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Welcome!

Note that audio will be through your phone.

Please dial: 866-740-1260

Access code: 6260070

The webcast will be 60 minutes in length with

time allotted for responding to questions.

An archive of the webinar will be available at

http://www.mhectech.org

or

http://www.youtube.com/user/mhec12

Designing and Building a

Cybersecurity Program

2

Overview

The Midwestern Higher Education

Compact (MHEC)

MHEC/EiQ Networks Master Price

Agreement

Justin Pennock, EiQ

Special Guest: Larry Wilson,

Information Security Lead,

President’s Office, UMass

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WICHE

1953

SREB

1948

NEBHE

1955

MHEC

1991

Interstate Compacts

4

The compact statute creating MHEC makes MHEC an

instrumentality of state government of each of its

member states.

This statutory language gives MHEC broad

contracting authority to help carry out its mission.

MHEC then enters into agreements for the benefit of

its twelve member states, effectively letting

institutions in one state pool their resources and

expertise with different institutions in other states to

gain advantages in the marketplace they otherwise

would not be able to obtain.

What is a Compact?

5

Illinois - Chapter 45 ILCS 155

Indiana - Chapter IC 20-12-73

Iowa - Chapter 261D

Kansas - Chapter 72-60b01

Michigan - Section 390.1531

Minnesota - Section 135A.20

Missouri - Section 173.700

Nebraska - Section 85-1301

North Dakota - Chapter 15-10.2

Ohio - Chapter 3333.40

South Dakota - Chapter 13-53C-1

Wisconsin - Chapter 14.90

Statutory Authority to

Purchase from MHEC Contracts

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Competitively Sourced in 2011

Award to EiQ Networks

Log Analysis

Event Pattern Detection

Compliance Automation

Etc…

Contract Term: July 31, 2014 – August 1, 2015

with three one-year renewals (2018).

7

Security Event & Information

Management

Master Price Agreements

Product and Services Price List

Large Order Negotiations

Terms and Conditions

EULA

http://www.mhectech.org/sites/mhectech.or

g/files/20110919eiqnetworks_mstr_0.pdf

8

Master Price Agreement

Compacts:

MHEC’s 12 Midwestern states

(ND & SD dual members)

SREB’s 16 Southeastern states

WICHE’s 15 Western states

Higher Education

K-12 districts and schools

Cities, State and Local Governments

Who is eligible to purchase?

9

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http://www.mhectech.org/

Contract Highlights

http://www.mhectech.org/eiq

12

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Contract Page

http://mhectech.org/contracts

Contact Information:

Nathan Sorensen

Strategic Information Technology (IT) Procurement Officer

612-677-2767

[email protected]

Rob Trembath

Vice President and General Counsel

612-677-2763

[email protected]

Mary Roberson

Director of Communications & Marketing

612-677-2765

[email protected]

MHEC Resources

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Effective Cyber Security 

Monitoring & Compliance

What is an effective security program?

A set of processes and best practices 

developed and implemented

Based on industry standards

Process

Technology

Immediate and comprehensive visibility 

into the “Threat”

Remove silos and connect the dots

People

Trained, experienced Information Security 

professionals

Must be operational 24 x7

What EiQ’s SOCVue Delivers:

Council on Cyber Security & SANS Critical Security 

Controls Automation

– Continuously analyze your IT environment against Security best practice – Identify weak Links in your security posture

Process

Technology

EiQ SecureVue

– Log Management & Security Monitoring – Correlation & Forensic Analysis  – Compliance Reporting – Asset Discovery

People

EiQ SOCVue Service

– Certified Security & Product engineers  – 24x7 Monitoring

– Alert Notification and Remediation Guidance  – On‐Demand Investigation 

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Justin Pennock

EiQ MHEC Account Manager

978‐266‐3165

[email protected]

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Larry Wilson [email protected] October 23, 2014

Designing & Building a Cybersecurity Program

To protect our critical assets…

Our Controls Factory

Midwestern Higher Education Compact 

1

The Challenge: To our Corporate and Government Leaders

There is a global awakening among non technologists

 That we are vulnerable in cyberspace  We are not organized well to protect ourselves  We suffer from a “fog of more” ……   More standards, more checklists, more devices, more things …

Where does your business stand on basic cybersecurity hygiene?

