How far does it feel? Construal level and decisions under risk

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ContentslistsavailableatScienceDirect

Journal

of

Applied

Research

in

Memory

and

Cognition

j ou rn a l h o m epa g e : w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / j a r m a c

Original

Article

How

far

does

it

feel?

Construal

level

and

decisions

under

risk

Martina

Raue

∗

,

Bernhard

Streicher,

Eva

Lermer,

Dieter

Frey

DepartmentofPsychology,LudwigMaximilianUniversityMunich,Leopoldstr.13,80802Munich,Germany

a

r

t

i

c

l

e

i

n

f

o

Articlehistory:

Received1November2013 Accepted30September2014 Availableonline17October2014 Keywords: Construallevel Psychologicaldistance Risk Decisionmaking Framing Prospecttheory

a

b

s

t

r

a

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Researchhasshownthatframingdecisionsasgainsorlossesdistortshumanjudgment.Humanjudgment isalsoassumedtobeinfluencedbytheactuallevelofconstrual.Whetherdecisionsareconstruedinamore detailedmanner(lowlevelconstrual)orinamoreabstractmanner(highlevelconstrual)candepend onperceivedpsychologicaldistance.Inthepresentstudies,weexaminedtheinfluenceofframingand psychologicaldistanceonrisktaking.Inthreestudieswithstudents(n=65),physicians(n=60),and hotelmanagers(n=39),wefoundevidencethatconstruallevelinfluencesriskseekingingainsituations, butnotinlosssituations.Furthermore,theframingeffectcouldbereplicatedinpsychologicallyclose situations,andwaseliminated(Studies1and2)orreversed(Study3)inpsychologicallydistantsituations. Ourfindingsilluminatetheinterplayofframingandconstruallevel,andpointsouttheirapplicabilityin organizationaldecisionmaking.

Whatinﬂuencesprofessionaldecision making?Accordingto

theoriesofboundedrationality(e.g.,Selten, 2001;Simon,1955,

1991),peopledonotalwayscarefullyanalyzedecisionproblems,

butoftenrelyonintuitionsandheuristicswhenmakingdecisions.

Basedonthisdifferentiation,severalresearchershaveproposed

twocognitivesystems:Whilesystem1isintuitive,fastand

auto-matic,system2isdeliberative,slowerandcontrollable(seeEvans,

2009foranoverview;Kahneman,2003;Stanovich&West,2000).

Researchsuggests thatrelying onintuitionsand applying rules

ofthumb(heuristics)canimprovedecisionmaking(Gigerenzer,

Todd, &The ABC Research Group, 1999), but can also lead to

certainbiasesthatdistortjudgments(e.g.,Tversky&Kahneman,

1974).

Inthisarticlewefocusontheheuristics-and-biases program

asTverskyandKahneman(1974)haveintroducedit.Conclusions

fromtheirresearchhavemadeitoutsideofscienceintopractical

decisionmakingandhaveledtoawarenessforatleastsomeof

thesebiases.Forexample,duetoanincreasingamountof

popu-larpressonthetopic,decisionmakersmightbeawareofthefact

thatunrelatedpiecesofinformation(anchors)caninﬂuence

sub-sequentdecisions,orthatintensivepresscoveragemakesevents

seemmorelikelythantheyreallyare(Kahneman,Lovallo,&Sibony,

2011;Tversky&Kahneman,1974).Mostdecisionmakersmight

∗ Correspondingauthor.Tel.:+4908921803570;fax:+4908921805238. E-mailaddresses:martina.raue@psy.lmu.de(M.Raue),streicher@psy.lmu.de

(B.Streicher),eva.lermer@psy.lmu.de(E.Lermer),dieter.frey@psy.lmu.de(D.Frey).

alsoknowthattheframingofdecisionsintermsofgainsandlosses

canleadtocontradictingdecisionsinobjectivelyidentical

prob-lems.Thisphenomenonhasbecomeknownastheframingeffect

(Tversky&Kahneman,1981).

Butdoesitalsomakeadifferencewhetheradecisionismadefor

oneself,aclosefriend,oranemployee?Willamanagertakemore

riskswhenhemakesadecisionforabranchinanothercountrythan

whenmakingthesamedecisionforabranchinhishomecountry?

Theinterplayofpsychologicaldistanceandrisktakingin

profes-sionalsettingsisnot oftenexplored.Therefore, weinvestigated

thesequestionsinthreestudiesthatilluminatehowpractitioners’

decisionsunderriskmightbedistorted.

DecisionsunderriskhavereceivedspecialattentionbySlovic

(2010)whoassumesthatriskperceptionisusuallyaccompanied

bysomeformofemotionoraffect.Theperceptionofrisksas

feel-ingsthusleadstoarelianceonintuitionandaneglectofobjective

probabilitieswhenjudgingrisks(e.g.,Slovic,2010;Slovic&Peters,

2006;Slovic&Västfjäll,2010).Thishas,forexample,been

demon-stratedforsimpleinvestmentchoices:Whilehealthypeoplelost

money,patientswholackedaffectduetoneurologicalimpairment

didnot(Shiv,Loewenstein,Bechara,Damasio,&Damasio,2007).

DeMartino(2006)pointsoutthataffectalsoinﬂuencestheframing

effect,andexperimentsusingmagneticresonanceimagingsuggest

thattheframingeffectisstrongeramongpeoplewhostronglyrely

ontheirintuitions(Kahneman&Frederick,2007).Basedonthese

ﬁndings,wearguethatrisktakingbehaviorisaformofintuitive

decisionmakingandinvestigatedhowitisaffectedbythelevelof

construal.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2014.09.005

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1. Construallevelanddecisionmaking

Construalleveltheoryofpsychologicaldistanceisbasedonthe

assumptionthatonlythehereandnowcanbedirectlyexperienced;

thefuture,otherplacesandotherpeoplearebelievedtobe

repre-sentedina moreabstractwaysuchasimaginations,memories,

plansorhopes.Therefore,thetheorystatesthatobjects,eventsor

individualsarerepresentedaseithercloseordistant.Thereference

pointistherebytheselfinthehereandnow,fromwhichanobject

canmoveawayintermsoftime,space,socialdistanceor

hypothet-icality.Whilepsychologicaldistancehasbeenlinkedtoabstract,

highlevelconstrualslikebroadconceptsoftheobject,

psychologi-calclosenesshasbeenlinkedtoconcrete,lowlevelconstrualssuch

asdiscretefeaturesoftheobject(Trope&Liberman,2010).This

alsoworksviceversainthewaypeoplejudgeabstractobjectsto

bemoredistant(Bar-Anan,Liberman,&Trope,2006).

