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IEEE C /88 An Alternative Approach for Enhancing Security of WMANs using Physical Layer Encryption

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An Alternative Approach for Enhancing

An Alternative Approach for Enhancing

Security of

Security of

WMANs

WMANs

using Physical

using Physical

Layer Encryption

Layer Encryption

By By Arpan Pal Arpan Pal Wireless Group Wireless Group

Center of Excellence for Embedded Systems Center of Excellence for Embedded Systems

Tata Consultancy Services Tata Consultancy Services

India India

(2)

Agenda

Agenda

Security Threats of Wireless MAN

Security Threats of Wireless MAN

Proposed System Overview

Proposed System Overview

Proposed System Features

Proposed System Features

How the proposed system mitigate the security

How the proposed system mitigate the security

threats

threats

(3)

Security Threats of Wireless MAN

Security Threats of Wireless MAN

• Human Initiated EventsHuman Initiated Events •

• Data PrivacyData Privacy •

• Data ForgeryData Forgery •

• Denial of ServiceDenial of Service •

• Hardware ErrorsHardware Errors

Data Privacy

Data Privacy, , Data ForgeryData Forgery and and Denial of ServiceDenial of Service

are the main security events that need to be addressed are the main security events that need to be addressed

Ref:

Ref:-- Alan Chickinsky, “Wireless Security Threats”, Alan Chickinsky, “Wireless Security Threats”, IEEE C802.20

(4)

System Overview

System Overview

Traditional System

Traditional System

Read Transmitted PHY params info

Configure

Baseband PHY Transmitter

PHY config params

Framed data from Media Access Control (MAC) layer

Transmitter Front-end sent using prior-known PHY

config PHY params info

+ Add before actual data

Transmitter

PHY config params

Framed data To Media Access Control (MAC) layer

-Hacker can access only at here

Receiver Front-end

Receiver

Baseband PHY Receiver Configure

Decode Tx PHY params info using prior-known PHY config

(5)

System Overview

System Overview

Proposed System

Proposed System

Read Transmitted PHY params info+ KEY2

Configure

Baseband PHY Transmitter

PHY Transmitter config params

Framed data from Media Access Control (MAC) layer

Transmitter Front-end sent using prior-known

PHY config PHY Transmitter param

info + KEY2

+ Add before actual data

Transmitter

PHY Receiver config params

Framed data To Media Access Control

(MAC) layer

-Hacker can access only at here

Receiver Front-end

Receiver

Baseband PHY Receiver

Configure

Decode transmitted PHY params info using prior-known

PHY config Modifications to Tx Algorithms based on KEY2 Encrypt with KEY1 Modifications to Rx Algorithms based on KEY2 Decrypt with KEY1

(6)

Proposed System Features

Proposed System Features

• KEY1 delivered to valid users using some secure KEY1 delivered to valid users using some secure key distribution mechanism

key distribution mechanism •

• Possible Physical layer system parameters encrypted Possible Physical layer system parameters encrypted using KEY1

using KEY1

• Error Control Coding RateError Control Coding Rate •

• Type of ModulationType of Modulation •

• Length of PacketLength of Packet •

• Second Level Key KEY2Second Level Key KEY2

• Possible Physical layer system parameters modifiedPossible Physical layer system parameters modified using KEY2

using KEY2

• Interleaving PatternInterleaving Pattern •

• Phase offset of OFDM symbolsPhase offset of OFDM symbols •

(7)

Proposed System

Proposed System

-

-

Example

Example

‰

‰ KEY2 can be varied from packet to packet KEY2 can be varied from packet to packet ‰

‰ One may modify using random numbers seeded by KEY2One may modify using random numbers seeded by KEY2 •

• Phase offset of OFDM symbols at IFFT inputPhase offset of OFDM symbols at IFFT input

Note:

Note:-- Phases of only data points (excluding pilots and zero padding) Phases of only data points (excluding pilots and zero padding) should be altered

should be altered

Error Control Coding Rate

Error Control Coding Rate Modulation TypeModulation Type Packet LengthPacket Length KEY2KEY2

XOR XOR Random No. Generator

Random No. Generator Encrypted Output Encrypted Output KEY1

(8)

Proposed System

Proposed System

Application to 802.20

Application to 802.20

• Physical Layer of 802.20 is evolvingPhysical Layer of 802.20 is evolving •

• OFDM could be an integral part of PHY given the OFDM could be an integral part of PHY given the operational scenario

operational scenario

• The proposed scheme can easily be adaptedThe proposed scheme can easily be adapted

to the 802.20 OFDM PHY to the 802.20 OFDM PHY •

(9)

Mitigation of Security Threats

Mitigation of Security Threats

--

Data Privacy

Data Privacy

• KnownKnown--Plaintext AttackPlaintext Attack •

• Recording of encrypted data at MAC levelRecording of encrypted data at MAC level •

• Key can be found out if Data is knownKey can be found out if Data is known

• Proposed Scheme prevents hackers from recording correctProposed Scheme prevents hackers from recording correct encrypted data at MAC level

encrypted data at MAC level

( wrong FEC rate, wrong modulation, unknown phase ( wrong FEC rate, wrong modulation, unknown phase

offset, unknown interleaving pattern etc.) offset, unknown interleaving pattern etc.)

(10)

Mitigation of Security Threats

Mitigation of Security Threats

--

Data Forgery

Data Forgery

• Unauthorized users insert data into network as valid userUnauthorized users insert data into network as valid user •

• ReplayReplay •

• MimickingMimicking •

• Proposed Scheme prevents hackers from both Replay andProposed Scheme prevents hackers from both Replay and Mimicking

Mimicking •

• Replay is not possible as the data recorded at MAC layerReplay is not possible as the data recorded at MAC layer is totally wrong and hence cannot be replayed

is totally wrong and hence cannot be replayed to generate a valid message

to generate a valid message •

• Mimicking is not possible because this needs finding outMimicking is not possible because this needs finding out the key first (using Known

(11)

Mitigation of Security Threats

Mitigation of Security Threats

--

Denial Of Service

Denial Of Service

• Intruder can flood network with valid and invalid messagesIntruder can flood network with valid and invalid messages •

• Channel jamming at RF levelChannel jamming at RF level

• Proposed Scheme prevents hackers from sending validProposed Scheme prevents hackers from sending valid messages as they don’t know the Key

messages as they don’t know the Key •

• Invalid messages can be filtered out in the PHY level asInvalid messages can be filtered out in the PHY level as the encryption is taking place in PHY layer itself

the encryption is taking place in PHY layer itself •

(12)

Conclusion

Conclusion

• Data Privacy, Data Forgery and DenialData Privacy, Data Forgery and Denial--ofof--Service Service

(valid messages) at MAC layer (software) can be prevented (valid messages) at MAC layer (software) can be prevented •

• DenialDenial--ofof--Service (invalid messages) can be preventedService (invalid messages) can be prevented using PHY layer message integrity check

using PHY layer message integrity check •

• DenialDenial--ofof--Service (Channel jamming at RF level)Service (Channel jamming at RF level) cannot be prevented

cannot be prevented •

• To break into the proposed security scheme, hackers needTo break into the proposed security scheme, hackers need costly hardware set

costly hardware set--upup •

• Even with Hardware set-Even with Hardware set-up, breaking the system up, breaking the system in Real

in Real--time is extremely difficult time is extremely difficult –– the PHY level cipheringthe PHY level ciphering substantially increases the entry barrier for break

substantially increases the entry barrier for break-in-in •

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Thank You

Thank You

Email:

References

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