Context-dependent cheating: experimental evidence from 16 countries

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Pascual-Ezama, David and Fosgaard, Toke R. and Cardenas, Juan C.

and Kujal, Praveen and Veszteg, Robert and Gil-Gomez de Liano,

́

̃

Beatriz and Gunia, Brian and Weichselbaumer, Doris and Hilken,

Katharina and Armenak, Antinyan and Delnoij, Joyce and Proestakis,

Antonis and Tira, Michael D. and Patromo, Yulius and Jaber-Lopez,

́

Tarek and Branas-Garza, Pablo (2015) Context-dependent cheating:

experimental evidence from 16 countries. Journal of Economic

Behavior and Organization, 116 . pp. 379-386. ISSN 0167-2681

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.04.020

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JournalofEconomicBehavior&Organization116(2015)379–386

ContentslistsavailableatScienceDirect

Journal

of

Economic

Behavior

&

Organization

jo u r n al ho me p ag e :ww w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / j e b o

Context-dependent

cheating:

Experimental

evidence

from

16 countries

David

Pascual-Ezama

a,∗

_,

_Toke

_R.

_Fosgaard

b

_,

_Juan

_Camilo

_Cardenas

c

_,

Praveen

Kujal

d

_,

_Robert

_Veszteg

e

_,

_Beatriz

_Gil-Gómez

_de

_{Lia ˜}

_no

f

_,

_Brian

_Gunia

g

_,

Doris

Weichselbaumer

h,i

_,

_Katharina

_Hilken

j

_,

_Armenak

_Antinyan

k

_,

Joyce

Delnoij

l

_,

_Antonios

_Proestakis

m

_,

_Michael

_D.

_Tira

n

_,

_Yulius

_Pratomo

o

_,

Tarek

Jaber-López

p

_,

_Pablo

_{Bra ˜}

_nas-Garza

d

a_Department_of_Financial_Economy_and_Accounting,_Universidad_Complutense_Madrid,_Campus_Somosaguas,_Madrid_28223,_Spain

b_Department_of_Food_and_Resource_Economics,_University_of_Copenhagen,_Rolighedsvej_23,₁₉₅₈_{Frederiksberg}_C,_Denmark c_Facultad_de_Economia,_CEDE,_Universidad_de_Los_Andes,_Calle_19A_No._1-37_Este,_Bloque_W_(W-803),_Bogotá,_Colombia d_Economics_Department,_Business_School,_Middlesex_University_London,_The_Burroughs,_NW4_4BT,_London,_UK e_School_of_Political_Science_and_Economics,_Waseda_University,_1-6-1_Nishiwaseda_Shinjuku-ku,_Tokyo_169-8050,_Japan

f_Department_of_Social_Psychology_and_Methodology,_Universidad_Autónoma_de_Madrid,_Campus_de_Cantoblanco_s/n,_Madrid_28049,

Spain

g_The_Johns_Hopkins_Carey_Business_School,₁₀₀_{International}_Drive,_Baltimore,_MD_21202-1099,_USA h_Department_of_Economics,_University_of_Linz,_{Altenbergerstr.}_68,₄₀₄₀_Linz,_Austria

i_Department_of_Women’s_and_Gender_Studies,_University_of_Linz,_{Altenbergerstr.}_68,₄₀₄₀_Linz,_Austria j_Department_of_Applied_Economics,_Vrije_Universiteit_Brussel_(VUB),_Pleinlaan_2,₁₀₅₀_Brussels,_Belgium

k_University_of_{Erlangen-Nuremberg,}_Chair_of_Economic_Theory,_Lange_Gasse_20,₉₀₄₀₃_Nuremberg,_Germany

l_Utrecht_University_School_of_Economics,_Utrecht_University,_{Kriekenpitplein}_21-22,₃₅₈₄_EC_Utrecht,_The_Netherlands

m_Institute_for_Health_and_Consumer_Protection,_Joint_Research_Centre,_European_Commission,_Via_Enrico_Fermi_2749,₂₁₀₂₇_Ispra_(VA),

Italy

n_Department_of_General_Psychology,_University_of_Padua,_Via_Venezia_12,₃₅₁₃₁_Padova,_Italy

o_Department_of_Economics,_Faculty_of_Economics_and_Business,_Satya_Wacana_Christian_University,_Jalan_Diponegoro_52-60,_Salatiga

50711,Indonesia

p_Laboratorio_de_Economía_{Experimental,}_Department_of_Economics,_Universitat_Jaume_I,_Castellón,_Spain

a

r

t

i

c

l

e

i

n

f

o

Articlehistory:

Received25September2014

Receivedinrevisedform24February2015

Accepted25April2015

Availableonline21May2015

Keywords: Honesty Corruption Culturaldifferences

a

b

s

t

r

a

c

t

Policymakersuseseveralinternationalindicesthatcharacterizecountriesaccordingtothe qualityoftheirinstitutions.However,noefforthasbeenmadetostudyhowthehonestyof citizensvariesacrosscountries.Thispaperexploresthehonestyamongcitizensacross16 countrieswith1440participants.Weemployaverysimpletaskwhereparticipantsfacea trade-offbetweenthejoyofeatingaﬁnechocolateandthedisutilityofhavingathreatened self-conceptbecauseoflying.Despitetheincentivestocheat,weﬁndthatindividualsare mostlyhonest.Further,internationalindicesthatareindicativeofinstitutionalhonestyare completelyuncorrelatedwithcitizens’honestyforoursamplecountries.

