G.R. No. L-69870 November 29, 1988 G.R. No. L-69870 November 29, 1988
NATIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION (NASECO AN! ART"RO L. PERE#,
NATIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION (NASECO AN! ART"RO L. PERE#,petitioners, vs.
T$E $ONORA%LE T$IR! !IVISION, NATIONAL LA%OR RELATIONS CO&&ISSION, &INISTR' O T$E $ONORA%LE T$IR! !IVISION, NATIONAL LA%OR RELATIONS CO&&ISSION, &INISTR' O LA%OR AN! E&PLO'&ENT, &ANILA AN! E"GENIA C. CRE!O,
LA%OR AN! E&PLO'&ENT, &ANILA AN! E"GENIA C. CRE!O,respondents. ACTS)
ACTS)
Eugenia C. Credo, an employee of the National Service Corporation (NASECO), was administratively charged y Sisinio S. !loren, "anager of #inance and Special $ro%ect and Evaluation &epartment of NASECO, stemming from her non'compliance with !lorens memorandum.
hen Credo was called y !loren to e*plain further the said instructions, she showed resentment and ehaved in a scandalous manner y shouting and uttering remar+s of disrespect in the presence of her co'employees. Credo was called to meet Arturo !. $ere, then Acting -eneral "anager of NASECO, to e*plain her side in connection with the administrative charges filed against her. On same date, Credo was placed on #orced !eave status for /0 days.
NASECOs Committee on $ersonnel Affairs delierated and evaluated a numer of past acts of misconduct or infractions attriuted to her and recommended Credos termination, with forfeiture of enefits. Credo was made to e*plain her side in connection with the charges filed against her1 however, due to her failure to do so, she was handed a Notice of 2ermination. Credo filed a supplemental complaint for illegal dismissal, alleging asence of %ust or authoried cause for her dismissal and lac+ of opportunity to e heard.
2he laor ariter rendered a decision3 /) dismissing Credos complaint, and 4) directing NASECO to pay Credo separation pay e5uivalent to one half months pay for every year of service. 6oth parties appealed to N!7C which rendered a decision directing NASECO to reinstate Credo to her former position. 8ence, the present recourse y oth parties.
9SS:E3 hether the termination of Credo was for a valid or authoried cause. 7uling3
2he Supreme Court held in the negative. NASECO did not comply with the guidelines for employers in the e*ercise of their power to dismiss employees for %ust causes in effecting Credos dismissal. Although she was apprised and given the chance to e*plain her side of the charges filed against her, this chance was given so perfunctorily, thus rendering illusory Credos right to security of tenure. 2hat Credo was not given ample opportunity to e heard and to defend herself is evident from the fact that the compliance with the in%unction to apprise her of the charges filed against her and to afford her a chance to prepare for her defense was dispensed in only a day.
6esides, Credos mere non'compliance with !orens memorandum regarding the entry procedures in the companys Statement of 6illings Ad%ustment did not warrant the severe penalty of dismissal. 9n %ustifying Credos termination of employment, NASECO claims as additional lawful causes for dismissal Credos previous and repeated acts of insuordination, discourtesy and sarcasm towards her superior officers.
9f such acts of misconduct were indeed committed y Credo, they are deemed to have een condoned y NASECO. No disciplinary measure was ta+en or meted against her, nor was she even reprimanded. NASECOs condonation is gleaned from the fact that on ; Octoer /<=>, Credo was given a salary ad%ustment for having performed in the %o at least satisfactorily and she was then rated ?ery Satisfactory as regards %o performance, particularly in terms of 5uality of wor+, 5uantity of wor+, dependaility, cooperation, resourcefulness and attendance.
Considering that the acts or omissions for which Credos employment was sought to e legally terminated were insufficiently proved, as to %ustify dismissal, reinstatement is proper. #or asent the reason which gave rise to @the employees separation from employment, there is no intention on the part of the employer to dismiss the employee concerned.
G.R. No. 80609 A*+* 2, 1988 G.R. No. 80609 A*+* 2, 1988 P$ILIPPINE
P$ILIPPINE LONG !ISTANCE TELEP$ONE LONG !ISTANCE TELEP$ONE CO&PAN'CO&PAN',, petitioner, vs.