Empiricalstudiessupportthenotionthatpsychologicaldistance

isassociatedwithdecisionmakingbyactivatingacertainlevelof

construal(Trope&Liberman,2010;Trope,Liberman,&Wakslak,

2007).Forexample,participantswhowereaskedtogiveadviceto

anotherpersonconcerningajobofferthatwasperceivedasdistant,

gavemoreweighttoabstractattributes(e.g.,personalsatisfaction)

thanconcreteattributes(e.g.,salary;Kray,2000).AnotherStudy

demonstratedthatparticipantswerelesspronetothesunkcost

bias(continuingtoinvestin analready failingproject;Arkes &

Blumer,1985)whentheinvestingcompanywaslocatedina

dis-tantasopposedtoanearlocation(Wakslak&Liberman,2006).

Researchinconsumerbehaviorhasdemonstratedthatpeople

pre-fertowaitforaproductdeliveryandsavethefeewhentheproduct

isdescribedinamoreabstractmanner,asopposedtoaconcrete

manner(Malkoc,Zauberman,&Bettman,2010).

Especiallyimportantdecisions(e.g.,highstakedecisions)

usu-allyinvolvethinkingaboutconsequences,andarethussuggested

tobeinﬂuencedbytheactivatedlevelofconstrual(Kim,Schnall,

&White,2013).TropeandLiberman(2010)highlightthat

induc-ingaconcretemindset(lowlevelconstrual)shiftsthefocusonto

thefeasibilityofanaction(e.g.,probabilityofapositiveoutcome),

whileanabstractmindset(highlevelconstrual)shiftsthefocuson

itsdesirability(e.g.,attractivenessoftheoutcome).Forexample,

intime-dependentgamblingtasksparticipantspreferredgambles

withhighprobabilityinthenearfuture,butgambleswithahigh

outcomeinthedistantfuture.Asaconclusion, theauthors

pro-posethattemporaldistanceshouldleadtomoreriskseekingdue

toafocusonthedesirabilityofanoutcome(Sagristano,Trope,&

Liberman,2002).Gettingbacktotheframingeffect,Trautmannand VandeKuilen(2012)pointoutthatpeopleintuitivelyinterpret

prospectsinriskydecisionsaseitherdesirableorfeasible.The

inter-playofconstruallevelandriskseekinghasrecentlybeenfurther

investigatedinaseriesofstudiesthatexperimentallymanipulated

thelevelofconstrual bydifferentways ofpriming.Participants

whowereprimedwithahigh(versuslow)construallevelengaged

in more risk taking and judged risks as less probable (Lermer,

Streicher,Sachs,Raue,&Frey,2014a;Streicher,Lermer,Sachs,& Frey,2012).ThisisalsoinlinewithﬁndingsbyWakslakandTrope (2009),whodemonstrated thatparticipantsinahighlevel

con-strualmindsetmadelowerprobabilityjudgmentsinneutraltasks

thanparticipantsinalowlevelconstrualmindset.

Thecurrentstudiesaddtotheseﬁndingsbyinvestigatingthe

inﬂuenceofpsychologicaldistanceinriskydecisiontasks,which

isbelievedtobetterreﬂectpracticaldecisionmakingthana

prim-ingofconstrual level.Furthermore,thecurrent studiesnotonly

takealookatgainsituations,butalsoatlosssituationsand

espe-ciallyfocusondecisionmakingofpractitioners.Ithasrepeatedly

beendemonstratedthatpeopleengageinmoreriskseeking

behav-iorwhenconfrontedwithpotentiallossesasopposedtopotential

gains.Thisbehaviorisknownaslossaversionandassumedtobe

grounded onpeople’s hopetoavoid theunpleasant experience

ofloss(Kahneman&Tversky,1979;Tversky&Kahneman,1992).

While we haveintroducedresearch thatinvestigated the

inﬂu-enceof construal levelonrisk seekingin gainsituations, there

is a lack ofresearch lookingat theinﬂuenceof construal level

inlosssituations.Shelley(1991),forexample,exploredwhether

a time delayin lossesaffects risk seekingand could not draw

a clearpicture.A seriesof ﬁeldexperiments onrisk

communi-cationdemonstratedthatpersuasivelossframedmessageswere

strongerwhenpairedwithconcretefeatures,whilegainframed

messageswerestrongerwhenpairedwithabstractfeatures(White,

MacDonnell,&Dahl,2011).Furthermore,lossframed messages

activatedamoreconcretemindset,whilegainframedmessages

activatedamoreabstractmindset.Inasimilarlineofresearch,the

impactofpersuasivegainframedmessageswasstrongerwhenthey

concernedsociallydistantasopposedtosociallyproximalentities

(Nan,2007).Interestingly,inthisexperiment,theimpactof

loss-framed messageswasnot inﬂuencedby psychologicaldistance.

Theseﬁndingscouldbeexplainedbythenotedassumptionthat

peoplefocusonthedesirabilityofanoutcomewheninanabstract

mindset(e.g.,attractivegain),andonitsfeasibilitywhenina

con-cretemindset(e.g.,chanceofavoidingloss).Therefore,weexpect

anoppositeeffectofpsychologicaldistanceinlosssituations

com-paredtogainsituations.Thisisfurthersupportedbyexperiments

connectingregulatoryfocustheory(Crowe&Higgins,1997)and

construalleveltheory:Participantsinaconcretemindsetpreferred

apreventionfocus(avoidingloss)overapromotionfocus(attaining

gains;Förster&Higgins,2005;seeBryant&Dunford,2008foran

overview).