Our Executives need to ask five basic questions

 Do we know what’s connected to our systems and networks?  Do we know what’s running or trying to run on our systems and networks?  Are we limiting the number of people with administrative privileges to change,  bypass or override the security setting?  Do we have continuous processes backed by security technologies that allow us to  prevent most breaches, rapidly detect all that do succeed and minimize damage to  our business and customers?  Can you demonstrate all this to me, to our Board, and to our shareholders and  customers today?

Because ….

 Having these basic safeguards in place will prevent 80% to 90% of the known  attacks 2 Jane Holl Lute Council on Cybersecurity Served as Deputy Secretary for  Homeland Security  from April,  2009 to April 2013

Manage or Risks

 Understand and establish a well developed risk management model

Manage our Assets

 Inventory, prioritize, categorize (by type and value), safeguard  Lifecycle Management (provision, de‐provision, discover, manage changes, reconciliation,  monitor & alert  Because every security incident starts with a compromised asset

Alignment and Transparency 

 Are we on the same page?   Are we learning and improving?  Are we testing and measuring?  Are we maturing our program over time?

Our Response: We Need to be Proactive ….

3

Secure our Assets

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Manage our Risks

How do we calculate risk?

 Risk is based on the likelihood and impact of a cyber‐security incident or data breach  (model)  Threats involve the potential attack against IT resources and information assets (model)  Vulnerabilities are weaknesses of IT resources and information that could be exploited by a threat (model)  Asset Value is based on criticality of IT resources and information assets (assess)  Controls are safeguards that protect IT resources and information assets against threats and/or vulnerabilities (assess)  Residual risk includes  a combination of unknown threats + unknown vulnerabilities +  unmanaged assets (model) Risk Threats = Asset Value Vulnerabilities X X Controls

+

Residual Risk 4

The Risk Equation

Manage our Assets

5

Our Managed Assets 

ARE

protected

Identify and secure our managed assets  We need to understand why security breaches occur  And the steps to take to prevent them What is our managed asset portfolio?  We need to build a portfolio of managed assets Identify and secure our unmanaged assets  There are undetected problems – not seen, not reported   Our unmanaged assets become easy targets   Ultimately leads to a breach from missing or ineffective controls What is our unmanaged asset portfolio?  We need to secure our unmanaged assets and add them to our  managed asset portfolio

Our Unmanaged Assets 

ARE NOT 

protected

Unmanaged Assets

The Cybersecurity Controls Factory

2.2 The C³  Framework  Components 3.2 Security  Programs &  Projects 2.1 Controls Framework &  Standards 1.1  Threats,  Vulnerabilities  Consequences 1.2 The  Cyber Attack  Chain 3.1 Vendor Technologies  & Services 1.0 Threat 

Model 2.0  ControlsDesign Implementation3.0  Controls

1.3 Modeling  Cyber Attacks 2.3. The  Cybersecurity  Controls Model  3.3 Security as  a Service  (SaaS) 4.2 Controls  Testing  Techniques 4.1 Controls   Testing  Guidelines 4.0  Controls  Testing 4.3 Controls   Assessment  Procedures Input

Alignment and Transparency

6 Unmanaged Assets* Managed Assets* * The Assets 00: Master Blueprint – Incorporates all programs and projects into single program blueprint 01: Endpoint Devices ‐ laptops, workstations, smart phones, tablets, point of sale terminals, etc. 02: Applications & Spreadsheets ‐ developing, implementing secure applications based on BSIMM‐V 03: Network Security ‐ including the perimeter, across the LAN, WAN, wireless networks  04: Data Center Systems ‐ securing servers in the data center (windows, linux, etc.). 05: Databases ‐ database applications or stored functions, database systems, database servers, et 06: Identity & Access Governance ‐ securing users, accounts, entitlements

07: Data Governance  ‐ processes , technologies , and methods used by data stewards and data custodians to handle data 08: Monitoring & Response Center ‐ real‐time monitoring, correlation and expert analysis of security activity 

Output Current State ‐ “As‐is” Risk Environment Desired State ‐ “To‐be” Risk Environment