T$E NATIONAL LA%OR
T$E NATIONAL LA%OR RELATIONS CO&&ISSION /RELATIONS CO&&ISSION / &ARIL'N A%"CA' &ARIL'N A%"CA',, respondents. ACTS)
ACTS)
"arilyn Aucay, a traffic operator of the $hilippine !ong &istance 2elephone Company, was accused y two complainants of having demanded and received from them the total amount of $>,=BB.BB in
consideration of her promise to facilitate approval of their applications for telephone
installation. 9nvestigated and heard, she was found guilty as charged and accordingly separated from the service. She went to the "inistry of !aor and Employment claiming she had een illegally removed. After
consideration of the evidence and arguments of the parties, the company was sustained and the complaint was dismissed for lac+ of merit. 8owever, the laor ariters declared that Aucay must e given one month pay for every year of service as financial assistance.
6oth the petitioner and the private respondent appealed to the National !aor 7elations 6oard, which upheld the said decision in toto and dismissed the appeals. 2he private respondent too+ no further action, therey impliedly accepting the validity of her dismissal. 2he petitioner, however, is 5uestioning the award as having een made with grave ause of discretion.
9SS:E3 hether the award of financial assistance to an employee who had een dismissed for cause as found y the pulic respondent is legal.
7uling3
2he Supreme Court held that the grant of separation pay in the case at ar is un%ustified. Separation pay shall e allowed as a measure of social %ustice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. here the reason for the valid dismissal is, for e*ample, haitual into*ication or an offense involving moral turpitude, li+e theft or illicit se*ual relations with a fellow wor+er, the employer may not e re5uired to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the
ground of social %ustice. A contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly argues, have the effect, of rewarding rather than punishing the erring employee for his offense.
G.R. No. L-062- Ar34 11, 1972 G.R. No. L-062- Ar34 11, 1972
CALTE5 ILIPINO &ANAGERS AN! S"PERVISORS ASSOCIATION
CALTE5 ILIPINO &ANAGERS AN! S"PERVISORS ASSOCIATIONpetitioner, vs.
CO"RT O IN!"STRIAL RELATIONS, CALTE5 (P$ILIPPINES, INC., .E. &ENEEE / %.. CO"RT O IN!"STRIAL RELATIONS, CALTE5 (P$ILIPPINES, INC., .E. &ENEEE / %.. E!AR!S,
E!AR!S, respondents. ACTS)ACTS)
Calte* #ilipino "anagers and Supervisors Association is a laor organiation of #ilipino managers supervisors of the respondent Company. After the Association was registered as a laor organiation, it sent a letter to the Company informing the latter of the formers registration and therey sent a set of proposals wherein one of the demands was the recognition of the Association as the duly authoried argaining agency for managers and supervisors in the Company. 2o this the Company countered stating that a distinction e*ists etween representatives of management and individuals employed as supervisors and that managerial employees are not 5ualified for memership in a laor organiation1 hence, it is digested that the Association institute a certification proceeding so as to remove any 5uestion with regard to position titles that should e included in the argaining unit. 2he Association felt disinclined to follow the suggestion of the Company and so the Company initiated a certification proceeding. 2he Association filed
notice to stri+e.
&uring the hearing of the certification proceedings, udge 2aigne cautioned the parties to maintain the status quo. On the asis of the stri+e notice filed and in view of acts committed y the Company which
the Association considered as constituting unfair laor practice, the Association struc+ on April 44, /<D0, after the efforts e*erted y the 6ureau of !aor 7elations to settle the differences etween the parties failed. 2he company then filed an :rgent $etition or as an incident of the certification election proceedings which prayed that the stri+e of respondent Calte* #ilipino "anagers and Supervisors Association e declared illegal.
6ecause of the settlement etween the parties on "ay >B, /<D0 of some of their disputes, the Association filed with respondent court a manifestation (to which was attached a copy of the return'to'wor+ agreement signed y the parties), to the effect that the issues in Case No. /;=;'"C (/) had ecome moot and academic. 2he Company filed a counter'manifestation disputing the representations of the Association on the effect of the return'to'wor+ agreement.
