Page 1 of 492 Chapter 13: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
1. Read: Art. IX, 1987 Constitution 2. Digest the following cases: A. The Civil Service Commission 1. UP v. Regino, 221 SCRA 598 2. Tupas v. NHC, 173 SCRA 33
3. Juco v. NLRC, G.R. No. 98107, Aug. 19, 1997 4. Hilario v. CSC, 243 SCRA 206
5. Pagcor v. Rilloraza, G.R. No. 141141, June 25, 2001 6. Besa v. PNB, 33 SCRA 330
7. Dario v. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 8. De la Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294
9. Palma-Fernandez v. Dela Paz, 160 SCRA 751 10. Santos v. Yatco, 106 Phil. 745
11. Cailles v. Bonifacio, 65 Phil. 328
12. SSS Employees Association v. CA, 175 SCRA 686 13. Bangalisan v. CA, G.R. No. 124678, July 23, 1997 14. Intia v. COA, G.R. No. 131529, April 30, 1999 15. Quimzon v. Ozaeta, 98 Phil. 705
16. Santos v. CA, G.R. No. 139792, Nov. 22, 2000 B. The Commission on Elections
17. Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, Sept. 3, 1991 18. Brilliantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358
19. Gallardo v. Judge Tabamo, 218 SCRA 253
20. LDP v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161265, Feb. 24, 2004 21. Alunan v. Mirasol, G.R. No. 122250, July 21, 1997 22. Javier v. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194
23. Aquino v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400 24. Cawasa v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 150469 25. Guevara v. COMELEC, 104 Phil. 269 26. De Jesus v. People, 120 SCRA 760 27. COMELEC v. Silva, 286 SCRA 177
28. Loong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 160427, Sept. 15, 2004 29. Sambrani v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 160427, Sept. 15, 2004 C. The Commission on Audit
30. Orocio v. COA, 213 SCRA 109
31. Gonzales v. Provincial Board of Iloilo, 12 SCRA 711 32. Guevara v. Jimenez, 6 SCRA 813
Page 2 of 492 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 88167 May 3, 1993
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and UP SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, petitioners, vs.
THE HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 84 NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, Q.C., ANGEL PAMPLINA, and The CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Araullo, Zambrano, Gruba, Chua Law Firm for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
Private respondent Angel Pamplina, a mimeograph operator at the University of the Philippines School of Economics, was dismissed on June 22, 1982, after he was found guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct for causing the leakage of final examination questions in Economics 106 under Prof. Solita Monsod. 1
His appeal was denied by the UP Board of Regents, prompting him to seek relief from the Merit Systems Board (MSB), created under Presidential Decree No. 1409. Under Section 5(l) thereof, the MSB has the power to "hear and decide administrative cases involving officers and employees of the civil service."
The University of the Philippines filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the MSB. UP relied heavily on the case of University of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 2 where it was held that administrative matters involving the discipline of UP employees properly fall under the Jurisdiction of the state university and the UP Board of Regents.
The motion was denied. Thereafter, in its decision dated July 5, 1985, the MSB exonerated Pamplina and ordered his reinstatement with back wages. 3 UP, represented by its Office of Legal Services, moved for reconsideration, but this was denied on January l0, 1986.
UP then appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which on November 4, 1987, issued Resolution No. 87-428, sustaining the MSB. 4 The motion for reconsideration was denied on April 13, 1988.
On June 10, 1988, the petitioners, through their new counsel of record, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a second motion for reconsideration. This was also denied on August 31, 1988, on the basis of Section 39(b) of PD 807, providing in part that "only one petition for reconsideration shall be entertained" by the Civil Service Commission.
Pamplina filed a "Manifestation and Motion for Execution of Judgment" of the Commission, copy of which was received by the Office of the Solicitor General on October 4, 1988. 5 This was opposed by the
Page 3 of 492 petitioners, but in an order dated November 7, 1988, the Commission granted the motion. Nevertheless, Pamplina was still not reinstated. UP claimed that the resolutions of the Commission had not yet become final and executory.
Pamplina's reaction was to file a petition for a writ of mandamus on November 11, 1988. Judge Teodoro P. Regino of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City granted the petition on April 27, 1989. The respondents (herein petitioners) were ordered to immediately reinstate Pamplina "to his former position as mimeograph operator without change of status as permanent employee with back wages from June 22, 1982, up to his reinstatement, plus salaries for the period of his preventive suspension covering December 15, 1981 to March 15, 1982." 6
On June 19, 1989, the present petition for certiorari was filed with this Court to seek the annulment of the decision of the trial court and the orders of the Commission directing the reinstatement of Pamplina. The petitioners also pray that the decision of the UP President and Board of Regents ordering Pamplina's dismissal be upheld.
UP contends that under its charter, to wit, Act 1870, enacted on June 18, 1906, it enjoys not only academic freedom but also institutional autonomy. Section 6(e) of the said Act grants the UP Board of Regents the power "to appoint, on recommendation of the president of the university, professors, instructors, lecturers, and other employees of the university, to fix their compensation and to remove them for cause after an investigation and hearing shall have been had." Pamplina was dismissed by virtue of this provision.
The Civil Service Law (PD 807) expressly vests in the Commission appellate jurisdiction in administrative disciplinary cases involving members of the Civil Service. Section 9(j) mandates that the Commission shall have the power to "hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal." And Section 37(a), provides that, "The Commission shall
decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposititon of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty (30) days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office." (Emphasis supplied)
Under the 1972 Constitution, all government-owned or controlled corporations, regardless of the manner of their creation, were considered part of the Civil Service. 7 Under the 1967 Constitution only government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters fall within the scope of the Civil Service pursuant to Article IX-B, Section 2(l), which states:
The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
As a mere government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was clearly a part of the Civil Service under the 1973 Constitution and now continues to be so because it was created by a special law and has an original charter. As a component of the Civil Service, UP is therefore governed by PD 607 and administrative cases involving the discipline of its employees come under the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.
