The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily of the U.S. Government, the U.S. Department of the Navy or the Naval War College.
International Law Studies—Volume 3
51
It
would
be better in this case to substitute ArticleXL
VI
ofThe
Hague
Convention
with
respect tothe lawsand customs
ofwar
on
land in place of Article 12 of theNaval
War
Code.Naval
forces thusoccupying
hostilecountries,
by
thesimple fact of occupationbecome
amen-able tothe rules ofThe
Hague
Convention. This ArticleXL
VI
with
an
introductory clausewould
read: Inhos-tile countries occupied
by
forces of theUnited
States ofAmerica,
"Family
honor
and
rights, individual livesand
private property as well as religious convictionsand
liberty,must
be respected."There
are also otherHague
Convention
articles that should beinserted here. (See Section III.—
On
MilitaryAuthority
over HostileTerritory, p. 155.)
Section
III.—
Belligerent
and
Neutral
Vessels.Article 13.
All publicvesssels ofthe
enemy
are subject to capture, except thoseengaged
in purely charitable or scientificpursuits, in
voyages
of discovery, or as hospital shipsunder
the regulations hereinafter mentioned.Cartel
and
other vessels of theenemy,
furnishedwith
a proper safe-conduct, are
exempt
from
capture unlessengaged
in trade or belligerent operations.(a)
Would
a vessel flyingan
enemy
flagand
carryingsupplies to a neutral state
where
afamine
exists beliable to capture
and under
what
circumstances?"A
vessel flyingan
enemy
flagand
carrying suppliesto a neutral state
where
afamine
exists"might
not beliable to capture if the vessel
were
publicand
thesup-plies
were
of a charitable nature destined for the relief of the famine.Such
a use of supplies could not directlyorindirectlyaid the
enemy, but
ratherby
theamount
of the supplieslessen the enemy'sresources.
Of
course, if the supplieswere
destined for the neutral country simply because a higher price could be securedon
account of existenceof the famine, the vessel
and
supplies asengaged
in acommercial
undertakingwould
be liable to capture.52
If the vessel be a private vessel of the
enemy
it issubject to capture
under
Article 14 of theNaval
War
Code. Intime of
war
otherarrangements
must
bemade
for the transportation of such supplies, e. g.,
by
neu-tral vessels,
by
enemy
vesselunder
pass previously obtained, etc.(6)
Should
a vesselengaged
inmaking
deep-seasound-ings be
exempt from
capture asengaged
in scientificpursuits?
Vessels
engaged
in deep-sea soundingsmight
not beliable to capture because
engaged
in scientific pursuits,but
from
the nature of the vessel it could be directly utilized for hostilities, e. g., the vessel could be used forgrappling cables, or for cable laying, etc.
The
officermust
judge,but
such a vessel doubtlesswould
be sent into portwithout
exception, or ifexcep-tion
were
made
itwould
be only inthe rarest instances.(c)
Are
private vessels'
'
engaged
in purelycharitableor scientific pursuits, in
voyages
of discovery" liable tocapture?
Why
?Privatevessels '
'
engaged
inpurelycharitable orscien-tific pursuits, in
voyages
of discovery" are liable tocapture.
While
such vesselsmay
inno
way
contributetoward
strengthening theenemy,
but rather divert acertain
amount
from
his military resources, yet thedifficulty of responsible control is so great that these
vessels should be
exempt
onlyby
grace of thecom-mander
in theimmediate
region, notby
general rule.(cl)
How
should vesselsengaged
in religiousand
mis-sionary
work
be treated?Vessels
engaged
in purely religiousand
missionarywork would
beexempt
under
this section asengaged
incharitable pursuits provided they are.public vessels.
Such
cases, however,would
be exceedingly rare.Pri-vate vessels thus
engaged
should be left as in the priorcase (c) to the discretion of the
commander.
In all suchcases, the
ranking
officer in the region actson
hisown
responsibilityand
should accordinglyguard
against53
missionary serviceduringthe continuance of hostilities,
or even to capture these
enemy
vessels.(e)
How
should a boat belonging exclusively to the light-house service be treated?Boats belongingexclusively to the light-house service
should in general be liable to the penalties of
unarmed
vesselsengaged
in the enemy's service. JSToexemption
should be
made
by
rule, as the service is, ormay
be,made
of great military importance.An
exceptionwas
formallymade
in time ofwar
inthe Prize
Law
ofJapan
in 1894,when
exemption
from
capture
was
extended to "boats belonging tolight-houses."
The
nature of the light-house service inChina
at this timemay
have
prompted
this extension.1Article lJf.
All
merchant
vessels of theenemy,
except coastfishing vessels innocently employed, are subject to
cap-ture, unless
exempt
by
treaty stipulations.In case of military or other necessity,
merchant
vessels ofan
enemy
may
be destroyed, or theymay
be retained for the service of theGovernment.