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1.0 The Threat Model

7

1.1 The Threats, Vulnerabilities, Consequences

1.2  The Cyber Attack Chain

1.3 Modelling Cyber Attacks

1.1 Threats, Vulnerabilities, Consequences

8

Threats Vulnerabilities Consequences

9

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10

1.3 Modelling Cyber‐Attacks

Process for Attack Simulation and Threat Analysis (PASTA) 

2.0 The Controls Design

11

2.1 Controls Frameworks and Standards

2.2 The C³ Framework Components

2.3 The Cybersecurity Controls Model

2.1 The Controls Frameworks and Standards  

12 NIST Cybersecurity Framework Core Functions Council on Cybersecurity Critical Security Controls (CSCs) ISO 27002: 2013  Code of Practice for Information Security Controls

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Building a Cybersecurity Program 13

6/25/2014 Building a Cyber-security Program 13

2.2 The C³ Framework Components

Function  Unique  Identifier Function (Basic  activities) Category  Unique  Identifier Category (Cybersecurity outcomes) Subcategories (Specific outcomes of technical or  management activities) Informative References (Specific sections of standards, guidelines, and best  practices)  ID Identify (24 activities)

ID.AM Asset Management 6 technical or management activities Align  to ISO/IEC 27001:13 & CCS CSC best practices ID.BE Business Environment 5 technical or management activities Align  to ISO/IEC 27001:13 best practices ID.GV Governance 4 technical or management activities Align  to ISO/IEC 27001:13 best practices ID.RA Risk Assessment 6 technical or management activities Align  to ISO/IEC 27001:13 best practices ID.RM Risk Management Strategy 3 technical or management activities Align  to ISO/IEC 27001:13 best practices

PR Protect

(35 Activities)

PR.AC Access Control 5 technical or management activities Align  to ISO/IEC 27001:13 & CCS CSC best practices PR.AT Awareness & Training 5 technical or management activities Align  to ISO/IEC 27001:13 & CCS CSC best practices PR.DS Data Security 7 technical or management activities Align  to ISO/IEC 27001:13 & CCS CSC best practices PR.IP Information Protection Process 12 technical or management activities Align  to ISO/IEC 27001:13 & CCS CSC best practices PR.MA Maintenance 2 technical or management activities Align  to ISO/IEC 27001:13 best practices PR.PT Protective Technology 4 technical or management activities Align  to ISO/IEC 27001:13 & CCS CSC best practices

DE Detect

(18 Activities)

DE.AE Anomalies and Events 5 technical or management activities Align  to ISO/IEC 27001:13 best practices DE.CM Security Continuous Monitoring 8 technical or management activities Align  to ISO/IEC 27001:13 & CCS CSC best practices DE.DP Detection Processes 5 technical or management activities Align  to ISO/IEC 27001:13 & CCS CSC best practices

RS Respond

(16 Activities)

RS.RP Response Planning 1 technical or management activities Align  to ISO/IEC 27001:13 & CCS CSC best practices RS.CO Communications 5 technical or management activities Align  to ISO/IEC 27001:13 best practices RS.AN Analysis 4 technical or management activities Align  to ISO/IEC 27001:13 best practices RS.MI Mitigation 3 technical or management activities Align  to ISO/IEC 27001:13 best practices RS.IM Improvements 2 technical or management activities Align  to ISO/IEC 27001:13 best practices

RC Recover

(6 Activities)

RC.RP Recovery Planning 1 technical or management activities Align  to ISO/IEC 27001:13 & CCS CSC best practices RC.IM Improvements 2 technical or management activities Not aligned with ISO/IEC 27001:2013 or CCS CSC practices RC.CO Communications 3 technical or management activities Not aligned with ISO/IEC 27001:2013 or CCS CSC practices

The Voluntary Framework is a set of Cybersecurity Activities, Desired Outcomes and Applicable References Asset Governance  Provisioning – initial creation of the asset  Reconciliation – periodic recertification of the asset    De‐provisioning  – removal of the asset from the environment  Monitoring & Management – generate alerts and reports Unmanaged Assets  Start with all known assets  Categorize assets by type and value  Discover / Identify unknown assets   Asset Discovery   Scan, Monitor, Filter for unknown assets  Update known assets with those discovered  Security Controls    Management  & Communications Controls [MGT]  Cyber‐security Controls [CSC]  General Computer Controls [GCC] Managed Assets    Known assets (per asset group) with controls applied Managed Assets   Unmanaged Assets Asset Governance Management &  Communications  Controls Cybersecurity  Controls General  Computer  Controls