∗ Correspondingauthorat:DepartmentofFinancialEconomyandAccounting,UniversidadComplutenseMadrid,CampusSomosaguas,Madrid,28223,

Spain.Tel.:+34630176315;fax:+34910102708.

E-mailaddresses:[email protected](D.Pascual-Ezama),[email protected](T.R.Fosgaard),[email protected](J.C.Cardenas),

[email protected](P.Kujal),[email protected](R.Veszteg),[email protected](B.Gil-GómezdeLia ˜no),[email protected](B.Gunia),

[email protected](D.Weichselbaumer),[email protected](K.Hilken),[email protected](A.Antinyan),[email protected]

(J.Delnoij),[email protected](A.Proestakis),[email protected](M.D.Tira),[email protected](Y.Pratomo),

[email protected](T.Jaber-López),[email protected](P.Bra ˜nas-Garza).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.04.020

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380 D.Pascual-Ezamaetal./JournalofEconomicBehavior&Organization116(2015)379–386

1. Introduction

Imagineyourselfonauniversitycampus.Youseethefollowingannouncement:“Isthisyourluckyday?Flipacoinandwin aChocolate”.YouapproachthedeskandreceivetheopportunitytowinadeliciousandbeautifullywrappedLindtLindor chocolatetrufflebyflippingacoinwithablackandawhiteside.Youflipthecoininaboxatanearbytable;theboxprotects youranonymity.Youwinachocolateifyoureportthatthewhitesidecameupandnothingifyoureportblack.Ifyouactually rolledblack,theonlythingkeepingyoufromenjoyingthetruffleisyourmoralcompass.Youfaceatradeoffbetweenthe joyofeatingafinechocolateandtheindividualdisutilityofhavingathreatenedself-conceptbecauseoflying.Thereisno socialshamingorostracism.Weranthisexperiment(threetreatments)in16countriestotesthowsomeregularcitizens aroundtheworldbehaveinsuchasituation.Interestingly,wedidnotfindanysignificantdifferencesacrossanotherwise veryheterogeneoussetofcountries.

Moststudiesaboutculturaldifferencesregardingdishonestbehaviorhaveusedthesurveymethodology.Transparency InternationalreportslargedifferencesincorruptionaroundtheworldandtheWorldValueSurveydocumentscross-cultural differencesinopinionsregardinghow“justiﬁable”itistocheatontaxesorpublictransportationfares.However,corruption indicesmeasureperceptionsandnotactualbehaviors.Further,variationsacrosscountriesinacademicdishonesty(Rawwas etal.,2004)andtaxevasion(Almetal.,1995;Cummingsetal.,2009)reinforcetheimpressionthatcheatingisbothabundant anddiversearoundtheworld.Inthesameline,recentresearchinbehavioralandexperimentaleconomicshasshownthat alargefractionofindividualsarepronetocheating(Ariely,2012;Gneezy,2005).AnexceptiontothistrendisAbeleretal.

(2014)whoreportaphone-basedincentivizedexperimentwitharepresentativesampleinGermany.Theyﬁndthatmost

peoplereporthonestlyafterflippingacoininabsoluteprivacywitha50%chanceofgettingapayoffof15eurosincashor throughanAmazongiftcertificate.Abelerandcolleaguesalsocomplementedtheirstudywithalaboratoryexperimentand findthatthereisaslightlyhigherlevelofdishonestreportinginthissetting.

Thedominantviewintheliteratureisthatindividualsengageindishonestbehavioraslongastheycanmaintaina positiveself-imagewhileobtainingthemaximumpayoffsfromtheirdishonesty(Mazaretal.,2008).Further,researchhas shownthatcreatingajustiﬁcationofapositiveself-imagewhilebehavingdishonestlyiscontextspeciﬁc(Fosgaardetal.,

2013;GinoandGalinsky,2012;Pascual-Ezamaetal.,2013).