Whenever
captured vessels, arms, munitions of war, or other
ma-terial are destroyed or taken for the use of theUnited
States beforecoming
into the custody of a prize court,they shall be surveyed, appraised,
and
inventoriedby
persons as
competent
and
impartial as can be obtainedand
the survey, appraisement,and
inventory shall besent to the prize court
where
proceedings are to beheld.
(a)
Should
theword
"private" be inserted in the place of theword "merchant"
inboth
instances inArticle 14?
The word
"private" should be inserted in place of"
merchant"
inboth
instances in Article 14, for reasons already givenunder
Article 11 (b).(b)
What
should be the treatment of vesselsengaged
in deep-sea fisheries?Why
?Whale,
seal, cod, or other fish not taken tomarket
innatural form,
but
salted or otherwisechanged, are lines of fisherieswhich
render vessels soengaged
liable to1
54
capture because such vessels are primarily
engaged
incommercial
ventures,and
the shore population is notimmediately dependent
upon
them. This position isfully discussed in the case of the Paquete
Habana
(175U. S., 677),
with
the following conclusions:Thereview ofthe precedents and authorities on the subject ap-pears to us abundantly to demonstratethat at the present day, by the general consentof the civilized nations of the world, and
inde-pendently of any express treaty or other public act, it is an estab-lished rule of international law, founded on considerations of hu-manityto a poor andindustrious orderof men, and of the mutual
convenienceofbelligerentstates,thatcoast-fishing vessels,withtheir
implements andsupplies, cargoesand crews, unarmedand honestly pursuing their peaceful calling of catching and bringingin fresh
fish, areexempt from capture as prize ofwar.
The exemption, of course, does not apply to coast fishermen or
their vessels if employed for a warlike purpose, or in anysuch way as to give aid or information to the enemy; nor whenmilitary or
naval operations create a necessity to which all private interests
mustgive way.
Nor has the exemption beenextended to shipsorvesselsemployed onthehigh sea in taking whales orseals orcod or otherfish which arenot brought fresh to market, but are salted or otherwise cured andmade aregular article of commerce.
(c)
Should
thewords
"or
other" in line 5 of Article 14 be stricken out ?Why
?The
words "or
other" should not be stricken out.The
action following could be justified not onlyon
theground
of military necessity,but
alsoon
other grounds,as in case of
dangerous
epidemicon
a captured ship, etc.Article 15.
Merchant
vessels of theenemy
thathave
sailedfrom
a port within the jurisdiction of the
United
States, priorto the declaration of war, shall be allowed to proceedto their destination, unless they are
engaged
in carrying contraband ofwar
or are in the military service of theenemy.
Merchant
vessels of theenemy,
in ports within thejurisdiction of the
United
States at the outbreak of war,shall be allowed thirty days after
war
hasbegun
to loadtheir cargoes
and
depart,and
shall thereafter beper-mitted to proceed to their destination, unless they are
engaged
in carryingcontraband
ofwar
or are in theMerchant
vessels of theenemy,
which
shallhave
sailedfrom any
foreign port forany
port within thejurisdiction of the
United
States before the declarationof war, shall be permitted to enter
and
discharge theircargo
and
thereaftertoproceedtoany
portnotblockaded.(For the discussion
and
final opinion of the Conferenceupon
Article 15 as a whole, seepage
57and page
63.It
was
as set forth in theform
ofan
amended
article of the code as follows:"In
absence of treaty governing the case, thetreat-ment
to be accorded private vessels ofan
enemy
sailingto or
from
a port of theUnited
States prior to thebeginningof a war, or sojourningin a port of the
United
States at the beginning of a
war
will be determinedby
special instructions
from
theNavy
Department.")(a)
Should
theword
"private" be inserted for theword "merchant"
in all instances in Article 15?The
word
"private" should be inserted in the placeof the
word "merchant"
in line 1, of Article 15. In other cases theword "merchant"
may
remain.There
should be
some
provisions in the code for the sojourn,etc., of private vessels other than
merchant
vessels.(b) Is not the first
paragraph
of Article 15 too liberalin its provisions?
The
firstparagraph
of Article 15 ismore
liberalthan
has been admitted generally in earlierpractice
and
from
the point of
view
ofmany
well qualified to givean
opinion is too liberal, even considering the fact thatthe
United
States hasuniformly been
a leader in favoringthe
freedom
ofcommerce.
(See Questionson
Article 15,page
57 ff.)(c)
How
should the words,"war
has begun," line (.»,
of Article 15, be interpreted?
The
words
"war
hasbegun" must
be interpreted, in case a declaration is issued, asfrom
the date of thedeclaration,
and
in case ofno
declaration, asfrom
thefirst outbreak of hostilities.
(d)
Should
a vessel of theenemy
under
the rule ofthe last
paragraph
of Article 15 be allowed to enterand
discharge its cargo at a port for
which
ithad
regularly56
port is blockaded,
and
thence ''proceed to
any
port notblockaded?"