Decision makers are constantly confronted with different

dimensions of psychological distance. Theirdecisions can have

immediate(time:proximal)orlong-termconsequences(time:

dis-tal);can concernthepeople aroundthem (space:proximal) or

peopleinanothercountry(space:distal);orcanaffectthemselves,

their company (social distance: proximal), or other companies

(social distance: distal). Numerous laboratoryand ﬁeld

experi-mentshavealreadyshownthattherearediscrepanciesindecision

makingbasedonwhetherthedecisionismadeforoneselfversus

someoneelse(Garcia-Retamero&Galesic,2012;Hsee&Weber,

1997; Polman, 2012;Stone, Yates, &Caruthers,2002), for now

versus later (Malkoc, Zauberman, &Ulu, 2005; Pronin, Olivola,

&Kennedy, 2007; Sagristanoet al., 2002), or for hereversus a

distantlocation(Goodman&Malkoc,2012).Additionally,

empir-icalresearchhassuggestedthattheperceiveddistancecanalso

beinﬂuencedindirectly.Anexamplehighlyrelevantforthe

pro-fessionalcontextis politeness.Politenesscreatessocial distance

anddistance,inturn,causespeopletoactmorepolitely(Stephan,

Liberman,&Trope,2010).Themannerinwhichclearfactsare

pre-sentedcanalsoleadtoavariationinperceiveddistance.Targets

oreventspresentedinlargernumbersandsmallerunits,suchas

7days,wereshowntobeperceivedmoreconcreteandasmore

dangerousthansmallernumbersandlargerunits,suchas1week

(White&Kwan,2013).Therefore,manipulatingconstruallevelvia

psychologicaldistanceishighlyreﬂectingreallifesituations.

Psy-chologicaldistanceisthusassumedtodirectlyinﬂuencethelevel

ofconstrualand,inturn,guidejudgmentanddecisionmaking(

Bar-Ananetal.,2006;Fujita,Henderson,Eng,Trope,&Liberman,2006;

Tropeetal.,2007).

Inthepresentresearch,weinvestigatedtheinﬂuenceof

con-struallevelonintuitivedecisionmakinginriskychoiceproblemsby

manipulatingpsychologicaldistance,becausedistancedimensions

aremoreorlessinherentineverydecision.Indifferentdecision

problems,wevariedseveraldimensionsofpsychologicaldistance

suchas social, spatial and temporal distance. In each problem,

twoorthree ofthesedimensionswerecombinedinawaythat

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simplechangesofperceiveddistanceinthedescriptionofdecision

problemsinﬂuenceintendedrisktakingbehavior.Furthermore,we

investigatedhoweffectsofpsychologicaldistanceinteractwiththe

well-knownframingeffect(Tversky&Kahneman,1981).Todate,

thisinteractionremainslargelyunexplored(cf.Trautmann&Van

deKuilen,2012),butisofgreatimportanceforpractitioners,who

canbeconfrontedwithbotheffectsatthesametime.

2. Hypotheses

Thepresentinvestigationconsistedofthreestudies:Study1was

conductedinauniversitysettingandtheothertwostudieswith

practitioners,speciﬁcallyphysicians(Study2)andhotelmanagers

(Study3).Wemeasureddifferencesinparticipants’preferencesfor

riskandsecurityinriskychoices,framedaseithergainsorlosses,

andmanipulatedthelevelofconstrualbyvaryingpsychological

distance.Prospect theory(Kahneman&Tversky, 1979;Tversky

&Kahneman,1981)statesthatpeopleareriskaversewhen

con-frontedwithgainsandriskseekingwhenconfrontedwithlosses,

whichcanbeinducedbytheframingofdecisionsasgainsorlosses.

Accordingtorecentresearchonconstrualleveltheory(Trope&

Liberman,2010),whichshowsthatpeopleareriskaversewhenin

lowconstruallevelmindsetandriskseekingwheninanhigh

con-struallevelmindset,construallevelisexpectedtomoderatethe

inﬂuenceofframingeffectsondecisionmaking.Weexpectthat

anincreaseofconstruallevelshiftsthefocusonthedesirability

oftheoutcome.Whileinagainframe,thisshouldleadtomore

riskseeking,inalossframeweexpectmoreriskavoidancedueto

theunattractivenessofthepotentialloss.Thismaybestatedinthe

followingformalhypotheses:

Hypothesis1a. Inagainframe,peoplearemoreriskaverseina

lowconstruallevelthaninahighconstruallevelmindset.

Hypothesis1b. Inalossframe,peoplearemoreriskseekingina

lowconstruallevelthaninahighconstruallevelmindset.

While Hypotheses 1a and 1b were developed prior to

col-lectingthedata,theanalysisindicatedasecondhypothesisthat

weapproachedinanexploratorymanner:

Hypothesis2. Alow construallevel leadstostronger framing

effectsthanahighconstruallevel.

3. Study1

3.1. Method

3.1.1. Participantsanddesign

Oursampleincluded65students(72%female)aged18to47

(M=23.03,SD=5.27)fromaGermanuniversitywhoagreedto

par-ticipateinthisstudy.Theparticipantswererecruitedduringlecture

andweregivenabriefpaper-and-pencilsurveythatincludedan

unrelatedstudy.For participatingin bothstudies theyreceived

coursecredit,andhadthechanceofwinningoneoutofthree

text-booksonsocialpsychology.Participantswererandomlyassignedto

oneoftwoconditionsofthe2(between)×2(within)mixeddesign.

Thebetween-subjectsvariablewaspsychologicaldistance

(proxi-malvs.distal)andthewithin-subjectsvariablewasframing(loss

vs.gain).

3.1.2. Materialsandprocedure

WeusedtheAsiandiseaseproblemasgainframe(Tversky&

Kahneman,1981)andasimilarproblemaslossframetomeasure

theinﬂuenceofconstruallevelondecisionmakinginanapplied

andestablishedsetting.Construallevelwasmanipulatedby

fram-ingtheproblemaspsychologicallyproximal(lowconstruallevel)or

distal(highconstruallevel).Inthegainframeproblem,participants

in theproximal conditionweregiven thefollowing instruction

(parenthesesexcluded):

Imagineyouarepartofa studentboard(socialdimension)at

yourUniversitythat isincludedinimportantdecisions.

Cur-rently(temporaldimension),yourcity(spatialdimension)isbeing

threatenedbyanewﬂuvirusthatisexpectedtokill600

inha-bitants.Twoalternativeprogramstocombatthediseasehave

beenproposed.

Inthedistalconditionparticipantswereaskedtoimaginebeing

aconsultantinhealthcare,andthat anunusualdiseasewillbe

threateningsomecountriesinthecomingmonths.Thelossframe

problemconcernedemployeesthathavetobedismissed.

