificate of) up to the time they instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of 1958. The increment, therefore, never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
Did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive prescription?: physical possession and dates or duration of such possession. After analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-appellees were in possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. This finding of the existence of these facts, after an examination of the evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be reviewed by the SC. The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of the Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code were not in force and before the effectivity of the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.
REPUBLIC VS CA AND LAPINA
CASE NO: 235 SCRA 567
CHAPTER: JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE, P 100 PONENTE:
FACTS:
Respondent spouses bought lots, they were then natural born Filipino Citizens: Eventually they filed application for registration but they were no longer Filipino citizens and had opted to embrace Canadian Citizenship. Opposition was filed by the republic on the ground of Foreign Nationality ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent can register there land which they bought when tehy were Filipino citizen even if at the rgistration they are altready of another citizenship?
RULING:
They can register it
Private respondents were undoubtedly natural born citizens at the time of the acquisition of the property and by virtue thereof acquired vested rights thereon tacking in the process, the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their predecessor in interest under Public Land Act
A natural born citizen who has lost his Philippine Citizenship may be a tranferee of private lands upto a maximum of 5000 sq m urban and 1 hectare -rural
It is not significant that whetehr private respondents are no longer filipino citizens at the time they registered the land what is important is that they were former natural-born citizens of the Philippines Public Land Act requires that applicant must prove that:
1) The land is alienable public Land and
2) his possesion in the concept above stated must be either since time immemorial or for period prescribed by Public Land Act
Thus, when the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of land by operation of law acquires a right to a grant, a government grant without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. As such the land ceases to be a part of public domain and goes beyond the Dir. of Lands to dispose
“REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NICANOR DOLDOL” CASE NO.: GR 132963, 295 SCRA 359
CHAPTER: ORIGINAL REGISTRATION, p. 70 PONENTE: Romero
FACTS:
In 1945, Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Barrio Pontacan, Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental. On Oct. 23, 1963, he applied for salt work purposes with the Bureua of Forest Developemnt which was later rejected on April 1, 1968. In 1965, Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental passed a resolution reserving a lot as a school state. The reserved lot included the area occupied by Doldol. Opol High School transferred to the site in 1970. On Nov. 2, 1987, President Aquino issued a Proclamation No. 180 reserving the area for Opol National Secondary Technical School. The school made several demands for Doldol to vacate but he refused to move. The school filed a complaint for Accion Possessoria with the RTC of Cagayan De Oro in 1991. Trial Court ruled in favor of the school. On appeal, CA reversed. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE:
WON the school has the better right to possess the lot? RULING:
Yes; RTC decision reinstated
• Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the disputed lot since his occupation of the same started only in 1959, much later than June 12, 1945. not having complied with the conditions set by law, Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a right to the land in question as to segregate the same from public domain.
• Doldol cannot, therefore, assert a right superior to the school, given that the president had reserved a lot for Opol National School.
• The privilege of occupying public lands with a view of preemption confers no contractual or vested right in the lands occupied and the authority of the president to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the public use, prior to the divesting by the government of title thereof stands, even though this may defeat the imperfect right of a seller. Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, VS.
CARMENCITA M. ALCONABA; LUISITO B. MEL;ENDEZ; CONCEPTION M. LAZARO; MAURICIO B. MELENDEZ, JR. AND MYRNA M. GALVEZ, represented by CONCEPTION M. LAZARO, respondents. DATE: APRIL 14, 2004
FILE: GR NO 155012 427 SCRA 611 PONENTE: CHIEF JUSTICE DAVIDE FACTS:
On November 14, 1996, the respondents filed before the MTC of Cabuyao, Laguana, an application for registration of tile over 5 parcels of land situated in Barangay Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna. The applicants averred that their parents had been in possession of the said property since 1949, more or less. After the death of their mother and father, they partitioned the property among themselves and subdivided it in 5 lots since then they have been in actual possession of the property in the concept of owners and in public and peaceful manner.
The OSG opposed because according to it neither the respondents nor their predecessors in interest possess sufficient tile to the property or have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question; also the muniments of title i.e. tax declarations do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide ownership.
The TC found in favor of the respondents. The CA affirmed. ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents and their predecessors in interest have been in OCENCO of the questioned land and whether or not the land in question is an alienable land of the public domain.
HELD:
The respondents did not have in their favor an imperfect title over the land subject of the application at the time the case was filed with the trial court. They failed to prove that (1) the lot was classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of the public domain as of June 12, 1945 or earlier; (2) they and their predecessors in interest have been in OCENCO of the land.
There is no doubt that the subject property of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain. But it is not clear as to when it was classified as alienable and disposable by the proper authorities.
Further they have failed to prove that they have been in OCENCO of the property. Their witnesses Carmencita and Mauricio were aged 62 and 60 respectively, when they testified in 1997. Thus they were only 5 and 3 years old respectively in 1940. Clearly it is quite impossible that they could fully grasp, before coming to the age of reason, the concept of possession of such a big tract of land and testified thereon nearly six decades thereon.
Proof of specific acts of ownership must also be presented. These respondents failed to do. Possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND CORAZON NAGUIT. CHAPTER: JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT OR INCOMPLETE TITLES
Facts:
Naguit filed with MCTC a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land. The application seeks judicial confirmation of Naguit’s imperfect title over the land. Te MCTC granted the registration however the Republic thru the Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the land applied for was declared alienable and disposable only on October 15 1980.
Issue: Whether or not under the Property Registration Decree that the subject land first be classified as alienable and disposable before the applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start?
Held:
The phrase ‘since Jun 12, 1945’ qualifies its antecedent phrase ‘under a bone fide claim of ownership. Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. Hence, what the law merely requires is that the property sought to be registered is ‘already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed’. In other words it is not necessary that the land be first classified as alienable and disposable le before the applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could start.
“JAMES R. BRACEWELL vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES” CASE NO.: GR NO. 107427, 323 SCRA 193
CHAPTER: JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT OR INCOMPLETE TITLE, p. 74 PONENTE: Ynares-Santiago
FACTS:
Sometime in 1908, Maria Cailles, married to james Bracewell Sr., acquired parcels of land totaling 9,657 sqm. Located in Las Pinas, M.M. from the Dalandan and Jimenez families, after which tax declarations were issued in her name. On Jan. 16, 1961, she sold the said parcels of land to her son (petitioner) by virtue of a deed of sale which was duly annotated and registered. Tax declarations were thereafter issued in the latter’s name. On Sept. 19, 1963, petitioner filed for an action for confirmation of imperfect title with the CFI. On Feb. 21, 1964, the Dir. of Lands, represented by the SolGen, opposed. Registration proceedings were meanwhile suspended on account of an action filed by Crescencio Leonardo against Maria Cailles, which later upheld the rights of Cailles over those of Leonardo. On Mar. 26, 1985, entire records were forwarded to the RTC. SolGen resubmitted its opposition. On May 3, 1989, RTC granted the application. On appeal, CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. Motion for reconsideration was denied hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON petitioner has imperfect title over the subject parcels of land? RULING: Petition denied
• Respondents allege that since the subject parcels of land were only classified as alienable and disposable on March 27, 1972, petitioner did not have any title to confirm when he filed his application in 1963.
• It is required that the applicant must prove that the land is alienable public land.
• Petitioner failed to show that the parcels of land subject of his application are alienable or disposable. On the contrary, it was conclusively shown by the government that the same were only classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972.
• Petitioner cannot claim title by virtue of possession (since 1908) since the subject were not yet alienable at the time nor capable of private appropriation.
• The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain.
• Rules on the confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