9ssue3
hether or not the stri+e staged y the Association on April 44, /<D0 is illegal. 7uling3
2he Supreme Court held that the lower court erred in its findings that the stri+e staged y the Association on April 44, /<D0 is illegal.
9t is clear that the stri+e of the Association was declared not %ust for the purpose of gaining recognition as concluded y respondent court, ut also for argaining in ad faith on the part of the Company and y reason of unfair laor practices committed y its officials. 6ut even if the stri+e were really declared for the purpose of recognition, the concerted activities of the officers and memers of the Association in this regard cannot e said to e unlawful nor the purpose thereof e regarded as trivial. Significantly, in the voluntary return'to'wor+ agreement entered into etween the Company and the Association, therey ending the stri+e, the Company agreed to recognie for memership in the Association the position titles. 2his goes to show that stri+ing for recognition is productive of good result in so far as a union is
concerned.
One of the important rights recognied y the "agna Carta of !aor is the right to self'organiation and we do not hesitate to say that is the cornerstone of this monumental piece of laor legislation. 9ndeed, ecause of occasional delays incident to a certification proceeding usually attriutale to dilatory tactics employed y the employer, to a certain e*tent a union may e %ustified in resorting to a stri+e. e should not e understood here as advocating a stri+e in order to secure recognition of a union y the employer. On the whole we are satisfied from the records that it is incorrect to say that the stri+e of the Association was mainly for the purpose of securing recognition as argaining agent.
G.R. No. L-069-70 ebr*/r 28, 197 G.R. No. L-069-70 ebr*/r 28, 197 %.. GOO!RIC$ P$ILIPPINES, INC.,
%.. GOO!RIC$ P$ILIPPINES, INC.,petitioner, vs.
%.. GOO!RIC$ (&ARIINA ACTOR' CONI!ENTIAL : SALARIE! E&PLO'EES "NION-NAT", %.. GOO!RIC$ (&ARIINA ACTOR' CONI!ENTIAL : SALARIE! E&PLO'EES "NION-NAT", %.. GOO!RIC$ (&AATI OICE CONI!ENTIAL : SALARIE! E&PLO'EES "NION-NAT", / %.. GOO!RIC$ (&AATI OICE CONI!ENTIAL : SALARIE! E&PLO'EES "NION-NAT", / CO"RT O IN!"STRIAL RELATIONS,
CO"RT O IN!"STRIAL RELATIONS,respondents. ACTS)
ACTS)
2he specific 5uestion raised impressed with an aspect of novelty, sustained with vigor and plausiility, persuaded this Court that the petition was worth looning into. 9t is whether the determination of an unfair laor practice case, rought against respondent'unions, must precede the holding of a certification election. A negative response came from respondent Court of 9ndustrial 7elations, through udge Anserto $aredes. 8is order, affirmed y respondent Court en anc, is sought to e nullified in this
certiorari proceeding. 2he answer filed on ehalf of respondent'unions would sustain its validity. hat is more, it called attention to what is characteried as a consistent pattern of anti'union practices on the part of petitioner intended to defeat the rights of laor to collective argaining. A careful study of the specific legal issue posed, namely, whether the e*istence of an unfair laor practice case against a laor organiation, consisting of an illegal stri+e, would suffice to call for the postponement of a proposed certification election, incidentally started at the instance of petitioner itself, yields the same conclusion reached y respondent Court. 2he o%ectives of the 9ndustrial $eace Act 1 1 would e sooner attained if, at
the earliest opportunity, the employees, all of them of an appropriate collective argaining unit, e polled to determine which laor organiation should e its e*clusive representative. "oreover, the discretion on the matter vested in respondent Court is rarely interfered with. e dismiss the petition.
7odolfo $a%aro, as $resident of 6.#. -oodrich ("a+ati Office) Confidential and Salaried Employees :nion'NA2:, sent a letter to the petitioner, see+ing recognition as the argaining agent of such
employees so that thereafter there could e negotiations for a collective contract.
On the same date, one $alo C. #ulgar, as $resident of 6.#. -oodrich ("ari+ina #actory) Confidential and Salaried Employees :nion'NA2: and one "arcelino !onto+, r., representing himself as ?ice'$resident, NA2:, sent a letter to the petitioner, of a similar tenor.