Coming now to the petition itself, we note that the petitioners received a copy of the resolution denying their motion for reconsideration on April 22, 1968.
In Article IX-A, Section 7, of the 1987 Constitution, which was already in effect at that time, it is provided that:
Page 4 of 492 . . . Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
This provision was reproduced almost verbatim in Section 28 of the Administrative Code of 1987.
The petitioners therefore had thirty days from April 22, 1988, or until May 22, 1988, within which to elevate their case to this Court. They did not do so and instead filed a second motion for reconsideration, which was not allowed under Article IX, Section 39(b) of PD 807. On top of this, the second motion for reconsideration was filed only on June 10, 1988, or 19 days beyond the 30-day reglementary period. 8
In this connection, it is stressed that where a motion for reconsideration of a decision, order or ruling of any Constitutional Commission is denied, the 30-day reglementary period does not begin anew. The petitioner has only the balance of that period (after deducting the time elapsed before the motion was filed) to come to this Court on certiorari.
The assailed orders having become final and executory, Pamplina had every right to seek mandamus to compel their execution. Respondent Judge Regino was quite correct when he issued the questioned writ. The case cited repeatedly by the petitioners, viz., University of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 9 cannot apply to the present controversy. The reason is that at the time it was promulgated on January 28, 1971, PD 807 had not yet been enacted. PD 807 took affect only in 1975.
In ruling in that case "that the President and Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines possess full and final authority in the disciplining, suspension and removal of the civil service employees of the University, including those of the Philippine General Hospital, independently of the Commissioner of Civil Service and the Civil Service Board of Appeals," Justice J.B.L. Reyes relied on the Civil Service Law of 1959, which then empowered the Civil Service Commission:
Except as otherwise provided by law, to have final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all permanent officers and employees in the competitive or classified service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such officers and employees; and to prebcribe standards, guidelines and regulations governing the administration of discipline; (Emphasis supplied)
Article V, Section 9(j), of PD 807 simply gives the Commission the power to "har and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal," without the qualifiying phrase appearing in the above-quoted provision. The petitioners cannot invoke that phrase to justify the special power they claim under Act 1870.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the assailed decision of respondent Judge Teodoro P. Regino dated April 27, 1989, and the challenged orders of the Civil Service Commission, are AFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Romero, J., took no part.
Page 5 of 492 # Footnotes
1 Decision of UP President Edgardo J. Angara dated June 22, 1982, Rollo, pp. 30-31.
2 37 SCRA 64.
3 Rollo, 88-94. Decision penned by Commissioner Alfredo B. Deza with the concurrence of Commissioners Villones and Amilhasan.
4 Rollo, pp. 119-124. Resolution penned by Commissioner Celerino G. Gotladera with the concurrence of Commissioners Yangco and Deza.
5 Rollo, p. 202.
6 Ibid., 190-195.
7 Article XII-B, Section 1(1). 8 Rollo, p. 171.
Page 6 of 492 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 49677. May 4, 1989.]
TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION and ATTY. VIRGILIO SY, as Officer-in-Charge of
the Bureau of Labor Relations, Respondents.
The Government Corporate Counsel for respondent NHC. Raul E. Espinosa for intervenor PACIWU.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ONLY GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS WITH ORIGINAL OR LEGISLATIVE CHARTERS, NOW COVERED BY THE CIVIL SERVICE. — The civil service now covers only government-owned or controlled corporations with original or legislative charters, that is those created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation. The situations sought to be avoided by the 1973 Constitution and expressed by this Court in the National Housing Corporation case . . . appear relegated to relative insignificance by the 1987 Constitutional provision that the Civil Service embraces government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters and therefore, by clear implication, the Civil Service does not include government-owned or controlled corporations which are organized as subsidiaries of government-owned or controlled corporations under the general corporation law."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. LABOR LAW; UNIONS OR EMPLOYEES’ ORGANIZATION; RIGHT TO FORM RECOGNIZED AND GRANTED TO EMPLOYEES’ IN BOTH THE GOVERNMENTAL AND THE PRIVATE SECTORS. — The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employees’
organizations. The right to unionize or to form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and the private sectors. The Bill of Rights provides that" (t)he right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged." This guarantee is reiterated in the second paragraph of Section 3, Article XIII, on Social Justice and Human Rights, which mandates that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library 3. ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES TO UNIONIZE. — Specifically with respect to government employees, the right to unionize is recognized in Paragraph (5), Section 2, Article IX B which provides that" (t)he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees."cralaw virtua1aw library
4. ID.; NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION; BEING A GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND/OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION WITHOUT AN ORIGINAL CHARTER, HOLDING OF A
Page 7 of 492 therefore, no impediment to the holding of a certification election among the workers of NHC for it is clear that they are covered by the Labor Code, the NHC being a government-owned and or controlled corporation without an original charter Statutory implementation of the last-cited section of the Constitution is found in Article 244 of the Labor Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 111.
5. ID.; CERTIFICATION ELECTIONS; DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE TWO TYPES OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS RENDERED ACADEMIC BY SUBSEQUENT STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS. — The records do not show that supervening factual events have mooted the present action. It is meet, however, to also call attention to the fact that, insofar as certification elections are concerned, subsequent statutory
developments have rendered academic even the distinction between the two types of
government-owned or controlled corporations and the laws governing employment relations therein, as hereinbefore discussed. For, whether the employees of NHC are covered by the Labor Code or by the civil service laws, a certification election may be conducted.
6. ID.; DETERMINATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVE AMONG EMPLOYEES IN CORPORATIONS AND ENTITIES COVERED BY THE LABOR CODE. — For employees in corporations and entities covered by the Labor Code, the determination of the exclusive bargaining representative is particularly governed by Articles 255 to 259 of said Code. Article 256 provides for the procedure when there is a representation issue in organized establishments, while Article 257 covers unorganized establishments. These Labor Code provisions are fleshed out by Rules V to VII, Book V of the Omnibus Implementing Rules. 7. ID.; EMPLOYEES COVERED BY THE CIVIL SERVICE LAWS; GUIDELINES FOR THE EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHT TO ORGANIZE COVERED UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 180. — With
respect to other civil servants, that is, employees of all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters and who are, therefore, covered by the civil service laws, the guidelines for the exercise of their right to organize is provided for under Executive Order No. 180. Chapter IV thereof, consisting of Sections 9 to 12, regulates the determination of the "sole and exclusive employees’ representative."