Partici-pantsintheproximalconditionwereaskedtoimaginetheyworked

foracompanyinthesamecityastheiruniversity.Theparticipants

immediatelyhadtolayoff300employeesalongwiththeir

super-visor.Inthedistalcondition,participantswereaskedtoimagine

beinga consultantfor a companyabroadthat willhaveto

dis-miss300employeesthefollowingyear.However,participantswere

offeredtwooptionsthatincludedthepossibilityofhavingto

dis-missfeweremployees.Insteadofmakingachoicebetweenoptions,

weaskedforparticipants’preferenceforthesafe(e.g.,200

employ-eeswillbedismissed)ortheriskyalternative(e.g.,1/3probability

thatnobodywillbedismissedor2/3probabilitythat300

employ-eeswillbedismissed)ona six-pointLikertscalefrom1(strong

preferenceforthesafeoption)to6(strongpreferencefortherisky

option).Themanipulationcheckconsistedofthreeitems

concern-ingperceiveddistance,concretenessandhypotheticalityofboth

decisionproblemsona5-pointscalefrom1(proximal)to5(distal),

˛=.73.

3.2. Resultsanddiscussion

A 2 (psychological distance)×2(framing) repeatedmeasure

ANOVAdidnotshowmaineffects,butindicatedaninteractionof

framingandpsychologicaldistance,F(1,62)=6.72,p=.01,p2=.10.

In the gain frame,low psychologicaldistance ledto more risk

avoidanceandhighpsychologicaldistancetomoreriskseeking,

t(63)=2.65,p=.01,d=.67(seeFig.1).Inthelossframe,therewas

noinﬂuenceofpsychologicaldistanceonriskseeking.Furthermore,

intheproximalcondition,participantspreferredthesafeoptionin

thegainframeandtheriskyoptioninthelossframe,t(31)=2.33,

p=.027,d=.61, whichreplicatestheframingeffect.However,in

thedistalconditiontherewasnodifferencebetweenparticipants’

preferences.

Concerningthemanipulationcheck,at-testrevealedthat

par-ticipantsin theproximalcondition(M=3.15,SD=1.21)showed

lowerratingsthanparticipantsin thedistal condition(M=3.91,

SD=1.04),t(63)=2.78,p=.007,d=.69,thussuggestingasuccessful

Fig.1.Preferencefortheriskyoptionintheproximalversusdistalcondition,inthe gainandthelossframe.Errorbarsindicate95%conﬁdenceintervals.

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manipulationofpsychologicaldistance.Bymanipulating

psycho-logicaldistance,weaimedatactivatingloworhighlevelconstruals

whenthinkingaboutriskychoices.InlinewithHypothesis1a,

peo-pleweremoreriskaverseintheproximal/gainframecondition

thaninthedistal/gainframecondition.Therewasnoeffectof

psy-chologicaldistanceonthelossframeconditionandHypothesis1b

couldnotbesupported.However,sincethetendencyisinlinewith

Hypothesis1b,themanipulationofconstruallevelmighthavebeen

strongerinthegainconditionthaninthelosscondition.Savingor

losinglivesmightbemorepolarizingthandismissingorkeeping

employees.Furthermore,theframingeffectcouldonlybe

repli-catedintheproximalcondition,butwaseliminatedinthedistal

condition,whichsupportsHypothesis2.Still,thedifferentsetting

ofthegainandlossframemighthaveconfoundedourresults.Based

ontheassumptionthatintuitivedecisionmakingdevelopsthrough

experience(e.g.,Betsch,2008;Klein,1993;Reyna,2004),onemight

criticizethatthestudentsampleusedinStudy1didnotrelyon

theirintuitionswhenconsideringtheoptionsduetoalackof

expe-riencewiththetopic.Therefore,inStudies2and3,whichwere

conductedparallel,weinvestigatedpractitioners’decisionmaking

intheirﬁeldsofexpertise.

4. Study2

TheﬁndingsfromStudy1suggestaninteractionofgainversus

lossframingandthelevelofconstrualthatinﬂuencesriskychoice

behavior.InStudies2and3,wefurtherinvestigatedthisinterplay

anditsapplicabilityinorganizationaldecisionmaking.Wechose

tostudyphysiciansandhotelmanagers,sincewehadeasyaccess

tobothofthesesamples.Inprofessionalsettings,decisionmakers

arecontinuouslyconfrontedwithproblemsthatareframedeither

asratherproximalorratherdistal.FollowingTropeetal.(2007),

thisframingactivatesdifferentmindsets.Physiciansareonegroup

ofprofessionalsthathavetomakehigh-stakeandoftenquick

deci-sionsonadailybasis.Forexample,in2012,physiciansinGermany

wereonstrikebecausetheregulationsofhealthinsurance

com-paniesshortenedtheirfeesfor consultations.Thisdevelopment

leadstolesstimespentwitheachpatient,whichisaccompanied

bymoreanonymityinmedicalofﬁces,andthereforeanincrease

inperceivedsocialdistance.Anevenstrongerperceivedsocialand

alsospatialdistanceisassumedtobefoundinonlineconsultations.

Inﬂuencedonlybytheactivatedlevelofconstrual,theﬁnal

medi-caldecisionoradvicemightbecompletelydifferentandpotential

consequencescanbesevere.Therefore,itishighlyrelevantto

inves-tigatewhetherourﬁndingsalsoaffectprofessionalsinaclinical

setting.

4.1. Method

Overall, 150 physicians started the online questionnaire. Of

theseparticipants,72cancelledthesurveyatonepoint,17hadtobe

excludedduetotechnicalproblemsofthesurveytool,andonedue

tonotbeingaphysician.Overall,60physicians(54%female)aged

27to61(M=37.31,SD=8.43)fromGermanycompletedthesurvey.

Thestudywasconductedonlineand124physiciansofdifferent

specializationswerecontacteddirectlythroughe-mail(basedon

personalcontactsandonlinesearch).However,sincee-mailswere

forwardedfromphysicians totheircolleaguesand wealso

pro-motedthestudyonFacebook,acleardropoutratecouldnotbe

calculated.

The specializations of thephysicians includedprimary care,

anesthesia, cardiology, orthopedics, gynecology, surgery,

pedi-atrics,dermatology,urology,internalmedicine,andpsychiatrics.

Mostoftheparticipants(34%)had5to10yearsexperience,30%

had1to4yearsexperience,16%had10to20yearsexperience,

13%hadmorethan20yearsexperience,and5%hadlessthan1

yearexperience.Forparticipatinginthestudy,physicianshadthe

chanceofwinningoneoutoftwobooksonmedicaldecision

mak-ing.Participantswererandomlyassignedtooneoftwoconditions

ofthe2(between)×4(within)mixeddesign.Thebetween-subjects

variablewaspsychological distance(proximalvs. distal)and the

within-subjectsvariablewasframing(2×lossvs.2×gain).

Participantswerepresentedwithfourmedicaldecision

prob-lems, either described as psychologically proximal (n=28) or

psychologicallydistal(n=32),inrandomorder:twoinagainframe

(decision 1 and2) and two in a lossframe(decision 3 and 4).