$etitioner filed two petitions for certification election with respondent Court of 9ndustrial 7elations. 2wo stri+e notices from respondents were filed with the 6ureau of !aor 7elations, demanding union recognition. On April /< and 4B, /</, there was a stri+e staged y those affiliated with private
respondents, to force recognition of their unions.
Suse5uently, after preliminary investigation first had, on a finding of a prima facie case of illegal stri+e and unfair laor practice committed y the memers of the two unions, Case No. 0D/4':!$ of the Court of 9ndustrial 7elations for unfair laor practice was filed against them. 2here was on "ay 4, /</, an
answer with affirmative defenses filed in such case. Earlier, on "ay 4B, /</, the petitioner filed identical
motions in "C Cases Nos. 4<<0 and 4<<D to hold in aeyance the hearings of the petitions for certification election.1010
2hen, on August 0, /</, respondent Court, through udge Anserto $aredes, denied the petitioners motions to hold in aeyance the hearing of "C Cases Nos. 4<<0 and 4<<D.1111
2he challenged order of udge $aredes stated the nature of the issue efore him as well as the respective positions of the parties3 Sumitted for resolution without further arguments are petitioners motions filed in each of the aove'entitled cases, praying that the proceedings therein e held in aeyance pending final %udgment in Case No. 0D/4':!$ and the oppositions thereto filed y the
respondent unions. 9t is petitioners stand that if Case No. 0D/4':!$ will prosper and the stri+e staged y respondent unions during the pendency of the instant cases will e declared illegal and the individual memers cited therein as respondents found guilty of the unfair laor practice acts complained of, the latter will conse5uently lose their status as employees and will e dis5ualified to vote in a certification election that may e ordered y the Court. On the other hand, respondents'oppositors maintain that the pendency of said unfair laor practice case is not a ar to the hearing of the instant cases, following the ruling of this Court in Case No. 40>D'"C entitled 9n re3 $etition for Certification Election at the Central 2e*tile "ills, 9nc., ?icente #lores, et al. 1212 2his was his ruling3 2he motions can not e granted.
9ndividual respondents in the :!$ case are still employees and possessed of the right to self' organiation. 9ncluded therein is their choice of a argaining representative (Secs. 4 @d, > F /4, 7. A. =0). 2o hold the certification proceedings in aeyance until final %udgment of the :!$ case will e a denial of the aforesaid statutory right, the employees eing left without a collective argaining
representative.11 2he dispositive portion was to deny the motions for lac+ of merit. 2here was a motion
for reconsideration, ut such motion did not prosper. 9t was denied on August >/, /</.11
2hese certiorari proceedings were then f iled with this Court, with petitioners maintaining through copious references to National !aor 7elations 6oard cases that, with the declaration of what it considered to e an illegal stri+e resulting in an unfair laor practice case, the status as employees of memers of the two respondent !aor :nions would e placed in dout and thus should e determined efore the certification election. 2his Court, in a resolution of Novemer /B, /</, re5uired private respondents to file an answer. 2here is, on the whole, an admission of the allegations of the petition. 9n addition, the following special and affirmative defenses were interposed3 2hat up to the present, the stri+e of the respondent unions is still on, thus the stri+ing employees cannot e considered to have aandoned, 5uit, or otherwise terminated their employment relationship with the petitioner company, on the asis of the doctrine that a stri+e does not serve to sever the employer'employee relationship1 ... 2hat the respondent unions were virtually coerced y the petitioner companys latant resort to all +inds of union'usting tactics, topped y
the technical refusal to recognie and argain with the respondent unions through the neat tric+ of filing a aseless petition for certification election and 5uestioning therein the right of over <BG of the unions memership to %oin the unions1 ... 2hat the memers of the respondent unions are still employees of the petitioner company and as such are 5ualified to vote in any certification election that the Court of 9ndustrial 7elations may direct to e held on the petitioner companys own petition, pursuant to Section 4(d) of 7epulic Act =0, ... .1;1; 2hey sought the dismissal of these certiorari proceedings for lac+ of
merit. Suse5uently, memoranda were filed y the parties, and the case was deemed sumitted on #eruary /;, /<4.