D E C I S I O N
REGALADO, J.: The employees of the public sector comprise the largest bloc of workers in our national work force. Governmental bureaucracy is continually being reorganized to cope with the growing complexity of the problems and needs of political and administrative governance. As the increase in the number of government employees grows apace, the need to enhance their welfare correspondingly becomes more imperative. While it may be assumed that the Government is exerting efforts to advance the interests of its employees, it is quite
understandable that the employees themselves should actively seek arrangements whereby they can participate more meaningfully in management and employment relationships. There is, thus, a proliferation of unions or employees’ organizations, each seeking concomitant
Page 8 of 492 representational recognition.
The antecedent facts which led to the filing of this special civil action for certiorari are clear and undisputed. The juridical status and relevant circumstances of respondent corporation have been established in a case of illegal dismissal filed against it, as previously decided by the Court and hereinafter discussed. However, submitted this time for Our resolution is a controversy on the propriety of and requirements for certification elections in government-owned or controlled corporations like the Respondent.
Respondent National Housing Corporation (hereinafter referred to as NHC) is a corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations, dated January 1, 1951. Its shares of stock are and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its incorporation under Act 459, the former corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock are the Government Service Insurance System, the Social Security System, the
Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and Development Corporation and the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation. 1 Petitioner Trade Unions of the
Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS, for brevity) is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in NHC.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
On July 13, 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election with Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor in order to determine the exclusive
bargaining representative of the workers in NHC. It was claimed that its members comprised the majority of the employees of the corporation. 2 The petition was dismissed by med-arbiter Eusebio M. Jimenez in an order, dated November 7, 1977, holding that NHC "being a
government-owned and or controlled corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or assist any labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code." 3 From this order of dismissal, TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations 4 where, acting thereon in BLR Case No. A-984-77 (RO4-MED-1090-77), Director Carmelo C. Noriel reversed the order of dismissal and ordered the holding of a certification election. 5 This order was, however, set aside by Officer-in-Charge Virgilio S.J. Sy in his resolution of November 21, 1978 6 upon a motion for reconsideration of respondent NHC.
In the instant petition for certiorari, TUPAS seeks the reversal of the said resolution and prays that a certification election be held among the rank and file employees of NHC.
In retrospect, it will be recalled that in a former case of illegal dismissal involving the same respondent corporation, 7 We had ruled that the employees of NHC and of other government owned or controlled corporations were governed by civil service laws, rules and regulations pursuant to the 1973 Constitution which provided that "the civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations." 8
It was therein stressed that to allow subsidiary corporations to be excluded from the civil service laws would be to permit the circumvention or emasculation of the above-quoted constitutional provision. As perceptively analyzed therein," (i)t would be possible for a regular ministry of government to create a host of subsidiary corporations under the Corporation Code
Page 9 of 492 funded by a willing legislature. A government-owned corporation could create several
subsidiary corporations. These subsidiary corporations would enjoy the best of two worlds. Their officials and employees would be privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required by the Civil Service Decree and the regulations of the Commission on Audit. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive restraints of the open market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment." chanrobles law library : red
The rule, however, was modified in the 1987 Constitution, the corresponding provision
whereof declares that" (t)he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters." 9
Consequently, the civil service now covers only government-owned or controlled corporations with original or legislative charters, that is those created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation. As We recently held —
". . ., the situations sought to be avoided by the 1973 Constitution and expressed by this Court in the National Housing Corporation case . . . appear relegated to relative insignificance by the 1987 Constitutional provision that the Civil Service embraces government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters and therefore, by clear implication, the Civil Service does not include government-owned or controlled corporations which are organized as subsidiaries of government-owned or controlled corporations under the general corporation law." 10
While the aforecited cases sought different reliefs, that is, reinstatement consequent to illegal dismissal, the same lis mota determinative of the present special civil action was involved therein.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employees’ organizations. The right to unionize or to form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and the private sectors. The Bill of Rights provides that" (t)he right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged." 11
This guarantee is reiterated in the second paragraph of Section 3, Article XIII, on Social Justice and Human Rights, which mandates that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library Specifically with respect to government employees, the right to unionize is recognized in Paragraph (5), Section 2, Article IX B 12 which provides that" (t)he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees." The rationale of and justification for this innovation which found expression in the aforesaid provision was explained by its proponents, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The government is in a sense the repository of the national sovereignty and, in that respect, it must be held in reverence if not in awe. It symbolizes the unity of the nation, but it
Page 10 of 492 does perform a mundane task as well. It is an employer in every sense of the word except that terms and conditions of work are set forth through a Civil Service Commission. The government is the biggest employer in the Philippines. There is an employer-employee relationship and we all know that the accumulated grievances of several decades are now beginning to explode in our faces among government workers who feel that the rights afforded by the Labor Code, for example, to workers in the private sector have been effectively denied to workers in government in what looks like a grotesque, (sic) a caricature of the equal
protection of the laws. For example, . . . there were many occasions under the old government when wages and cost of living allowances were granted to workers in the private sector but denied to workers in the government for some reason or another, and the government did not even state the reasons why. The government employees were being discriminated against. As a general rule, the majority of the world’s countries now entertain public service unions. What they really add up to is that the employees of the government form their own association. Generally, they do not bargain for wages because these are fixed in the budget but they do acquire a forum where, among other things, professional and self-development is (sic)
promoted and encouraged. They also act as watchdogs of their own bosses so that when graft and corruption is committed, generally, it is the unions who are no longer afraid by virtue of the armor of self-organization that become the public’s own allies for detecting graft and corruption and for exposing it. . . ." 13
There is, therefore, no impediment to the holding of a certification election among the workers of NHC for it is clear that they are covered by the Labor Code, the NHC being a government-owned and or controlled corporation without an original charter Statutory implementation of the last-cited section of the Constitution is found in Article 244 of the Labor Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 111, thus:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"Right of employees in the public service. — Employees of the government corporations established under the Corporation Code shall have the right to organize and to bargain
collectively with their respective employers. All other employees in the civil service shall have the right to form associations for purposes not contrary to law."cralaw virtua1aw library
The records do not show that supervening factual events have mooted the present action. It is meet, however, to also call attention to the fact that, insofar as certification elections are concerned, subsequent statutory developments have rendered academic even the distinction between the two types of government-owned or controlled corporations and the laws
governing employment relations therein, as hereinbefore discussed. For, whether the
employees of NHC are covered by the Labor Code or by the civil service laws, a certification election may be conducted.