Decision1concernedanindividualtreatment,decision2a

gen-eraltreatment(adoptedfromGarcia-Retamero&Galesic,2012),

decision3wastheAsiandiseaseproblem(Tversky&Kahneman,

1981),whichisalsoageneraltreatmentdecision,anddecision4

concernedanindividualtreatmentdecision.Eachproblemoffered

ariskyoptionwithahighoutcomeandasafeoptionwithalow

outcome,analoguetotheclassicAsiandiseaseproblem,whichwas

alsoincluded.Choiceoptionsdidnotdifferinexpectedvalue.

Construallevelwasmanipulatedbypsychologicaldistancein

thewaythattheproblemsvariedintermsoftemporal,social,and

spatialdistance.Asanexample,decision2wasdescribedasfollows

(thedistancemanipulationishighlightedthroughboldletters):

Proximalcondition:Youwouldliketoimplementan

innova-tivetreatmentconceptfor100ofyourpatientswhosehealth

situationhasnotimprovedwiththestandardtreatment.Today

youneedtodecidehowtoproceed.

Distalcondition: Nextmonth a newcolleague willstart in

yourpracticeandwouldliketoimplementaninnovative

treat-mentconceptfor100patientswhosehealthsituationhasnot

improvedwiththestandardtreatment.Whichapproachwould

youprefer?

ConceptA:Thereisan80%probabilitythatthehealthsituation

of40patientswillimprove.

Concept B: The health situation of 30 patients will surely

improve.

In ordertoget aclearer pictureof participants’preferences,

wechangedtheratingschemefromStudy1toStudy2.Besides

makingachoicebetweentheoptions,participantsindicatedtheir

preferencefortheriskyalternative(conceptAintheexample)and

theirpreferenceforthesafealternative(conceptBintheexample)

separatelyandforeachsituationona7-pointscalefrom1(little

preference)to7(strongpreference).

5. Resultsanddiscussion

Participants’choicesshowcleardifferencesbetweengainand

lossframes,butnotbetweenpsychologicaldistanceconditions(see

Figs.2and3).Theanalysisofourdatasupportsthisnotion,

espe-ciallyforonegain–losspairintheproximalcondition:Participants

preferredthesureoptionindecision1(gain)andtheriskyoption

indecision4(loss),2_(1,₂₈₎₌_4.77,_p₌_.029,_which_are_the

individ-ualtreatmentdecisions.Thisisinlinewithprospecttheory,stating

thatpeopleareriskaverseingainframesandriskseekinginloss

frames.Insum,intheanalysisofchoices,wedidnotﬁndsupportfor

Hypotheses1aand1b.Nevertheless,therewasaframingeffectin

theproximal,butnotinthedistalcondition,whichisinlinewith

Hypothesis2.Descriptively,thedistalconditionalsoshowedthe

framingeffect,butobviouslyweakerandthereforestillsupports

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Fig.2.Choiceofphysiciansbetweenthesureandtheriskyoptionforeachdecision intheproximalcondition.

Fig.3.Choiceofphysiciansbetweenthesureandtheriskyoptionforeachdecision inthedistalcondition.

In the next step, we took a look at the preferences for

eachoption.A 2(psychologicaldistance)×4(framing)repeated

measuresANOVA revealedthat participants had higher

prefer-encesforthesureoption inthegainthaninthelossdecisions,

F(3,174)=49.66,p<.001,p2=.46,andhigherpreferencesforthe

riskyoptioninthelossthaninthegaindecisions,F(3,174)=50.56,

p<.001, p2=.47. Thisreplicatestheclassicframing effect.

Pre-ferencesforthesureoption werenotaffectedbypsychological

distance (see Fig. 4), F(3, 174)=1.17, p=.32, p2=.02, but

pre-ferencesfortheriskyoption wereaffectedbyan interactionof

framingand psychologicaldistance(seeFig. 5), F(3,174)=4.40,

p=.01,p2=.07.

Afurtherinvestigationofthatinteractionrevealedthat

psycho-logicaldistanceseemstoaffectthegeneral,butnottheindividual,

treatmentdecisions.Theindividualtreatmentdecisions1and4

Fig.4.Preferenceforthesureoptionintheproximalversusthedistalcondition,in thegain(decision1anddecision2)andthelossframe(decision3anddecision4). Errorbarsindicate95%conﬁdenceintervals.

Fig.5.Preferencefortheriskyoptionintheproximalversusthedistalcondition,in thegain(decision1anddecision2)andthelossframe(decision3anddecision4). Errorbarsindicate95%conﬁdenceintervals.

showedstrongframingeffects,bothintheproximal,t(27)=−9.52,

p<.001,d=2.97, andthe distalcondition,t(31)=−7.88,p<.001,

d=1.87,anddidnotdifferacrosspsychologicaldistanceconditions.

However,thegeneraldecisions2and 3revealed aninteresting

pattern:Participantsweremoreriskseekingindecision2(gain)

inthedistalthanintheproximalcondition,t(58)=−2.65,p=.01,

d=.69,whichsupportsHypothesis1a.AsshowninFig.5,the

ten-dencyofdecision3(andalsodecision4,bothloss)isinlinewith

Hypothesis1b,indicatingmoreriskseekingfortheproximalthan

thedistalcondition,butthisisnotsupportedstatistically.

Further-more,whilewe founda framingeffectfor decisions2and 3in

theproximalcondition,t(58)=−3.56,p=.001,d=1.00,the

fram-ingeffectdisappearedinthedistalcondition,t<1.Thisstrongly

supportsHypothesis2,statingthattheframingeffectisweakerin

thedistalthanintheproximalcondition.

AsinStudy1,Study2revealedaninteractionofframingand

psychologicaldistanceforgeneraltreatmentdecisions,indicating

thatconstruallevelmoderatesframingeffects.Inlinewith

Hypoth-esis 1a,physicians were more risk aversein the low construal

level/gainframeconditionthanin thehighconstrual level/gain

frame condition. We also found some descriptive support for

Hypothesis1b,showingthatriskseekingislowerinthehigh

con-struallevel/loss framecompared tothelowconstrual level/loss

framecondition.Furthermore,we founda framingeffectinthe

proximal,butnot inthedistal condition,indicating supportfor

Hypothesis2.