I. This case supposes that a port within the jurisdic-tion of the
United
States before the declaration ofwar
has passed into the jurisdiction of the
enemy
and
isblockaded
by
theUnited
States,and
that amerchant
vessel ofthe
enemy
sailed for theport before the declara-tion of war.II. Or, again, it is
assumed
that this rule allows freetrade
with
the territorywhich
has passedfrom
theUnited
States jurisdiction into thehands
"of theenemy,
provided the
merchant
vessel of theenemy
shallhave
sailed
from
the foreign port before the declaration ofwar.
III. Or, again,
would
this rule not apply to ports within the jurisdiction of theenemy
at the time of sail-ing before the declaration ofwar
but
within the juris-diction of theUnited
States at the time of arrival of thevessel?
While
the rule as it stands possiblymight
provide forsuch a case or such cases, manifestly such is not the
intent of the rule.
The
rule as itshould readwould
provide forthat classof
enemy
vesselswhich
before the declaration sail forports within the jurisdiction of the
United
States.The
clause should therefore read:
"Merchant
vessels ofthe
enemy,
which
before the declaration ofwar
shallhave
sailedfrom any
foreign port forany
port withinthe jurisdiction of the
United
States." In regard tothelast clause of the last paragraph, however, a question
may
be raised. This clause permits the vessel to pro-ceed toany
port not blockaded.The
wording
would
naturally prohibit departure to a port of the
United
States blockadedby
theenemy
as well as to ports of theenemy
blockadedby
theUnited
States forces. This requirementmay
notalways
be advisable. Further, itallows the departure to certain other ports to
which
itmight
be advisable to prohibit sailing eitherfrom
the nature of the port orfrom
the nature of the serviceThis clause
seems
too liberaland
itwould
be advisableto retain the
naming
of the port of destination within thepower
of theUnited
States, astheUnited
States has permittedthe entranceand
departureofthevessel.The
clause
may
therefore better read ''thereafter topro-ceed to
any
portwhich
theUnited
States shall permit;"also in second line
from end change "permitted"
to"allowed."
The
aim
of thischange
is to retain for theUnited
States fuller jurisdiction of
enemy
vessels inport during war, while not deprivingthem
of reasonable freedom.(e)
Should
this articleberewritten? If so,how
should it read ?QUESTIONS ON ARTICLE 15.
The
first question is raised in regard to the vesselsthat are
known
as auxiliary or volunteer navy.Should
these while still
engaged
in mercantile transactions be treated as private vesselsunder
Article 15 or shall they be regarded as public vessels?There
is a considerabledifference of opinion in regard to the character of these
vessels.
Some
regard such vessels within the prohibitedclass
under
the Declaration of Paris;and
others regardthem
as legitimateand
necessaryunder
the present system.Hall speaks of the volunteer
navy
as follows:"The
sole real difference
between
privateersand
a volunteernavy
is then that the latter isunder
naval discipline,and
it is not evidentwhy
privateers should not also besubjectedto it. Itcan not be supposed that the
Declara-tion of Paris
was
merely
intended to putdown
the useof privateers
governed
by
the precise regulationscus-tomary
up
to that time. Privateeringwas
abandoned
because it
was
thought
thatno
armaments
maintainedat private cost, with the object of private gain, and often necessarily for a long time together
beyond
thereach of the regular naval forces of the state, could
be kept
under
proper control.Whether
this beliefwas
wellfounded
or not is another matter. If theorganization intended to be given to the Prussian
58
analogous organization
no doubt
can be procuredwhich
would
provide them. If so, there could beno
objectionon moral grounds
toits use;but
unlessp volunteernavy
were brought
into closerconnectionwith
the state thanseems
tohave been
the case in the Prussian project itwould
be difficult toshow
as amere
question of theory that its establishment did not constitutean
evasion ofthe Declaration of Paris.
"The
incorporationof a part of themerchant
marine
of a country in its regular
navy
is, of course, to bedis-tinguished
from
such ameasure
as thatabove
discussed.A
marked
instance of incorporation is suppliedby
theRussian
volunteer fleet.The
vesselsare built atprivatecost,
and
intime of peace they carry the mercantile flag of their country;but
their captainand
at least one other officer holdcommissions
from
their sovereign,they are
under
naval discipline,and
they appear to beemployed
solely in public services, such as theconvey-ance of convicts to the
Russian
possessionson
thePacific.
Taking
the circumstances asa whole, it isdiffi-cult to regard the use of the mercantile flag as serious
;
they are not
merely
vesselswhich
in the event ofwar
can be instantaneously converted into public vessels of
the state, they are properly to be considered as already belonging tothe imperial navy.
The
position of vesselsbelonging to the great
French
mail lines is different.They
arecommanded
by
acommissioned
officer of the navy,but
so long as peace lasts theiremployment
isgenuinely private
and
commercial;means
is simplyprovided
by which
they can be placedunder
navaldis-cipline
and
turned into vessels ofwar
so soon asan
emergency
arises.They
are notnow
incorporated inthe
French
navy,but
incorporationwould
take placeon
the outbreak of hostilities." (InternationalLaw,
4th ed., p. 549.)