For employees in corporations and entities covered by the Labor Code, the determination of the exclusive bargaining representative is particularly governed by Articles 255 to 259 of said Code. Article 256 provides for the procedure when there is a representation issue in organized establishments, while Article 257 covers unorganized establishments. These Labor Code provisions are fleshed out by Rules V to VII, Book V of the Omnibus Implementing Rules.chanrobles law library
With respect to other civil servants, that is, employees of all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters and who are, therefore, covered by the civil service laws,
Page 11 of 492 the guidelines for the exercise of their right to organize is provided for under Executive Order No. 180. Chapter IV thereof, consisting of Sections 9 to 12, regulates the determination of the "sole and exclusive employees’ representative." Under Section 12, "where there are two or more duly registered employees’ organizations in the appropriate organizational unit, the Bureau of Labor Relations shall, upon petition, order the conduct of certification election and shall certify the winner as the exclusive representative of the rank-and-file employees in said organizational unit."cralaw virtua1aw library
Parenthetically, note should be taken of the specific qualification in the Constitution that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" and that" (t)hey shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law." 14 (Emphasis supplied.)
ON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the assailed resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations, dated November 21, 1978, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the conduct of a certification election among the affected employees of respondent National Housing Corporation in accordance with the rules therefor is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Gancayco, J., on leave. Endnotes:
1. Rollo, 191; National Housing Corporation v. Juco, Et Al., 134 SCRA 172 (1985). 2. Ibid., 14; Annex A.
3. Ibid., 20, Annex B. 4. Ibid., 21, Annex C. 5. Ibid., 27, Annex D. 6. Ibid., 31, Annex E.
7. National Housing Corporation v. Juco, Et Al., ante. 8. Sec. 1, Art. XII B.
9. Section 2 (1), Art. IX B.
Page 12 of 492 Commission, etc., Et Al., G.R. No. 69870, Nov. 29, 1988; see also Bliss Development
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, Et Al., G.R. No. 82824, Resolution, Jan. 18, 1989.
11. Sec. 8, Art. III, 1987 Constitution.
12. Constitutional Commissions; B. The Civil Service Commission. 13. Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, 567.
Page 13 of 492 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 98107. August 18, 1997.]
BENJAMIN C. JUCO, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION, Respondents.
Ricardo C . Valmonte for Petitioner.
The Government Corporate Counsel for Respondents. SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1973 CONSTITUTION; CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS; CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; EMPLOYER IN GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND/OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS EMBRACED WITHIN THE CIVIL SERVICE. — Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations were governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code. Hence, Article 277 of the Labor Code (PD 442) then provided: "The terms and conditions of employment of all government employees, including employees of government-owned and controlled corporations shall be governed by the Civil Service Law rules and regulations. . . The 1973 Constitution, Article II-B, Section 1(1), on the other hand provided: "The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency-subdivision and instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. 2. ID.; 1987 CONSTITUTION; CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION; CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; ONLY EMPLOYEES OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND/OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS WITH ORIGINAL CHARTER, EMBRACED WITHIN THE CIVIL SERVICE. — Although we had earlier ruled in National Housing Corporation v Juco, that employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations, whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries under the general Corporation Law, are governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code, this ruling has been supplanted by the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the said Constitution now provides: "The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter." (Article IX-8, Section 2[1]).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; "WITH ORIGINAL CHARTER," CONSTRUED. — We ruled that the new phrase "with original charter" means that government-owned and controlled corporations refer to corporations chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation Code.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; CONSTITUTION IN PLACE AT TIME OF DECISION
DETERMINES JURISDICTION OVER CASES INVOLVING EMPLOYEES IN GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND/OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS. — In National Service Corporation (NASECO) v.
National Labor Relations Commission, we had the occasion to apply the present Constitution in deciding whether or not the employees of NASECO are covered by the Civil Service Law or Labor Code notwithstanding that the case arose at the time when the 1973 Constitution was still in effect. We ruled that the NLRC has jurisdiction over the employees of NASECO on the
Page 14 of 492 ground that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs because it is the Constitution in place at the time of the decision. Thus, NASECO which had been organized under the general
incorporation statute and a subsidiary of the National Investment Development Corporation, which in turn was a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank, is excluded from the purview of the Civil Service Commission.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; EMPLOYEES OF NHA INCORPORATED UNDER THE FORMER CORPORATION LAW, SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE LABOR CODE. — We see no cogent reason to depart from the ruling in the aforesaid case. In the case at bench, the National Housing Corporation is a government owned corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with
Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government Corporation dated January 1, 1959. Its shares of stock are and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its incorporation under Act 1459, the former corporation law. The government entities that own it shares of stock are the Government Service Insurance System, the Social Security System, the Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and Development Corporation and the People’s Homesite and Housing
Corporations. Considering the fact that the NHA had been in incorporated under Act 1459, the former corporation law, it is but correct to say that it is a government-owned or controlled corporation whose employee are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code. This observation is reiterated in the recent case of Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. National Housing Corporation, where we held that the NHA is now within the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment, it being a government-owned and/or controlled
corporation without an original charter. Furthermore, we also held that the workers or employees of the NHC (now NHA) undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employee’s organization and that there is no impediment to the holding of a certification election among them as they are covered by the Labor Code. Thus, the NLRC erred in dismissing petitioner’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the rule now is that the Civil Service now covers only government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Having been incorporated under the Corporation Law, its relations with its personnel are governed by the Labor Code and come under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission.