Inthispaper,weexaminepreciselythis.Thatis,whethercheatingpersediffersacrossdifferentcountriesandwhether thecontext1_inﬂuences_this_behavior._We_conducted_an_experiment_in_which_participants_reported_the_outcome_of_a_coin

tosstowinaprize.Wereplicatedtheexperimentinadiversesetof16countriesaroundtheworldwith1440subjects,90 ineachcountry(30pertreatment).WeusedasimplecheatingtaskbasedonBucciolandPiovesan(2011).Wetookgreat caretoruneachsessionundersimilarconditions.Thelocationoftheexperimentwasalwaysabusycommonareason universitycampuses(seeTable1foranoverview).Participantshadtoflipablack/whitecoin;iftheoutcomewasreported white,theyobtainedaredLindtLindorTruffle;ifreportedblack,theyobtainednothing.Asoursampleincludessubstantial culturalvariation–includingparticipantsfromAnglo-Saxon,Latin,Germanic,NordicandAsiaticcountries–onewould expectsubstantialheterogeneityincheating.Inaddition,andconsistentwithasocialconstructionistview,theeffectsof culturedependonthespecificsofthechoicecontext(Gelfandetal.,2013;KramerandMessick,1995).

Inthefirsttreatment(theSelf-ReportedTreatment,SRT)eachparticipantflippedacoininaprivateareawithoutthe presenceoftheresearchersorotherparticipants.Afterwardsthesubjectfilledareportsheet–indicatingsexandthe white/blackcoin-tossresult.Itwasclearlyindicatedthatthefilledformshouldbeleftintheboxnearby.Nointeractionwith theexperimentersoccurredinthistask.

Takingintoaccountthatthereareheterogenoustypesofdishonestpeople(Gneezyetal.,2013),thistaskisagood measureofdishonestyforseveralreasons.Firstly,asagrowingbodyofresearchsuggeststhatincompletelyanonymous settings,wheretheriskofbeingcaughtisinexistent,ﬁnding100%cheatingisnotunusual(Pascual-Ezamaetal.,2013;Shu etal.,2012),however,peoplemayalsorestricttheamountofcheating(AyalandGino,2011;Gneezy,2005).

Inourtaskthereisnopossibilitytorestricttheamountofcheating,thedecisionissimplytobehonestornot(report blackorwhite).Further,decisionmakingisimmediateandintuitive,insteadofdeliberativeandmeditativeinacognitive dualsystem(BazermanandTenbrunsel,2011;Kahneman,2011).Inourexperiment,cheatingisanautomaticresponseand theneedforjustiﬁcationmattersonlywhenpeoplehaveenoughtimetodeliberate(Shalvietal.,2012).Finally,thereward isasimplechocolatethatgivesinstantgratiﬁcation.

ThetwoothertreatmentsweretheWrittenandtheVerbalReportedTreatments(WRTandVRT,respectively).InWRT, participantscompletedareportsheetinprivateandsubmittedittotheexperimenter.Theexperimentermadeanoteofthe reportedoutcome,and,ifdue,handedthechocolatetotheparticipant.InVRT,participantswerenotaskedtoﬁllanyform. Theyverballyreportedtheoutcomeofthecoinﬂiptotheexperimenter.Ifreportedwhite,theexperimentalisthandeda chocolatetothem.

Ourdifferenttreatmentsallowustounderstandhowthelevelofcheatingisshapedbycontext,i.e.thedifferencesin reportingacrosstreatments.Buildingonthetheoryofself-imagemaintenance(Mazaretal.,2008),wepredictthatour threetreatmentswillhavedifferentimplicationswithregardtothemoralprocessesofreportingincorrectoutcomes.We

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D.Pascual-Ezamaetal./JournalofEconomicBehavior&Organization116(2015)379–386 381

Table1

Summaryofcountriesstudied.

Country City University

Austria Linz JohannesKeplerUniversityLinz

Belgium Brussels VrijeUniversiteitBrussel(VUB)

Colombia Bogotá UniversidaddelosAndes

Denmark Copenhagen CopenhagenUniversity

Finland Oulu UniversityofOulu

Germany Nuremberg UniversityofErlangen-Nuremberg

Greece Rethymno UniversityofCrete

India Delhi HansrajCollege,UniversityofDelhi

Indonesia Salatiga UniversitasKristenSatyaWacana

Italy Padova UniversitàdiPadova

Japan Tokyo WasedaUniversity

Netherlands Utrecht UtrechtUniversity

Spain Madrid UniversidadAutónomaMadrid

Turkey Istanbul Bahc¸es¸ehirÜniversitesi

USA Baltimore JohnsHopkinsUniversity

UK London MiddlesexUniversity

conjecturethatmisreportingintheSRTistheleastmorallydifﬁcultdecisionsincereportingdoesnotinvolveanykindof socialinteractionand,subsequently,nosocialpressurefromtheexperimenter.Consequently,thedecisiontobedishonestis onlyatradeoffbetweentheinternalmoralpressure(andtheconsequentguiltexperienced)againstthepleasureofenjoying aLindtchocolate.