Theindividualtreatmentdecisionsdidshowaframingeffect,

butwerenotaffectedbypsychologicaldistancemanipulation.An

explanationcouldbethatthehighconstruallevelmanipulation

failedfordecisions1and4.Thefactthatthesedecisionsconcerned

individualtreatmentsmighthavereducedperceivedpsychological

distance.Thisnotionissupportedbythefactthat,across

condi-tionsandespeciallyconcerningpreferencesfortheriskyoption,

we found a differencewithin the gain frame (decisions1 and

2),t(59)=−7.02,p<.001,d=1.02,andthelossframe(decisions3

and4),t(59)=−4.30,p<.001,d=.60.Whiledecision1showshigh

riskavoidance,decision4showshighriskseeking.Basedonour

hypotheses,thisindicatesthatbothdecisionsareperceivedas

psy-chologicallyproximal.

Study2furthersupportstheﬁndingsofStudy1,indicatingthat

construal level moderates theframing effect.Participants were

more risk seeking in psychologically distal as opposed to

psy-chologicalproximalgainframes.Highpsychologicaldistanceand

thereforeanactivationofhighlevelconstrualsnotonlyledtoa

reductionoftheframingeffect,butrathereliminatedit.Thefact

thatwedidnotﬁndthisforindividualtreatmentdecisionsmight

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above.Overall,resultsfromStudy2 replicatetheﬁndingsfrom

Study1inaprofessionalsetting.

6. Study3

Study3wasconductedparalleltoStudy2withthesamedesign,

butinsteadofphysiciansweaskedhotelmanagers.Therefore,the

contentoftheproblems wasadaptedtoamanagement setting.

Managersareanothergroupofprofessionals thathavetomake

high-stakeﬁnancialorpersonneldecisions ona dailybasis. For

example,perceivedclosenessordistancetowardemployeesmight

inﬂuence personnel decisions. Investment decisions that imply

somekindofdistancemightaffecttheinvestedamount.We

devel-opedfourdecisiontasksinahotelmanagementsettingandchose

differenttopics(e.g.,money,employees)inordertoincreasethe

chancesofreplicatingtheframingeffect.

6.1. Method

Overall,92hotelmanagersstartedtheonlinequestionnaire.Of

these,53cancelledthesurveyatonepoint,while39hotelmanagers

(19%female)aged23to69(M=44.44,SD=12.35)fromGermany

participatedinthewholestudy.Thestudywasconductedonline

and100hotelmanagerswerecontacteddirectlythroughe-mail

(basedonpersonalcontactsandonlinesearch).However,since

e-mailswereforwardedfrommanagerstotheircolleaguesandwe

alsopromotedthestudyonFacebook,acleardropoutratecould

notbecalculated.Overhalf(59%)oftheparticipantsmanageda

medium-sizedhotel with11to50employees,aboutonefourth

(24%)managedalarger-sizedhotelwith51–100employees,and

therestmanagedsmaller(10%)orlarger(7%)hotels.Mostofthe

participants(34%)had10to20yearsexperiencerunningahotel,

aboutonefourth(22%)hadmorethan20yearsexperience,12%had

5to10yearsexperience,20%had1to4yearsexperience,and12%

hadlessthanoneyearexperience.Furthermore,70%ofthehotels

werefour-starshotels,24%werethree-starshotels,andtherest

wereeitherone-star(2%)orﬁve-stars(4%)1_._For_{participating}_in

thestudy,thehotelmanagershadthechanceofwinningoneoutof

twobooksonhotelandbarpsychology.Participantswererandomly

assignedtooneoftwoconditionsofthe2(between)×4(within)

mixeddesign.Thebetween-subjectsvariablewaspsychological

dis-tance(proximalvs. distal)and thewithin-subjectsvariablewas

framing(2×lossvs.2×gain).

Participants were presented with four managerial decision

problems,eitherdescribedaspsychologicallyproximal(n=16)or

psychologicallydistal(n=23),inrandomorder:twoinagainframe

(decision1and2)andtwoinalossframe(decision3and4).In

decision1,anewpromotionconceptwasintroducedthatcould

increasethenumberofguests.Indecision2,aninvestmentin

ren-ovationneededtobemadethatcouldincreasesales.Indecision3,

savingmeasuresneededtobeimplementedinordertopreventthe

dismissalofemployees.Indecision4,savingmeasuresneededto

beimplementedthatimpliedareductionofthemanager’ssalary.

Construallevelwasmanipulatedbypsychologicaldistanceinthe

waythattheproblemsvariedintermsoftemporal,social,and

spa-tialdistance.Asanexample,decision1wasdescribedasfollows

(thedistancemanipulationishighlightedthroughboldletters):

1_One-star₌_tourist,_two-stars₌_standard,_three-stars₌_comfort,_four-stars₌_ﬁrst

class,ﬁve-stars=luxury(hotelratingaccordingtotheGermanHotelandCatering Association).

Proximalcondition:Youurgentlyneedtoinvestinyour

orga-nizationandyouhavedecidedtoimmediatelyrenovatesome ofyourrooms.Thisverydayyouwanttoawardthecontract

andhavetochoosebetweentwodifferentofferswhose

conse-quencesyouhavealreadycalculated.

Distalcondition:A colleagueasksyouforadviceconcerning

upcomingpossibilitiesforinvestment.Hewouldliketo

ren-ovate someroomsthe followingyearand he hasreceived

differentofferswhoseconsequenceshealreadycalculated.

OptionA:Withthisrenovationsaleswillsurelyincreaseby5%.

OptionB:Withthisrenovationthereisa50%chancethatsales

willincreaseby10%anda50%chancethatsaleswillnotincrease

atall.

AsinStudy2,besidesmakingachoice,participantsindicated

theirpreferencefortheriskyalternative(optionBintheexample)

andtheirpreferenceforthesafealternative(optionAinthe

exam-ple)separately,andforeachsituationona 7-pointscalefrom1

(littlepreference)to7(strongpreference).

6.2. Resultsanddiscussion

Whenwelookatchoices(seeFigs.6and7),participantshada

clearpreferencefortheriskyoptionindecision3(loss)compared

totheremainingdecisions.Descriptively,thepreference forthe

riskyoptionisstrongerintheproximalconditionasopposedto

thedistalcondition,whichisinlinewithHypothesis1b.However,

thesmallsamplesize(n=16)intheproximalconditionmightbe

thereasonthatouranalysesdonotreachanacceptablelevelof

statisticalsigniﬁcance.

Wefoundtheclassicframingeffectfordecisions2(more

secu-rity seekingin thegainframe) and 3(moreriskseekingin the

Fig.6.Choiceofhotelmanagersbetweenthesureandtheriskyoptionforeach decisionintheproximalcondition.