D E C I S I O N
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) dated March 14, 1991, which reversed the Decision dated May 21, 1990 of Labor Arbiter Manuel R Caday, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of respondent National Housing Corporation (NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975. On May 14, 1975, he was separated from the service for having been implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds.cralawnad
On March 25, 1977, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the NHC with the Department of Labor.
Page 15 of 492 On September 17, 1977, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case. 1
Petitioner then elevated the case to the NLRC which rendered a decision on December 28, 1982, reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. 2
Dissatisfied with the decision of the NLRC, respondent NHC appealed before this Court and on January 17, 1985, we rendered a decision, the dispositive portion thereof reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the respondent National Labor Relations Commission is SET ASIDE. The decision of the Labor Arbiter dismissing the case before it for lack of jurisdiction is REINSTATED." 3
On January 6, 1989, petitioner filed with the Civil Service Commission a complaint for illegal dismissal, with preliminary mandatory injunction. 4
On February 6, 1989, respondent NHC moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Civil Service Commission has no jurisdiction over the case. 5
On April 11, 1989, the Civil Service Commission issued an order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. It ratiocinated that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Board finds the comment and/or motion to dismiss meritorious. It was not disputed that NHC is a government corporation without an original charter but organized/created under the Corporation Code.
Article IX, Section 2 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library ‘The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including government owned and controlled corporations with original charters.’ (Emphasis supplied)
From the aforequoted constitutional provision, it is clear that respondent NHC is not within the scope of the civil service and is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of this Board. Moreover, it is pertinent to state that the 1987 Constitution was ratified and became effective on February 2, 1987.
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction, the instant complaint is hereby dismissed." 6
On April 28, 1989, petitioner filed with respondent NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal with preliminary mandatory injunction against respondent NHC. 7
On May 21, 1990, respondent NLRC thru Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed from his employment by respondent as there was evidence in the record that the criminal case against him was purely fabricated, prompting the trial court to dismiss the charges against him. Hence, he concluded that the dismissal was illegal as it was devoid of basis, legal or factual.
Page 16 of 492 He further ruled that the complaint is not barred by prescription considering that the period from which to reckon the reglementary period of four years should be from the date of the receipt of the decision of the Civil Service Commission promulgated on April 11, 1989. He also ratiocinated that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It appears . . . complainant filed the complaint for illegal dismissal with the Civil Service Commission on January 6, 1989 and the same was dismissed on April 11, 1989 after which on April 28, 1989, this case was filed by the complainant. Prior to that, this case was ruled upon by the Supreme Court on January 17, 1985 which enjoined the complainant to go to the Civil Service Commission which in fact, complainant did. Under the circumstances, there is merit on the contention that the running of the reglementary period of four (4) years was suspended with the filing of the complaint with the said Commission. Verily, it was not the fault of the respondent for failing to file the complaint as alleged by the respondent but due to, in the words of the complainant, a ‘legal knot’ that has to be untangled." 8
Thereafter, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the dismissal of the complainant as illegal and ordering the respondent to immediately reinstate him to his former position without loss of seniority rights with full back wages inclusive of allowance and to his other benefits or equivalent computed from the time it is withheld from him when he was dismissed on March 27, 1977, until actually reinstated." 9
On June 1, 1990, respondent NHC filed its appeal before the NLRC and on March 14, 1991, the NLRC promulgated a decision which reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 10
The primordial issue that confronts us is whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is not governed by the Labor Code.
Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations were governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code. Hence,
Article 277 of the Labor Code (PD 442) then provided:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The terms and conditions of employment of all government employees, including employees of government-owned and controlled corporations shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The 1973 Constitution, Article II-B, Section 1(1), on the other hand provided:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations."cralaw virtua1aw library Although we had earlier ruled in National Housing Corporation v. Juco, 11 that employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations, whether created by special law or formed
Page 17 of 492 as subsidiaries under the general Corporation Law, are governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code, this ruling has been supplanted by the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the said Constitution now provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government owned or controlled corporations with original charter." (Article IX-B, Section 2[1])
In National Service Corporation (NASECO) v. National Labor Relations Commission, 12 we had the occasion to apply the present Constitution in deciding whether or not the employees of NASECO are covered by the Civil Service Law or the Labor Code notwithstanding that the case arose at the time when the 1973 Constitution was still in effect. We ruled that the NLRC has jurisdiction over the employees of NASECO on the ground that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs because it is the Constitution in place at the time of the decision. Furthermore, we ruled that the new phrase "with original charter" means that government-owned and controlled corporations refer to corporations chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation Code. Thus, NASECO which had been organized under the general incorporation statute and a subsidiary of the National Investment
Development Corporation, which in turn was a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank, is excluded from the purview of the Civil Service Commission.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary We see no cogent reason to depart from the ruling in the aforesaid case.
In the case at bench, the National Housing Corporation is a government owned corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government Corporation, dated January 1, 1959. Its shares of stock are and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its incorporation under Act 1459, the former corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock are the Government Service Insurance System, the Social Security System, the
Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and Development Corporation and the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation. 13 Considering the fact that the NHA had been incorporated under Act 1459, the former corporation law, it is but correct to say that it is a government-owned or controlled corporation whose employees are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code. This observation is reiterated in the recent case of Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. National Housing Corporation, 14 where we held that the NHA is now within the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment, it being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter.
Furthermore, we also held that the workers or employees of the NHC (now NHA) undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employee’s organization and that there is no impediment to the holding of a certification election among them as they are covered by the Labor Code. Thus, the NLRC erred in dismissing petitioner’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the rule now is that the Civil Service now covers only government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters. 15 Having been incorporated under the Corporation Law, its relations with its personnel are governed by the Labor Code and come under the
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission.