InWRT,anadditionalmoralpressureoriginatesfromthefactthatthedecisionisdocumentedonpaperandhandedto anotherperson.Thisadditionalsocialprocessislikelytoinvolveshame(ontopofguilt)incaseofdishonesty,andhence weexpectlessdishonestyoccurringinthistreatment.Relativetoverbalreports,weconjecturethatwrittenreportsare moredistantandmakeiteasiertotakeawayinternalmoralcontrol(Shuetal.,2012).Therefore,weexpecttheVRTtobring evenstrongerself-imageerosionincaseofcheating,sincetheuntruthfuldecisionnowmustbestatedface-to-face.Inthis situationweexpectthemostmoralpressuretobepresentandhencetheleastdishonestbehavior.Thisisconsistentwith

Banduraetal.(1996)whoﬁndthatverbalreportsarelikelytobelesspronetodishonestbehaviorthanwrittenreports.

Giventhiswehypothesizethatself-reportingwithnointeraction(withtheexperimenter)increasethetemptationtobe dishonest.

2. Experimentaldesign

WereplicateasimplecointaskbyBucciolandPiovesan(2011).Asnotedbefore,participantshadtoﬂipablack/white coin.IfthereportedtosswaswhitetheyobtainedaredLindtLindorchocolateandnothingotherwise.

Atﬁrstglance,thechoiceofchocolateasanincentivemightseemasunusualcomparedtotheconventionalchoice ofmoney.Webelievethatchocolatesareagoodsolutionforstudyingdecision-makingacrosscountries,giventhatour studyisinaﬁeldsettingandnotinthelaboratory.Infact,webelievethatitisadvantageoustotellstudentsyouhave achanceofwinningachocolate,ratherthantellingthemyouhaveachancetowinadollar(oranycorrespondinglocal currency).Consumingasmallsnackinsuchasituationissimplymuchmoreofaneverydayevent,andhencefeelsmore natural.Andamorenaturalsettingenablesgreaterexperimentercontrolandexternalvalidity.Furthermore,achocolateis achocolateanywhere,andsubjectsneverhavetocalculatethemonetaryvalueofthegood,justreceiveasmalldelicious snack.Clearly,therearemanyotherpotentialincentiveapproachesonecouldapply.Amonetaryprizecouldbescaledbased onBigMacprizes,GDP,oranypurchasingpowerindex.Althoughtheremightbecountrydifferencesinchocolatepreference (asindicatedbyMesserli,2012),thechoiceofchocolateaspaymentconstitutesjustasmanyorjustasfewconcernsasany othercross-countrypaymentvehicle,includingcountry-adjustedmonetarycompensations.Anotherpossibleconcernisthe verysmallsizeoftheincentive.Weacknowledgethesmallsize,yetwewanttoemphasizethatconsideringtheextremely shortdurationoftheexperiment(perhaps1or2min),ourpaymenttranslatesintoanhourlypaymentsimilartowhatis usedinmostlaboratorystudies.

Ourparticipantsareuniversitystudents.2_The_coin_was_ﬂipped_only_once_and_by_one_person_at_a_time._The_task_was

performedinaprivateareaatasafedistancefromtheexperimentersorotherparticipants.Thelocationoftheexperiment waswithinthecollege/universitycampus,forexample,inahallwayinthecafeteriaarea,henceensuringasteadyﬂowof potentialparticipants.Toensurethatwedostudycountrydifferences,weensuredthatonlynativepeopleparticipatedin thevariouslocations.Theimportanceofensuringthisissupportedbyevidenceoftheeffectofimmigrants’originalcountry

2_Recent_papers_show_that_typical_experimental_subjects_are_not_really_different_from_ordinary_people_(see_for_instance_Exadaktylos_et_al.,₂₀₁₃_for_social

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socialnormsinethicalbehavior(KountourisandRemoundou,2013).Theexperimentwascarriedoutinthelocalworking languageforboththeverbalandthewrittenpart.3

Thewholestudycomprisesthreedifferenttreatmentsaccordingtothelevelofproximitybetweentheparticipantand theexperimenter:

• Self-ReportedTreatment(SRT):Astudentapproachedtheexperimenter(attableA,seeFigureA1intheappendixfor details),he/shewashandedareportsheet,andwasguidedtotableB(farenoughawayfromtheresearcherarea)toflip theblack/whitecoinprivately(seeBinFig.A1).Thecoinflipwascarriedoutinsideasmallcardboardboxtomakeittruly private.ThestudentnotedgenderandtheresultofthecoinfliponthereportsheetattableB.Afterfillingoutthereport sheet,thestudentwalkedovertoathirdtable(tableCinanotherprivateareaatadistancefromtheexperimenter,seeC inFig.A1)todepositthereportsheetinabox,andtotakethechocolatehim/herselfincaseofawhitetoss.

