APPENDIX A
This mathematical appendix derives the political equilibrium production and trade policies under cooperation with a global production externality.
Home and foreign country exhibit similar economic and political structures. Variables and parameters for the foreign country are denoted with an asterisk (*). Supply for industry i in the home country is given by Hotelling’s lemma
(A1) Xi(pis)= ′Πi(pis)
Each individual j maximizes direct utility
(A ) uj c j u cij( ij) u ( )E
i n
2 0 Ej
1
= + +
∑
= ,where c0j is the consumption of the numeraire good, cij is the consumption of good i by
individual j, and uEj( ) is the utility that individual j derives from the state of the environment asE determined by the externality E. The externality is global and is generated by production of one or more nonnumeraire goods e in one or both such that ∂
∂ E X X
Xe e E
e
X
( , *)
= > 0 and
∂
∂ E X X
Xe e E
e
X
( , *)
* = * > 0. All uij(.) are assumed to be increasing and concave function. Further assume that the externality is negative, that is ∂
∂ u
EE j = ′ <uE j 0 . All consumers are assumed to be identical and the indirect utility of a representative consumer is given by
(A3) v(p ,y,E) = y+s(p ) + ud d E( )E ,
where pd=( ,p p1d 2d,...,pnd) is the vector of consumer prices for nonnumeraire goods, and y represents her income. Consumer surplus from all nonnumeraire goods is
(A4) s(p ) = d u [d (p )] - i i id p d (pid i id
i=1 n
i=1 n
∑
) .∑
Using Roy’s Identity yields individual demand for good i
(A5) d p s p
i i p
d
d
i
( ) ( d )
= −∂
∂ .
Total demand for good i in the home country is Di = Ndi and ∂
∂ D p i D
i
d = ′ <i 0 . The price equilibrium conditions for supply and demand in the home and foreign country are
(A a) pis i p
i i
6 =θ w
τ
( ) *
*
A b pis i* p
i i
6 =θ w
τ
(A c6 ) pid =θipiw (A d6 ) pid* =θi*piw.
The net revenue of the government in the home country is generated by domestic and trade policies. Net per-capita transfer is then
(A ) r( , , *, *) N pi( )X p( ) p ( )[D p( ) X (p )]
s
i i i
s
i
N i
w
i i i
d
i i
s
i
7 τ θ τ θ = 1
∑
τ −1 + 1∑
θ −1 − .The governments cooperate when they set production and trade policies and efficiency requires that they maximize the weighted sum
( ) [ ( , , , ) ( , , , )]
[ ( , , , ) ( , , , )]
* * * * * * *
* * *
*
* * * *
A A G AG A C aW
A C a W
i L i
i L i
8 + = +
+ +
∈
∈
∑
∑
τ θ τ θ τ θ τ θ τ θ τ θ τ θ τ θ
where A=(αL +a)and A* =(α*L +a*). The first order condition for the cooperative equilibrium is then
( )
( )
( )
( , , , ) ( , , , )
( , , , ) ( , , , ) ,
* * * * *
*
* * * * * * *
A
A W a W
A W a W
i L i
i L i
9
0
∇ + ∇ +
∇ + ∇ =
∈
∈
∑
∑
β β
β β
τ θ τ θ τ θ τ θ
τ θ τ θ τ θ τ θ
where β τ τ θ θ= , *, , *.
Substituting in for the partial derivatives in (A9) yields
( )
( { ( ) [ ( , , , ) ( ) ( , )]}
{ ( ) ( , , , ) ( ) ( , )})
( { ( ) [ ( , , , ) ( ) ( , )]}
* * * *
* * *
* * * * * * *
*
* * *
*
A
A l p N r R s p u X X
a l p Nr R Ns p Nu X X
A l p N r R s p u X X
i i i
s
i N
d
E e e
i L
i i
s
i n
d
E e e
i i i
s
i N i
d
E e e
i L
10
1
1
1
∇ + + + + +
+ ∇ + + + + +
+ ∇ + + − + +
+
∈
=
∈
∑
∑
∑
β β
β
τ θ τ θ τ θ τ θ
τ θ τ θ Π
Π Π
a l i pis N r R N s p N u X X
i n
i i i
d
i E e e
* * * * * * * * * * * * * *
{ ( ) ( , , , ) ( ) ( , )}) .