As made clear at the outset, petitioner has not made out a case for the reversal of the challenged order of udge Anserto $aredes.
/. 2here is novelty in the specific 5uestion raised, as to whether or not a certification election may e stayed at the instance of the employer, pending the determination of an unfair laor practice case filed y it against certain employees affiliated with respondent'unions. 2hat is a matter of which this Court has not had an opportunity to spea+ on previously. hat is settled law, dating from the case of Standard Cigarette Workers' Union v. Court of Industrial Relations,1616 decided in /<0, is that if it were a laor organiation
o%ecting to the participation in a certification election of a company'dominated union, as a result of which a complaint for an unfair laor practice case against the employer was filed, the status of the latter union must e first cleared in such a proceeding efore such voting could ta+e place. 9n the language of ustice .6.!. 7eyes as ponente3 As correctly pointed out y udge !anting in his dissenting opinion on the denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration, a complaint for unfair laor practice may e considered a pre%udicial 5uestion in a proceeding for certification election when it is charged therein that one or more laor unions participating in the election are eing aided, or are controlled, y the company or employer. 2he reason is that the certification election may lead to the selection of an employer'dominated or company union as the employees argaining representative, and when the court finds that said union is employer'dominated in the unfair laor practice case, the union selected would e decertified and the whole election proceedings would e rendered useless and nugatory.1717
2he ne*t year, the same %urist had occasion to reiterate such a doctrine in Manila Paper Mills Emploees and Workers !ssociation v. Court of Industrial Relations,1818 thus3 e agree with the C97 on the reasons given in its order that only a
formal charge of company domination may serve as a ar to and stop a certification election, the reason eing that if there is a union dominated y the Company, to which some of the wor+ers elong, an election among the wor+ers and employees of the company would not reflect the true sentiment and wishes of the said wor+ers and employees from the standpoint of their welfare and interest, ecause as to the memers of the company dominated union, the vote of the said memers in the election would not e free. 9t is e5ually true, however, that the opposition to the holding of a certification election due to a charge of company domination can only e filed and maintained y the laor organiation which made the charge of company domination, ecause it is the entity that stands to lose and suffer pre%udice y the certification election, the reason eing that its memers might e overwhelmed in the voting y the other memers controlled and dominated y the Company,1919
9t is easily understandale why it should e thus. 2here would e an impairment of the integrity of the collective argaining process if a company'dominated union were allowed to participate in a certification election. 2he timid, the timorous and the faint'hearted in the ran+s of laor could easily e tempted to cast their votes in favor of the choice of management. Should it emerge victorious, and it ecomes the e*clusive representative of laor at the conference tale, there is a frustration of the statutory scheme. 9t ta+es two to argain. 2here would e instead a unilateral imposition y the employer. 2here is need therefore to in5uire as to whether a laor organiation that aspires to e the e*clusive argaining representative is company'dominated efore the certification election.
4. 2he uni5ue situation efore us, however, it e*actly the reverse. 9t is management that would have an unfair laor practice case filed y it for illegal stri+e engaged in y some of its employees concluded, efore it would agree to the holding of a certification election. 2hat is the stand of petitioner. 9t does not carry conviction. 2he reason that %ustifies the postponement of a certification election pending an in5uiry, as to the "ona fides of a laor union, precisely calls for a different conclusion. 9f under the circumstances disclosed, management is allowed to have its way, the result might e to dilute or fritter away the strength of an organiation ent on a more ealous defense of laors prerogatives. 2he difficulties and ostacles that must e then hurdled would not e lost on the rest of the personnel, who had not as yet made up their minds one way or the other. 2his is not to say that management is to e precluded from filing an unfair laor practice case. 9t is merely to stress that such a suit should not e allowed to lend itself as a means, whether intended or not, to prevent a truly free e*pression of the will of the laor group as to the organiation that will represent it. 9t is not only the loss of time involved, in itself not li+ely to enhance the prospect of respondent'unions, ut also the fear engendered in the mind of an ordinary employee that management has many weapons in its arsenal to ring the full force of its undeniale power against those of its employees dissatisfied with things as they are. 2here is no valid reason then for the postponement sought. 2his is one instance that calls for the application of the ma*im, le# dilationes semper e#$orret . "oreover, is there not in the posture ta+en y petitioner a contravention of what is e*pressly set forth in the 9ndustrial $eace Act, which spea+s of the laor organiations designated or selected for the purpose of collective argaining y the ma%ority of the employees in an appropriate collective argaining unit @e the e*clusive representative of all the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective
argaining.2020 2he law clearly contemplates all the employees, not only some of them. As much as
possile then, there is to e no unwarranted reduction in the numer of those ta+ing part in a certification election, even under the guise that in the meanwhile, which may ta+e some time, some of those who are employees could possily lose such status, y virtue of a pending unfair laor practice case.