• WrittenReportedTreatment(WRT):ExactlythesameasSRT,butnowwiththeﬁlledoutreportsheetinhand,thestudent wentbacktotableA,gavethereportsheettotheexperimenterandreceivedthechocolateifawhitetosswasreported. TableCisthereforenotused(seeFig.A1,Appendix).

• VerbalReportedTreatment(VRT):ExactlythesameasWRT,butnowthestudentdidnothavetoﬁlloutthereportsheet (onlyreportgender)andhadtoinformtheexperimenterverballyabouttheoutcomeofthecointoss.

Werantheexperimentwith90participantsineachcountry.Therewere10studentsforeachtreatmentandthiswas repeatedthreetimes:10(WRT),10(VRT),10(SRT),10(WRT),10(VRT),10(SRT),10(WRT),10(VRT),10(SRT).Westarted eachtreatmentwithtenchocolatesonaplateontableB(VRTandWRT)ortableC(SRT).Whenwechangedthetreatmentwe reﬁlledthechocolatestakenbytheparticipantsandregisteredtheexactnumberofchocolatesreplaced4_._At_the_beginning

ofeachtreatmentwestartedwithtenchocolatesintheplate.Attheendoftheexperimentwecomparedthenumbersin ourrecordswiththereportsbytheparticipants.InWRTandSRTparticipantswrotethecoloronthereportsheet.InVRT participantsonlywrotethegender.Inthiscase,whenparticipantsgaveusthereportsheetandtoldusthecolorwetore alittlecornerofthereportsheetwhentheytoldusblacksoattheendwecouldknowhowmanyblacksandwhiteswere declared.

Notethat,aswekeptnonamesorindividual-speciﬁcrecords,wehadtobeverycarefulaboutwhethersomeonereturned. Experimenterswereinstructedtoinformanyonewhotriedtoreturntoﬂipthecoinagainthatitwasonlypossibleto participateonce.Incase,facultymembersshowedupforparticipation,itwasemphasizedthatitwasintendedtobea studentevent.Completingtheexperimenttookaboutaminuteortwo.

3. Results

3.1. Differencesbytreatments

Toourgreatsurprise,overallonly57%oftheparticipantsreportedwhiteacrossallthreetreatmentsandcountries.Since theprobabilityofobtainingwhiteis50%,thisresultindicatesthat86%resistedthetemptationtolie[100%−2(57%–50%)]. Weconcludethatlittledishonestyisobservedacrossallcountriesandtreatments.Lookingatthedifferenttreatments,the degreeofdishonestbehavior,listedasthepercentageofwhiteoutcomes,conﬁrmsourinitialconjectures.Weobservea greateramountoflyingintheSRT,withWRTinthemiddle,andwithVRThavingthesmallestamountoflying.

62%(SelfRT)>57%(WrittenRT) >53%(VerbalRT)

ThedifferencesbetweenSRTandWRTarenotstatisticallysigniﬁcant(2₌_.316;_p-value₌_.574),_although_the_average

acrossthesixteensocietieswere5percentagepointshigherfortheformer.However,usingacontingencytable(Pearson 2₎_the_difference_between_SRT_and_VRT_was_larger₍₉_percentage_points)_and_signiﬁcant_at_the_5%_level₍2₌_4.479;

p-value=0.034).Further,wedonotﬁndanysigniﬁcantdifferencesbetweenWRTandVRT(2₌_2.422;_p-value₌_0.120)._Thus,

comparingthedifferenttreatmentsweﬁndthattheverbalreportsarelikelytobelesspronetodishonestbehaviorthan writtenreportsinlinewithpreviousliterature(Banduraetal.,1996;FestingerandCarlsmith,1959;Mazaretal.,2008)and wefurtherﬁndthatself-reportingtheanswers(andnothavingtodeliverittotheexperimenter)increasesthiseffect.

3 _A_few_students_asked_why_the_{coin-chocolate}_event_was_carried_out._Our_prepared_explanation_was_that_the_purpose_was_to_understand_the_students’

interestforchocolates.Thisstatementwasintentionallymadeimprecise,suchthatstudentsdidnotthinkthiswasatestbutrathersawitasachocolate

promotion(weneversaiditwasaLindtpromotion).

4 _Note_that_having_more_or_less_chocolates_on_the_plates_is_not_an_issue_for_participants_as_they_never_get_to_know_the_total._What_they_see_(on_the_plate)

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Table2

Resultsbyconditionandcountry.