∇ + + − + + =
∑
=β Π τ θ τ θ
1
0
Adding and subtracting A*α ΠL i and Aα*LΠi*, and noting that labor supply is unchanged, yields
( ) { ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( , , , ) ( ) ( )]}
{ ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( , , , ) ( ) ( )]} .
* * * *
,
*
*
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
,
A A I p A A p Nr R Ns p Nu X X *
A I p AA p N r R N s p N u X X
iL L i i
s
i i
s d
E e e
iL L i i
s
i i
s d
e e e
11 0
∇ − + + + + + +
∇ − + + − + + =
β β
α τ θ τ θ
α τ θ τ θ
Π Π
Π Π
Note that an international transfer R drops out of the maximization problem because it does not affect efficiency. First consider the first-order condition for the home country’s production policy for good i, that is for β = τi.Denoting Mi =Di −Xi, substituting (A7) into (A10), and then using (A1) and (A5) gives
( )
( )
[ ( ) ( ) ]
[ ( ) ( )( )]
[ ) ]
(
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
A
A I X p
A A X p
X p
p X p X p
D p
A A p
M p D p
X p
A A N u E X p
N u E X p
A I
iL L i
i s
i
i i
s
i
i i
i s
i i
s
i i
s
i i
i s
i i
i d
i
i w
i
i i i
w
i i
i d
i i
i s
i
E X i
i s
i
E X i
i s
i
12
1 1
1 1
−
+ + − + + − ′ −
+ − + − ′ − ′
+ ′ ′ ′ + ′ ′ ′
+
α ∂
∂τ
∂
∂τ τ ∂
∂τ τ ∂
∂τ
∂
∂τ
∂
∂τ θ θ ∂
∂τ
∂
∂τ
∂
∂τ
∂
∂τ
iL L i
i s
i
i i
s
i
i i
i s
i i s
i i
i s
i i
i d
i
i w
i
i i i
w
i i
i d
i i
i s
i
E X i
i s
i
E X i
X p
AA X p
X p
p X p
D p
AA p
M p D p
X p
AA N u E X p
N u E X
*
* * *
*
* *
*
* *
*
* * *
*
*
*
* * * * *
*
*
*
* * * * *
*
* *
)
[ ( ) ( ) ]
[ ( ) ( )( )]
[ )
−
+ + − + − ′ −
+ − + − ′ − ′
+ ′ ′ ′ + ′ ′ ′
α ∂
∂τ
∂
∂τ τ ∂
∂τ τ ∂
∂τ
∂
∂τ
∂
∂τ θ θ ∂
∂τ
∂
∂τ
∂
∂τ
∂
1 1
1 1
p
A I X p
A A X p
p A A p X X p
X p
A A p D p
X p
A A N u E X p
N u E X p
AA I X
i s
i
iL L i
i s
i
i i
i s
i i
i i
w i
i i
w
i i i
i s
i
i i
i w
i
i w
i i
i d
i i
i s
i
E X i
i s
i
E X i
i s
i
iL L i
∂τ
α ∂
∂τ
τ ∂
∂τ θ τ
θ
τ τ ∂
∂τ θ ∂
∂τ
θ ∂
∂τ
∂
∂τ
∂
∂τ
∂
∂τ α
]
( )
[( ) ] [ ]
[ ( )( )]
[ ) ]
( )
*
* *
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
* *
=
−
+ − ′ + + −
+ − ′ − ′
+ ′ ′ ′ + ′ ′ ′
+ −
1
1
*
*
* * *
*
* * * *
* *
*
* * *
*
*
* * * * *
*
* *
[ ( ) ]
[ ( )( )]
[ ) ] .