>. Nor would any useful purpose e served y such a postponement of the holding of a certification election until after the determination of the unfair laor practice case filed. 2he time that might elapse is hard to predict, as the matter may eventually reach this 2riunal. 9n the meanwhile, there is no opportunity for free choice on the part of the employees as to which laor organiation shall e their e*clusive argaining representative. 2he force of such an o%ection could e lunted if after a final decision to the effect that the employees complained of were engaged in illegal stri+e, they would automatically lose their %os. Such is not the law, however.2121 9t does not necessarily follow that whoever might have participated
in a stri+e thus proscried has therey forfeited the right to employment. hat will e gained then y holding in aeyance the certification electionH 2here is no certitude that the final decision arrived at in the pending unfair laor practice case would sustain the claim of petitioner. Even if success would attend such endeavor, it cannot e plausily asserted that its employees ad%udged as having een engaged in such illegal stri+e are ipso facto deprived of such status. 2here is thus an aspect of futility aout the whole thing. hy should not respondent Court then decide as it didH
;. 2his Court, moreover, is led to sustain the challenged order y another consideration. 9n %eneral Maritime Stevedores' Union v. Sout$ Sea S$ipping &ine,2222 a /<DB decision, ustice !arador, spea+ing
for this Court, stated that the 5uestion of whether or not a certification election shall e held may well e left to the sound discretion of the Court of 9ndustrial 7elations, considering the conditions involved in the case, ... .22 2his Court has since then een committed to such a doctrine.22 As a matter of fact, the only
American Supreme Court decision cited in the petition, ational &a"or Relations (oard v. !.). *o+er Co.,2;2;
li+ewise, sustains the same principle. 9t was there held that the discretion of the laor triunal, in this case, the National !aor 7elations 6oard of the :nited States, is not lightly to e interfered with. 2he issue in that case, as noted in the opinion of ustice "urphy, e5ually noted for his laor law decisions, as well as his civil liertarian views, concerns the procedure used in elections under the National !aor
7elations Act in which employees choose a statutory representative for purposes of collective argaining. Specifically, we must determine the propriety of the National !aor 7elations 6oards refusal to accept an employers post'election challenge to the eligiility of a voter who participated in a consent election.2626 8is
opinion then went on to state that the #irst Circuit Court of Appeals set aside the 6oards order. 2he matter was then ta+en to the :nited States Supreme Court on certiorari . 9n reversing the Circuit Court of Appeals, ustice "urphy made clear the acceptance of such a doctrine in the light of the National !aor 7elations Act thus3 As we have noted efore, Congress has entrusted the 6oard with a wide degree of discretion in estalishing the procedure and safeguards necessary to insure the fair and free choice of argaining representatives y employees.2727 8ence, this ruling of American Supreme Court3 9t follows
that the court elow erred in refusing to enforce the 6oards order in full.2828 9n the :nited States as in the
$hilippines, the decision in such matters y the administrative agency is accorded the utmost respect. 7elevant is this affirmation y the then ustice, now Chief ustice, Concepcion that in such proceedings, the determination of what is an appropriate argaining unit is entitled to almost complete finality.2929
2he prevailing principle then on 5uestions as to certification, as well as in other laor cases, is that only where there is a showing of clear ause of discretion would this 2riunal e warranted in reversing the actuation of respondent
Court.00 2here is no showing of such a failing in this case.