One final point. Petitioners have been tossed from one forum to another for a simple illegal dismissal case. It is but apt that we put an end to his dilemma in the interest of justice.
Page 18 of 492 WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC in NLRC NCR-04-02036089 dated March 14, 1991 is hereby REVERSED and the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated May 21, 1990 is
REINSTATED.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur. Endnotes: 1. Rollo, pp 20-2l 2. Id., pp. 22-26 3. Id., pp. 27-37 4. Id., pp. 38-42. 5. Id., pp. 43-47 6. Id., p. 52. 7. Id., pp. 53-58. 8. Id., p 68 9. Id., p 69. 10. Id., pp 78-86. 11. 134 SCRA 172 (1985). 12. 168 SCRA 122 (1988).
13. National Housing Corporation v. Juco, 134 SCRA 172 (1985). 14. 173 SCRA 33 (1989).
15. PNOC-Energy Development Corporation v. NLRC, 201 SCRA 487 (1991) The NHC (now NHA).
Page 19 of 492 EN BANC
G.R. No. 116041 March 31, 1995
NESCITO C. HILARIO, Petitioner, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and CHARITO L. PLANAS,Respondents.chanrobles virtual law library
ROMERO, J.: This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. Petitioner seeks to declare CSC Resolution No. 94-3336 dated June 23, 1994 and Resolution No. 93-4067 dated September 21, 1993 of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) null and void.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library On August 18, 1986, petitioner was appointed as City Attorney by the then OIC Brigido R. Simon, Jr., at that time the Officer-In-Charge of the Office of the Mayor of Quezon City under the Freedom Constitution of 1986.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library On July 24, 1992, the newly-elected mayor, Ismael Mathay, Jr. took over from Mayor Simon.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Mayor Mathay issued a letter 1dated July 24, 1992 to petitioner, which states:
In the absence of a tender of resignation on your part from your present position as City Attorney (City Legal Officer), please be informed that pursuant to Sec. 481, Art. II of the Local Government Code of 1991 providing that the position of City Legal Officer is co-terminous with the appointing authority, you are considered resigned as of June 30, 1992.
On July 1, 1993, respondent Vice Mayor Charito L. Planas of Quezon City filed a complaint 2with the CSC against petitioner and a certain Jose L. Pecson praying that respondents be found administratively liable for usurpation, grave misconduct, being notoriously undesirable, gross insubordination, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On September 21, 1993, the CSC issued Resolution No. 93-4067, 3the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission resolves to hold in abeyance any administrative disciplinary action against Atty. Nescito C. Hilario. However, Atty. Hilario should not be allowed to continue holding the position of the Legal Officer (City Attorney) of Quezon City.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the CSC in its Resolution No. 94-3336, 4the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby resolves to deny the motion for reconsideration of Atty. Nescito Hilario. Accordingly, CSC Resolution No. 93-4067 dated September 21, 1993 stands.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Page 20 of 492 The Commission hereby orders the Cashier of the Quezon City government to stop payment of salaries to Atty. Hilario, otherwise the former shall be personally liable for its
refund.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished Mayor Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. and Vice Mayor Charito L. Planas at their known addresses.
Hence, this petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Petitioner raises the following issues:chanrobles virtual law library
(1) petitioner's position as city legal officer is not confidential; andchanrobles virtual law library
(2) respondent CSC has no authority to remove or terminate the services of petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner alleges that when he was appointed City Attorney, the applicable law governing his appointment was Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 and, therefore, his position should not be
considered confidential. He argues that although the said position was considered confidential under Republic Act No. 5185, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 impliedly repealed the confidential nature of the position when it expanded the duties of City
Attorney.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We find petitioner's contention to be devoid of merit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The relevant provision of Republic Act No. 5185 states:
Sec. 19. Creation of positions of Provincial Attorney and City Legal Officer. - To enable the provincial and city governments to avail themselves of the full time and trusted services of legal officers, the positions of provincial attorney and city legal officer may be created and such officials shall be appointed in such manner as is provided for under Section four of this Act. For this purpose, the functions hitherto performed by the provincial and city fiscals in serving as legal adviser and legal officer for civil cases of the province and city shall be transferred to the provincial attorney and city legal officer, respectively. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, Section 188 enumerates the qualifications, powers and duties of the city legal officer thus:
Sec. 188. Appointment, Qualifications, Compensation, Powers and Duties. - (1) The city legal officer shall be appointed by the city mayor, subject to civil service law, rules and
regulation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
(2) No person shall be appointed city legal officer unless he is a citizen of the Philippines, of good moral character, a member of the Philippine Bar, and has acquired experience in the
Page 21 of 492 practice of his profession for at least five years.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
(3) The city legal officer shall receive such compensation, emoluments and allowances as may be determined by law or ordinance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library (4) The city legal officer shall be the chief legal adviser of the city and all offices thereof, and as such shall:
(a) Represent the city in all civil cases wherein the city or any officer thereof, in his official capacity, is a party;chanrobles virtual law library
(b) When required, draft ordinances, contracts, bonds, leases and other instruments involving any interest of the city, and inspect and pass upon any such instruments already
drawn;chanrobles virtual law library
(c) Give his opinion in writing, when requested by the mayor or the sangguniang panlungsod, upon any question relating to the city or the rights or duties of any city officer;chanrobles virtual law library
(d) Investigate or cause to be investigated any city officer for neglect or misconduct in office, or any person, firm or corporation holding any franchise or exercising any public privilege from the city for failure to comply with any condition, or to pay any consideration mentioned in the grant of such franchise or privilege, and recommend appropriate action to the sangguniang panlungsod and the city mayor;chanrobles virtual law library
(e) Institute and prosecute in the city's interest when directed by the mayor, a suit on any bond, lease, or other contract upon any breach or violation thereof; andchanrobles virtual law library
(f) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law ordinance.