∂
∂τ
τ ∂
∂τ θ ∂
∂τ τ ∂
∂τ θ τ
θ ∂
∂τ
∂
∂τ
∂ ∂
p
AA X p
X p
X p
p
AA p D p
X p
AA N u E X p
N u E X p
i s
i
i i
i s
i
i i
i w
i
i i
i s
i i
i i w
i w
i i
i d
i i
i s
i
i s
i s
+ − + − ′
+ − ′ − ′
+ ′ ′ ′ + ′ ′ ′ =
1
1
0
Differentiating the price equilibrium conditions (A6) with respect to τi yields
(A a) pis p p
i i
i i
w
i i
w i
i
13 ∂ 2
∂τ θ τ
∂
∂τ
θ
= − τ⋅
( )
* *
A b pis * p
i i
i i w
i
13 ∂
∂τ θ τ
∂
= ∂τ
(A c) pid p
i i
i w
i
13 ∂
∂τ θ ∂
= ∂τ
( )
*
A d pid * p
i
i w
i
13 ∂ ii
∂τ θ ∂
= ∂τ .
Using equations (A13), and collecting terms, the first order condition for the production policy (A12) can be written as
( )
( ) ( )
[( ) ( )]
[ ( )( ( ))]
[ ( ))
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
A
A I X p p
A A X p p p
A A p D p
X p p
A A Nu E X p p
Nu E X
iL L i
i
i i
w
i i
w i
i
i i
i
i i
w i
i i
w
i i
w i
i
i w
i i
i w
i
i i
i
i i
w
i i
w i
i
E X i
i
i i
w
i i
w i
i
E X i
i
i
14
1
1
2
2
2
2
− − +
− ′ − +
− ′ − ′ −
+ ′ ′ − + ′ ′
α θ
τ
∂
∂τ
θ τ
τ θ
τ
θ τ
∂
∂τ
θ τ
θ ∂
∂τ θ θ
τ
∂
∂τ
θ τ θ
τ
∂
∂τ
θ τ
θ τ
∂
∂τ
α θ
τ
∂
∂τ
τ θ
τ
∂
∂τ θ τ
θ θ ∂
∂τ θ τ
∂
∂τ
θ τ
∂
∂τ
θ τ p
A I X p
AA X p
p
AA p M p
AA N u E X p
N u E X p p
i w
i
iL L i
i
i i
w
i
i i
i
i i
w
i i
i i
w
i w
i i i
i w
i
E X i
i
i i
w
i
E X i
i
i i
w
i i
w i
i
]
( )
[( ) ]
[ ( ) ]
[ ( )]
.
*
* * *
*
*
* * *
*
*
*
*
* * * *
* * *
*
*
*
*
* *
+
−
+ − ′
+ − ′
+ ′ ′ + ′ ′ −
=
1
1
0
2
To get ∂
∂τ piw
i
totally differentiate the world market equilibrium condition
D p X p
D p X p
i i i
w i
i i
w
i
i i i
w i
i i
w
i
( ) ( ) [ *( * ) *( )]
*
θ θ *
τ θ θ
− = − − τ , where the asterisk stands for the variables
in the foreign country. This yields
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
* * * * *
*
A p X p
D D
X p
M M
i w
i
i i
w
i i
X
i i
X
i i
w
i i i i
i i
i i
i i
i
15 ∂ 2 i2
∂τ θ θ θ θ
θ τ
τ τ
θ τ
= − ′
′ − + ′ − = − ′
′ + ′
′ ′ ,
whereMi′ = ′ −Di Xi′
τi and Mi′ = ′ −Di Xi′
i
* * *
τ*. Differentiating the price equilibrium conditions, pis i p
i i
=θ w
τ and pid =θipiw, and using equation (15) yields
( ) ( )
( )
* *
* *
1 6a p p2 D M
M M
i s
i
i w
i i i i
i i i i i
∂
∂τ
θ θ θ
τ θ θ
= − ′ + ′
′ + ′
( ) ( )
* *
1 6b p X 2 p
M M
i d
i
i i i
w
i i i i
i
∂ i
∂τ
θ
θ θ
θ τ
= − ′
′ + ′
( )
( )
* *
* *
16c p M p
M M
i s
i
i i i
w
i i i i i
∂
∂θ
θ
τ θ θ
= ′
′ + ′
( ) .