Country Self-Report(SRT) (n=30p/t) WrittenReported (WRT) (n=30p/t) VerbalReported (VRT) (n=30p/t) All (n=90) Austria 40% 77%*** _60% _59%* Belgium 57% 47% 53% 52% Colombia 57% 67%** _43% _56% Denmark 70%** _43% _40% _51% Finland 63%* _67%** _53% _61%** Germany 73%*** _50% _53% _59%* Greece 60% 60%** _37% _52% India 47% 67% 50% 54% Indonesia 60% 57% 40% 52% Italy 60% 47% 57% 54% Japan 57% 60% 57% 58%* Netherlands 67%** _60% _50% _59%* Spain 77%*** _67%** _63%* _69%*** Turkey 53% 67%** _57% _59%* USA 70%** _53% _63%* _62%** UK 63%* _33% _70%** _56%

Notes:Columnsshowthepercentagesofparticipantswhohavetakenchocolatesineachtreatment(denoted“p/t”).

*_p-value_<_0.10. **_p-value_<_0.05. ***_p-value_<_0.01.

3.2. Differencesbycountries

Asecondimportantresultisthatweﬁndnostatisticallysigniﬁcantdifferencesacrossthe16countriesacrossany treat-ment:SRT(2₌_16.953;_p-value₌_0.322);_VRT₍2₌_15.691;_p-value₌_0.403)_and_WRT₍2₌_22.674;_p-value₌_0.091)._This

suggeststhatthereisahighlevelofhomogeneityinbehavioracrossoursamplecountries.

Additionalinterestingresultsshowupfromacloserexaminationofthedata.Sincetossingacoinfollowsabinomial distribution,welookedforthosecountrieswherethereisananomalousnumberofwhite(awarded)coinsreported.Table2

reportsdetailedinformationbycountryandtreatments.5_At_the_country_level,_the_share_of_whites_reported_in_excess_of_50%

(acrossalltreatments),issigniﬁcant(ata5%signiﬁcancelevel)inthreeoutofsixteencountries.Yet,theoverallcountry leveleffectscanmaskunderlyingeffectsatthetreatmentlevel.Wethereforefocusonthetreatmenteffectsatthecountry level.Obviouslyasamplesizeof30pertreatmentallowsusonlytomakeroughassessmentofthedegreeofcheating,but westillbelievethisroughmeasureprovidesausefulcomparisonacrosscountriesandtreatments.6

ResultfromtheSelf-reporttreatment(SRT)isdisplayedinFig.1.InSRTweﬁndthatthenullhypothesisofhonestbehavior isrejectedforanumberofcountries.ThisﬁgureshowsthatUKandFinlandrejectthenullat˛=10%(dottedlinelabeledwith *).Mostimportantly,GermanyandSpainrejectat˛=1%(continuouslinelabeledwith***).Finally,Netherlands,Denmark andtheUSrejectfor1%<˛<10%.

Fig.2displaysdatafromTable2forthewrittenandtheverbaltreatments.Blue(leftside)barsinFig.2refertoWRT (written).ThenumberofcountriesthatrejectthenullisreducedtosixandtheyarenotthesameasinSRT:Colombia, Finland,TurkeyandIndiarejectat1%<˛<10%whileAustriadoessoat˛=1%.Spainweaklyrejects(˛=10%).DatafromVRT (verbal)areshownintheredbars(rightside)ofFigure2.Onlytwocountriesappearsigniﬁcant:Spainrejectsat1%<_˛<10% whiletheUKrejectsatthe1%level.TheUSweaklyrejects(˛=10%).

Therearesomeinterestingissuestoemphasize:Spainalsorejectedthenullinalltreatments.UnexpectedlyUKappears undertheverbalandtheself-reportedtreatmentbutnotinthewritten.Thelattercaseisexactlythecomplementaryof Austriawhichappearsinthewrittencaseonly.AlsotheUSandFinlandappearintwotreatments.Itisalsoimportantto remarkthatBelgium,Greece,Italy,IndonesiaandJapanneverappearasdishonest.7_Although_it_is_interesting_to_note_that

thesedifferenceattheconditionleveldonotaimatexplainingeachcountry-speciﬁceffects,wesimplywanttohighlight thatbesidesouroverallconclusionofnosigniﬁcantacross-countryeffects,wedoobservesomevariationinthedata.

5_We_have_also_conducted_a_Logit_analysis_to_explain_the_outcome_of_individual_coin_tosses._In_the_regression,_among_other_factors,_we_controlled_for

differentincomelevelsacrosscountries(withthehelpofper-capitaGNI)andforcountry-levelper-capitacocoaconsumption.Whileincomedoesnot

seemtohaveasigniﬁcantimpact,per-capitacocoaconsumptionhasanegativeeffectoncheating,i.e.thehighertheper-capitaconsumptiontheloweris cheating.

6_We_also_conduct_the_analysis_by_using_{Inglehart-Welzel}_cultural_categories_(based_on_the_World_Value_Surveys)._Again_we_do_not_ﬁnd_any_robust_effect

ofcultureoncheatingbehavior.