Of
volunteerand
auxiliary navies briefly itmay
besaid: '
'
The
relationship of privatevessels to the state intime of war,
which
had
been settledby
the Declarationof Paris in 1856,
was
againmade
an
issueby
the act ofequip
them
forwar
and
placethem
under
the navaldiscipline.
The
officersand
crewswere
to be furnishedby
theowners
of the vessels, towear
naval uniform, tosail
under
theNorth
German
flag, to take oath to thearticles of war,
and
toreceive certainpremiums
forcap-ture or destruction of the enemy's ships.
The
French
authoritiescomplained
to the British that thiswas
pri-vateering in disguise
and
a violation of the Declarationof Paris.
The
law
officers of thecrown
declared that therewas
'a substantial difference'between
such avolunteer
navy
and
asystem
of privateering,and
that the action of Prussiawas
not contrary to theDeclara-tion of Paris. "With this position
some
authorities agree, while others dissent.The
weight
of the act as a precedent is lesson
account of the fact thatno
shipsof this
navy
ever put to sea. Similarly, the plan ofGreece for a volunteer
navy
in 1897was
neverput
into operation.1
'Russia, in
view
of possible hostilitieswith
England
in 1877-1878, accepted the offer of certain citizens to
incorporate into the
navy
during thewar
vesselspri-vately purchased
and
owned.
Such
vessels are stillnumbered
in the 'volunteer fleet,' and,though
pri-vately
owned
and managed,
are, since 188(3,under
theAdmiralty. These vessels
may
easily be converted intocruisers,
and
are, so far as possible, favoredwith
gov-ernment
service.There
seems to be little question astothe propriety of such a relationship
between
the stateand
the vesselswhich
may
be used in war."Still less
open
to objection is the plan adoptedby
Great Britain in 1887
and
by
theUnited
States in 1892,by which
these governments,through agreements
withcertain of their great steamship lines, could hireor pur-chase at a fixed price certain specified vessels for use
in case of war.
The
construction of such vessels issub-ject to
government
approval,and
certain subsidies are grantedto these companies. In time ofwar
both officersand
men
must
belong to the public forces.The
plansof Russia, Great Britain,
and
theUnited
Stateshave
met
with
little criticism." (Wilsonand
Tucker,60
Lawrence
declares his opinion as follows:"The
legality of a volnnteer
navy
must
depend, like thelegality of a volnnteer
army,
npon
the closeness of its connectionwith
the state,and
the securities it affords for adue
observanceof the laws ofwar." (Principles ofInternational
Law,
p. 435.)Article 9 of this code
(which
earlierwas
voted to be stricken out as unessential) certainly Tecognizesunder
the
term
"auxiliaries," the officersand
men
of suchvessels as in the category of
armed
forceswhen
com-missioned
and
perhaps at all times of war.The
status of a private vesselwhich
hasassumed
cer-tain public obligations is insome
respectsshown
in the decisioninregardtothePanama,
renderedby
theUnited
StatesSupreme
Court on
February
26, 1900.The
re'sume' of the case is as follows:
The
Panama
was a steamship of 1,432 tons register, carrying a crewof seventy-onemen, all told, owned by a Spanish corporation,sailingunderthe Spanish flag, havinga commissionas aroyalmail
ship from the Government of Spain,and plying from and to
New
York andHavana andvarious Mexicanports, withgeneral cargoes, passengers, and mails. At the time of her capture, she was on a voyagefrom
New
York to Havana, and had on board twobreech-loading Hontoria guns of9 centimeters bore, one mounted on each
side ofthe ship, one
Maxim
rapid-firing gunon the bridge, twentyRemington rifles, and ten Mauser rifles,withammunition forallthe
guns andrifles, and thirty or forty cutlasses. The gunshad been puton board three years before, and the small arms and ammuni-tion had been on board a year or more. Her whole armamenthad
beenput on board by the company incompliance with itsmail
con-tract with the Spanish Government (made more than eleven years before, and still in force), which specifically required everymail steamship ofthe company to "take onboard,for her
own
defense,"such an armament, with the exception of the
Maxim
gun and the Mauserrifles.Thatcontractcontains
many
provisions looking to theuse ofthe company's steamships by the SpanishGovernmentasvesselsofwar.Among
other things,it requires that each vessel shall have thecapacity to carry 500 enlisted men; that that government, upon inspection ofherplans as prepared for commercial and postal
pur-poses,
may
order herdeckand sidesto be strengthened so asto sup-port additional artillery; andthat, in case of the suspension of the mail service by naval war, or by hostilities in any of ths seas or portsvisited by the company's vessels, the governmentmay
taketo be made by a commission; and shall at the termination of the warreturn them to the company,paying5 per cent onthevaluation whileithasthem in its service, as well as an indemnity for any diminution intheir value.