* *
* *
16d p M p
M M
i d
i
i i i
w
i i i i
∂
∂θ
θ
θ θ
= ′
′ + ′
Using equations (A15) and (A16) and solving implicitly for the home production policies yields
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )[ ( ) ( )
( ) ]
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
* *
* *
*
* *
* *
*
* *
*
*
*
A I
a
X p X
p M p X X p p M M
X p p D M
I a
X
p D M
X
i
iL L
L
i
i s
i
i
i i
w
i i i
w
i i i
w
i i
w
i i i i
i i
w
i i
w
i i i i
iL L
L
i
i s
i i i i
i
i
i i
i i
i i
17 1
1
1
2
2
τ α
α
θ τ θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ
α
α θ θ τ
θτ θτ θ
τ
− = − −
+ ′
− − ′ − ′ + ′ ′ + ′
− ′ ′ + ′
− −
+ ′ + ′ − − ′*
* *
*
* *
* *
* *
*
* *
*
*
* *
*2
*2
*
*
( )
( )[
( )]
( ) ( )
( )
θ τ θτ
θτ
θ τ
θ θ
θ θ
θ θ
θ θ
i i
i i
i i
i i
i i i i
i
i i
i i i i
E E X
i s
E X E X i
i s
i i i i
D M
M
D M
Nu N u E p
Nu E N u E X
p D M
′ + ′
− − ′
′ + ′
− ′ + ′ − ′ + ′ ′
′ + ′ 1
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
[( ) ( )][
( )]
( )
*
* *
* *
*
* *
*
*
* *
*
* *
* *
* *
*
*
*2
*2
A I
a
X p X
I a
X
p D M
p X
p D M
p M
p D M
Nu N u E p
i
iL L
L
i
i s
i
iL L
L
i
i s
i i i i
i
i w
i
i s
i i i i
i i
i w
i i
i s
i i i i
E E X
i s
i i
i i
18 1
1
1 1
τ α
α
α
α θ θ
τ θ θ
θ θ θ
θ θ
θ τ
θ τ
− = − −
+ ′ − −
+ ′ + ′
− − ′
′ + ′
+ − − − ′
′ + ′
− ′ + ′ − ′ + ′ ′
′ + ′
( )
( ) .
* *
*
*
* *
*
Nu N u E X *
p D M
E E X i
i s
i i i i
i i
θ τ
θ θ
The foreign production policy can be derived in a similar manner as the home production policy
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
[( ) ( )][
( )]
( )
* *
* *
* *
*
* * * * *
* * *
*
* * *
* *
*
A I
a
X p X
I a
X
p D M
p X
p D M
p M
p D M
Nu N u E p
i
iL L
L
i
i s
i
iL L
L
i
i s
i i i i
i
i w
i
i s
i i i i
i i
i w
i i
i s
i i i i
E E X
i i
i i
19 1
1
1 1
2 2
τ α
α
α
α θ θ
τ θ θ
θ θ θ
θ θ
θ τ
θ τ
− = − −
+ ′ − −
+
′
′ + ′
− − ′
′ + ′
+ − − − ′
′ + ′
− ′ + ′
i s
E E X i
i s
i i i i
Nu N u E X
p D M
i i
*
* *
* * *
( )
( )
− ′ + ′ ′
′ + ′
θ τ
θ θ
Equations (A18) and (A19) are the same as equations (20a) and (20b) in chapter 4. Now consider the first-order condition for the trade policy for industry i, that is for β θ= i in (A10).
Substituting (A7) into (A10), and using (A1) and (A5) gives
( )
( )
[ ( ) ( ) ]
[ ( ) ( )( )]
[
*
*
*
*
A
A I X p
A A X p
X p
p X p
D p
A A p
M p M p D p
X p
A A N u E X p
iL L i
i s
i
i i
s
i
i i
i s
i i s
i i
i s
i i
i d
i
i w
i
i i i
w
i i
w
i i
i d
i i
i s
i
E X i
i s
20
1 1
1 1
−
+ + − + − ′ −
+ − + + − ′ − ′
+ ′ ′ ′
α ∂
∂θ
∂
∂θ τ ∂
∂θ τ ∂
∂θ
∂
∂θ
∂
∂θ θ θ ∂
∂θ
∂
∂θ
∂
∂θ
∂
∂θ
α ∂
∂θ
∂
∂θ τ ∂
∂θ τ ∂
∂θ
∂
∂θ
∂
∂θ θ θ ∂
i
E X i
i s
i
iL L i
i s
i
i i
s
i
i i
i s
i i
s
i i
i s
i i
i d
i
i w
i
i i i
w
i i
i d
N u E X p
A I X p
AA X p
X p
p X p
D p
AA p
M p D p
) ]
( )
[ ( ) ( ) ]
[ ( ) ( )(
*
*
*
*
* * *
*
* * * *
*
* * *
*
*
*
* * * * *
*
+ ′ ′ ′
+ −
+ + − + − ′ −
+ − + − ′
1 1
1 1
∂θ
∂
∂θ
∂
∂θ
∂
∂θ
i i
i s
i
E X i
i s
i
E X i
i s
i
X p
AA N u E X p
N u E X p
− ′
+ ′ ′ ′ + ′ ′ ′ =
*
*
* * * * *
*
* *
)]
[ ) ] 0.