Managed Asset Model

14

2.3 Modeling Cybersecurity Controls

Filter  Unmanaged  Assets Monitor  Unmanaged  Assets Scan  Unmanaged Assets  1. Establish system of record  Create initial baseline of known users, devices, applications, information assets, information owners 2. Update with known assets  Add / remove assets following standard approach 3. Scan network for unknown assets   Establish network scanning process to detect unknown devices.  4. Monitor network for unknown assets   Establish traffic monitoring  process to detect unknown devices.  5. Filter network access from unknown assets   802.1x, NAC, Client Certificates, Whitelist, Blacklist 6. Update system of record with known but unmanaged assets   Discovered through scanning, monitoring and filtering  7. Apply security controls to known assets  General Computer Controls [GCC], Cyber‐security Controls [CSC], Management  & Communications Controls [MGT] 8. Generate real‐time alerts and management reports  Alert management when suspicious activity is detected. 9. Update system of record with managed assets    Update with known as well as unknown (discovered) devices

Managed Assets

The Controls Model

15

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3.0 The Controls Implementation

16

3.1 Vendor Technologies and Services

3.2 Cybersecurity Programs and Projects

3.3 Security as a Service (SaaS)

3.1 Vendor Technologies & Services

17

TEC‐01 TEC‐02 TEC‐03 TEC‐04 TEC‐05

TEC‐06 TEC‐07 TEC‐08 TEC‐09 TEC‐10

TEC‐11 TEC‐12 TEC‐13 TEC‐14 TEC‐15

TEC‐16 TEC‐17

SVC‐01 SVC‐02 SVC‐03

Quest Software

TEC‐18 TEC‐19 TEC‐20

3.2 Security Programs and Projects

PRG‐01: Endpoint Security PRG‐02: Application Security PRG‐03: Network Security PRG‐04: Data Center System  Security PRG‐05: Database Security PRG‐07: Data Governance PRG‐00:  Master Blueprint PRG‐06: Identity Governance PRG‐08: Monitoring & Alerting Center 18

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3.3 Security as a Service (SaaS)

19 Option 1: Corporate Security Operations Center (SOC) Option 2: Outsourced Managed Cybersecurity Services Option 3: Co‐Managed Cybersecurity Services  Option 4: Hybrid Cybersecurity Services

4.0 The Controls Testing 

20

4.1 Controls Testing Guidelines

4.2 Controls Testing Techniques

4.3 Controls Assessment Procedures

4.1 Controls Testing Guidelines

21 Open Source Security Testing  Methodology Manual (OSSTMM) Cybersecurity Assessments  Critical Infrastructure  Security Analysis  (CRISALIS)  NIST 800‐115:  Technical Guide to Information  Security Testing and Assessment  Information Systems Security  Assessment Framework (ISSAF) Experimental Cyber Immersion  Training & Exercises (EXCITE)

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4.2 Controls Testing Techniques

22 TST‐03:  White Box  Testing TST‐02:  Grey Box  Testing TST‐01:  Black Box  Testing

No TST‐01: Black Box Testing TST‐02: Grey Box Testing TST‐03: White Box Testing 1 The Internal Workings of an application are not  required to be known Somewhat knowledge of the Internal  Workings are known Tester has full knowledge of the  Internal Workings of the application 2 Also known as closed box testing, data driven  testing and functional testing Another term for grey box testing is  translucent testing as the tester has limited  knowledge of the insides of the application Also known as clear box testing,  structural testing or code based testing 3 Performed by end users and also by testers and  developers Performed by end users and also by testers  and developers