An examination of the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 reveals no intention by the legislature to remove the confidential nature of the position of city legal officer. What it does, is to merely specify the various qualifications, powers and duties of a city legal officer which were not enumerated under Republic Act No. 5185.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We have consistently held in previous cases 5that the position of City Legal Officer is a confidential one. In the recent case of Griño v. Civil Service Commission, 6respondent was appointed provincial attorney at a time when Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 was in effect. We held that the position of City Legal Officer has its counterpart in the position of provincial attorney appointed by the provincial governor, both being positions involving the rendering of trusted services. We said:
By virtue of Republic Act No. 5185, both the provincial attorney and city legal officer serve as the legal adviser and legal officer for the civil cases of the province and the city that they work
Page 22 of 492 for. Their services are precisely categorized by law to be "trusted services."chanrobles virtual law library
A comparison of the functions, powers and duties of a city legal officer as provided in the Local Government Code with those of the provincial attorney of Iloilo would reveal the close
similarity of the two positions. Said functions clearly reflect the highly confidential nature of the two offices and the need for a relationship based on trust between the officer and the head of the local government unit he serves. The "trusted services" to be rendered by the officer would mean such trusted services of a lawyer to his client which is of the highest degree of trust.
Petitioner next questions the validity of CSC Resolution Nos. 93-4067 and 94-3336 for having been issued without authority. He argues that the CSC "usurped the power, functions, and prerogatives of Mayor Mathay to exclusively discipline and decide on matters affecting the conduct and employment of Quezon City employees and officials who are under his control and supervision." 7CSC Resolution 94-3336 states that: "It appears that Atty. Hilario was issued an appointment effective August 18, 1986 by then Mayor Simon. Hence, his term of office is deemed to have automatically expired when now Quezon City Mayor Mathay was elected in office and subsequently assumed his position."chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner maintains that the Mayor is the only one who may remove him from office directly and not the CSC, which only has appellate powers to review the decision of the
Mayor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We find this argument untenable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Nothing in the Administrative Code precludes the CSC from deciding a disciplinary case before it. Precisely, Section 47 thereof, states:
Sec. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. - (1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all
administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed directly with the
Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.
Although respondent Planas is a public official, there is nothing under the law to prevent her from filing a complaint directly with the CSC against petitioner. Thus, when the CSC
determined that petitioner was no longer entitled to hold the position of City Legal Officer, it was acting within its authority under the Administrative Code to hear and decide complaints filed before it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner further claims that he is not covered by Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991, which explicitly states that the term of the legal officers shall be co-terminous with the office appointing authority. 8He argues that the co-terminous
Page 23 of 492 provision applies only to future appointments of the legal officer but does not apply to
incumbents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
This provision is but a reiteration of the principle that since the position of City Legal Officer is a confidential one, it is perforce deemed to be co-terminous with that of the appointing
authority.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Lastly, petitioner alleges that although Mayor Mathay in his letter dated July 24, 1992 considered him resigned as of June 30, 1992, the latter still continued to give him legal assignments, a cogent indication that Mayor Mathay still reposes trust and confidence in him; thus, there is no reason for him to vacate his office.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
If Mayor Mathay really intended to retain the services of petitioner as City Legal Officer, he could easily have done so by issuing a formal appointment to this effect. This he did not do. In fact, at no time during the proceedings before the Civil Service Commission did Mayor Mathay ever indicate a desire to rescind his letter dated July 24, 1992. Nor did the Mayor raise any objection when the CSC ordered petitioner to vacate the position of City Legal Officer in Quezon City.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We can only draw the irresistible conclusion that Mayor Mathay's silence is eloquent proof that he does not intend petitioner to continue in the said
position.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Narvasa, C.J., took no part. chanrobles virtual law library chanrobles virtual law library
Separate Opinion PADILLA, J., concurring:chanrobles virtual law library
In Griño v. Civil Service Commission (194 SCRA 458), I stated in my dissenting opinion that the position of provincial attorney (and, by analogy, the city attorney) is not primarily
confidential but a career position, and, as such, the holder of the office owes his loyalty not to the appointing authority (the provincial governor or city mayor) but to the provincial or city government for which he acts as counsel or attorney.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Page 24 of 492 The attorney-client relationship existed really between the local government unit concerned and the lawyer appointed to the position of provincial or city attorney. It was clear that it should be the local government unit concerned which should decide whether or not to terminate said relationship and not the governor or mayor alone. In other words, governors and mayors could go but the provincial attorney and city attorney would remain as a career officer, subject to removal only for cause as provided by law and the civil service
rules.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is unfortunate, however, that the Local Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act No. 7160) in Sec. 481 made the position of legal officer co-terminous with that of the appointing authority. This, in my opinion, certainly adds to the demoralization within the ranks of career
government employees since appointments to the position of legal officer can now be based on considerations other than performance, efficiency, dedication and public service. The "spoils system" is now given free reign at least in the position of provincial attorney and city attorney.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Given the above provision of the Local Government Code, I am left with no choice but to concur with the Court's decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Separate Opinions PADILLA, J., concurring:chanrobles virtual law library
In Griño v. Civil Service Commission (194 SCRA 458), I stated in my dissenting opinion that the position of provincial attorney (and, by analogy, the city attorney) is not primarily
confidential but a career position, and, as such, the holder of the office owes his loyalty not to the appointing authority (the provincial governor or city mayor) but to the provincial or city government for which he acts as counsel or attorney.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The attorney-client relationship existed really between the local government unit concerned and the lawyer appointed to the position of provincial or city attorney. It was clear that it should be the local government unit concerned which should decide whether or not to terminate said relationship and not the governor or mayor alone. In other words, governors and mayors could go but the provincial attorney and city attorney would remain as a career officer, subject to removal only for cause as provided by law and the civil service
rules.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is unfortunate, however, that the Local Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act No. 7160) in Sec. 481 made the position of legal officer co-terminous with that of the appointing authority. This, in my opinion, certainly adds to the demoralization within the ranks of career
government employees since appointments to the position of legal officer can now be based on considerations other than performance, efficiency, dedication and public service. The "spoils system" is now given free reign at least in the position of provincial attorney and city attorney.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Given the above provision of the Local Government Code, I am left with no choice but to concur with the Court's decision.