Differentiating the price equilibrium conditions (A6) with respect to θi yields
(A a) p ( p )
i p
s
i i
i i
w
i i
21 ∂ 1 w
∂θ τ θ ∂
= ∂θ +
( )
* *
A b pis * p
i i
i i
w
i
21 ∂
∂θ θ τ
∂
= ∂θ
(A c) p p
i p
d
i i
i w
i i
21 ∂ w
∂θ θ ∂
= ∂θ +
( )
*
A d pid * p
i i
i w
i
21 ∂
∂θ θ ∂
= ∂θ
Substituting (A21) into (A20) and collecting terms yields
( )
( ) ( )
[ ( ) ]
[ ( ) ]
[( ) ( )]
[ ( )( )(
*
*
*
*
*
A
A I X p
p
A A X p
p p X X p
A A D p
p p D D p
A A X p p
p
A A p D X
iL L i
i i
i w
i i
w
i i
i i
i w
i i
w i
w
i i i
i w
i
i i
i w
i i w
i w
i i i
i w
i
i i
i
i i
w
i i
i w
i i
w
i w
i i
i i
i
22
1
1
1 1
1
− +
+ + − −
+ − + + +
+ − ′ +
+ − ′− ′
α τ θ ∂
∂θ τ τ θ ∂
∂θ θ ∂
∂θ
θ ∂∂θ θ ∂
∂θ
τ θ
τ τ θ ∂
∂θ
θ τ θ ∂p
p
A A N u E X p
p N u E X p
A I X p
AA X p
X p
AA D p
D p
AA p X
i w
i i
w
E X i
i i
i w
i i
w
E X i
i
i i
w
i
iL L i
i
i i
w
i
i i
i
i i
w
i
i i
i w
i
i i
i w
i
i i
i w
i
i i
w i
∂θ
τ θ ∂
∂θ
θ τ
∂
∂θ
α θ
τ
∂
∂θ
τ θ
τ
∂
∂θ θ ∂
∂θ θ ∂∂θ θ ∂
∂θ
τ θ
+
+ ′ ′ ′ + + ′ ′ ′
+ −
+ −
+ − +
+ − ′
)]
[ ( )) ]
( )
[ ]
[ ]
[( ) (
*
*
*
*
*
* * *
*
*
* * *
*
*
* *
* * * * *
* * *
1
1 i
i i
w
i
i w
i i i
i i
i w
i
E X i
i
i i
w
i
E X i
i i
i w
i i
w
p
AA p D X p
AA N u E X p
N u E X p
p
*
*
* * * *
*
*
* * * * *
*
*
* *
) ]
[ ( ) ( ) ]
[ ) ( )]
.
τ
∂
∂θ
θ θ τ ∂
∂θ θ
τ
∂
∂θ τ θ ∂
∂θ
2
1
1 0
+ − ′ − ′
+ ′ ′ ′ + ′ ′ ′ +
=
Total differentiation of the market equilibrium condition yields
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
* * * * *
*
A p D p
D D
M p
M M
i w
i
i X
i w
i i
X
i i
X
i i
w
i i i i
i i
i i
i i
23 ∂
∂θ θ θ θ θ
τ
τ τ
= − ′ −
′ − + ′ − = − ′
′ + ′
′
′ ′
Substituting equation (A23) into equation (A22) and solving for the difference in trade policies yields