The
Panama
wasnot a neutral vessel; but she was enemyprop-erty, andas such, even ifshe carriedno arms (either aspart of her equipment,orascargo),wouldbe liable to capture,unlessprotected
by the President's proclamation.
It
may
be assumedthata primaryobjectof her armament, andinthe time of peace,itsonly object,was forpurposes of defense. But that armament was not ofitselfinconsiderable, as appears, not only fromthe undisputedfacts of the case, but from the action of the
district court, uponthe application of the commodore commanding at the port wherethe courtwasheld, and ontherecommendationof
the prize commissioners, directing her armsand ammunitionto be
delivered to the commodore forthe use of the Navy Department.
And
the contract ofher owner with the Spanish Government,pur-suant to which the armament had been put on board, expressly
provided that, in case of war, that governmentmight take
posses-sion of the vessel with her equipment,increase herarmament, and use her as awarvessel; and, intheseandother provisions, evidently
contemplated her use for hostilepurposesintime ofwar.
Shewas, then, enemyproperty, bound for an enemy port,
carry-ingan armament susceptibleofuse for hostile purposes,andherself
liable, upon arrival in that port, to be appropriated by the enemy
to such purposes.
Theintent of the fourth clause of the President's proclamation
was toexemptfora time fromcapturepeaceful commercialvessels;
notto assistthe enemyin obtaining weaponsof war. This clause
exempts "Spanish merchant vessels" only, and expressly declares that it shall not apply to '
' Spanish vessels having on board any
officer in the military or naval service of the enemy, or any coal
(except such as
may
be necessary for their voyage), or any otherarticle prohibited or contraband ofwar, oranydispatch of or to the
Spanish Government."
Upon full consideration of this case, this court is of the opinion thatthe proclamation, expressly declaring that the exemptionshall
not applyto any Spanish vesselhaving on board any article
prohib-itedor contraband of war, or a single military or naval officer, or
even a dispatch, of the enemy, can not reasonably be construed as including, in the description of "Spanish merchantvessels" which
are tobe temporarily exempt from capture, a Spanishvessel owned
by a subjectof the enemy; having an armanentfit for hostile use;
intended,in theeventof war,to be used as awarvessel; destined to
a port of theenemy: andliable, onarrivingthere, tobe taken
pen-sion of bythe enemy, and employed asanauxiliary cruiser of the
enemy'snavy, inthewar with thiscountry.
The result is, that the
Panama
was lawfully captured and62
Such
vessels are certainly potentiallywar
vesselsand
are certainly designed
and
liable to conversion for nsein war. In
no
case aresuch
vessels purely privateves-sels because the
Government
has a prior right to con-vertthem
to its useunder
terms of their registration orby
virtue of specific contract as the casemay
be. (27 Stat. L., actMay
10, 1892.)This being the case it
would
be for theGovernment
to enunciate its policy at the time in regard to such
vessels
and
to determinewhether
such vesselswere
actually " in the military service of the
enemy"
or not.The
status of such auxiliary vessels being at presentuncertain, it
would
be advisable to allow thewording
of thecode in Article 9 to stand as it is sufficientlybroad
to permit seizure should policy or act of the vessel
re-quire seizure while not
throwing
the responsibilityupon
the naval officer to decide in regard to a class of vessels
whose
status is uncertain. If such vessels are clearly in the military service of theenemy,
they are notby
Article 15 entitled to exemption. In
any
case thestatus of auxiliary vessels should bemade
clear.Again, while it can not be said that the provisions of
the first clause of Article 15 are absolutely established
in international law, they are, however, so well estab-lished that the privilege of entry
and
departure ofbona
fide privatevessels
would
be allowedby
all nations. Itwas
so allowed intheCrimean
war, 1854; in theFranco-Prussian
war
of 1870,and
Russo-Turkish
war
of 1877,and
in theSpanish-American
war
of 1898by
theUnited
States. It is proper thatsome
provisionupon
this matter be
made
known
to the officers of theNavy
eithenin the code or elsewhere.In regard to the "thirty
days"
allowancementioned
in the second clause of Article 15, itmay
be said thatboth
longerand
shorter timeshave been
allowed, that itis
now
generalto allowsome
time,and
thatprobablythe navaldepartment
of theGovernment
is notcompetent
States at outbreak of
war
when
allowed a specified timeafter
war
hasbegun
to load their cargoesand
depart, shall thereafter be permitted to proceed to their desti-nation, unless they areengaged
in carrying contrabandof
war
or are in the military service of theenemy."
Thus
theGovernment
is notcommitted
beyond
what
international
law
sanctionsthough
taking a reasonablyliberal position.
It should be observed that this
whole
Article 15 givesto
commerce
between
theenemy
and
theUnited
Statesa
measure
ofexemption
that is not given to thecom-merce between
theenemy
and
a neutral. This is in oneway
illogical yet it is desirable to give the widestex-emption
tocommerce
as the destruction ofcommerce
does not bring
any commensurate
military advantage.OPINION OF COMMITTEE OF THE CONFERENCE.