7_It_is_also_interesting_the_case_of_Denmark._Signiﬁcant_differences_for_SRT_vs._WRT₍2₌_4.344;_p-value₌_0.037)_and_VRT₍2₌_5.445;_p-value₌_0.020)_are

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Fig.1. PercentageofchocolatestakenintheSRT.*p-value<0.10;***p-value<0.01.

Fig.2.PercentageofchocolatestakenintheWRTandVRT.*p-value<0.10;***p-value<0.01.

3.3. Genderdifferences

Onanexploratorybasis,wealsoanalyzedtheeffectofgender(seeCrosonandGneezy,2009,forareview).Although previousstudieshavefoundcorrelationsbetweengenderandcheating(e.g.,DreberandJohannesson,2008;Fosgaardetal., 2013),nostatisticallysigniﬁcantdifferencesbetweenthecountrieswerefoundforthemale(2₌_15.898;_p-value₌_0.389)_or

forfemale(2₌_10.679;_p-value₌_0.775)_participants_in_line_with_very_recent_studies₍_Abeler_et_al.,₂₀₁₄_)._Analyzing_by

treat-ment,nodifferenceswerefoundintheSRT[(2₌_16.374;_p-value₌_0.358)₍2₌_17.051;_p-value₌_0.316)],_WRT_[(2₌_19.872;

p-value=0.177)(2₌_19.341;_p-value₌_0.199)]_or_the_VRT_[(2₌_8.581;_p-value₌_0.898)₍2₌_12.618;_p-value₌_0.632)]

treat-ments.Clearly,studyinggenderfurtherreducesdatasizeandourlackofresultscouldbeduetothis.Ourresultsindicate thatthatmalesandfemalesdonotbehavedifferentlyinoursample.

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Table3

Pearsoncorrelationsofthefourindexeswiththethreetreatments. BSI2011 (11countries) PCI2012 (16countries) GCB2013 (14countries) AOC2014 (16countries) SRT 0.057 −0.334 −0.590** _−0.096 p-value 0.868 0.205 0.026 0.725 WRT 0.232 0.317 0.340 0.115 p-value 0.492 0.231 0.235 0.673 VRT −0.483 −0.381 −0.339 −0.336 p-value 0.132 0.146 0.236 0.203

Notes:(.)indicatesthenumberofcountriesinthesample.SomecountriesofoursamplearemissingintheBSI(Austria,Colombia,Denmark,Finland,

Greece)andintheGCB(Austria,Netherlands);p-valueis2-tailed.

**_p-value_<_0.05.

3.4. Comparisonwithotherevidenceofunethicalbehavior

Theanalysisofourresultcanbecomplementedwithacomparisonofthe(published)rankingsofcorruption.Notethatthe linkbetweencheatingandcorruptionhasbeenreportedasstrong(Magnusetal.,2002).Therefore,wehavetestedwhether ourexperimentaldatacorrelatewithanyofthefollowinginternationalcorruptionindexesfromTransparencyInternational andWJRRuleofLawIndex:i.e.theBSI2011:BriberyPayingIndex(fromTransparencyInternational);thePCI2012:Perception ofcorruptionIndex;theGCB2013:GlobalCorruptionBarometer(averageofallsectors)andAOC2014:Absenceofcorruption.8

Table3summarizesallthecorrelations(12comparisons:4indices×3treatments),forthecountriesinoursamplethatare

alsorepresentedintheindices.

AsshowninTable3,onlyonecorrelationisstatisticallysigniﬁcant(GCB2013vs.SRT;p<0.05).Ontopofthat,thesignof thecorrelationsdonotfollowanypattern:weget7negativesand5positives.Wecansafelysaythatinternationalindices indicativeofinstitutionalhonestyarenotcorrelatedwithourexperimentaldata.

Asafurtherrobustnesscheckwealsoanalyzedtherelationbetweenthebehaviorintheexperimentsandanswerstothe worldvaluesurveysquestionsaboutmoralityattitude.9_We_ﬁnd_that_neither_the_answer_of_individual_item_(all_p_>_0.100)

northeaverage(p=0.179)ofthemiscorrelatedwithourexperimentalevidence.

4. Conclusions

Whypeoplecheatand howitvariesacrossculturesisanimportantpolicyquestion.Mostofthestudiesregarding thishavefocusedoninstitutionaldishonesty(orcorruption).However,whetherinstitutionalhonestydirectlymapsinto itscitizens(innate)honestyhasnotbeenexplored.Notethat,whileinstitutionalhonestyisafunctionofits(self)rules, individualhonestyismuchmoreprimal,andhencedifferentfromitsmorepopularcounterpart,i.e.institutionalhonesty. Interestingly,thereislittleworkinthisregard.Thispapersattemptstostudycitizen’shonestyinamulti-countrystudy.To ourknowledgethisistheﬁrststudyofthiskindduetothespanofcountriesandtheincentivizedmechanismused.