Fig.7.Choiceofhotelmanagersbetweenthesureandtheriskyoptionforeach decisioninthedistalcondition.

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Fig.8.Preferenceforthesureoptionintheproximalversusthedistalcondition,in thegain(decision1anddecision2)andthelossframe(decision3anddecision4). Errorbarsindicate95%conﬁdenceintervals.

lossframe),2_(1,₃₉₎₌_4.39,_p₌_.036,_across_conditions._Our

analy-sesfurtherrevealedadifferencebetweendecisions1(gain)and4

(loss)inthedistal,2_(1,₂₃₎₌_5.79,_p₌_.016,_but_not_in_the_proximal

condition.Whileparticipantswereindifferentindecision1(gain),

theychosethesureoptionmoreoftenindecision4(loss),which

alsosupportsHypothesis1b.

Asin Study2,we alsolookedat thepreference forthesure

andtheriskyoptionseparately(seeFigs.8and9).A2

(psycho-logicaldistance)×4(framing)repeatedmeasureANOVArevealed

amaineffectofframingforpreferencesforthesureoption,F(3,

111)=4.25,p=.007,p2=.103,andpreferencesfortheriskyoption,

F(3,111)=4.19, p=.007, p2=.102. However, psychological

dis-tancedidnothaveaneffectoneitherofthemeasures,Fs<1,and

wealsodonotﬁndinteractions,Fs<1.

Inordertogetaclearerpictureoftheframingeffect,we

com-paredgain–losspairsseparatelyfor eachcondition.Participants

bothintheproximal,t(15)=2.29,p=.037,d=.71,and thedistal

condition,t(22)=2.11,p=.046,d=.56,hadhigherpreferencesfor

securityindecision2(gain)thanindecision3(loss),indicatinga

classicframingeffect.However,theeffectisweakerinthedistal

condition,whichindicatessomesupportforHypothesis2.

InlinewithHypotheses1aand1b,theframingeffectisreversed

fordecision1anddecision4inthedistalcondition:While

partici-pantswereratherriskseekingindecision1(gain),theywererather

riskavoidingindecision4(loss),t(22)=4.60,p<.001,d=.95.Atthe

sametime,thiseffectcontradictsHypothesis2,statingthatahigh

construallevelreducesframingeffects.However,thereasonforthis

effectmightalsolieinthecontentsofdecisions1and4.While

deci-sion1concernsanewadvertisingconceptthatmightleadtomore

(15%increasewithachanceof80%)orless(10%increase)overnight

Fig.9.Preferencefortheriskyoptionintheproximalversusthedistalcondition,in thegain(decision1anddecision2)andthelossframe(decision3anddecision4). Errorbarsindicate95%conﬁdenceintervals.

stays,decision4concernssavingmeasurementsthatmightleadto

larger(50%decreasewithachanceof50%)orsmaller(25%decrease)

lossesinsalaryforthemanager.Theriskyprospectofdecision4

isquiteharmfuland mightlead toexistentialproblemsforthe

manager,whichcouldbethereasonwhyweﬁndstrongerrisk

aver-sioninthisdecisionthaninallotherdecisions.Furthermore,due

totheirexperience,ourparticipantsmightnot havebelievedin

anadvertisingconceptthatsurelyincreasestheovernightstays,

plustheyalsomightbeusedtohavingsomeriskwheninvestingin

marketing.

Inconclusion,whencomparingdecisions2and3,wefounda

framingeffectinthepreferencesforthesureoption,whichwas

slightlystrongerfortheproximalthanthedistalconditionand

sup-portsHypothesis2.Psychologicaldistancehadnoeffectandwedid

notﬁndclearsupportforHypothesis1aand1b.However,when

comparingdecisions1and4,theframingeffectwasreversedfor

thedistalconditionandthisﬁndingpartlysupportsHypothesis1a

and1b,butcontradictsHypothesis2.

7. Generaldiscussion

Ourresultssupportthenotionthatbothnovicesand

profes-sionalsareinﬂuencedbyperceivedpsychologicaldistancewhen

making decisions under risk. In line withTrope and Liberman

(2010),wepresumedthatavariationinperceivedpsychological

distanceaffectsthecognitivemindset,leadingtomoreconcrete

thinking(lowconstruallevel)inpsychologicalclosesituationsand

moreabstractthinking(highconstruallevel)inmoredistant

situ-ations.Overall,twoimportantresultsemergedfromourstudies.

First,inStudies1and2wefoundevidenceforHypothesis1a,

statingthatahighconstruallevelleadstolessriskavoidanceingain

framesthanalowconstruallevel.Whiletheproximalcondition

(i.e.,lowconstruallevel)ledtoriskavoidance,whichisinlinewith

prospecttheory,thedistalcondition(i.e.,highconstruallevel)led

toriskseeking,whichcontradictsprospecttheory.Inlossframes,

construalleveldidnothaveaninﬂuenceonriskseeking,andwe

didnotﬁndevidenceforHypothesis1b,statingthatalowconstrual

levelleadstomoreriskseekinginlossframesthanahighconstrual

level.However,areversedframingeffect(moreriskavoidancein

thelossthaninthegainframe)thatwefoundinStudy3partly

supportsbothHypothesis1aand1b,butforthedistalcondition

only.ThecontradictingresultsinthelossframesofStudies1and2

maybeduetooneoftworeasons:eithertheconstruallevel

manip-ulationwasnotstrongenough,ortheinﬂuenceoflossaversionis

strongerthantheimpactofconstruallevel.Thephenomenonofloss

aversion,whichstatesthatlossesloomlargerthangains,isseenas

oneofthemostcommonbiasesindecisionmaking(Hastie,2001;

Kahneman&Tversky,1979;Tversky&Kahneman,1981,1992).A

recentseriesofexperimentsevensuggeststhatitdominates

con-strualleveltheory(Trautmann&VandeKuilen,2012).Thismight

explaintheresistanceoflossaversiontoourmanipulation,but

needstobefurtherinvestigated.