Page 25 of 492 Endnotes:
1 Rollo, p. 8.chanrobles virtual law library
2 Annex "U," Petition; p. 90.chanrobles virtual law library
3 Annex "X," Petition; Rollo, p. 105.chanrobles virtual law library 4 Annex "A," Petition; Rollo, p. 36.chanrobles virtual law library
5 Besa v. Philippine National Bank, 33 SCRA 330 (1970); Claudio v. Subido, 40 SCRA 481 (1971); Villegas v. Subido, 41 SCRA 190 (1971).chanrobles virtual law library
6 194 SCRA 458, 467 (1991).chanrobles virtual law library 7 Rollo, p. 214, Reply of Petitioner.chanrobles virtual law library 8 Sec. 481, Art. II, R.A. 7160.
Page 26 of 492 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141141. June 25, 2001.]
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), Petitioner, v. CARLOS P. RILLORAZA, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
DE LEON, JR., J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari praying for the reversal of the Decision dated August 31, 1999 1 as well as the Resolution dated November 29, 1999, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51803.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The facts are undisputed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On November 5, 1997, administrative charges for dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and loss of confidence, were brought against respondent Carlos P. Rilloraza, a casino operations manager of petitioner PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR). Respondent allegedly committed the following acts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Summary description of charge(s):chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Failure to prevent an irregularity and violations of casino and regulations committed by co-officers during his shift on October 9, 1997.
1. During his shift of 6:00 a.m.-2:00 p.m. on October 9, 1997, four (4) personal checks with a total value of Pesos: Five Million (P5,000,000) were issued by a small-time financier/player and were facilitated by a COM with the Treasury Division which enabled the small-time financier/player to withdraw and receive said amount. The facilitation of the checks was not authorized by the Senior Branch Manager (SBM) or the Branch Manager for Operations (BMO) and the COM who facilitated the checks was not on duty then.
2. He even facilitated one (1) of the personal checks with a value of Pesos: Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00)
3. He failed to stop a top-ranking officer from placing bets over and above the allowable limit of P5,000.00 per deal, he failed to stop the same officer from playing in the big tables and lastly, he allowed the same officer to play beyond the allowable time limit of 6:00 a.m. Respondent duly filed his answer during an investigation conducted by petitioner’s Corporate Investigation Unit. He narrated the events that transpired:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"When I reported for my 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. shift, on October 9, that morning I saw BM RICHARD SYHONGPAN beside TABLE #22 (BB) sitting at a coffee table inside Area 3. While
Page 27 of 492 inside the Area 3, GAM RENE QUITO approached me with a check worth P500,000.00
requested by a customer for endorsement to the Treasury. Since I’ve been out of Manila branch for 2 years and I’ve just been recalled to this branch for only more than 3 weeks, I’m not quite familiar with the systems and I don’t know this customer. I immediately approached COM CARLOS GONZALES, who at that time was still around, to verify regarding the said check and his immediate reply was "IT’S OKAY AND GOOD AND IT WAS GUARANTEED BY BM
SYHONGPAN’. In fact, I reconfirmed it again with COM GONZALES since he is more familiar with the systems and customers, he answered me the same. So I gave the approval to GAM QUITO for endorsement. When I went in the office, I instructed OOS GILBERT CABANA to beep SBM VIC ADVINCULA and BMO DARIO CORDERO to call office "ASAP" because I wanted to relay this matter to them and there were no reply from both of them. I instructed OOS
CABANA to send messages again to SBM & BMO, but still I received no reply. It was until after noontime that BMO CORDERO returned my call and I reported the incident to him. When I was at home at around 3:30 p.m. SBM ADVINCULA returned my call and I reported the incident. I also relayed the incident to SBM REYES.
While during my rounds, I went down to the New VIP area and there I saw BM SYHONGPAN sitting at TABLE #3 (BB) and he was holding house cards at that time. I approached and stopped him but he reacted that the bet was not his but to a CUSTOMER’S. I took his words because as a subordinate, I respected him as one of our superior who very well know all our company’s policy esp. that an officer is not allowed to play at BIG table and are only allowed to bet with a maximum of P5,000.00 only. So I believe it was not his bet but the said
customer. At that time there was no way for me to stop the game because I saw the said customer, named MS. CORAZON CASTILLO, whom I don’t know her [sic] since I was out of Manila Branch 2 years, and whom BM SYHONGPAN was referring to as the player, has a lot of chips worth about P7 Million in front of her and was betting P1.5 M on the banker side which was over the maximum table limit by P500,000.00. I know we are allowed to authorize approval by raising the betting limits as per request of the playing customers.
After the game, the chips were encashed and I instructed GAM J. EUGENIO to accompany BM SYHONGPAN to his room because he was too drunk. When I was doing my rounds again, that’s how I found out from rumors within the gaming areas that this MS. CASTILLO was used by BM SYHONGPAN and COM GONZALES to played [sic] in behalf of them the whole time. And I also learned that there were four checks endorsed during my shift which I facilitated only one check worth P500,000.00 after I verified and confirmed it with COM GONZALES. With regards to the other 3 checks, I have no knowledge about it since they, BM SYHONGPAN and COM GONZALES, kept it a secret from me. When GAM EUGENIO returned from the room of BM SYHONGPAN he handed me some cash, which according to him, was given by BM SYHONGPAN as ‘BALATO’. I did not accept the money because at that moment I was so mad that they involved me beyond my innocence since I am new in the branch. I then instructed GAM EUGENIO to return the money to BM SYHONGPAN. (sic)
Finding Rilloraza’s explanation unsatisfactory, the PAGCOR Board handed down a Resolution on December 2, 1997 dismissing respondent and several others from PAGCOR, on the grounds of dishonesty, grave misconduct and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and loss of confidence, effective December 5, 1997. The Board also denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated December 16, 1997.