Moststudiesoninstitutionalhonestyrelyonnon-incentivizedself-reportedsurveys.Inourstudy,weusechocolatesas anincentiveandtemptationdevice.Therewardisannouncedandisthemainmotivatortoprospectiveparticipantsinour experiment.Theyhopetowinachocolatebytakingpartintheexperiment.Thisselfselectionalsoimpliesthattheyhave apreferencefortherewardandhavefallenforthe“temptationofwinningachocolate.”Byusingthismechanismwethus studytheinnatetendencytolieamongstcitizensof16countries.

Ourmainfindingisthattherearenostatisticallysignificantdifferencesacrossoursamplecountriesregardingtheir honestylevels.Infactweobserveahighlevelofhonestyandsomeimportantculture-specificinteractions.Recallthatin ourtaskwecomparehonestbehavioracrosscountrieswhensubjectscanreporttheoutcomeunderthreeconditions,i.e. Self,WrittenorVerbal.Wearguethatthesethreeconditionsdifferintermsofthemoralweightoflying.Thatis,underSelf reportingandnointeractionwiththeexperimenter,themoralweightoflyingistheleast,meanwhile,itincreasesaswe movefromtheVerbaltotheWrittencondition.

Overall,wedofindsupportforourinitialhypothesisinthatthereisgreaterdeceptionundertheSelfreportingcondition followedbyWrittenandVerbal.However,weobservenodifferencesacrosscountries.Ourlackofresultsinthisregardcould beduetothesmallerdatasizeatthetreatmentlevelineachcountry.Wehaveadditionallylookedwhetherweobserve significantdifferencesacrosscountriesbygroupingtheaccordingtocommoncharacteristics(i.e.European,Asian,etc.). Againwefindnosignificantdifferencesacrossoursamplecountries.Finally,thoughhandicappedbyevensmallernumber ofobservations,wedonotfindanygenderdifferencesacrossthethreeconditionsorcountries.

Asmentionedearlierwemeasuretheinnatetendencyofcitizenstocheatandwouldliketostressthatthisisverydifferent fromstudyinginstitutionalhonesty.Ourresultsshouldnotbeconfoundedwiththosestudyinginstitutionalhonestyasthe

8_Note_that,_countries_were_ordered_from_least_to_most_corrupt_for_all_indices_for_the_analysis.

9_{Justifiable:}_Someone_accepting_a_bribe_in_the_course_of_their_duties;_{Justifiable:}_Claiming_government_benefits_to_which_you_are_not_entitled;_{Justifiable:}

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factorsthatdetermineonearedifferentfromtheother.Further,thekindofcheatingwestudyisinstinctive.Thatis,subjects donotgettimetodeliberatetheiractions.Thesameappliestotheirparticipationintheexperiment.Thatis,weexplicitly statetherewardandhenceexpectthatweattractparticipantsthathaveanafﬁnitytowardchocolateconsumption.Given this,thehighlevelsofhonestyweobserveacrosscountriesisindeedsurprising.Further,ourresultsshowthatapparently thisistrueacrossoursamplecountries.

Welookatthesideofcitizensandnotatthesupplysideofcorruptionintheprivateandpublicsectoroftheeconomy. Surveystudiessufferfromempiricalissuessuchasconfoundingfactorsandhypotheticalbiasesthatareinherentin ques-tionnaires(FalkandHeckman,2009).Further,reliabledataonissuessuchascorruption,dishonesty,cheating,etc.arehard tocomeby.Itisinthiscontextthattheexperimentalmethodologyisveryuseful.Wetestedordinarycitizens’behavior, asopposedtosubjectiveperceptionsofnationalinstitutions.Importantly,however,ourdatasuggestthatordinarycitizens aremuchmorehonestthanimpliedbysurveysfocusedonnationalinstitutions.Perhapsitisthecorruptingnatureofthese institutionsthatisreﬂectedinthesesurveystudies,butnotthecorruptionoftheaveragecitizen.Thelackofconnection betweenthesupplyofcorruptionandthehonestyofindividualcitizensalsorequiresfurtherinquiry.Ourresultssuggest thatthevariationinhonestyacrosscountriesisnotcorrelatedwithcorruptionindices,openingquestionsaboutthe account-abilityofprivateandpublicinstitutionsandthepoorconnectionwiththecitizens’behaviorandpreferencesforhonestyin theirprivatedecision.Ourresultsclearlyshowtheneedforfurtherincentivizedandcontrolledexperimentstoexplorethe issueofordinarycitizens’honestyacrosscountries.

Acknowledgements

Financialsupportfromthefollowing:MinistryofSciencefromSpain:ECO2013-44879-RandJuntadeAndaluciaExcelllent GroupsP12-SEJ-1436(Spain).

AppendixA. Supplementarydata

Supplementarydata associated with this article can be found, in theonline version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/

j.jebo.2015.04.020.

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