Second,theclassicframingeffectwasreplicatedforthe

proxi-malcondition,butwaseliminated(Studies1&2)orreduced(Study

3)inthedistalcondition,whichsupportsourexploratory

Hypoth-esis2,statingthatalowconstruallevelleadstostrongerframing

effectsthanahighconstruallevel.Experimentshaveshownthat

thebiasofframingcanbereducedoreveneliminatedwhen

peo-plerelymoreondeliberativethinkingthanonintuitivethinking

(e.g.,Keysar,Hayakawa,&An,2012).Reasonsforashiftfrom

intu-itivetomoredeliberativethinkingmightbebasedonareductionof

emotionalresonancecausedbytheincreaseinpsychological

dis-tance(Keysaretal.,2012)oronperceiveddisﬂuency.Disﬂuency

occurswhenanexperienceismoredifﬁculttoprocesscognitively,

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(Alter&Oppenheimer,2008).Intermsoftheframingeffect,loss

framesareassumedtobeprocessedmoreﬂuentlywhen paired

withconcreteattributesandlowpsychologicaldistance,

respec-tively(Whiteet al.,2011).Disﬂuency cantemperconﬁdencein

one’sjudgmentandleadtoashifttomoreanalyticalprocessing

(Alter&Oppenheimer,2008).

Insum,ourresultssuggestthatitnotonlymakesadifference

whetheradecisionisframedintermsofgainsorlosses(Tversky

& Kahneman, 1981), but also if a decision is framed in terms

ofpsychologicalclosenessor distance.Fromphysicianswho do

onlinediagnosestomanagerswhomakehigh-stakeﬁnancial

deci-sionsforinternationalbranches,allareconfrontedwithaspectsof

psychologicaldistance.Whiletheheuristics-and-biasesapproach

hasa longtraditionand receivedquitea lotofattentioninthe

realworld,construallevel theoryis rathernew.Construallevel

theoryexplainscognitivemechanismsunderlyingknown

psycho-logicaleffectssuchastime-dependedchangesinpreference(e.g.,

Loewenstein,1987;Thaler,1992)andphenomenaconcerningthe

psychology of prediction (e.g., the planning fallacy; Kahneman

&Tversky, 1979).Furthermore, construal level theorysuggests

thattemporal,socialandspatialdistanceinﬂuencepeople’s

cog-nitiveprocessingofeventsinthesameway.Thereforethetheory’s

applicationtopracticaldecisionmakingisespeciallyinteresting.

Practitionersneedtobemadeawareofthefactthatpsychological

distanceinherentinadecisionproblemcaninﬂuencetheir

mind-setandthereforetheirdecisionmakingbehavior.Adecisionmaker

mightwanttothoroughlyconsiderwhoisaffectedbyhisdecision

andwhenorwhereitwillcomeintoeffect.Oneormoreofthese

psychologicaldistancedimensionscanbefoundinalmostevery

decision.

Inorder toimprovepractical decisionmaking,psychological

distancecouldbeintentionallyvariedtoward amoredistantor

acloserperspective.Thatwouldprovidea decisionmakerwith

theopportunitytoilluminateadecisionfromdifferentdistant

per-spectivesandconsideritsinﬂuenceonhisevaluation.Forexample,

ifamanagerisconsideringmakingabiginvestmentinanother

country,hemightwanttoimaginehimselfbeingon-siteversusfar

away,aclosefriendbeingaffectedversusanunknownperson,or

theconsequencesofanimmediateimplementationversusafuture

implementation.Whetherhypotheticality,thefourthdimensionof

psychologicaldistance,alsoinﬂuencespracticaldecisionmaking

needstobefurtherinvestigated.

Agreat potentialconcerningthe practicalapplication of our

researchmightlieintheﬁeldofriskcommunication.AsGigerenzer,

Gaissmaier,Kurz-Milcke,Schwartz,andWoloshin(2007)propose,

psychologicalresearchneedstoinvestigatehowtopresentrisks

visuallyaswellasnumericallyinawaythatfosterseasyand

cor-rectprocessing.Basedonseveralexperiments,theauthorspropose

thatrisksshouldbepresentedintermsofabsoluterisksinsteadof

relativerisksandasnumbersinsteadofwords,sincetheformer

leadstomoreaccurateriskperceptions.Lermer,Streicher,Sachs,

andFrey(2013)furtherinvestigatedthepresentationofrisksand

suggestthat theabstractness ofthe target(e.g.,person atrisk)

moderatestheinﬂuenceofpresentationformatonriskperception.

Thisindicatesthatconstruallevelmightcontributetothe

discus-siononhowtoeffectivelypresentrisks.Studieshavepointedout

thatlargernumbersandsmallerunits(e.g.,7daysasopposedto1

week)increaseperceivedharm(White&Kwan,2013)orthatthe

presentationofmessagesaspicturesversuswordsaffectsperceived

psychologicaldistance.Forexample,whilepeoplepreferred

pic-tureswhencommunicatingwithproximalothers,theypreferred

wordswithdistalothers.Inthesamelineofresearch,itwas

sug-gestedthatpeoplearemorelikelytoheedtheadviceofamessage

if themedium of presentation (aspicture or word) is

congru-entwithpsychologicaldistance(Amit,Wakslak,&Trope,2012).

Lermer,Streicher,Sachs,Raue,andFrey(2014b),ontheotherhand,

havefoundevidencethatrisksthataregenerallyoverestimated

becomemoreaccuratewheninducingaconcretemindset,while

veryunlikelyrisksthataregenerallyunderestimatedbecomemore

accuratewheninducinganabstractmindset.Insum,thecurrent

ﬁndingsimplythatconstrualleveltheoryshouldbeconsideredin

riskcommunicationand suggestfurtherresearchconcerningits

practicalapplication.

Ourﬁndingscontributetodecisionmakingtheoryandhighlight

theimportance of subtle inﬂuences, suchasperceived

psycho-logical distance,onpractical decision making.However,further

research is needed to draw a clearer picture concerning the

interplayofframingandconstruallevel,especiallyoutsidethe

lab-oratory.Beyond that,it couldbeinterestingtoinvestigatehow

construalleveltheoryinteractswithcompetingapproachesinthe

areaofintuitivedecisionmaking.Theseapproachesmightinclude

fast-and-frugalheuristics(Gigerenzer,Todd,&TheABCResearch

Group,1999), fuzzy-tracetheory (Reyna &Brainerd, 1995), the

adaptivedecisionmaker(Payne,Bettman,&Johnson,1993),or

con-nectionistmodelssuchasparallelconstraintsatisfaction(Glöckner

&Betsch,2008).Theseideasgobeyondthescopeofthisarticle,but

carrygreatpotentialforfutureresearch.

ConﬂictofIntereststatement

Theauthorsdeclarethattherearenoconﬂictsofinterest.

Acknowledgements

We thank Dominique Schapperer for providing excellent

researchassistance.

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