In
view
of the objections raisedupon
variousgrounds
to Article 15, it
was
votedby
the Conference that acom-mittee consider
what
changes should bemade
therein.This committee, after debating the merits of positive
positions, decided that in
view
of* disagreementamong
authorities,
and
in practice,and pending an
international convention, Article 15 should read:"In
absence oftreaty governing the case, the treatment to be accorded private vessels of
an
enemy
sailing prior to the begin-ning of a war, to orfrom
a port of theUnited
States orsojourning in a port of the
United
States at the begin-ning of a war, willbe determinedby
specialinstructionsfrom
theNavy
Department."
This
was
the action takenby
theNavy
Department
in publishing GeneralOrder
No. 492 onJune
20, 1898.This order,
"prepared
by
theDepartment
of State " and"published for the information
and
guidance of thenaval service," contains several clauses not so liberal
toward
neutrals as those in Article 15 of theNaval
War
Code,
though
very liberal in their provisions. Tliis order states in section 17 thatmerchant
vessels of tin'enemy
"are good
prize,and
maybe
seizedanywhere,
64
President's proclamation of April 26, 1898, in order to
provide against
undne
hardships in the beginning of the war,made
the following exceptions:
4. Spanish merchant vessels in any ports or places within the
UnitedStates, shall be allowed till
May
21; 1898, inclusive, for
load-ing theircargoes and departing from such ports orplaces; and such Spanishmerchant vessels, if met at sea by any United States ship, shall be permitted to continue theirvoyage, if, on examination of their papers, it shallappear that their cargoes weretaken on board before the expiration of the above term: Provided, Thatnothing herein contained shall applyto Spanishvessels having on board any
officer in the military or naval service of the enemy, or any coal
(except such as
may
be necessary for their voyage), or anyotherarticle prohibited or contraband ofwar, oranydispatch ofor to the
Spanish Government.
5.
Any
Spanish merchant vessel which, prior to April 21, 1898, shallhave sailedfrom any foreign portbound forany port or place inthe UnitedStates, shall be permitted to enter such port orplace,andto dischargehercargo, andafterwards forthwithtodepart with-out molestation; and any suchvessel, if met at sea by any United
States ship, shall be permitted to continue hervoyage to anyport not blockaded.
The
following clauses of GeneralOrder
492 of theISTavy
Department
contain the material applying to this subject:3. Neutral vessels are entitled to notificationof a blockadebefore
theycanbemade prize for its attemptedviolation. The character
ofthis notification isnot material. It
may
be actual, as by avesselof the blockading force,or constructive, asbya proclamationof the
government maintaining the blockade, or by
common
notoriety.If a neutral vesselcanbe shown to havehad notice of the blockade
in any way,she isgood prize and should besent in foradjudication; but, should formal noticenot have been given,the rule of
construc-tive knowledge arising from notoriety should be construed in a
mannerliberalto the neutral.
4. Vessels appearing before a blockaded port, having sailed
with-out notification, are entitled to actual notice bya blockadingvessel.
Theyshouldbe boarded byan officer,
who
shouldenterin theship'slog the fact of such notice, such entryto include thename of the
blockadingvessel giving notice,the extent of the blockade, the date
andplace, verified byhis official signature. Thevesselisthen to be
set free; and should she again attempt to enter the same orany
other blockaded port as to which she has had notice she is good
prize.
the establishment of a blockade will, unless otherwise ordered by the UnitedStates, be allowedthirty days from the establishment of the blockade toload theircargoesand depart from suchport.
Article 16.
Neutral vessels in the military or naval service of the
enemy,
orunder
the control of theenemy
for militaryornaval purposes, are subject to capture or destruction.
What
should bedone
in case a neutral vessel within neutral territory isfound
to be transmitting messagesto the
enemy
by means
of wireless telegraphy?Article 16 covers the rule for neutral vessels within the field of belligerent action.
The
code does not cover the field of peaceful actionwhich
neutral waters are ever supposed to be.In case a neutral vessel within neutral territory is
found
to be transmitting messages totheenemy by
wire-less telegraphy the vessel is guilty of unneutral service
and
isliable tothepenaltiesconsequentupon
suchservicewhen
within the field of belligerent action,but
so longas she remains within neutral waters while the service
is
unchanged
so far as the neutral vessel is concerned,no
belligerent actmay
beperformed
against the neutralvessel in neutral territory.
The
act should be reportedto the
government
inwhose
jurisdiction the vessel iswitha request that the vessel berestrained
and
it shouldalso bereported to the
home
government
for diplomaticconsideration.
It
would
be permissible to useany
means
to intercept the messages outside of neutral jurisdiction.The
caseis
somewhat
parallel to that ofsubmarine
telegraphy.The
internationallaw
status of wireless telegraphyis asyet undefined. Doubtless agreements in regard to the use of this
means
ofcommunication
must
bemade.