Normally performed by testers and  developers 4 Testing is based on external expectations.  Internal behavior of the application is unknown Testing is done on the basis of high level  database diagrams and data flow diagrams Internal workings are fully known and  the tester can design data accordingly 5 This is the least time consuming and exhaustive Partly time consuming and exhaustive The most exhaustive and time 

consuming type of testing 6 Not suited to algorithm testing Not suited to algorithm testing Suited to algorithm testing 7 This can only be done by trial and error method Data domains and Internal boundaries can be 

tested, if known Data domains and Internal boundaries  can be better tested Evaluate Design of Controls Document Significant Business  Processes & Controls Remediate Exceptions Perform Year End Activities Test Operating Effectiveness of Key  Controls Perform Scoping Analysis • Document process flows and develop control sets for all significant business processes  and applications / IT • Confirm location where significant processes are performed • Confirm control sets with business process owners • Business units perform Self‐Assessments for all documented control activities • Identify significant changes in processes and system quarterly • Identify control exception and root cause • Work with business owners to determine remediation plan • Analyze remediation items (individual and in aggregate) • Implement remediation plan • Monitor and track remediation progress • Define scope and approach for  Q4 testing • Perform '4Q / Update' testing (e.g., retesting of remediated items, high risk) • Analyze remediation items (individual and in aggregate)  • Report on evaluation of internal controls  • Design and develop test plans • Determine level of testing for each location • Execute test plans (Internal Audit, External Audit) • Identify significant business applications, modules, line items and accounts • Map processes and systems to significant accounts • Determine locations / departments where significant business processes are performed  (individual important, significant risk, significant when aggregated)

4.3 Controls Assessments Procedures

23 24

Cybersecurity Testing Center

Endpoint  Devices  Test Center 1 Enterprise  Applications Test Center Network Security Test Center Data Center Systems Test Center Database Security Test Center Identity  Governance Test Center 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Data Governance Test Center Monitoring &  Response Center Cybersecurity  Controls Test  Center

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Identify NIST Controls  Framework Attack Chain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Management Controls (ISO 27001:2013) Technical Controls (Council on Cyber‐security CSC) General Computer Controls (ISO 27001:2013) Controls  Standards Programs &  Projects Technology &  Services Cybersecurity Controls Mapping Database Security Security  Operations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Endpoint Devices Application Security Network Security Data Center Systems Identity  Governance Data Governance

Controls Mapping

Testing Center Cybersecurity Testing Guides, Techniques, Assessment Procedures

Phase 1: Before an Attack Phase 2: During an Attack Phase 3: After an Attack Attack Phase Testing Approach 1 2 3 4 Cybersecurity Controls Testing Center

Protect Detect Respond Recover

FAIR Risk Model  

26 Factor Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR) Terminology:  Risk – The probable frequency and probable magnitude of future loss  Loss Event Frequency – The probable frequency, within a given timeframe, that a threat agent will inflict harm upon an asset  Loss Magnitude – The magnitude of loss resulting from a loss event  Threat Event Frequency  – The probable frequency, within a given timeframe, that a threat agent will act against an asset  Vulnerability ‐ The probability that an asset will be unable to resist the actions of a threat agent  Primary Loss – Consists of asset loss factors and threat loss factors  Secondary Loss  – Consists of organizational loss factors and external loss factors  Contact  Frequency ‐ Occurs when a threat agent establishes a physical or virtual (e.g., network) connection to an asset  Probability of Action ‐ An act taken against an asset by a threat agent. Requires contact occur between the asset and threat agent  Threat Capability ‐ The probable level of force that a threat agent is capable of applying against an asset.  Resistive Controls ‐ The resistive strength of a control as compared to a baseline measure of force.

Risk Management Approach

27

Cybersecurity Program Summary

Threats Vulnerabilities Controls

The Risk = Unmanaged Assets

Our Assets Where does our business stand on basic cybersecurity hygiene? Known Assets 1. Do we know what’s connected to our systems and networks? Managed Assets 2. Do we know what’s running or trying to run on our systems and networks? Managed Assets 3. Are we limiting the number of people with administrative privileges to change, bypass or override  the security settings? Managed Assets 4. Do we have continuous processes backed by security technologies that allow us to prevent most  breaches, rapidly detect all that do succeed and minimize damage to our business and customers? Cybersecurity Testing  Center 5. Can you demonstrate all this to me, to our Board, and to our shareholders and customers today?

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28

Thank You!

References

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The City of Moline is requesting a statement of qualifications for consulting and print assessment services in order to identify feasibility of a long term agreement with a

Public transport is made of private-owned means of transport, notably taxis, collective taxis (commonly called “cent cent”-so called because of the silver franc CFA 100

The removal of the bottleneck in Sweden is calculated to generate cost savings for the entire route.21 The Swedish Transport Administration (Ekmark, 2012) estimates that