Article 17.
Vessels of
war
of theUnited
Statesmay
take shelterduring
war
in a neutral port subject to the limitationsthat the authorities of the port
may
prescribe as to thenumber
of belligerent vessels to be admitted into the port atany
one time. This shelter,which
is allowed66
by
comity
of nations,may
be availedof for the purposeof
evading
theenemy,
from
stress of weather, or toob-tain supplies or repairs that the vessel needs to enable her to continue her
voyage
in safetyand
to reach the nearest port of herown
country.(a)
Would
it be aground
for protest if a neutral stateprescribed other limitations
than
those in regard to"the
number
of belligerent vessels to be admitted intothe port at
any
one time?"It
would
beno
ground
for protest if a neutralpre-scribed other limitations
than
those in regard to"the
number
of belligerent vessels to be admitted into theport at
any
one time."The
neutral port regulations are matters within neutral competence, as isshown
by
Article 18
and
as is affirmedby
all writerson
interna-tional law.(b)
How
should thewords "to
continue hervoyage
in safety" be interpreted?Do
thesewords
refer to the clause"to
obtain supplies" in line 7 of Article 17?"To
continue hervoyage
in safety"must
beinter-preted
with
reference to the last clause of Article 18,which
forbids increase in"armament
military stores,or in the
number
of thecrew
of a vessel of war."The
wording
is too free according to the generallyaccepted standards as "safety"
may
bemade
to applyto security
from
enemies as well asfrom
the elementsof nature.
The
generally admitted repairsand
supplies are those necessary for the continuance of thevoyage
to the nearest
home
portwith
reference to therisksdue
to natural causes.
Further, the supplies are
by
the last clause of Article18 limited to those not military in their nature.
"To
continue hervoyage
in safety" refers to one or bothof the
words
"supplies" or "repairs"with
theabove-mentioned
restrictionson
the nature of the supplies.Article 18.
sailing in pursuit orafter the departureof avessel of the
enemy.
No
increase in thearmament,
militarystores, orin thenumber
of thecrew
ofavessel ofwar
of theUnited
States shall be attempted during the stay of such vessel in a neutral port.Might
it not often be necessary to violate theprovi-sions of the last sentence ofArticle 18 in orderto obtain
supplies or repairs sufficient to enable a vessel
"to
con-tinue hervoyage
in safety?"The
last sentence in Article 18 is in accordwith
the generally accepted opinion of the rule of correct actionin a neutral port.
The
phrase "to continue hervoyage
in safety " should be interpreted asabove
statedwith
reference to safety
from
the dangers of the sea rather than dangersfrom
enemies.The
Netherlands issued the following during thewar
between
theUnited
Statesand
Spain: "It is forbidden to supplyarms
or ammu-nition to the ships ofwar
or privateers of thepowers
at war, as also to renderthem
any
assistancewhatever
in the increasing of their crews, arming, or equipment,and
ingeneraltovoluntarilyperform
any
act thatmight
endanger
the neutrality of the state."Article 19.
A
neutral vessel carrying the goods ofan
enemy
is,with
her cargo,exempt
from
capture, exceptwhen
car-rying contraband of
war
or endeavoring to evade a blockade.Should
thewords "or
guiltyof unneutral service" beadded
after theword
"blockade"
in the last line of Ar-ticle 19?With
the increase in theforms
of servicewhich
neu-tral vessels
may
render, they should certainlyhave no
more
liberal treatmentthan
mail steamers inArticle20,for mail steamers are or
may
beunder
a partialgov-srnment
control,and
these are liable to detention for"violation of the laws of
war
with
respect tocontra-band
blockade, or unneutral service."The
words "or
guilty of unneutral service" should68
Article 20.
A
neutral vessel carrying hostile dispatches,when
sailing as a dispatch vessel practically in the service of
the
enemy,
is liable to seizure. Mail steamersunder
neutral flags carrying
such
dispatchesinthe regularand
customary manner,
either asa part of theirmail in theirmail bags, or separately as a matter of
accommodation
and
without
specialarrangement
or remuneration, arenot liable to seizure
and
should not be detained, exceptupon
cleargrounds
of suspicion of a violation of thelaws
ofwar
with
respect to contraband, blockade, orunneutral service, in
which
case the mailbags
must
beforwarded
with
sealsunbroken.
(a)
Would
the transmission of hostile dispatchesre-ceived
by
a neutral vessel on thehigh
seamake
thatvessel liable to seizure; if so, for
how
long a time?Dana,
in note 228 toWheaton's
InternationalLaw,
says:
Supposea neutral vesseltotransmit signals betweentwoportions
ofafleetengaged in hostile combinedoperations, and not in sight
ofeach other. Sheisdoubtless liable tocondemnation. Itis
imma-terialwhetherthese squadrons are at sea or in ports of their
own
countryor in neutralports, orhow
fartheyare apartorhow
impor-tantthe signals
may
betothegeneralresultsof the war,or whethertheneutral transmits themdirectly or through a repeatingneutral
vessel. Thenature ofthe communication establishesits final
desti-nation anditisimmaterial
how
farthe delinquent carries it on itsway. The reasonofthecondemnationis the natureofthe servicein
whichthe neutral is engaged.
The
neutral vessel transmitting hostile dispatches isliableto seizure as
engaged
in unneutral service.Tay-lor says
:
No
overt act could be performed by a neutral in aid of abellig-erentmore clearlyunlawful than the transmission of signals or the
carryingofmessages betweentwoportions of afleetengagedin con-cert inhostileoperations, and notin sight of each other. Itmakes
nodifference whether such fleets or squadrons are in ports of their
own
country,inneutral ports, or onthehigh seas, orwhether suchsignals are transmitted bythe neutral directly orthrough a
repeat-ing neutralvessel.
No
matter whether such communications be verbal or written, importantor unimportant to the general resultsof the war, as the criminality of the act depends alone upon the
natureof the service in which the neutral is engaged. The same
69
land force and a fleet, orto thelaying of a cable to be used chiefly
or exclusively for hostile purposes. (International Public Law,
p. 754, sec. 670.)
Of
the nature of such, serviceLawrence
well saysWe
arenow
ina positiontodistinguish clearlybetweenthe offense of carrying contraband and the offense of engagingin unneutralservice. Theyare unlike in nature, unlike in proof, and unlike in penalty. To carry contraband is to engage in an ordinary trading
transactionwhichisdirected toward a belligerent community sim-plybecause a better marketis likelyto be found there than
else-where. To perform unneutral serviceis tointerfere in the struggle by doinginaid of a belligerent actswhich are in themselves not
mercantile, but warlike. In order that a cargo of contraband
may
be condemned asgood prize, the captors mustshow that itwas on
the way to a belligerent destination. If without subterfuge it is
bound to a neutral port, thevoyageis innocent, whatever
may
be the nature ofthe goods. Inthe case ofunneutral service thedesti-nation of the captured vessel is immaterial. The nature of her missionis the all-important point. She
may
be seized andconfis-catedwhen sailingbetwentwoneutral ports. The penalty for
car-rying contraband is the forfeitureof the forbidden goods, the ship
being retained as prize of war onlyunder special circumstances.
Thepenaltyforunneutral serviceisfirst and foremost the
confisca-tionof the vessel, the goods on board being condemned when the owner is involved or when fraud and concealment have been
re-sortedto.
Nothing butconfusioncanarise fromattempting to treattogether
offenses so widely divergent as the two
now
under consideration. (Principles ofInternational Law, p. 633.)The
liability to seizure attaches to thevessel inconse-quence
oftheactperformed, notbecauseofthe possessionof the dispatches (which in case of wireless telegraphic dispatches
might
be outside of the vessel almost imme-diately).The
nature of the act is ormay
bemore
nox-ious
than
that of breaking a blockade orany
other act forwhich
liability attaches to thevesseltill thecomple-tion of the
voyage
and
return to thehome
port. Lia-bility therefore to seizure attaches to the vessel guiltyof the transmission of such dispatches till return to the
home
port.(6)
Under
Article 20,would
repetitionby
a neutral70
Yes, as
above
under
clause allowingseizureon
ground
of unneutral service.
(c)
Should
theNaval
War
Code
containan
articleupon
unneutral service? If so,
what
shouldit coverand
how
should it read?
No. It is better to leave that to the progressof
opin-ionasthe
range
of action to be consideredunder
unneu-tral service will continually change.
Lawrence,
aftermentioning
that—
A
neutral ship isforbidden to—
* (1)
Transmitcertainkindsof signalsormessagesforabelligerent;
(2) Carry certainkinds of dispatches for a belligerent;
(3) Transport certain kinds of persons in the service of a bellig-erent;
says:
The most importantandthemostfrequentlyperformedunneutral
services are arrangedunder the three heads
we
have justenumer-ated. But the classificationisby nomeans exhaustive. There are otherways of givingunlawful aid to belligerents besides thosewe
have been considering. The exigencies of warfare are so numerous
and sochangefulthatno one can describebeforehandeverypossible modein whicha neutral ship
may
make herself into atransport in the service ofone or other ofthe belligerents. Theprinciple ofthelawis clear. It forbids anything approaching to an actual
partici-pationinthe war. The application ofthe principle must be settled
ineach case as itarises.
Among
the acts whichitassuredly covers wemay
mentiontransferring provisions, coals,or ammunition fromone belligerentship to anotheratsea,and showingthe channelto a
fleet advancing for a hostile attack. (Principles of International
Law, pp. 625 and 629.)
(d)
Should
the code containan
article inregard to the transfer of vesselsfrom
a belligerent to a neutral flag in the time ofwar?
No. This is in the
main
a matterof domesticlaw and
may
change with
thechange
of national policy,there-fore the code should contain
no
provision in regard tosuch transfer. It